

Protracted Displacement and Militarisation in Eastern Burma



2009

TBBC

Thailand Burma Border Consortium

Thailand Burma Border Consortium

November 2009

**PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT
AND MILITARISATION
IN EASTERN BURMA**

With Field Research and Situation Updates by:

**Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
Karen Office of Relief and Development
Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
Mon Relief and Development Committee
Shan Relief and Development Committee**

Thailand Burma Border Consortium
12/5 Convent Road, Bangrak, Bangkok, 10500, Thailand
tbbcbbkk@tbbc.org
www.tbbc.org

Front Cover photo : Aged and displaced, Thandaung, 2009 (CIDKP)
Back Cover photo : River crossing, Mong Ton, 2009 (SRDC)
Design : Wantanee Maneedang Printing : Wanidapress, Chiang Mai, Thailand

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
1. INTRODUCTION	5
1.1 The Bleak State of Burma	6
1.2 Protracted Displacement	8
1.3 Methodology	10
2. EASTERN BURMA SITUATION UPDATE	15
2.1 Southern Shan State	16
2.2 Karenni State.....	18
2.3 Northern Karen Areas.....	20
2.4 Central Karen State	22
2.5 Mon Areas	24
2.6 Tenasserim Division.....	26
3. PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT AND MILITARISATION	29
3.1 Causes of Vulnerability	30
3.2 Specific Threats to Women and Children	36
3.3 Scale and Distribution of Displacement.....	39
3.4 Coping Strategies and Protection.....	43
3.5 Peace-Building Constraints and Opportunities.....	46
APPENDICES	49
1. Internally Displaced Population Estimates (2009).....	50
2. Destroyed, Relocated or Abandoned Villages (1996-2009)	51
3. Relocation Sites (2009)	53
4. SPDC Military Command in Eastern Burma (2009)	55
5. 2009 Survey Guidelines	57
6. Acronyms and Place Names	60

MAPS

Southern Shan State	17
Karenni State.....	19
Northern Karen Areas.....	21
Central Karen State.....	23
Mon Areas	25
Tenasserim Division.....	27
Militarisation in Eastern Burma, 2009.....	31
Development Projects in Eastern Burma, 2009.....	33
Displaced Villages in Eastern Burma, 1996-2009	39
Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma, 2009.....	41

CHARTS

Household Survey Sample.....	12
Respondents by Sex, Age, Ethnicity, Religion and State of Displacement.....	14
Threats to Safety and Security	32
Threats to Livelihoods	35
Perceptions of Violence Against Women.....	37
Child Recruitment in Armed Forces	38
Early Warning Sources.....	44
Impacts of Humanitarian Aid on Protection	45
Impacts of Documenting Human Rights Abuses	45
Obstacles to Contacting Nearby Towns.....	46
Connections with Nearby Towns	47

“These violations have been so numerous and consistent over the past years as to suggest that they are not simply isolated acts of individual behaviour by middle or lower rank officers but are the result of policy at the highest level entailing political and legal responsibility.”

Rajsoomer Lallah, 1998, “Interim Report on the Situation of Human rights in Myanmar”, prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN General Assembly, A/53/364, para 59

“The General Assembly.... strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar.... to take urgent measures to put an end to the military operations targeting civilians in the ethnic areas, and the associated violations of human rights and humanitarian law against persons belonging to ethnic nationalities, to end the systematic forced displacement of large numbers of persons and other causes of refugee flows to neighbouring countries, (and) to provide the necessary protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, in cooperation with the international community ...”

(United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 61/232, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 13 March 2007, para 3(b) and (d))

“Serious human rights violations have been widespread and systematic, suggesting that they are not simply isolated acts of individual misconduct by middle or low ranking officers, but rather the result of a system under which individuals and groups have been allowed to break the law and violate human rights without being called to account.”

Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2008, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of human rights in Myanmar”, A/HRC/7/18, para 59,

Executive Summary



On the move, Thandaung, 2009 (CIDKP)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the sixtieth anniversary of the Geneva Conventions is recognized, the relevance of international humanitarian law continues to be challenged by the Burmese junta. Despite ratifying these rules of war, the Burmese Army persists in indiscriminately attacking civilians and causing massive displacement with apparent impunity.

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002. This year's survey updates information about the scale and distribution of displacement in 38 townships and reviews trends through an analysis of interviews with over 3,100 households between 2005 and 2009. It also includes a conflict assessment based on community consultations in areas of ongoing fighting as well as ceasefire areas.

The main threats to human security in eastern Burma are related to militarisation. TBBC's partner groups have identified 235 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) battalions that are currently based in eastern Burma. In areas of ongoing conflict, Burmese Army patrols target civilians as a means of undermining the opposition. Land confiscation and extortion are more widespread impacts of the Burmese Army's so-called 'self-reliance' policy. Increasing pressure on ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces has already resulted in the resumption of hostilities in the Kokang region of north-eastern Burma, and raised fears about Burmese Army deployments into other border areas.

The SPDC's most infamous large scale development project is the Yadana natural gas project which has generated billions of dollars for the junta that are seemingly missing from the national accounts. Evidence of ongoing human rights abuses in the pipeline area has been collected from 40 villages during 2009. Hydro-electric projects planned by the Burmese, Chinese and Thai governments in areas of ongoing conflict along the Salween River continue to cause displacement and obstruct return and resettlement. Rather than alleviate poverty, coercive state-sponsored development projects induce the collapse of livelihoods and leave households no choice but to leave their homes.

Trend analysis of the indicators for both threats to safety and livelihoods suggests that the prevalence of abuse has increased since 2005. Military patrols and landmines are the most significant, and fastest growing, threat to civilian safety and security, while forced labour and restrictions on movement are the most pervasive threats to livelihoods. The findings reflect how widespread and systematic violence and abuse continues to be committed by the Burmese Army in eastern Burma.

Local humanitarian and human rights groups have documented the destruction and forced relocation of over 3,500 villages and hiding sites in eastern Burma since 1996, including 120 communities between August 2008 and July 2009. This report includes a sample of new satellite imagery verifying recent field reports of displaced villages. This scale of forced displacement is comparable to the situation in Darfur and has been recognised as the strongest single indicator of crimes against humanity in eastern Burma.

At least 470,000 people are currently estimated to be internally displaced in the rural areas of eastern Burma alone. This assessment includes 231,000 people in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities. A further 111,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in remote areas that are most affected by military skirmishes. Approximately 128,000 other villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. Only the rural areas of 38 townships most commonly affected by displacement were surveyed, so these estimates are conservative. The overall internally displaced population in eastern Burma is likely to be well over half a million people.

This survey estimates at least 75,000 people were forced to leave their homes in eastern Burma between August 2008 and July 2009. The highest rates of recent displacement were reported in northern Karen areas and southern Shan State. Almost 60,000 Karen villagers are hiding in the mountains of Kyaukgyi, Thandaung and Papun, and a third of these civilians fled from artillery attacks or the threat of Burmese Army patrols during the past year. Similarly, nearly 20,000 civilians from 30 Shan villages were forcibly relocated by the Burmese Army in retaliation for Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) operations in Laikha, MongKung and KehSi townships.

Communities in the conflict-affected Karen areas as well as the Mon and Wa ceasefire areas are most at risk of being forced into Thailand during the lead up to the proposed 2010 elections. The prospects of ceasefires collapsing and hostilities resuming along the Shan and Mon State borders with Thailand are related to efforts by SPDC to transform the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) troops into Border Guard Forces. Similarly, just as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army's (DKBA's) acquiescence to SPDC's command has intensified conflict along the Karen State border in 2009, Lahu militias are under increasing pressure to fight both the SSA-S and the UWSA along Thailand's border with Shan State.

The resilience of local coping strategies are showing signs of exhaustion. Social networks are increasingly constrained, which has adversely affected early warning signals of approaching troop patrols. Given the Burmese government's ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access into conflict affected areas, cross border aid delivered by community based organisations remains vital.

Just as forced displacement is one of the most visible signs of conflict, the lack of opportunities for return and resettlement in eastern Burma demands a more integrated effort at peacebuilding. Household surveys indicate that, despite the challenges, significant economic and social connections exist across political conflict lines. The potential of these networks of civil society groups and grassroots communities as catalysts for peace should not be ignored.

The ongoing insecurity in areas of conflict and the breakdown of law and order in ceasefire areas were identified during grassroots conflict assessments as the primary concerns of internally displaced persons. These grassroots perspectives reflect a low level of confidence that the Burmese government's "road map to democracy" will lead to peace. From the villagers' perspective, the withdrawal of Burmese Army troops and holding the perpetrators of abuse to account are fundamental to stopping the cycle of violence.

These are the key issues that need to be raised with the Burmese government in promoting a solution to protracted conflict and displacement. Civilian security and the rule of law were fundamental to the commitments made to our common humanity 60 years ago. They remain an urgent challenge for the international community's engagement with Burma today.

Chapter 1

Introduction



Far from town: Close to conflict, Thandaung, 2009 (CIDKP)

1.1 THE BLEAK STATE OF BURMA

“The Burmese troops accused my father of contacting KNU, so they tortured us. Then they made me dig a grave and lie down in it. They dumped earth over my whole body except my face so I could still breathe, and left me there.”

(Karen woman, Thandaung Township, KORD interview, June 2009)

With a “road map to democracy” set to entrench military power and the impacts of economic mismanagement exacerbated by Cyclone Nargis, the medium-term outlook for Burma’s political economy is “bleak”.¹ Indeed, Burma is failing as a state according to indicators of state cohesion and performance because the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is “strong enough to choke the life out” of its society.²

On the political front, the Orwellian prosecution and conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi and the ongoing detention of over 2,000 political prisoners continues to undermine the credibility of the national elections proposed for 2010. While recognizing that the elections will not be free nor fair, there remain some hopes that even a small diffusion of power will change the political landscape in a way that the generals can not control.³ However, the Burmese Army’s resumption of hostilities in the Kokang region represented more than the breakdown of a 20 year old ceasefire agreement. It was also a somber reminder that the resolution of ethnic grievances is essential to national reconciliation, peace and democracy in Burma.⁴

Prospects for re-establishing the rule of law in Burma are undermined by fundamental flaws and contradictions in the Constitution which will come into effect after the election. Rather than introducing a transition to civilian rule, the Constitution provides an amnesty to the junta for crimes committed and perpetuates the military’s dominance over government.⁵ Political and military interference in judicial processes will be institutionalized by allowing for exceptions to the separation of powers, by establishing presidential powers over the judiciary, and by assigning the Armed Forces as the primary defender of the Constitution and the rule of law.⁶ The extensive use of caveats and qualifications results in a Constitution that fails even by its own standards to be the supreme law for a coherent legal system, not to mention international standards for the protection of human rights.⁷

¹ International Monetary Fund, 7 January 2009, “Myanmar: Staff Report for the 2008 Article IV Consultation”, unpublished report, p3

² Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, 2009, *The Failed States Index*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index (accessed 15/10/09)

³ International Crisis Group, 20 August 2009, *Myanmar: Towards the Elections*, Asia Report No.174,

⁴ Tom Kramer, September 2009, “Burma’s ceasefires at risk”, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?&act_id=19883 (accessed 15/10/09)

⁵ International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009, *Impunity Prolonged: Burma and its 2008 Constitution*, New York, http://www.ictj.org/static/Asia/Burma/ICTJ_MMR_Impunity2008Constitution_pb2009.pdf

⁶ Asian Legal Resource Centre, 1 September 2009, “Burma/Myanmar: Institutionalized denial of fundamental rights and the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar”, Written statement to the UN Human Rights Council, http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_st2009/575 (accessed 15/10/09)

⁷ Yash Ghai, December 2008, “The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and assessment”, Professor Emeritus, University of Hong Kong, www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/2008_Myanmar_constitution--analysis_and_assessment-Yash_Ghai.pdf (accessed 15/10/09)

The junta's capacity for economic mismanagement is infamous. Chronic fiscal deficits at around 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have resulted from spending heavily on the military and large infrastructure projects such as the new capital at Naypidaw.⁸ Printing money to finance these expenditures has led to inflation levels currently around 30% per annum, which in turn has further undermined trust in Burma's currency and its monetary system more broadly. Foreign exchange reserves generated from natural gas exports are recorded at the grossly overvalued official exchange rate, and thus contributed just 1% to total budget revenue rather than 57% if gas exports had been valued at market rates.⁹ Combined with these policy problems, the damage caused by Cyclone Nargis and the global economic slowdown are expected to result in negligible economic growth this year.¹⁰

Government spending on health and education is the lowest in the region at just 1.6% of GDP and export-led growth is "insufficient to reduce poverty".¹¹ Indeed, the junta has "few (if any) initiatives in the pipeline to support households and businesses or to stimulate the economy"¹² Recent conservative estimates, which excluded conflict-affected areas in eastern Burma, suggest at least 5 million people live below the food poverty line in Burma.¹³ Perhaps a more realistic assessment is that approximately 15 million people live in poverty nation-wide, including over 50% of people in the ethnic States.¹⁴

Protracted conflict is ongoing in the rural areas of eastern Burma. The impacts of the junta's counter-insurgency strategy on human rights and displacement in eastern Burma have been widely documented.¹⁵ Indeed, the compilation of reports from multiple UN agencies over the past 15 years recently led international jurists to urge the UN Security Council to establish a Commission of Inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes in Burma.¹⁶ However, despite regular UN resolutions urging an end to violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the impunity continues as the junta is unwilling to stop these abuses.¹⁷

⁸ Economic Intelligence Unit, April 2009, *Myanmar (Burma): Country Report*, pp12 & 15

⁹ International Monetary Fund, 7 January 2009, *op cit*, pp6-9

¹⁰ Sean Turnell, 2009, "Burma's Economy 2009: Disaster, Recovery... and Reform?", Macquarie University, Sydney, pp4-5

¹¹ International Monetary Fund, 7 January 2009, *op cit*, pp4 & 10

¹² Economic Intelligence Unit, April 2009, *op cit* p4

¹³ FAO/WFP, 22 January 2009, *Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Myanmar*, p5

¹⁴ United Nations Development Programme, 2006, *Impact of the UNDP Human Development Initiative in Myanmar, 1994-2006*, Yangon, UNDP

¹⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 5 March 2009, *Myanmar: Conflicts and human rights violations continue to cause displacement*, www.internal-displacement.org (accessed 15/10/09)

¹⁶ International Human Rights Clinic, May 2009, *Crimes in Burma*, Harvard Law School, <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Crimes-in-Burma.pdf> (accessed 15/10/09)

¹⁷ UN General Assembly, 23 January 2009, *Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, Resolution 63/245. AND ICRC, 29 June 2007, Press Release: Myanmar – ICRC denounces major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law, Yangon / Geneva

Despite an expansion of humanitarian space elsewhere in the country over the past twenty years, there has been no relaxation of restrictions for aid agencies to access the conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma.¹⁸ Recognising these constraints, aid policy advocates are calling for additional funding to fully utilise the existing humanitarian space elsewhere.¹⁹ For the foreseeable future at least, civilians affected by conflict are likely to remain marginalised and dependent on community based organisations discreetly channelling assistance across national borders.

The threats that Burma poses to regional security have long been associated with the drug trade, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, protracted conflict, refugee outflows and irregular migration.²⁰ Indeed, Thailand's National Security Council is currently preparing for another mass influx of refugees due to conflict in Burma's border areas leading up to the 2010 elections.²¹ However, security concerns have broadened even further due to unconfirmed reports that the SPDC is developing nuclear weapons.²² If verified, the importance of an inclusive political process for national reconciliation will be even more urgent for regional stability. Security agencies have been officially silent, but Russia is working with SPDC on a nuclear energy programme while North Korea has been selling conventional arms and upgrading Burma's defence infrastructure.²³

1.2 PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT

"After the Burmese soldiers burnt down our homes, we became very poor. We don't have enough food anymore and are still sleeping at the monastery. I hope someone can come to help us."

(Shan man, Mong Kung Township, SRDC interview, August 2009)

Protracted displacement refers to situations in which the process for finding solutions for people forced from their homes has been stalled and / or they continue to be marginalized or lack protection of human rights as a consequence.²⁴ Situations of protracted displacement are ongoing in 35 countries around the world including Burma, and generally result from the lack of political will to resolve persistent conflicts and stop persecution.²⁵

¹⁸ Morten Pedersen, 8 May 2009, "Setting the scene: Lessons from 20 years of foreign aid", Paper prepared for a forum presented by National Bureau of Asian Research, US-ASEAN Business Council and the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC, http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/ETA/BMY_Conf09_Pedersen.pdf (accessed 7/10/09)

¹⁹ Richard Horsey, 8 May 2009, "Strategies and priorities in addressing the humanitarian situation in Burma", Paper prepared for a forum presented by the National Bureau of Asian Research, US-ASEAN Business Council and the Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington DC, http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/ETA/BMY_Conf09_Horsey.pdf (accessed 7/10/09)

²⁰ ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, 2006, *Asian Voices: Myanmar's Threat to Regional Security*, <http://www.aseanmp.org/docs/aipmc%20booklet.pdf> (accessed 15/10/09)

²¹ *The Nation*, 7 October 2009, "Border Security Chief: We won't force refugees back to Burma", <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/option/print.php?newsid=30113935> (accessed 15/10/09)

²² Des Ball & Phil Thornton, 2 August 2009, "Burma's nuclear bomb alive and ticking", *Bangkok Post*

²³ Andrew Selth, 24 August 2009, "Burma and North Korea: Smoke or fire?", in *Policy Analysis* no.47, Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

²⁴ Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, *Expert Seminar on Protracted IDP Situations*, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2007/0621_displacement.aspx (accessed 15/10/09)

²⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, April 2009, *Internal Displacement: Global overview of trends and developments in 2008*, p9, www.internal-displacement.org (accessed 15/10/09)

In cases where displaced persons have crossed international borders, protracted refugee situations result when there are “restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to camps”.²⁶ The consequences include “wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security”.²⁷ In the context of conflict and abuse, women and children are particularly at risk to the indirect consequences on health and survival. The elusive possible solutions in refugee situations are widely understood as either voluntary return to the country of origin, integration into the country of asylum or resettlement to a third country.

Potential solutions for internally displaced persons are more domestically focused on voluntary return to the community of origin, integration into the host community or resettlement to another part of the country.²⁸ Opportunities for displaced persons to make informed decisions and to participate fully in planning are integral processes for successful return or local resettlement. Similarly, physical safety and security, legal protection, economic, cultural and social reintegration and the re-establishment of political rights are essential conditions.²⁹

Apart from the intransigence of national authorities who obstruct efforts to address the root causes, compartmentalised international policy responses have also been criticised for failing to solve these situations. Comprehensive solutions for protracted displacement will be found only by overcoming these divisions and coordinating engagement by a range of humanitarian, development, peace and security actors.³⁰ Indeed, the way forward is not to see solutions as “lucky windows of opportunity”, but rather to simultaneously promote protection during displacement and solutions for an end to displacement.³¹

This is where protracted displacement is inextricably linked with peacebuilding. Just as forced displacement is one of the most visible consequences of armed conflict, the voluntary return of displaced persons reflects confidence in conflict resolution processes and can help stimulate economic recovery.³² Indeed, “the scale of return and success of reintegration are two of the most tangible indicators of progress in any peacebuilding process”.³³ Conversely, failure to address the causes of displacement or the needs of displaced persons during recovery processes can contribute to renewed conflict and abuse.³⁴

²⁶ Executive Commission of the High Commissioner's Programme, 10 June 2004, “Protracted Refugee Situations”, UNHCR, para 4, <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/40c982172.pdf> (accessed 15/10/09)

²⁷ Ibid, para 8

²⁸ Jeff Crisp, 2007, “Protracted Refugee and IDP Situations: Apparent Similarities and Differences” in Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2007, opcit

²⁹ UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, March 2007, “Benchmarks for Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons”

³⁰ Gil Loescher & James Milner, September 2009, “Understanding the Challenge”, in *Protracted Displacement*, Forced Migration Review, Number 33, Oxford, UK, p9, www.fmreview.org/protracted.htm

³¹ Jean-Francois Durieux, September 2009, “A regime at a loss?”, in *Protracted Displacement*, Forced Migration Review Number 33, Oxford, UK, p61, www.fmreview.org/protracted.htm (accessed 15/10/09)

³² Vincent Chetail, 2009, “Foreward” in *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Number 1, UNHCR, Oxford University Press, p2

³³ Antonio Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the United Nations Security Council, 8 January 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/496625484.html> (accessed 15/10/09)

³⁴ Erika Feller, 2009, “Giving peace a chance: Displacement and the rule of law during peacebuilding” in *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Number 1, UNHCR, Oxford University Press, p94

The challenges for peacebuilding include issues that specifically apply to displacement as well as other cross-cutting concerns with broader ramifications. Issues specifically related to displacement include property restitution and the need to recover losses, while cross-cutting concerns include economic rehabilitation and political transition.³⁵ However, the priorities for displaced persons are not necessarily those which only affect them. Where populations have been terrorised, the issue of immediate concern for displaced persons is generally to stop the violence and abuse. The priority for peacebuilding processes in situations of protracted conflict and displacement must then be to re-establish physical security and the rule of law.³⁶

1.3 METHODOLOGY

“We tried to understand the dynamics of local conflicts and look for solutions together with the affected villagers.”
(Field worker, Mon Relief and Development Committee, August 2009)

TBBC has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002.³⁷ Much of eastern Burma remains inaccessible to international observers and there are significant risks associated with collecting information from conflict-affected areas. Without the participating ethnic community-based organizations’ commitment and courage, none of these reports would have been possible.

All of the surveys have been designed collaboratively with community based organizations and situated within the authoritative framework provided by the UN Guiding principles on Internal Displacement.³⁸ While profiling internally displaced persons was relatively untested just a few years ago, TBBC’s experience has contributed to the development of methodological advice for humanitarian agencies around the world.³⁹ This year’s survey updates information about the scale and distribution of displacement, reviews trends relating to vulnerability and assesses the prospects for peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

³⁵ Khalid Koser, 2009, “Integrating displacement in peace processes and peacebuilding” in *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Number 1, UNHCR, Oxford University Press, pp5-12

³⁶ Erika Feller, 2009, opcit

³⁷ Previous surveys can be accessed from www.tbbs.org/resources/resources.htm

³⁸ The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998, UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, recognises internally displaced persons as “persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

³⁹ UN OCHA and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, April 2008, *Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons*, Geneva, www.internal-displacement.org

Quantitative surveys of the scale and distribution of displacement and the impacts of militarisation and development have been based on interviews with key informants in 38 townships during June and July 2009.⁴⁰ Population estimates were compiled for people who:

- have fled from SPDC patrols and hide in the most militarily contested areas
- were forcibly evicted and obliged to move into SPDC relocation sites
- reside in ethnic administered ceasefire areas after having fled from human rights abuses and the effects of war, having been forcibly relocated by non-state actors, or having returned from refugee camps in Thailand.

All of the maps presented in this report use spatial data collected during these interviews, which was subsequently digitised by TBBC's five partner organizations. Data and maps have been cross-referenced with published sources and field reports. While the map features are drawn to the best approximations, the location of some positions and areas may not be exactly precise.


As in previous years, it has not been possible to estimate the number of people obliged to leave their homes but remaining in a state of internal displacement in urban or mixed administration areas. Given the complexities in distinguishing between different location types as well as between displaced and resident populations, population figures are best estimates only.

Trend analysis of vulnerabilities has been based on household surveys conducted in 2005, 2007 and again in 2009. Over 1,000 households were interviewed in 2009 alone, which contributed to an overall sample size of over 3,100 households in eastern Burma. A multi-stage cluster sampling method was utilized to conduct each of these household surveys to ensure a representative sample across six states and divisions, as well as between villagers living under the authority of different actors.


While the demarcation of distinct areas according to political authority is imprecise, the following definitions of different location types were used to guide field workers:

- Hiding sites are the most contested areas where people are actively seeking to conceal themselves from detection by SPDC patrols.
- Relocation sites are consolidated villages where people have been ordered to move by SPDC after having been forcibly evicted.
- Ceasefire areas are special regions with some autonomy for ethnic nationality authorities and provisional guarantees against SPDC attack.
- Mixed administration areas are rural areas nominally under SPDC control, but within the sphere of influence of the armed opposition.

⁴⁰ The survey guidelines are reproduced in Appendix 5.



As demographic charts of respondents to the household survey indicate, the sample population includes a diverse range of voices, geographic areas and place types. Approximately 200 households in each state and division and around 250 households in each place type were interviewed each year. Fewer households were surveyed in Pegu Division as there are no ethnic ceasefire areas there, while the sample size from Mon State was consistently small due to the general absence of relocation sites and hiding sites.








Key charts for the overall demographic breakdown of respondents to surveys conducted in 2005, 2007 and 2009 are presented on the following page. The overall number of female respondents was relatively low, primarily due to a lack of gender awareness amongst field staff in 2005. Children under 18 were not surveyed, as illustrated in the age distribution of respondents. Religious and ethnic diversity in eastern Burma has also been captured, with greater representation for Karen voices proportionate to their prominence in conflict-affected areas in Pegu Division, Tenasserim Division and Karen State.

Unlike the population surveys, the household vulnerability surveys have not attempted to distinguish internally displaced persons from the wider conflict-affected population. Approximately two thirds of respondents to the household survey indicated that they had been forcibly displaced from their homes during the past ten years. Within this displaced sample, one in three households reported having subsequently returned to their former village or resettled in another place, re-established a livelihood and re-integrated into society. However, this may understate the proportion of displaced households if respondents were forced from their original homes more than ten years ago and have not counted subsequent rounds of displacement. The findings may also reflect villagers' hopes about the sustainability of resettlement, rather than their actual state of current displacement.

The conflict assessment process was facilitated with assistance from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.⁴¹ This began with a 3 day workshop for representatives from TBBC's partner agencies plus three ethnic women's organizations during which participants were introduced to a range of conflict assessment tools. The community based organizations then facilitated a series of participatory conflict assessments in eastern Burma. 70 villagers participated in these workshops, which were conducted in areas of ongoing conflict in Papun Township of Karen State and the Mon ceasefire areas in Yebyu Township of Tenasserim Division. This provided an opportunity to consult the perspectives of grassroots communities about the dynamics of conflict, and a platform for internally displaced people to raise their voices about potential peacebuilding initiatives.

⁴¹ <http://www.centrepeaceconflictstudies.org/>

Demography of Survey Respondents in 2005, 2007 and 2009
 (Overall sample size = 3,113 interviews)



Chapter 2

Eastern Burma

Situation Update



Gold mining, Shwegyin, 2009, (KORD)

2.1 SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

*If the Burmese and Wa armies start fighting again, how can we protect our property? Where will we go? How will we survive?
(Shan woman, Mong Hsat Township, SRDC interview, July 2009)*

For over 30 years, people in Southern Shan State have lived under emergency law and dealt with systematic human rights abuses and armed conflict. During the past year, the regime has exerted new political pressure on cease fire groups to reform under the command of the Burmese Army as Border Security Forces.


People living in Kehsi, MongKung, and Laikha Townships, in particular, continue to suffer because of frequent fighting between the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and the Burmese Army. In the first half of 2009, there were at least four battles every month and the SPDC retaliated against villagers by confiscating property, extortion and forced relocation. At the end of July 2009, more than five hundred houses were burnt and 30 villages forcibly relocated in Laikha township alone. 19,000 civilians are estimated to have been displaced during the past year throughout these three townships. Some have fled into hiding sites, while others have moved into nearby towns, but checkpoints along the main roads to Thailand have blocked escape routes.

In mid 2008, a PaO cease fire group, the Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organization (SNPLO), splintered into two factions across Mawk Mai, Hsi Hseng and Mong Nai townships. One faction surrendered their weapons to the SPDC and the other resumed armed resistance. The resulting increase in skirmishes and Burmese Army patrols led to violent repercussions for villagers, with at least 9 village elders killed during June 2009 for allegedly being rebel sympathizers. Together with forced evictions, rape, torture and associated harassment, the intimidation has led to the displacement of over 3,000 people in these areas.

SPDC's pressure on ceasefire groups to reform into Border Security Forces led to an offensive against a Kokang ceasefire group in northern Shan State during August 2009, which forced around 37,000 people to flee into China. The threat of armed force has since shifted to the United Wa State Army's (UWSA's) forces along both the China and Thailand borders. In Mong Ton & Mong Hsat Townships, the SPDC has demanded the removal of some UWSA military outposts and relations are extremely tense. In addition, the Burmese Army is exerting more pressure on Lahu militias to conscript more soldiers and prepare to fight both the SSA-S and the UWSA. SPDC has already supported three basic military training courses for the Lahu militia in Mong Ton during 2009.

Despite the instability in southern Shan State, state-sponsored development projects continue to be pursued. The proposed Tasang Dam on the Salween River was recently included in Thailand's National Power Development Plan, which will further frustrate the opportunities for tens of thousands of displaced villagers to return to their homes. Thai investors are also planning to excavate large lignite deposits at Mong Kok in Mong Hsat township, about 70 km from the northern Chiang Rai border. Once the roads from the site to the Thai border have been completed, full-scale mining will begin. It is estimated that 8 villages situated on the coal fields will be forced to move, and potentially thousands of civilians in surrounding areas will be affected by militarisation.

Southern Shan State



2.2 KARENNI STATE

“They insisted we take loans that we didn’t want, and repay this huge interest rate. It’s happened twice since last year.”

(Karenni man, Loikaw Township, KSWDC interview, July 2009)

Armed conflict in Karenni State has been most prominent in the northern townships of Shadaw and Loikaw during the past year. After the PaO National Liberation Army (PNLA) splintered from the SNPLO and resumed armed resistance in 2008, the SPDC LIB#261 increased troop deployments along the Karenni and Shan State border. As a result of subsequent skirmishes, village leaders have been constantly subjected to accusations, threats and torture. Villages in northern Loikaw along the river that acts as the state border and those along the Prawn River have been most affected due to accusations they helped Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and PNLA troops escape across the rivers.

These military patrols have also led to demands for more porters, with villagers in northern Shadaw area reporting they used to carry food to SPDC outposts every two weeks but now they have to do it every week. In addition, SPDC’s LIB#530 in northern Loikaw township has introduced a “micro-finance” programme which more closely resembles extortion for 20 villages. Since 2008, each household was forced to borrow 10,000 kyat and repay double that amount after the harvest in December. The villagers cannot afford the loan, but are not allowed to refuse.


Food security in DeMawSo and Pruso townships has been affected by drought and mismanagement of the Ngwe Daung Reservoir, which previously supplied irrigation water for over 20,000 acres of farm land. The reservoir has largely dried up and farmers are relying on rain and run-off water. However, the farms that SPDC’s IB#102 and #427 had earlier confiscated continue to flourish as the Irrigation Department was reportedly ordered to prioritise water supplies to the military farms.

In the southern areas around MawChi, the Burmese Army IB#72 and LIB#530 has increased restrictions on movement and trade. Every village has been ordered to regularly report to local military commanders, farm huts have been prohibited in upland areas and traders have been ordered not to sell more than one tin of rice (15kg), 1.2 kg of salt and 1.2 kg of fish paste per customer. SPDC troop patrols continue to harass villagers by confiscating property and consuming their livestock.

Villagers in ceasefire areas also face an uncertain year ahead, with the respective political and military parties’ autonomy challenged by SPDC’s proposed Border Guard Forces. All of the ceasefire groups rely on logging and mining concessions from the SPDC, so it will be difficult for them to refuse. The Karenni National People’s Liberation Front’s (KNPLF’s) leadership has already agreed to SPDC’s demands, which has reportedly disturbed rank and file members.

The Karenni National Solidarity Organisation (KNSO) and the Kayaw majority Karenni Peace and Development Party are already too small to exist without the support of KNPLF. Economic vulnerability recently led the Kayaw ceasefire group to promote the cultivation of poppy fields in the Hoya area of western Pruso Township and establish opium trading links in neighbouring Shan State. Farmers in this area are already becoming dependent on poppy cultivation for their livelihoods.

Karenni State



2.3 NORTHERN KAREN AREAS

“When we entered the forest, a woman stepped on a landmine and lost her leg. The Burmese Army commander told her off for going where she was not supposed to go. He said that he had lost one of his landmines because of her, and told her to pay back the cost of replacing it.”

(Karen woman, Kyaukgyi Township, CIDKP interview, May 2009)

At the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009, the Burmese Army withdrew troops from over 30 outposts in northern Karen state and eastern Pegu Division. However, the SPDC's military operations continued to target civilians, especially in Thandaung and Kyaukgyi townships. Heavy artillery attacks on civilian settlements and upland farming sites intensified along the Taungoo-Mawchi road, where most remote villagers were harassed by 4-5 patrols during the past year. The Karen National Union's (KNU's) armed wing responded by ambushing a Burmese Army convoy in May 2009, which killed a senior SPDC Brigadier General.

The Burmese Army increased demands for villagers to serve as messengers, suppliers of forest products, builders, porters, water carriers and other menial work. In Thandaung, every village had to send 5-10 people to work for the military every day. The increased imposition of forced labour was particularly noticed around KlerLah (on the Mawchi to Taungoo road) where SPDC has confiscated land and is planning construction of a new town. At least 10 villages in northern Kyaukgyi township were forced to work for the Burmese Army for the first time ever, and this generally meant 50-100 people had to sacrifice their livelihoods for each order.


Extortion is rampant in the northern Karen areas, and especially in Kyaukgyi township. Every household in Kyaukgyi had to pay a monthly fee of at least 1,500 kyat to the local SPDC troops while villagers ordered to serve as soldiers had to pay up to 500,000 kyat (US\$500) to avoid conscription.

Restrictions on travel were particularly severe in the Taungoo hills, where many of the new roads are only open for military use. Traders had to pay bribes at 13 checkpoints between Taungoo and Kler Lah (on the road to MawChi) at a combined total of 190,000 kyat (US\$190) for a return trip. Even where travel to farms or markets outside of a village wasn't prohibited, people generally had to pay 200 kyat for a single day pass, or 1,000 kyat for a weekly pass.

The unsustainable nature of relocation sites as well as the economic greed of local SPDC commanders led to movements out of relocation sites. Plans for a new town in the Taungoo hills at KlerLah led to people from SharZeBo, YeShan, ZePyuGone and TawGone relocation sites being allowed to return to their former villages. In Kyaukgyi township, villagers wishing to leave HteTu relocation site were extorted 1,500,000 kyat (US\$1,500) in exchange for permission from local SPDC authorities.

Papun township hosts about 38,000 people who do not dare to show themselves to SPDC forces. In other words, approximately half of the township's total population are living in hiding and run away if Burmese Army troops approach. Most of these villagers have fled to the mountains north of Papun town, where the SPDC is expanding its control through road construction and militarisation. As the population steadily increases and the land available for cultivation decreases, food shortages are becoming increasingly severe.

Northern Karen Areas



2.4 CENTRAL KAREN STATE

*DKBA ordered one person in each household to join their army. Otherwise, we were forced to pay 500,000 kyat as a fine.
(Karen man, Kawkareik Township, CIDKP interview, August 2009)*

The impact of SPDC's plan to centralise command of the nation's armed groups by reforming armed ceasefire groups into Border Guard Forces was first felt in central Karen State. In pursuit of this plan, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) has expanded territorial control by over-running the Karen National Union's (KNU's) remaining fixed military bases along the Thailand border.


A KNU battalion headquarters in southern Myawaddy Township was over-run in April and, together with associated human rights abuses, forced more than 2,000 people from their homes. DKBA/SPDC operations displaced a further 4,000 civilians and captured two more military bases in Hlaing Bwe Township at the beginning of June. KNU abandoned their positions but threats to villagers remain due to DKBA's conscription of new recruits, use of civilians as porters and deployment of landmines.

DKBA's conscription of new recruits to fulfill its quota as a Border Guard Force has been coercive. In May 2009, two village leaders in Myawaddy township were arrested and detained by DKBA Battalion#907 for refusing to provide new recruits. Similarly, villages in Hlaing Bwe township had to pay fines of between 50,000 and 300,000 kyat (US\$50-300) for each case of non-compliance. Those villagers who were obliged to join received minimal military training from the SPDC before they were sent to the front lines.

The harassment of villagers by joint DKBA and SPDC patrols was consistent with the Burmese Army's usual counter-insurgency strategy. Villagers were routinely ordered to work as porters and landmine-sweepers in front of the DKBA's foot soldiers, with the SPDC's heavy artillery forces safe at the rear. The destruction of property, extortion, arbitrary arrest and torture continued to be used as punishment for any villagers assumed to be supporting the KNU. Villagers who fled their homes during these joint operations are not likely to return in the near future due to the fear of newly laid landmines and further abuse by the DKBA or SPDC soldiers.

The DKBA leadership's motivation for complying with the SPDC's plans appears related to economic opportunity more than political ambition. Since 2007, approximately 1,600 acres of farm land has been confiscated west of the Dawna Range in Hlaing Bwe township. During the past year, former land owners and nearby villagers have been forced to cultivate 17 rubber plantations by DKBA's Battalion #999. Logging concessions have also become a lucrative business in Hlaing Bwe township, while mining concessions and control of border trade taxes are key interests in Myawaddy and Kawkareik townships.

Central Karen State



2.5 MON AREAS

“We heard that the NMSP will resist the SPDC’s plans. We’re worried we’ll be accused of supporting rebels and will have to run again”.
(Mon woman, Ye Township, MRDC interview, August 2009)

The ceasefire between the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the SPDC has been unstable since NMSP was requested to transform its armed force into a militia or Border Guard Force and put under the command of Burmese Army. NMSP is in a difficult position because the ceasefire areas have enabled many people to re-establish their livelihoods. In early August 2009, NMSP leaders officially replied to SPDC’s Southeast Command that they would not transform to be under the Burmese Army command. Since there is no clear political process for resolving conflicts between the ethnic ceasefire groups and SPDC, there are increasing concerns that armed hostilities will resume.


Outside of the ceasefire areas, however, the Burmese Army’s “self-reliance” policy continued to result in the confiscation of villagers’ land during the past year. SPDC Artillery Regiment #315 based in Thanbyuzayat Township confiscated about 270 acres of land, predominately rubber plantations, from Mon farmers. Similarly, Artillery Regiment #318 based in Mudon Township confiscated over 400 acres of rubber plantations from which they can produce rubber compounds for sale. After confiscating the land, the battalions hired the former land owners to collect rubber sap for the battalions.

Two Mon splinter groups continue armed resistance against the Burmese Army in southern Ye and northern Yebyu Townships while KNU troops are active in northern Ye and southern Yebyu Townships. In the first half of 2009, at least 6 villagers were killed and 14 villagers were severely tortured by troops from SPDC LIB #273 for allegedly being rebel sympathisers. Similarly, during military operations by the SPDC’s LIB #282, LIB #273 and LIB #107 in Yebyu Township between July 2008 and June 2009, at least 37 villagers were tortured and another 8 villagers were killed. Further, a village with over 60 households near NMSP’s ceasefire area in Yebyu Township was forcibly evicted by LIB No. 282 in late 2008 in order to cut off the villagers’ supposed support to KNU. The villagers dispersed, with some fleeing into hiding and others trying to merge into nearby Karen villages.

The Burmese Army also continues to abuse human rights in the name of securing two gas pipelines that pass through Mon areas. Hundreds of local villagers in Mudon, Thanbyuzayat and Ye Townships were conscripted on a daily basis to guard the Kanbawk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline. However, abuses along the Yadana gas pipeline in Yebyu Township are more severe as villagers were also accused of being ‘rebel-supporters’.

The Burmese Army also forced the local leaders of villages along Ye-Tavoy road to form militia forces working under SPDC command. The newly formed militias were ordered to inform local Burmese Army battalions if they hear about the activities of rebel armies. Many villagers fled into the NMSP ceasefire areas to avoid being recruited into the Burmese Army’s militia force.

Mon Areas



2.6 TENASSERIM DIVISION

“Every year, the SPDC troops order every village to cultivate jatropha plants. We have to buy the seed ourselves. After the harvest, we have to sell the products to them at cheap prices. If we do not grow enough, they fine us.”

(Karen woman, Tavoy Township, CIDKP interview, March 2009)

Every aspect of public affairs in Tenasserim Division is controlled by the military. The Division Peace and Development Council chairperson is the Burmese Army Coastal Regional Commander and every District and Township Chairperson is the respective area’s Military Commander. Military officers also head some administration departments in the division. Village tract leaders are selected and trained by the respective Township Peace and Development Council. Moreover, in July 2009, the Tenasserim Divisional Police force instructed township police stations to appoint an officer into every village tract administration to monitor activities.

The Burmese Army currently has 46 Infantry and Light Infantry battalions, 12 Artillery battalions, and 3 Anti-Aircraft battalions spread throughout the division. Along the Thailand border, the Burmese Army’s out posts are stationed at strategic points. As relocation sites are generally located close to Burmese Army camps, villagers in relocation sites are particularly vulnerable to harassment.


Villagers in relocation sites along the Tenasserim River banks continue to be forced to carry military supplies to the border camps, especially in the dry season. Arbitrary taxation by the SPDC authorities includes extortion and the confiscation of property and livestock. Villagers continue to be routinely ordered to construct and repair buildings in military camps. Further, the Burmese Army’s so-called self-sufficiency policy endorses the confiscation of civilian farms for the benefit of military families.

The SPDC’s health and education services are minimal and increasing assistance from the international community is essential, but obstacles to the delivery of aid remain. For example, in Paungdaw village of Tavoy Township, a health clinic was built with international aid in 2005 but stopped operating a year later and now only an empty building remains. Similarly Banchaung village tract in Tavoy and Manoerone village tract in Bokpyin received free mosquito nets from an international agency during the past year, but local authorities charged up to 1,000 kyat per household for transportation costs.

In 2007 and 2008, the authorities forced most households throughout Tenasserim division to purchase and cultivate castor oil (*jatropha*) seedlings as part of a national initiative to promote bio-diesel. However, flooding during the past year destroyed many of these fields. Regardless, the Coastal Region Command ordered villagers to purchase and replant more jatropha seedlings. Similarly, in the beginning of 2009, farming land along the SPDC’s proposed railway route from Tavoy to Mergui was confiscated by the military without any compensation being offered. The railway project has now commenced and villagers along the route are likely to face another wave of forced labour as a result.

These kinds of mismanagement and coercive economic policies have led to nearly half of the villagers in relocation sites and rural areas living in debt. During the past year, thousands of villagers from relocation sites crossed into Thailand to seek income to supplement their families’ livelihoods.

Tenasserim Division



Chapter 3

Protracted Displacement and Militarisation



Life in hiding, Kyaukgyi, 2009 (CIDKP)

3.1 CAUSES OF VULNERABILITY

“The SPDC and DKBA troops destroyed our hut and rice paddy, and then planted landmines near the village. Now I don’t dare to go work anywhere. So we have to borrow food from relatives and friends.”

(Karen man, Kawkareik Township, CIDKP interview, February 2009)

Through decades of low-intensity conflict, the SPDC and its predecessors have based their counter insurgency strategy on targeting the civilian population. The “Four Cuts” policy aims to undermine the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies and finances by forcibly relocating villagers from contested areas into government controlled areas. The policy has aimed to turn “black” opposition controlled areas into “brown” contested areas and ultimately into “white” areas controlled by Rangoon. Villagers who do not comply with forced relocation orders are considered sympathetic to the armed opposition. The subsequent targeting of these civilians by military patrols induces further displacement and is a violation of international humanitarian law which the State of Burma has formally ratified.⁴²

The main threats to human security in eastern Burma are related to militarization. Under the guise of state building, the Burmese army’s strength grew from 180,000 soldiers in 1988 to 370,000 troops by 1996,⁴³ and it is generally assumed there are now over 400,000 soldiers. The number of battalions deployed across eastern Burma has approximately doubled since 1995.⁴⁴ In 2009, TBBC’s partner groups have identified 235 SPDC battalions that are permanently based in eastern Burma. The distribution of these battalions, which has been cross-referenced with documentation from within the Burmese Army and from the armed opposition groups,⁴⁵ is outlined in Appendix 4.

In the context of pressure on armed ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces, the deployment of Burmese Army troops into border areas raises fears about the resumption of hostilities causing widespread displacement. The Burmese Army’s offensive against the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDA) at the end of August 2009 has already caused 37,000 Kokang civilians to flee from the fighting.⁴⁶

Targeting civilians as a means of undermining the armed opposition is the most severe impact of militarization into ethnic areas. This type of conflict-induced displacement has been most prevalent in northern Karen areas and Southern Shan State during the past year. Artillery attacks on civilians characterized the violence in Karen areas, while forced village relocations were predominate in Shan State. Similarly indiscriminate attacks on civilians were employed by SPDC proxy forces such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) in central Karen State. The subsequent deployment of landmines further obstructed the return of displaced villagers which was a common pattern across eastern Burma.⁴⁷

⁴² Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949, Common Article 3, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/>

⁴³ Mary Callahan, 2003, *Making Enemies: War and state building in Burma*, Cornell University Press, p211


⁴⁴ Pinheiro, 12 February 2007, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, UN Human Rights Council, UN doc. A/HRC/4/14, para 54.

⁴⁵ Network for Democracy and Development, 2009, *Civil and Military Echelon of the State Peace and Development Council in Burma*, (in Burmese)


⁴⁶ Tom Kramer, September 2009, “Burma’s ceasefires at risk: Consequences of the Kokang crisis for peace and democracy” Transnational Institute, www.tni.org/drugs

⁴⁷ Yeshua Moser-Puangswan, December 2008, “Anti-personnel landmines in Myanmar: a cause of displacement and an obstacle to return”, *Humanitarian Exchange*, No.41, pp 33-34, www.odihpn.org

Militarisation in Eastern Burma, 2009



TBBC's household surveys have found that military patrols and landmines are the greatest threat to the personal safety and security of civilians in rural areas of eastern Burma. These aspects of militarization, together with forced portering which is often linked with the imposition of sweeping for landmines, were reported as the fastest growing threats to safety and security since the first household survey was conducted in 2005.



When disaggregated by place type, these findings reaffirm previous assessments that primary perpetrators of violence and abuse in eastern Burma are the SPDC's own troops and administrative authorities.⁴⁸ The dangers of military patrols, landmines and artillery attacks particularly affect households in contested areas, where the Burmese Army does not distinguish between civilians and combatants. However, the risks of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and forced portering are greatest in relocation sites and areas where the Burmese Army has a constant presence.

Perhaps the most onerous and widespread impact of militarization is the so-called "self-reliance" policy. By withholding rations and paying meager salaries, the SPDC effectively compels frontline troops to extort food and confiscate fields from local villagers. Indeed, "tenure security is virtually non-existent in either towns or rural areas".⁴⁹ Such coercive practices are widespread and directly undermine civilian livelihoods, regardless of whether troops are deployed as part of counter-insurgency patrols or more generally to secure remote areas, including those surrounding large scale government sponsored development projects.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ TBBC, 2007, Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma, p46, <http://www.tbtc.org/resources/resources.htm>

⁴⁹ Scott Leckie, April 2009, "Housing, Land and Property Rights in Burma: Towards New Strategies" in Burma Lawyers Council, *Lawka Pala: Legal Journal on Burma*, No. 32, p21

⁵⁰ All Arakan Students & Youth Congress, PaO Youth Organisation & Mon Youth Progressive Organisation, 2009, *Holding our Ground: Land Confiscation in Arakan and Mon State and PaO Area of Southern Shan State*

Development Projects in Eastern Burma, 2009



By focusing on infrastructure development and commercial agriculture, the junta's Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict affected areas.⁵¹ Instead, state-sponsored development initiatives have generally undermined livelihoods and "primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population".⁵² Communities perceived as opposing the State generally bear a disproportionate share of the costs, including forced eviction, and are denied a fair share of the benefits.

The SPDC's most infamous large scale development project is the Yadana natural gas project, which has generated billions of dollars for the junta that is missing from the national accounts and only partially recorded in the foreign exchange reserves.⁵³ Meanwhile, evidence of ongoing forced labour, land confiscation, extortion and restrictions on travel in the pipeline area has been collected from 40 villages during 2009.⁵⁴ Similar abuses committed by Burmese troops while ostensibly 'securing' another gas pipeline in Mon State⁵⁵ and an oil mining project in Shan State⁵⁶ have also been documented recently. Despite this context of corruption and abuse, the proposed Shwe Gas project and a 2,000 kilometer long pipeline from the Arakan State to China is continuing as planned.⁵⁷

Hydro-electric projects planned by the Burmese, Chinese and Thai governments along the Salween River continue to cause displacement and obstruct return and resettlement.⁵⁸ The proximity of these proposed sites to areas of ongoing conflict was highlighted by fighting in August 2009 between the Burmese Army and a Kokang armed group in an area adjacent to the proposed Kunlong dam site in northern Shan state.⁵⁹ Similarly, over 4,000 civilians were displaced by military attacks from areas near the Hatgyi dam site in Karen State into Thailand during June 2009.⁶⁰

More generally, internal displacement has resulted from "a combination of coercive measures, such as forced labour, extortion and land confiscation, which drive down incomes to the point that the household incomes collapse and people have no choice but to leave their homes".⁶¹ The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors

⁵¹ International Crisis Group, 2004, *Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas*, Yangon / Brussels,

⁵² Human Rights Watch, 2005, *They came and destroyed our village again: The plight of internally displaced persons in Karen State*, p43

⁵³ Sean Turnell, 2009, *Burma's Economy 2009: Disaster, Recovery, and Reform?*, Macquarie University, Sydney, p8.

⁵⁴ Earthrights International, September 2009, *Total Impact: The Human Rights, Environmental and Financial Impacts of Total and Chevron's Yadana Gas Project in Military-Ruled Burma (Myanmar)*

⁵⁵ Human Rights Foundation of Monland, May 2009, *Laid Waste: Human Rights along the Kanbauk to Myaingkalay pipeline*, www.rehmonnya.org

⁵⁶ PaO Youth Organisation, June 2009, *Robbing the Future: Russian-backed Mining Project Threatens PaO Communities in Shan State, Burma*

⁵⁷ Shwe Gas Movement, September 2009, *Corridor of Power: China's Trans-Burma Oil and Gas Pipelines*, www.shwe.org

⁵⁸ Shan Sapawa Environmental Organisation, July 2009, *Roots and Resilience: Tasang dam threatens war-torn Shan communities*, www.burmariversnetwork.org AND www.salweenwatch.org

⁵⁹ Shan Herald Agency for News, 1 September 2009, "Activists say clashes may be linked to Salween dam with Chinese investments"


⁶⁰ Karen Environment and Social Action Network, August 2009, "Recent Conflict in Relation to the Hatgyi Dam", Unpublished map provided to TBBC.

⁶¹ Pinheiro, 7 March 2008, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, A/HRC/7/18, para 75, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=89

is distinct from the voluntary, profit-oriented, pull-factors more commonly associated with economic migration.⁶²

Exposure to such abuses has been exacerbated since 2006 when the junta initiated a nation-wide programme to cultivate *jatropha* (aka castor oil or physic nut) plantations for the production of bio-diesel.⁶³ Similarly, the junta's expansion of control necessitates road construction which relies upon the imposition of forced labour. However, villagers and traders are obstructed from utilising the roads and strengthening their links by restrictions on movement.⁶⁴

TBBC's household surveys have consistently found that forced labour and restrictions on movement are the most pervasive threats to livelihoods across eastern Burma. The prevalence of restrictions on movement has increased dramatically during this period, which is indicative of the stronger controls exercised by the Burmese Army over the civilian population that have been facilitated by militarization.



When disaggregated by place type, the findings are consistent with TBBC's previous documentation.⁶⁵ The incidence of forced labour, restrictions on movement and extortion are highest amongst households living in close proximity to the Burmese Army. Conversely, destruction or confiscation of food supplies and the destruction of, or forced eviction from, housing primarily targeted villagers who were hiding from the Burmese Army in militarily contested areas. This reflects the predatory nature of the Burmese Army's counter-insurgency strategy of targeting civilians through impoverishment and deprivation.

⁶² Andrew Bosson, May 2007, *Forced Migration / Internal Displacement in Burma: With an Emphasis on Government Controlled Areas*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

⁶³ Ethnic Community Development Forum, 2008, *Biofuel by Decree: Unmasking Burma's bio-energy fiasco*,

⁶⁴ Karen Human Rights Group, 28 September 2009, *Patrols, Movement Restrictions and Forced Labour in Toungoo District*, KHRG #2009-F16, www.khrg.org

⁶⁵ TBBC, 2007, "Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma", pp 47-48 <http://www.tbtc.org/resources/resources.htm>

Disturbingly, trend analysis of the indicators for both threats to safety and livelihoods suggests that the prevalence of abuse has generally increased since 2005. These interviews with over 3,000 households support the assessments of human rights defenders that violence and abuse continues to be committed with impunity in eastern Burma.⁶⁶

3.2 SPECIFIC THREATS TO WOMEN AND CHILDREN

"I don't want to talk about it. I'm ashamed, upset and so angry. The Burmese soldiers surrounded my house, then came up and raped me one by one. Nobody dared to help me."

(Mon woman, Yebyu Township, MRDC interview, June 2009)

Whereas the majority of casualties from war around the globe in the early twentieth century were soldiers, over 90% of casualties are now civilians.⁶⁷ In this context of conflict and abuse, it is typical for women and children to suffer disproportionately from the indirect consequences on health and survival.

Whereas women generally live longer than men, protracted conflict reverses this phenomenon.⁶⁸ In conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma, women constitute a significantly higher proportion of the population aged less than 45 years as a result of more men being conscripted into armed forces, killed as combatants and migrating in search of income. However, women in these same communities have been documented as having a shorter life expectancy than men which has been associated with the impacts of conflict on malnutrition and poor health predominately being borne by women.⁶⁹

Apart from reduced access to food, health care and clean water, gender-based violence typically increases during times of conflict. A climate of abuse and impunity coupled with a breakdown of social order incites sexual violence both within and outside of the domestic household. In warfare, rape has been used to shame the enemy, spread terror and as a reward for conquering soldiers.⁷⁰ While there is no evidence of the Burmese Army issuing written orders for soldiers to perpetrate sexual violence, the impunity military personnel enjoy has undoubtedly contributed to the persistence of violence against women and girls.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 7 March 2008, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar", A/HRC/7/18, para 59,

⁶⁷ Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol, 2003, "Measuring the Costs of Conflict", University of Oxford and the World Bank.

⁶⁸ Plumper & Neumayer, 2005, "The Unequal Burden of War: The Effect of Armed Conflict on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy", University of Essex and International Peace and Research Institute

⁶⁹ TBBC, 2004, *Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma*, p41

AND Back Pack Health Work Team, 2006, *Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma*, p 30


⁷⁰ USAID, 2007, *Women and Conflict: An Introductory Guide for Programming*, pp11-12

⁷¹ Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 7 March 2008, "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar", A/HRC/7/18, para 87,

AND Women's League of Burma, 2008, CEDAW Shadow Report

AND Christina Fink, December 2008, "Militarization in Burma's ethnic states: Causes and Consequences", in *Contemporary Politics*, Vol.14, No.4, Routledge, p455

However, villagers surveyed in 2007 and again in 2009 perceived domestic violence as the most common form of violence committed against women in eastern Burma. Significant increases in perceptions of the prevalence of domestic violence, rape and sexual harassment were recorded during this period. Given that sexual violence has been a hidden issue in Burma until recently, these apparent increases may reflect widespread and deteriorating violence against women and/or greater community awareness of the risks. Regardless, in both years, villagers living in close proximity to Burmese Army troops reported significantly higher levels of violence committed against women than that reported from hiding sites and ceasefire areas.




Children have also been disproportionately affected by conflict in eastern Burma. Acute malnutrition rates in conflict-affected areas suggest at least 10% of children are wasting, which is substantially higher than Burma's national baseline statistics and represents a serious public health problem according to World Health Organisation indicators.⁷² Similarly, mortality rates amongst infants (91 deaths per 1,000 live births) and children under five years of age (221 deaths per 1,000 live births) are more comparable to indicators from humanitarian disasters in the Congo and Angola.⁷³

⁷² TBBC, 2007, *Internal Displacement and in Eastern Burma*, pp51-52

⁷³ Back Pack Health Work Team, 2006, *Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma*,

Six grave violations have been identified as priority concerns for children affected by armed conflict, namely killing and maiming, recruitment into armed forces, sexual violence, abductions, the denial of humanitarian access, and attacks against schools and hospitals.⁷⁴ A UN-led Task Force established in June 2007 to monitor these grave violations in Burma has been constrained by access and security impediments imposed by the Burmese government, but has confirmed the ongoing recruitment of child soldiers.⁷⁵ Independent monitors have more comprehensively documented the situation and concur that the recruitment of child soldiers and other grave violations against children continue to be committed by the Burmese Army and to a lesser extent by non-state armed groups.⁷⁶

While the majority of Burma's child soldiers are in the Burmese Army, TBBC's survey suggests that rural children in eastern Burma are more likely to be recruited as soldiers by non state armed groups. This is indicative of how the Burmese Army generally conscripts soldiers from urban areas, whereas the constituency of non state armed groups is in rural areas. Conversely, rural children are much more likely to be recruited by the Burmese Army for menial labour such as working in the kitchen, portering supplies, sending messages and providing massages. The findings reflect the widespread imposition of forced labour by the Burmese Army in general, as well as the belief amongst villagers that children will be ordered to do less tasks than adults. This is an example of coping strategies employed by adults inadvertently being detrimental to the best interests of children.




⁷⁴ "Children and Armed Conflict : Report of the Secretary General", 21 December 2007, UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, A/62/609 – S/2007/257

⁷⁵ "Report of the Secretary General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar", 1 June 2009, UN Security Council, S/2009/278

⁷⁶ Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, May 2009, *No More Denial: Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Myanmar (Burma)*, www.watchlist.org
AND Human Rights Education Institute of Burma, 2008, *Forgotten Future: Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Burma*,

3.3 SCALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF DISPLACEMENT

Displaced Villages in Eastern Burma, 1996-2009



“We live in fear and are always prepared to run. Whenever we hear that Burmese troops are active near our hiding site, we run to another place.”
(Karen man, Tavoy Township, CIDKP interview, April 2009)


Internal displacement has been evident throughout Burma’s modern history, with squatters having been forcibly evicted from Rangoon and relocated into satellite towns in the 1950s. Nonetheless, the scale of internal displacement remains unknown due to the political sensitivities of the junta. It has not been possible to assess areas under the junta’s control since the UN estimated that 1.5 million people were evicted from urban centers and resettled into sub-standard housing in satellite towns between 1988 and 1990.⁷⁷ However it has been estimated that there may remain up to four million internally displaced persons spread across Burma.⁷⁸

TBBC’s research focuses on the scale, distribution and characteristics of displacement in the conflict-affected region of eastern Burma. Field surveys conducted by local humanitarian and human rights groups have previously indicated that more than 3,300 villages were destroyed, forcibly relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma between 1996 and 2008.⁷⁹ The number of villagers damaged and displaced is comparable to the situation in Darfur and has been recognised as the strongest single indicator of crimes against humanity in eastern Burma.⁸⁰

Some of these field reports have previously been corroborated by high resolution commercial satellite imagery of villages before and after the displacement occurred.⁸¹ To continue the process of verifying field surveys of displaced villages, TBBC acquired new satellite imagery of selected sites documented in last year’s report. The images below contrast a village with 14 houses in Papun township late in 2006 with a deserted site two years later in which the burn scars of destroyed houses are clearly visible.



(© 2009 DigitalGlobe)



(© 2009 DigitalGlobe)

⁷⁷ UN Habitat, 1991, *Human Settlements Sector Review : Union of Myanmar*, p10


⁷⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, April 2009, *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2008*, Norwegian Refugee Council, p9

⁷⁹ TBBC, 2008, *Internal Displacement and International Law in Eastern Burma*, p18 &19

⁸⁰ International Human Rights Clinic, May 2009, *Crimes in Burma*, Harvard Law School, p. iii

⁸¹ Science and Human Rights Program, 2007, *High Resolution Satellite Imagery of the Conflict of Burma*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC, <http://shr.aaas.org/geotech/burma/burma.shtml> (accessed 10/10/09)

Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma, 2009



This report documents the displacement of a further 120 villages in eastern Burma between August 2008 and July 2009. These villages and hiding sites were almost exclusively located in the low-intensity war zones of Karen State, eastern Pegu Division and southern Shan State. This represents the Burmese Army's ongoing counter-insurgency strategy of evicting villages out of contested areas and into areas under government control. Such relocations are generally ordered at short notice and enforced through burning the former village locations. Civilians who refuse to relocate are obliged to abandon their villages and hide in the surrounding areas at the risk of being shot on sight as alleged rebel sympathisers.

This survey estimates at least 75,000 people were forced to leave their homes in eastern Burma between August 2008 and July 2009. Such a large scale of displacement is indicative of ongoing conflict and human rights abuses, and yet this is a conservative estimate as it only covers the rural areas of 38 townships most commonly affected by forced migration. In particular, it should be noted that 37,000 people who fled from the Kokang ceasefire area in northern Shan State during August 2009 have been excluded from this survey's estimates of displaced persons.

The highest rates of recent displacement were reported in southern Shan State and northern Karen areas. Approximately 19,000 villagers were displaced across three townships in each region, but the dynamics were considerably different. 30 Shan villages in Laikha, Mong Kung and Keh Si townships were forcibly relocated by the Burmese Army in retaliation for Shan State Army-South operations in the area. Conversely, most of the Karen villagers displaced in Kyaukgyi, Thandaung and Papun townships were already living in hiding sites but had to flee again from artillery attacks and the threat of Burmese Army patrols.

Some of these 75,000 recently displaced persons were previously included in TBBC's estimates for the internally displaced population and have been displaced again. The overall increase was also offset by migration into urban areas, flight into refugee and migrant communities in Thailand and some sustainable return to former villages or resettlement elsewhere in Burma. Overall, the internally displaced population in eastern Burma is estimated to have increased by approximately 20,000 people during the past year.

At least 470,000 people are currently estimated to be internally displaced in the rural areas of eastern Burma alone. This assessment includes 231,000 people in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities. A further 111,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in remote areas that are most affected by military skirmishes. Approximately 128,000 other villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. However, if all areas of all townships were surveyed, the internally displaced population in eastern Burma would undoubtedly be well over half a million people.

Communities in the conflict-affected Karen areas as well as the Mon and Wa ceasefire areas are most at risk of being forced into Thailand during the lead up to the proposed 2010 elections. The prospects of ceasefires collapsing and hostilities resuming along the Shan and Mon State borders with Thailand are related to efforts by SPDC to transform UWSA and NMSP troops into Border Guard Forces. Similarly, just as DKBA's acquiescence to SPDC's command has intensified conflict along the Karen State border in 2009, Lahu militias are under increasing pressure to fight both the SSA-S and the UWSA along the Shan State border.

3.4 COPING STRATEGIES AND PROTECTION

“We borrowed rice from other villagers. We also caught fish, weaved bamboo baskets and collected spices to exchange for rice. But we had to struggle very hard.

(Karen man, Kyaukgyi Township, CIDKP interview, April 2009)

“It’s possible to travel, but we need to have enough money to give the Burmese soldiers when they interrogate us.”

(Mon man, Ye Township, MRDC interview, June 2009)

The responses of affected communities to survive shocks and stresses to livelihoods as well as threats to safety and security are broadly referred to as coping strategies.⁸² Acknowledging and supporting these local coping strategies has been recognised as fundamental in order for humanitarian policy makers and practitioners to develop appropriate civilian protection strategies in complex emergencies.⁸³ In turn, the basic objectives of protection strategies are to minimize risks of harm, limit exposure to threats and strengthen safe environments.⁸⁴

Although unable to completely stop abuses, internally displaced and conflict-affected communities in Burma have developed a range of methods to cope with violence and abuse. Rather than merely categorizing villagers as passive victims, supporting these non-violent forms of daily resistance against militarization has been urged as a more constructive means of promoting protection.⁸⁵

Early warning signals of approaching troop patrols provide villagers in contested areas with vital hours in which to assess their security situation and respond accordingly. When villagers were surveyed in 2005, traders and other civilians were the main source of early warnings. This demonstrated the importance of social capital, or networks of trust, between local communities for the development of protective environments. However, the significance of traders and other civilians has decreased dramatically since then, which is consistent with reports of increased restrictions on movement. As a result of constraints on broader economic and social networks, villages have become more dependent on local security guards.


Non state armed groups also remain a significant source of information, especially in hiding sites and ethnic ceasefire areas. Conversely, warnings from the Burmese Army have consistently been reported as negligible. These findings confer legitimacy to claims by non state armed groups that, some of them at least, are genuine representatives of the people affected by conflict. Similarly, the results suggest that some non state armed groups have responsive administrative systems in place to protect their constituents.

⁸² Jaspers, O’Callaghan and Stites, December 2007, “Linking Livelihoods and Protection: A Preliminary analysis based on a review of the literature and agency practice”, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, www.odihpn.org

⁸³ Slim and Bonwick, 2005, *Protection: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies*, ALNAP, London

⁸⁴ O’Callaghan and Pantuliano, December 2007, “Protective action: Incorporating civilian protection into humanitarian response”, Humanitarian Policy Group Report, p3, www.odihpn.org


⁸⁵ Karen Human Rights Group, November 2008, *Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarised Karen State*, www.khrg.org




Villagers in hiding sites store food supplies in various locations and prepare alternative hiding sites in case emergency evacuation is necessitated by approaching military patrols. Many of these households work in fields at night to avoid detection, indicating both fear of the threats but also the determination of villagers to survive and remain in their own land. Resources shared by neighbours, loans offered by traders and aid provided by community based organizations are key mechanisms by which communities affected by conflict cope with shocks to livelihoods. This underscores how maintaining strong relations between communities is fundamental to the viability of coping strategies.⁸⁶

Given the Burmese government’s refusal to accept offers of humanitarian assistance for civilians in conflict affected areas, the aid provided under the junta’s radar by community based organisations is vital. Most of this assistance is channelled across the border and is primarily focused on emergency relief to reduce vulnerability and mitigate against displacement. However, household surveys indicate that aid has also had positive impacts on protection in regards to strengthening social and economic links across conflict lines and contributing to a decrease in human rights abuses. These far outweigh reported negative impacts relating to violent or abusive repercussions. Nonetheless, the protection dividend of food and cash assistance, health care and other relief programmes appears to have decreased since 2005. This does not necessarily reflect poorly on community based organisations, as aid is not a panacea for protracted conflict, violence and abuse.

⁸⁶ TBBC, 2007, “Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma”, pp54-56
www.tbtc.org/resources/resources.htm



The impunity with which abuses are perpetrated in Burma is widely documented, and the lack of judicial redress has been consistently represented in the findings of household surveys in eastern Burma. Villagers report that monitoring and documenting human rights violations has negligible impacts in terms of leading to the punishment of perpetrators. It is difficult to conceive how impunity could possibly be challenged without documentation of abuses, and yet the findings suggest that recriminations rather than justice is a more likely impact in the short term. Nonetheless there remains significant recognition that documentation is associated with human rights education initiatives at the grassroots level as well. Villagers recognize that promoting attitudinal change in this way is important to stop patterns of abuse in the long term.



3.5 PEACE-BUILDING CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES


If KNU and DKBA have an understanding with each other, we will return to our farms and have enough food.

(Karen woman, CIDKP interview, Paan Township, March 2009)

Peacebuilding processes need not wait until the end of armed conflict to start rebuilding trust, re-establishing security and the rule of law, promoting democratic governance and reconstructing economies. These processes can include “track one” or official government diplomacy, “track two” networks involving civil society groups, and “track three” interventions with grassroots communities. Not only is the participation of civil society and grassroots communities important from a rights-based perspective, but also because they often have significant contributions to make as “connectors” in divided societies and catalysts for peace.⁸⁷


In 2009, TBBC’s partners surveyed over 1,000 households to assess the connections and divisions between rural households and nearby towns in conflict affected areas of eastern Burma. This was conceived as a preliminary assessment tool for quantifying the constraints against, and opportunities for, peacebuilding at the grassroots level.

The obstacles to contacting nearby towns vary considerably depending on the Burmese Army’s degree of occupation and control. For villages hiding from the Burmese Army in forests and fields, the fear of harassment, lack of an official identity card and restrictions on trade or travel were fundamental security constraints. However, villagers in government controlled areas or those administered by ethnic ceasefire groups reported general poverty and the economic costs of travel as the primary impediment.



⁸⁷ Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, September 2007, *Addressing Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace Agreements and Peacebuilding*, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses/2007_peaceprocesses.pdf

Despite these obstacles, villagers reported that significant networks remained across conflict lines. Economic linkages through trade and employment were found to be the strongest connections. Even remote communities who are hiding from the Burmese Army reported strong links with traders from nearby towns via unauthorised “jungle markets”. There is a relatively high degree of social interconnectedness, incorporating visits to family and friends, community events and social services. These responses from grassroots communities challenge the perception widely held by diplomats, bureaucrats and aid workers who are not allowed access to conflict-affected areas that those communities are disconnected from the rest of Burma.



In addition to the household surveys, participatory conflict assessments were facilitated with community groups in a conflict-affected area of Papun township in Karen State and a Mon ceasefire area of Yebyu Township in Tenasserim Division. These workshops provided as opportunity to consult the perspectives of local communities about the dynamics of conflict, and a platform for internally displaced people to raise their voices about potential peacebuilding initiatives.

The main concerns identified by villagers in areas of armed conflict were the lack of security and chronic displacement. Even in ceasefire areas, villagers highlighted the breakdown of trust, law and order as the most immediate obstacles to peace. These grassroots perspectives about the pervasive and ongoing implications of conflict reflect a low level of confidence that the Burmese government’s road map to democracy is leading to peace.

Given the protracted and widespread nature of conflict in Burma, villagers generally perceived that peacebuilding was something beyond their control. However, the consulted communities agreed that they have a lot to offer in terms in providing information to aid agencies about the impact of conflict and displacement. Villagers asked for greater consultation and feedback during assessment procedures, and believed that this would facilitate better targeting of aid to support return, resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons. This suggests the skills and resources that

internally displaced persons offer peacebuilding processes may initially manifest in relation to humanitarian aid, as this directly addresses current levels of vulnerability.

Senior UNHCR policy makers assert that in situations of protracted conflict and displacement, re-establishing the rule of law is the priority for peacebuilding initiatives.⁸⁸ This was also the key message from Karen and Mon participants in the conflict assessments. The withdrawal of Burmese Army troops from ancestral lands was highlighted by both groups as key to the return of displaced persons and the peace process. Similarly, reform of the judicial and military systems so that perpetrators of abuse are held to account was identified as an essential step to stopping the cycle of violence. Addressing these root causes of conflict and displacement is probably beyond the scope of local non-violent resistance. However, from the villagers' perspective, these are the key issues that need to be raised with the Burmese government in search of a solution to protracted conflict and displacement.

⁸⁸ Erika Feller, 2009, "Giving peace a chance: Displacement and the rule of law during peacebuilding" in *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 28, Number 1, UNHCR, Oxford University Press, pp78-94

Appendices



School in hiding, Thandaung, 2009 (CIDKP)

APPENDIX 1 : INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION ESTIMATES (2009)

States, Divisions, and Townships	Population displaced in past 12 months	IDPs in Hiding Sites	IDPs in Relocation Sites	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas	Total IDPs
SHAN STATE	37,700	22,000	27,700	85,700	135,400
Mawk Mai	3,500	1,500	1,400	0	2,900
Mong Kung	3,400	2,000	2,900	0	4,900
Laikha	13,200	7,000	6,500	4,600	18,100
Loilem	1,500	1100	700	600	2,400
Nam Zarng	2,700	1,500	2,200	2,000	5,700
Kun Hing	3,500	3,000	1,500	6,000	10,500
Mong Hsat	800	800	0	31,000	31,800
Mong Ton	1,800	1,000	4,300	27,000	32,300
Mong Pan	1,600	1,400	1,700	1,300	4,400
Kehsi	2,500	1200	3,000	12,000	16,200
Langkher	1500	400	1300	500	2,200
Mong Nai	1,700	1,100	2,200	700	4,000
KARENNI STATE	800	8,250	4,600	45,300	58,150
Shadaw	150	900	1,000	0	1,900
Loikaw	150	0	1,800	4,000	5,800
Demawso	0	0	0	26,000	26,000
Pruso	0	1,600	0	7,500	9,100
Bawlake	0	0	1,700	0	1,700
Pasaung	500	5,750	100	3300	9,150
Mehset	0	0	0	4500	4,500
PEGU DIVISION	11,700	21,100	15,700	0	36,800
Taungoo	0	0	1,300	0	1,300
Kyaukgyi	9,000	12,000	13,800	0	25,800
Shwegyin	2,700	9,100	600	0	9,700
KAREN STATE	22,800	54,300	18,500	52,300	125,100
Thandaung	4,100	8,200	8,600	0	16,800
Papun	6,000	38,600	2,200	0	40,800
Hlaing Bwe	4,000	0	0	7,000	7,000
Myawaddy	3,200	2,500	1,200	5,000	8,700
Kawkareik	2,500	2,000	2,600	2,300	6,900
Kyain Seikgyi	3,000	3,000	3,900	38,000	44,900
MON STATE	900	800	5,000	41,000	46,800
Thaton	0	0	0	0	0
Bilin	0	0	0	0	0
Ye	900	800	5,000	41,000	46,800
TENASSERIM DIVISION	1,100	4,550	56,500	6,700	67,750
Yebyu	650	1000	9,500	6,700	17,200
Tavoy	100	500	6,400	0	6,900
Thayetchaung	0	0	4,200	0	4,200
Palaw	300	1,250	12,100	0	13,350
Mergui	50	50	7,500	0	7,550
Tenasserim	0	1,250	14,400	0	15,650
Bokpyin	0	500	2,400	0	2,900
TOTALS	75,000	111,000	128,000	231,000	470,000

**APPENDIX 2 :
DESTROYED, RELOCATED OR ABANDONED VILLAGES
(August 2008 - July 2009)**

SHAN STATE

Laikha Township		Mong Kung Township	
Ho Lom	Wan Nawng Kern	Wan Paang	Wan Long
Wan Taad Mawk	Wan Nawng Kaaw	Paang Saang	Paang Kaad
Wan Kun Hung	Zalaai Loi	Loi Saai	Wan Kawng
Mawk Zamm	Wan Naa	Wan Kiu Tawk	Wan Mawm
Wan Ti	Wan Long Tawng	Wan Koong Yer	
Mark Mong Sem	Yum Lawd	Wan Haang Nam	Kehsi Township
Wan Kun Saai	Nawng Wo/KawngAai	Wan Pak Kum	Mong Yaai
Zalaai Khum	Nawng Leng	Ho Nam/Ba Kaang	Wan Bong Long
Ho Nam	Nam Naw	Wan Nawng	Maak Tee
Nawng Wo	Nam Mun	Kawng Hoong Hak	
		Phaa Wawng	
Langkher Township			
Wan Bang Ta Vi			

KARENNI STATE

Pasaung Township	Loikaw Township	Shadaw Township
Pa Char Khee	Yan Kin	Daw Ta Kue
Hosachi		
GayLo		

PEGU DIVISION

Kyaukgyi Township		Shwegyin Township	
Kyauk Phya	Klaw Khee	Ler Khee	Plaw Hta
K'Pa Hta	Thay Nwe Khee	Ler Wah	Koh Phoe Khee
Law Day	Ko Ni	Wah Pae Kwee	Mae Yeh Hta
Tae Na Hta	Ohn Shi Khin	Htee Blah	Toe Thoo Khee
Saw Tay Der	Aung Soe Moe	Kweh Hta	To Khee
Kheh Po Der	Pa Kaw Khee	Ler Ka	Mae Yeh Khee
Yaw Khee	Ta Kaw Der	Mae K'Ti	
Nya Mu Khee	Thaw Nge Der		
Ler Klah	Phaw Ler Kho		
Maw Lu Kho	K'Dee Mu Der		
Ler Htaw Der	Ler Hsu Kho		
Hto Aw Phay Der	Wa Kay Kho		
Saw Kha Der	MawKehThaPerKho		

KAREN STATE

Hlaingbwe

Township

Htee Bo Day
Mae Kreh
Khler Ka
Wa Shu Kho
No Boe Htee Wa
Ler Htu Gaw
P’Nwe Pu
Mae La Ah Khee
Mae La Ah Hta
Wa Mi Klah

Myawaddy

Township

Blah To
T’Kaw Ka Klo
Khaw Phoe Khee
Maw Phoe Khee
Oo Kri Khee
Hsaw Phoe Pu
Ka Law Mee
Po Kler Khee
Sgaw Plaw

KawKreik

Township

Lah Kru
Aw Kraw
Thay Ler Pu
Doo Koo Kyeh

Papun

Township

Kler U Ngah
Phoe Thwee Khee
Kler Hsi Kho
Thwa Hta
Law Phla Hta
Khay Thee Hta

Thandaung

Township

Hsaw Wa Der
Yu Lo
Ler Sha Htoo
Ka Mo Lo

KyainSeikgyi

Township

Mae Kray

TENASSERIM DIVISION

Tavoy Township

Lerkler
Kaymaegu

Yebyu Township

Nat-aing

APPENDIX 3 : RELOCATION SITES (2009)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Mong Pan Township

Nong Bar Mon
Nar Law
Wan Mai

Mong Ton Township

Mae Ken
Nar Kong Mu

Mong Nai Township

Nar Khan

Nam Zarng Township

Kart Ray
Wan Nong
Wan Nam Mo

Mong Kung Township

Kat Pui
Kher Oh Ooi

Mawk Mai Township

Nam Lot
Kan Do Long

Laikha Township

Wan Mark Lang
Bang Pon

Lang Kher Township

Wan Hart

Bang Long Township

Wan Nong Leng

Kehsi Township

Wan Hai

Kung Hing Township

Keng Lom

KARENNI STATE

Loikaw Township

Nwa Laboe
Palaung

Pasaung Township

Doe Hta

Shadaw Township

Shadaw
Pon chaung

Bawlake Township

Nam Hpe
Bawlake
Ywa Thit

PEGU DIVISION

Kyaukgyi Township

Ko Ni
Kyauk Phya
Maw Lay
Oon Shi Khin

Yan Myo Aung
Aung Soe Moe
Kweh Chan
Sa Leh
Mu Thay

Nant Than Gwin
P'Deh Gaw
Klaw Maw
Ma La Daw

Taungoo township

Ye Sein Gohn
Na Gar Mauk

Shwegyin Township

Pahn Aye

KAREN STATE

Kyain Seikgyi Township

Ti Hu Than
Shwe Doe
Anankwin
Thet-kwe
Myaing Tha Ya
Kyain Seikgyi

Thandaung township

Tha Phay Nyunt
Hsaw Wa Der
Taik Pu
Thandaung Kyi
Baw G'Li Kyi (Kler Lah)

Myawaddy Township

Mae K'neh

Papun Township

T'Per Phar

MON STATE

Ye Township

Khaw-za	Ywathit (Sanpya)
Wengtamoik	Thayaraye
Leinmawchan	

TENASSERIM DIVISION

Tenasserim Township Theyetchaung

Natthami	Pe
ThebawU	Milaunggyaung
Sarawachaungwa	Thinbonechaung
Sinmagyon	Padaukgyi
Pagwin	Padaukngae
Shoutgone	

Palaw Township

Kyaukpea	Immagyi
Sanpe	Bayektaung
Kinigyon	Madaw
Tamu	Wazwinoak
Konthaya	Kabyupyin
Pawutchaung	Yebu
Kawet	Pyicha
Tharabwechaungpya	Taminmasan
Pyindaung	Myitchinsut
Peinchaung	Shandot
Kyauktaung	Sarke
Talainda	Paw
Tharabwe	Migyaungthaik
Ananchaung	Kyauklaik
Yekanchaung	Minwin
Ngayaein	Yinshan
Dugyo	Kamaungla
Tonbyaw	Duyinbinshaung
Taungbein	Gyini
Kanankwin	Zadiwin
Kalaeak	Kabya
Kamalaing	Pawut
Melaungkwin	Pettaut
Anen	Kawblen
Taungma	Letpanbyin
Aingwai	Tapo
Laeseit	Michaungpyu
Thebyu	Thayagon
Poemen	
Moro	
Bawtanaw	
Theinkun	

Mergui Township

Bok
Yazapa
Kaungki
Wunehchaungpya
Kyetmaoh
Wunehchaung
Banmade
Alechaung
Pathwi
Tanyat
Mazaw
Thagan
Papyin

Yebyu Township

Lot-tine
Yebu Ywathit
Mile 62
Koh-Hlaing
Myinzoung
Yapu
Mayanchaung
60 miles
Zinba
Yinbon

Bokepyin Township

Manoro
Lanphonnga
Kenchaung
Nantaung
Kaukbauk
Hengrai
Yoday
Chaungmon
Sadien
Ngaboakchaung

Tavoy Township

Nyaungdon
Pyinthadaw
Taungthonlone
Myitta
Budayu
Kyaikpelaung
Paungdaw
Thebyuchaung
Nantayok

APPENDIX 4: SPDC MILITARY COMMAND IN EASTERN BURMA (2009)

REGIONAL MILITARY COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Triangle Area Command - *Keng Tong, Shan State* South East Command - *Moulmein, Mon State*
 Eastern Command - *Taunggyi, Shan State* Coastal Command - *Mergui, Tenasserim Division*
 Southern Command - *Taungoo, Pegu Division*

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIDs)

LID - 11 - *Rangoon, Rangoon Division* LID - 55 - *Kalaw, Shan State*
 LID - 22 - *Pa-an, Karen State* LID - 77 - *Pegu, Pegu Division*
 LID - 44 - *Thaton, Mon State* LID - 99 - *Meiktila, Mandalay Division*

REGIONAL & MILITARY OPERATIONAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS (ROCs & MOCs)

Mong Pyat ROC - *Mong Pyat, Shan State* MOC - 12 - *Kawkareik, Karen State*
 Loikaw ROC - *Loikaw, Karenni State* MOC - 13 - *Bokepyin, Tenasserim Division*
 MOC - 2 - *Mong Nang, Shan State* MOC - 14 - *Mong Hsat, Shan State*
 MOC - 6 - *Pyinmana, Mandalay Division* MOC - 17 - *Mong Pan, Shan State*
 MOC - 7 - *Pekon, Shan State* MOC - 19 - *Ye, Mon State*
 MOC - 8 - *Tavoy, Tenasserim Division* MOC - 20 - *Kauthaug, Tenasserim Division*

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS BY STATES AND DIVISIONS

(IB : Infantry Battalion; LIB : Light Infantry Battalion; AB : Artillery Battalion)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Mong Nai Township	Langkher Township	Mong Ton Township	Mawk Mai Township
IB-248	IB-99	IB-65	IB-132
LIB-576	LIB-525	IB-133	Nam Zarng Township
LIB-518	LIB-578	IB-277	IB-247
LIB-569	Mong Hsat Township	IB-225	IB-66
LIB-574	IB-49	LIB-519	AB-359
AB-336	IB-278	AB-386	LIB-516
LIB-574	LIB-527	Laikha Township	Hsi Hseng Township
Kunhing Township	LIB-579	IB-64	LIB-423
IB-246	LIB-580	LIB-515	LIB-424
IB-296	LIB-333	Loilem Township	LIB-425
LIB-524	Kehsi & Mong Kung	IB-9	Mong Pyat Township
Mong Pan Township	LIB-132	IB-12	IB-221
IB-294	LIB-514	LIB-513	LIB-329
IB-295	IB-286	Taunggyi Township	LIB-330
LIB-575	IB-287	IB-94	LIB-335
LIB-332	Pekon Township	LIB-510	LIB-570
LIB-520	LIB-336	Pinlaung Township	Yatsauk Township
LIB-517	LIB-421	IB-249	IB-292
LIB-598	LIB-422	LIB-511	LIB-508
LIB-577	Mong Yawn Township	LIB-512	LIB-509
Kalaw Township	LIB-311	Tachileik Township	Mong Khet Township
IB-3	LIB-334	LIB-331	IB-227
IB-7	LIB-573	LIB-359	LIB-327
LIB-18	LIB-553	LIB-526	LIB-328
LIB-112	Mong Ping Township	LIB-529	Keng Tong Township
LIB-117	IB-43		IB-244
	LIB-360		IB-245
	LIB-528		LIB-314

KARENNI (KAYAH) STATE

Loikaw Township	Pruso Township	Bawlakeh Township	Deemawso Township
IB-54	LIB-428	LIB-337	IB-102
IB-72	LIB-531	LIB-429	LIB-427
IB-261	Pasaung Township	LIB-430	
IB-250	IB-134		
LIB-530	IB-135		
AB-360			

KAREN STATE

Papun Township	Hlaingbwe Township	Kyain Seikgyi Township	Kawkareik Township
IB-68	IB-28	IB-32	IB-97
IB-34	LIB-338	IB-283	IB-230
LIB-19	LIB-339	IB-284	IB-231
LIB-340	Myawaddy Township	LIB-202	LIB-545
LIB-341	IB-275	LIB-550	LIB-546
LIB-354	LIB-355	LIB-206	LIB-548
LIB-434	LIB-356	Tantabin Township	LIB-549
LIB-522	LIB-357	IB-73	Pa-an Township
Thandaung Township	LIB-205		LIB-201
IB-124	LIB-547		LIB-203
IB-603			LIB-204
LIB-542			LIB-310

PEGU DIVISION (EAST)

Taungoo Township	Shwegyin Township	Kyaukgyi Township	Phyu Township
IB-26	IB-57	IB-60	IB-35
IB-39	LIB-350	LIB-599	Pegu Township
	LIB-349	LIB-590	IB-30
	LIB-589	LIB-351	LIB-440

MON STATE

Thaton Township	Kyaikhto Township	Ye Township	Thanbyuzayat Township
IB-24	LIB-2	IB-31	IB-62
LIB-1	LIB-207	IB-61	LIB-209
LIB-9	LIB-208	IB-106	Mudon Township
LIB-118	Moulmein Township	IB-229	LIB-210
Bilin Township	IB-81	LIB-586	LIB-202
IB-2	LIB-102	LIB-587	
IB-8	LIB-104	LIB-343	
IB-96		LIB-591	
LIB-3		LIB-299	
		LIB-588	
		AB-316	

TENASSERIM DIVISION

Yebyu Township	Tenasserim Township	Tavoy Township	Bokepyin Township	Kauthaug Township
IB-273	LIB-556	IB-25	IB-224	IB-288
IB-282	LIB-557	LIB-402	LIB-585	IB-262
LIB-410	LIB-558	LIB-401	LIB-559	LIB-597
LIB-408	LIB-561	AB-302	LIB-560	LIB-594
LIB-409	AB-306	Mergui Township	LIB-358	LIB-595
LIB-406	Theyetchaung Township	IB-17	LIB-432	LIB-596
LIB-407	LIB-403	IB-103	LIB-581	LIB-342
LIB-498	LIB-404	IB-101	LIB-593	LIB-431
AB-304	LIB-405	IB-265	LIB-555	LIB-582
AB-307	LIB-405	LIB-433	LIB-592	AB-303
Palaw Township	AB-201	AB-301	LIB-584	AB-305
IB-280	Launglon Township	AB-401	AB-308	
IB-285	IB-104		AB-501	
AB-309	IB-267			

APPENDIX 5 : 2009 SURVEY GUIDELINES

POPULATION SURVEY

The objective is to assess the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development.

Township name (on maps of Burma) :

Background about key informants :

.....

1. How many villages have been completely destroyed, relocated or abandoned during the past 12 months? Where were these villages?
(Please indicate on the table and map)
2. How many people have fled or been forced to leave their homes and moved elsewhere due to war or human rights abuses during the past 12 months?
(Please indicate on the table)
3. How many people currently live in rural areas in total?
(Please indicate on the table)
4. How many SPDC “relocation sites” (including consolidated villages) currently remain populated by force? Where are these relocation sites?
(Please indicate on the table and map)
5. How many people are currently obliged to live in SPDC relocation sites (including consolidated villages)?
(Please indicate on the table)
6. Where are any “hiding areas” in which people conceal themselves from SPDC patrols, including opposition controlled areas?
(Please indicate on the map)
7. How many people currently hide from, or do not show themselves to, SPDC patrols?
(Please indicate on the table)
8. Where are any special regions or “ceasefire areas” in which the ethnic nationality authorities have limited autonomy and guarantees against SPDC attack?
(Please indicate on the map)
9. How many displaced people currently live in ethnic “ceasefire areas”?
(Please indicate on the table)
10. Where are development projects which have caused human rights abuses during the past 12 months?
(Please indicate relevant roads, agricultural plantations, mines, logging areas, dams and gas pipelines on the map)
11. Where are current locations of SPDC outposts, battalion headquarters, Light Infantry Divisions (LID), Operational Control Headquarters (OCH) and Regional Commands?
(Please indicate the location and type of army camp on the map provided)

Thankyou for your cooperation!

HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY SURVEY

(You may interview only one person per household)

Name of interviewer: Organisation of Interviewer :
Township of Respondent: State or Division of Respondent :

Type of place? (Mark one box only.)

- Hiding site in forest or fields SPDC Relocation site
 Village in ceasefire area Village in mixed administration area

Hi, my name is _____. I work for _____, a humanitarian relief organization. I would like to ask you about your personal experiences of displacement, conflict and vulnerability in Eastern Burma. I do not need to know your name, and all of your individual responses will be kept confidential. There are no correct or wrong answers. I will start by asking you a few personal questions just to make sure that I am talking to a broad range of people. Can we start?

1. Sex?

1. Male 2. Female

2. How old are you? Years

3. What religious beliefs do you follow?

(Mark one box only)

1. Animist 2. Buddhist 3. Christian
 4. Moslem 5. None 6. Other

4. Which ethnic group do you recognize as yours?

(Mark one box only)

1. Sgaw Karen 2. Pwo Karen 3. Kayah
 4. Kayaw 5. Paku 6. Kayan
 7. Shan 8. Palaung 9. Pa-O
 10. Lahu 11. Mon 12. Burman
 13. Other.....

5. Have you been forced to leave your home due to armed conflict, violence, abuse or natural disasters during the past ten years? (mark one box)

1. Yes (go to question 6) 2. No (go to question 7)

6. What has been your experience of returning home or resettling somewhere else? (Mark one box)

1. resettled safely, re-established a livelihood and reintegrated into society
 2. returned home safely, re-established livelihood & reintegrated in society
 3. re-established a livelihood but have not reintegrated into society
 4. reintegrated into society but have not re-established a livelihood
 5. have not re-established a livelihood nor reintegrated into society

7. Has your household's livelihood been damaged during the past 12 months? If so, how?

(mark all relevant boxes)

1. Floods, landslides or pests damaged crops 2. food supplies destroyed by arm
 3. theft of food supplies by armed forces 4. travel restrictions
 5. forced displacement 6. land confiscation
 7. extortion or arbitrary taxes 8. imposition of forced labour
 9. no damage in past 12 months

8. Has your household's safety been threatened during the past 12 months? If so, how?

(mark all relevant boxes)

1. heavy artillery attack 2. small arms attack
 3. landmines or military patrols 4. arbitrary killing (family member)
 5. arbitrary arrest or detention 6. torture or beatings
 7. rape or other sexual abuse 8. house destroyed/forced eviction
 9. forced recruitment as a porter or landmine sweeper 10. forced recruitment into army
 11. no threat in past 12 months

9. Is there any violence and abuse that especially threatens women in your community? What?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Beatings | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Sexual harassment or rape |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Domestic violence | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Forced or early marriage |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Being tricked or sold into slavery | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Forced prostitution |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Dealing with authorities when men flee to hide | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. No additional threats | |

10. If anyone in your family is under 18 years old and working in an armed force, what are they doing?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Soldier for the Tatmadaw | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Soldier for an opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. works in kitchen for the Tatmadaw | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. works in kitchen for an opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. porter or messenger for the Tatmadaw | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. porter or messenger for opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. masseuse for the Tatmadaw | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. masseuse for an opposition group |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. no one in my family is under 18 years old and working in an armed force | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10. other | |

11. How have you received early warning about troop movements during the past 12 months?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Unarmed village security guards | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. Armed village security guards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Burma Army authorities | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Armed opposition or ceasefire authorities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Traders and other villagers | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Humanitarian or human rights monitors |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Have not received any warnings | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify)..... |

12. How has the presence of aid workers affected your safety and security during the past 12 months?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. No change – but hope they come again | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No change – but hope they stay away |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Better - human rights abuses decreased | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Better, economic & social links stronger |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Worse – violent threats beforehand | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Worse - violent repercussions afterwards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. No humanitarian aid reached us | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify)..... |

13. If human rights abuses have been reported from your area, how has that affected the safety of villagers during the past 12 months?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. No change – same as before | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. No one's collected that information here |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Better awareness about human rights | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Worse - more troop patrols afterwards |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. Better, government punished offenders | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Worse – victim suffered more abuse |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. Better, ethnic authorities punished offender | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other (specify)..... |

14. What are your main reasons for maintaining good relations with people from nearby towns?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. trade / bartering | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. weddings / funerals / community events |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. employment / daily wages | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. visit friends and family |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. education / health care / social services | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. information about military policies / patrols |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. relief assistance | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. Other |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. no contact | |

15. What are your main obstacles in maintaining good relations with people from nearby towns?
(mark all relevant boxes)

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. cost of travel | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. restrictions on travel and trade |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. lack of security / fear of harassment | <input type="checkbox"/> 3. lack of time / too busy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. lack of ID card | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. Other..... |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. No obstacles | |

Thank you for your cooperation!

APPENDIX 6 : ACRONYMS AND PLACE NAMES

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CIDKP	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
IASC	(UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IB	Infantry Battalion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
KNLP	Kayan New Lands Party
KNPLF	Karenni National People's Liberation Front
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNSO	Karenni National Solidarity Organisation
KNU	Karen National Union
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KNU/KNLA-PC	KNU / KNLA Peace Council
KORD	Karen Office of Relief and Development
KPF	Karen Peace Front
KSWDC	Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
LIB	Light Infantry Battalion
LID	Light Infantry Division
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
NGO	non government organisation
NMSP	New Mon State Party
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNO	PaO National Organisation
PNLO	PaO National Liberation Organisation
PNDO	PaO National Development Organisation
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSA-N	Shan State Army - North
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SNPLO	Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation
SRDC	Shan Relief and Development Committee
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWSA	United Wa State Army

PLACE NAMES PRIOR TO 1989

Burma
Irrawaddy Division
Karenni State
Karen State
Moulmein
Mergui
Pa-an
Pegu Division
Salween River
Sittaung River
Tavoy
Tenasserim Division
Taungoo
Rangoon

SLORC/SPDC SPELLINGS AFTER 1989

Myanmar
Ayeyarwady Division
Kayah State
Kayin State
Mawlamyine
Myeik
Hpa-an
Bago Division
Thanlwin River
Sittoung River
Dawei
Tanintharyi Division
Toungoo
Yangon



www.tbbsc.org

Thailand Burma Border Consortium

Working with displaced people of Burma

25 YEARS

Mission

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self-reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.