



Tearfund WASH service delivery in South Sudan:

contributions to peace-building and state-building

Michelle Kooy and Leni Wild, ODI

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Overseas Development Institute
203 Blackfriars Road, London, SE1 8NJ

Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399
www.odi.org.uk

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Abbreviations

BSF	Basic Services Fund
CCMP	Church and Community Mobilisation Process
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID)
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FCAS	Fragile and conflict-affected states
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
IDP	Internally displaced person
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoPI	Ministry of Planning and Infrastructure
MWRI	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
NCP	National Congress Party
NSP	Non-state provider
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PB	Peace-building
PHAST	Participatory Hygiene and Sanitation Transformation
RoSS	Republic of South Sudan
RWH	Rainwater harvesting
SB	State-building
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SUDRA	Sudanese Development and Relief Agency
WASH	Water supply, sanitation, hygiene
WES	Water, Environment, Sanitation Department
WRAPP	Water for Peace and Recovery Program

Executive summary

This report forms part of a one-year DFID-funded research project, implemented by Tearfund and ODI, that aims to explore the links between service delivery of water supply and sanitation and the wider processes of state-building and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states. It has focused on Tearfund's water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions implemented through the 'Capacity Building to Improve Humanitarian Action in the Water Sanitation and Hygiene' programme, funded by DFID CHASE. The objective of the programme was to increase the capacity of Tearfund disaster management team operations, local partner projects and local government departments in conflict-affected and humanitarian contexts, to support improved access to potable water, sanitation and public health education (PHE), resulting in sustainable improved health, well-being and dignity for grassroots communities.

The contribution of WASH service delivery to peace-building or state-building was not a specific objective of the programme and there has been no initial baseline, or on-going monitoring or evaluation of the impacts of WASH service delivery on these goals. However, as the programmes were implemented, Tearfund project staff and partners identified some examples of effects on peace-building and state-building (Burt and Keiru, 2011). This research project provides an opportunity to look further into these examples and to understand the relationships between Tearfund's WASH programming and these peace-building and state-building processes.

Some key features of the context in South Sudan seem particularly to shape the entry points and opportunities - as well as the constraints - for supporting peace-building and state-building efforts as part of WASH programmes. Firstly, conflict and insecurity within South Sudan have been largely driven by marginalisation and perceptions of ethnic, regional and other disparities. Access to water and sanitation services per se has not been a major source of conflict; instead, there may be minor and localised competition in terms of how communities (and who within them) access water points. Secondly, state-building processes remain uneven across the country; in some areas (such as the Equatorias), there is greater stability and greater potential for collective action at the local level; in border areas, this has been much more constrained in light of on-going conflicts. Thirdly, the predominance of non-state providers (NSPs) in the WASH sector has meant that few citizens view the state as a provider of services.

Two field sites were visited for this research and they show two contrasting models or approaches. In Yei River county (part of Central Equatoria), Tearfund has worked with and through an NGO called Across to implement its Church and Community Mobilisation Process (CCMP) approach, aiming to facilitate community initiatives and collaboration to address WASH gaps and needs. This community mobilisation approach involves training and sensitisation (for example, of hygiene monitors) based within communities. In contrast, in Aweil (part of Northern Bahr el Ghazal), Tearfund is a direct provider of WASH services, including direct construction (of boreholes, latrines) in some sites, albeit with an explicit intention to work with government partners in terms of selection of sites and reporting.

A number of strengths were identified for these programmes, particularly where the CCMP has helped build communities' own initiative and collective action capacity. In addition, a number of potential opportunities were identified, where there is greater scope to pay attention to, and in some cases to better support, peace-building and/or state-building processes. This offers useful insights for any future programming that aims have a more explicit peace-building or state-building focus.

In Yei River, for example, there were a number of positive examples on the ground, where the CCMP approach had helped to facilitate processes of collective action and collaboration within communities, bringing them together to address some critical gaps. Part of the success has been the programme's ability to identify and work with actors that count and who have convening power within communities; in Yei River, this involved working with churches but

also with local chiefs such as village head men. Across's local staff appeared to have strong local knowledge and networks which were particularly helpful for this. In addition, two key aspects show future potential. For peace-building, greater attention could be paid to processes of marginalisation, including how to work with a range of groups and communities. For state-building, there have been varying levels of engagement with state actors at different levels to date, and this could be further developed for the future.

In Aweil, Tearfund's programmes have addressed some clear areas of need, and there are some positive examples of working with different communities. Again, there are also a number of areas which could be exploited further in future programming. For peace-building, in some project sites there were signs of resentment, for example from host and returnee populations. While these are not drivers of major conflict, they may reinforce underlying marginalisation and perceptions of grievances. Strategies which explicitly seek to address perceptions of marginalisation and tensions within and between communities could be particularly helpful here. For state-building, again there may be greater opportunities for engagement with a range of state actors and for working further on aspects of state-society relations.

This points to a number of important findings and reflections for where and how peace-building and state-building processes can be supported as part of WASH programmes in the South Sudan context:

- **There are significant regional/other disparities which reinforce the need for tailored, local responses:** This can be challenging for multi-year programmes with countrywide targets/indicators. Tearfund already seems to have developed different strategies for different locations, although there is further scope for systematised analysis and reflection on programme design in light of key contextual differences.
- **Local conflict analysis should therefore be conducted and drawn upon** to understand localised patterns of insecurity (including marginalisation) and to ensure that interventions as a minimum do not further exacerbate existing tensions.
- **In some cases, there is greater scope for programmes to address perceptions of marginalisation and inequities** in access, particularly in more insecure areas. In Aweil, there were examples where projects had fuelled resentments or perceptions of marginalisation. There were also positive examples, where this had been overcome, particularly through substantive involvement of users in project design, which could be further developed.
- **One of the core strengths of Tearfund's approach – particularly where it uses the CCMP - is where it can use faith-based groups to facilitate collective action and collaboration.** These can be important convenors for communities where the state has historically had a limited presence. At present, this approach is not implemented in Aweil; however, there seems to be significant scope to introduce this more widely.
- **Over time, collective action approaches could do more to involve local state actors.** This has already been recognised as a priority in some areas (e.g. in Central Equatoria). Realistic expectations are crucial, but with the new government, it is vital to begin to explore opportunities for this and working further on state-society relations.
- **In general, the high presence of NSPs is likely to continue to undermine the visibility of the state.** This is a challenge not just for Tearfund but for the wide range of NSPs operating in South Sudan. While there is an on-going imperative to continue to respond to high levels of need, there are real challenges here of sustainability which collectively NGOs operating in the sector are beginning to recognise. On a practical level, steps can be taken to reduce 'the branding' of programmes. Over the longer term, external actors such as Tearfund can seek to play greater roles as facilitator or convenors rather than direct service providers.

1 Introduction

1.1 DFID WASH capacity building project

This country report is part of a one-year DFID-funded research project implemented by Tearfund and ODI. The project explores the links between service delivery of water supply and sanitation and the wider processes of state-building and peace-building in fragile and conflict-affected states.

It is focused on Tearfund water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) interventions implemented through the 'Capacity Building to Improve Humanitarian Action in the Water Sanitation and Hygiene' programme, funded by DFID CHASE. The objective of the programme was to increase the capacity of Tearfund disaster management team operations, local partner projects and local government departments in conflict-affected and humanitarian contexts to support improved access to potable water, sanitation and public health education (PHE), resulting in sustainable improved health, well-being and dignity for grassroots communities.

The contribution of WASH service delivery to peace-building or state-building was not a specific objective of the programme, and was subsequently not included in the logical framework. As such, there has been no initial baseline, or on-going monitoring or evaluation of the impacts of WASH service delivery on these goals. However, as the programme was being implemented, Tearfund project staff and partners began to gather *ad hoc* evidence of increased community cohesion, increased capacity for local conflict resolution and improved capacity of local government (Burt and Keiru, 2011). This research project provides an opportunity to conduct an analysis of the impact of the programme on PB and SB.

Box 1: Defining peace-building and state-building

Peace-building: Peace-building refers to 'those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalise peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict... and a modicum of participatory politics... that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation' (Call and Cousins, 2007; cited in Menocal, 2009). Over time, the concept has become much more expansive, and there is increasing awareness of the importance of state institutions, while still emphasising the centrality of non-state actors and bottom-up processes in building peace (Menocal, 2009). DFID's definition refers to establishing 'positive peace', characterised by 'social harmony, respect for the rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development' (DFID, 2010), which emphasises the expansive nature of some definitions.

State-building: 'State-building' is a commonly used term that encompasses deliberate actions by national and international actors to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions and build state capacity and legitimacy (Menocal, 2009). This is in line with DFID's definition of state-building, which emphasises the state's capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and the political and economic processes that underpin state-society relations (DFID, 2010). State-building is not only about the state in isolation: the quality and nature of the relationship linking state and society are also crucial (Menocal, 2009). As an objective, state-building is often discussed in terms of how the international community can support fragile states and those emerging from conflict, whereby increasing the legitimacy and authority of the government is essential for maintaining peace.

Globally, while there has been an emergent focus of international development donors on fragile states (World Bank, 2011), the role of basic services in terms of delivering 'peace dividends' or contributing to 'state legitimacy' are under debate, and in some cases have been found to be based on ungrounded assumptions (Bennett *et al*, 2010). This evidence gap is now being addressed by various research projects,¹ to better understand what processes, within

¹ DFID is funding a five-year research programme consortium on 'Secure Livelihoods', as well as CfBT-led consortium looking specifically at basic services and state legitimacy.

which contexts, allow which basic services (health, education, WASH) to contribute to PB and SB. This research project aims to contribute to these efforts, grounding statements made on PB and SB in concrete examples and observations of Tearfund projects, while remaining focused on operational implications and feasible guidelines for Tearfund and other WASH agencies on ways to increase positive impacts.

The first output of this research project was a literature review on the current evidence base of WASH service delivery and PB and SB (Mason, January 2012), followed by the development of a conceptual framework and research methodology (Mason *et al*, February 2012). South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo were selected by Tearfund and ODI as case study countries for this project. These countries were selected according to criteria of: current status of the programme (on-going or closed); interest of Tearfund country office to participate in case study and their ability to host ODI researchers; the ability to access the project field sites given the existing security situations and the duration of field research (two weeks in each country); type of WASH intervention implemented by Tearfund (including both water, sanitation and hygiene interventions and different hardware/software approaches); and the geographical expertise of ODI and existing ODI partnerships.

This report provides an overview of the findings from South Sudan. A similar report looks at the findings for DRC. These will contribute to a synthesis report that identifies key recommendations and works towards developing some diagnostics to help inform future programme design. A policy brief and academic journal article will also be used to support dissemination of these findings.

1.2 Research approach

The goal of the research project is to help Tearfund 'support effective water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) service delivery in ways that maximise their contribution towards peace- and state-building' (PB and SB).

The project responds directly to DFID's call to the international community to 'place PB and SB at the centre of all interventions in conflict-affected countries'. DFID's practice paper, *Building Peaceful States and Societies*, called for a step change in the approach of the international community to fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) to improve the peace, stability and long-term development of FCAS. However, the lack of evidence and limited understanding to date on how WASH service delivery can contribute to PB and SB has so far prevented the development of any practical guidance for implementing agencies.

The overall purpose of the research is to improve understanding and practice of donors and practitioners by:

1. Developing the evidence base on the PB and SB role of WASH service delivery in FCAS;
2. Developing guidance on what effective WASH service delivery programmes might look like when measured against criteria of both increased access to services and supporting PB and SB agendas;
3. Developing diagnostics which can be used in the design of WASH programming of development and relief agencies, to identify entry points to support PB and SB and to define the appropriate/possible degree of PB and SB.

The **specific research questions** are:

1. To what extent and in what ways can the processes of improving access to WASH make an explicit contribution to peace- and state-building in FCAS?
2. Given the impact WASH service delivery can have on peace- and state-building, what does effectiveness look like in FCAS and how can it be measured both qualitatively and quantitatively?

3. What diagnostic tools or indicators might guide future WASH service delivery programmes in FCAS, to help maximise the extent to which they can contribute to peace- and state-building?

The above research questions for the project contain a number of **key assumptions**:

1. The research questions assume that WASH service delivery has an impact on PB and SB. This research project will therefore seek to identify and isolate potential routes of impact of WASH service delivery on PB and SB, so assumptions about causal links can be better isolated and examined. In Section 1.3, we outline the five potential impact routes.
2. The research questions imply that PB and SB are mutually reinforcing. While this may often be the case, there are tensions between the peace-building and state-building endeavours to be explored, as appropriate, in the course of research (Box 2).

We also highlight the lack of differentiation between water supply, sanitation or hygiene services within the research questions, despite significant variations in the potential for impact on PB and SB between the three different, yet related, services (or sub-sectors). The research project explores the nature of the service being delivered for specific impact on PB and SB, with the hypothesis that, given different conditional factors and country contexts, one service may have a stronger potential for positive impact on PB and SB than another.

Box 2: Peace-building and state-building: aiming for complementarity

The increasing volume of research and thinking around peace-building and state-building has given rise to a search to integrate the two around the common aims of strengthening relations between state and society, and promoting representative and inclusive social and political systems. Haider (2010a, p.5) sees the primary aim of state-building as being 'to transform states and make them more responsive' and of peace-building 'to transform societal relationships', but concedes that, in practice, they are often interlinked in complex environments where both endeavours can impact on peace, stability and state-society relations.

The title of DFID's 2010 practice paper, *Building peaceful states and societies*, reflects this desire to integrate peace-building and state-building in a mutually reinforcing manner.

However, the practice paper also reflects on the tensions between peace-building and state-building, including the desire to secure a 'peace dividend' by providing basic services in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Where government capacity is very low, there may be a temptation to bypass government systems and deliver services via non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but this potentially undermines the wider (state-building) goal of developing government capacity to discharge these functions and so increase its legitimacy. The tension here has been explored in the WASH sector by the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program (WSP) which describes it as a 'capacity conundrum' with important implications for service delivery.

On the other hand, this interpretation arguably implies an assumption that state and government are synonymous. A broader conceptualisation of the state may place equal emphasis on civil society and private sector (and possibly other 'constituencies') alongside government – meaning that service delivery routed through these former channels would not by default undermine the state, as broadly conceived.

Furthermore, the desire to create a stable peace, i.e. to go beyond peace-keeping, means that in theory the ultimate ends of PB and SB are frequently aligned, for example around establishing the rule of law, conflict management systems, and democratic forms and processes – even if trade-offs exist between PB and SB, as to the means to achieve these ends. 'It would seem sensible, therefore, to align peace-building actions with longer-term planning for support to state-building, to provide the foundations for state-building and help bridge short and longer-term issues' (Eldon and Gunby, 2009, p.8).

This project follows the approach of the project terms of reference, by using 'PB and SB' as shorthand which implies that peace-building and state-building should, wherever possible, be mutually reinforcing. The potential for peace- and state-building goals to come into tension is nonetheless acknowledged and explored, as a structural issue, in the research approach.

Source: Haider (2010a), DFID (2010), Menocal (2009), Eldon and Gunby (2009) and WSP (2011a and 2011b)

1.3 Methodology

In this section, we briefly outline the main stages of research, and how links to PB and SB were analysed, for the Tearfund programme in the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS).²

Stage 1 – Political economy analysis was conducted to understand the key institutions, actors and incentives towards peace-building/state-building, as well as drivers of conflict for South Sudan. This included a specific focus on the WASH sector to identify existing levels of collaboration, accountability, legitimacy and capacity of the state, inclusion and opportunity. The political economy analysis identifies the existing openings for PB and SB, as well as limitations or 'reality checks' with regard to the degree to which Tearfund would be able to contribute to PB or SB through its programme (i.e. such as the existing capacity of the state, motivations of key actors, drivers of conflict).

² Hereon after referred to as 'South Sudan'

Stage 2 – WASH service delivery modality: The *what*, *who* and *how* of WASH service delivery in Tearfund project sites were identified through secondary literature (project proposals, annual reports, mid-term evaluation), and then verified by ODI researchers in the field. For the purposes of this research it was important to identify different components of the modality of service delivery – the *what*, *who* and *how* – which are subsumed within ‘WASH’. Our hypothesis was that each aspect of the modality – *what*, *who*, *how* – would have different impacts on PB and SB.

- Which service was delivered – water supply for household use, water for livelihoods, hygiene promotion, sanitation services?
- Who delivered it – Tearfund operational staff, through a local partner, through government agencies, by the private sector, with religious groups or other NSPs?
- How was it delivered – through participatory community-driven processes, demand-led, emergency relief, within a long-term development programme or within a shorter-term humanitarian response?

Stage 3 - Routes for potential impact on PB and SB: The potential relationship between WASH service delivery and PB and SB was unpacked into five ‘routes for influence’, for WASH services to contribute to PB and SB.

- **Opportunity**, which concerns the ability for citizens to participate in the economic, social and political activities of ‘normal’ life. *To what degree does access to WASH services or the modality of WASH service delivery allow citizens this opportunity (e.g. water for livelihoods, private sector participation)?*
- **Visibility**, which relates to the presence of the institutions (including the state) and infrastructure associated with stable societies. *To what degree is the state visible through the modality of service delivery? To what degree are non-state actors (e.g. NGOs, religious institutions) visible?*
- **Collaboration**, which entails processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which can reinforce cohesion. *To what degree does the modality of service delivery entail collaboration between state/society?*
- **Inclusion**, which relates to the involvement of all in political, social and economic life and the levelling of inequalities which lead to grievance.
- **Accountability**, which concerns responsiveness to citizens’ needs and implies a two-way dialogue rather than a top-down process.

ODI researchers were in Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states in South Sudan from 14 to 27 April, 2012, and visited five project sites in two of the four states³ in which Tearfund is implementing WASH service delivery with either partial or full support from the DFID WASH Capacity Building programme (see Table 1). Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were held with stakeholders in country to identify how WASH service delivery (elements of *what*, *who*, *how*) manifests itself across the five routes detailed above, and the subsequent impact of the programme on state-building and peace-building. The researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with Tearfund South Sudan staff, Tearfund South Sudan partners (Across), provincial and local government actors relevant to WASH and other WASH and PB and SB agencies. Interviews and focus group discussions were also conducted with WASH committees in the project villages, traditional authorities and villagers. Interviews and focus group discussions were commonly conducted together with Tearfund/Across staff in the project communities.

Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal were selected in consultation with Tearfund as project locations to use as case studies. In Central Equatoria, the WASH service delivery project is implemented by Tearfund’s partner, Across, a national NGO. Central Equatoria is a

³ Tearfund is also implementing/supporting WASH service delivery projects in Upper Nile state (Manyo & Fashoda counties), Jonglei state (three counties), and in the Aweil East/Aweil Centre counties in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.

relatively stable, post-conflict context in comparison with Northern Bahr el Ghazal, and allows for a more development-oriented approach than in the regions closer to the border with Sudan. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, the Tearfund operations team is directly implementing the project, in a context where humanitarian interventions still dominate over development. Northern Bahr el Ghazal is still conflict-affected, with on-going security issues at the border. The ODI researchers originally intended to visit the more substantial WASH project sites in Aweil East county but the Tearfund sub-base was closed down and staff evacuated from that area at the time of the research visit. Site visits were instead carried out in Aweil Centre county, close to the Tearfund sub-base in Aweil town. These two contrasting sites were selected to provide a comparison across the what, who and how of WASH service delivery, in order to enable an analysis of SB and PB entry points, or limitations, contained within the array of approaches used in Tearfund.

Table 1: Tearfund project sites selected for research, April 2012

Project location	WHAT service was delivered?	WHO delivered the services?	HOW was the service delivered?	
Central Equatoria state – Across projects				
1	<p>Yei River county, Goja village</p> <p>DFID WASH Capacity Building funded 100% of the project</p> <p>2009–2011/12</p>	<p>Household hygiene promotion using the PHAST model: sanitation, hand-washing, cooking hygiene, solid waste hygiene</p> <p>School hygiene committee training & follow-on activities (water treatment, latrine maintenance)</p> <p>Household sanitation/latrines (zero subsidy)</p>	<p>Across and the local church are the most visible NSPs</p> <p>Traditional authorities (headman, <i>payam</i>, <i>boma</i>)> attend workshops, mobilise village, engage with government if required and/or possible</p> <p>Community Development Committees</p> <p>Village WASH Advocacy teams</p> <p>Village Hygiene promoters (volunteers)</p> <p>School hygiene committee</p>	<p>Development approach</p> <p>CCMP led to identification of WASH services articulated as a village development need</p> <p>WASH activities demand-led</p> <p>Timeline determined by community</p> <p>Software only, hardware (latrines, lining of wells, boreholes) financed by local resources</p>
2	<p>Morobo county, Aworo village</p> <p>DFID WASH Capacity Building funded 100% of the project</p> <p>2009–2011/12</p>	<p>Hygiene promotion (training, promoters) using the PHAST model</p> <p>Sanitation, hand-washing, cooking hygiene, solid waste hygiene</p> <p>School hygiene committee training & follow-on activities (water treatment, latrine maintenance)</p> <p>Household sanitation/latrines (zero subsidy)</p>	<p>Across and the local church are the most visible NSPs</p> <p>Traditional authorities (headman, <i>payam</i>, <i>boma</i>)> mobilise village, engage with government if required and/or possible</p> <p>Community Development Committees</p> <p>Village WASH Advocacy teams</p> <p>Village Hygiene promoters (volunteer)</p>	<p>Development approach</p> <p>CCMP led to identification of WASH services articulated as a village development need</p> <p>WASH activities demand-led</p> <p>Timeline determined by community</p> <p>Software only, hardware (latrines, lining of wells, boreholes) financed by local resources</p>

			School hygiene committee	
Northern Bahr el Ghazal state – Tearfund projects				
4	<p>Aweil Centre county > Nyala payam: Apada IDP camp</p> <p>Funded by DFID WASH, OFDA, CIDA, CHF</p> <p>2011 to present date</p>	<p>Spring well protection and handpumps</p> <p>Household and institutional latrines</p> <p>Hygiene promotion</p>	<p>Tearfund operations team</p> <p>Traditional authorities – consultation, key decision-making</p> <p>State/county government – engaged during site selection but not visible in project</p>	<p>Fully subsidised, no cost-recovery</p> <p>Humanitarian/development approach</p> <p>Temporary water infrastructure</p>
5	<p>Aweil Centre county, Nyala payam: peri-urban community with mixed host/IDPs</p> <p>Funded by DFID WASH, OFDA, CHF</p> <p>2011–2012</p>	<p>Spring well protection and handpump</p> <p>Hygiene promotion</p>	<p>Tearfund operations team</p> <p>Traditional authorities – not engaged</p> <p>WASH committee – 100% female</p> <p>State/county government – engaged during site selection but not visible in project</p>	<p>Hardware 100% subsidy</p> <p>Humanitarian/development approach</p> <p>Some cost-recovery for later maintenance</p> <p>WASH committee operates and maintains infrastructure</p>
6	<p>Aweil Centre county, Aroyo payam: Majongrak village</p> <p>Funded by DFID WASH, OFDA</p> <p>2011–2012</p>	<p>Borehole & handpump</p> <p>Hygiene promotion</p> <p>Handpump mechanic training</p>	<p>Tearfund operations team</p> <p>Traditional authorities – consultation, leadership, key decision-making</p> <p>State/county government – engaged during site selection but not visible in project</p>	<p>Hardware + tools for maintenance 100% subsidy</p> <p>Village WASH committees operate and maintain infrastructure</p>

2 South Sudan

2.1 Country context⁴

The long history of conflict in South Sudan continues to shape the context for both service delivery and for processes of state-building and peace-building. Following Sudan's independence in 1956, violent clashes degenerated into the first North-South civil war (1955–1972). These patterns of internal conflict continued in the second North-South civil war (1983–2005). The second civil war, fought between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), was brought to an end by the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. It left about 2 million people dead and 4 million displaced from their homes (Oxfam GB, 2010).

The CPA established a six-year interim period (dated from 9 July, 2005) during which the South Sudanese would have the right to govern affairs in their region and participate equitably in the national government. The CPA also stipulated that, after the interim period, South Sudan would have the right to vote in an internationally monitored referendum, which voted in favour of secession for South Sudan in 2011. The creation of the independent state of the Republic of South Sudan on 9 July, 2011, has marked the start of processes of state-building for this new country.

Despite these historic developments, a number of issues remain unresolved and the political economy of South Sudan continues to be significantly shaped by its relations with Sudan (AfDB, 2011). Agreement has not yet been reached on the demarcation of the border between Sudan and South Sudan (including oil fields). This came to a head earlier this year, leading to new bouts of conflict in the border regions and a new round of peace talks (see *The Economist*, 14/7/2012). Another unresolved issue is that of the transit and reintegration of returning populations. For the South Sudan government, the political priority has been to facilitate the return of populations (in part due to the conduct of a census in 2009). This was based on an implicit assumption that relatives and local communities would be able to carry the burden of reintegration, an assumption that proved ill-founded (Pantuliano *et al*, 2008). The prioritisation of return over reintegration programming also reflected donor priorities.

In addition, although progress has been made in establishing government structures and systems, and attempts are being made to address recovery and development needs, very little has been accomplished in relation to the magnitude of need. Low budgeting and financial capacity and accountability across all levels of government also undermine the sustainability of basic service provision.

2.2 Peace-building and South Sudan

A number of commentators have identified historic drivers for conflict in terms of centre-periphery inequalities, conflicts over resources, intra-elite competition, identity clashes and what de Waal has referred to as 'brute causes' (i.e. patterns of criminality, individual agency and the effects of a cycle of violence) (de Waal, 2007). Alongside these tensions, additional drivers stand out from more recent analysis. The failure to disarm armed groups is a recurring challenge, contributing to an escalation of violence since the signing of the CPA (Lewis, 2009: 63). A lack of progress in building more inclusive political settlements in Juba (Schomerus and Allen, 2010:13) is also an on-going challenge.

This has had significant effects on basic services. Primarily, it has significantly disrupted their delivery, due to on-going patterns of conflict and violence. There remains, however, conflicting

⁴ Throughout this paper we use the terms Sudan (formerly referred to as North or Northern Sudan) and South Sudan (formerly Southern Sudan).

evidence on the extent to which access to water resources affects regional conflict patterns (between tribes and ethnic groups) and/or local ones (within villages).

The South Sudan government – particularly the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) – has lobbied for more support to the Water for Livelihoods programme, arguing that this is necessary because of the role that improved livestock grazing and water resources (*hafirs*) can play in the stabilisation process: ‘Access to grazing lands and water, especially during the dry season, is a major factor of conflict in many parts of the country’ (MWRI, 2012). The government’s Water Policy also states the need to strengthen mechanisms for solving disputes over access to water, as a potential source of conflict, especially at local levels. Different states within South Sudan have noted the potential for conflict rooted in competition over scarce water resources at the biannual sector planning meeting, both in relation to migration of pastoralist groups but also regarding competition between host communities and returnees (Oxfam, 2012).

Other experts, however, note a lack of evidence for the role of increased numbers of *hafirs* on reducing conflict. For example, conflict among pastoralists over scarce water resources may be a compounding factor in conflicts, but it builds on conflict drivers rooted in ethnicity, power-sharing, land boundaries and so on. Overall, it has been difficult to separate out access to water resources (*hafirs*) from migration, access to grassland and other livelihood opportunities. The experiences of the Water for Recovery and Peace Programme is instructive in this respect (see Box 3). Crucially, it finds that its WASH programmes were able to resolve conflicts related to the intervention itself (e.g. site selection, water point location, management of water points) but did not have any wider peace-building effects on other drivers of conflict.

Box 3: Water for Recovery and Peace Programme (WRAPP)

WRAPP specifically linked provision of WASH services with peace-building aims. Supported by USAID, and implemented with PACT-Sudan and local partners, it ran from 2004 to 2008. An independent evaluation found that, while WRAPP eased tensions over WASH resources in areas with a high proportion of internally displaced persons and returnees, all of the conflicts that the interventions resolved related to those caused by the intervention itself (i.e. standposts, community management, user fees), and there was no evidence of reduced conflict through the provision of *hafirs* (Welle *et al*, 2008). Since 2008, PACT-Sudan continues to implement WRAPP, but without any direct peace-building objectives, in light of the lack of evidence in relation to broader PB objectives. Instead, it has separate programmes in peace-building and justice. A key recommendation from the external evaluation of WRAPP highlighted ‘Do No harm’ as an often-neglected yet important aspect of conflict mitigation and highly relevant for WRAPP interventions in water supply and water resources management.

The WRAPP evaluation highlighted that other peace-related activities may be necessary, particularly in relation to *hafir* construction, such as disarmament or the facilitation of negotiations for grazing space (Welle, 2008). This provides an example of how peace-building strategies may need to extend beyond the WASH sector in relation to a given issue.

A comprehensive evaluation of multi-donor support to South Sudan usefully highlights some of the mistaken assumptions in relation to the role of basic services in peace-building processes. It argues that many donor agencies (and other actors) made assumptions that conflict was driven by under-development – hence, a focus on the provision of basic services. In fact, according to this evaluation, the key drivers of conflict lay in issues of marginalisation, particularly in terms of ethnic divisions, land and cattle disputes and tensions around disaffected youths (Bennett *et al*, 2010: xvii). In light of this, the evaluation recommended a greater focus on developing appropriate, localised strategies that paid attention to: firstly, ensuring appropriate placement of services and infrastructure in conflict-prone areas; and secondly, providing institutionalised support to communities to ensure peace is upheld, rather than uniformly providing services across all regions (*Ibid*).

2.3 State-building and South Sudan

Legacies of conflict and emergent processes of state- and peace-building have all shaped the nature of the incentives and decision logics of key actors as well as the institutions that underpin them. State-building processes are themselves therefore still evolving, and this remains a highly political (and contested) process.

With the creation of the new Republic, the core institutions or rules of the game are currently being remade. The process for drafting a new Constitution is underway, and a Transitional Constitution is in place. This incorporates a Bill of Rights, requires the government to promote democratic principles and political pluralism, and establishes principles of decentralisation and devolution. It also provides for an independent judiciary and a range of horizontal accountability mechanisms to act as checks on state power (Democracy Reporting International, 2011). Reforms are also underway to improve budgetary and planning processes within government. However, these structures are themselves still evolving and reform processes remain underway.

The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) was established following the CPA in January 2005, with John Garang as President of Southern Sudan and Vice-President of Sudan; following his death in July 2005, he was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mavardit (subsequently re-elected in 2010 with 93% of the vote). The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) remains the predominant political party within the government of South Sudan and there is in practice little separation between the party and the current government (see Box 4). In general, civil society organisations and the media are slowly institutionalising but, again, remain relatively weak and do not yet function as effective checks or watchdogs (*Ibid*).

Box 4: The role of the SPLM

ICG (2011) notes that 'internal party politics will be among the most significant determinates of political stability in South Sudan'. Two key factors have been highlighted going forward: the degree to which the SPLM allows an opening up of the political space for a more multi-party system; and whether it has the political will to undertake democratic reform within the SPLM, as intra-party politics continue to dominate the political arena in the near term (*Ibid*). Moreover, significant questions remain as to the future timeframes and the length of the transition period (and until the next elections), with the SPLM calling for four to five years but opposition parties suggesting a much shorter timeframe (*Ibid*).

External agencies provide significant levels of funding and support to South Sudan. According to recent surveys, approximately 70-80% of donor funds went to 'socioeconomic development' between 2005 and 2009 (ITAD, 2010). In the main, this has been in the form of humanitarian and recovery assistance. A number of common funds were developed to support joint implementation, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (implemented by the World Bank), UNDP-managed pooled funds, such as the Common Humanitarian Fund and the Basic Services Fund of the Government of South Sudan. The choice of aid instruments has reportedly had a significant impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery (Bennett, 2010). In general, most donor and NGO-supported recovery has focused on capital investment, equipment and especially training while avoiding recurrent costs such as salaries of public services personnel, essential supplies and maintenance, and has failed to develop a strategic approach to capacity building (*Ibid*).

While decentralisation has been championed, it has not yet happened in practice, with most attention focused around Juba (ICG, 2011). For instance, county commissioners should be locally elected but in practice they need to be signed off by SPLM leadership; local councils should be established but they are not yet functioning effectively locally (*Ibid*). To date, local government structures have reportedly tended to reflect ethno-geographic boundaries, with policies generally unclear or poorly understood (AfDB, 2011: 18). According to political economy analysis for AfDB, as a result of this incoherent system and weaknesses in monitoring and implementation, 'people have come to associate low levels of access to public services, not

with limited effectiveness of government institutions, but rather with their ethnic group's limited political representation and access to power. In many of these cases, ethnic minorities have responded to poor service delivery by demanding their own administrative units and/or redrawn territorial boundaries' (AfDB, 2011: 18).

Within these processes, traditional authorities have been granted various administrative powers, including legislative, executive and judicative powers (especially traditional leaders at the local territorial level – known as the *Boma* level) (Hoene, 2008). Chiefs are seen as having been undermined during the conflict, as communities were displaced and their authority was often challenged, for example by militias. Increasingly, however, they are seen as having played more significant roles in bargaining and mediation between warring factions (*Ibid*).

Regional diversity within South Sudan also needs to be recognised. The country contains more than 60 cultural and linguistic groups, each of which has a strong sense of their separate identity as 'tribes' (Maduk Jok, 2011). This has had implications for state structures and institutionalisation, with interviews indicating a perception of emerging state capacity (to some degree) in the southern part of the country, in contrast to the northern part which has experienced higher levels of insecurity in recent years.

As this short analysis highlights, various reform processes are still underway, and state-building processes are themselves evolving. These are highly political and uneven processes, with on-going tensions, for example where different ethnic, regional and other groups compete for access to power and resources. A recent evaluation of donor support argued that there remained a 'conceptual vacuum' regarding statehood for the country, with little sense of a convincing model for what the country will look like in the next five or so years (Bennett *et al*, 2010). This has reportedly been exacerbated by inconsistent and *ad hoc* donor approaches to supporting state-building processes (*Ibid*).

Moreover, the legacy shaping service delivery is one of donors mobilising to deliver food and emergency relief on a large scale; at present, INGOs provide 85% of basic services. While there was evidence of high citizen expectations for what the new country/government would deliver post-independence, there are reportedly low expectations specifically for service provision (CfBT, 2012). The multi-donor evaluation in fact found that the predominance of non-state actors – including in WASH – may have further de-legitimised state-building processes, as most South Sudanese people reportedly did not see the state as a provider of many of these services (Bennett *et al*, 2010). This was confirmed by interviews – no stakeholder interviewed in any of the sites visited identified the state or levels of government as responsible for WASH service delivery, or as those they would approach if there were gaps or problems with provision.

The government has stated its intention to meet the expectations of its people, including through the provision of basic services and the effective management of public resources. However, it currently does not have a primary role in relation to delivering some basic services, such as water and sanitation, and has yet to develop an effective role as a regulator of NSP provision in these areas. Furthermore, the current oil crisis (with South Sudan suspending oil output) has contributed to significant economic instability and may pose additional challenges for increasing the state's role in service delivery (*The Economist*, 14/7/2012).

Basic service delivery in the WASH sector

South Sudan has extremely poor WASH indicators, with huge deficits in water supply and sanitation coverage as a result of decades of conflict and under-investment. 2010 data reports that only 55% of the population have access to improved sources of drinking water, and 80% of the population does not have access to any toilet facility (SSCCSE, 2010). Water and sanitation indicators in South Sudan are the lowest in the world and the MDG water supply and sanitation targets are distant goals in both rural and urban areas (AMCOW, 2010). Many disparities exist between states regarding levels and quality of basic service provision. While sector policies and institutions are evolving, they are not yet functional and most provision is

funded by donors and delivered by NGOs, with significant implications particularly for state-building processes.

South Sudan has substantial water resources but these are unevenly distributed across the territory and vary substantially between years, with periodic major flood and drought events. It remains a difficult place to develop water projects, in particular in more remote rural areas where the hydrogeology is complex and access limited, even during the dry season. The majority of the rural population relies on self-supply from shallow/hand-dug wells, or surface water, and for those with improved access, around 95% of both rural and urban populations do so from boreholes. Sanitation remains a low priority for both rural and urban households and hygiene awareness is one of the lowest worldwide, according to a 2010 South Sudan Health and Household Survey by GoSS. One-third of the existing water points in South Sudan are known to be non-functional due to the weak operation and maintenance capacity, and less than 50% of existing basic primary schools – and even fewer health facilities – have access to safe water and sanitary latrines. Only 20% of the population contribute to operation and maintenance of their water supply.

While the overall sector policy seems sound and has been in place since 2009 (see Box 5), the organisational structure, institutions, legislation and policy frameworks, financing and capacity required to achieve its objectives are currently absent. The Water Act and the Sector Investment Plan are still being drafted and mandates, responsibilities and authority for WASH service delivery functions remain unclear while the processes of decentralisation remain contested and in light of the lack of a clear policy framework on fiscal decentralisation.

Box 5: South Sudan Water Policy

The South Sudan Water Policy was developed in 2009, and represents a comprehensive framework for the sector. The key principles are: improved access to be prioritised over improved quality of water; improved access to basic sanitation in small towns and peri-urban areas to be prioritised over rural sanitation investment; the need to combine water supply with sanitation and hygiene interventions; and the requirement to provide technological options and give communities a choice based on financial and managerial capacity and accessibility of location. The policy sees water as a human right, and actively encourages community participation as well as NSP through the involvement of the private sector in water service delivery.

The sector lead is the Ministry for Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) with a regulatory mandate set by presidential decree in 2008 to expand its mandate to include rural water and sanitation and urban water supply programmes. The MWRI is the central policy-making, management and coordinating body for the sector, even though specific parts of sub-sectors remain under other ministries.

The institutional set-up for the water sector is strongly interlinked with the newly established federal and decentralised administrative system of local government, but still faces challenges, as the lower tiers of government have not yet been harmonised with the institutional needs of the sector. For example, at the state and county level, there are no MWRI departments. Rather, each of the ten state Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (MoPI) has a Water Resources Management and Irrigation Directorate (WRMD) and a Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Directorate (RWSSD). These departments have administrative responsibility for implementing sector policy, and deciding state-level operational budgets, although staff are financed from the MWRI budget. At the county level, there is a Department for Water and Sanitation (WES), headed by the Assistant Commissioner for Water and Sanitation, under the responsibility of the RWSSD. Actual operation and delivery of services is the responsibility of state and county levels. There are also non-salaried WASH positions at the *payam* level (WASH Committee); and the *Boma* level (village water committees). Capacity of state-level staff is said to have been growing substantially over the last three years, based on interviews with the MWRI. In contrast, county-level departments remain fairly weak in their capacity. Notably, the Department of WES, where responsibility for service delivery lies, is not present in all of the counties.

A large percentage (75%) of water sector financing is provided by donors. While there are some large bilateral sector donors (notably USAID), overall humanitarian and development assistance is mainly delivered through pooled financing mechanisms, including for WASH. These include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund, the Basic Services Fund and a pooled capacity building fund. There is a shortage of historical data but in 2009 donors were expected to contribute 75% of the WASH sector budget through the following: Multi-Donor Trust Fund (21%), USAID (29%), the European Commission (8%) and the Basic Services Fund and others (17%). Data on the overall contribution of NGOs is unavailable (AMCOW, 2010).

Much of this funding has been channelled through humanitarian mechanisms and delivered by non-state service providers. This largely bypasses state institutions, although there have been more recent efforts to move towards more longer-term development financing in recognition of the need to begin to deliver services through government agencies in order to build the state, with roles of NSPs such as large INGOs changing to capacity building and support, as recent experience with the Basic Service Fund highlights (see Box 6).

Box 6: Basic Services Fund (BSF), South Sudan

The BSF (established in 2005 and due to end in December 2012) was designed to support the government in expanding primary education, primary health, and water and sanitation services to communities recovering from conflict. It receives support from donor agencies and has directly financed local and international NGOs to deliver basic services.

In recent years, there has been a recognition that NGOs implementing these programmes were not always well coordinated and sometimes bypassed state institutions. In water and sanitation, there have been newer efforts to encourage NGOs to report directly to the MWRI, with BSF as a conduit for information. Moreover, the BSF is currently reducing its funding for WASH activities dramatically, and focusing on sustainability of the sector as a priority. Funding for WASH is down to less than £1 million, only related to health or education WASH needs, and an assessment of the boreholes implemented in previous BSF phases is underway. As a result, the Netherlands has withdrawn support to the sector through the BSF, and is developing a longer-term programme focusing on capacity development for the MWRI. USAID is also withdrawing funding support for WASH programmes in the northern states, and moving its operational focus to Central and Eastern Equatoria – where a more stable environment reportedly allows for implementation of longer-term development programmes in water and agriculture.

Encouraging other NSPs, specifically the private sector, is a main policy objective and sub-sector priority stated by the South Sudan government (2009, 2011). Interviews with BSF staff highlighted the approach of the MWRI in sector development projects, which relies on private sector operators for borehole-drilling, construction/instillation of water systems, urban sanitation provision, water-quality testing and monitoring. In pooled sector funding, channelled through INGOs, most/all of these activities are carried out by NGOs themselves, with some use of the private sector for drilling. The role of other typical NSPs, such as various faith-based institutions, seems to be more limited in WASH services. Although dominant in education and health, the activities of religious institutions in WASH are largely limited to humanitarian/relief responses (such as the South Sudan Development and Relief Agency of the Episcopal Church Council of Sudan, SUDRA, which participates in WASH distribution and related activities).

In light of this diversity, a key challenge has been the lack of coordination of WASH services, with multiple actors involved in funding and delivering services. This partly dates from the humanitarian conflict phase and is now improving somewhat with the bi-annual WASH planning and coordination meeting. Challenges reportedly still exist regarding coordination and monitoring within government institutions, as state sector agencies do not yet report upwards to MWRI (including financial reporting), and prefer instead to report to governors. While there are various sector coordination forums (see Box 7), these do not yet provide substantive forums for information exchange and strategy development.

Box 7: Sector coordination forums

Various sector coordination forums currently exist, including:

- South Sudan Water Sector Steering Committee
- WASH bi-annual planning and coordination meeting
- WASH Donor group
- South Sudan WASH Cluster Forum – co-led by the government and UNICEF although challenges remain over ownership, with MWRI rarely attending meetings and focusing more on coordinating development approaches through the bi-annual meetings.

2.4 Implications for peace-building and state-building

The preceding analysis has a number of implications for peace-building and state-building processes in relation to WASH service delivery and for the mechanisms identified in section 1.2.

Firstly, conflict within South Sudan appears to be driven primarily by issues of marginalisation rather than under development itself. Other evaluations have pointed to some mistaken assumptions that supporting basic services, and hence improving development, will itself produce 'peace dividends'. These evaluations have suggested greater emphasis be placed on addressing marginalisation of particular groups. This suggests that economic opportunities around WASH could be usefully linked to strategies for greater inclusion.

The evidence in terms of whether water access and supply is itself a driver of conflict remains disputed. However, there is some evidence that WASH programmes have been able to ameliorate localised conflicts centred around their specific projects (e.g. in terms of site location, selection of beneficiaries and management of resources). This suggests the need for process-driven approaches that, at a minimum, do not reinforce perceptions of marginalisation and over time help to bring different communities together to cooperate around a given water/sanitation service. This could be a helpful and feasible entry point in terms of peace-building processes.

Secondly, both peace-building and state-building processes seem to be uneven across the country. In some areas (such as in the Equatorial states, in the southern part of the country), there may be greater opportunities to both work with newly established local state structures and greater potential to facilitate collaboration and collective action between and among communities. In others, particularly in the border states, this is much more limited and there remains a high threat of on-going insecurity, which reinforces more humanitarian relief models. This diversity means that programme approaches are likely to require conflict-sensitive approaches which analyse local levels of insecurity and their potential drivers.

Finally, the predominance of NSPs seems to undermine state visibility and accountability. This reflects the country's history of civil war, which has resulted in high levels of NSP involvement in services. While state structures are becoming institutionalised, there remains little perception of the state's responsibilities, including in relation to WASH. There is a recognised need to begin to shift this over time, but it remains hampered both by NGO/NSP incentives and by the lack of capacity and capability of local state structures and officials.

In summary, the main likely mechanisms or channels in relation to WASH include:

- **Inclusion**, (involvement of all in political, social and economic life and the levelling of inequalities which lead to grievance): many disparities exist between states and between different groups in relation to WASH provision, including signs of tensions among displaced and returnee communities. Some WASH programmes have sought to address this, specifically in relation to their projects.

- **Collaboration**, (processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which can reinforce cohesion): legacies of conflict and displacement have undermined joint working and collaboration between different actors. Some efforts are underway to support greater collaboration, but this remains a pressing gap.
- **Visibility**, (presence of the institutions, including the state, and infrastructure associated with stable societies): main visibility remains NSPs (particularly INGOs) rather than the state, contributing to low citizen expectations. This is increasingly recognised, including by NGOs themselves.
- **Accountability**, (responsiveness to citizens' needs and implies a two-way dialogue rather than a top-down process): water programmes lack evidence and evaluation of community consultation and participation, leading to the conclusion that communities are often bypassed during implementation by NSPs and there are little or no accountability links with government, particularly where local structures (e.g. county level) are themselves still evolving.

3 Case study 1 - Central Equatoria

3.1 Context

Within Central Equatoria, there are a number of key features which shape service delivery and the nature of state- and peace-building processes. Central Equatorial state has significant regional diversity, making it important to identify key local contextual features. Interviews for this research were conducted in Yei and in surrounding villages (Gojo Yei River county and Aworo, in Morobo county). Yei is the second largest urban centre in Central Equatoria state (Juba is the largest), and is part of Yei River county, which is divided into five administrative sub-units (*payams*). It bordered by Maridi county to the north, Morobo county (close to the Uganda border) to the south, Lainya county to the east and DRC to the west (see Annex 1).

This area was a vibrant commercial hub during the colonial period, a centre for trade between Uganda and DRC, and it also benefitted from fertile soil and regular rainfall (Martin and Sluga, 2011). During the 1970s, Yei town also reportedly had well developed infrastructure, including roads, electricity supply, water and sanitation (*Ibid*). From the mid-1980s, Yei town experienced periods of control by both the Sudan government and by the SPLM/A. From 1997, it remained under the control of the SPLM/A, with the town becoming the centre of military and humanitarian relief operations (administered by SPLM/A), although much of the infrastructure was destroyed (*Ibid*). Despite this, Equatorians were reportedly not very prominent in the SPLM/A (Branch *et al*, 2005) and, from 1997, many migrated to Uganda and DRC rather than joining SPLM/A forces (Schomerus 2008). There were also influxes of IDPs and Congolese refugees (some of whom are still in camps just outside Yei). Many of those who had been displaced have returned (encouraged by GoSS), following the signing of the CPA; this further increased following the 2011 referendum on secession.

This means there are a number of features of the context which seem relevant to WASH programming:

- There are diverse populations, including returnees. This means that there is uneven community capacity to collaborate and work together across different villages.
- In general, security risks are not as high as in other areas of the country (such as the border areas) but it remains a present concern. There are on-going legacies of past conflict and the potential for spill-over from neighbouring countries, such as the DRC. This requires on-going monitoring.
- Despite the region's past history as a commercial hub, it now faces major challenges of basic infrastructure. There is limited road access and significant shortages of equipment

and raw materials. This means there is strong need for both hardware investment (infrastructure, construction) and more software investment.

- Throughout the region, state structures are themselves still developing. For instance, Morobo county was established in the mid-2000s, and various government offices and structures at local levels are still becoming institutionalised. While in theory there is an oversight and monitoring role for these lower levels of government, in practice, the majority of WASH service provision is delivered by a range of non-state providers (INGOs, NGOs and others), with *ad hoc* reporting to government.

3.2 Theory of change

Tearfund delivers its community mobilisation and sensitisation activities in two of the six counties in Central Equatoria (around Yei, in Yei River and Morobo counties), through an NGO called Across. This has been funded through Tearfund's DFID WASH programme since 2009. Across is a historical partner of Tearfund, and is assessed to have a high capacity for increasing its work in the WASH sector.

Across is involved in church and community development programmes in the areas of education, health, livelihood and media, and provides some humanitarian support to refugee groups and internally displaced people. It seeks to improve development outcomes, including improved hygiene or literacy, working often in partnership with local churches (Across, 2011).

WASH support in this area has mainly worked through the Church and Community Mobilisation Process (CCMP). This involves mobilising local churches to act as facilitators in mobilising whole communities to address their own needs. This approach has been promoted by Tearfund in a range of countries, although there are different models or variations of it (Raistrick, 2003). The model used in Central Equatoria (around Yei) seems closest to that of 'Community mobilisation', where a church development department (or in this case, Across) works directly with local community structures in mobilising communities to identify and address their own needs, and to initiate, manage and resource sustainable initiatives (*Ibid*). The WASH component is currently in a pilot phase (covering six villages), although there are plans for further roll-out to more of the 32 villages in which Across has initiated CCMP. Based on project documents and interviews in country, the main features of this approach are as follows:

- The overall goal of the programme is to ensure greater incidences of hand-washing and a reduction in diseases.
- Main activities include the training of hygiene promoters, WASH sensitisation in schools and communities, and the facilitation of community initiatives (for example, in relation to borehole or latrine construction and maintenance, often with some additional funding from other sources, through the CCMP model).
- These activities are assumed to help improve awareness and understanding on hygiene and sanitation issues.
- In turn, this in the long run improves behaviour and helps to reduce disease prevalence.
- To do this, Tearfund uses a local implementer (in this case, Across) which has adopted the church and community mobilisation model.

The CCMP model has been developed by Tearfund and implemented across a number of countries. It is grounded in addressing and helping to overcome potential dependency on aid resources, as it seeks to promote communities' own initiatives. This is potentially very important in a context such as South Sudan, which has experienced long cycles of violence and dependency on aid for the delivery of some basic services. For this research, we did not fully appraise or evaluate the extent to which the WASH programmes had met or achieved their specific WASH objectives. As the theory of change makes clear above, the main aims of this programming are disease reduction and improving hygiene practices. As the next section sets

out, there may also, however, be a number of entry points for engaging with processes of state-building and peace-building.

3.3 Service delivery modality: what, who, how, where

Table 2: Across WASH project service delivery modality

WHAT		WHO		HOW
		NSPs	Government actors	
Rural water supply	Training on water treatment in schools	Primary school staff	None	
Household sanitation	Household sanitation/latrines (zero subsidy)	Local churches - leadership, motivation	None	Development approach
School sanitation	School hygiene committee training + follow-on activities (water treatment, latrine maintenance)	Across and the local church are the most visible NSPs	None	CCMP led to identification of WASH services articulated as a village development need
Hygiene education	Household hygiene promotion using the PHAST model: sanitation, hand-washing, cooking hygiene, solid waste hygiene	Traditional authorities (headman, <i>payam</i> , <i>boma</i>) attend workshops, mobilise village, engage with government if required and/or possible	None	WASH activities demand-led
		Community Development Committees		Timeline determined by community
		Village WASH Advocacy teams		Software only, hardware (latrines, lining of wells, boreholes) financed by local resources
		Village Hygiene promoters (volunteer)		
		School hygiene committee		

3.4 Potential effects and entry points for peace-building and state-building

The desk phase of this project identified a number of potential channels for peace-building and state-building effects. Some of these seem to be present in South Sudan; for others, there may be unrealised opportunities to support them, although it is important to remain highly realistic about what can be achieved in such a constrained environment.

Turning first to some of the strengths of the programme approach, the CCMP model – combined with the strong local knowledge of Across staff – did seem to be effective in facilitating processes of collaboration and collective action in some communities, which remains a significant gap for WASH provision. This potentially helps support some aspects of peace-building. The analysis in the previous section makes clear that access to water does not seem to be a prominent driver of conflict between groups, but that there are on-going risks where access to water sites and resources may exacerbate underlying tensions. Across appeared to be sensitive to dynamics within communities and, in some cases, had engaged in conflict mitigation specifically in relation to WASH projects. For instance, in one of the villages Across works in, funds of the WASH committee were not accounted for and Across reportedly led a conflict resolution process to resolve this form of localised community conflict. This provides a useful illustration of local-level problem-solving, including around the use and management of funds.

Moreover, the CCMP model itself appeared to support greater collaboration, with the potential to foster greater cohesion within communities. In the village of Goja, for instance, Across has worked in local communities (alongside the church) and had been able to bring together community members, enabling them to address collective action challenges and to co-produce various services together. This included new well construction, where community members contributed stone, brick and sand and a local community-based organisation provided labour and cement, with the involvement of the county government.

Some of the trained hygiene promoters and community leaders interviewed felt that before the programme, 'the community was blind to many things', including issues of hygiene and sanitation. This points to the role of information and sensitisation. Crucial to success, though, was the fact that the programme allowed communities to realise their own resources, including contributions to construction outlined above, as well as their own ability to make changes in their homes and local environments (for example, in terms of hand-washing and other sanitary practices). There seems to be much greater scope to recognise this as a core feature – and a value added – of Tearfund's support in this region and it potentially helps to support stronger societal structures, while in the process supporting very localised peace-building.

Significantly, Across staff seemed to have focused as much on their engagement with traditional leaders or chiefs at local level as with church leaders, reflecting the relative strength of chiefs within local communities and within local state structures too. While there is some evidence that chiefs' roles and influence may have been weakened by patterns of conflict and displacement in the villages visited, they seemed to play key roles, not just in bargaining and mediation between groups, but also in bringing communities together to take collective action. Across staff involved in the WASH programme seemed to be skilled at playing to some of the interests and incentives of these leaders; they were reportedly approached first, to ensure their support for the process, and appeals were made in terms of their benefits (in status, for instance) from improvements within the community. This could be further capitalised on, for example by facilitating the presentation of issues and complaints to emerging local state structures.

There are remaining questions as to how effectively this approach may be rolled out, however. Some respondents felt that some villages had greater pre-existing capacity for collective action than others. Goja was reportedly seen as a 'self-starter' village, with community members already motivated. In this context, Across support could act as a catalyst or facilitator, tapping into this latent capacity. It was less clear from fieldwork how this could be rolled out to other villages with much less capacity; as the programme is in a pilot phase and will be rolled out further, it may be important to develop criteria for this, for example ones which can identify how cohesive communities seem to be, and whether there are local leaders who are able to facilitate collective action and can be included within programmes.

Alongside some of these strengths, there also appear to be a number of potential opportunities where peace-building and state-building could be further capitalised upon in future programming. Firstly, in relation to peace-building effects, while there were some positive examples of support to community conflict resolution or collaboration, this could become a more systematic feature of programme approaches. While Central Equatoria enjoys relative security at present, there are remaining risks in the region and it was evident, in this research, that these were not being sufficiently analysed and assessed on an on-going basis. It was not clear whether a conflict assessment was conducted by Across, for example; according to interviews, issues of conflict and marginalisation were not part of the criteria for the selection of project sites or for project design and implementation in different villages. This could be further systematised within programming design and site selection. Undoubtedly, local staff working for Across appeared to have strong local knowledge, and many were from local communities and had good local networks. This was an important part of ensuring programmes were aware of local dynamics and risks. Systematising this through regular analysis and updates could also help maintain up-to-date assessment of issues, and provide a helpful overview in case of changes to programme staffing.

Secondly, in relation to state-building effects, there are two significant areas which pose implications for Tearfund's approach, namely: the visibility of NSPs and whether this can undermine longer-term state-building and legitimisation processes; and reflections on whether and how different state actors can be further brought into community-level issues.

There was evidence of a general trend in Central Equatoria of a predominance of NSPs in WASH and some questions as to the accountability or responsiveness of these providers. This is not a criticism directly levelled at Tearfund's programmes in the area, but it provides an important backdrop. In Goja, for example, there were reports that four boreholes had been drilled by other NSPs in the vicinity but that they were clustered in areas which were difficult for local populations to access, and that there had been a lack of consultation with communities by the organisations involved in the siting of these boreholes. For the Tearfund/Across programme, there were also reports of challenges in terms of the emphasis on voluntary community members, many of whom may move on to use their skills in other settings. As a result, many of the benefits of service delivery programmes are credited to NSPs (largely INGOs or NGOs), rather than to communities themselves or to state actors who should have some formal responsibilities. All respondents interviewed identified NSPs (often referred to generically as 'NGOs') as their primary source of assistance for service delivery; where there were gaps identified or problems with provision which communities could not address themselves, villages reported that they would 'wait for NGOs to visit' rather than reporting to local authorities at *payam* or county level. Recommendations for addressing this are discussed in the concluding sections of this report.

This has implications for Across's work in these areas. There were some signs that the community mobilisation approach was starting to challenge perceptions of responsibility; in Goja, one of the hygiene monitors stated: 'We are not so much bothered with government, especially with the current government; Across has opened our eyes to be self-empowered.' This highlights the need to pay attention to potential balance and trade-offs between promoting communities' own initiatives and building stronger relations with service providers and the state, something we also return to in the conclusions.

In practice, field visits reveal varying attempts to engage state officials at *payam* or county level in current programmes; in some government offices visited, there was awareness of this programme but, in others, there was not. These offices also face significant capacity and incentive barriers – in some cases, the actual offices are newly constructed and there are reports of a lack of resourcing for transport, fuel and so on, as well as limited staff training and skills, to enable effective monitoring, oversight and participation of state officials. In Yei River county, there are only three staff within the WES department, and in Morobo county, only two staff.

Opening up possibilities for this engagement would need to proceed carefully, particularly in light of the incentive problems on all sides (for NSPs and the government). It is not yet clear that lower levels of government have strong incentives to respond to community demands. However, it currently remains a closed door for this programme and, with careful diagnostics, could usefully be integrated into future approaches, as discussed further in our conclusions.

4 Case study 2 - Northern Bahr el Ghazal: Aweil Centre county

4.1 Context

Aweil Centre county is located in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, which is subdivided into five counties (divided into 39 *payams*). The capital of the state is Aweil town, where the Tearfund sub-base is located. The division of Northern Bahr el Ghazal into counties started in 2005 after the Interim Constitution entered into force. Borders, as well as names of counties and *payams*, were modified. The high return movement has made it necessary to continue this restructuring, as new villages and *bomas* have been created.

Instability along the border area in Northern Bahr el Ghazal has led to road closures, with implications for access and trade. This has undermined supply routes and infrastructure, in addition to on-going insecurity in the border areas, all of which has contributed to price rises and shortages of some goods.

Northern Bahr el Ghazal has received an estimated 76,000 people who have moved from Sudan since October 2010, putting renewed strain on states which are not all equally equipped to cope. In Aweil Centre county, the area has seen little or no meaningful increase in WASH service provision post-CPA, despite its status as a main receiving point for returnees (Tearfund, 2012). Authorities and agencies are continuing to scale up assistance but there are still some areas where very few NGOs are working, especially on longer-term interventions such as water and sanitation (Aweil Centre county and Aweil town are two such examples). For example, the area of Apada, the key receiving point for returnees in Aweil, has no clinic and no school and until recently the government only allowed the construction of temporary WASH infrastructure due to conflict with the returnee communities over long-term settlement sites. In 2009, village assessments in Northern Bahr el Ghazal highlighted insufficient access to water in communities as the most pressing issue among the population across all five counties in the state (IOM, 2009).

Thus, the context in Aweil is significantly different from that in and around Yei, in Central Equatoria. Here, the main features include:

- High levels of insecurity. This has had knock-on effects, for example in terms of the destruction of infrastructure and closure of access roads, affecting livelihoods.
- There are high numbers of returnees, and there has not yet been a commensurate increase in WASH provision, with some areas remaining particularly poorly served.
- There is a visible presence of NSPs in direct service provision and in infrastructure construction.

4.2 Theory of change

In Aweil Centre, Tearfund defines its intervention as that of 'humanitarian relief' (Tearfund, 2012). This involves support for the government's resettlement strategy for returnees, while also ensuring that the needs of the most vulnerable returnees are met through direct WASH service provision. Tearfund involvement in direct service provision focuses on establishing new permanent WASH facilities, such as boreholes, at sites earmarked for returnees to settle in permanently; maintaining WASH services in transit camps for returnees, including through repairing and constructing new household and institutional latrines with temporary infrastructure; and working to address the WASH needs of the most vulnerable among both returnee and host community populations.

Tearfund's WASH project activities in Aweil Centre state began in 2011, and are supported by the DFID Capacity Building Programme, complemented by OFDA and CHF⁵ (both of which are short-term humanitarian funding mechanisms to support emergency response). The target beneficiaries from the four *payams* in which Tearfund is working in Aweil Centre is 25,300, including 1,012 IDPs (Tearfund, 2012b). The budget from 2011 to 2012 was \$1.028 million USD. The project sites visited during the research trip were set to close in 2012 (and had a one-year implementation timeline). The DFID WASH Capacity Building Programme is now closed, although Tearfund continues to implement WASH service delivery with the same approach, using new humanitarian funding in new project sites.

The stated goal of Tearfund's intervention in Aweil Centre is to add additional resources and build local capacity to meet the needs of both host community and recently arrived returnees. Tearfund has also identified the mitigation of potential conflict over scarce resources as a goal (Tearfund, 2012), although conflict prevention or peace-building are not explicitly mentioned within the project objectives or activities. No specific conflict mapping or analysis was conducted prior to or during the project. Specific objectives for the project are primarily oriented at increased provision of improved rural water supply, sustainable sanitation facilities and improved knowledge of hygiene practices.

The objective of the DFID Capacity Building project is to build the capacity of Tearfund partners, community actors and the government to sustain the humanitarian service delivery intervention (Tearfund, 2006). Building the capacity of local government and local communities to work together is thought to contribute towards aspects of state-building (in terms of collaboration, visibility of the state). Specifically for Aweil Centre county, Tearfund notes that 'there is a considerable gap in the county's ability to manage its water sources and a need for capacity building so that WASH interventions will be sustainable in the long term' (Tearfund, 2012). Specific indicators related to state capacity building in the DFID WASH programme include:

- Partners and local/national government engaging in joint action to improve PHE coverage and access to water-sanitation, within three years.
- 90% of trained personnel from government and civil society health institutions capable of giving improved quality of PHE service, and competently applying new PHE techniques within the community.

As this demonstrates, Tearfund's approach in Aweil varies considerably to that in and around Yei. Rather than working through a local faith-based organisational partner, Tearfund is involved in direct programme delivery, and instead of working on community mobilisation, the emphasis is on direct construction and service provision, albeit within a stated commitment to support government processes. This reflects some of the wider differences in context in these respective regions, with humanitarian relief models much more prominent in Aweil.

4.3 Service delivery modality: what, who, how, where

Table 3: Tearfund WASH project service delivery modality

Locations Visited	WHAT		WHO		HOW
			NSPs	Government actors	
Apada returnee camp 45,000 residents, incoming since 2010	Rural water supply	22 boreholes repaired 6 new boreholes Spring well protection in	Tearfund most visible actor delivering WASH services Headmen in camp -	State/county government – site selection, needs assessment,	IDP camp: Humanitarian approach Fully subsidised

⁵ The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) is pooled funding from UN-OCHA coordinated through the UN Cluster and Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

<p>Conflict with state authorities on location for permanent settlement</p> <p>Peri-urban community, Nyala <i>payam</i></p> <p>Majongrak village, Aroyo <i>payam</i></p>		<p>camp</p> <p>4 RWH tanks at schools</p> <p>Training of pump mechanics</p>	<p>consultation, needs identification, leadership, coordination</p>	<p>approval of work plan but not visible during implementation</p>	<p>Other sites:</p> <p><u>Water supply:</u> hardware free, communities contribute labour and local materials (wood for well protection) - village WASH committee operates and maintains, finances repairs</p> <p><u>Sanitation:</u> cement slabs are free, households construct supra-structure</p>
	Household sanitation	<p>65 emergency latrines (plastic slab)</p> <p>400 household latrines (cement slab)</p>	<p>Private sector contractor for borehole drilling</p> <p>Households: transport of materials and construction labour</p>	<p>Government counterpart intended, but staff very limited and unskilled, especially at county level</p>	
	School sanitation	<p>7 new school latrine blocks</p> <p>3 rehabilitated latrine blocks</p>	<p>Village WASH committee (10 members): management, financing repairs, operation</p>	<p>Monthly coordination meetings at state cluster level (not county)</p>	
	Hygiene education	<p>Training of local leaders</p> <p>School health clubs</p> <p>Safe water storage</p> <p>Water treatment training</p>	<p>(Traditional authority), oversight and facilitation of work with the village</p>		

4.4 Potential effects and entry points for peace-building and state-building

In the South Sudan context, and from fieldwork around Aweil Centre state, two key dimensions emerge. The first relates to the visibility of the state, and whether the visibility of NSPs rather than the state undermines perceived legitimacy; the second relates to issues around the capacities and capabilities of fledgling state institutions. These shape significantly the context for Tearfund programmes and the potential entry points for peace-building and state-building processes.

There seems to be a number of strengths of Tearfund’s approach in Aweil. Unlike in Central Equatoria, in Aweil, Tearfund is able to provide direct construction of new WASH facilities (such as boreholes) and to maintain services in transit camps. This allows it to contribute towards high levels of need, as shown in the poor WASH indicators in the county. Helpfully, the programme approach also has an emphasis on sustainability, and building core relations with government institutions.

In the case of Majongrak, for example, Tearfund can point to some positive impacts. The construction of a water source (borehole) in the village meant that villagers did not have to walk two hours to another water point in a neighbouring village, where there were frequent conflicts over who had priority in the queue. Similarly, Tearfund’s due diligence in conducting site assessment ensured that no one area within the *payam* was privileged.

However, a number of opportunities were identified, with implications both for state-building and peace-building processes. In relation to state-building and as in Central Equatoria, all respondents interviewed identified NSPs (often referred to generically as ‘NGOs’) as their primary source of assistance for service delivery; where there were gaps or problems with provision, villages waited to report to NGOs rather than reporting to local authorities at *payam* or county level.

Expectations for the state to provide services appeared to be higher among returnee communities than for the host communities (also in relation to the quality/level of services), and, not unsurprisingly, there were more negative feelings held toward the state for not fulfilling these functions among returnees than for host communities. This concurs with other research in South Sudan (CfBT, 2012). This likely reflects the fact that many of these communities may have previously received higher quality services and have brought these expectations with them.

Within Aweil, where Tearfund is the primary deliverer of the programme, its benefits are clearly credited to Tearfund (rather than to the government, for example). In Majongrak village, the headman stated that he used to go to the *payam* office to request development and water supply in particular, but 'there was never anything coming out of this'. The *payam* was perceived as non-responsive to local needs, and reportedly officials responded to these requests with the statement: 'Why continue to ask for something that will never come?' While state structures are themselves still evolving, there may be greater opportunities to support forms of co-production, which bring together communities and some local government actors over time. This seems to be the general direction that support is moving in (and it is an approach that UNICEF and others increasingly advocate).

Moreover, residents in Majongrak were unclear as to the *payam's* role in approving or determining Tearfund project locations. Thus, even though Tearfund has trained and involved local government (county, *payam*) actors in conducting site assessments used to select project locations, the benefits of being selected for Tearfund interventions were not, at least in this case, attributed to state involvement. This suggests some gaps between stated intentions to work with and alongside the government, and realities of perceptions on the ground, particularly in contexts dominated by high levels of NSP provision. There may be different strategies to address this; fieldwork identified, for example, potential to remove some of the 'branding' of programmes (for example, signs highlighting Tearfund support) as well as scope for greater involvement of *payam* and county leaders, for example in key workshops and programme handover ceremonies.

Related to this, our research confirms current capacity and resource constraints for county-level government and lower levels. Interviews revealed a lack of basic resourcing (for transport, fuel, tools and so on) and limited staff training and capacity. However, unlike in Central Equatoria/Yei River county, there seem to be greater incentives for the state and county government to coordinate with NSPs, in part because of their dominant presence. State government approves Tearfund work plans for each project, and county and *payam* government staff are trained and involved in the initial site assessments for each project. In interviews, the state and county government were able to identify which NGOs were working in the area. There was a common practice of county governments passing on requests for assistance from communities to the relevant NGOs. For instance, following training with county and *payam* staff on how to conduct a site assessment, Tearfund received three letters from other counties requesting Tearfund interventions in their areas (Aweil North, East and South).

However, government priorities in addressing the needs of large numbers of returnees, and coordinating humanitarian responses, also presents limitations in terms of capacity building. While Tearfund's intervention were reportedly greatly appreciated by the government, and they were recognised as a valued partner, there were few government staff available as counterparts for project implementation due to other commitments. In addition, while all the counties in Northern Bahr el Ghazal have around 11 staff, many of them are untrained and can lack key skills. Many of the county-level staff working in the WES, for example, are pump mechanics, who worked in these areas during the previous conflict and have been maintained as government staff.

There are also some learning implications for processes of peace-building. In some project locations, Tearfund interventions did seem to support greater collaboration, in terms of supporting processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which can reinforce cohesion. This was most effective where it linked to communities with the capacity to engage in collective action, with noticeably more collaboration from settled/host communities

rather than from returnee camps. Tearfund staff also noted large differences in levels of collective action between rural and urban areas.

For example, in the Apada returnee camp, Tearfund has reportedly found it challenging to bring together residents to either contribute to project implementation, or to sustain and maintain services/infrastructure. Communities requested that Tearfund repair a broken hand pump in the camp, even though tools and training were provided to community committees. Similarly, latrines were not maintained, and some were subsequently non-functional. In contrast, the returnee community permanently settled in Majongrak was able to collaborate with Tearfund's support. Led by an engaged headman, the community contributed labour and some were reportedly committed to maintaining services. This highlights the importance of understanding some of the underlying conditions likely to facilitate or determine where there is capacity for collective action.

Similarly, in the peri-urban community in Nyala *payam* close to Aweil town, greater collaboration among women in the community was noted. Motivated by hygiene awareness training, a women-only water management committee worked together to improve their spring well, with the assistance of hardware from Tearfund. Additional opportunities were identified, for example where greater links could be made between these water management committees, pump mechanics and local authorities. Women interviewed stated that they were keen to take responsibility for the continued functioning of the hand pump, but they 'don't know who to approach to fix it', as they were not connected to technicians or mechanics in their area, nor to decision-makers at *payam* or county levels.

Looking at specific conflict drivers, conflict in relation to water sources and sanitation in Aweil Centre reflects a number of categories (see Box 8).

Box 8: Drivers of conflict for WASH in Aweil

These include:

- Conflict between tribes and migratory communities as they move from highlands to lowlands for access to water and grazing lands (potential tensions between pastoralists and farmers).
- Resentment from returnees on the lack of assistance provided by the South Sudan government and resentment from host communities on perceived prioritisation of returnees.
- Competition between host and returnee populations over access to water, site selection, management of resources and so on.

Potential conflicts between pastoralists and farmers were not relevant to the Tearfund programmes analysed through fieldwork. However, there was some evidence that various resentments, perceptions and competition over access to and control of water points were evident in some programme locations. There were some complaints from those within returnee communities, who felt that their needs were not being met. For instance, chiefs in the Apada returnee camp complained that 'the government has forgotten the returnee community'. There were also some signs of resentment from host communities, evident in the peri-urban community in Nyala *payam*, and some examples of competition between host and returnee communities. While this is more prevalent in other states (e.g. Upper Nile and Unity states), it was evident at a much lower scale of competition in the Tearfund project site in Majongrak village, where there were reports of frequent conflicts in the queue for water at a hand pump in a host community village. This was combined with wider patterns, for example where local *payam* offices were targeted for resentment as they were seen to be directing NSP projects towards favoured communities.

This was manifest in tensions over who uses water sources or facilities and who contributes to their maintenance. In the Apada camp, for example, latrines were not maintained and thus had become non-functional. In another Tearfund project site, school latrines installed by another INGO had to be rehabilitated, as returnees who had settled nearby began to use the latrines but did not contribute to their maintenance. This reflected wider patterns: in Central

Aweil, Tearfund rehabilitated 22 boreholes previously drilled by other NGO interventions. This lack of sustainability reflects a variety of issues: a lack of community training in technical maintenance, a lack of access to tools and parts, or cultures of dependency where communities do not see it as in their interests to maintain provision (and are protected from the consequences of this, as external actors will continue to provide support). Where boreholes do break down, there may be increased demand on government services to repair, as in Aweil Centre where broken boreholes were followed by requests for assistance to the *payam* and county government. This provides one useful entry point for greater state-building engagement, where Tearfund could potentially both sensitise communities in terms of their own responsibilities for service provision, and help broker contracts or agreements between communities and state actors to co-produce or collaborate around certain services.

In relation to peace-building, these apparent conflicts and tensions in relation to WASH services are not drivers of armed violence *per se*. This is an important point. It suggests that while WASH interventions might have the potential to address intra- and inter-community tensions related to water access and water management (especially between host and returnee communities, as is the case in Aweil), the national and regional conflict dynamics associated with armed violence in the region remain outside the scope of such a project. Rather, WASH interventions may have the potential to bring communities together around the common goal of increasing their access to water and sanitation, and in the process reduce hostility towards, or resentment of returnees. Alternatively, the project interventions themselves have the potential to cause conflict, as noted above.

This seems to underscore the importance of adopting a conflict-sensitive approach. At present, these are not institutionalised, and are largely the initiative of local and national staff (for example, through hiring local staff from representative ethnic groups). A conflict assessment to determine the ways in which the project intervention could positively or negatively impact existing tensions/conflicts was not conducted in any of the project sites in Aweil Centre.

In addition, Tearfund's WASH programmes themselves seem to have been affected by conflicts and tension in the state, further reinforcing the need for conflict-sensitive approaches and analysis (see Box 10).

Box 9: Insecurity in Aweil and effects for Tearfund programmes

On-going insecurity has had the following impacts on Tearfund programming:

- Conflict between the Apada returnee camp and the state government over the permanent settlement site has meant that Tearfund activities were limited to installing temporary WASH infrastructure in the camp (e.g. limited permanent infrastructure was allowed, three boreholes were drilled). The protected shallow wells with hand pumps did not provide sufficient water and, during the research visit, the headmen in the camp requested additional water points and latrines.
- The increase in gang-related violence led to increased security precautions taken by Tearfund staff, and limited their hours of operation to daylight hours.
- The on-going resentment from host communities over the amount of humanitarian assistance given to returnees, and perceived prioritisation of returnees over host communities, for WASH and other services (food and seed distribution), led to specific project design by Tearfund to include both communities in its interventions.

In summary, there are a number of important findings from fieldwork in Aweil.

In relation to state-building, as in Central Equatoria, the general predominance of NSPs has affected perceptions of the roles and responsibilities for WASH services. Despite state involvement being explicitly part of programme design in Aweil, users continue to identify Tearfund as the key provider of services and infrastructure – and NGOs in general are seen as those to approach regarding problems and gaps in provision. This finding concurs with other

assessments in South Sudan, and is unsurprising given the predominance of humanitarian funding models (Bennett *et al*, 2010; CfBT, 2012).

Communities often contrasted Tearfund's response to needs with the perception of a 'non-responsive' state. In the Apada returnee camp, one chief stated: 'You NGOs have a relationship with the government and you can report to them and tell them what we need.' This highlights the extent to which residents of the camp do not identify their potential relationships to state actors. Similarly, the Majongrak project site highlighted where the perceived lack of accountability of the local government was redressed by Tearfund. This further indicates that there are still weak lines of accountability between state and societies. While Tearfund does involve local government actors in the site selection, and intends to involve them in project monitoring for the future, project benefits continue to be credited to Tearfund. Addressing this could involve different strategies, including on the one hand, reducing the 'branding' of Tearfund in programmes and on the other, greater involvement of government in key events (such as site selection or community handover meetings). The latter strategy will only be possible where the state has some form of presence (which is not yet uniformly the case in this region).

The degree to which Tearfund is able to change these relationships depends both on the incentives and capacity of the state institutions, as well as practical implications of the project timeline and duration of engagement. A longer-term development approach is being implemented in the WASH sector in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, notably through Dutch NGO SNV and Swiss NGO Swiss Development Corporation (SDC), which implement WASH service delivery through state institutions and have a particular focus on building the capacity of the county WES departments, through jointly conducted site assessments, project planning, budgeting, project implementation and monitoring. The trade-off, noted by these NGOs and highlighted by Tearfund staff, is their inability to take part in humanitarian responses, as their programmes do not have the capacity for quick response. Addressing this could involve being much more explicit in the mandate for humanitarian response, and ensuring that this is time-limited to particular events, with a general preference for longer-term institution building. Paying greater attention to sequencing and prioritisation therefore seems to be helpful.

In relation to peace-building processes, as highlighted above, there are signs that resentment and tensions could be more effectively addressed in project sites. While the drivers of armed conflict are beyond the scope of WASH programmes, there is some evidence that more could be done to ensure that decisions over the location and delivery of services do not exacerbate or further inflame tensions between and within communities. There may be some fairly practical strategies – which were in evidence in some sites such as Majongrak – to address this, including processes to involve beneficiaries in site selection, improved community training in maintenance and sensitisation regarding their own roles. This would help to build greater transparency in terms of who benefits and to give communities themselves a greater stake in delivering or helping to co-produce these services. This will be further developed in the final synthesis report and the development of a diagnostic tool.

5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Routes and limitations to peace-building and state-building in South Sudan

Section 2 set out the potential implications for peace-building and state-building through WASH service programming. General assessments of the context in South Sudan suggest that insecurity has been driven more by processes of marginalisation (and perceived marginalisation) than by under-development. Moreover, state-building processes remain uneven and incoherent: there is not yet a clear vision or model for what the South Sudanese state will look like in years to come. Across the board, the visibility of NSPs, particular in the WASH sector, means there is little perception of the state's role in either delivering or regulating these services; in general, there is a plurality of uncoordinated and *ad hoc* approaches, resulting in patchy provision and common examples of construction of water points which then quickly fall into disrepair.

In this chapter, we briefly review the potential mechanisms for peace-building and state-building for Tearfund, based on the evidence of the two field sites presented in Chapters 3 and 4. In the table below, we summarise some of the main evidence drawn from these two sections.

Table 4: Potential routes for influence on peace-building and state-building seen in Tearfund WASH service delivery project sites

Potential routes for influence on peace-building and state-building	
1	Opportunity: the ability for citizens to participate in the economic, social and political activities of 'normal' life
	<i>Conditioning context: Under-development is not the significant driver of conflict in South Sudan, making provision of basic services on its own a weak link for peace-building. There are significant gaps in WASH indicators, but the visibility of NSPs (see 2) detracts from understanding of the state's responsibilities here too.</i>
2	Visibility: presence of the institutions, including the state, and infrastructure associated with stable societies
	<i>Conditioning context: The main visibility for WASH service provision remains NSPs (particularly INGOs) rather than the state.</i> There have been limited attempts to involve state actors to date. There are conflicting incentives for this, for example in terms of low capacity/skills of officials, as well as patterns of patronage and competition over access to power and resources.
3	Collaboration: processes for joint-working between state and society, or within society, which can reinforce cohesion
	<i>Conditioning context: Legacies of conflict and displacement have undermined the capacity for collective action (although this is higher in some more established communities). At the local level, traditional authorities (chiefs, churches) can be key brokers or facilitators within communities.</i> The use of the CCMP approach in Yei River county appears to demonstrate the potential to act as a catalyst or facilitator for community initiatives and collaboration. The capacity for this is stronger in some communities than in others, however. In Aweil, there are more limited examples of community initiatives, and Tearfund does not use the CCMP approach there. In some cases, the way projects have been delivered (siting of provision etc) may have exacerbated tensions within and between communities, rather than facilitating their collaboration.
4	Inclusion: involvement of all in political, social and economic life and the levelling of inequalities which lead to grievance
	<i>Conditioning context: NSPs dominate provision and may not always involve users in decision-making processes, which can reinforce or exacerbate tensions and perceptions of marginalisation.</i> There are some examples where perceptions of Tearfund programmes may have exacerbated tensions, for example between host and returnee communities in Aweil. In other examples, conflicts have been resolved through careful involvement and planning of local staff. Crucially, WASH programmes can ensure their projects do not exacerbate or trigger tensions and marginalisation at local levels, but this does not mean they alone can

	address broader drivers, for example of armed conflict.
5	Accountability: responsiveness to citizens' needs and implies a two-way dialogue rather than a top-down process
	<i>Conditioning context: Little or no accountability links between government, no incentives or penalties for poor performance; NGOs and NSPs perceived as key actors to approach regarding problems or gaps in provision.</i> State-building processes are still evolving, and realistic expectations are needed regarding strengthening government accountability for WASH in the shorter term. However, there may be some unexploited opportunities to sensitise communities on the roles and responsibilities of government (but this may also require reducing some of the visibility of NGO support, which remains a challenge). Incremental strategies could be identified to bring local state officials (from <i>payam</i> and county level) into programme approaches, particularly where facilitating forms of collective action and collaboration.
6	Peace-building: addressing causes of armed conflict and/or role of local conflicts within wider conflict dynamics
	<i>Conditioning context: Persistence of conflict highlights the need to consider conflict dynamics in programming; significant regional differences are also apparent.</i> Positive route for impact if Tearfund adopts a conflict-sensitive approach to WASH interventions.

5.2 Implications for programming

The fieldwork sites reveal the extent to which significant regional and other disparities reinforce the need for tailored, local responses. This can be challenging for multi-year programmes with countrywide (and cross-country) targets and indicators.

Usefully, Tearfund appears to have developed different, localised strategies, with a more classic humanitarian model in the border states (and direct provision and construction of WASH services) alongside a more 'developmental' model of facilitating community initiatives and action in states further south. This reveals the diversity even within one country and the extent to which the entry points and opportunities for supporting peace-building and state-building are reliant on local conditions and require tailored strategies.

To systematise this fully, and to ensure that programme design and implementation provides the 'best fit' to the local context, greater use of local conflict analysis is likely to be very helpful. This would help to better understand localised patterns of insecurity (including marginalisation and perceptions of marginalisation) and to ensure that, at a minimum, interventions do not further exacerbate or inflame any underlying tensions.

In some cases, there was evidence that future programmes could do more to address perceptions of marginalisation and inequities in access, particularly in more insecure areas. In Aweil, there were examples where projects had fuelled resentments or perceptions of marginalisation. This may be damaging in the long term and may not support localised peace-building processes. There were also some positive examples, where this had been overcome, for example through involvement in project design and through careful project implementation.

Crucially, this requires significant realism regarding expectations for how WASH programmes impact on peace-building. In South Sudan, there is mixed evidence as to whether armed conflict is fuelled by access to water points or related WASH activities. At very local levels, however, competition in terms of access to services and water sites can be exacerbated where there are underlying tensions (for example, between host and returnee communities). Thus, WASH programmes may need, as a first step, to more fully incorporate peace-building strategies around specific interventions and locations, rather than aiming for more general effects. This could include developing processes to involve beneficiaries in site selection, improved community training in maintenance and sensitisation regarding their own roles and responsibilities, alongside conflict analysis to track and monitor local risks.

Findings from Central Equatoria offer some useful insights. One of the core strengths of Tearfund's approach, and particularly working through the CCMP approach, seems to be its use of faith-based groups to facilitate collective action and collaboration within communities. There may be some particular added value of using the church as an entry point in some South Sudan communities, where the state has not historically had a strong presence and churches remain conveners of community action. The involvement of chiefs and village headmen as part of this process seems to have been an important component of effectiveness in some sites.

Over time, these collective action approaches could be extended to involve local state actors to a greater extent. This has already been recognised as a priority in some areas (including in the Equatoria programme, although it has not been realised in the pilot phase). It is crucial to have realistic expectations for what can be achieved in the short to medium term from this, in light of low state capacity and skills but also the lack of incentives for state officials to play active roles in monitoring and overseeing WASH services at present. There is a role, however, for an organisation such as Tearfund to set a positive example in terms of both reporting to, and identifying creative strategies to engage, state officials, particularly in relation to its facilitation of community action.

Moreover, while localised, targeted strategies are crucial, the rigidity of some models may pose additional challenges. In Aweil, Tearfund states that it is operating a 'humanitarian relief' model, which allows for NSP provision and delivery of WASH services. There are undoubtedly urgent and pressing water and sanitation needs in this part of the country; however, humanitarian support has been provided for more than a decade and fieldwork revealed repeated examples of NGO construction of water sites (e.g. boreholes) which quickly fell into disrepair or of dependency relations seemingly developing between NGO providers and local communities (not specific to Tearfund activities).

This further supports the importance of new models and ways of working. In these contexts, greater consideration of whether and how to introduce support that facilitates community involvement and participation – including through the CCMP model – offers potential opportunities to help address this. This is not yet being fully explored and seems to be a potentially critical gap, as it misses capitalising on some of the interesting learning from experience implementing this approach in other parts of the country, such as Central Equatoria. This is in line with the findings of a 2011 South Sudan NGO forum report, which also stressed more substantial support for initiatives that promote community participation in both humanitarian and development assistance, including through community-driven development models (Barber, 2011).

Our findings suggest that communities' pre-existing capacities and capabilities (including whether local leaders are motivated) may shape the effectiveness of the CCMP, at least in the short term. In extending the CCMP to new regions, it may be particularly helpful to identify those communities with greater existing capacity (in Aweil, for example, this may mean an initial focus on settled/host communities rather than returnee camps). These can then act as examples to other communities, and support can extend out to communities with less capacity, where strategies will need to be tailored to ensure incremental strategies to build up communities' abilities to engage with this model.

This is reinforced by the reality that the high presence of NSPs is likely to continue to undermine the visibility of the state. These are challenges not just for Tearfund but for the wide range of NSPs and INGOs operating in South Sudan. It brings into sharp relief some of the on-going debates on the humanitarian-development transition, and reveals the extent to which, in practice, this transition is rarely managed smoothly or effectively. Instead, many donors and INGOs have continued to operate in humanitarian modes which may not be sustainable in the longer term.

There are some signs that collectively the NGO community within the WASH sector is starting to recognise this challenge, and WASH Cluster meetings have begun to document NGO activity, in an effort to improve coordination and learning across different organisations. Longer-term strategies have been recommended, including supporting the government to

develop and implement an appropriate regulatory framework to facilitate the work of NGOs (Barber, 2011). Fieldwork for this report finds that there may be some short-term strategies, such as reductions in the 'branding' of particular programmes, alongside the wider mainstreaming of more community-driven approaches over time.

This is arguably well overdue after more than a decade of activity. What appears to be needed now is a much clearer vision and narrative of what the South Sudan state wants to look like in next five to ten years and of how donors/INGOs and others can best support this transition. While these big questions remain unresolved, there will be continuing challenges for NGOs operating in this sector, but we hope that the findings and recommendations discussed here highlight some feasible and realistic next steps in relation to both peace-building and state-building opportunities.


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
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Annex 1 - Project locations





Annex 2: Tearfund project summary

Title: Capacity Building to Improve Humanitarian Action in the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Sector

Date: September 2007

Countries: Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, Myanmar and Haiti.

Progress: The WASH project is currently operational in Darfur (Sudan), South Sudan, Myanmar and Haiti. The project is in its closing stages in DRC and Afghanistan, and activities finished in Liberia at the end of 2009.

Project goal: Sustainable improvements in the health and well-being of communities in up to seven programmes in complex political and disaster-affected environments.

Project purpose: Increased capacity of Tearfund operations, local partners and local government services to support seven programmes of improved access to potable water, sanitation and public health education for grassroots communities, within a five-year period.

Project outputs:

- Increased quality of WASH service delivery (good practice, gender, conflict and HIV-sensitive, accountable to beneficiaries and environmentally sustainable) in up to seven Tearfund operational programmes and up to 12 associated partner projects.
- Capacity building intervention implemented to increase the quality of PHE service delivery of local government and civil society health institutions within each operational area.
- Low-cost, sustainable, innovative and contextualised alternatives for WASH researched, piloted and implemented.
- Improved policy environment and service provision at local and national levels, through increased advocacy by Tearfund and partners on WASH issues at local, national and international levels.
- Lessons learnt, captured and disseminated to local and international NGOs and donors on good practice service delivery specific to water & sanitation interventions in fragile states and disaster-affected environments.