

FIGHTING TO CONTROL

YUGOSLAVIA'S MILITARY

I. OVERVIEW

Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica's 24 June 2002 sacking of Yugoslav Army (VJ) Chief of the General Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic was necessary, welcome, and long overdue. The EU, U.S., and NATO acclaimed the move as an effort to assert civilian control over the military, and Kostunica indeed deserves credit for removing a significant obstacle to the country's reintegration with Europe. Nonetheless, the action was probably more the result of the ongoing power struggle between Kostunica and Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic than a genuine effort to bring the military under civilian control or dismantle the extra-constitutional parallel command structures that the post-Milosevic leadership of the country has created within the VJ.¹

The dramatic action will deserve to be interpreted as a genuine step in the right direction only if Kostunica follows up with concerted efforts to remove other compromised individuals and introduce democratic civilian control over the military. Until then, Pavkovic's charges – since supported by two other generals – that the president ordered VJ troops to attack the Serbian Republic government as part of his power struggle with Djindjic will continue to raise questions about the nature of politics and governance inside a state that has not yet shaken off the dark legacy of the 1990s.

The "Pavkovic Affair" highlights the lack of democratic parliamentary control over Yugoslavia's military and brings into public view the

questionable chain of command Kostunica's cabinet has used with respect to the VJ. It also highlights similar structures Djindjic has created within the Interior Ministry. The manner in which Kostunica removed Pavkovic was legally controversial, and is undergoing judicial and parliamentary scrutiny. The assertion that Kostunica ordered the army to attack his political rival, Djindjic, has set the stage for a constitutional and legal challenge that could weaken the president domestically during the crucial run-up to Serbian presidential elections and may even lead to his impeachment for violations of the constitution.

II. WHAT HAPPENED

At a hurriedly scheduled meeting on Monday, 24 June 2002, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica asked the other members of the Supreme Defence Council (VSO) to vote with him to remove from office General Nebojsa Pavkovic, the Chief of the General Staff. The Yugoslav Federal Constitution enshrines the VSO as the highest civilian authority over the armed forces. Its members included Kostunica in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, and Pavkovic himself in his capacity as Chief of the General Staff. Many experts, and much of the public, read the FRY constitution as requiring the VSO to operate on the principle of consensus.²

In response to Kostunica's suggestion, it appears that Djukanovic and Milutinovic stated that they would vote for Pavkovic's removal provided Kostunica agreed also to fire General Aco Tomic – a Kostunica loyalist and head of the VJ's Counter-

¹ ICG has warned of these parallel structures in its last three Serbia reports. See ICG Balkans Report No.117 *Serbia's Transition: Reforms Under Siege*, 21 September 2001; ICG Balkans Report No.126 *Belgrade's Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern*, 7 March 2002; and ICG Balkans Briefing *Serbia: Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reforms*, 28 March 2002.

² ICG interviews with FRY experts in the field of civil-military relations.

Intelligence Service (KOS). Kostunica refused, and neither Djukanovic nor Milutinovic were willing to drop Pavkovic alone.³ The meeting also saw an acrimonious exchange between Kostunica and Pavkovic. The session lasted over four hours, and ended inconclusively slightly before 6 pm.

Immediately afterwards, Kostunica and Pavkovic attended a 7 pm session of the Presidium of the General Staff,⁴ to which several members of the Federal government had also been invited. At the Presidium he issued a presidential decree that pensioned off Pavkovic and made General Branko Krga acting Chief of the General Staff. On leaving the Presidium shortly before 7:30 pm, Kostunica gave a brief statement to the press, in which he reported that Pavkovic had been retired and praised him for his Kosovo service in 1999.

Shortly afterwards, Pavkovic told the press that he refused to accept Kostunica's decision, which, he claimed, violated the Federal Constitution and the Law on the Army. He asserted that Kostunica had removed him because of personal and political animosity and said he would appeal to the Supreme Court and the Federal Parliament. He also called on the Federal Parliament to remove Kostunica from office.

Later in the evening, after meeting once again with the Presidium of the General Staff, but without Kostunica present, Pavkovic announced that he had the full support of the generals. At that point, it appeared that a revolt of the generals might be possible. The next day, however, Kostunica met with all VJ senior officers and obtained a somewhat ambiguous written statement that asserted their loyalty to him as commander in chief and to the VSO and seemed to nip in the bud any potential for military unrest.

The more serious challenge to Kostunica was Pavkovic's claim that on the night of 7/8 June 2001, he had refused an order by an allegedly inebriated Kostunica and his similarly afflicted advisors to use VJ special forces to attack a Serbian Republic government agency. He also asserted the existence of extra-constitutional and extra-legal parallel command structures in the VJ established by Kostunica and his cabinet.

Since Pavkovic's dismissal, Belgrade's legal and constitutional experts and military analysts have heatedly discussed a) whether Kostunica's action independent of the VSO was legal and b) whether Kostunica had the authority to retire Pavkovic, or simply to reassign him. The only precedent for removing a Chief of the General Staff occurred in 1998, when Milosevic removed Momcilo Perisic. Lacking the consent of the VSO (Montenegro would not have agreed to the move) and fearing that without this consent the move would appear illegitimate, Milosevic merely reassigned Perisic to a different post within the VJ. Perisic quickly took the hint and "voluntarily" retired.

ICG has interviewed a number of specialists, examined the arguments, and analysed the relevant sections of the FRY Constitution and the Law on the Army. These documents are internally ambiguous, so there are substantive arguments on both sides. Although Pavkovic's initial presentation of his case before the Federal Constitutional Court was rejected on 12 July, on the grounds that it was a labour dispute and not a constitutional matter, his legal remedies are far from exhausted and his case now goes to the Military Supreme Court. The legal process will give the courts and parliament useful opportunities to address the question of presidential powers and prerogatives.

Pavkovic's startling charges regarding Kostunica and his cabinet have since been supported publicly by two other generals. Pavkovic claimed that at 1 am on 8 June 2001, Kostunica called him to his cabinet office in the federal building where he encountered the president, his Chief of Staff Ljiljana Nedeljkovic, his advisor Gradimir Nalic, and General Aco Tomic, all under the influence of alcohol. Tomic was said to be there without the knowledge or permission of his superior officers.

According to Pavkovic, Kostunica's advisors ordered him to use VJ troops to attack the Serbian Republic Bureau of Information, an office that monitors the media and maintains government web sites.⁵ Allegedly the advisers claimed that the Republic government had placed eavesdropping equipment in the Bureau to wiretap Kostunica's office and telephones.⁶ Pavkovic refused. Three

³ "Pavkovic ukazom smenjen, postavljen Branko Krga," *Radio B92*, 24 June 2002.

⁴ Roughly equivalent to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁵ Although some controversy surrounds the work of this agency, to date no evidence has emerged of wrong-doing.

⁶ ICG notes of Pavkovic's press conference on 24 June 2002.

retired generals, Milan Djakovic (former head of the Directorate of Security), Milan Simic (former head of the Directorate of Morale) and most importantly Aleksandar Vasiljevic (former head of KOS itself) have asserted that they were present on the night in question and that Pavkovic's version of events is accurate. Pavkovic had summoned these generals along with other top VJ officers, to Kostunica's cabinet that night to discuss the matter. All three supported Pavkovic's refusal of Kostunica's order and were retired shortly afterwards by Kostunica.

Kostunica has publicly denied all allegations on several occasions, as have members of his staff.⁷ Nalic, who has been connected to the Red Beret revolt in November 2001⁸ and the Perisic arrest in March 2002, and who may have been the brains behind the alleged plot, immediately claimed the allegations were "foolishness," and then went incommunicado.⁹

III. WHO IS NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC?

During the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, General Nebojsa Pavkovic commanded the VJ's Third Army, which was responsible for Kosovo. Given the arguments of command responsibility favoured by the prosecution at the war crimes tribunal in the Hague (ICTY), Pavkovic may well find himself indicted for war crimes. He has already been cited in the prosecution's opening argument against Milosevic as part of the chain of command. After the conflict, Milosevic rewarded him for his loyalty by appointing him as Chief of the General Staff, to replace Dragoljub Ojdanic, who had been indicted by the ICTY. During Pavkovic's tenure, he worked with General Vladimir Lazarevic, his Third Army successor, to purge officers suspected of disloyalty to both them and Milosevic. Pavkovic continued this activity after Milosevic's ouster, indeed up to the moment Kostunica removed him. As a result, the upper ranks of the VJ officer corps are packed with Pavkovic and Milosevic loyalists.

Because of Pavkovic's role as a Milosevic appointee and guardian of the regime, and his high profile media attacks against the political opposition during the September 2000 election campaign, the DOS coalition set his removal as a goal. However, when DOS overthrew Milosevic on 5 October 2000, Pavkovic played an important role, mediating between Kostunica and Milosevic. The specifics of an oft-mentioned meeting with the latter at that time remain secret. In spite of that meeting, DOS expected Kostunica to remove Pavkovic immediately.

During Pavkovic's tenure, the VJ has faced media accusations of illegal activities, including cigarette smuggling, and questions have been raised about possible improprieties in acquisition of medical supplies for the military health care system.¹⁰ Other questions have been raised about possible Pavkovic improprieties in allocation of military apartments and construction contracts.¹¹ Pavkovic has frequently and openly intervened in domestic political struggles, often attacking in the media the policies of DOS politicians.¹² These include recent statements attacking DOS' respected elder statesman Dragoljub Micunovic, the speaker of the upper house of the federal parliament, whose committee for Defence and Security has been rewriting the laws and regulations on civil-military relations in order to introduce democratic parliamentary control.

Pavkovic is accused of blocking serious efforts at military reform, and the ICTY has stated that the VJ he controlled is still blocking access to archives and protecting indicted war criminals, such as Ratko Mladic, the former commander of the Bosnian Serb army.

In an attempt to turn aside pressure for his removal from the U.S. and the EU, Pavkovic would often tell foreign diplomats and local politicians that he had to remain as Chief of Staff to deter unrest in the VJ

⁷ ICG interview with Rade Bulatovic, Kostunica's Security Advisor.

⁸ See ICG Balkans Report N°117 *Serbian Transition: Reforms Under Siege*, 21 September 2001.

⁹ "Kostunica trazio prepad na Vladu Srbije," *Danas*, 25 June 2002. ICG attempted to reach Nalic both at his office and on his mobile phone. The receptionist said that he had left "on vacation," and his mobile phone is switched off.

¹⁰ "Bitka za kontrolu nad vojskom," *Dnevnik*, 26 June 2002. ICG interview with Finance Minister Bozidar Djelic.

¹¹ The weekly *Nedeljni Telegraf* ran a series of articles during March 2001 dealing with this topic. Pavkovic appears to have told his version of events in the article "Ni Milosevicu ni Kostunici nisam dozvolio da zloupotrebe vojsku", *Nedeljni Telegraf*, 3 Jul 2002.

¹² For a more detailed examination of some of Pavkovic's interventions, see ICG Balkans Report N°126 *Belgrade's Lagging Reforms: Cause for International Concern*, 7 March 2002.

that could lead to a civil war.¹³ Had he been retained, however, the FRY would have found itself at loggerheads with NATO over its application to join Partnership for Peace (PfP).

IV. WHY DID KOSTUNICA ACT?

Kostunica had two possible motivations for removing Pavkovic in the way that he did. The first possibility is that he genuinely sought, and seeks, to bring the VJ military under civilian control. The second is that the president was firing another salvo in his ongoing power struggle with Djindjic.

The first interpretation is supported by the debate inside the FRY over membership in the Council of Europe and PfP. At the beginning of 2002, Foreign Minister Svilanovic stated that these were two of the FRY's three main foreign policy goals, and he hoped to achieve both by year's end. One of the Council of Europe's key requirements for FRY accession is civilian control over the military. NATO members, including the U.S. and UK¹⁴ had told the FRY publicly that PfP membership would depend on removing individuals compromised by war crimes and imposing democratic civilian control over the military. In private NATO officials and Western ambassadors told top FRY leaders that two men in particular had to go: Pavkovic and General Lazarevic, who had commanded the Pristina Corps in Kosovo during the 1999 bombing, and is today the commander of VJ land forces.¹⁵ Their loyalty to Milosevic, the strong possibility that both had compromised themselves during the 1999 fighting, and their opposition to civilian control, posed insurmountable obstacles to PfP membership.

Kostunica also faced significant rhetorical pressure from other DOS members to remove Pavkovic. On 6 October 2001, the day after it overthrew Milosevic, DOS called almost unanimously for Pavkovic's removal. The only dissenting voice was Kostunica's. At this time the other two members of the VSO were willing to vote for Pavkovic's removal and pressed the new president, but to no

avail. Kostunica continually defended Pavkovic throughout the year, and on 25 December 2001, at a session of the VSO, rejected Pavkovic's tendered resignation.¹⁶ Throughout 2001, Djindjic had been seeking Pavkovic's removal, and in many respects the general's fate became a wedge splitting Kostunica from the rest of DOS. Foreign Minister Svilanovic was displeased with the lack of reform in the military and has threatened publicly to resign if the FRY did not get at least into the Council of Europe by the end of 2002.¹⁷ This threat no doubt placed pressure on Kostunica, who values Svilanovic both for his skills as a mediator between himself and Djindjic, and for his popularity with the international community.

There is, as noted above, a second interpretation of these events. In spite of sustained domestic pressure and foreign incentives, Kostunica had stubbornly refused to remove Pavkovic for twenty months,¹⁸ though many other generals were retired or rotated to other positions. Given this record, it will be hard to conclude that Pavkovic's ultimate dismissal is indeed part of an effort to impose civilian control over the VJ unless Kostunica is seen to take additional actions. These would have to include removing other problematic individuals, such as Lazarevic and Tomic, and supporting fully Micunovic's parliamentary effort to develop new civilian control mechanisms.

To date, however, the president's inclination appears to be in the opposite direction. Following the removal of Pavkovic, Kostunica declared that additional steps to impose civilian control would have to wait until the new constitutional charter for Serbia and Montenegro is in place. Kostunica has also hinted that any changes will have to await the end of Krga's tenure, which should, theoretically, last one year. In other words, Kostunica does not appear to be rushing to carry out further reforms of the military.¹⁹

On 25 March 2002, in the wake of the spectacular arrest by KOS of a U.S. diplomat, John Neighbour,

¹³ ICG interviews with western diplomats in Belgrade.

¹⁴ ICG interviews with U.S., UK and NATO officials.

¹⁵ Subsequently, other names may have been added to this list, and may include KOS head General Aco Tomic, and Police General Sreten Lukic.

¹⁶ Media Center and SMMRI Media Monitoring Service, 2 January 2002.

¹⁷ See the GSS web site at:

<http://www.gradjanskisavez.org.yu/cela.htm>

¹⁸ Media Center and SMMRI Media Monitoring Service, 2 January 2002.

¹⁹ "Kostunica, Djindjic i Pavkovic o 'slucaju Pavkovic,'" *Radio B92*, 26 June 2002.

and Serbian Vice-President Momcilo Perisic,²⁰ Kostunica changed his stance on Pavkovic. This was probably because during the Perisic Affair two things became clear: first, that Pavkovic had switched to the Djindjic camp;²¹ secondly, that the general's actions and open conflict with Tomic and Kostunica over the question of responsibility and chain of command had revealed publicly the parallel structures within the VJ that illegally bypassed the Chief of the General Staff and the constitutionally authorised chain of command. When Pavkovic contradicted Kostunica and denied publicly any advance knowledge of the arrests, the split came into the open.

As a result, at the fifth session of the VSO held on 25 March 2002, Kostunica tried to remove Pavkovic but was thwarted by Djukanovic and Milutinovic, who linked Pavkovic's removal to that of Aco Tomic.²² Since that meeting, Pavkovic had been under pressure from Kostunica to resign, while Djindjic's Serbian Republic government appeared to be supporting him.

Although the timing is still a mystery, the struggle for control over the VJ may provide clues. According to Pavkovic's public statements²³ several individuals in Kostunica's cabinet had created parallel command structures inside the VJ the purpose of which was to provide a chain of authority that would allow the president to use the army for the benefit of his party, the DSS,²⁴ while bypassing constitutionally mandated procedures. These structures reportedly depended upon General Aco Tomic. Tomic's career, however, suffered a major setback several weeks prior to Pavkovic's removal when he was expelled from the School of National Defence for failure to attend classes.²⁵

Tomic commanded KOS in Kosovo during the 1999 bombing and, as a result, may also be compromised by his wartime activities.²⁶ He then served as the VJ's Deputy Director of the Sector of Security, under the command of General Milan Djakovic in late 2000. He received this appointment despite not having finished the appropriate military post-graduate education or training. A favourite of Kostunica's, he gained a reputation for insubordination to his superior officers, including Djakovic and Pavkovic. After six months, Djakovic was removed and Tomic became his successor as head of the Directorate of Security (head of KOS), even though he did not meet the qualifications required by VJ regulations. To rectify this shortcoming, Kostunica's Chief of Staff Ljiljana Nedeljkovic directed Tomic to continue his military schooling at the School of National Defence in July 2001.

Tomic's expulsion from that institution in late spring 2002 is a black mark on his record that could disqualify him from any future command assignments, and certainly rules him out as a future Chief of the General Staff.²⁷ It may be only a matter of time before VJ regulations force his removal. Given Tomic's close ties to the president and his cabinet, it is doubtful that he could have been expelled from the National School of Defence without Pavkovic's express knowledge and permission. Likewise, the neutralisation or removal of Tomic would have given Pavkovic a green light to dismantle Kostunica's parallel structures by reassigning officers whose loyalty was suspect. As a result, Kostunica may have needed to act quickly to protect his position in the VJ by removing Pavkovic, even if he did not have the acquiescence of the VSO.

V. POLITICAL IMPACT

²⁰ See ICG Balkans Briefing, *Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reform*, 28 March 2002.

²¹ It is not known precisely when Pavkovic changed sides, but various governmental and other sources tell ICG that it may have taken place as early as December 2001/January 2002.

²² "Kostunica se koleba," *Danas*, 27 March 2002.

²³ Confirmed by ICG sources in the VJ and the Serbian Republic government.

²⁴ Serbian Premier Zoran Djindjic has also attempted to create his own parallel command structures within the Serbian MUP.

²⁵ "Da li je Pavkovic smenjen da bi postavio Aco Tomic," *Danas*, 26 June 2002.

²⁶ The KOS (Counter-Intelligence Service) serves not only as an internal secret police within the VJ, but also is responsible for organising a broad spectrum of "black" or "deniable" activities. KOS took a primary role in organising the Serbian paramilitary formations inside Croatia prior to the outbreak of fighting in 1991 and also played a similar role in Bosnia. KOS also has the function of maintaining the ideological loyalty of the army.

²⁷ In most armies such a black mark would signal the imminent end of an officer's career.

Reactions from Brussels and Washington to Pavkovic's removal were swift and unequivocal: good riddance to Pavkovic, and hurrah for Kostunica and civilian control. A few DOS politicians also welcomed unconditionally Pavkovic's removal, most notably Foreign Minister Svilanovic and Serbian government Vice-President Miodrag Isakov, who said "there is never a bad time to remove Pavkovic".²⁸ But with the exceptions of Svilanovic and Isakov, it appeared that the only thing DOS leaders agreed upon was that the removal had come late. Most domestic reactions were nuanced, indicating that the opening shots in the fall presidential race had been fired. As often, clear battle lines were drawn between Kostunica on the one hand and Djindjic and the rest of DOS on the other. After all, Kostunica was left with Tomic still in place, while Djindjic had lost Pavkovic.

Inside DOS, not even Pavkovic's erstwhile patron, Djindjic, was willing to support Pavkovic openly. Nonetheless, it was obvious that many were willing to use the affair to attack Kostunica, especially to tarnish his reputation as a stickler for legal procedures. Djindjic and others argued that Kostunica had acted illegally by going around the VSO.²⁹ Serbian Vice-President Nebojsa Covic was typical, when he said that although he had called for Pavkovic's removal since the beginning of the year, he was not in favour of the way it had been carried out. Zarko Korac, another Vice-President, echoed Covic. Others, such as the Vojvodina coalition leader Dragan Veselinov, accused Kostunica of sacking Pavkovic in an effort to take personal control of the army.³⁰ Minister of Justice Vladan Batic, who of late appears to act as Djindjic's stalking horse, called for Kostunica's resignation.³¹

The other major issue raised by the Pavkovic Affair is whether Kostunica and his cabinet tried to use the VJ to attack the Serbian government. Opinion polls show that the VJ is the most popular institution in Serbia,³² and any impression that the president had attempted to manipulate this institution for personal political gain or to attack another legitimate governmental institution could hurt his popularity.

Sensing blood in the water, DOS politicians are calling for a special investigation. A DOS presidency meeting on 27 June urged DOS deputies in both the Serbian and Yugoslav Parliaments to use the appropriate committees to pursue the matter. Because Kostunica is a likely candidate for the Presidency of Serbia later this year, there can be no doubt that his opponents in DOS will attempt to gain maximum political mileage from the Pavkovic Affair, both on the issue of legality, and on the issue of improper manipulation of the army. Even if the courts or Micunovic's parliamentary committee do not rule against him, Kostunica will have a very difficult political race against other candidates, probably including Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus and Cacak mayor Velimir Ilic. There is no doubt that DOS will attempt to drag the investigations out through the election campaign.

The Pavkovic Affair and its fallout have exacerbated disputes in the Federal Parliament's already tenuous DOS coalition; it has been unable to form an investigative committee into the matter due to obstruction in the parliament by DSS. This could delay the drafting and ratification of the new Serbia-Montenegro constitutional charter consequent to the agreement brokered by Javier Solana on March 14.³³ A judicial decision favouring Kostunica could give rise to more separatist agitation, since pro-independence politicians in both Serbia and Montenegro could cite the Pavkovic Affair as evidence that Federal institutions are unresponsive to their needs and that the republics cannot control the military through the constitutional mechanism of the VSO. For his part, Pavkovic has hinted that he may enter political life, and that there are more revelations to come.

VI. TOWARDS REALISTIC CIVILIAN CONTROL

Nevertheless, in the long run the Pavkovic Affair could have a salutary effect by strengthening democracy in FRY and stimulating greater civilian control over the armed forces. The general's appeal has bestowed a new form of legitimacy on the Parliament, giving it for the first time new de facto as well as de jure authority to review decisions

²⁸ "Slozni samo u tome da kasni," *Danas*, 26 June 2002.

²⁹ "Djindjic i Svilanovic: reakcije na smenu Pavkovica," *Radio B92*, 24 June 2002; "Vojni vrh podrzao Kostunicu," *Danas*, 26 June 2002.

³⁰ "Slozni samo u tome da kasni," *Danas*, 26 June 2002.

³¹ "Batic trazi ostavku Kostunice," *Danas*, 26 June 2002.

³² "Vera u snagu volje i duha," *VOJSKA*, 30 May 2002.

³³ See ICG Balkans Report No. 129, *Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European Union*, 7 May 2002.

related to the military. Most importantly, the Pavkovic Affair demonstrated that the VJ would not revolt against the civilian authority, although the ambiguities in both the constitution and the law make it uncertain as to which civilian authority it gives its loyalty. Contrary to the initial expectations of some FRY politicians, a military coup was not a real threat.³⁴ Following the revolt of the Red Beret special forces unit in November 2001, this was a welcome surprise.

For the Pavkovic Affair to be helpful in the long term, however, the FRY and the Serbian Republic will have to establish serious democratic Parliamentary control over their armed forces. This will require real reforms of both the VJ and the Serbian and Montenegrin MUPs. Micunovic has noted that the Pavkovic removal should be followed by others.³⁵ Although he did not give names, the strongest candidates are Tomic and Lazarevic on the federal level and Serbian police General Sreten Lukic on the Republic level. The Serbian government will have to push forward rapidly the stalled draft reform laws on the Ministry of the Interior, the Police and Secret Service, and the Federal government will have to support actively the work of Micunovic's parliamentary commission. Only if these reforms are advanced rapidly will it be plausible to claim that the Pavkovic Affair was a step forward in the development of civilian control over the armed forces. Otherwise, it will be viewed as simply one more battle between Djindjic and Kostunica.

Belgrade/Brussels, 15 July 2002

³⁴ "Pavkovic ne sme da bude jedini," *Danas*, 27 June 2002.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

APPENDIX A

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and across four continents.

In *Africa*, those locations include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

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APPENDIX B

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