

PEACEBUILDING IN HAITI: INCLUDING HAITIANS FROM ABROAD

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PEACEBUILDING IN HAITI: INCLUDING HAITIANS FROM ABROAD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) will not stay forever and, in any case, cannot be made responsible for solving Haiti's manifold and deep-seated problems. The absence of adequate professional staff, sufficient financial resources and efficient management at all levels of government has delayed structural reforms and economic and social programs. The country needs institutional strengthening prior to its transition from President René Préval to his successor after the elections in 2011 – also the likely outside limit for MINUSTAH's mandate. Otherwise, political polarisation along traditional cleavages will reappear, as will the risk of conflict. Training civil servants and increasing their salaries are important but insufficient to produce the advances Haitians are demanding. A serious and sustained initiative to include three million Haitians living abroad could overcome historic nationalistic mistrust of outsiders, bring a missing middle class within reach and help Haiti escape its "fragile state" status.

Most Haitians abroad live in the U.S. and Canada. Their remittances to family in Haiti reached an estimated \$1.65 billion in 2006 and now account for 35 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). This direct subsidy to family incomes should not lessen the state's willingness to develop sustainable financing for basic public services. Instead, its impact should be maximised through better access to credit and finance, and greater remittances literacy. Savings and other resources should also be leveraged through incentives programs, hometown associations (HTAs), professional organisations and diaspora investment funds. The Haitian government should facilitate greater coordination and partnerships to redirect some funds to local, departmental and national development initiatives.

Members of the diaspora are Haiti's first customers and investors in tourism, small business and mining but they prefer to conduct business informally, waiting for more security, greater confidence in the government and an improved investment climate. At the same time, they are becoming aware of their potential power as lobbies in their host countries and as transnational networks and actors in Haitian politics. Their economic contribution should be reflected in the political system by allowing dual citizenship and diaspora representation in parliament. These changes

will require, after broad consultations and negotiations, at least constitutional amendment and possibly a new constitution before the 2011 elections. Measures to facilitate voting in Haitian consulates are also needed.

The diaspora is ready to help but it needs government assistance to remove formal and informal barriers to expanded engagement. A reverse brain drain would bring several hundred skilled and professional expatriates back and greatly expand the nation's management capacity. Yet to realise those benefits the government must clearly communicate to key sectors and the public the reasons for encouraging returns. President Préval should personally launch a ten-year diaspora policy with full international support. A plan designed in collaboration with the diaspora, parliament and civil society that targets specific objectives and transparently addresses the downside risks of expanded diaspora involvement will help pave the way for a smooth transition at the end of his term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To President Préval and the Government of Haiti:

1. Set up a one-year mandated commission comprising Haitians from abroad, parliamentarians, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the business sector, with a sufficient budget to organise three diaspora-wide consultative workshops to debate and design a ten-year diaspora policy and assess potential risks of the reforms proposed.
2. Consult with political forces countrywide and parliament on the quickest ways of achieving constitutional and other reforms that will include the diaspora in the 2011 presidential election process by allowing dual citizenship, permitting diaspora representation in parliament and facilitating voting abroad.
3. Increase the high-level staff and budget of the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad (MHLA) to better reflect the diaspora's economic weight and open half these new positions to well-qualified Haitians from abroad.

4. Pursue large-scale recruitment programs in public administration, equally open to well-qualified Haitians inside and outside the country, to promote transfer of knowledge by immediately bringing several hundred Haitians from abroad for periods of up to ten years, perhaps starting with one- to three-year commitments, coupled with sound communication and compensatory policies to avoid tensions inside state institutions.
5. Maximise use of remittances through better access to financial services and credit and finance literacy programs, and intensify efforts to improve the investment climate in terms of infrastructure, property protection and economic security.
6. Set up a diaspora development fund together with hometown associations (HTAs) and international donors and coordinated with the Local Government Management and Development Fund (FGDCT, Fonds des Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales).
7. Set up an interministerial task force to prepare a law on labour force migration and negotiate bilateral agreements to better control migrations flows with countries hosting the largest Haitian populations.
8. Publish regular electronic and radio security bulletins with accurate statistical crime data for Port-au-Prince and the regions directed at Haitians abroad seeking up-to-date information on security risks.

To the Haitian Parliament:

9. Debate and build parliamentary consensus regarding a long-term diaspora policy and the need for constitutional reform, a law on labour migration and an increased budget for the MHLA.
10. Consider constitutional amendments or other constitutional reform procedures to allow dual citizenship and diaspora representation in the parliament, as well as other measures to facilitate voting abroad.

To the International Community, including the U.S., Canada, the European Union (EU), International Financial Institutions and Other Major Donors:

11. Establish diaspora liaison centres and criteria favouring the employment of Haitian expatriates in foreign aid programs and develop public administration staffing programs in coordination with the Haitian government.
12. Support diaspora networks and NGOs operating in their territories and in Haiti by helping them plan, finance and implement development and investment projects in Haiti in coordination with the MHLA and other relevant public and private entities.

13. Support a Haitian diaspora development fund designed to finance local development projects.

To the Haitian Diaspora, Hometown Associations (HTAs) and Transnational Networks:

14. Pressure the Haitian government on voting abroad, dual nationality and representation in the parliament, as part of constitutional and other reform.
15. In the U.S. and Canada, encourage the development of a Haitian “community” lobby to create stronger political cohesion within the diaspora and promote better understanding of Haiti’s challenges among policy-makers in those countries to increase their engagement in Haiti.

To the Organization of American States (OAS), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Governments of the Dominican Republic and Haiti:

16. Revitalise the functioning of the bilateral commission with, if needed, more assertive mediation from the OAS or the IOM, to manage migration issues between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 14 December 2007

PEACEBUILDING IN HAITI: INCLUDING HAITIANS FROM ABROAD

I. INTRODUCTION

With just three years until the next presidential election in 2011, Haiti must make a major effort to strengthen its state institutions and private sector – two key elements for sustainable peace and development. The presence of an estimated three million Haitians abroad challenges Haitian nationalism and mistrust for the outside world; it also shows that a well-trained and capable Haitian middle class¹ is within reach. In the U.S., Canada and France, hundreds of Haitian associations support communities and help relatives or friends in the homeland. In other Caribbean countries, Haitian communities are still struggling for integration but manage to transfer money back and encourage other Haitians to join them.

Mobilising Haitians abroad is one means to advance state and economic reconstruction, but half-hearted efforts will bring little or no results. Although Haitians abroad are often consulted on pressing domestic issues,² their ideas and skills have been poorly utilised and a strong feeling of exclusion from their country's destiny prevails. Remittances sent back home, estimated at around \$1.65 billion per year, have propped up society and helped avoid the state's collapse, but they are not sufficient to strengthen public administration, create growth and kick-start development.³ Only if the government purposefully gathers Haitians worldwide around a rejuvenated and credible diaspora policy will their contribution be effective.

Sending money back home is not enough to rebuild the country and some Haitian expatriate human capital must relocate back to Haiti. Transferring knowledge remains the main obstacle to socio-economic progress, but attracting it is a delicate exercise which, without careful government communication and management, could

create further tensions in the fragile country. The diaspora is keen to help but their communities abroad are fragmented and until recently tended to be polarised around political figures or movements. The divisions are also along class lines between the wealthy elite, some of whom left voluntarily, the middle and educated upper class, many of whom were political exiles from the Duvalier-era, and recent arrivals, many by boat, who are working class. Although Préval's presidency provides an opportunity to reunite communities abroad and reconcile them with those living in Haiti, all players need to shift from wishful thinking to concrete initiatives focusing on political inclusion in the 2011 presidential election, staffing and training of public administration, business development, job creation and migration management. To succeed, the Préval government will need to lead politically and act pragmatically, quickly developing a strategy that removes legal and logistical obstacles to full partnership with the diaspora.

¹ Joseph J. Lévy, *Entretiens avec Georges Anglade, L'espace d'une génération* (Québec, 2004), p. 128.

² The most recent attempt to reach out to the diaspora was the November 2007 visit of ten Haitian senators to several Haitian communities in the U.S. to discuss the constitution and its possible reform. Since the 1990s at least a dozen conferences on the diaspora have been organised in Haiti, the U.S., Canada and France.

³ "Haiti Remittance Survey", Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), slide show, 6 March 2007.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF A HAITIAN DIASPORA

Almost a quarter of officially recognised Haitians live outside Haiti mainly in the U.S., Canada, France, the Bahamas, Cuba and the neighbouring Dominican Republic.

Haitian communities in the U.S. especially feel that their economic power and motivation is now at its peak and are concerned that their children, “the second generation”, do not wish to maintain the same economic and social links with Haiti as nationalised citizens of other countries. Yet the political cleavages that have prevented the diaspora from working together in the past, again mainly in the U.S. but to a lesser extent also elsewhere, are gradually being reduced.⁴

A. THE CONCEPT OF A HAITIAN DIASPORA

“Diaspora” became a derogatory term in Haiti during François Duvalier’s regime (1957-1971) and remains so today.⁵ However, it is an unstable and changing status.⁶ Haitians who fled the Duvalier regime could be defined as a historic diaspora but other groups do not fall into this category: Haitian officials working in Haiti but with their immediate family resident abroad; the economic elite often outside the country; former members of the diaspora who have returned; and Haitian deportees from the U.S. or other countries. These groups cannot be regarded as part of the diaspora per se but rather as members of a transnational community,⁷ which, excluding the deportee group,

⁴ Crisis Group interview, members of the Haitian diaspora, Miami, 12-18 October 2007. The contribution from all classes and opposing political groups to lobby for and then construct the Savannah memorial (inaugurated in October 2007) to remember Haitian soldiers who fought during the American Revolution demonstrated the diaspora’s ability to unite around a common project. Crisis Group interview, Marleine Bastien, executive director of FANM (Fanm Ayisien Nan Miyami), 17 October 2007.

⁵ Crisis Group interviews, New York, Montreal and Port-au-Prince, September and October 2007. The paradox is that many Haitians would love to become “diaspora” themselves to escape from economic hardship and political instability in the country.

⁶ Diaspora status or title is subjective and may change over time if individuals build enough trust or prove to be genuinely engaged in the country.

⁷ The concept of diaspora has been broadened by scholars to “transnational community” which encompasses diaspora groups, as well as other segments of an ethnic group living outside the homeland as a result of voluntary migration. A diaspora is a group dispersed from its country of origin and which settled elsewhere while keeping cultural ties with the homeland. Originally a rather neutral if not positive term in Ancient Greek,

represents a unique potential for the development of Haiti. This report thus uses the terms “Haitians from abroad/outside”, “members of the diaspora” and “Haitian expatriates” interchangeably to analyse the potential of this transnational community to contribute to Haiti’s stability and development.⁸

Many Haitians abroad are nostalgic for an imagined Haiti.⁹ They feel the country is never going to change and those who tried to engage have been discouraged because “two steps forward are always followed by 50 steps back”.¹⁰ They receive information on the political situation of the country through expatriate papers and radio stations¹¹ but rely on hearsay when assessing the security situation, leading to exaggeration of negative trends and increased fear of insecurity and kidnappings, which often target the diaspora.¹² At times hearsay can also have a positive effect: members of the diaspora who participated in the successful carnival and *fet champet* (annual village festivals) in 2007 relayed the message to Haitians abroad that the security situation has improved.

the Jewish experience of diaspora gave it a negative meaning associated with the idea of “victim diaspora”. Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers”, *International Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (1996), pp. 507-520; and R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka”, York University/Berghof Center, 2004.

⁸ Inclusion and exclusion dynamics in Haiti are essential to understanding current divisions. Haitians are a diverse African diaspora as a consequence of slavery. Robin Cohen, “The diaspora of a diaspora: the case of the Caribbean”, *Social Science Information*, vol. 31, no. 1 (1992), pp. 159-169. The practice and feeling of being inside or outside was conceptualised by Gérard Barthélémy, *L’univers rural haïtien: le pays en dehors* (Port-au-Prince, 1989). Paradoxically, most Haitians from inside are as excluded as those from outside.

⁹ Dr Lominy, “An innovative vision for Haiti’s future”, speech in Montreal, 4 October 2007.

¹⁰ Crisis Group phone interview, Jocelyne Mayas, involved in development programs in the 1990s, New York, 28 September 2007.

¹¹ Interviewees say they consult Haitian media on the web regularly, including *Le Nouvelliste*, Radio Kiskeya, Radio Métropole and *The Haitian Times*.

¹² Crisis Group interview, Edwige Danticat, author, Miami, 13 October 2007. Rumours circulate and entertain the fear of mafia, of vested interests of the elite, of the “Syrians” and “Lebanese” mafia. Crisis Group interview, Haitian IT manager, Montreal, 1 October 2007.

B. EMIGRATION PHASES AND DIASPORA GENERATIONS

Even before François Duvalier came to power in 1957, labour migration, mainly from the agricultural sector, to other Caribbean countries was already underway. However, repression and socio-economic hardship under François Duvalier and Jean-Claude Duvalier's (Baby Doc) dictatorships created a larger and more economically powerful diaspora as many of the upper and middle classes left Haiti, particularly in the 1960s, for the U.S., Canada, France and francophone African countries. Steady migration has continued ever since, with two more significant waves: one in the early 1980s when many Haitians arrived by boat in Florida; and then a large wave after the coup d'état against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991.¹³

Although fewer migrants are leaving today than during earlier mass waves, the numbers constitute a sizeable brain and work force drain. Some leave legally by qualifying for host country working visas or as close relatives of legal residents abroad, while others leave illegally by overstaying their temporary visas, or, relying instead on bribes and luck, entering on boats or crossing the Dominican Republic (D.R.) border.¹⁴ In the north, established links and proximity mean small boats are bound for the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, or Miami; in the south, links are with France and its overseas territories of Guadeloupe and Martinique. The flow is unstoppable despite increased patrols, threat of repatriation and fatal accidents at sea.

¹³ Tatiana Wah, *Haiti's Development through Expatriate Reconnection: Conditions and Challenges* (Florida, 2003), p. 51.

¹⁴ Boats leave almost daily with illegal migrants. The price for a place on a boat is around 4,000 gourdes (\$110) which is paid to a broker. Crisis Group interview, Jean Wilson, Director of Immigration, Port-de-Paix, 20 September 2007. U.S. Coast Guard figures show that since records began in 1982 the average number of Haitian migrants interdicted annually has been between 1,000-2,000; in 1991, 1992, and 1994 the figures rose considerably to the tens of thousands. 2004 was the only other year when interdiction figures surpassed 3,000. See www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/AMIO/FlowStats/CY.htm.

III. THE DIVERSITY OF HAITIANS ABROAD

Haitians abroad, despite the diversity of their identities according to colour, gender, region, and social and political lines,¹⁵ usually see themselves as belonging to the diaspora and are willing to do more to help their homeland.

A. UNITED STATES

Most Haitians abroad live in the U.S. (a population some estimate as high as two million).¹⁶ Communities are concentrated on the east coast, with the largest being located in the states of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Florida. The average Haitian-American family income is only \$32,000¹⁷ compared to \$48,200¹⁸ nationally. Nevertheless estimates of their savings and possessions make them a potential contributor to large-scale investment in their homeland.¹⁹

¹⁵ Micheline Labelle, "Re-reading citizenships and the transnational practices of immigrants", May 2002, available at www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/mai02/artml.pdf.

¹⁶ According to a National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians (NOAH) study, in 2000, 2,023,000 Haitians lived in the U.S., 60 per cent of whom were U.S. born; 19.4 per cent were naturalised citizens; 19.9 per cent residents and 1 per cent with illegal status, *Fineness* magazine, September 2007, p. 3. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau 2006 American community survey gives the following figures: around 509,000 U.S. citizens were born in Haiti and almost 770,000 citizens report ancestry from Haiti, at <http://factfinder.census.gov>. Since 1997 around 177,800 permanent resident permits have been delivered to Haitians, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, at www.dhs.gov/ximgmt/statistics/.

¹⁷ Tatiana Wah, "The Significance of US Haitian Expatriates for Haiti's Development and their Requirements for Participation", *CaribSeek Kaleidoscope*, at http://kaleidoscope.caribseek.com/Articles/publish/article_33.shtml. It takes Haitian immigrants several decades to improve their position in society by learning English, acquiring work skills and "navigating the system", Crisis Group interview, investor, New York, 25 September 2007.

¹⁸ 2006 U.S. Census Bureau figures, at http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032007/hhinc/new04_001.htm.

¹⁹ NOAH estimates the diaspora's possession at over \$50 billion. "The Haitian diaspora", slide show, at www.haiti-usa.org/modern/noah_haiti/THE%20HAITIAN%20DIASPORA_files/frame.htm#slide0001.htm; and Crisis Group interview, Jacques Jiha, former deputy comptroller for pension investment and public finance in the New York State Office of the Comptroller, Manhattan, 27 September 2007.

1. Florida

With a population estimated at more than 400,000, the Haitian-American community in Florida appears to have surpassed that of New York.²⁰ In the sixties and seventies, only a small number of political exiles from the Duvalier regime settled in Florida. This started to change in the early eighties as more Haitians arrived by boat to Miami. Integration has been difficult for this group of immigrants labelled as “boat people” and even more pejoratively as carriers of both HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.²¹ Many Haitians initially settled in Little Haiti; some have grown and prospered and moved to more affluent suburbs elsewhere in Florida. A large part of the Haitian population in Miami still lives below the poverty line,²² faces poverty-related issues such as gang violence and inadequate health-care access, and struggles to earn enough to support family in the U.S. and Haiti. Close links are kept with Port-au-Prince supporting a small, informal trade exchange of local Haitian produce and manufactured U.S. goods, mainly clothing.²³ Many newly arrived immigrants see their stay in Florida as a temporary economic measure, and retain dreams of retiring in Haiti. The Catholic Church provides support to families and since the 1980s has also been active in lobbying for Haitian immigrants’ rights in the U.S.

The skilled middle class that has emerged in Florida in the last decade could be a significant contributor to Haiti’s development. The concentration of Haitians in Miami has prompted active involvement in local politics starting in the late nineties. Unlike in the past when political lobbies focused on overthrowing Duvalier or the reinstatement of Aristide after the 1991 coup, local politicians focus on housing, health care and taxes, although Haitian politics remain important.²⁴ Indeed, many in Miami were spurred

²⁰ The 2000 U.S. census figure for Florida was 182,224; however, the 2000 census figures of 95,000 Haitians for Miami-Dade alone likely underestimate by 15 per cent to 50 per cent. See also Cédric Audebert, *L’insertion socio-spatiale des Haïtiens à Miami* (Paris, 2006); and “Civic Engagement of Haitian Immigrants and Haitian Americans in Miami-Dade County”, Immigration and Ethnicity Institute, October 2001.

²¹ For background, see fn. 136 and Paul Farmer, *Aids and Accusation, Haiti and Geography of Blame* (Berkeley, 1992).

²² In 1999 more than 38 per cent were under the poverty line, Cédric Audebert, op. cit., pp. 50, 53.

²³ “Air Smuggling of Cocaine Surging”, Haiti Democracy Project, at www.haitipolicy.org/content/3776.htm?PHPSESSID=6321cf5e7fe78. The flight from Miami to Port-au-Prince is less than two hours. Three American Airlines flights complete the daily round trip from Miami International Airport with another leaving from Fort Lauderdale. Spirit Airlines also has daily flights from Fort Lauderdale and Air France reopened the Port-au-Prince to Miami route in November 2007.

²⁴ Cédric Audebert, op. cit., pp. 215-237. The presence of ten elected officials of Haitian origin in Florida in 2000 reflects

by the prospect of political representation to take U.S. citizenship to vote; some now regret that it excludes them from running for Haitian political positions.²⁵

2. New York, Massachusetts and New Jersey

Approximately 500,000 Haitians live²⁶ in the state of New York with the highest concentration in Brooklyn and Queens. Job opportunities in industry made Brooklyn the primary destination for migrants until the mid-1980s, but some have probably left since due to economic hardship. Nonetheless, a middle class has emerged with some intellectual and financial capital.²⁷ The community is fragmented with numerous grassroots community organisations in the education, health and social sectors.²⁸ Since Préval came to power, political polarisation is decreasing²⁹ and cultural events, such as the *kreyol* festival organised by *The Haitian Times* in New York and attended by some 10,000, have become more popular than politics. Of the community organisations trying to enhance the Haiti’s image by lobbying and even financially supporting national U.S. politicians, one of the most visible is the National Organisation for the Advancement of Haitians (NOAH).³⁰

the increasingly active and visible role of Haitian-Americans in electoral politics.

²⁵ “Civic Engagement of Haitian Immigrants”, op. cit.; and Crisis Group interview, Wilson Ciceron, former Port-au-Prince attorney, Miami, 14 October 2007.

²⁶ Crisis Group interview, Brooklyn and Queens Bishop Guy Sansariq, Brooklyn, 26 September 2007. Estimates vary from 300,000 to 800,000 but are much higher than official figures which do not include recent migrants and illegal residents. The 2000 U.S. census figure in New York City is close to 204,000. Cédric Audebert, op. cit., p. 219. The figure of 840,800 taken from a 2000 NOAH study is given in *Finesness* magazine, September 2007, p. 9.

²⁷ A third of black doctors in New York State are Haitians and there are around 1,100 Haitian doctors in New York alone, Crisis Group interview, Gary Pierre Pierre, *The Haitian Times*, New York, 23 September 2007.

²⁸ There are dozens of Haitian community-based organisations working in adult literacy, social support, women’s rights, migrants’ rights and anti-discrimination. Several community radios operate in New York. The oldest one is Radio Soleil, which used to serve as a key media tool for Lavalas in the U.S. Other radios are Radio Tropicale (www.radiotropicale.com) or Radio Panou (www.radyopanou.com). See fn. 134 on Lavalas.

²⁹ This is acknowledged by Ricot Dupuy, presenter of Radio Soleil, who runs weekly free antenna shows, Crisis Group interview, New York, 27 September 2007.

³⁰ Based in Washington DC, NOAH was founded by Haitian-American doctors who then merged with another Haitian group of around 125 businessmen and represents upper/middle class Haitians. It played a strong role in bringing back Aristide in 1994, but it is sometimes seen by other Haitians as a

3. Haitian gangs and deportees

Haitian gangs emerged in the mid-1990s and have become a growing concern amplified by intense media coverage in North America. The phenomenon has been linked to deep social marginalisation of Haitian groups, vulnerability of family structures and social integration through drug dealing and control of urban territories.³¹ Official responses since 1999 have focused on repression and law enforcement rather than prevention and investment in communities where fights between Haitian and Black Americans were frequent and gangs multiplied and became more criminalised.³² Increased deportations of young Haitians in 1996 probably contributed to the development of transnational crime between Haiti and the U.S.³³ Some deportees have played a bridging role in drug trafficking though the number is hard to estimate.³⁴ There is a risk that proliferation of gangs in Miami and Montreal will lead to more deportations, therefore displacing criminality to Haiti, a country less able to cope despite international police cooperation from the U.S., Canada and MINUSTAH.

B. CANADA/QUEBEC

Most Haitians living in Canada reside in Québec and Montreal alone has a community estimated at 130,000.³⁵ Historically the Haitian-Canadian community consisted of skilled migrants but this has changed since the mid-1970s. Though Haitians working in the taxi business struggled to integrate in the 1980s, the new generation holds postgraduate degrees and works in science, technology, health, education and trade.³⁶ Because of their knowledge

self-promotion initiative. Crisis Group interview, an investor, New York, 26 September 2007.

³¹ Louis HERN Marcelin, "Gangs, générations et processus transnationaux", workshop on "Organised Armed Urban Violence, a Haitian Response", SSRC/Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum/MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 19-20 June 2007. In 2007, 20 per cent of gangs in Miami are of Haitian origin compared to 3 per cent in 1995.

³² Ibid, p. 7.

³³ Freelance photographer Chantal Regnault is working on a documentary on deportees and estimates their number at 4,000 to 5,000 since 1996, Crisis Group interview, Port-au-Prince, 16 October 2007.

³⁴ Ibid. According to Haitian police figures approximately 50 per cent of deportees have been caught in the U.S. because of their involvement in drug trafficking.

³⁵ This figure includes Haitians born in both Haiti and Canada. Estimations for Quebec in 2001 were up to 90,000, "Spécial Communauté haïtienne du Canada", *Haiti Tribune*, 18 November-1 December 2001. Georges Anglade's map gives a figure of 132,000, "La carte maîtresse du Tricentenaire", *Le Nouvelliste*, 4 September 2007.

³⁶ Samuel Pierre, *Ces Québécois venus d'Haïti*, *École Polytechnique de Montréal* (Montreal, 2007); see also the Centre

of French and relative youth,³⁷ Haitians in Quebec are probably best placed to contribute to Haiti's development by sharing know-how and work experience. However, Canada's successful integration policies and strong encouragement of further skilled immigration have made returning to Haiti less relevant for them.

The community is better coordinated and structured than in other countries. Extreme political polarisation was never an issue in Canada, even during the 2004 crisis.³⁸ Many community leaders returned to Haiti after the fall of Duvalier's regime but their children remained in Canada and took over their parents' leadership roles.³⁹ The National Council of Citizens of Haitian Origin (CONACOH, Conseil National des Citoyens et Citoyennes d'Origine Haïtienne) was created as a platform of Haitian community-based organisations in 1986, and the Gathering of Canado-Haitian development organisations (ROCAHD, Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement) in 1994.⁴⁰

C. EUROPE

France has the largest Haitian diaspora population in Europe.⁴¹ Despite modest standards of living, it is a strong contributor to Haiti's development through remittances and hometown associations (HTAs). Several dozen Haitian organisations based in France have created a joint platform, the Franco-Haitian Associations Network (PAFHA, Plateforme des associations franco-haïtiennes).⁴² Together

International de Documentation et d'Information Haïtienne, Caribéenne et Afro-canadienne (CIDIHCA) website, www.cidihca.com/diaspora.htm.

³⁷ Conseil National des Citoyens et Citoyennes d'Origine Haïtienne (CONACOH), www.conacoh.ca/CH_en_chiffre.htm.

³⁸ Crisis Group interview, Frantz Voltaire, CIDIHCA Director, Montreal, 30 September 2007.

³⁹ This has allowed contacts with influential Haitian-Canadians such as Canada's Governor General Michaëlle Jean, Member of Parliament (MP) Vivian Barbot, Québec Deputy Minister for Immigration Maryse Alcindor and Québec MP Emmanuel Dubourg.

⁴⁰ CONACOH provides a useful profile of the Haitian community on its website. ROCAHD was funded since its creation until 2004 by the Canadian Agency for International Development (CIDA), see ROCAHD, Annual Report 2006-2007, at www.rocahd.com.

⁴¹ Estimates for Haitians (both naturalised and Haitian citizens) range from 50,000 to 130,000, Crisis Group interviews, Lorfils Réjouis, Association pour le rayonnement culturel d'Haïti et de son environnement (ARCHE) and PAFHA, Massy Palaiseau, 9 September 2007; a Haitian IT technician who spent six years in France, Montreal, 1 October 2007; and Romel Louis Jacques, presenter of the popular Haitian program Kon Lambi at the Fréquence Paris Plurielle (www.rfpp.net), Paris, 7 September 2007.

⁴² <http://assofrancohaïtiennes.online.fr/index.htm>.

with the Collectif Haïti de France (French Group for Haiti), PAFHA organised the first nationwide meeting of Franco-Haitian organisations and actors in 2006 with a second planned for 2008.⁴³ Other NGOs fostering debate about Haiti include the Collectif Image 2004 which has co-organised various film festivals since 2004, as well as “Esclaves au Paradis”, an exhibition on Haitian sugar cane workers in Dominican Republic.⁴⁴ The Haitian-French community is divided on the dual nationality issue but the majority wishes to be integrated as French citizens.⁴⁵ In other European countries, such as Belgium, the UK and Switzerland, smaller Haitian communities are active in development advocacy efforts and human rights campaigns.⁴⁶

D. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Historical tensions over Haitian occupation of what became the Dominican Republic (D.R.) in the nineteenth century and the treatment of Haitian legal and illegal workers there have marked the relations between the countries sharing Hispaniola. Today, a *laissez-faire* attitude rules on both sides, smoothing over contentious issues but also enabling informal employment, lack of legal protection for migrants and, at times, human rights abuses.⁴⁷ They also share a strong *de facto* social hierarchy linked to skin colour; thus, mulatto, white or non-Black elites from Haiti and the D.R. are closer to each other than to the Black majorities in their own countries.⁴⁸

⁴³ PAFHA was created in 2000 as the result of a two-year dialogue between Haitian-French NGOs. The Collectif Haïti de France (www.collectif-haiti.fr) is composed mostly of French citizens and NGOs working or interested in Haiti, and first focused on democratisation in the 1990s. Since 2000 it has planned projects for four-year periods focusing on upgrading the profile of Haiti in France, human rights and migrants' rights. Members also mobilised against the end of the freezing of Duvalier's funds. Crisis Group interview, member of PAFHA, Paris, September 2007.

⁴⁴ This exhibition, shown in Paris, Montreal, New York and Haiti, created deep controversy. See section on the Dominican Republic for further details.

⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview, Lorfil Réjouis, ARCHE and PAFHA, Massy Palaiseau, 9 September 2007.

⁴⁶ In Belgium, the NGO Échanges et Synergies is a focal point for Haiti-related activities. In London, Anne McConnell works with the Haïti Advocacy Platform Ireland-UK, which is a member of the pan-European Coordination Europe Haiti network gathering 50 NGOs, which published an advocacy report entitled “Une autre Haïti est possible”, September 2007, available at www.collectif-haiti.fr/coeh.php.

⁴⁷ It is too early to assess the impact of the presence since September 2007 of a new Dominican border force, the CESFRONT (Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Fronteriza - Specialized Frontier Security Corps), on Haitian-Dominican relations.

⁴⁸ Crisis Group interview, members of French and Haitian

1. A mutually beneficial neighbourhood relationship

In the last twenty years increasing numbers of Haitians and Haitian-Dominicans have been employed in low-paying jobs in agriculture, construction, tourism and other service professions in the D.R.⁴⁹ An increasing number of women and young people with a primary education from urban areas are choosing to immigrate, despite being well aware of the challenges and prejudices in the neighbouring country.⁵⁰ This cheap and often illegal labour force is useful for the D.R. and benefits Haiti as well since at least \$30 million is sent back annually.⁵¹ There are no clear figures of the number of Haitians living in the D.R.⁵² but

business community, Santo Domingo, 26 October 2007.

⁴⁹ Most Haitian migrants to the D.R. during the twentieth century were either cane cutters employed in severe conditions by the sugar industry until its crisis in the late 1980s, or those who wanted to flee but did not have enough resources to reach the U.S. or Canada. The labour flow ceased after massacres of Haitians in 1937 and was relaunched through successive bilateral agreements since 1952. There are still some 10,000 workers in the sugar cane-cutting sector, according to Fernando Ferrán from the Vicini Group (one of the largest privately owned sugar companies in the Dominican Republic and featured in the documentary “The Price of Sugar”(2007)), but it is no longer the main employment sector for Haitians in the D.R. Crisis Group interviews, Santo Domingo, 27 and 28 October 2007. The “Esclaves au Paradis” exhibition portraying the exploitation of Haitian sugar cane workers has created controversy between those who consider Haitians in the D.R. better off than in Haiti and others convinced that working conditions need to be denounced if they violate international norms. In Paris the organisers of the event were warned and threatened by pro-Dominican lobbies and debates around the documentaries were particularly tense. Some French academics working on Haiti and participating in the event have expressed reservations about some of the documentaries. Crisis Group interviews, Anne Lescot, Collectif Image 2004, Paris, 8 September 2007. The Vicini Group, accused in one of the documentaries, states that people shown in the film do not work in the Vicini's bateys, Crisis Group interview, Fernando Ferrán, Vicini Group, Santo Domingo, 28 October 2007.

⁵⁰ Bridget Wooding and Richard Moseley-Williams, *Les immigrants haïtiens et leurs descendants en République Dominicaine* (Santo Domingo, 2005), pp. 58, 65; and Rubén Sillé, Carlos Segura, and Carlos Dore Cabral, *La nueva inmigración haitiana* (Santo Domingo, 2002), pp. 68-69 and 135-168.

⁵¹ This IDB figure largely underestimates the reality according to Jean-Michel Caroit, correspondent for *Le Monde*, Crisis Group interview, Santo Domingo, 27 October 2007.

⁵² Crossing the border now costs from \$125 to \$175 after a significant increase following the establishment of new Dominican border control forces in September 2007. Crisis Group email exchange with www.espacinsular.org; and Crisis Group interview, Fernando Ferrán, Vicini Group, Santo Domingo, 28 October 2007. Since January 2007, a positive inflow of over 30,000 has been recorded by the Dominican

estimates of the Haitian population, including Dominican citizens of Haitian origin, legal and illegal residents, vary from 380,000 up to 850,000.⁵³ While the majority are unqualified, live in poverty and work physically demanding jobs, a significant number has acquired experience and education, as well as technical and language skills.⁵⁴

The Haiti-D.R. border is a space of intense exchanges of agricultural products, second-hand textiles and workers, without any solid state regulation on either side. Security incidents occur regularly. Emergency meetings between authorities of both countries were held to defuse inter-community violence and rising tensions in Anse à Pitre and Pedernales in July 2007.⁵⁵ Urban aggregations are developing with Haitians living on either side of the border and cross-border cooperation efforts involving municipalities, civil society and economic entrepreneurs are ongoing.⁵⁶

2. The struggle for integration in Dominican Republic

Discrimination against the Haitian community has attracted the attention of local and international civil society and the international community.⁵⁷ The mission of two UN rapporteurs in the D.R. in October 2007 and an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling against the Dominican state for not providing ID documents to two Haitian girls born in the D.R. (as required by the constitution)⁵⁸ is a clear sign the situation is under scrutiny.

government, Crisis Group interview, civil servant in the security sector, Santo Domingo, 28 October 2007.

⁵³ An IOM/FLACSO 2004 study stated 800,000 but was criticised and the research results are being reviewed. Nationalists and government officials often estimate 1.5 or even 2 million but without substantiation, Crisis Group interviews, migration NGOs, Santo Domingo, 7 September 2007.

⁵⁴ Furthermore, there are around 12,000 Haitian students in D.R., mostly in Santiago and Santo Domingo, who represent a significant financial and brain potential, Crisis Group interview, prominent businessman, Port-au-Prince, 14 November 2007.

⁵⁵ "Graves incidents au cours d'un conflit frontalier à Anse-à-Pitres", *Alterpresse*, 3 July 2007.

⁵⁶ Crisis Group interview, José Serulle Ramia, Dominican ambassador to Haiti, Port-au-Prince, 5 December 2007; and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso and Sobeida de Jesús Cedanos (eds.), *Frontera en Transición* (Santo Domingo, 2007). The Brooklyn and Queens Diocese together with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is setting up a host centre for Haitians from the Dominican Republic, Crisis Group interview, Brooklyn and Queens Bishop Guy Sansaricq, New York, 28 September 2007.

⁵⁷ See www.redhjacquesviau.org.do, www.espacinsular.org/, www.garr-haiti.org/; and www.sjrdom.org/; and "Dejados al margen, Discriminación contra lora inmigrantes Haitianos y sus descendientes en la República Dominicana", Christian Aid, 2006.

⁵⁸ Inter-American Court on Human Rights, "Case of the girls Yean and Bosico vs Dominican Republic", 8 September 2005, at

Nevertheless, in the run-up to the May 2008 presidential elections in the D.R., the nationalist card against Haitians and Haitian-Dominicans is being wielded by both the right and President Fernandez's Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). Some civil servants are guilty of abuse, corruption and discriminatory behaviour, particularly regarding renewal of Haitian Dominicans' birth certificates and ID and electoral cards.⁵⁹ The legal debate over migration laws has been further complicated by a politically manipulated and controversial 2006 Supreme Court ruling considering Haitian workers "in transit" that has left thousands of migrants and their descendents in a legal limbo.⁶⁰

3. Border controls and border development

Despite a small number of deaths in recent years, the risk of violence between Haitian and Dominican communities is low because relationships are based on pragmatic commercial or economic interests. However, the balance is fragile and should be supported by binational and local initiatives enhancing dialogue between communities and state institutions on pressing issues such as cross-border movements. Although Presidents Préval and Fernandez are paying attention to regulating legitimate commerce and migratory labour flows, more political will, including from the international community, and the revitalisation of the Haitian-Dominican joint commission, established in 1997, are prerequisites for violence prevention. The concern over illicit trafficking was cited in the latest extension of MINUSTAH's mandate and the mission is not only authorised but directed, together with the Government of Haiti, "to address cross-border illicit trafficking".⁶¹ Consultations already have begun between the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), MINUSTAH, the Haitian National Police (HNP), and the Dominican armed forces along with potential donors,

www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_130_per_cent20ing.pdf; and 2004 Dominican law on migration, "Ley 285 sobre migración", 15 August 2004.

⁵⁹ These abuses or shortcomings are systematically denied, Crisis Group interview, Braulio Frias, Head of the Haitian affairs bureau, Santo Domingo, 25 October 2007. Several thousand Dominicans themselves do not possess a birth certificate because of the absence of strong state policies, Wooding and Moseley-Williams, op. cit., p. 56.

⁶⁰ The court ruling is on the website www.suprema.gov.do. A critical analysis was done in Ramón Emilio Nuñez and Nassef Perdomo Cordero, "Los fallos del fallo: Análisis de la sentencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia sobre la constitucionalidad de la Ley de Migración", Instituto Caribeño para el Estad de Derecho (ICED), 2006. See also "A Rights Advocate's Work Divides Dominicans", *New York Times*, 29 September 2007.

⁶¹ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1780, S/RES/1780, 15 October 2007, points 9-11.

particularly Canada and the U.S., and a comprehensive border management plan is under preparation.⁶²

E. CARIBBEAN REGION

Many Haitian migrants in Caribbean countries⁶³ have arrived illegally and taken jobs in the informal agricultural sectors, and often live in poorer neighbourhoods and experience difficulties with the local population. Migrants in Guadeloupe have suffered from anti-Haitian campaigns because of their competitiveness in local agricultural and basic services markets.⁶⁴ The 75,000 or so Haitians in the Bahamas account for 25 per cent of the entire population,⁶⁵ a proportion that leads to the local population blaming them for unemployment and gang violence. Children born to migrants often have no papers until the age of eighteen because of conflicting *jus sanguinis*/*jus soli* nationality laws between Haiti and the Bahamas. Despite the problems, a small Bahamian-Haitian middle class is emerging on the Bahamas and there is an active interest in investing in Haiti. In Turks and Caicos, Haitians are roughly 20 per cent of the population⁶⁶ and experience the same resentment⁶⁷ and regular checks of their papers.⁶⁸

Cuba represents a different phenomenon as many of the estimated 400,000 Haitians or Cuban citizens of Haitian origin arrived before the Cuban revolution in 1959. Most are located in the eastern part of the island in Camaguey and have integrated into society although they maintain their language and cultural links.

⁶² Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Port-au-Prince and Washington DC, 15 and 28 November 2007.

⁶³ In the French Caribbean and Latin American territories the lowest figure available is 80,000 for legal and illegal residents. This includes between 38,000 in Guyana, between 15,000 and 25,000 in Guadeloupe, 15,000 in St Martin and 5,000 in Martinique. Lionel Etienne, Haitian ambassador to France, believes 70,000 Haitians live in Guadeloupe, Crisis Group interview, Port-au-Prince, 18 September 2007. Other estimates from the geographer Georges Anglade reach 200,000 for all the Lesser Antilles, see www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html; and Paul Brodwin, "Marginality and Cultural Intimacy in a Transnational Haitian Community", Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Occasional Paper no. 91, October 2001.

⁶⁴ "Propositions pour une politique de gestion de la migration de main d'oeuvre en Haïti", Haitian Government/IOM, September 2006, pp. 32-33.

⁶⁵ "Migration in the Caribbean: Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Beyond", Minority Rights Group International, July 2003.

⁶⁶ According to figures from the 2005 census estimate, at www.thecommonwealth.org/YearbookInternal/140416/140431/turks_and_caicos_islands/.

⁶⁷ On 4 May 2007 a boat overloaded with Haitian immigrants capsized and around 70 Haitians drowned. Many survivors accused the Turks and Caicos boat towing it of having purposefully capsized the boat. This mirrored another incident in June 1998 when Turks and Caicos police were accused of firing on a boat of Haitian migrants.

⁶⁸ Marc Lacey, "New Routes and New Risk, as More Haitians Flee", *New York Times*, 19 May 2007.

IV. THE NEED FOR HAITIANS ABROAD IN DEVELOPMENT

In Haiti, human resources and capacities are absent as much in the public as the private sector and civil society.⁶⁹ Haitian foreign investors acknowledge the local workforce lacks qualifications, particularly in information technology,⁷⁰ and requires technical assistance from outside.⁷¹

A. REMITTANCES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES

Remittances represent an increasing percentage of Haiti's gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for some 35 per cent.⁷² Communities in the U.S. remit the majority (71 per cent of remittances compared to 14 per cent from Canada) and as the senders are relatively young, the upward trend will continue for at least a decade.⁷³ Remittances from Caribbean countries will probably also continue to increase with the flow of migrants but from France and Canada they may diminish as younger generations retain fewer links to their homeland. The full size of the current flow and projections for the future remain uncertain because remittances remain the choice of the individual senders.⁷⁴ Similarly, it is still too early

to judge whether increased return travel to Haiti because of security improvements will decrease remittances.⁷⁵

Remittances are not in themselves a panacea and their impact is varied. In small towns, money transfer institutions are among the few if not the only functioning institutions with a cash flow and as such they play a role in stemming land flight, but they can also act as a tool for drug money laundering.⁷⁶ Remittances primarily buy food for families, especially in households where adults are unemployed; unsurprisingly, only one third of all remittances are used to start a business or invest in a house. There is also a real risk that they may create a dependency culture, with recipients refusing to accept low-paid employment and choosing instead to wait for a monthly transfer. They may also result in currency appreciation by placing pressure on interest and exchange rates⁷⁷ and decrease the government's willingness to implement public policies for housing, health, and education, hampering long-term state strengthening. More partnerships between remittance senders, NGOs and Haitian social services, such as the project to improve financial literacy and technology upgrading in rural areas run by Fondasyon Kole Zepòl (FONKOZE),⁷⁸ are necessary.

Apart from remittances, return trips by Haitians living abroad pump significant capital into local economies and tourism.⁷⁹ Financial investments in the U.S. in

⁶⁹ Crisis Group phone interview, Carlo Dade, FOCAL, 4 October 2007.

⁷⁰ Crisis Group interview, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) staff, Port-au-Prince, 10 October 2007.

⁷¹ "Technicians and managers are not numerous in Haiti", Serge Zagury, Gildan, speech at Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, 2 October 2007. ROCAHD estimates that only six workers out of 1,000 have a professional diploma or technical training certificate that can be used on the labour market, Eric Faustin, ROCAHD, Montreal Conference with the Haitian diaspora, 10-11 December 2004, p. 49. Minister of Public Works Frantz Verella recognised the need for more construction companies to step in since only 25 per cent of tenders for public works projects can be absorbed by local Haitian firms, speech in front of the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, Montreal, 2 October 2007.

⁷² According to Central Bank of Haiti, World Bank Development Indicators of 2006 and data collected by Manuel Orozco, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷³ Crisis Group interview, Guy G. Lamothe, director of the Investment Facilitation Centre (CFI), Port-au-Prince, 16 November 2007; and Manuel Orozco, op. cit., p. 5. The Haitian government estimated that migrant remittances to Haiti totalled more than \$930 million in 2004, more than twice the amount sent only five years earlier and almost ten times the amount sent in 1995, IDB, op. cit.

⁷⁴ Inter-American dialogue, "Making the Most of Family Remittances", March 2007, p. 8. Data collection is often based solely on small samples and insufficient quantitative research.

Complementary methodologies have been identified such as "snowball sampling" and "intercept sampling", partly used in this report with qualitative interviews of a pre-identified population. In the north west department, owing to geographic proximity, diaspora families send remittances in kind via boats arriving at Port-de-Paix. These products are either for personal consumption or reselling. Crisis Group interviews, Port-de-Paix, September 2007.

⁷⁵ Remittances from Bahamas go back with friends or relatives but not through financial operators, Ria N. M. Treco, op. cit.

⁷⁶ "National Drug Threat Assessment 2008", National Drug Intelligence Center, October 2007, at www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/finance.htm#Money.

⁷⁷ More research on this latter phenomenon is needed. Eve Hamilton, "The State of Remittance Research: An Overview", Inter-American Dialogue Conference: Policy Research on Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, 14 March 2007.

⁷⁸ FONKOZE is Haiti's largest microfinance institution. The project is funded by the Multilateral Investment Fund (FOMIN) of the IDB and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). For more information see www.fonkoze.org.

⁷⁹ Orozco has calculated that 64 per cent of Dominican migrants visiting home spends more than \$1000 per visit. The percentage is 52 per cent for Jamaica, 50 per cent for Cuba, 48 per cent for Guatemala, 43 per cent for Honduras and 27 per cent for Nicaragua. Similar research on Haiti should be carried out. Manuel Orozco and Jull Reifsteck, op. cit., p. 31.

pension funds, stock market shares and saving accounts have not been mobilised but should be targeted by Haiti's finance policies by offering special state bonds for development. Haitian-Americans' financial records and properties in the U.S. could help them to obtain second mortgages from U.S. banks (which offer lower interest rates) for credit and investments in Haiti.⁸⁰

B. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

The diaspora contributes to development through hometown associations (HTAs), professional organisations and individual projects led by prominent Haitians abroad. Recent security improvements will hopefully make it possible for these groups to plan more ambitious and sustainable development projects with closer supervision.⁸¹

Hometown associations have implemented micro-community projects, especially in rural areas,⁸² with the dual objective of development and economic progress. HTA projects traditionally bypass corrupt local authorities and negotiations with state providers, and ignore existing legal frameworks.⁸³ The projects also suffer from a lack of follow-up as they rarely have a reliable local contact or partner organisation.⁸⁴ From the local communities' point of view, there is insufficient

consultation and condescension from expatriates in project implementation.⁸⁵ Members of the diaspora can recognise and harness foreign sources of funding and volunteer support but as project implementers they lack consistent funding, which weakens their sustainability and effectiveness.⁸⁶

However, some public-private and North-South partnerships have succeeded.⁸⁷ HTAs have acquired experience over time:⁸⁸ they now demand more accountability from their Haitian counterparts and are aware of the need to coordinate with state institutions and local government. Cooperation could be enhanced by the creation of a diaspora development fund jointly managed by HTAs together with the Haitian government, local authorities and donors and in coordination with the existing Local Government Management and Development Fund (FGDCT, Fonds des Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales).⁸⁹ It is hoped that a database of HTAs and training and support projects for local communities implemented by FONKOZE in coordination with Haitian authorities will assist in resolving some of these problems.

In addition to HTAs, support is received from associations of professionals focusing on specific fields with mixed success. Though some initiatives have taken off,⁹⁰ some professional organisations do not understand

⁸⁰ Crisis Group interview, prominent member of the business community, Port-au-Prince, 11 October 2007. For instance, retirees could have a second home in Haiti instead of Florida or Dominican Republic.

⁸¹ Crisis Group interview, Maud Pierre Pierre, ROCAHD, Montreal, 1 October 2007.

⁸² Projects range from football pitches to provision of road signs, ambulances and electricity generators. They are usually selected by HTAs after members return to Haiti for annual celebrations or receive requests from relatives. The pressure on HTAs from family and friends in their hometown to establish a project cannot be underestimated either. There is pride in having a relative abroad and one-off, highly visible projects are often preferred by relations in Haiti. Crisis Group interview, Jacques Jacques Nesi, Secretary General of Union des St Louisiens de France (USLOFRADES), 15 September 2007.

⁸³ This is particularly acute in the case of electricity provision. Crisis Group learned of three neighbouring villages all engaged in equally problematic electricity projects without any plans for a joint scheme. Crisis Group field research in south department, 13-15 September 2007; and Crisis Group interview, Louis HERNS Marcellin, Professor of Anthropology, Miami, 17 October 2007. In one instance a hospital has been constructed and is functioning, but its legal status is unclear and the ownership of the building is under dispute, Crisis Group interview, local inhabitants, Vieux Bourg d'Aquin, September 2007.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group interview, Berthony Pierre-Louis, Professor of Faculty of Social Sciences, Port-au-Prince, 5 October 2007.

⁸⁵ Crisis Group interview, Leonie Hermantin, Lambi Fund Haiti, Miami, 13 October 2007; and François Pierre Louis, *Haitians in New York City: Transnationalism and Hometown Associations* (Florida, 2006), p. 79.

⁸⁶ The electricity project at Vieux Bourg d'Aquin is one example of a lack of sustained funding. They are now looking for further support, Tatiana Wah, Haiti's Development, op. cit., p. 123.

⁸⁷ The HTA electricity project in Aquin is making use of the Songhai organisation (a centre for training, production, research and development of sustainable agricultural practices based in Bénin) to develop a more sustainable source of energy for the electricity plant and has also enlisted the support of Electricians without Borders (ESF). One solution to the individual approach taken by HTAs is Collectif Haiti de France's approach, which brings together many diaspora organisations to support the national Haitian NGO Veterimed, which works across Haiti to improve the life of peasant farmers through assistance with cattle rearing and milk distribution. Crisis Group interviews, Aquin, September 2007 and Professor Carolle Charles, Baruch College, New York, 28 September 2007.

⁸⁸ HTAs appeared in the 1980s, Pierre-Louis, op. cit., p. 19.

⁸⁹ Crisis Group interview, Jean-François Chamblain, MHLA Chief of cabinet, Port-au-Prince, 15 November 2007.

⁹⁰ One training program was agreed in 1997 between the Port-au-Prince State University medicine faculty and the Association of Haitians Physicians Abroad (AMHE,

the specifics of the Haitian situation and local beneficiaries are reluctant partners if they see their private business threatened.⁹¹

As for individual commitments, singer Wyclef Jean has set up his own NGO, Yélé Haiti, brought back other famous performers and athletes⁹² and forged ties between Haitians and the diaspora. Sensing Jean's potential as a catalyst for uniting Haitians abroad and strengthening ties to further the goal of Haitian development and stability, President Préval appointed him to the position of roving ambassador for Haiti in January 2007. Similar positions could be created for other prominent Haitians abroad.

C. BUSINESS PROJECTS

Members of the diaspora are very aware of speeches by Préval, Prime Minister Jacques Alexis and other government officials in Haiti and abroad asking them to invest in Haiti. The Centre for the Facilitation of Investments (CFI) was inaugurated in July 2007 and although it is poorly staffed now, it aims to become a "one-stop shop" for diaspora and other foreign investors. The CFI claims the time necessary to create a company in Haiti has been dramatically reduced⁹³ but obstacles remain. Calls for tender are not all computerised and therefore cannot be communicated across borders easily.⁹⁴ Customs procedures, backlogs and corruption hold up shipments of material and equipment. Haitian officials also complain the diaspora prefers informal practices to

formal regulations, raising the risk of dishonest and troublesome investment in the country.⁹⁵

The diaspora wants to see concrete government actions to guarantee investments made. Public-private partnerships have foundered when roads are not maintained or electricity supply to their businesses is cut off.⁹⁶ Haitian investors also demand substantial reforms to the judicial system, particularly regarding property rights and dispute resolution mechanisms.⁹⁷ The lack of human resources within relevant ministries means investors often have to deal with ministers personally and impedes investment progress. Haiti has even lost out on business projects run by diaspora investors who, frustrated by the lack of infrastructure, have instead invested in the neighbouring Dominican Republic.⁹⁸

Haitian investors from abroad had rarely been able to pull resources together for large-scale projects in the past⁹⁹ but public-private initiatives are changing this trend. For example, the La Gonave Development Cooperation (GDC) is a 30-year public-private initiative to develop the area on La Gonave as a Special Economic Zones (SEZ) based on the Shenzhen Model.¹⁰⁰ Other diaspora-initiated tourist projects include Sun Group's on the Arcadins coast, Nouveau Kiskeya's in the north west department and Simact's in Jacmel.¹⁰¹ As with the

Association des Médecins Haïtiens à l'Étranger). Dialysis and HIV/AIDS services, which now host 3500 patients a month, have been set up. The AMHE plans to replicate the project in Cap Haïtien and, together with the U.S. SouthCom base in Florida, the association is setting up disaster prevention centres and equipping them for emergency care. Crisis Group interview, member of AMHE, Montreal, 4 October 2007.

⁹¹ Equipment has been regularly sent to Haiti by professional organisations but is not always suited to conditions or has been destroyed by reactionary local health workers, Crisis Group interview, member of AMHE, Montreal, 4 October 2007.

⁹² Details of the involvement of other famous performers and athletes can be found at the Yélé Haiti website, www.yele.org.

⁹³ Crisis Group interviews, Jean-Erick Bélinette, CFI, Montreal, 4 October 2007 and Guy G. Lamothe, CFI director, Port-au-Prince, 16 November 2007; and CFI statistical study on the average length of registration, shared with Crisis Group.

⁹⁴ For instance a TELECO (Haitian Telecommunications) call for tender was only available in hard copy and had to be picked up at the TELECO office in Port-au-Prince, Crisis Group interview, Daniel Godefroy, chargé de mission de la présidence (temporary representative of the Haitian presidency), Montreal, 1 October 2007.

⁹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Guy G. Lamothe, CFI director, Port-au-Prince, 16 November 2007.

⁹⁶ A major hotel owner, and thereby employer, in Aquin had hoped the public road leading to his hotel would be maintained but it has not been despite talks with the Minister of Public Works, Crisis Group phone interview, Aldy Castor, Miami, 17 October 2007.

⁹⁷ Crisis Group interview, former PromoCapital employee, Miami, 14 October 2007.

⁹⁸ Crisis Group interview, former PromoCapital employee, Miami, 14 October 2007; and Crisis Group telephone interview, Aldy Castor, 17 October 2007.

⁹⁹ Crisis Group interview, investor, New York, 25 September 2007.

¹⁰⁰ This ambitious scheme would be managed by a public-private authority (La Gonave Development Authority, GDA) and although started initially in 1996, it was only revived after Préval's election in 2006. The La Gonave Development Corporation (GDC) feels that the effort made by the central government has been encouraging: following high-level presentations, a counterpart in the prime minister's office was appointed to follow the project and they have been asked to submit a 3-5 year business plan. Crisis Group interview, Pierre Léger, chairman and CEO of GDC, Port-au-Prince, 11 October 2007.

¹⁰¹ Simact is a \$5 million company working in agriculture, trade, and tourism, created by seven doctors in New York who then welcomed other professionals like accountants, bankers, finance and real estate experts as shareholders. The company has invested \$1 million in Ste Geneviève Haiti, a mining

GDC model, all depend on political support and additional financing, which have not been forthcoming.¹⁰²

Small- and medium-businesses are underdeveloped and could be a niche for diaspora investments, including contributions from HTAs, to help a thin middle class develop.¹⁰³ The diaspora already consumes Haitian agricultural products and some traders estimate a market of up to 1.5 million Haitians living in Montreal, Boston and New York.¹⁰⁴ However, members of the diaspora have also faced obstacles and obstruction from the local business milieu when it became too obvious they would compete with local entrepreneurs.¹⁰⁵

Haitian investors from the U.S. have found it almost impossible to get credit from Haitian banks to launch businesses.¹⁰⁶ Potential diaspora investors do not see Haitian banks having the capital or willingness to finance large-scale projects and therefore seek financial backing abroad.¹⁰⁷ Promocapital, also known as the “Haitian-American Investment Bank”, a joint venture between the Haitian-American diaspora, PromoBank shareholders and Haiti businessmen, was established in January 2004 to provide investment infrastructure for

branch of the Canadian St Geneviève Resources Ltd. (www.sgv.ca/haiti_en.html) In Jacmel, Simact plans a 120 room resort with a shopping mall and private houses on 24 acres. The company is also ready to fund the building of the road leading to the resort.

¹⁰² Gregory Brandt, Presentation of the Sun Group project, Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, 2 October 2007. Initial investment from members of the diaspora for Nouveau Kiskeya, a requirement to prove viability of the project to financial backers, was easily obtained within days simply through word-of-mouth. However, access to the site relies on construction of a bridge from Port-de-Paix to the nearest main town with airport/port access, and tarmac a road. Crisis Group interview, Robert Ulysse, Port à l’Ecu, 20 September 2007.

¹⁰³ Crisis Group interview, Gary Pierre Pierre, *The Haitian Times*, New York, 23 September 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Crisis Group interview, Jean-Pierre Wiener, importer of Haitian products to North America, Montreal, 2 October 2007.

¹⁰⁵ This happened to an importer of vegetable oil who, after being successful with the selling of two containers, suddenly experienced the doubling of his customs fees and was told more imports were unnecessary. The investor was further discouraged by numerous “friendly” warnings. Crisis Group interview, investor, New York, 25 September 2007.

¹⁰⁶ One investor explained how Sogebank asked him to first make a deposit of \$200,000 if he wanted to borrow this sum. Crisis Group interview, investor, New York, 25 September 2007.

¹⁰⁷ Although credit for investments in the U.S. are easier to access, very few Haitian-American investors have actually borrowed money from their U.S. banks to invest in Haiti, Crisis Group interview, American entrepreneur, Port-au-Prince, October 2007.

Haitian-American and Haitian investment projects. However, the partnership failed to work owing to differences between the business cultures.¹⁰⁸

D. KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

More than money shortages, know-how gaps in public and private sectors are undeniably one of the main obstacles to stability and development.¹⁰⁹ Without competent and stable managers in the public administration and the private sector, generous diaspora efforts remain incapable of revitalising public service delivery, infrastructure and technology upgrading. The country suffers from extreme human capital flight and the potential to reverse that loss of knowledge through the return of hundreds of skilled Haitians has never been realised.¹¹⁰ In 2004, the World Bank-sponsored Interim Cooperation Framework called for the “use of qualified individuals and organizations from the Haitian diaspora”¹¹¹ but since then, only a few dozen have come back permanently or on temporary work contracts.

Lessons should be learned from previous initiatives. The Florida Association of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action (FAVACA) runs short-term transfers of knowledge by identifying members of the diaspora with professional skills who fill a particular Haiti government or community need. Some feel it is a model to be replicated more broadly.¹¹² An Organization of American States (OAS)-

¹⁰⁸ One explanation was that diaspora investors hoped to begin new businesses at the same time the Haitian side wanted to channel the money into already existing businesses, Crisis Group interview, former PromoCapital employee, Miami, 14 October 2007.

¹⁰⁹ “Haiti Country Assistance Evaluation”, World Bank, 12 February 2002; Nancy Roc, “Entente tripartite entre les gouvernements canadien, québécois et haïtien. Le Canada accorde \$ 7,2 millions à Haïti pour la modernisation de l’administration publique”, *Alterpresse*, 8 November 2007; and “We are in quest for external competences and we naturally turn to Quebec”, Frantz Liautaud, head of the Haitian-Canadian chamber of commerce, speech at Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal, 2 October 2007.

¹¹⁰ “A Time to Choose, Caribbean Development in the 21st Century”, World Bank, 2005; and Patricia Grogg, “Migration-Latin America: No Destination”, IPS News, 15 February 2007.

¹¹¹ “Cadre de coopération intérimaire”, executive summary, 2004, item 43, p. 10 (Crisis Group unofficial translation).

¹¹² Montreal Conference with the Haitian diaspora, FOCAL, Final report, 10-11 December 2004, pp. 7-8, at www.favaca.org and www.floridahaiti.org. FAVACA’s success over the years on short-term technical assistance through volunteers has key positive lessons, including the critical importance of management “matchmaker”. FAVACA consults closely with

backed scheme that provided a small group of advisers to the LaTortue government showed that their suggestions were ignored and the selection process was based on personal relations rather than credentials.¹¹³ The first shortcoming could be avoided by a snowball effect inside the administration, created by a critical mass of new comers,¹¹⁴ while cronyism can be avoided by a transparent recruitment procedure with an independent third party tasked to carry out the selection process in partnership with the Haitian authorities.

Grassroots organisations warn against the risk of competing with local agronomists and building engineers who are competent enough.¹¹⁵ Even so, Haitian needs are significantly greater than existing in-country resources and this concern has delayed donor construction project implementation.¹¹⁶ Short-term training and distance learning may bring partial support, but the structural change required will not occur unless experienced staff are permanently based in Haiti, engaged on a daily basis in state and economic reforms and civil service training.

The first group ready to come back is young retirees who could work as problem solvers, managers and trainers. The second group is young professionals without constraining roots such as families and mortgages.¹¹⁷ Both groups will need convincing incentives that go

beyond improved security.¹¹⁸ From the moment someone signs up to return to Haiti, how they will travel, where they will live, what their work environment provides, and a return trip paid at the end of their commitment should be guaranteed. Returnees will be viewed by certain sectors as a threat to public administration and the private sector and tensions may arise due to different standards for salaries and benefits.¹¹⁹ Haitians from abroad may also behave with condescension while ignoring their trainers' skills. Prejudices on both sides will need to be overcome by careful human resources management from the government. Such large-scale diaspora return programs have not yet been tried in Haiti and it would be a mistake to rule out this option without seriously attempting it.

the Haitian receiving agency to identify the specific skills lacking in that Haitian management structure (government, non-government or private) and then matches them with individuals with the specific professional skills needed. That allows the Haitian counterparts in Haiti to recognise the value-added of the new arrival. The program takes care of all logistic problems for the volunteer. "Florida's International Volunteer Corps honors founder Bob Graham at 25th Anniversary", South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 17 November 2007; and "Volunteers will be honored Friday for their help with assisting Caribbean nations during the past 25 years", *The Miami Herald*, 12 November 2007.

¹¹³ Crisis Group interview, businessman, Miami, 14 October 2007.

¹¹⁴ Crisis Group interviews, Frantz Voltaire, CIDIHCA director, Montreal, 30 September 2007; Georges Anglade, Port-au-Prince, 11 October 2007; and François Pierre Louis, adviser to the PM Office, Port-au-Prince, 28 November 2007.

¹¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Eric Faustin, ROCAHD director, Montreal, 4 October 2007.

¹¹⁶ Crisis Group interview, international cooperation agency officials, Port-au-Prince, August 2007.

¹¹⁷ It is also almost impossible to find Haitians abroad who do not know anybody wanting to return. All those older than 40 and who left Haiti since 1980 interviewed for this report expressed the wish to return to Haiti or contribute to its development. The same cannot be said of their children, although some acknowledge that a "wave of Haitian pride" is currently circulating, galvanised by role models such as Wyclef Jean.

¹¹⁸ When asked about what criteria (security, salary, living conditions) would convince them to return to Haiti to work, young professionals from the Haitian chamber of commerce did not seem to have given it much thought and their genuine motivation to go back seems questionable, Crisis Group interview, young professionals from the Haitian chamber of commerce, Montreal, 4 October 2007.

¹¹⁹ Crisis Group interview, Guy G. Lamothe, CFI Director, Port-au-Prince, 16 November 2007.

V. HAITIANS ABROAD IN POLITICS

In the past, spoilers of democracy and peace as well as their defenders have fled Haiti and found support abroad. The “tenth department”, the name for the diaspora until recently when a tenth Haitian province was established, is more a Haitian constituency than a pro-Haiti lobby abroad. However, emerging transnational networks are changing this picture by intervening in Haitian and international political agendas. Their increased participation, if dual citizenship is allowed and they are represented in the parliament, may well frustrate some political and administrative elites who consider the diaspora as a threat and a competitor. If not well assessed and communicated it could lead to fierce political competition and even potential destabilisation of the current situation.

A. EXITS, EXILES AND RETURNS OF DEMOCRATS AND SPOILERS

Most of the current political elite in Haiti was educated abroad, experienced political exile or spent several years voluntarily outside Haiti. President René Préval lived in New York and studied in Belgium and Italy.¹²⁰ Prime Minister Jacques Edouard Alexis studied in Canada, Minister of Economy Daniel Dorsainvil studied in the U.S. and worked abroad, Minister of Planning and External Cooperation Jean-Max Bellerive studied in Belgium, and Minister of Justice René Magloire worked in Canada. Several current or former advisers to ministers or the president also have lived abroad like Gabriel Verret and Bob Manuel, economic and security advisers to Préval, and Jean Moisset and François Pierre-Louis, advisers to Alexis.

Former rulers have been granted residency abroad. Jean-Claude Duvalier has been in exile in France since 1986. He has tried to remain politically active and made public statements in 2003 and 2007 to remind he is ready to come back to Haiti and rule again.¹²¹ A François Duvalier Foundation, of which Jean-Claude is a member, was inaugurated in Port-au-Prince on 15 April 2007 by well-known Duvalierists.¹²² On 28 September 2007, President Préval announced plans to recover Duvalier’s \$6.3 million frozen in a Swiss bank and stated he could face prosecution on return.

¹²⁰ René Préval left Haiti in 1963 and came back in 1975.

¹²¹ “Exile in France Takes Toll on Ex-Tyrant ‘Baby Doc’”, *Wall Street Journal*, 16 March 2003.

¹²² Radio Kiskeya, 15 April 2007.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide has been in exile since 2004 in South Africa but is still present on Haiti’s political scene through media appearances. In an interview in July 2006 he confirmed plans to return when Préval judges the time is right, adding that he would teach rather than play a role in politics.¹²³ Despite this affirmation Aristide is said to maintain communication with his allies and partisans, as well as with high-level government officials, and closely follow local politics. Support for him in Haiti appears to have waned¹²⁴ but his continued presence through conversations, graffiti, and press reports is a distracting if not destabilising factor.

B. HAITIANS ABROAD AND JUSTICE

Given the common practice for the political elite and their allies to leave and return, some have faced justice abroad for crimes perpetrated in Haiti. Notorious violent political actors have been tried in the U.S. Emmanuel Toto Constant was the leader of FRAPH, a paramilitary group which, together with Haitian Armed Forces, intimidated, killed and raped in various communities under the junta regime from 1993 to 1994. Constant lived and worked openly in New York after 1994. Anonymous complaints for rape were made against him in 2006.¹²⁵ After he was arrested in 2006 for mortgage fraud, the initial efforts from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to urge the court to accept a plea bargain that would give Constant credit for time served, allowing him to be immediately deported back to Haiti, failed thanks to a human rights campaign that convinced the judge that his track record for human rights abuses means that he does not deserve leniency under the law. The judge ruled to throw out the original plea bargain. Unless the parties can agree to a plea more acceptable to the judge, Constant will face trial. There also is a serious question whether Haitian judicial institutions are strong enough to handle the Constant case were he to be returned with potential destabilising consequences.¹²⁶

¹²³ Peter Hallward, “An Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide”, *London Review of Books*, 22 February 2007.

¹²⁴ See Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Report N°21, *Consolidating Stability in Haiti*, 18 July 2007, pp. 10-11.

¹²⁵ These were supported by the Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA), pro-bono co-counsel from Sonnenschien, Nath & Rosenthal, LLP and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) which represented several of the women.

¹²⁶ For more background on Constant and this case, www.cja.org/cases/Constant.shtml.

Jean-Claude Duvalier was cited in a complaint made by a committee of Haitians in France in 1998.¹²⁷ Talks on the possibility of prosecution resurfaced in 2007 when the Swiss government announced that it was going to release Duvalier's frozen funds unless the government of Haiti provided them with evidence of corruption or crime.¹²⁸ This was finally done at the last minute by President Préval and the freezing of the funds was prorogued. Even though no formal case has been opened yet against Jean-Claude Duvalier for the crimes of his regime, human rights groups are pushing for this to happen.

The Préval government declined to pursue civil corruption charges against Aristide which had been filed by a private U.S. firm at the instigation of the Latortue interim government. The firm put the case on hold after the Préval government, as the Latortue government before it, decided to cease paying the firm's hefty legal fees. Segments of the business community and civil society in Haiti regularly criticise the decision.¹²⁹ Other cases related to drug trafficking and money laundering were opened in the U.S., resulting in arrests in Haiti in summer 2007; the suspects were subsequently transferred to the U.S.

C. THE CONSTITUENCY OF OUTSIDE AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

Anti-Duvalier networks created by exiles and refugees during his dictatorship had time to build up and consequently played a critical role in overthrowing the regime in 1986. Many exiles went back to Haiti in 1986 as part of a return program included in the constitution. Instability discouraged most from staying and a back-and-forth movement of political refugees and returnees ensued under following governments.¹³⁰ Aristide's reinstatement in 1994 brought new hopes and a new wave of returnees but they were discouraged when attempts to promote diaspora investments and returns fizzled.

The diaspora has also been a primary target for Haitian politicians who need funds and use popular topics to leverage Haitians abroad. It is believed members of the

diaspora remain deeply interested in Haitian politics and influence tremendously their relatives' and friends' voting behaviour.¹³¹ In 2006, many presidential candidates campaigned hard among the diaspora and used Haitian media in the U.S. to reach their audience.¹³² The time has come for a redefinition of political constituencies along new lines inspired by functional or sectoral competences or interventions (education, infrastructure, local governance, etc.) to contribute to democracy and development without being polarised around controversial figures such as Duvalier or Aristide.¹³³ This opportunity is endangered by a limited minority of Lavalas-extremists based mostly in Miami but with global websites disseminating partisan views and fomenting a climate of mistrust.¹³⁴

Transnational advocacy networks have started to play an increasing role in Haitian politics. On development issues, Haitians participate in NGO coalitions that lobby the EU and international organisations on debt relief and development policies. On press freedom, Reporters sans Frontières (RSF), together with Haitian journalists, has applied pressure to end impunity for journalists' murderers. On human rights, a transnational network of political, social and cultural actors involving Haitians from abroad has circulated an exhibition and film festival on working conditions of Haitians in the Dominican sugar cane sector ("Esclaves au Paradis"). Such events, while controversial, open space for public debate and dialogue. These initiatives directed to democracy, stability and development all illustrate that politicians and the government now have to deal with a wide range of new forces both internally and in their diplomacy.

Emerging pan-Haitian diaspora initiatives to unite Haitians abroad echo similar government efforts in the 1990s to bring together the diaspora. In 2004, a global conference organised by the Canadian and Haitian governments with the Canadian Foundation for the

¹²⁷ "Bring Baby Doc to Justice", BBC, 8 December 1998. A Haitian painter, Gérald Bloncourt, is the founder of the "Committee to judge Duvalier", www.bloncourt.net.

¹²⁸ "Switzerland to return funds from Haiti's Baby Doc", Reuters, 22 May 2007.

¹²⁹ "Le gouvernement retire une plainte déposée à Miami contre l'ancien président Aristide", *Alterpresse*, 7 July 2006.

¹³⁰ A typical example of this movement is the life of journalists Jean Dominique and Michèle Montas of Radio Haiti Inter and of Georges Anglade, a geographer and former adviser and minister under Aristide.

¹³¹ An issue on Haiti can generate three times the amount of callers to a Florida-based Haitian radio program than a similar issue on the U.S., Crisis Group interview, Alix St Surin, CEO of Radio Mega, Miami, 16 October 2007.

¹³² Amy Bracken, "(Don't) Vote for Me...", IPS News, 7 November 2006; and Crisis Group interview, Alix St Surin, CEO of Radio Mega, Miami, 16 October 2007.

¹³³ Crisis Group interview, Ricot Dupuy, head of Brooklyn-based Radio Soleil, New York, 27 September 2007, stated: "In the recent past, before being Haitian, one was either Lavalas or against it".

¹³⁴ The Lavalas movement was created by Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Its partisans campaign for his return to Haiti and actively oppose MINUSTAH as an occupying force. Many others, beyond political opponents, are uncomfortable with any foreign military presence, including MINUSTAH, reflecting the country's long history of occupation.

Americas (FOCAL) gathered several hundred Haitian community leaders from abroad. Other initiatives include the Congrès Mondial Haïtien, created and registered in Montreal in 1994, the Association of Overseas Haitians, focusing on civic and political participation, and the Haitian Congress to Fortify Haiti.¹³⁵ They indicate a desire among Haitians for deeper engagement with their homeland and could become a forum for discussing elections of community representatives abroad. However, most are empty shells awaiting political and financial support. It would be a mistake for the Haitian government to feel challenged by such initiatives which do not threaten or replace political leadership in Haiti as long as the diaspora is represented politically in the parliament.

D. HAITIAN LOBBIES?

Haitians abroad in the eighties and early nineties fought against stigmatisation as carriers of HIV/AIDS in the U.S.¹³⁶ and assimilation to the “African-American” identity,¹³⁷ and for their rights as legitimate workers in

the taxi industry in Montreal. They have become less polarised and as a group feel more secure with their identity and political representation at local and national levels.¹³⁸ They are mature enough to become lobbies within their host countries to coordinate actions with Haiti. The increased number of Haitian-Americans in Florida has for sometime now been recognised by the authorities¹³⁹ and elected officials in Florida and they are often mobilised to respond to humanitarian disasters in Haiti.

The political organisation of Haitians in the U.S. deserves particular attention since it could be used to leverage expanded U.S. engagement in Haiti. Elected Haitian-Americans are a formidable asset for the Haitian government in its efforts to strengthen Haitian democracy and development. The 2008 U.S. presidential election as well as 2009 New York municipal elections are good opportunities for the Haitian community and the Haitian government to define a new role for the diaspora and to promote a common political agenda in support of Haiti¹⁴⁰ and to pressure candidates about their intentions vis-à-vis Haiti’s development and stability.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ See www.haitiancongress.com. Messages from the Haitian consul in Chicago announcing high levels visits in coordination with the diaspora NGO are at www.haitianconsulate.org/ Other local organisations are trying to become more global. A French-based HTA for St Louis du Sud tried unsuccessfully to found a confederation of organisations for St Louis du Sud from Miami, New York and Montreal, Crisis Group interview, Jacques Nesi, Secretary-General, Union des St Louisiens en France pour le développement de St Louis du Sud, USLOFRADES, Aquin, 15 September 2007.

¹³⁶ In the early eighties the Center for Disease Control included Haitians in their at-risk group for HIV/AIDS and although they later retracted it the stigma remained. On February 1990 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) put forward a recommendation that would exclude all people from Haiti from donating blood. Over 50,000 Haitians held a mass rally on 20 April 1990 to demand the FDA retract the recommendation which it subsequently did. The debate over HIV/AIDS and its link to Haiti continues; a new study released in November 2007 claims a Haitian immigrant to the U.S. probably carried a particular strain of HIV to the U.S. in the late sixties, M. Thomas P. Gilbert, Andrew Rambaut, Gabriela Wlasiuk, Thomas J. Spira, Arthur E. Pitchenik, and Michael Worobey, “The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the Americas and beyond”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), at www.pnas.org.

¹³⁷ For U.S. census purposes Haitian-Americans have long been considered as African-Americans. The 2010 census may change and include Haitian-Americans. Many Haitians who were of college age in the 1960s and 1970s were actively engaged in the Black Power movement. Marie St Fleur, “The Haitian-American Political Voice”, in “The Emerging Presence in the U.S. of the Haitian Diaspora and its Impact on Haiti”, Trinity College, October 2002.

¹³⁸ The fact that Wyclef Jean, appointed as special ambassador of Haiti, draped the Haitian flag around his shoulders at the Grammy awards ceremony gave a sense of pride in being Haitian. Similarly, Edwige Danticat, a prominent writer, is another role model.

¹³⁹ Governor Jeb Bush created a task force in July 2004 entitled the “Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group” to “identify critical needs for Haiti’s successful transition and to assess recommendations for meeting these needs”. The Advisory Group consisted of seventeen Haitian-Americans with the eight officially elected Haitian-American officials serving as ex-officio members. One of the members feels that only 20 to 25 per cent of the recommendations were finally implemented. Final report of the Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group, available at <http://internationalaffairs.flgov.com/pdf/haitifinalreport.pdf>; Implementation Status Report for Governor’s Haiti Advisory Group Recommendations, March 2006, at <http://internationalaffairs.flgov.com/pdf/3-0> (6Haiti InitiativeStatus.pdf; and Crisis Group interview, member of Task Force, Miami, 15 October 2007.

¹⁴⁰ See Minister of Public Transport and Telecommunications Frantz Vérella’s speech on 17 May 2007, at www.conatel.gouv.ht. Although Mathieu Eugene of the New York City Council declared that he is “ready to do whatever is possible to help Haiti”, he did not mention any concrete initiative, Crisis Group interview, Brooklyn, 28 September 2007.

¹⁴¹ Crisis Group interview, Rosemonde Pierre Louis, Manhattan Deputy Borough President, New York, 28 September 2007.

E. THE QUEST FOR RECOGNITION: RIGHT TO VOTE AND DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Haiti's constitution allows its citizens abroad to vote provided they have not lost their citizenship, the consequence of being naturalised in a foreign country.¹⁴² Due to the weakness of Haitian diplomatic service, it currently is impossible for eligible Haitians abroad to vote in an embassy or a consulate.¹⁴³ The limited right of these Haitians to vote should not be impeded by administrative obstacles.

Article 15 of the 1987 constitution states dual citizenship with a foreign country is not allowed and article 13 states Haitian citizenship is lost after a Haitian acquires another citizenship in another country or a political position in a foreign government. These provisions make it impossible for foreign citizens of Haitian origin and those who have renounced their Haitian citizenship to access political positions in the homeland.¹⁴⁴ In practice, double standards are applied: de facto dual citizenship exists in numerous cases because article 15 of the 1987 constitution is rarely applied since it is almost impossible to prove that a Haitian has renounced his or her citizenship.¹⁴⁵ Children born abroad to Haitian parents may also become de facto and, as is the case in the U.S., de jure citizens of another country even if disallowed by the constitution. Acquiring a Haitian passport can be done for a sum of \$500 on the black market¹⁴⁶ and some

members of the political and economic elite allegedly have Haitian and foreign passports.¹⁴⁷

If granted dual nationality, Haitians abroad would not necessarily overwhelm domestic Haitian politics or receive wide popular support overnight.¹⁴⁸ In the best case, their activism would inject new democratic cultures and practices into Haiti's political scene.¹⁴⁹ Dual citizenship is a political stake which would eventually make the participation of the diaspora in the political process more efficient and transparent. Nationalists and conservatives fear such a transformation and therefore manoeuvred to block the 2005 candidacy of Dumas Siméus, who had become a multi-millionaire industrialist in the U.S., by challenging his Haitian citizenship.¹⁵⁰ Excluding Haitians worldwide from domestic politics denies their economic contribution. Siméus and his U.S. allies consider further economic participation contingent on recognition of their political rights.¹⁵¹ They have created the Alliance Overseas Haitians, of which Siméus is a board member, which lobbies for dual citizenship and has a representation office in Haiti.¹⁵²

¹⁴² Article 13. It is also possible that in practice Haitians keep their Haitian passport until it becomes invalid and therefore benefit temporarily from double citizenship.

¹⁴³ This practice is increasingly common in many other countries, Michael Collyer and Zana Vathi, "Patterns of extra-territorial voting", Sussex Centre for Migration Research, October 2007, p. 20, at www.migrationdrc.org/publications/working_papers/WP-T22.pdf.

¹⁴⁴ This concerns the positions of president (article 135), prime minister (article 157), senator (article 96) and member of the lower chamber of the parliament (article 91). Foreign citizens can also be expelled from the country if they interfere in political life. This limits de jure foreigners from becoming a minister (article 56) or mayor (article 70). Monferrier Dorval, "La constitution de 1987 et nationalité haïtienne", Blog du juriste, <http://juristehaitien.blogspot.com/>.

¹⁴⁵ Blog du juriste, 26 October 2007; and Théodore E. Achille, *Les Haïtiens et la double nationalité* (Montreal, 2007). Lawyers are divided on how to interpret the renouncement to citizenship. Some consider that renouncement must be proved by a legal document without which it is not possible for state authorities to deny a person's documented citizenship. This kind of document is almost impossible to find in Haiti since many citizens of Haitian origin in other countries are unable to document the loss of their citizenship, do not wish to do so, but can prove they were born from Haitian parents.

¹⁴⁶ This was offered to Crisis Group staff in January 2007.

¹⁴⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Port-au-Prince, New York and Santo Domingo, September and October 2007. Legal provisions dating back to the Duvalier era, specifically the decrees promulgated on 29 November 1983 and 19 November 1984, are still in place for non-Haitians to acquire Haitian citizenship if they invest significantly in the country, Achille, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

¹⁴⁸ Crisis Group interview, Guy G. Lamothe, CFI Director, Port-au-Prince, 16 November 2007.

¹⁴⁹ Francois Pierre Louis, op. cit., pp. 70-73; and Crisis Group interview, Professor Carole Charles, Baruch College, New York, 28 September 2007.

¹⁵⁰ Although there was no guarantee that he would win, all the levers were used to stop him from running: the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP, Conseil Provisoire Electoral), the Supreme Court, a special commission on candidates' nationality, and statements from the president and the prime minister. Siméus' point was that he had never rejected his Haitian citizenship. This legal-political battle has been extensively debated by Haitian lawyers on the Blog du juriste, <http://juristehaitien.blogspot.com/>. See also Théodore E. Achille, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

¹⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, Dr Daniel Faustin, executive vice-president of Smact, Inc, New York, 26 September 2007. He is also director general of the New York-based Radio Tropicale and vice-president of the Alliance Overseas Haitians (<http://overseashaitians.org/index.aspx>).

¹⁵² Siméus was supported by the movement Tèt Ansam. When asked by Crisis Group why he has not engaged in massive investment in the country as promised during his campaign, Siméus replied that he would not invest until dual citizenship was allowed. He still supports communities in Haiti through benevolent actions such as his charity Sove Lavi. Crisis Group phone interview, Dumas Siméus, Miami, October 2007.

The diaspora should be allowed to vote and participate in elections, which will require, at a minimum, constitutional amendments. President Préval blames the current 1987 constitution for being a main source of instability and called for the adoption of a new one¹⁵³ but the amendment procedure stipulated in the 1987 constitution is complex and slow.¹⁵⁴ Other options deserve consideration. For example, a constituent assembly (CA) with clearly limited powers could be elected or established following either a referendum,¹⁵⁵ a public petition from civil society signed by a sufficient number of citizens, or a presidential decree, supported by a parliamentary resolution and the high council of judiciary power. However, the government must debate transparently any reforms.

VI. THE WAY FORWARD: A TEN-YEAR DIASPORA PLAN

Numerous consultations and conferences on the subject of the diaspora have led to the conclusion that a joint mechanism bringing together Haitians abroad and in Haiti is needed. Yet no concrete action has been taken.¹⁵⁶ President Préval should engage personally in the design and launch of a ten-year diaspora policy with the support of the diaspora and the international community. The policy would allow the government to make progress toward development and stability and help guarantee a smooth transition to the new administration in 2011.

A. CURRENT TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS OF THE DIASPORA POLICY

It was Aristide who first realised the potential of the Haitians abroad – he coined the term “Tenth Department” and fundraised extensively for his presidential campaign in Haitian communities abroad.¹⁵⁷ In 1991, he created a cabinet position referred to as the “Tenth Department”¹⁵⁸ but it was not until after his return to power that the Ministry of the Tenth Department was officially created in January 1995.¹⁵⁹ Called the Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad (MHLA, Ministère des Haïtiens Vivant à l’Etranger (MHAVE)) since 2003, it coordinates diaspora policies but is relatively unknown¹⁶⁰ and its weak and understaffed administration is unable to meet current challenges despite efforts of successive ministers.¹⁶¹

In 1997, the Préval-Camdessus initiative aimed at hiring twenty experts from the diaspora with the support of \$1

¹⁵³ “Préval veut rendre leur nationalité aux expatriés”, France 24, 13 November 2007, at www.france24.com/france24Public/fr/nouvelles/amerique/20071113-haiti-rene-preval-expatries-double-nationalite-constitution.html; and Claude Moïse and Cary Hector, “Rapport sur la question constitutionnelle et Annexes”, 2007, report from the ad hoc constitution on constitution reform created by President Préval.

¹⁵⁴ The 1987 constitution can only be amended by two thirds of the current parliament during its last ordinary session (Autumn 2011) and by the two thirds of the next one (2012-2016) during its first session. The entry into force of the amended text must start with the next president’s mandate (2016-2021). If this procedure was followed successfully, a modified constitution would not be applied before 2016. 1987 constitution, articles 282 to 284.4.

¹⁵⁵ While article 284-3 of the 1987 constitution forbids a referendum to “modify” the constitution, it abstains from referring to the possibility of holding a referendum on a new text. However, the use of a referendum could be criticised on the basis it is not mentioned in article 58, which refers to the ways for the people to exert sovereignty. Furthermore, the referendum could fail, considering there might be resentment in Haiti as to opening the possibility for Haitians abroad to participate in domestic politics.

¹⁵⁶ Montreal Conference with the Haitian Diaspora, FOCAL, 10-11 December 2004.

¹⁵⁷ Crisis Group interview, Professor Carolle Charles, Baruch College, New York, 28 September 2007.

¹⁵⁸ François Pierre-Louis Jr., op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁵⁹ Tatiana K. Wah, *Haiti’s Development*, op. cit., p.90.

¹⁶⁰ Crisis Group interview, François Guillaume, Miami, 16 October 2007.

¹⁶¹ “Allocution de Jean Victor Généus, minister for Haitians living abroad”, *La semaine de la diaspora: Actes des colloques*, (Port-au-Prince, 1999). Leslie Voltaire, minister for Haitians living abroad under Aristide, is often mentioned by diaspora as a reason for the return of some Haitian-Americans. His ideas went further than rhetoric: he organised an annual diaspora week with special events and conferences and is also author of the “Voltaire law” of 2002 granting advantages to foreigners of Haitian origin. http://haitixchange.com/article_0024.asp; and “The Emerging Presence in the U.S. of the Haitian Diaspora and its Impact on Haiti”, Trinity College, October 2002, pp. 11-12.

million from the OAS.¹⁶² Other isolated cases of return took place in the framework of the UN Tokten program.¹⁶³ In 1999 the MHLA was offered assistance from Mexico and El Salvador but it lacked the capacity to absorb this offer.¹⁶⁴ In 2004 the ministry presented a sensible policy focus on development, investment and know-how transfers.¹⁶⁵ However, in practice policy remains confused, piecemeal, and focused short-sightedly on remittances¹⁶⁶ without long-term planning.¹⁶⁷ Embassies and consulates do not receive instructions from the MHLA or the ministry of foreign affairs, resulting in parallel structures, such as in Montreal, put in place to disseminate Haiti-related information among the diaspora.¹⁶⁸ Nor is there any staff in the ministry of economy responsible for diaspora-related affairs.

Diaspora policies are a crucial option for developing countries highly dependent on remittances and suffering from brain drain. Remittances policy formulation is at an early stage globally but experts have already identified ways to maximise their use based on the experience of the Jamaica National Building Society (JNBS), the Mexican governmental agency Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros (BANSEFI), and joint USAID, Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) and Banco Agricola programs in El Salvador.¹⁶⁹ The “tres por uno” program in Mexico is often cited as a model, as well as French co-development initiatives in Mali and other African countries, and the Indian policy

affording legal status to non-resident Indians (NRIs) and persons of Indian origin.¹⁷⁰ The European Commission considers its International Organization for Migration (IOM)/EU-Return of Qualified Afghans program as a success and model for other countries.¹⁷¹ These programs should inspire donors present in Haiti to engage with the government in realistic but ambitious initiatives.¹⁷²

B. A TEN-YEAR DIASPORA PLAN

All the ingredients are there for President Préval to consolidate into a profound modernisation of Haiti’s political system: the national poverty reduction strategy has been finalised; Haitians abroad expect an ambitious initiative that will recognise their political role and enable them to contribute strongly to their homeland;¹⁷³ and the private sector is aware a genuine diaspora policy would create a solvent middle class.¹⁷⁴

He should set up a one-year mandated diaspora task force comprising Haitian officials, all political forces represented in parliament, civil society, and private sector and diaspora representatives to debate and draft a ten-year diaspora strategy the implementation of which would run until 2018. The task force should consult all relevant stakeholders worldwide in a year-long process, punctuated by three worldwide diaspora meetings. The strategy should present a limited number of objectives with clear indicators of success, budgeted resources and risk assessments for envisaged reforms. The implementation plan should establish thematic clusters to guide cooperation with Haitians from abroad, coordinated by the MHLA.

¹⁶² The initiative was received \$1 million in support from the OAS, “Haiti Country Assistance Evaluation”, World Bank, 2002.

¹⁶³ Joseph J. Lévy, op. cit., p. 188.

¹⁶⁴ Crisis Group phone interview, Carlo Dade, FOCAL, 4 October 2007.

¹⁶⁵ Montreal Conference with the Haitian diaspora, FOCAL, Final report, 10-11 December 2004.

¹⁶⁶ Crisis Group email correspondence with Tatiana Wah, 9 October 2007.

¹⁶⁷ Patrick Delatour, minister of tourism, acknowledged a communication deficit during a debate organised by the Association of Haitian-Canadian Engineers and Scientists (AIHC, Association des ingénieurs et scientifiques haïtiano-canadiens) in Montreal on 4 October 2007.

¹⁶⁸ Two consultants based in CIDIHCA have been contracted by the Haitian presidential palace for a year to facilitate and encourage contacts between Haiti and the diaspora. The contract does not comprise any functioning budget and their activities are limited to email dissemination about public tenders, bids and job offers, in coordination with the prime minister’s office, the MHLA and the foreign affairs ministry.

¹⁶⁹ Manuel Orozco, Jill Reifsteck, op. cit. pp. 29-30; Crisis Group interview, Paul Tuebner, USAID representative, Port-au-Prince, 19 November 2007; and “The Multiplying Action of Remittance Transactions”, *El Tiempo Latino*, 25 February 2005, at http://comunidadespanamericanas.org/porta/alias__Rainbow/lang__en/tabID__3597/DesktopDefault.aspx.

¹⁷⁰ R. Cheran, op. cit.

¹⁷¹ Crisis Group interview, Patrick Lefèvre, European Commission, 23 October 2007. Returns lasted from six to twelve months. Experiences worked better in the public than in the private sectors.

¹⁷² Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development of origin countries”, International Migration Institute, 2006, at www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/engaging-diasporas-hein-de-haas.pdf.

¹⁷³ “The main purpose of a ministry of overseas Haitians should be to facilitate our unity by stimulating the formation and the recognition of regional and global organizations in the diaspora, offering to them the structured assistance and safety to carry out their mission inside the country,” Dr Daniel Faustin, Vice-President of the U.S.-based Alliance of Haitian Overseas, at <http://overseashaitians.org/issues.htm>.

¹⁷⁴ Frantz Liautaud, in a statement made in Montreal during a 2 October 2007 seminar with the Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal invited the diaspora to plan what Haiti will look like in ten years time. Also, Crisis Group interview, Gregory Mevs, Port-au-Prince, 14 November 2007.

1. Political inclusion and constitutional change

The MHLA, together with the ministry of foreign affairs and a new elections commission, will have to draw up an elections plan for Haitians abroad which will include administrative measures to set up an electoral registration and points managed by diplomatic representations abroad. If this requires additional staff and resources, they will have to be budgeted for and included in future annual budgets. Haitians living abroad could be hired or voluntarily mobilised to participate in the registration of voters and in the monitoring of elections abroad.

Dual citizenship must be discussed widely at the worldwide diaspora meetings organised by the task force and in the media, assisted by ministries acting on a communication plan distributed by the MHLA. The 2002 “Voltaire” law on foreign citizens of Haitian origin already allowing limited access to land property is a helpful framework to be used more systematically for expatriates willing to invest or come back to their homeland. In the longer term, constitutional reform will have to allow dual citizenship for all Haitians able to prove they were born from Haitian descendants. On the basis of the French model, political representation of Haitians abroad should be achieved by including new articles in the future constitution specifying a certain number of senators or deputies elected by constituencies overseas, preferably directly, to avoid excessive organisational costs.¹⁷⁵

2. Escaping from state fragility with new Haitian staff onboard

Haiti needs well-paid administrative cadres, mid-level managers, technicians and problem-solvers immediately to fill the gap before first graduates from the National Public Administration School (ENAP) reach international standards and gain sufficient experience. If the government is serious about strengthening state institutions, it will have to tap into the diaspora reserve by opening the recruitment process in the civil service to Haitians abroad through a special gap-filling program or a new law on civil service. Incoming staff should be recruited to complement existing civil servants rather than replace them. This may still generate animosity vis-à-vis Haitians from abroad because of jealousies over salaries, nationalistic reflexes or fear of competition. The government will need to sensitise the public about the added value of and the norms guiding the return of qualified Haitians. An incentives system should be

adopted to help returnees and local employees remain motivated, following the ongoing \$10 million IDB program on human resources management in public administration.¹⁷⁶

In addition to salary increases, training for civil servants and punctual foreign technical assistance to key ministries, a public service staffing plan should be put in place, in close coordination with the prime minister’s office, to position Haitians from abroad in strategic positions in all ministries and governmental bodies to inject international working methods and best practices. This would be most relevant for the MHLA and public transport and communications, health, education, justice and interior ministries.¹⁷⁷ Members of the diaspora could also contribute to the newly agreed tripartite program to strengthen the National Public Administration School.¹⁷⁸

To ensure a positive snowball effect, there should be a minimum hire of 300 staff with fair competition between candidates from the diaspora and Haiti.¹⁷⁹ A rough assessment of salaries shows that such a program would cost \$12 million annually¹⁸⁰ but this figure will need to be studied more rigorously by the Haitian government and international donors. For people to return, the government must make the country and these positions attractive. It will not only be a question of salary to attract returnees: what will be needed is employment stability for periods of up to ten years, perhaps beginning with one- to three-year commitments that could be renewed with material and security incentives like the availability of a vehicle, accommodation and health

¹⁷⁶ “Support for Public Sector Human Resource Management”, IDB, HAL1018, 2006; and Crisis Group interview, IDB representative, Philippe Dewez, Port-au-Prince, 30 November 2007.

¹⁷⁷ Crisis Group has repeatedly recommended hiring Haitian-American police officers to work in partnership with their colleagues of the HNP.

¹⁷⁸ Nancy Roc, op. cit.

¹⁷⁹ A direct recruitment campaign would save time and replace the lengthy process of setting up a skills database as previously recommended by brainstorming symposiums. Recruitment should be done by the MHLA with half the team composed of Haitians from abroad. Recruitment management and interview costs could be reduced to a minimum if the MHLA partners with HTAs, diaspora networks and donor agencies, and uses the internet and modern technologies to interview candidates remotely.

¹⁸⁰ For instance, 20 administrative directors (\$4,000/month), 40 deputy directors (\$3,400), 60 head of departments (\$3,000), 80 advisers (\$2,400) and 100 project managers (\$2,000) could be hired for the whole amount of \$12 million annually, including an individual \$10,000 material benefits allowance such as transportation, housing and security which could be provided through shared facilities. Over ten years, such a program would cost less than \$150 million.

¹⁷⁵ On the French and other European models, see the French Senate’s comparative study at www.expatries.senat.fr/lc166.html.

benefits, round-trip travel and a secure environment.¹⁸¹ Once positions have been identified, the MHLA should advertise jobs abroad by using diplomatic representations, Haitian media abroad and the HTA network.

In other sectors, similar initiatives could be launched to attract Haitians volunteers from abroad for development and humanitarian work; existing twinning programs in education and vocational training could be replicated all over the country.¹⁸² More sabbatical years for Haitians abroad could also be negotiated with partner countries.

3. Improve investment climate and maximise the use of remittances

Though ongoing efforts to improve the investment climate need to be acknowledged, the current government has undermined its credibility among some of the diaspora business community because they feel it has delayed bringing suspects of corruption to justice.¹⁸³ Haitians from outside are the first potential partner for the homeland.¹⁸⁴ The government should develop a consistent information policy on security developments in Haiti, with bi-monthly bulletins directed at Haitians abroad to address their security concerns.

Facilitating access to property will require competent and honest notaries and lawyers, possibly from the diaspora, to assist investors. Stronger public-private partnerships for job creation and vocational training need

political and foreign donor support. The CFI needs to be fully-staffed and should build closer relationships with Haitian embassies and consulates abroad who can assist it in reaching investors and gathering economic data.¹⁸⁵ Small- and medium-size enterprise development to facilitate export of Haitian products should be a priority.¹⁸⁶ In the banking sector, incentives to attract available capital from the diaspora are necessary.¹⁸⁷ Pension funds in the U.S. represent a strong commodity which could be directed to Haiti if the government put the right framework in place with the support of international financial institutions and large U.S. pension funds.¹⁸⁸

Remittances should be at the centre of policy strategies. Given remittance fees reach on average 15 per cent, options to reduce this cost need to be explored.¹⁸⁹ Competition stimulation policies, wireless internet, debit cards and mobile phone services could help rural areas where there is less access to banks.¹⁹⁰ It is questionable whether a tax on individual transfers would be beneficial without financial and remittance literacy programs targeting receivers and senders of voluntary transfers to enhance remittance development potential.¹⁹¹ If senders imposed more conditionality, receivers would make better use of the money.¹⁹² The ministry of economy, the Central Bank of Haiti, World Bank, the IDB and the EU together with bilateral donors should explore these and other options compatible with the Poverty Reduction Strategy.

¹⁸¹ Crisis Group interview, François Guillaume, Director, Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce of Florida (HACCOF), Miami, 16 October 2007.

¹⁸² A \$300,000 initiative of this kind is being launched by Haytrac Caterpillar Inc. to create a vocational training centre, with the participation of a Haitian trainer previously based in D.R., in cooperation with Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) and with financial support from the IDB through a loan made to the National Institute for Vocational Training (INFP, Institut National de Formation Professionnelle). The centre, to be opened in March 2008, will aim at the certification of heavy equipment operators (male and female). Crisis Group interview, Reynold Bonnefil, president, and Patrick Sagna, Haytrac Caterpillar Inc, Port-au-Prince, 30 November 2007.

¹⁸³ Crisis Group interview, investor, New York, 25 September 2007. David Brandt, a business man from a well-known and wealthy family, suspected of customs evasion and detained since 25 July, was released against a bail of \$100,000 on 3 December 2007 according to a legally contestable procedure since bail payment does not exist in Haiti's criminal law, Crisis Group interview, a foreign jurist, Port-au-Prince, 5 December 2007.

¹⁸⁴ A procedure manual for investors from Haitian communities abroad is a possibility, Crisis Group interview, Daniel Godefroy, chargé de mission de la présidence (temporary representative of the Haitian presidency), Montreal, 1 October 2007.

¹⁸⁵ Crisis Group interview, Jean Erick Bélinette, CFI, Montreal, 2 October 2007.

¹⁸⁶ Montreal Conference with the Haitian Diaspora, FOCAL, 10-11 December 2004, recommendation 5, p. 8.

¹⁸⁷ Crisis Group interview, Jacques Jiha, Black Enterprise, former deputy comptroller for pension investment and public finance in the New York State Office of the Comptroller, Manhattan, 27 September 2007.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* Jiha regrets the Haitian government never asked the New York Pension Fund to explore the possibility of investing some of its capital in Haiti. Some discussions on this initiative already took place with the World Bank and the New York Pension Fund but did not bring any result.

¹⁸⁹ Montreal Conference with the Haitian Diaspora, FOCAL, 10-11 December 2004, recommendation 8, p. 9. This option is not supported by all experts. What needs to be assessed in Haiti is the actual margin to reduce transaction costs. Given the Haitian banking system is largely family-run and untransparent, this may be a challenge in the short term.

¹⁹⁰ Michelle Lapointe, "Diasporas in Caribbean Development", IDB and the World Bank, August 2004, pp. 1-2.

¹⁹¹ As Lorfils Réjouis, leader of ARCHE and PAFHA, said "we don't know if it is useful, but if we don't send them, we feel guilty", Crisis Group interview, Massy Palaiseau, 9 September 2007.

¹⁹² Crisis Group interview, Mathurin Gbetibouo, World Bank representative, Port-au-Prince, 18 October 2007.

4. A diaspora development fund

Hometown associations need to be recognised as crucial players in Haiti's social stability and development. The MHLA will need more staff to ensure coordination in this realm with the ministry of planning, sectoral ministries and local powers. Such a framework, which should not be compulsory and respect the independence of hometown associations, could take the shape of a diaspora development support fund to be set up by the ministry and jointly managed with HTAs and donors. Its linkage with the Local Government Management and Development Fund (FGDCT) will have to be considered to avoid any overlap.

5. Law on migration in order to better control migrations flows

Haiti lacks a solid framework to manage labour migration.¹⁹³ If the state manages to better control its migration flows, Haitians will be less exposed to the negative impacts of migration and on the contrary will be supported by a set of tools to enhance socio-economic standards. Various options to reshape the currently uncoordinated and split administrative skeleton of migration policy have been already explored by the IOM and other experts which now need to be shared to inform on the concrete choices of reform. More involvement of embassies and consulates will also certainly have to be envisaged in order to facilitate the relations with partner countries regarding migration issues.

In addition to the ratification of international conventions on migrants a new migration law will have to be prepared, debated and voted quickly by the parliament to pave the ground for better managed migration of the Haitian workforce.¹⁹⁴ Cooperation with the Dominican Republic regarding the situation of illegal or undocumented Haitians will need to be re-launched possibly with the mediation of the IOM or the OAS with linkage to its ongoing identification program in Haiti. Cross-border cooperation initiatives need to be supported further. Bilateral migration agreements with host countries should become a priority for Haiti to find a solution to ongoing brain drain and worker exploitation.

¹⁹³ "Propositions pour une politique de gestion de la migration de main d'oeuvre en Haïti", op. cit., pp. 52-56.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, draft bill on Haitian migration, pp. 64-85.

C. A PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

International agencies are aware of the potential of the diaspora but have only cautiously engaged on the topic. The U.S. government has in the past funded diaspora return programs, for instance under former commerce secretary Ron Brown, but with limited success. A new USAID program consisting of locating 23 advisors in key ministries, mainly recruited among the diaspora, is ongoing, and USAID also places formal requirement on their contractors to recruit Haitian-Americans.¹⁹⁵ Since 2004 Canada has funded technical assistance programs hiring several dozens of Haitians from Haiti and Canada as consultants located in various ministries and the prime minister's office but on an ad hoc basis.¹⁹⁶

The French government has located a volunteer in the MHLA to coordinate development programs aimed at gathering funding from the French development aid ministry (€200,000), hometown associations and the MHLA.¹⁹⁷ The EU has financed a short-term needs assessment mission from European Network of Implementing Development Agencies (EUNIDA) to identify key needs in ministries and parliament before providing relevant technical assistance. Efforts to address structural needs at medium and low levels of the central and local administrations where ministers' instructions get lost will hopefully follow. The IDB together with the CFI has commissioned studies on foreign direct investment and the diaspora's role; the World Bank has also launched research projects and would be supportive of any large-scale initiative from the Haitian government.¹⁹⁸

However, the international community is generally reluctant toward ambitious diaspora policies: reaching dispersed individuals and influencing their professional choices is seen as a difficult exercise.¹⁹⁹ Corruption and risks of abuse are other counter-arguments.²⁰⁰ Contacts

¹⁹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Paul Tuebner, USAID representative, Port-au-Prince, 19 November 2007.

¹⁹⁶ \$2.5 million has been spent since 2004 to support the role of diaspora organisations in Haiti's development, Crisis Group interview, CIDA representative, Port-au-Prince, 6 December 2007; and email exchange with CIDA staff in Ottawa, 11 December 2007.

¹⁹⁷ If successful, this experience could lead to more French funding, Crisis Group interview with Belinda Bah, volunteer in the MHLA, Port-au-Prince, 15 November 2007.

¹⁹⁸ Crisis Group interview, Mathurin Gbetibouo, World Bank representative, Port-au-Prince, 18 October 2007.

¹⁹⁹ Crisis Group interview, senior UNDP official, Port-au-Prince, July 2007.

²⁰⁰ Crisis Group interview, European Commission delegation staff, Port-au-Prince, May 2007.

with active diaspora members are difficult since most have full-time employment in addition to their diaspora commitments²⁰¹ and resentment from Haitians at home does not help. Diaspora policies require long-term synergies between foreign aid agencies, immigration services and foreign affairs ministries in host countries.²⁰² The international community needs to be risk-tolerant and consider this an important opportunity with a potential for success.

Funds are needed but the amount required is within reach of international donors and the Haitian government.²⁰³ HTAs and diaspora networks deserve international support, especially when their legitimacy has been recognised by the government of Haiti.²⁰⁴ Donor countries with a significant Haitian population should have a contact point to manage relations and cooperation with the diaspora,²⁰⁵ establish criteria favouring their employment in foreign aid programs and develop public administration staffing programs with the Haitian government.

VII. CONCLUSION

The peacebuilding phase Haiti entered in December 2006 may end in 2011, or even before if state institutions are not strengthened in a sustained fashion and if the government does not revive the trust of investors. Haitian officials continually refer to the diaspora as the main resource for stability and development but this rhetoric is not matched by concrete actions. The diaspora entertains the illusion of an imagined *Ayiti cheri* (beloved Haiti) but waits for the government to include it fully in the country's destiny. Mistrust exists on both sides.

The diaspora, with its investors, trainers, technicians, health workers, remittances senders and community associations, is much less polarised now and ready with the skills to pave the way for sustainable peace and development in Haiti. Diaspora policies are not a panacea but Haiti cannot afford to scorn this option. President Préval needs to lead reforms for an amended or new constitution to include all Haitians and ensure their political participation in the 2011 elections.

The government has less than three years to implement an ambitious ten-year diaspora policy to invest in Haiti's future that will extend beyond Préval's mandate and with the support of the international community. If this opportunity is not seized, it may not present itself again in the foreseeable future.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 14 December 2007

²⁰¹ Crisis Group phone interview, Carlo Dade, FOCAL, 4 October 2007.

²⁰² Crisis Group interview, foreign aid agency representative, Port-au-Prince, 6 December 2007.

²⁰³ Montreal Conference with the Haitian Diaspora, FOCAL, 10-11 December 2004, recommendation 10, p. 10.

²⁰⁴ It is the case for ROCAHD in Quebec. In May 2006, René Préval, before being sworn in, repeated his support to ROCAHD as a key player in the relationship with the diaspora. Anthony Dessources, chief of cabinet for the minister of foreign affairs, has insisted on the need to support diaspora's efforts at local level. Crisis Group interview, Eric Faustin, Director of ROCAHD, Montreal, 4 October 2007.

²⁰⁵ Montreal Conference with the Haitian Diaspora, FOCAL, 10-11 December 2004.

APPENDIX A

MAP OF HAITI



Map No. 3855 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
 June 2004

Department of Peacekeeping Operations
 Cartographic Section

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARCHE	Association pour le rayonnement culturel d'Haïti et de son environnement (Association for Haiti's cultural development and environment)
AIHC	Association des ingénieurs et scientifiques haïtiano-canadiens (Association of Haitian-Canadian Engineers and Scientists)
AMHE	Association des Médecins Haïtiens à l'Étranger (Association of Haitian Physicians Abroad)
BANSEFI	Banco del Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CEP	Conseil Electoral Provisoire (Provisional Electoral Council)
CESFRONT	Cuerpo Especializado de Seguridad Fronteriza (Specialized Frontier Security Corps)
CFI	Centre de facilitation des investissements (Centre for the Facilitation of Investments)
CHF	Cooperative Housing Foundation
CIDIHCA	Centre International de Documentation et d'Information Haïtienne, Caribéenne et Afro-canadienne (Haitian, Caribbean and Afro-Canadian International Documentation and Information Centre)
CJA	Centre for Justice and Accountability
CCR	Centre for Constitutional Rights
CONACOH	Conseil National des Citoyens et Citoyennes d'Origine Haïtienne (Citizens of Haitian Origin National Council)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
D.R.	Dominican Republic
EU	European Union
EUNIDA	European Network of Implementing Development Agencies
FANM	Fanm Ayisien Nan Miyami (Haitian Women in Miami)
FAVACA	Florida Association of Voluntary Agencies for Caribbean Action
FDA	Food and Drug Administration
FGDCT	Local Power Management and Development Fund (Fonds des Gestion et de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales).
FOCAL	Canadian Foundation for the Americas
FONKOZE	Fondasyon kole zepol (The Shoulder-to-Shoulder Foundation)
GDC	Gonave Development Cooperation
HACCOF	Haitian-American Chamber of Commerce of Florida
HNP	Haitian National Police
HTA	Hometown Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
INFP	Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (National Institute for Vocational Training)
IOM	International Organization for Migration

JNBS	Jamaica National Building Society
MHLA	Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
NOAH	National Organization for the Advancement of Haitians
NRI	Non-Resident Indians
OAS	Organization of American States
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
PAFHA	Plateforme des associations franco-haïtiennes (Franco-Haitian Associations Network)
PLD	Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Dominican Liberation Party)
ROCAHD	Regroupement des organismes canado-haïtiens pour le développement
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
TELECO	Télécommunications d'Haïti (Haiti Telecommunications)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

APPENDIX C

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 145 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates twelve regional offices (in Amman, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes

Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of the Andean region and Haiti.

Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for International Development, Economic and Social Research Council UK, U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Fundación DARA Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, ProVictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA Trust.

December 2007

APPENDIX D

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN SINCE 2004

Hostages for Prisoners: A Way to Peace in Colombia?, Latin America Briefing N°4, 8 March 2004 (also available in Spanish)

Venezuela: Headed Toward Civil War?, Latin America Briefing N°5, 10 May 2004 (also available in Spanish)

Increasing Europe's Stake in the Andes, Latin America Briefing N°6, 15 June 2004 (also available in Spanish)

Bolivia's Divisions: Too Deep to Heal? Latin America Report N°7, 6 July 2004 (also available in Spanish)

Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?, Latin America Report N°8, 5 August 2004 (also available in Spanish)

Colombia's Borders: The Weak Link in Uribe's Security Policy, Latin America Report N°9, 23 September 2004 (also available in Spanish)

A New Chance for Haiti?, Latin America/Caribbean Report N°10, 17 November 2004 (also available in French)

War and Drugs in Colombia, Latin America Report N°11, 27 January 2005 (also available in Spanish)

Haiti's Transition: Hanging in the Balance, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°7, 8 February 2005 (also available in French)

Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru, Latin America Report N°12, 3 March 2005 (also available in Spanish)

Spoiling Security in Haiti, Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13, 31 May 2005

Colombia: Presidential Politics and Political Prospects, Latin America Report N°14, 16 June 2005 (also available in Spanish)

Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°8, 3 August 2005 (also available in French)

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