Afghanistan: Treatment of members and former members of the Afghan military by the Taliban and other anti-government groups, including whether they are personally targeted outside of active conflict zones; whether rank, branch or type of military services poses a greater risk; information on state protection, including protection programs offered by the military (2012-August 2017)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. The Taliban
1.1 Structure of the Taliban

According to sources, the Taliban is also known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Jamestown Foundation 21 Feb. 2014, 5; Jane's Terrorism Watch Report 27 Feb. 2012; TRAC n.d.). According to a 2012 report on Taliban networks in Afghanistan published by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, a research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre of the London School of Economics, and who has written several books on Afghanistan and the Taliban (Giustozzi 2012, 5), the Taliban is "the largest opposition armed group in Afghanistan" and accounts for over 80 percent of insurgents (Giustozzi 2012, 20). The same source describes the Taliban as "a network of networks," being predominantly religious and tribal in nature, and led by local commanders known as mullahs (Giustozzi 2012, 20).

According to sources, the Taliban is headed by Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada (BBC 26 May 2016; Al Jazeera 2 July 2016). The BBC further states that there are two deputies, one of whom leads the Haqqani Network [1] (BBC 26 May 2016). Under the Akhundzada and the Deputies is the Rahbari Shura [also called the Quetta Shura], an 18-member leadership council, comprised of former Taliban ministers, religious leaders, diplomats, governors, and military commanders (BBC 26 May 2016) or "veterans of the Taliban regime" (Jamestown Foundation 21 Feb. 2014, 5). The leadership council oversees various Taliban commissions (BBC 26 May 2016; Jamestown Foundation 21 Feb. 2014, 6).

For further information on the structure and intelligence capabilities of the Taliban, including the Taliban's ability to track and pursue individuals, as well as intimidation and targeted assassinations, please see Response to Information Request AFG105412 of 15 February 2016.

1.2 Taliban-Controlled Territory

According to a 2017 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an office created by the US Congress to "provide independent and objective oversight of Afghanistan reconstruction projects and activities" (US n.d.), 57.2 percent of Afghanistan's 407 districts "are under Afghan government control or influence as of November 15, 2016," which is nearly a "15% decrease since November 2015" (US 30 Jan. 2017, 89). The report states that "233 districts were under government control (83 districts) or influence (150), 41 districts (in 15 provinces) were under insurgent control (9) or influence (32), and 133 districts were 'contested'" (US 30 Jan. 2017, 89). According to the same source,

USFOR-A [U.S. Forces Afghanistan] identified the regions/provinces with the largest percentage of insurgent-controlled or influenced districts as Uruzgan Province, with five out of six (83.3%) of its districts under insurgent control or influence, and Helmand with eight out of 14 (57.1%) of its districts under insurgent control or influence. The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwest Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence. (US 30 Jan. 2017, 90)

A 2017 article by Voice of America (VOA), an international media broadcaster funded by the U.S. government (VOA n.d.), quotes a spokesperson for the Afghan defense ministry responding to the January 2017 SIGAR report, stating that they had since "recaptured many areas from the enemy" (VOA 13 Jan. 2017). The same source further reports that the Afghan government

said it controls nearly two-thirds of the country's 407 districts. Afghan officials said the Taliban controls 33 districts, less than 10 percent of the national total, and a recent U.S. military assessment lists 116 districts - more than one-quarter of the country - as "contested" areas. (VOA 13 Jan. 2017)

FDD's Long War Journal, a project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a non-profit, non-partisan policy institute focusing on foreign policy and national security (FDD's Long War Journal n.d.), compiled data and compared it to a Taliban report of the area it controls and found that the Taliban report's "claims of district control largely match with press reporting from Afghanistan" (FDD's Long War Journal, 28 Mar. 2017). Of 400 districts in Afghanistan, of which 349 are covered in the Taliban's report, the Taliban

fully controls 34 districts, including the district centers, and contests another 167 districts (these are districts where the Taliban claims it controls between 40 to 99 percent of the territory). The Taliban has a significant presence (10 to 39 percent) in another 52 districts, and a minimal presence in six more districts (1 to 9 percent). The Taliban said it has no presence in 89 districts, however, in some of those provinces it says it is conducting "guerilla activities." (FDD's Long War Journal 28 Mar. 2017)

The same source also reports on the regional presence of the Taliban as follows:

According to the Taliban, it controls or contests nearly all of the districts in the southern provinces of Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Ghazni, and half of Kandahar. Eastern and northwestern Afghanistan look equally bleak, as do the northern provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan. (FDD's Long War Journal 28 Mar. 2017)

2. Targeting of Former and Current Members of the Afghan Military by the Taliban and other Anti-Government Groups

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a representative of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), a "national human rights institution" in Afghanistan that protects and promotes human rights (AIHRC n.d.), stated that the Taliban considers those employed by the military or Government as "legitimate targets" (AIHRC 16 Aug. 2017). Citing a "staff member of an international development agency in Afghanistan," a 2012 report by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) states that "for ANA [Afghan National Army] and ANP [Afghan National Police] soldiers it might not be sufficient to simply quit their job in order to escape the threat by insurgents. They would have to change sides in order to avoid further targeting" (EU Dec. 2012, 35).

Similarly, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, a Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue [2], speaking on his own behalf, stated that they were aware of a "number of cases" in which "current and former members of the ANSF [Afghanistan National Security Forces] have been targeted by insurgents," without providing further detail (Director 27 July 2017). An Afghan researcher at Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) [3], speaking on his own behalf, stated that "ex members of the military could be a target, if [they] happen to live in areas under Taliban control" (Afghan Researcher 16 Aug. 2017).

The information in the following paragraph comes from the December 2012 EASO report:

Citing reports by the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) [4], the EASO report states that in south-east Afghanistan in 2012, "off-duty ANSF members were killed and their private residences were also attacked" (EU Dec. 2012, 51). In the west of Afghanistan, "[f]amily members of ANSF and off-duty ANSF members were targeted as well" (EU Dec. 2012, 52). The EASO report notes that ANSF members "are not only targeted when on the job but in around 15 documented episodes, they were targeted when off duty or acting in a private capacity. In around 10 documented episodes, their family members or relatives were targeted as well" (EU Dec. 2012, 52). The EASO report also specifies locations in which ANSF have been targeted, stating:

There was evidence found of the targeting of ANSF in several cities in Afghanistan, including attacks on their headquarters: Lashkar Gah (Helmand), Ghazni, Sharan (Paktika), Gardez (Khost), Khost (Khost), Pul-e Alam (Logar), Jalalabad, Mehterlam (Laghman), Kunduz, Sar-e Pul and Kabul. But at the top of the list is Kandahar City for which ANSO report, in April 2012, an average of five to eight targeted killings of ANSF members every 2 weeks. (Dec. 2012, 53)

A 2016 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that "[Anti-Government Elements] are reported to systematically target civilians who are associated with, or who are perceived to be supporting the Afghan Government" (UN 19 Apr. 2016, 34). Furthermore, the same report states:

[Anti-Government Elements] have been reported to target family members of individuals with the above risk profiles, both as acts of retaliation and on a "guilty by association" basis. In particular, relatives, including women and children, of government officials and members of the ANSF have been subjected to harassment, kidnappings, violence, and killings. (UN 19 Apr. 2016, 41)

According to a 2016 SIGAR report, "[a] female lieutenant colonel in the [ANA] said the Taliban especially targeted women in the army. Her brother warned her that if people know she was in the army, the family could be killed. Because of this, she no longer wears her uniform in public" (US Oct. 2016, 10).

Sources report the following examples of targeting of former or off-duty members of the military:

• On 25 August 2013, "Anti-Government Elements abducted and killed a former ANA soldier who had left the army to run an education centre in Bati Kot district, Nangarhar province" (UN Feb. 2014, 26);
• On 19 December 2013, "Anti-Government Elements shot and killed a local school teacher" who was the brother of an ANA soldier in Bar Kunar district, Kunar province, "while he was travelling in a local taxi" (UN Feb. 2014, 26);
• In February 2014, near Asadabad, 21 ANA soldiers were killed "in their bunks" by "Taliban insurgents," with "eight other soldiers reported to have been taken prisoner by the insurgents" (The New York Times 23 Feb. 2014);
• In August 2015, in Maidan Shahar, the capital of Wardak province, security forces were wounded in explosions in an area of shops where "security forces usually were busy…shopping" (Pajhwok Afghan News 10 Aug. 2015);
• In 2015, Amnesty International stated that there were reports of the "Taliban conducting house-by-house searches looking for people linked to the Afghan security forces or government" (Amnesty International 29 Sept. 2015);
• In December 2015, in northern Faryab province, an off-duty ANA service member travelling in a passenger vehicle was kidnapped and killed by Taliban; his body and a letter were left as a warning to other ANA members (Pajhwok Afghan News 26 Dec. 2015);
• On 11 February 2017, a "Taliban-claimed suicide attack target[ed] ANA soldiers collecting salaries at the New Kabul Bank in Lashkar Gah city, Helmand province" (UN July 2017, 39);
• On 8 March 2017, "multiple attackers carried out a complex attack targeting Mohammad Sardar Daud Khan Hospital - an ANA military hospital facility - located in a central area of Kabul city" (UN July 2017, 18). The hospital serves ANA soldiers and their family members, in addition to civilians requiring specialized care (UN July 2017, 18). UNAMA verified at least 48 civilian casualties and 44 casualties "among medical personnel with military rank," as well as "the killing of 13 hors de combat soldiers and the injury of six others" (UN July 2017, 18).

3. Impact of Rank, Branch, Type of Military Service

The 2012 EASO report states:

High-ranking ANSF officials face a real risk of being intimidated or targeted by insurgents in all parts of Afghanistan. Low-ranking members face a low risk of being intimidated or targeted in safer areas in Afghanistan which are not under the insurgents' control, unless there are specific individual circumstances that increase the risk. They also might be targeted by complex attacks in several other cities, including Kabul. (EU Dec. 2012, 19)

The report defines high-ranking ANSF members as, "for example, commanders or colonels" and low-ranking ANSF members as, "for example, ANA soldiers or policemen" (EU Dec. 2012, 53). However, the Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, speaking on his own behalf, reported that "rank does not play so much of a role. Insurgents have demonstrated an interest in targeting anyone (current or former) associated with the ANSF" (Director 27 July 2017). The AIHRC representative similarly noted that the Taliban "does not care what rank people have" (AIHRC 16 Aug. 2017). In contrast, the Afghan Researcher working for CPAU stated that rank does affect the risk level for former and current members of the military because

ordinary soldiers can hide their military service by telling their community that they work as labourers outside their province or country, but for officers it is not possible to hide their rank or nature of their job, thus they are exposed to increasing threats and dangers. (Afghan Researcher 16 Aug. 2017)

The Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue indicated that while the local militia and police have been "disproportionately targeted" because they "are on the front lines in the districts," insurgents continue to target National Directorate of Security, ANA, and police (Director 27 July 2017). The Director further noted that, due to demographics, "officers have been targeted and killed by insurgents in cities while in villages it is foot soldiers who have been targeted" (Director 27 July 2017).

Further information on the impact of rank, branch, or type of military services on risk could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. State Protection

The Afghan Researcher working for CPAU stated that he was "not aware of any protection program" for former military and military members outside of conflict zones by the government, including at the "ministry of defense" (Afghan Researcher 16 Aug. 2017). The Director at the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue stated that he was not aware of any formal program that exists to "address the safety of ANSF members," but that, in light of the risk they face, "in many cases lower ranked officers and soldiers are permitted to carry a light weapon while a high ranked officer may be permitted a body guard" (Director 27 July 2017). The AIHRC representative noted that "the government is not in a situation that it could provide protection" to former military and military members outside of conflict zones, but that "there are some exceptional cases in which former or current military members are provided with protection, because they are either influential or knew and have connections with the government's high ranking officials" (AIHRC 16 Aug. 2017). Further information on state protection could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The Haqqani Network is one of a number of armed groups fighting in Afghanistan who the UN refers to as "Anti-Government Elements," and which includes those identifying as "Taliban" or other armed groups, such as: Hezbe-e-Islami, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba, Jaysh Muhammed, Daesh, and others (UN Aug. 2015, 2).

[2] The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue is "a Swiss-based private diplomacy organisation founded on the principles of humanity, impartiality and independence. [Their] mission is to help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict through dialogue and mediation" (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, n.d.).

[3] According to their website, Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) is "an Afghan-led non-profit organisation" that was founded in 1996 (CPAU n.d.). It is a "research and peace-building organisation" that "promot[es] peace and social justice in Afghanistan," and has "extensive experience in conducting quantitative and qualitative research on a community, district, and provincial level" (CPAU n.d.).

[4] The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) was created in 2002 as a safety platform for NGOs, hosted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC); in 2009 it developed the concept of establishing itself as an independent NGO and later became the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) (INSO n.d.).

References

Afghan Researcher, Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). 16 August 2017. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). 16 August 2017. Correspondence sent to the Research Directorate by a representative.

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). N.d. "A Brief Introduction of AIHRC and its Programs and Activities." [Accessed 29 Aug. 2017]

Al Jazeera. 2 July 2016. "Taliban Leader: No Peace without Foreigners Leaving." [Accessed 24 July 2017]

Amnesty International. 29 September 2015. "Afghanistan: Taliban Tactics put Civilians in Harm's Way." [Accessed 26 July 2017]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 26 May 2012. "Who are the Taliban?" [Accessed 19 July 2017]

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. N.d. "About." [Accessed 27 July 2017]

Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU). N.d. "Our Work." [Accessed 16 Aug. 2017]

Director, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 27 July 2017. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

European Union (EU). December 2012. European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan: Insurgent Strategies -- Intimidation and Targeted Violence against Afghans. [Accessed 25 July 2017]

FDD's Long War Journal. 28 March 2017. Bill Roggio. "Afghan Taliban lists 'Percent of Country under the Control of Mujahideen.'" [Accessed 26 July 2017]

FDD's Long War Journal. N.d. "About." [Accessed 26 July 2017]

Giustozzi, Antonio. 2012. Taliban Networks in Afghanistan. CIWAG Case Study Series 2011-2012. US Naval War College, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups. [Accessed 24 July 2017]

International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO). "History." [Accessed 23 Aug. 2017]

Jamestown Foundation. 21 February 2014. Abubakar Siqqique. "The Quetta Shura: Understanding the Afghan Taliban's Leadership." Terrorism Monitor. Vol. 12, No. 4. [Accessed 26 July 2017]

Jane's Terrorism Watch Report. 27 February 2012. IHS Markit. "Aftermath of Koran Burning Damages Afghan-NATO Relations." [Accessed 24 July 2017]

The New York Times. 23 February 2014. Niamatullah Karyab and Rod Nordland. "Taliban Raid Afghan Army Base, Killing Soldiers in their Sleep." [Accessed 16 Aug. 2017]

Pajhwok Afghan News. 26 December 2015. Qutbuddin Kohi. "Taliban Kill ANA Soldier, Place Bomb Beneath his Corpse in Faryab." [Accessed 16 Aug. 2017]

Pajhwok Afghan News. 10 August 2015. Nasim Hotak. "Dozens Dead, Wounded in Wardak, Zabul Incidents." [Accessed 26 July 2017]

Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC). N.d. "Taliban / Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)." [Accessed 24 July 2017]

United Nations (UN). July 2017. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan MidYear Report 2017: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. [Accessed 26 July 2017]

United Nations (UN). 19 April 2016. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan. (HCR/EG/AFG/16/02) [Accessed 25 July 2017]

United Nations (UN). July 2016. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan MidYear Report 2016: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. [Accessed 25 July 2017]

United Nations (UN). August 2015. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan Mid-Year Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. [Accessed 26 July 2017]

United Nations (UN). February 2014. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan Annual Report 2013: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. [Accessed 26 July 2017]

United States (US). 30 January 2017. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. [Accessed 27 July 2017]

United States (US). 30 October 2016. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. [Accessed 23 Aug. 2017]

United States (US). N.d. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). "About SIGAR." [Accessed 23 Aug. 2017]

Voice of America (VOA). 13 January 2017. Noor Zahid. "Afghanistan Disputes US Report on Taliban Gains." [Accessed 26 July 2017]

Voice of America (VOA). N.d. "VOA History." [Accessed 23 Aug. 2017]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Researchers specializing in the human rights and security situation in Afghanistan; Researchers specializing in the Taliban.

Internet sites, including: Afghanistan Times; Factiva; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Freedom House; Haaretz; Human Rights Quarterly; Human Rights Watch; Humanitarian Response; Institute for War & Peace Reporting; IRIN; The Kabul Times; Radio France internationale; Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty; ReliefWeb; Transparency International; United Nations – Refworld; US – Department of State.