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Humanitarian  
Policy Group

# Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

## Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme

Phase 2: April 2012–March 2013

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# Acronyms and other terms

<b>ACF</b>	Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger)
<b>Adeso</b>	African Development Solutions
<b>AS</b>	Al Shabaab
<b>BL</b>	Baseline
<b>CaLP</b>	Cash Learning Partnership
<b>CBRWG</b>	Cash-based Response Working Group
<b>CBT</b>	Community-Based Targeting
<b>COOPI</b>	Cooperazione Internazionale
<b>CPD</b>	Centre for Peace and Democracy
<b>CPI</b>	Consumer Price Index
<b>CRC</b>	Cash Relief Committee
<b>CVMG</b>	Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group
<b>DANIDA</b>	Danish International Development Agency
<b>Deyr</b>	The short rainy season (September–December)
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development (UK)
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ECHO</b>	EU Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
<b>FAO</b>	(UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>FEWSNET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FHH</b>	Female-headed household
<b>FSNAU</b>	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FAO)
<b>GAM</b>	Global Acute Malnutrition
<b>Gu</b>	The main rainy season (April–June)
<b>Hawala</b>	Money transfer agents
<b>HDDS</b>	Household Dietary Diversity Score
<b>HH</b>	Household
<b>HIJRA</b>	Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid
<b>HPG</b>	Humanitarian Policy Group
<b>HVF</b>	High-value food
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>ID</b>	Identification
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People

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<b>IFMs</b>	Independent Field Monitors
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated (Food Security) Phase Classification
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MEB</b>	Minimum Expenditure Basket
<b>MHH</b>	Male-headed household
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MUAC</b>	Middle Upper Arm Circumference
<b>NFI</b>	Non-Food Items
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>OCHA</b>	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute
<b>OIC</b>	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
<b>PDM</b>	Post-distribution monitoring
<b>QM</b>	Quarterly Monitoring
<b>SAM</b>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<b>SATG</b>	Somali Agriculture Technical Group
<b>SIDA</b>	Sweden International Development Assistance
<b>SoSh</b>	Somali Shilling
<b>SSA</b>	Sub-Saharan Africa
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>TLU</b>	Tropical Livestock Unit
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>VRC</b>	Village Relief Committee
<b>WFP</b>	(UN) World Food Programme



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# Preface

The Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group was established in August 2011 as a mechanism for monitoring the efficiency and impact of cash and voucher transfers distributed by non-international NGOs<sup>1</sup> and their respective local partners in response to the 2011 famine and severe food insecurity in Southern Somalia.

At the height of the intervention the agencies distributed \$50.6 million worth of cash and vouchers to a total of 136,673 beneficiary households, across nine regions of South Central Somalia. It is estimated that by December 2011, the cash and voucher transfers distributed by the group were reaching over 20% of the households in 'crisis' according to the IPC system.

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), Somali Agriculture Technical Group (SATG) and NorthLink were contracted to establish an external monitoring system during Phase 1. ODI designed the monitoring system and then trained agencies on its use. As well as providing information about project implementation, the monitoring system included specific variables to measure donors'<sup>2</sup> concerns about possible diversion of resources. The monitoring system was also designed to provide up-to-date information on market behavior, the ease

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<sup>1</sup> ACF, Adeso, Concern, Danish Refugee Council, Oxfam and Save the Children.  
<sup>2</sup> UK Department for International Development (DFID); the European Commission's Department for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO); the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA); the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

with which cash and vouchers were received by beneficiaries, how resources were used, and the overall viability of a large-scale cash and voucher distribution programme operating in insecure areas through a range of NGO and private sector partners.

A sizable quantitative data collection system – managed by the implementing partners themselves – was supplemented by independent qualitative surveys (facilitated by SATG and NorthLink). All data was collated and analysed by ODI, giving project stakeholders access to a wide range of information on a range of programme issues from targeting to impact.

Phase 1 was implemented from August 2011 to March 2012, with monitoring data available for all months and all agencies from October 2011. In March 2012 additional funding was made available for a second phase (Phase 2), and the same cohort of NGOs as well as two new agencies embarked on a second round of transfers, with ODI and SATG providing independent monitoring support.

This report describes the findings of monitoring carried out over Phase 2 of the programme. Monitoring findings for Phase 1 are presented in a separate report<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Longley, K., Dunn, S & Brewin, M (2012) CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme. Phase 1 September 2011–March 2012. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.



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We also recognise the agency staff members that were based in Nairobi who made programmatic decisions based on the monitoring information throughout the implementation period of the CVMG interventions. Your dedication to the monitoring system is critical for learning and the development of best practice and for that we thank you.

UNICEF provided much of the funding for the monitoring activities undertaken by the CVMG and also played an invaluable coordination role. We also give special thanks and appreciation of the efforts of Claire Mariani and her dedication to the programme.

We also acknowledge other members of SATG and ODI for their contributions to this report. Hussein Haji, Salim Hagi and Simon

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Thanks also to FSNAU staff, who helpfully shared tools and data with the monitoring team – specifically the revised Coping Strategy Index used in Phase 2, and market price data when requested.

Last, but by no means least, we thank the Somali community, especially the people who provided information that contributed to the data collection exercise. Beneficiaries and other stakeholders have shared their opinions and their personal information with the CVMG partners and we thank you for doing so. We truly hope that this programme has met the needs of the targeted households with whom the CVMG partners worked. We thank you for your time, your honesty and your patience with the monitoring process.

We also acknowledge that, while we wrote this report on the basis of information provided to us by members of the CVMG, any faults or misrepresentations remain the sole responsibility of the authors.



# Executive summary

The Somalia Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) has been monitoring cash-based interventions (both unconditional cash transfers and commodity-based food vouchers)<sup>4</sup> implemented in South Central Somalia in response to famine and humanitarian crisis since September 2011.

The CVMG (Phase 2) was made up of ten non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (eight international NGOs and two local NGO partners), two independent consultants contracted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and one independent organisation: Somali Agricultural Technical Group (SATG) was contracted to provide Independent Field Monitors (IFMs). Two new international NGOs joined the CVMG in Phase 2, while all the other partners have been involved since Phase 1. UNICEF supported the coordination of the CVMG and provided most of the funding for the monitoring component of the CVMG.

The emergency cash interventions in Somalia in 2011–12 by the CVMG constitute the largest emergency cash-based programme to date that was not government run. At the height of the intervention (Phase 1) agencies distributed a total of \$50.6 million-worth of cash and vouchers to 136,673 beneficiary households over a period of six months, across nine regions of South Central Somalia. Over the course of Phase 2, 96,763 beneficiary households (approximately 677,000 individuals) received assistance in the form of either vouchers or cash for at least one month. Of these Phase 2 households just 29,265 were newly targeted, while the remaining 67,498 (69%) also received assistance during Phase 1.

The monitoring system for the CVMG was primarily designed to inform ongoing programming. It included quantitative data collection (surveys), supplemented with qualitative monitoring (in-depth interviews) to allow for greater insight into issues such as targeting and diversion. It also included data related to donor concerns about large-scale cash programming and agency concerns specific to the Somali context. As this was the first time that cash programming had been used in Somalia at scale, donors requested a comprehensive monitoring system, something that food assistance and other types of aid in Somalia have not been subjected to in the past. The monitoring system therefore provided a substantial<sup>5</sup> and rigorous database.

South and Central Somalia are among the most complex environments in the world for delivering humanitarian

<sup>4</sup> 'Commodity vouchers' are vouchers that are redeemable for specific goods (in this case specific food items), as opposed to vouchers that have a cash value whereby the beneficiary can choose the goods to purchase. The term 'cash-based interventions' is used throughout this report to refer to both cash and commodity voucher projects.

<sup>5</sup> More than 22,000 households interviewed over the full implementation of the programme (Phase 1 + Phase 2).

assistance. Security concerns mean that agencies often work through remote management, and within Somalia even local staff face ongoing difficulties in accessing beneficiaries. The prospect of large-scale cash programming in such a context was therefore met with significant scepticism from donors and the larger humanitarian community. However, since the World Food Programme (WFP) had been forced to withdraw from South Central Somalia more than a year earlier,<sup>6</sup> the humanitarian community was left with few response options.

Although there was already experience of cash programming in Somalia prior to the famine, it had not been done on such a scale. The debate about the appropriateness of large-scale cash interventions caused serious delays in action, but it also forced 'pro-cash' agencies (those with previous experience) to articulate and examine the operational risks and potential mitigation strategies (a process that should not be specific to cash-based responses). This enabled actors with experience of cash-based interventions to share learning, debate issues and reach conclusions together. This process has been beneficial to the CVMG agencies themselves and, through this report, will also benefit the larger humanitarian community.

At the inception of the programme the challenges and risks associated with successful aid delivery in Somalia were significant. However, many of these challenges are not specific to cash-based programmes, but are problems that come with working in difficult environments through remote management. Indeed, many of the problems faced by the CVMG (such as targeting and diversion) were due to the working environment, remote management, the difficulties of large-scale continuous monitoring (monitoring fatigue) and funding issues, rather than being due to cash-based interventions *per se*.

In fact, despite the significant security and access challenges faced by humanitarian agencies Somalia is an appropriate environment for cash interventions: it has an innovative, national system of money transfer agents (*hawala*), which regularly deals with billions of dollars from the diaspora. The market system is highly integrated and competitive as the country relies heavily on imported food, so availability is rarely an issue. The famine was a result of livelihood failure (loss of income as a result of drought) rather than a failure of the market system. This was confirmed by market assessments prior to implementation, which found that items were available in most markets, but households lacked the income to purchase them.

<sup>6</sup> The World Food Programme and its local partners were forced to withdraw their services in early 2010 after repeated attacks on their transport convoys. Soon afterwards, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia published a report alleging that three of WFP Somalia's primary contractors had been accused of mass corruption. The report estimated that half of WFP's food aid destined for Somalia was being diverted and sold off illegally.

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The CVMG programme has now been subject to a comprehensive external evaluation,<sup>7</sup> which determined that cash programming was indeed an appropriate response to the famine and severe food insecurity that was present at the start of Phase 1 of the programme. While there were some specific contextual factors that enhanced the ability to utilise cash transfers as a mode of intervention, there is much to learn from the Somalia experience.

Food assistance (and other types of interventions) in Somalia have not been subject to the same level of monitoring as the CVMG programme, so it is difficult to know how this programme compares on issues such as targeting error, accountability and ease of delivery. However, it is clear that cash programming was held to different standards in terms of both monitoring and targeting than food assistance. Given the high level of need at the start of Phase 1, blanket coverage was the most appropriate response; if food assistance had been an option, it would most likely have been done with blanket coverage. However, because the intervention involved cash this was an option not afforded by donors.

Although there were considerable difficulties during implementation relating to access, security and the sheer volume of transfers required, the process of cash and voucher delivery was relatively smooth thanks largely to the previous experience of agencies and the role of local private sector partners (the *hawala* and local traders) in delivery. The monitoring system also allowed agencies to pick up issues in real time, allowing for timely changes to their projects. The intricacies of delivery were improved during Phase 1 so that the systems were running well by the end of the first six months of implementation. By Phase 2 beneficiaries answered the majority of the process monitoring questions positively, indicating that the cash and vouchers were reaching them in a timely and appropriate manner.

In terms of impact, there is strong evidence that the cash and voucher interventions enabled households to purchase food, increase the number of meals consumed each day and increase dietary diversity. Importantly, there is evidence that the intervention also allowed households to repay debts, which opened up new lines of credit. This contributed greatly to building household resilience as it put people in a better position in the event of another crisis. The cash intervention also improved the social standing of beneficiaries and enabled them to participate in community alms giving, for which they were previously recipients.

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<sup>7</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

In addition, although there was significant concern among the humanitarian community that cash would cause inflation in the market, this has not been the case. Despite more than 100,000 households receiving regular cash transfers for more than six months, at a value sufficient to meet their food needs, no evidence of inflation was evident. In fact, local traders reported that cash and vouchers contributed positively to demand, particularly in Mogadishu, where the combination of declining global food prices and distribution of in-kind food aid contributed to food price deflation in mid-2012.<sup>8</sup>

In summary, the monitoring system was beneficial to the CVMG agencies in three ways:

1. It helped identify practical implementation issues in a timely manner, which allowed agencies to make changes to the cash and voucher delivery process. This included increasing the number of distribution points to reduce travel time for beneficiaries; improving the service at distribution points to reduce beneficiary waiting time; increasing the value of the vouchers; changing the value of cash distributed based on market price information; and managing operational issues brought to agencies' attention through the feedback mechanism.
2. The monitoring system also highlighted larger issues about targeting, diversion and reliance on gatekeepers, which would not have been picked up without the qualitative data collection. These issues are important for understanding the working environment and for helping agencies recognise and mitigate potential risks to their programmes.
3. It provided evidence of changes in the beneficiary households as a result of the interventions.

Good programme monitoring is necessary to ensure that programmes are implemented well. The CVMG monitoring system has provided evidence that cash and vouchers can be used at scale, as a means of providing food assistance in one of the most complex humanitarian environments in the world. It is therefore recommended that cash-based responses be used to provide humanitarian assistance to households in crisis in Somalia in future.

It is also recommended that agencies continue to include key aspects of this monitoring system, including qualitative data collection related to targeting, programme stakeholders (NGOs, camp leadership, village leaders) and possible diversion. This should complement the more traditional quantitative data collection on item delivery, programme impact and market price monitoring.

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The Somalia Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) has been monitoring cash-based interventions (both unconditional cash transfers and commodity-based food vouchers<sup>9</sup>) implemented in South Central Somalia in response to famine and humanitarian crisis since September 2011. The projects monitored by the CVMG represent a significant effort by agencies to address the food insecurity of the most vulnerable households.

The CVMG (Phase 2) was made up of ten non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (eight international NGOs and two local NGO partners), two independent consultants contracted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and one independent organisation: Somali Agricultural Technical Group (SATG) was contracted to provide Independent Field Monitors (IFMs). Two new international NGOs joined in the CVMG in Phase 2, while all the other partners have been involved since Phase 1. UNICEF, which also supported the coordination of the CVMG, provided most of the funding for the CVMG exercise (both Phase 1 and Phase 2).

Over the course of Phase 2, 96,763 households (approximately 677,000 individuals) received assistance in the form of either vouchers or cash for at least one month (Annex 1). Of these Phase 2 households just 29,265 were newly targeted – the remaining 67,498 (69%) also received assistance during Phase 1.

The number of households supported in Phase 2 was lower than Phase 1, which targeted almost 137,000 households. <sup>9</sup> ‘Commodity vouchers’ are vouchers that are redeemable for specific goods (in this case specific food items), as opposed to vouchers that have a cash value whereby the beneficiary can choose the goods to purchase. The term ‘cash-based interventions’ is used throughout this report to refer to both cash and commodity voucher projects.

and approximately 960,000 people. The reduction in targeted households is a reflection of both the improved food security conditions during 2012, and funding constraints.

The monitoring exercise was undertaken in close collaboration with the implementing NGO partners in order to share findings on the impacts of the project and to learn from the challenges of implementation. This is the second monitoring report for the CVMG. It presents the findings of the monitoring activities undertaken for Phase 2 (April 2012 to March 2013).

Phase 1 of the CVMG projects, as well as other cash and voucher programmes implemented by non-CVMG agencies in response to the famine, have been independently evaluated.<sup>10</sup> It was found that the interventions made a quantifiable difference in reducing hunger and improving food security. The evaluation found that cash enabled a more rapid recovery of food and nutrition security and also enabled livelihood investments. This was achieved within an extraordinarily difficult operating environment, which required risk-taking on the part of organisations and the individual staff members involved.<sup>11</sup>

More information on the Phase 1 monitoring findings or the evaluation can be obtained from HPG or from UNICEF Somalia.<sup>12</sup> Some of the evaluation findings are based on the CVMG monitoring data, and as such some of the evaluation findings are highlighted in this report.

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<sup>10</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Longley, K., Dunn, S & Brewin, M (2012) CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme. Phase 1: September 2011–March 2012. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.





# Chapter 2

## Background

South and Central Somalia are among the most complex environments in the world for delivering humanitarian assistance. Since the ousting of General Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has suffered continued violent conflict between groups vying for power. The absence of a permanent and effective central government resulted in a decline in the welfare of the population.

Somalia ranks poorly on a wide range of social, economic and political and military indicators, including the US Fund for Peace Failed State Index, where it has been top of the list every year since 2008.<sup>13</sup> Attributes of a failed state include the loss of physical control of its territory, the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.<sup>14</sup> Operating in this environment comes with considerable security risks for the humanitarian community: many international humanitarian agencies have limited access to beneficiaries, having instead to operate through remote management or through partnerships with local organisations.

Corruption and clan politics are also notable problems, and humanitarian aid in Somalia faces considerable risks of diversion. Prior to Phase 1 of this intervention, aid options in Somalia were changed significantly when the World Food Programme and its local partners were forced to withdraw their services in early 2010 after repeated attacks on their transport convoys. Soon afterwards, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia published a report alleging that three of WFP Somalia's primary contractors had been accused of mass corruption. The report estimated that half of WFP's food aid destined for Somalia was being diverted and sold off illegally.<sup>15</sup>

Against this backdrop is a highly food insecure country, dependent on imported food and with large groups of the population reliant on the humanitarian community for support. Repeated droughts have had a severe impact on agricultural and pastoralist households. The ongoing conflict and droughts are the two main factors that have resulted in large-scale population displacement, poor infrastructure, low education levels and lack of health care facilities, all of which have limited the livelihood opportunities of poor Somali households.

<sup>13</sup> Fund for Peace & Foreign Policy. Failed State index – ranked by country. Somalia has been in the top 7 countries (out of 177) since the index started in 2005.

<sup>14</sup> Fund for Peace website. <http://www.ffp.statesindex.org>.

<sup>15</sup> UN Somalia Monitoring Group, 2010: 60.

### 2.1. Opportunities for cash-based interventions

Despite the significant security and access challenges faced by humanitarian agencies it is perhaps surprising to learn that Somalia is well placed for cash-based programming. The Phase 1 report of this project discusses in detail the process involved in the decision to use cash-based interventions to address the food assistance needs of the famine-affected population so this will not be repeated here.

In summary, the withdrawal of WFP left few options available to the humanitarian community for providing food assistance aside from the use of cash-based interventions. A comprehensive market assessment by FSNAU/FEWSNET<sup>16</sup> found that local markets 'might be able to increase the supply of imported rice in response to cash in most of the regions affected by famine or humanitarian emergency in the south'. This ability of Somali markets to continue to operate in the face of considerable insecurity provided a key opportunity for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additional market analysis from mid-2011 indicated that, in most parts of the country, food items including staples were available in the market, but that prices were very high.<sup>17</sup> Urban markets continued to function despite the many challenges market participants faced, including the reduction in effective demand caused by collapsing livelihoods and weak purchasing power across southern Somalia.

A second opportunity was offered by the *hawala* system, an extensive network of money transfer agents operating throughout the country. As a result of the lack of central government and the failure of government services including banks, the Somali people have been innovative in order to survive. The Somali diaspora provides significant, ongoing remittance from abroad estimated in the range of US\$1.3–2 billion per year<sup>18</sup> requiring fast and reliable international money transfer systems. The *hawala* system allows money to be transferred into and within Somalia, effectively reaching individuals even in the most remote areas, often within 24 hours. Contrasted with input delivery projects employing dozens of contractors and many more sub-contractors, using the *hawala* system means that the money passes through fewer hands, potentially decreasing the risk of diversion.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> FSNAU (2011) *Special Brief: Market functioning in Southern Somalia – July 28, 2011*. FEWSNET, Washington.

<sup>17</sup> FSNAU (2011) *Market Data Update – Monthly Market Analysis*, July 2011, <http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/Market-Data-Update-July-August-2011.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Hammond, et al., (2011). *Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-building*. Report of a Study Commissioned by UNDP Somalia, January 2011.

<sup>19</sup> Longley, C et al (2012) *CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher programme. Phase 1: September 2011 – March 2012*. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.

Within Somalia, aid agencies have been implementing cash and voucher programmes since 2003 and there is considerable expertise, guidelines and learning available. The agencies that initially formed the CVMG are perhaps the most experienced in cash-based interventions in Somalia.

## 2.2. Food security in South Central Somalia (2010–2013)

At the end of 2010, the southern regions of Somalia experienced a failure of the short *Deyr* rains (Annex 2). The subsequent failed production meant that local cereal stocks were rapidly depleted. This led to rising prices of locally produced cereal, affecting both urban and rural populations. Throughout the country the prices of locally produced cereals skyrocketed from October 2010, significantly surpassing their 2008 hyperinflation peaks. Food insecurity at this time was largely due to food access issues rather than food availability, with households simply unable to afford the food that was present in the market as a result of their weakened livelihood position.

On 21 July 2011, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) declared that famine existed in two regions of southern Somalia: southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle. The famine subsequently spread to five out of the eight regions in South Somalia, with humanitarian emergencies in parts of all eight southern regions, the two central regions and four of the eight northern regions (Annex 3).<sup>20</sup>

Conditions in most parts of Somalia have improved significantly since 2011, resulting in a reduction in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in almost all project areas by the start of Phase 2 (Annex 4).

The improvement in food security was largely due to a decrease in local food prices. Prices began to fall at the same time as the 2011 *Deyr* rains, when agricultural and pastoral conditions improved. The famine was over by January 2012.<sup>21</sup> The FSNAU post-*Deyr* 2011/12 Special Brief, released in February 2012, reported ‘that famine outcomes no longer exist in southern Somalia’. The post-*Gu* assessment later that year found continued improvements in the food security and nutrition situation in Somalia.

These improvements continued through to the most recent (2012) *Deyr* rains and resulted in increased availability of water and pasture, which contributed to milk availability, and improved livestock body conditions. In farming areas, there was increased cultivation and related labour opportunities for the poor, improving incomes. These positive food security outcomes in most parts of the country probably translated into improved dietary intake and nutrition.<sup>22</sup> However, the urban poor, including IDP populations, who lack agricultural

20 <http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/FSNAU-Rural-Urban-IDP-Populations-in-Crisis-August-September-2011.pdf>.

21 Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

22 FSNAU (2012) September/October, 2012 – FSNAU Nutrition Update.

land and livestock, were not in a position to benefit from the improvements brought about by the rains.

In Southern Somalia, where this project is implemented, it was only Banadir Region (Mogadishu) and pockets of people in Middle Shabelle and Hiran that remained classified as IPC level 4 (emergency) at the start of Phase 2. In each of these areas the classification was due to the high numbers of IDPs, high malnutrition rates and high mortality rates. The post-*Gu* assessment (2012), prior to the start of Phase 2, highlighted the plight of IDP populations, especially those in Mogadishu. Nutrition surveys in Mogadishu Town found global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates of 10.8% (8.3–13.9) and 1.5% (0.7–3.0) respectively. These results indicated a sustained serious nutrition situation among the Mogadishu population. When coupled with retrospective crude mortality and child mortality rates, the situation was classified as *critical*.<sup>23</sup> While this is an improvement from April 2012 (the end of Phase 1), it indicated that urban populations were still facing food and nutrition issues that needed to be addressed more than 12 months after the declaration of famine.

Given the ongoing emergency in Mogadishu and the improvements in other Phase 1 project locations, some CVMG partners moved their interventions into Mogadishu for Phase 2. As high numbers of IDPs came into Mogadishu, it became a ‘hub’ of humanitarian assistance, attracting nearly half of all the resources intended for cash and voucher interventions. While this focus on Mogadishu was necessary and well-intentioned, it had the effect of drawing beneficiaries into a highly exploitative environment.<sup>24</sup>

During Phase 2 there were significant changes in the governance of Mogadishu, and in Somalia as a whole. In September 2012, Somalia elected a new government: the Federal Government of Somalia, following the dissolution of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Following the election the security situation in Mogadishu improved, allowing the CVMG projects to continue uninterrupted.

## 2.3. Other interventions implemented during Phase 2

In addition to the CVMG programme a number of other interventions took place, particularly in Mogadishu. The presence of other interventions in the project areas makes it difficult to attribute impact solely to the CVMG programme. While some CVMG partners were the sole agency working in their operational areas, their other interventions in other sectors were often designed to complement cash-based work and have therefore contributed to food security impacts.

The two largest interventions were assistance from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and from the Turkish

23 FSNAU (2012) Technical series: Report post-*Gu* 2012 nutrition analysis.

24 Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

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government. At the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided large-scale food distributions in a number of regions<sup>25</sup> and many affected households also received remittances from the diaspora community abroad. Many of these interventions concluded during 2012, although ICRC food distributions continued in Hiran and Mogadishu, and the OIC and Turkish government continued their distributions,

<sup>25</sup> Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba.

principally in Mogadishu. Somali NGOs supported by Saudi Arabia also distributed at least 12,500Mt of food items, and Somali NGOs carried out cash distributions worth nearly US\$1 million on behalf of the diaspora.<sup>26, 27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> [http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha\\_R4\\_A948\\_\\_1212201156.pdf](http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R4_A948__1212201156.pdf). The 1million USD diaspora donation does not include person-to-person money transfers.

<sup>27</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.



# Chapter 3

## Cash and voucher interventions in Phase 2

Table 1 shows the value of the monthly cash distributions by CVMG agencies during Phase 1 and Phase 2. The average value of cash distributed fell by US\$10 per distribution from Phase 1, reflecting the decline in food prices. Voucher values, however, increased to be more consistent with the food minimum expenditure basket.

The programme was operational in 45 districts, although most agencies only distributed cash or vouchers for a few months of the total period of Phase 2 (Figure 1). This somewhat sporadic implementation pattern was a result of funding constraints and delays, and in some cases the NGOs' own approach to

humanitarian relief – providing assistance in the lean season only, for example.

For the purpose of this report, six CVMG agencies provided post-distribution monitoring (PDM) data, and three collected impact data (quarterly monitoring (QM)). No data is included in this report for the three cash interventions that started late in Phase 2. All CVMG partners maintained the same implementation modality as in Phase 1 (i.e. using *hawala* agents to distribute cash and local traders to redeem vouchers and distribute food commodities). While the majority of agencies experienced breaks in their distribution

**Table 1: Average value of cash and voucher transfers in Phase 1 and 2**

NGO	Value of cash transfer (US\$)		Value of voucher transfer (% of minimum calorie requirement)	
	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 1	Phase 2
NGO1	120	117		
NGO2	125	100		
NGO3	115	105		
NGO4	88	79		
NGO5	120	110–120		
NGO6	N/A	45–63 <sup>28</sup>		
NGO7			70%	98%
NGO8			58%	N/A
NGO9			N/A	88% and 71%
<b>Average</b>	<b>US\$114</b>	<b>US\$92</b>	<b>64%</b>	<b>86%</b>


NB. Some agencies implemented more than one project.

**Figure 1: Timeline of CVMG programme implementation**

	Apr–12	May–12	Jun–12	Jul–12	Aug–12	Sep–12	Oct–12	Nov–12	Dec–12	Jan–13	Feb–13
<b>Cash interventions</b>											
NGO1											
NGO2											
NGO3											
NGO4											
NGO5											
NGO6											
<b>Voucher interventions</b>											
NGO1											
NGO2											
NGO3											
NGO4											

<sup>28</sup> Two different project locations.

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pipeline (as a result of funding delays or end of a funding cycle), one of the voucher agencies was active throughout the entire programme period, changing its transfer modality to a combination of cash and vouchers late in 2012. To avoid

confusion, the quantitative monitoring data collected on this new transfer approach is not included in the analysis presented in this report, although the qualitative results collected by IFMs are.

# Chapter 4

## Monitoring system and methodology

The monitoring system for the CVMG was primarily designed to inform ongoing programming. It was also designed to collect information on donor and agency concerns related to the Somali context, and concerns over large-scale cash programming. The monitoring system has therefore provided agencies with a substantial<sup>29</sup> and rigorous database.

The system has its issues: it is large, and requires time-consuming data collection and considerable analysis of the data. The CVMG accepted these issues from the beginning of Phase 1 in order to provide adequate monitoring information to determine whether large-scale cash and vouchers were appropriate interventions in Somalia.

### 4.1. Objectives of the monitoring exercise

The objectives of the monitoring exercise (Box 1) were agreed by all CVMG implementing partners at the start of Phase 1 and remained the same for Phase 2. The objectives essentially required three types of monitoring: process monitoring; market monitoring; and monitoring changes in beneficiary households and communities. There was also a strong learning and dissemination element.

### 4.2. The monitoring methodology

As with the objectives, the overall monitoring methodology remained the same as in Phase 1. However, the monitoring tools were substantially revised for Phase 2 based on Phase 1 learning and after recommendations from the Interim Programme Evaluation (which focused on the monitoring system).<sup>30</sup> Quantitative data were collected by the implementing NGOs on a monthly basis – process findings being collected every month in PDM surveys, and impact findings every third month in QM surveys.

It was initially planned that Phase 2 would include six rounds of process data and two rounds of impact data, as well as two rounds of qualitative data. However, it soon became apparent that most agencies were facing funding constraints that would result in either not having long enough implementation cycles, or implementation would not start in time to generate the quantitative and qualitative datasets that were planned. Additional funding disbursement issues for SATG contributed to the qualitative data collection starting late.

<sup>29</sup> More than 22,000 households interviewed over the full implementation of the programme (Phase 1 + Phase 2).

<sup>30</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2012) Interim Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.

#### Box 1: Objectives of the monitoring exercise

1. To monitor the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the cash and voucher distribution systems:
  - To determine the cost, speed and management efficiency with which inputs and activities are converted into results (i.e. whether the project is accountable to donors).
  - To determine whether the implementing partners adhered to the agreed targeting criteria and the level of beneficiary participation in the targeting process (i.e. whether implementing partners are accountable to themselves and to beneficiaries).
  - To assess the effectiveness of the community feedback mechanism and how the implementing agencies responded to comments received (i.e. whether project is accountable to beneficiaries).
  - To substantiate as far as possible any reported claims of diversion of cash or food vouchers due to taxation, targeting inclusion, etc.
2. To monitor the impacts of the cash and voucher distribution on local markets and participating traders.
3. To monitor beneficiary spending patterns (for cash) and the impacts of the cash and voucher distribution on nutrition and displacement/return.
4. To provide regular feedback to the consortium partners and their donors on the M&E findings.
5. To document and make publicly accessible the lessons emerging from the cash and voucher distribution project, particularly lessons regarding the scaling up of such interventions.

These delays in Phase 2 meant that it was not possible to assemble an ‘impact dataset’ (i.e. a series of two or more quarterly monitoring reports) from Phase 2 only, so some Phase 1 impact data including baseline data were added to give the presented results meaning and to show changes over time. Process results, on the other hand, are all derived from data collected over the course of Phase 2 only, albeit from a shorter implementation cycle than originally anticipated.

#### Qualitative monitoring

Qualitative data were collected by a team of 32 Independent Field Monitors (IFMs) specifically hired for the CVMG exercise, led by SATG. The qualitative monitoring of the interventions in Phase 2 is significantly different from Phase 1. The findings from Phase 1 and the Interim Evaluation<sup>31</sup> highlighted a number

<sup>31</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2012) Interim Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.

of areas where more detailed information was required. These included the role of ‘gatekeepers’<sup>32</sup> in IDP camps, the targeting process, the complaints/feedback mechanism and diversion/corruption. These areas were identified as gaps in the Phase 1 data. As a result, the focus of Phase 2’s qualitative enquiry has been to collect information from a wide range of stakeholders on these topics. The qualitative data collection tools were therefore extensively revised, with the expectation that at least two rounds of qualitative data would be collected. The list of stakeholders for interview was also expanded.

Interviews were conducted with a number of project stakeholders: traders, *hawala* agents, businesspeople, NGO staff and non-beneficiary households. In addition, a number of focus groups discussions were conducted with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (poorer and wealthy groups interviewed separately). More detailed information on the monitoring methodology can be found in Annex 6.

In addition, three (qualitative) research studies were commissioned by the Somalia Cash Consortium in order to gather more information on key issues affecting the implementation or outcomes of cash-based interventions in Somalia: gender, debt and credit and the role of gatekeepers.<sup>33</sup> In addition to the monitoring data presented in this report, the three Consortium studies provide valuable insight into the impacts of cash programming and complements the data collected by the CVMG.

A summary of the qualitative data collection focus groups and interviews is shown in the tables below. The qualitative data collection tools can be found in Annex 19, and the list of

locations where qualitative data were collected can be found in Annex 8. A separate, more detailed report on the qualitative data collection is available from SATG, Nairobi.<sup>34</sup>

#### *Quantitative monitoring*

The quantitative data included various surveys implemented among beneficiary households: a baseline survey (Annex 13), monthly PDM surveys (Annex 14 and Annex 15) designed to gather information relating to the cash transfer process and how the cash was spent; and QM surveys (Annex 16 and Annex 17) designed to gather information relating to changes in dietary diversity, number of meals consumed each day and coping strategies. Weekly market price monitoring (Annex 18) was also conducted. Slightly different tools were used for cash and voucher projects.

The quantitative data collection tools were revised for Phase 2 after the Interim Evaluation made a number of recommendations for changes (Annex 6). Like the qualitative data collection, it was expected that at least two rounds of quantitative impact data would be collected from each agency. As a result, some of the recommendations were incorporated while others were not, due to fear of respondent fatigue, time constraints or lack of agreement from CVMG partners. These changes are detailed in Annex 6.

#### *Household sampling*

The number of beneficiary households sampled for the various monthly and quarterly post-distribution monitoring surveys is shown in Table 3 and Table 4. The sampling procedures used for the various surveys are described in Annex 20. The sample size for the baseline survey, the first PDM and the quarterly monitoring

**Table 2: Summary of qualitative data collected**

<b>Focus Group Discussions</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
FGD Beneficiaries	4	12
FGD Non-Beneficiaries (poor)	4	12
FGD Non-Beneficiaries (wealthy)	4	12
<b>TOTAL</b>	12 groups (>60 people)	36 groups (>252 people)
<b>Interviews</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
Interview Hawala	3	1
Interview Trader	1	6
Interview NGO staff	6	5
Businesspeople (Nairobi & Mogadishu)	4	4
Beneficiary HH case studies	4	11
Non-Beneficiary HH case studies	4	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>52 people</b>	<b>65 people</b>

<sup>32</sup> In the context of a Somali IDP camp, a ‘gatekeeper’ is the name given to the person (or people) in charge of security, policing and imposing all necessary restrictions to the camp residents on behalf of the camp owner.

<sup>33</sup> The full list of references for these studies can be found in Annex 23.

<sup>34</sup> Sceck, A et al. (2013) Cash and voucher monitoring group Phase 2: Perspectives of the beneficiaries and their stakeholders on cash and voucher intervention in South Central Somalia. SATG and UNICEF.



**Table 3: Quantitative data collection**

Data type	n
Baseline Survey (BL)	1,727 HH
Monthly Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM)	3,251 HH
Quarterly Post-Distribution Survey (QM)	3,452 HH
Monthly market monitoring	31 markets per month (average)
Data from the feedback/complaints system	3 NGOs

**Table 4: Number of households sampled by region**

Transfer modality	Region	Monitoring round/data focus								
		Baseline		PDM1		PDM2		QM1		QM2
		Process	Impact	Process	Impact	Process	Impact	Process	Impact	Impact
<b>Cash</b>	Banadir	374	376	400	400	400	400	750	1,086	362
	Gedo	325		402	402					
	Hiran		346	535	535	375	375	375	375	200
	Lower Shabelle			200	200					
	Lower Juba	399		400	400					
	Middle Shabelle			239	239					
	Mudug	400		300	300					
<b>Voucher</b>	Banadir	229	696						640	375
	Bay			328	328					
	Lower Juba			188	188					
	Middle Juba			469	469					
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,542</b>		<b>3,461</b>		<b>775</b>		<b>2,101</b>		<b>937</b>

surveys was calculated with a 5% confidence interval for each INGO per region. Within each project area, not all districts were sampled due to access and logistical considerations.

Over the course of the monitoring activities conducted during Phase 2, a total of 9,800 households were interviewed (Table 4). Some households were interviewed on more than one occasion, particularly for the baseline and quarterly surveys.

It is important to remember that, in Phase 2, agencies were operating to different timetables, and therefore not all

baselines and monitoring rounds were conducted for each agency within the same months (Figure 2). In addition, due mainly to funding constraints, only one round of qualitative data and one round of quarterly quantitative data was ultimately collected from each agency.

#### *Market price monitoring*

The market price monitoring survey used the same approach as that developed by the FSNAU, so that the data trends could be compared over time.<sup>36</sup> NGO staff collected market data on the availability and price of 26 commodities, as well as exchange

**Table 5: Number of market surveys done per region per month by CVMG partners**

Region	Number of price points sampled within each district per month										
	Oct '11	May '12	June '12	July '12	Aug '12	Sept '12	Oct '12	Nov '12	Dec '12	Jan '13	Feb '13
Banadir	65	62	28	69	23	73	81	68	39	12	56
Bay	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	10	8	10	0
Gedo	26	34	0	0	7	9	41	52	53	23	32
Hiran	24	40	0	32	32	32	32	40	32	44	32
Lower Juba	27	14	0	0	0	0	24	0	1	4	16
Lower Shabelle	0	5	4	4	4	5	4	0	0	4	0
Middle Juba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	24	24	0
Mudug	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
<b>Total</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>168</b>

<sup>36</sup> A slightly different calculation was used by CVMG to determine the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the CVMG uses a different baseline CPI to FSNAU. For this reason, the CPI trends cannot be directly compared.

rates on a weekly basis from approximately 131 price points in 31 urban and rural markets per month within the project areas.

### 4.3. Monitoring challenges and limitations

The Phase 1 report<sup>37</sup> provides information about the various challenges and limitations of conducting this monitoring exercise, all of which remained in Phase 2.

The Phase 1 data collection relied heavily on beneficiary reported quantitative data, which was unable to capture certain areas of programming including targeting issues, diversion/corruption and accountability. While there was an effort to include qualitative data as well, for various reasons the data were not reliable. As a result, considerable effort

has gone into improving the qualitative data collection and analysis in Phase 2.

Overall, the challenges faced in monitoring the projects were not specific to cash-based programming, but rather were due to the difficulties of security and access, lack of experienced enumerators and interviewers, remote management and the challenges of a large monitoring system, such as respondent fatigue. Despite all these challenges and limitations of the Phase 1 data, the Interim Evaluation recommended continuation of the joint consortium methodology.<sup>38</sup>

Figure 2 shows the timing of the CVMG monitoring activities in Phase 2. It should be noted that agencies were not working to a common timetable. This is a limitation of the data.

**Figure 2: Timeline of CVMG monitoring activities**

	Apr-12	May-12	Jun-12	Jul-12	Aug-12	Sep-12	Oct-12	Nov-12	Dec-12	Jan-13	Feb-13
IFM qualitative monitoring											
Market price monitoring											
<b>Cash interventions</b>											
NGO1			BL		PDM1	PDM 2	QM1				
NGO2						PDM 1	PDM 2	QM1			
NGO3				PDM 1	PDM 2	QM1					
NGO4											BL
NGO5								BL			
NGO6									No BL data	PDM 1	
<b>Voucher interventions</b>											
NGO1				QM3			QM4				
NGO2				PDM 1	PDM 2	QM1					
NGO3					No BL data	PDM 1	PDM 2	PDM 3			
NGO4							No BL data	PDM 1	QM1		
NGO5		PDM 1	PDM 2	QM1							
<b>Total Beneficiaries</b>		<b>6,500</b>	<b>29,706</b>	<b>46,358</b>	<b>22,056</b>	<b>27,906</b>	<b>29,776</b>	<b>22,307</b>	<b>3,400</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>21,682</b>

KEY:

Data not included in Phase 2 Report

Data collection

New baseline for Phase 2

37 Longley, C et al (2012) CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher programme. Phase 1: September 2011 – March 2012. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.

38 Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

# Chapter 5

## Household characteristics

As noted earlier, a large proportion (32%) of households that have benefited from Phase 2 interventions are currently living in Mogadishu (Banadir Region). In Banadir, 86% of households sampled were internally displaced as a result of the drought. In other locations the majority of households were resident in the area (Table 6).

All four of the major livelihood groups (agriculturalists, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and urban) were included in the

sampling, although the majority is 'urban' (Table 7). The average household size is 7.2, including two children under five years of age (Table 8, p. 14).

For the purpose of this report, households were divided into 'urban' (Mogadishu) and 'rural' (all other project locations). Cash projects took place in both urban and rural locations, while the voucher projects for which monitoring data were provided were only implemented in Mogadishu (urban).

**Table 6: Residence status of sampled households**

Location	Residence status	n	%
Cash Rural	Unknown	14	0%
	Moved due to conflict	312	8%
	Moved due to drought	617	16%
	Moved for other reasons	41	1%
	Normally resident in the area	2,966	75%
Cash Urban (Banadir)	Unknown	3	0%
	Moved due to conflict	175	9%
	Moved due to drought	1,648	86%
	Moved for other reasons	8	0%
	Normally resident in the area	90	5%
Voucher Urban (Banadir)	Unknown	1	0%
	Moved due to conflict	56	25%
	Moved due to drought	73	32%
	Moved for other reasons	8	4%
	Normally resident in the area	91	40%

**Table 7: Original livelihood strategy of households sampled for process and impact monitoring**

Location	Livelihood strategy	Process		Impact	
		n	%	n	%
Cash Rural	Agriculture	382	10%	314	24%
	Agro-pastoralist	696	18%	197	15%
	Pastoralist	1,884	48%	318	25%
	Urban	963	24%	462	36%
Cash Urban (Banadir)	Agriculture	113	6%	167	15%
	Agro-pastoralist	421	22%	620	56%
	Pastoralist	185	10%	202	18%
	Urban	1,204	63%	121	11%
Voucher Rural	Agriculture	34	15%	34	15%
	Agro-pastoralist	33	14%	33	1%
	Pastoralist	27	12%	833	34%
Voucher Urban (Banadir)	Urban	15	7%	260	11%
	Agriculture	120	52%	1,034	42%

**Table 8: Average household size**

<b>Transfer type</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>HH size</b>	<b># Children &lt;5 years old</b>
Cash	Rural	8.1	2.1
	Urban	7.0	1.8
Voucher	Urban	7.0	1.7
Combined Rural and Urban		7.2	1.8

# Chapter 6

## Impact findings

The CVMG programme was designed to provide households with transfers, either cash or vouchers, to meet at least their minimum food needs. The impact of the programme therefore includes monitoring of changes in household food consumption patterns including the number of meals consumed, changes in dietary diversity and the use of coping strategies. However, because the project is implemented over a long period that includes seasonal variations, it is not possible to directly attribute these changes simply to the CVMG programme. In addition, comparisons between projects are confounded not only by whether they provided cash or vouchers, but also by agency-specific methodologies and by the fact that the projects were implemented in different locations, and at different times of the year.

The following impact findings were determined through analysis of all three data sets: quantitative, qualitative and market data. Where possible, impact findings are reported longitudinally, and include Phase 1 results (QM1 and QM2). This gives a clearer picture of the changes that have resulted from the programme in total, since September 2011. Unfortunately, however, a number of projects did not provide quarterly monitoring data, and the results are limited to a smaller number of projects than was expected.

It should be noted that most projects had a gap in implementation between Phase 1 (QM1 and QM2) and Phase 2 (QM3 and QM4).

### 6.1. Household and community impacts

#### *Household income and debt*

One of the objectives of the programme was to provide households with a regular source of income, at a level sufficient to purchase at least their basic household food needs. This was because at baseline (September 2011) it was clear that households were unable to afford the cost of food in the market and had few sources of income available to them.


At baseline, monthly household income was similar among urban and rural beneficiaries, at approximately US\$50 per month. Over the course of the project, household income (not including the cash or voucher transfer) has remained stable in urban areas, while increasing steadily in the rural area for which data area available. This is possibly due to a number of factors, including that households targeted in this area were generally better off than other beneficiaries to begin with, they may have had better access to livelihood assets and the 2011 *Deyr* rains would have had more impact than for households in urban areas (Figure 3, p. 16). In the urban areas, particularly in the IDP camps, households had few livelihood options and were therefore largely dependent on humanitarian assistance.

Household debt has both increased and decreased at different periods. It is impossible to tell if the changes are due to seasonality (different in different locations and among

**Table 9: Summary of data contributing to the impact findings**

Monitoring round	Transfer type	Location	2011				2012								
			Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Baseline	Cash	Urban		376											
		Rural		346											
	Voucher	Urban			320										
		Rural	376												
QM1	Cash	Urban					375								
		Rural					375								
	Voucher	Urban						446							
		Rural				194									
QM2	Cash	Urban							362						
		Rural								200					
	Voucher	Urban									375				
QM3	Cash	Urban												375	
		Rural											375		
	Voucher	Urban									375				
QM4	Voucher	Urban											375		

**Figure 3: Monthly household income (excluding transfer) and debt in the month prior to each monitoring round – cash and voucher beneficiaries in urban and rural areas**



different livelihood groups), improved access to credit or due to difficulties experienced by beneficiary households, necessitating new debt.

*Household spending*

Household expenditure data from Phase 1 (QM1 and QM2) suggest that food purchases took priority over other items throughout the duration of the project. This is expected given the famine conditions during much of Phase 1.

Debt repayment (usually to purchase food from local traders) was also high. When combined, Figure 4 shows that the proportion of household spending on food decreased over the course Phase 1, indicating an improvement in household food security. The increased proportion found at QM3 (Phase 2) indicates that household food security deteriorated between Phase 1 and Phase 2. This would be expected given the gap


between the two phases and the low levels of household income obtained outside the cash and voucher distributions.

Household expenditure on livelihood assets such as livestock, agricultural inputs or business investment was higher in rural communities than in Mogadishu, but both areas show relatively low expenditure compared to expenditure on food and debt repayment. This is understandable given the relatively low value of the cash transfer (only sufficient to purchase the food MEB in most cases) and the lack of livelihood opportunities in urban areas.

*Food security and nutrition indicators*


For Phase 2 the Household Hunger Index was replaced with a livelihood-based Coping Strategies Index (CSI).<sup>39</sup> It was intended that at least two quarters of data would be available so that comparisons could be made over time,

**Figure 4: Household expenditure on food and debt repayment (combined)**




<sup>39</sup> The new Coping Strategies Index (CSI) considers the severity of the strategy and the frequency of its use. The minimum score is 0 (no coping strategies used), and the maximum score is 275 (all strategies used, every day). The score is meaningless on its own but is useful for comparing populations or for comparing the same population over time. The severity and frequencies used for the calculation of the CSI can be found in the annexes.

**Figure 5: Household expenditure on livelihood assets**



**Figure 6: Number of meals consumed in the 24 hours prior to survey**



and between project areas. However, given that only one quarter of data was ultimately collected, and that agencies' distributions were done at different times, a comparison in CSI scores was not possible, and therefore the CSI has not been utilised to its full potential.

In addition to the CSI, monitoring data collected information on a number of food security- and nutrition-related indicators: number of meals consumed each day, the diversity of the diet (Household Dietary Diversity Score) and information on the types of food being consumed.

At baseline (September 2011), households reported a diet consisting mainly of cereals and oil, with little or no protein. This is consistent with the high rates of malnutrition noted at the start of the project.

Figure 6 shows the change in the number of meals consumed by households over the course of the programme. Meal consumption improved rapidly to three meals a day (both adults and children) in rural areas, and between two and three meals a day in urban areas.


The deterioration between QM2 and QM3 in the rural areas is again likely due to the gap in time between Phase 1 and Phase 2. This deterioration is not evident among voucher beneficiaries, who received assistance with no delay before Phase 2.

Similarly, Household Dietary Diversity Scores (HDDS) improved from between one to four food groups to more than four in all groups by the end of Phase 1, with cash recipients showing greater dietary diversity. However, all the cash projects had a gap between Phase 1 and Phase 2 and showed deterioration in overall HDDS during this time. The voucher households continued into Phase 2 without a gap, and these beneficiaries continued to improve their HDDS (Figure 7, p. 18).

As part of the measurement of HDDS, households reported their consumption of each food group on the day before the quarterly post-distribution surveys. This enabled analysis of changes in consumption of high-protein foods, an important nutritional indicator, particularly for children.

The programme evaluation noted that a higher transfer value correlated with a diet that included more diversity and

**Figure 7: Household Dietary Diversity Scores**



high-value foods (specifically animal sources of protein and fat). Surprisingly, urban voucher recipients had comparable high-value food (HVF) consumption (75%), challenging the assumption that, because recipients receive only cereals, pulses, oil and sugar, they naturally have lower dietary diversity. This also highlights the fungibility of transfers, as what is received (voucher items or food assistance items) is not necessarily what is consumed. Dietary diversity indicates that households were able to access high-value foods with little outside income other than that which was provided through the programme. This is most likely due to the sale or exchange of items, which was reported by traders but not by beneficiaries.

Differences in consumption by food group varied across locations, with more households in the rural cash location (Hiran) reporting variety than in the urban areas – potentially a function of the relatively greater wealth of beneficiaries for which there are data.

#### *Social and community impacts*

In addition to the impacts on individual households highlighted above, a number of social impacts have been found. More than half of the households surveyed (both cash and voucher beneficiaries) reported a perception that other households were jealous of them (Table 11). This is a useful point for agencies to consider when they are next doing community mobilisation. A transparent beneficiary selection process may also help reduce jealousy. Jealousy may have been partly allayed by the high percentage of households that reported sharing the food that was purchased or provided through the programme with non-beneficiary households. In both urban and rural areas, more than half of programme beneficiaries reported sharing food with others.

Table 11 also shows that intra-household conflict was reported in both voucher and cash projects. These findings challenge the common assumption that cash transfers result in more intra-household conflict than vouchers. The findings also

**Table 10: Household consumption after baseline for CVMG agencies**

Location	Percentage of households reporting consumption (%)															
	Cereal	White Tuber	Flesh meat	Organ meat	Eggs	Fish	Milk	Fruit	Vitamin A	Dark greens	Other Vegetable	Legume	Oil	Sugar	Spice	
NGO1	100	2	22	2	2	4	52	6	0	0	12	28	41	35	37	
NGO2	63	0	31	5	5	1	34	6	3	1	28	15	64	63	56	
NGO3	91	12	34	17	6	2	66	36	29	14	28	12	83	67	48	
NGO4	98	0	35	3	1	5	34	21	11	0	28	28	45	50	40	
NGO5	79	0	19	49	32	47	86	13	1	1	48	72	93	87	76	



**Table 11: Social impacts**

Monitoring round	Location	Transfer type	Has control of cash/voucher caused intra-HH conflict?	Did transfer allow you to invite non- HH members to eat?	Are other community members jealous?
QM1	Rural	Cash	0%	55%	100%
	Urban	Cash	14%	62%	58%
		Voucher	55%	78%	77%
QM2	Rural	Cash	0%	8%	100%
	Urban	Cash	64%	19%	50%
		Voucher	7%	8%	–
QM3	Rural	Cash	0%	0%	0%
	Urban	Cash	50%	83%	58%
		Voucher	5%	72%	72%
QM4	Urban	Voucher	3%	69%	68%

indicate that conflict was more common in the urban setting (Mogadishu) than in the rural areas. It is not clear why the urban results are different, but this may be something to consider when implementing future cash programmes in such settings. This indicator is not commonly used for monitoring programmes outside of cash and vouchers, so it is difficult to say how this compares to other types of programming.

## 6.2. Market behaviour and impacts

One of the main concerns at the outset of the CVMG programme was that an injection of cash would cause food price inflation as effective demand outstripped supply. As such, the CVMG committed to a comprehensive system to monitor the availability and price of key food commodities and services. Up-to-date information on food availability and price gave delivery agencies the information necessary to modify the transfer size upwards or downwards as

necessary, or indeed to step in with other interventions in the event of market failure (although this did not prove to be necessary).

All CVMG agencies conducted weekly surveys of the main markets in their operating areas to collect price data on a range of goods and services (Annex 18). However, a range of issues including accessibility and staff availability meant that data were not always collected in all regions each week, every month. The data collection schedule is presented below (Table 12). All data were added to the database built up in Phase 1 of the programme, allowing longitudinal trends to be observed.

Four key market-related variables are presented in this section: a) availability of key food commodities; b) the Consumer Price Index<sup>40</sup> (CPI); c) the Somali Shilling/US dollar exchange rate; and d) the cost of the 'food' and 'total' Minimum Expenditure

**Table 12: Number of market surveys done per district per month by CVMG partners, October 2011 and May 2012–February 2013**

Region	Number of price capture points within month										
	Oct '11	May '12	June '12	July '12	Aug '12	Sept '12	Oct '12	Nov '12	Dec '12	Jan '13	Feb '13
Banadir	65	62	28	69	23	73	81	68	39	12	56
Bay						3	6	10	8	10	
Gedo	26	34		7	9	41	52	53	23	32	
Hiran	24	40		32	32	32	32	40	32	44	32
Lower Juba	27	14					24		1	4	16
Lower Shabelle		5	4	4	4	5	4			4	
Middle Juba								18	24	24	
Mudug											32

<sup>40</sup> The CPI is calculated by calculating the price of a basket of goods relative to the basket's price in October 2011. The price in October 2011 represents 100% and subsequent prices are expressed as a percentage of this October price. For notes on how the CPI was calculated see Annex 22.

**Table 13: Overall availability of main food commodities October 2011 and May 2012– February 2013**

Month	White maize	Rice	Sorghum	Flour	Sugar	Veg oil	Cow milk	Tea	Cowpeas	Salt	Goat meat
Oct '11	88%	94%	78%	95%	96%	96%	78%	95%	82%	95%	92%
May '12	99%	99%	91%	99%	99%	98%	90%	99%	80%	100%	92%
June '12	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
July '12	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	92%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Aug '12	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	88%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Sept '12	100%	100%	100%	98%	100%	100%	93%	99%	97%	100%	100%
Oct '12	98%	100%	97%	98%	100%	100%	94%	100%	91%	100%	97%
Nov '12	97%	100%	93%	97%	99%	99%	91%	99%	90%	100%	98%
Dec '12	97%	100%	89%	97%	99%	100%	90%	99%	94%	100%	96%
Jan '13	97%	100%	97%	98%	100%	100%	89%	100%	98%	100%	98%
Feb '13	98%	100%	87%	99%	100%	100%	76%	100%	82%	100%	98%
Total	97%	99%	92%	98%	99%	99%	88%	99%	90%	100%	97%


Basket.<sup>41</sup> In addition, the findings of interviews with traders, businesspeople and beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on market and trader behaviour during the cash and voucher programmes are introduced.

#### Food availability

The period covered by Phase 2 of the CVMG programme was characterised by good availability of nearly all commodities in nearly all months. Table 13 shows that on only three occasions were certain food commodities available in less than 85% of markets sampled – cowpeas in May 2012 and February 2013, and milk in February 2013.

Four main factors contributed to improved food availability in 2012. The first was the retreat of Al Shabaab militia westwards into the Somali hinterland. This meant that traders were able to more easily transport goods into areas previously inaccessible because of roadblocks or insecurity. Second, good *Deyr* rainfall in 2011 resulted in a good harvest in 2012. This vastly improved the availability of grain staples like sorghum and maize. Third, food prices declined from their spike in the third quarter of 2011. A fourth but less significant reason was the increase in effective demand resulting from the array of interventions in response to the 2011 famine.

**Figure 8: Consumer Price Index trend in CVMG areas, October 2011 and May 2012–February 2013**



<sup>41</sup> The MEB is calculated by summing the total price of quantities of key food commodities calculated to be sufficient to support an averaged sized family (7 members). The cost of the food MEB varies depending on whether the household is in an urban or rural area and whether rice or sorghum is used as the main staple. The 'total' MEB is calculated by adding the price of key services and a cash allowance for non-food essentials such as clothing to the food MEB. The MEB concept was developed by FSNAU and, at the time of writing this report, is under revision.

### Consumer Price Index

As Figure 8 shows, throughout Phase 2 the CPI was never more than 78% of the October 2011 baseline, and at one point (June 2012) the index was just two-thirds of the baseline level. Not only were prices considerably lower than in October 2011, but they were also quite stable: between July 2012 and February 2013 the CPI fluctuated within a range of 7%, making it much easier for a cash recipient to predict what their food expenditure would be from week to week and month to month.

Interviews with businesspeople, traders, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries found quite categorically that price fluctuations were a result of supply issues and movements in the dollar/shilling exchange rate, rather than attempts by traders to take advantage of beneficiaries who had just received cash. Food wholesale and retail in Somalia is very competitive and characterised by a high number of actors, and it was competition between these actors that kept prices low.

It was also reported in interviews that, like all efficient markets, food markets in Somalia responded to an increase in supply. On the days that beneficiaries of food aid (through vouchers or direct transfers) received their food, prices in the market generally dropped by several percent as recipients sold a portion to meet their cash needs.

### Cost of Minimum Expenditure Baskets

One of the critical factors in determining the food security and wider welfare impact of a cash intervention is the value of the intervention relative to the cost of the food and/or


total minimum expenditure baskets. In the case of the food MEB the cost is based on the price of a 'basket' of specified quantities of foodstuffs (Annex 5); the total MEB combines the food MEB with the cost of other essential goods and services and a set amount of cash. When setting the size of cash transfers, consideration should be given to the size of a household's food deficit after other food and income sources have been exhausted. For optimal food security impact, the cash transfer should equal or exceed the cost of closing the food deficit.

Figure 9 shows the cost of the sorghum-based food and total MEB in rural and urban areas.<sup>42</sup> Throughout Phase 2 the cost of the food MEB in urban and rural areas was below \$80; it was lowest (\$55) in rural areas in July 2012, and the highest point was \$97 in urban areas in January 2013. In other words, any organisation providing a monthly transfer of at least \$97 throughout Phase 2 can be confident that they were providing enough to cover an average household's food requirements.

The cost of the total MEB ranged from \$61 in rural areas (July 2012) to \$106 in urban areas (January 2013). However, in only four of the 11 months covered by Phase 2 was it more than \$100, and then only in urban areas.

Given that the size of the cash transfers distributed by NGOs involved in Phase 2 of the programme ranged from \$75 to \$115, and average household incomes (not including the cash or voucher value) over the period remained relatively constant, at around 1,000,000 SoSh (~US\$50), it is safe to say that transfers were sufficient to enable households to purchase at least their food MEB. In some cases households would have been able to

**Figure 9: Overall trend in cost of sorghum-based food and total MEB October 2011 and May 2012 to February 2013 (US\$)**



<sup>42</sup> In Somalia it is calculated that the cost of the MEB is lower in rural areas than in urban areas because rural households are able to cover a greater proportion of their food needs from their own production.

purchase their total MEB, particularly if they were able to meet some of their consumption needs from their own production. The problem, of course, is that in many cases households only received the transfer for a few months, and because they were displaced from their farms or had lost their livestock capital had limited means of providing for their food needs during the periods when they were not in receipt of cash or vouchers.

#### Exchange rates

For a beneficiary receiving their transfer in Somalia in US dollars, probably the most important variable determining purchasing power after the cost of food itself is the Somali Shilling/US dollar exchange rate. A stronger shilling will mean that a beneficiary will receive less local currency and hence will be able to buy less.

Over the course of Phase 2, the Somali Shilling strengthened slightly against the dollar, although the range of movement was only about 6% over the entire programme period (Figure 10). From a fiscal perspective the shilling's behavior is curious: huge quantities of forged notes are in circulation and they are not accepted for exchange anywhere other than in Somalia, yet, as Figure 10 shows, there is sustained demand for the currency. What fuels this demand is a need for a smaller denomination than the one US dollar bill (shillings are needed for smaller value purchases), and the huge flow of foreign exchange into Somalia since October 2011.

It was reported through the qualitative surveys, however, that in a number of cases the shilling/dollar exchange rate could change by as much as 10% on the day of the cash transfer in response to the heightened demand for shillings by cash recipients. This also happened in Phase 1, and in one case Al Shabaab attempted to control the market by forcing

moneychangers to offer their normal rates. There were no reports of attempts to control the market in Phase 2.

#### Impacts on traders and trader behaviour

To triangulate the quantitative findings, a range of informants including beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, businesspeople and traders were interviewed about the impact of the cash and voucher programmes – first on market prices and second on the traders themselves.


Qualitative monitoring found unanimous agreement that the cash and voucher transfers had absolutely no impact on market price. There was simply too much competition amongst traders to enable one or a group of them to take advantage of the increase in effective demand.

It was also reported that food distributions going on in project areas generally had the effect of causing a temporary drop in food prices in the distribution locality as beneficiaries sold a portion of their ration to service their cash needs.

Traders involved in the CVMG voucher projects (i.e. redeeming beneficiaries' vouchers) all reported that they benefited from an increase in revenue as the number of customers increased. However, these interventions were just one of a number of factors, including better security and increased prosperity, which contributed to an improvement in business.

In summary, it is clear that the CVMG transfers did not result in market inflation to the detriment of the most vulnerable. Instead, they contributed to improved household food security and provided critically needed livelihood support. Both cash and vouchers were largely appropriate to the contexts where they were applied.

**Figure 10: Somali Shilling exchange rate October 2011 and May 2012–February 2013**



# Chapter 7

## Process findings

Both qualitative and quantitative monitoring data have been used to understand some key aspects of the project implementation process. Quantitative data was collected on operational issues relating to the delivery systems, such as travelling time to distribution sites, waiting times and issues with cash exchange or voucher redemption.

In addition, information was collected on the three main topics identified through gaps in Phase 1 data and from the Interim Evaluation Report<sup>43</sup>: targeting, accountability (the complaints/feedback mechanism) and diversion/corruption.

### 7.1. Delivery systems

During both Phase 1 and Phase 2, a large number of process indicators have been followed that relate to the cash and voucher delivery systems. Table 14 lists these indicators.

During Phase 1 a number of operational issues were highlighted from the early process monitoring data, including long traveling times and long waiting times at distribution points. As a result of this ongoing monitoring, agencies were able to work with the

*hawala* or traders to improve the service to the beneficiaries. A number of improvements were made to the programme during Phase 1, including increasing the number of distribution points, bringing them closer to the beneficiaries or providing more waiting space (with toilets, drinking water and other amenities). Other issues such as receiving old banknotes, problems of cash or voucher collection or identification issues were raised at the start of the programme and were rectified by the end of Phase 1.

During Phase 2 these issues have arisen much less frequently, if at all, indicating an overall improvement in the processes required for cash and voucher distribution. By the end of Phase 2, travel times to distribution sites were in most cases less than one hour, which was acceptable to almost all (>90%) beneficiaries. Waiting time at distribution points (both cash and vouchers) was also less than one hour. Security at distribution points was rated as ‘good’ by more than 90% of beneficiaries, as was the overall process of collection (both cash and vouchers). For the voucher projects, the quality of items received was rated as ‘good’ by the majority of beneficiaries, improving from 80% at the start of Phase

**Table 14: Process indicators followed during Phase 2**

Both cash and vouchers	Additional cash only	Additional vouchers only
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiary travel time to distribution points</li> <li>Beneficiary waiting time to collect their transfer</li> <li>Beneficiary ranking of the security at distribution point</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting feeling safe travelling home</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting paying someone to receive their cash or voucher</li> <li>Ranking of overall ease of cash collection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Location of cash exchange</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting that the cash was sufficient to cover their needs</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting that they received the expected value of cash</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Waiting time to redeem the vouchers</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting there were enough traders for voucher redemption</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting that trader treats them with respect</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting correct redemption of voucher (in terms of quantity of food items received)</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting that the food items were of acceptable quality</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting selling their voucher</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting selling their voucher items</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting that they were able to exchange their voucher for cash</li> <li>Percentage of households reporting preferring cash to vouchers</li> </ul>

<sup>43</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2012) Interim Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.

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2 to 100% by the end. Furthermore, one NGO trialled the distribution of cash through mobile phones during Phase 2. This approach worked well, resulting in reduced waiting and travel times for beneficiaries.

Both cash and voucher beneficiaries were asked if they had a preference for another form of intervention (cash, vouchers or direct food assistance) and a number of households reported a preference for another type of intervention other than the one they received. Cash beneficiaries reporting a preference for vouchers remained a fairly constant 13–15% throughout Phase 2. Voucher beneficiaries reporting a preference for cash decreased in the rural areas from 50% at the start of Phase 2 to 30% by the end. In urban areas, however, the preference for cash over vouchers remained around 10% for the duration of Phase 2.

The tables showing the process findings can be found in the annexes. Most of these show an improving trend throughout Phase 2.

## 7.2. Targeting

The complex process of beneficiary targeting was identified as a key area for more in-depth study in Phase 2. This was because there were gaps in the data in Phase 1 relating to targeting, as well as discrepancies between the CVMG partners' targeting methodology and how the beneficiaries and other stakeholders perceived the targeting process.

Somalia is a clan-based society, with pressure often put on agency staff to include family members and those with clan affiliations as project beneficiaries. Add to that the pressure from local authorities to be seen to assist households at a time of crisis, the urban setting of many of the projects and the urgent need for assistance by the overwhelming majority of households, and the working environment is ripe for targeting error. Lack of management access and security concerns compounded these problems, and it is therefore no surprise that targeting was not carried out as well as it would have been in a less urgent situation.

At the start of Phase 1, the food security situation in the programme area was desperate. There were more people in need of urgent assistance than the programme had resources for, and the likelihood of inclusion error was significantly lower than the likelihood of exclusion.

All the agencies recognised the difficulties of starting a large programme in such conditions. Assistance was urgent and agencies accepted that errors would, and did, occur. The CVMG partners tried to alleviate some of the targeting pressure by including a standard set of selection criteria (across all projects) and then adding community-specific criteria as necessary. However, differences between agencies regarding community participation, targeting methodologies,

understanding and application of 'community-based targeting' and the different operational issues faced by agencies working in different locations ultimately made standardisation of targeting procedures impossible.

The programme evaluation highlighted a number of targeting errors during Phase 1 and recommended that agencies re-target prior to Phase 2. This re-targeting was needed not only in recognition of exclusion in Phase 1, but also because of the rapidly changing food security conditions, which exacerbated the initial targeting errors.

However, with the exception of three agencies (two of whom only joined the CVMG in Phase 2), all the CVMG partners retained the same beneficiaries from Phase 1. Re-targeting was not sufficiently prioritised by CVMG partners for Phase 2 largely because of the considerable operational challenges involved.

### *Targeting methods used*

Interviews conducted with the NGOs covered the issue of targeting including the selection of geographical area, districts, villages and camps within the districts, and the methods used for the registration of beneficiaries.

The majority of CVMG partners reported selecting the region and district based on the following factors: high density of 'drought affected people', accessibility and security and the use of rapid assessments to determine the size of households and their needs. To avoid duplication and overlapping of operational areas, the CVMG partners consulted each other and other agencies and agreed on the areas where each NGO should intervene.

Some NGOs indicated that their head office in Nairobi provided or suggested the list of villages or IDP camps to be supported within the selected geographical areas. Others considered the location of villages or camps, and looked at those with 'high density of vulnerable, drought affected households'. In addition, consideration was given to camps or villages where the majority of residents were affected by severe malnutrition.

One agency provided cash only to households who were already beneficiaries of their feeding programmes. This was done because of instruction from Al Shabaab on the type of interventions that could be implemented in that area. With the exception of that agency, all NGOs indicated that they applied specific criteria to select beneficiaries:

- Primary consideration was given to disabled, elderly or women-headed households, and households with malnourished children.
- Other criteria included 'drought-affected households', orphans, pregnant and lactating women or pastoralist households that had lost their livestock.

However, despite agencies reporting the use of specific selection criteria, the majority of stakeholders interviewed by IFMs perceived a lack of transparency in the selection of beneficiaries (particularly in Mogadishu). Unanimously, the interviewed urban non-beneficiaries (poor) were unaware of selection criteria.

Other IFM informants reported a number of other targeting issues, such as lack of community participation, lack of verification and exclusion of minority groups (most likely the *Jerer*<sup>44</sup>). Another major issue raised by both IFM interviews and by the evaluation team was that, although many agencies tried hard to target the most vulnerable groups, and demonstrated rigorous application of the community-based targeting process, in most areas, targeting was influenced by more powerful local clans that subsequently obtained the majority of resources.<sup>45</sup>

All these targeting issues led the programme evaluation team to suggest that blanket targeting of households in some areas would have been a preferable option. Had agencies implemented blanket targeting for at least the first few months, they might have developed a better understanding of community politics, making it easier to target specific groups once the crisis had eased sufficiently.

In hindsight this seems like the right solution, but at the time it was quickly disregarded. This was the first time that cash programming had been implemented on this scale and there were numerous concerns from donors over its appropriateness. Had it been food, not cash, being distributed, blanket distributions would probably have been done, as the level of need was extremely high.

#### *Involvement of other stakeholders in the targeting process*

Initially, donors (and agencies) feared that local authorities, particularly militia groups, would hijack the targeting process,

‘Perhaps geographically targeted blanket distribution would have been more effective at reaching the most vulnerable, at least in the first three months (September to December 2012). This would have allowed time to get targeting strategies and methodologies right. While donors and NGOs had to show due diligence in ensuring Al Shabaab did not benefit from funds, there is no doubt that families with an Al Shabaab member suffered equally, if not more so, from famine conditions. And therefore, blanket distribution for a short time during a famine, coupled with specific risk mitigation measures, was probably justified.’

Source: Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

<sup>44</sup> Somali Bantus.

<sup>45</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

and that inclusion error would be high as a result. The Phase 1 report also highlighted the relationship with local authorities as a challenge, particularly when it came to access and security.

In many rural locations, CVMG agencies involved a wide range of people from their targeted communities in the targeting process. This helped reduce reliance on one information source. Groups included in the targeting process were often the local authorities, village committees, and community nutrition volunteers, nutrition project staff and nutrition mobilisers. In the urban context of Mogadishu, where many agencies were newly operational, agencies involved local authorities and camp leaders (or camp owners and/or gatekeepers).

When involving other stakeholders in targeting (or any project process), two key questions need to be asked: do the stakeholders adequately represent the views of the target community? And do the objectives (intentions) of the NGO and the other stakeholders match?


Unfortunately, particularly in Mogadishu, the answer to both of these questions is ‘no’. As a result, targeting errors appear to be higher in Mogadishu, with a perception among stakeholders that there was a lack of transparency about the process carried out by most (but not all) agencies. This included lack of transparency about what selection criteria were used, why certain groups were excluded, what the relationship was between the NGO and the local authorities and questions about who (if anyone) verified the beneficiary lists.

Overall, perhaps also due to the urgency of Phase 1 and the lack of re-targeting in Phase 2, the stakeholders least involved in the targeting process appear to be ordinary community members (Figure 11, p. 26). In the rural areas it appears that wealthier households were included in the discussions, as this group has reported that there was community involvement, whereas the poorer non-beneficiaries have not done so.


Qualitative data indicate that many CVMG partners did not have any community group or committee with the responsibility of supervising the selection process. The results of the interviews suggest that it was the NGOs alone that decided who to select as a beneficiary, often relying on information from local authorities or camp leaders, and often without verification.

In some cases, where committees were used, it appears that these groups were not representative of the community. Rather, they were often self-appointed individuals or people who had relationships with the authorities and/or NGO staff. Figure 12 shows that the wealthy non-beneficiaries in rural areas felt that committees had been used, whereas others were less certain. This may again be because it was the wealthy that sat on the committees.

**Figure 11: IFM Informants reporting that community members participated in beneficiary selection**



**Figure 12: IFM informants reporting that committees were used during targeting**



In addition to the involvement of non-representative stakeholders in the targeting process, another key targeting issue that has been overlooked by many agencies is the inclusion of minority or marginalised groups.

Targeting in Somalia is also often biased against ‘minority’ populations. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that it was minority groups who were most affected by the famine, and who have been provided with the least assistance as a result of both their marginalised status and their location (access issues) (Figure 13). In order to ensure participation of these groups, they need to be actively included by NGOs and authorities. The monitoring findings indicate that, in most locations, active inclusion and collaboration with minority or marginalised groups was not considered, and these groups, if included, were included by accident rather than intent. As a result, the majority of stakeholders believed that there were minority groups within the community that were excluded from the targeting process.

Agencies were understandably concerned about security issues, particularly in Mogadishu. In addition, the limited resources meant that exclusion was inevitable, and as a result, agencies have opted for less transparent methodologies in favour of security. In hindsight, this may have resulted in more targeting errors.

In Banadir region the lack of information provided to communities about many of the CVMG partners projects meant that those excluded from the targeting process also included camp residents who were simply absent on the day of registration – often because they were looking for work, begging or had gone to the market. In addition, 50% of beneficiaries interviewed by IFMs believed that wealthier households were registered to receive cash or vouchers.

#### *Selection criteria used*

The quantitative surveys asked beneficiaries why they were targeted for the project, using which specific selection criteria.



Figure 13: IFM informants reporting perceived inclusion and exclusion errors<sup>46</sup>




Table 15 shows that, in both urban and rural areas, the most common reason for being included in the project was selection by ‘community-based targeting’ (CBT). In urban areas (Mogadishu), 16% of households (n=315) reported that they did not know why they were targeted. When the ‘community based targeting’ selection criteria were looked at

more closely (Table 16), a further 19% (n=374) of households in Mogadishu could not identify why they were targeted.

#### Verification of beneficiary lists

After the completion of beneficiary selection, some CVMG agencies conducted a verification exercise to triangulate the

Table 15: Targeting criteria (as reported by beneficiaries)

Transfer type / location	Targeting method	n	%
Cash Rural	Unknown	70	2%
	CBT	2,696	68%
	Nutrition Centre Card	184	30%
Cash Urban	Unknown	315	16%
	CBT	1,143	59%
	Nutrition Centre Card	66	24%
Voucher Urban	Unknown	20	9%
	CBT	204	89%
	Nutrition Centre Card	5	2%

		Targeting criteria used						
		Elderly	FHH	IDP	Lack of Assets	Malnourished	Not reported	Pregnant or lactating mother
NGO1	n	28	43	33	1	27	985	24
	%	2%	4%	3%	0%	2%	86%	2%
NGO2	n	165	2	1	0	2	1,145	5
	%	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	87%	0%
NGO3	n	483	96	341	38	30	374	126
	%	32%	6%	23%	3%	2%	25%	8%
NGO4	n	0	0	0	0	375	0	921
	%	0%	0%	0%	0%	29%	0%	71%

<sup>46</sup> Non-beneficiary poor were not asked all questions.

**Table 16: Specific selection criteria used in Community Based Targeting processes (as reported by beneficiaries)**

Location	Targeting Criteria	n	%
Cash Rural	Unknown	159	4%
	Elderly/Other	442	11%
	Female-/Child-headed household	756	19%
	IDP	671	17%
	Lack of Assets	1,292	33%
	Malnourished	363	9%
	Pregnant/Lactating Mother	267	7%
Cash Urban (Banadir)	Unknown	374	19%
	Elderly/Other	33	2%
	Female-/Child-headed household	170	9%
	IDP	1,127	59%
	Lack of Assets	10	1%
	Malnourished	136	7%
	Pregnant/Lactating Mother	74	4%
Urban (Banadir)	Unknown	9	4%
	Elderly/Other	55	24%
	Female/Child-headed household	49	21%
	IDP	94	41%
	Lack of Assets	1	0%
	Malnourished	12	5%
	Pregnant/Lactating Mother	9	4%

information they had by checking consistency with name, photos and other related information. These included visiting the camps or villages and verifying whether the registered beneficiaries physically existed.

Verification of beneficiary lists should also involve checking that beneficiaries meet the selection criteria for the project (hence the need for easily verifiable criteria), and not simply checking for duplication within the list, or whether beneficiaries physically exist. This step was not adequately carried out by agencies, which is another contributing factor to the targeting errors found by the evaluation team.

### 7.3. Diversion

Diversion is a very real and acknowledged risk in Somalia. As previously mentioned, the Somalia aid community had previously been subject to large-scale corruption when WFP food items were diverted. There was therefore no reason to believe that cash would be less affected by corruption and diversion. Evidence collected by the evaluation team found instances of diversion, but noted that the diversion of cash was less serious than comparable in-kind interventions,<sup>47</sup> contrary to many preconceptions.

The Phase 1 definition of diversion was amended for Phase 2

<sup>47</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

### Box 2: What targeting methods worked well?

While no one agency has followed all the steps below, the following are a list of factors that have contributed to more successful targeting.

- Involvement of community (not just the leaders)
- Understand the motivation of other stakeholders before involving them in the targeting process
- Do not rely on one stakeholder's information in preparing beneficiary lists
- Develop clear (and easily verifiable) selection criteria
- Use representative committees
- Active inclusion of minor or marginalised groups
- Verification of beneficiary list by agency staff (against selection criteria)

to reflect the complex reality on the ground and the specific difficulties likely to arise through remote management (Box 3).

The qualitative data from NGO interviews indicates that many of the CVMG agencies reported being unaware of any diversion in their area. A few agencies even suggested that diversion was only observed in areas under the control of Al Shabaab, which was in fact not the case.

One of the findings of the evaluation, however, was that NGO staff were responsible for diversion, and subsequent

### Box 3: CVMG Phase 2 definition of corruption/diversion

- Taxation of beneficiaries by local militias or local authorities, landlords, shopkeepers, community committees, NGO staff, etc. who demand payment either on a one-off or regular basis.
- Errors of inclusion in targeting where those who do not meet the targeting criteria are included in beneficiary lists through personal connections, political associations, bribery or force/threats.
- Intentional double registration of beneficiaries.
- Registration of 'ghost' beneficiaries, i.e. use of false names and profiles that allow money to be collected.
- NGO staff misusing the registration lists to retain project funds e.g. by paying fewer beneficiaries than reported, by registering fewer beneficiaries than reported or paying less money each transfer.
- Collusion of stakeholders for private gain.
- Any other instance where stakeholders have abused power for private gain.<sup>48</sup>

investigations confirmed these findings. Clearly, agencies had underestimated the risk of their own staff being involved in diversion.

This highlights the need for better internal financial monitoring, with a system of checks and balances to ensure that staff members are unable to divert project resources (funds and other resources). Internal financial monitoring is part of programme monitoring. However, it was never discussed whether the CVMG should look at individual agency financial records as part of the monitoring framework. Perhaps this was a failing of the monitoring system, as it was assumed that agencies were able to manage their financial systems adequately. This is a lesson that future projects need to consider, to ensure that agencies have systems in place to capture possible internal fraud. Financial monitoring needs to include ways to identify collusion, fraud and corruption by each agency. As it was, when these issues arose during implementation they were not detected by programme monitoring, but rather through the examination of financial records during programme evaluation.

Aside from issues with the CVMG partner agencies themselves, diversion, corruption and rent-seeking emerged as major problems for beneficiaries receiving cash or vouchers in an urban, camp environment.

In Somalia the majority of IDP camps are privately run and camp hierarchies do not have a humanitarian mandate. Instead,

<sup>48</sup> Private gain refers not just to individuals but to families and communities; ethnic, regional or religious groupings; political or social organizations; corporations or militias. 'Gain' is not always financial: the abuse of power may enhance personal or organizational reputation or be for social and political purposes.

### Box 4: IDP camp leadership

**Camp owner:** The camp owner is a businessman who owns the camp. He and his partners make all the arrangements needed to settle the IDPs. He negotiates with the humanitarian agencies regarding the type of support to be provided to people who are settled in the camp. His business is not based on a humanitarian mandate, but is often a purely profit-making business of providing services: access to camp facilities, security, 'accommodation', water and related services in the camp. Camp owners often extract rent from IDPs by using political and security pressures.

**Camp leader:** The camp leader is the political arm of the camp and acts on behalf of the camp owner. His role is to supervise, coordinate and negotiate with participants and handle relations with the NGO and local authorities through camp committees. Camp leaders are often self-elected.

**Gatekeeper:** In the context of a Somali IDP camp, 'gatekeeper' is the name given to the person (or people) in charge of security and policing and imposing all necessary restrictions on camp residents on behalf of the camp owner.

they provide services for IDPs on a fee basis. Diversion and corruption are therefore likely when these 'service providers' are not paid for their services.

Diversion, corruption and rent-seeking come in various forms, often involving several groups of individuals, institutions and stakeholders. In the case of IDP camps in Mogadishu, the main players are (a) the camp owner, (b) 'gatekeepers' and (c) camp leaders, NGO staff and local authorities (see Box 4).

Qualitative monitoring highlighted the following issues on diversion, particularly in the IDP camps of Mogadishu.

- In order to join an IDP camp, people are asked by the gatekeepers to pay in advance a certain amount of money (estimated at approximately \$10 per month).
- If IDPs were not able to pay immediately they had to agree to hand over part of any cash or food they received from humanitarian organisations or other sources.
- Most beneficiaries did not report awareness of any instance of 'diversion' as they were more concerned for their day-to-day survival than anything else.
- Of those who said they were aware of diversion, they reported that the gatekeeper collected money or food from the beneficiaries whenever they received their transfers from the NGOs. The portion of the food received that had to be given to gatekeepers was, however, not clear.
- Many informants were of the opinion that there was an unwritten agreement between the camp residents and gatekeepers (or camp owners) that beneficiaries of NGO activities must give an agreed portion to the gatekeeper.
- The collection of monies or food by the camp hierarchy

might also include rent charged for accommodation, water and other services provided at the camp, such as security.

- Militia groups also regularly collect a portion of all aid from project beneficiaries.

Further qualitative data indicate that, aside from the ‘taxes’ discussed above that are paid to the camp leadership, no other parties involved in the project (NGOs, *hawala* or traders) appear to be charging taxes or fees for services.

Some non-beneficiaries reported that payment by IDPs to the camp leadership is an accepted, ongoing practice in most of the camps and villages where the programme is implemented. However, it has gone unreported by humanitarian agencies and staff, probably because of fears of the reaction from donors. The CVMG monitoring may therefore be the first time that diversion has actively been monitored and reported in Somalia.

What is clear is that beneficiaries are scared to provide honest information about diversion for fear of being punished by the gatekeeper or expelled from the camp. This needs to be considered in the monitoring of future projects, as it is unlikely that IDP households will report honestly on this subject. The IFMs were able to find out this information only because they used informants who were from the same clans/families as the IDPs. They therefore had access to the camp and enjoyed the trust of camp residents.

As a result of these findings, it is clear that NGOs need to be wary of relying on information provided to them by the camp hierarchy, particularly regarding targeting. In addition, it highlights that NGOs need a clearer understanding of their operating risks, the culture of the area and better procedures are needed for internal financial monitoring. A recent research study by the Somalia Cash Consortium confirms these findings.<sup>49</sup>

Traditional forms of data collection – both quantitative and qualitative – have limitations in exposing issues related to diversion and corruption. Agencies will therefore need to use qualitative or innovative quantitative methods in order to expose corruption and diversion in future projects. Traditional quantitative survey monitoring was unable to pick up information on diversion, probably because of the sensitivity of the topic and the risks to whistleblowers. The evaluation report highlighted that there are significant risks to staff and beneficiaries in reporting diversion of corruption, and these risks need to be addressed in order to improve the likelihood that information on diversion, including collusion, fraud and corruption by agency staff, will be captured.

More information on the relationships between project stakeholders, rent-seeking behaviour in the IDP camps and

49 Bryld et al (2013) Gatekeepers in Mogadishu. The Somalia Cash Consortium.

the links to diversion can be found in the SATG report on the qualitative data findings.<sup>50</sup>

‘Evidence suggests that these [diversions] were less serious than comparable in-kind interventions, but still could have been countered through better risk analysis and preparedness and were not sufficiently identified by monitoring systems.’

Source: Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

#### 7.4. Feedback and complaints mechanism

In order to try and improve project accountability, the majority of participating CVMG partners had a formal feedback mechanism in place as a way of collecting and responding to complaints or feedback from the communities with which they worked.

All the CVMG implementing partners have committed to accountability to the beneficiaries and communities they support. To determine whether this organisational value was being practiced, some NGOs have established a Complaints Unit<sup>51</sup> to affirm to beneficiaries and communities the right to complain if implementing agencies do not abide by their commitments. The complaints and feedback mechanism is intended to provide a clear communication channel for beneficiaries to voice their suggestions and provide feedback on the programme interventions. This is expected to contribute to improving the quality and efficiency of the programme.

As described in the Phase 1 report, the working environment and access issues within project locations made it difficult for NGOs to mobilise communities. As a result, participatory approaches that would usually allow for the collection of feedback and complaints at village level were not feasible. In the urban environment of Mogadishu, the rapidly evolving community structures did not allow for a focal point for communication or awareness.<sup>52</sup> As a result, during Phase 1 the complaints mechanisms were not as successful as agencies had hoped. The feedback mechanism was therefore highlighted as another area of focus for the qualitative monitoring in Phase 2.

##### *Operation and structure of complaint mechanism*

In most cases, agencies have put in place a very simple complaints/feedback mechanism. Agencies provided bene-

50 Scek, A (2013) Cash and voucher monitoring group Phase 2: Perspectives of the beneficiaries and their stakeholders on cash and voucher intervention in South Central Somalia. SATG and UNICEF.

51 A team responsible for receiving and responding to complaints

52 Longley, C et al (2012) CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher programme. Phase 1: September 2011 – March 2012. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.

ficiaries with telephone numbers (on the back of the project identification card) that they can call or send SMS messages to.

Some NGOs also established a complaints desk, while others assigned specific staff to process complaints and feedback. Some NGOs provided a Nairobi phone number as well as a local number, enabling feedback and complaints to be made about the local NGO office without fear of recrimination. One agency provided an online system for feedback.

There are a number of key weaknesses in these systems, the major one being the lack of anonymity. They also rely heavily on telephone communication (or on computer literacy). Another problem was that insufficient awareness-raising work has been done and beneficiaries are not adequately informed as to how the system works. As a result, all the complaints made by beneficiaries relate to relatively simple operational matters such as lost ID cards, problems with receipt of old banknotes or expired food provided through voucher redemption.

In an operating environment such as Somalia it takes considerable time to build trust and confidence in any process, especially when corruption is endemic. In addition, there is a tradition of community dispute resolution that operates through traditional leaders. Community members are therefore unfamiliar (and distrustful) of any system that encourages people to complain directly to someone else (such as the NGO).

These issues have not been adequately addressed by the CVMG agencies and as a result, beneficiaries have not utilised the complaints system to its full potential and agencies have therefore missed opportunities for receiving genuine feedback on problem issues. In addition, although complaints data were collected regularly in Phase 1, in Phase 2 data are only available from three NGOs and those data were incomplete.

In qualitative monitoring approximately 75% of interviewed beneficiaries in Mogadishu reported that they avoided

reporting or giving feedback because they feared persecution. Some of the other key issues reported by beneficiaries include lack of awareness about how the complaints system works; lack of trust in the confidentiality of information provided; possible removal from the beneficiary list after complaining about the NGO; and possible removal from the camps after complaining about the camp leadership.

It is clear that agencies need to put more effort into developing a system of complaints/feedback that is confidential. More effort is also needed to raise awareness of the system with targeted communities. It would also be worth seeking the opinion of beneficiaries and other stakeholders as to how they could improve the complaints/feedback system and how they would prefer to give feedback or make complaints, as this has not been done to date.

More training is also needed for staff members operating the Complaints Unit. In some cases staff felt threatened and interpreted complaints as a poor reflection on their performance. These led them to believe that reporting complaints to the management or communities should be avoided.

It would also be beneficial to expand the complaints/feedback system to include non-beneficiaries. Targeting errors, possible diversion or problems with leadership or with the NGO themselves are more likely to be captured if non-beneficiaries are included.


‘The effort put into a feedback mechanism had mixed results, being unable to capture misuse of funds by agency staff given beneficiaries’ fear of retribution, and often capturing only symptoms of problems (e.g. the ‘loss’ of identification cards) rather than causes (e.g. the confiscation of cards by gatekeepers).’

Source: Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

**Table 17: Strengths and weaknesses of NGO feedback mechanisms**

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides a venue (forum) for addressing and resolving issues related to the programme intervention.</li> <li>• Gives beneficiaries a feeling that they can report mismanagement and request redress.</li> <li>• Strengthens communication and relations between beneficiaries and NGOs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The system is not anonymous.</li> <li>• Non-beneficiaries are not provided with information about the mechanism.</li> <li>• Beneficiaries fear being punished for reporting against any powerful people.</li> <li>• Fear that reporting of a problem might create more problems, rather than providing a solution.</li> <li>• Most beneficiaries are illiterate and have difficulty submitting complaints in writing.</li> <li>• Beneficiaries are poor and are unable to incur or cover phone call expenses.</li> <li>• Text messaging or phone calls can identify the caller’s phone number and are not anonymous.</li> <li>• Poor capacity of NGO staff handling complaints.</li> </ul>

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Process monitoring results show clearly the need for innovative methods of data collection, the need to consult with a wide range of stakeholders for triangulation (including non-beneficiaries) and the need for agencies to understand their operating environment and monitor accordingly.

Accountability to beneficiaries also needs improvement. Information-sharing through open meetings, less reliance on leadership structures and more involvement from the community as well as the provision of clear information on project selection criteria, entitlements and programme duration will enable beneficiaries to plan better for their future.

# Chapter 8

## Conclusion

The CVMG programme (both phases) was the largest emergency cash-based programme in history that was not government-run. While there were some specific contextual factors that enhanced the ability to utilise cash transfers as a mode of intervention, there is much to learn from the Somalia experience.

The CVMG programme has faced many challenges since its inception – from the scepticism of the donor and larger humanitarian community to the implementation challenges that come with working in difficult environments through remote management. Admittedly, at the inception of this programme the challenges and risks associated with successful aid delivery in Somalia were significant. However, many of these challenges are not specific to cash-based programmes but are problems found regularly in other humanitarian responses.

Indeed, many of the problems faced by the CVMG (such as targeting and diversion) were due to the working environment, remote management, the difficulties of large-scale continuous monitoring (monitoring fatigue) and funding issues, rather than being due to cash-based interventions *per se*.

The debate around large-scale cash intervention, although causing serious delay in action, did force agencies to actively articulate and examine the operational risks and potential mitigation strategies, a process which, again, should not be specific to cash-based responses. This enabled the community of actors with experience of cash-based interventions to actively share learning, debate issues and reach conclusions together.

Despite all these issues, the programme evaluation found that both cash and vouchers were appropriate responses to the famine in Somalia. The provision of cash allowed households to purchase much-needed food and repay debts incurred previously. This opened up new lines of credit so that households are in a better position if another crisis occurs. In addition, although there was significant fear within the humanitarian community that cash would cause inflation in the market, this has not been the case. In fact, despite its larger scale compared with previous cash distributions, the size of the programme was still small (less than 6%)<sup>53</sup> in comparison to regular remittance flows to Somalia.

Local traders reported that cash and vouchers contributed positively to demand, particularly in Mogadishu where the

<sup>53</sup> It is estimated that all the cash and voucher interventions in response to the famine (including the CVMG) totaled US\$77 million compared to estimates of at least US\$1.3 billion in remittances.

combination of declining global food prices and distribution of in-kind food aid contributed to food price deflation in mid-2012.<sup>54</sup>

The CVMG programme has therefore successfully shown that cash and vouchers can be used, at scale, as a means of providing food assistance in a very complex humanitarian environment. There are many reasons to recommend that cash-based responses be used to provide humanitarian assistance to households in crisis in Somalia in the future.

### *Overall value of the monitoring system*

The use of a common monitoring approach by the CVMG partners improved both programme implementation and the understanding of the working environment and the overall impacts of cash-based interventions.

In summary, the monitoring system was beneficial to the CVMG agencies in three ways:

1. It helped identify practical implementation issues in a timely manner, which allowed agencies to make changes to the cash and voucher delivery process. This included increasing the number of distribution points to reduce travel time for beneficiaries; improving the service at distribution points to reduce beneficiary waiting time; increasing the value of the vouchers; changing the value of cash distributed based on market price information; and managing operational issues brought to their attention through the feedback mechanism.
2. The monitoring system also highlighted larger issues about targeting, diversion and reliance on gatekeepers, which would not have been picked up without the qualitative data collection. These issues are important for understanding the working environment and for helping agencies recognise and mitigate potential risks to their programmes.
3. It provided evidence of changes in the beneficiary households' wellbeing as a result of the interventions.

The tools that were used for the CVMG programme have also now been widely used by other agencies as the basis of other project monitoring activities.

It should however be remembered that the monitoring system developed for the CVMG is complex and time-consuming, both in data collection and analysis. It was also designed largely to provide answers to key donor concerns, rather than as an everyday system for cash-based project monitoring. As a result,

<sup>54</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia.

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it is not recommended that agencies adopt the monitoring system as a whole, but rather utilise the learning from this programme and develop monitoring systems appropriate for individual cash and voucher projects.

It is recommended that agencies continue to include key aspects of this monitoring system including qualitative data collection related to targeting, programme stakeholders (NGOs, camp leadership, village leaders), and possible diversion. This should complement the more traditional quantitative data collection on item delivery, programme impact and market price monitoring. Specific recommendations regarding useful indicators can be found in the next section.

Overall, the evaluation of unconditional cash and voucher programmes in Somalia (including CVMG projects and others) found that ‘those NGOs that did not participate in the CVMG were not able to report on process, output and impact indicators with the same degree of rigor [as the CVMG]’.<sup>55</sup>

The CVMG monitoring system has provided evidence that cash and vouchers can be used at scale, as a means of providing food assistance in one of the most complex humanitarian environments in the world. It is therefore recommended that cash-based responses be used to provide humanitarian assistance to households in crisis in Somalia in future.

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<sup>55</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2013) Final Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Response to the 2011–12 Crisis in Southern and Central Somalia..



# Chapter 9

## Recommendations for future cash-based interventions

As a result of this monitoring exercise a number of recommendations can be made regarding best practice in monitoring cash-based interventions.

- To understand issues around targeting, such as inclusion and exclusion error, it is necessary to include a wide range of stakeholders in the monitoring process, especially non-beneficiaries (particularly people with no vested interest in the programme).
- Active inclusion of minority groups is needed to ensure that they are involved throughout the programme and are targeted for assistance (if required).
- Traditional quantitative data collection was unable to pick up key programming issues such as diversion/corruption, and significant investment in qualitative data was needed in order to better understand these issues.
- Data from beneficiaries on this topic is often biased by fear of reprisal and may therefore not be an honest account of the situation. Agencies need to be aware of this and use trusted sources to collect data.
- Collusion between programme stakeholders is very difficult to monitor and will require innovative methods to identify occurrences. This may include interviewing more non-beneficiaries than are usually included – people with links to the targeted communities but who are not directly involved in the programme, or discussing the programme through personal networks of the programme staff.
- Including a complaints/feedback mechanism in programme

design is essential for improving accountability to beneficiaries and to the community at large. However, if the intention is to collect information on sensitive topics (such as diversion, treatment of beneficiaries or corruption), the system must be confidential. Ideally, the community should be involved in determining the type of system employed so that there is a level of community trust.

- Agencies should be aware that large-scale cash distributions in foreign currencies could affect the local exchange rate.

Table 18 provides a list of the monitoring indicators that provided useful results, either in terms of identifying implementation processes that needed improvement, or in determining the impact of the interventions. It is recommended that the use of these indicators be continued in future programme-monitoring activities.

In addition, the monitoring team has identified two indicators that could be included in future in order to improve data analysis: access to credit (indicates improved access to coping mechanisms), and the proportion of households taking on new debt (and why).

The Coping Strategies Index (CSI) appears to be better than the Household Hunger Index that was used in Phase 1 at measuring coping strategies. However, it needs to be used over a longer period than was possible in this programme, and so its utility cannot be confirmed at this stage.

**Table 18: Key monitoring indicators**

Quantitative process indicators	Quantitative impact indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Travel time to distribution</li> <li>• Waiting time</li> <li>• Security at distribution site</li> <li>• Transfer preference</li> <li>• Use of commodities (vouchers)</li> <li>• Overall process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % HH expenditure (on food)</li> <li>• Number of meals consumed</li> <li>• Household Dietary Diversity Score</li> <li>• Intra-household conflict</li> <li>• Market prices/CPI/exchange rate</li> </ul>




# Annex 1

## Total households targeted by district and region (Phase 2)

Region	District	NGO								Total HH	Total People
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		
Region	District									Total hh	Total People
Bay	Qans adhere						1677			1,677	11,739
	Din s or						1488			1,488	10,416
Hiran	Be let Weyn e	2,659						1950		4,609	32,263
	Bu lo Bu rti	3,332						3418		6,750	47,250
	Jalal aq si	1,884						2062		3,946	27,622
	Maha s	2,092								2,092	14,644
	Mata ban	1,033								1,033	7,231
Gedo	Be let H aw a		2,267							2,267	15,869
	Do lo		2,200							2,200	15,400
	El Wa q		3,765							3,765	26,355
	Luuq		2,400							2,400	16,800
	Be let Xa aw o						773			773	5,411
	Luuq						1111			1,111	7,777
	Do lo ow						446			446	3,122
	Garb a hare y						994			994	6,958
	Bar d era								800	800	5,600
Lower Ju ba	Afm ad ow		3,740						800	4,540	31,780
	Dh ob ley		2,010							2,010	14,070
Mid dle Ju b a	Bu ale						2680			2,680	18,760
	Sa kow						2138			2,138	14,966
Mudu g	Galka yo N orth		1,440							1,440	10,080
	Gald og ob		740							740	5,180
	Janb an		575							575	4,025
	Hoby o		1,160							1,160	8,120
	Galka yo So uth		1,385							1,385	9,695
Mogad ish u	Wa ab eri			975		3311				4,286	30,002
	Ward ig ey			1,004	944					1,948	13,636
	Ham arJaja b			1,353		133				1,486	10,402
	Hawlwa d aag			6,170						6,170	43,190
	Ham a rweyne			1,507		1263				2,770	19,390
	Abdi aaziz			943						943	6,601
	Ka ara n			1,130		1176				2,306	16,142
	Bo nd ere			1,318		920				2,238	15,666
	Sh an ga ni			678						678	4,746
	Yaqsh id			534						534	3,738
	Wa da jir			1,913		1938				3,851	26,957
	Da ynille			1,640						1,640	11,480
	Ho dh an				2,802	2982				5,784	40,488
	Sh ibis				498					498	3,486
Da rki hn ley				2,206	484				2,690	18,830	
Low er Sh ab elle	Wa law eyn							1001		1,001	7,007
	Afgo i							2351		2,351	16,457
Mid dle Sh ab elle	Maha d e y							870		870	6,090
	Ada le							900		900	6,300
	Ada n Ya ba l							800		800	5,600
<b>Total</b>									<b>96,763</b>	<b>677,341</b>	

# Annex 2


## South Somalia seasonal calendar



Source: FEWSNET Somalia, <http://www.fews.net/pages/timelineview.aspx?gb=so&tln=en&l=en>.


# Annex 3

## IPC map – Somalia, July 2011



# Annex 4

## IPC map – Somalia, July 2012



# Annex 5

## Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB)

Commodity	South		Central/North	
	Minimum Food (per household per month)			
	Urban Town	Rural Town	Urban Town	Rural Town
Sorghum or Rice	95kg 71.25	95kg 71.25	95kg 71.25	95kg 71.25
White flour	3.75kg	3.75kg	3.75kg	3.75kg
Sugar	5kg	5kg	5kg	5kg
Vegetable oil	4Lt	3Lt	4Lt	3Lt
Milk	15Lt	x	20Lt	x
Meat	4kg	2kg	10kg	5kg
Tea leaves	0.5kg	0.5kg	0.5kg	0.5kg
Salt	1.5kg	1.5kg	1.5kg	1.5kg
Cowpeas	6kg	x	4.0kg	x
	Minimum Non-Food			
Kerosene	1.5Lt	1.5Lt	1.5Lt	1.5Lt
Soap (Laundry Bar)	4pcs	4pcs	4pcs	4pcs
Firewood (bundle)	30	x	10	x
Water (Jerican 20Lt)	5	5	5	5
Human Drugs (SoSh)	20,000	10,000	20,000	10,000
Grinding Cost	30kg	30kg	9kg	13kg
Clothes (SoSh)	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000
School Fees (SoSh)	90,000	52,000	90,000	52,000
Social Tax (SoSh)	12,500	12,500	12,500	12,500
Other (SoSh)	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000

# Annex 6

## Additional details on the monitoring system and methodology

### Qualitative data collection

The design of the qualitative monitoring process was carried out in two stages. A framework was initially developed between CVMG partners and consensus was reached on the objectives, purposes and results of the exercise. The second stage entailed analysis of whether Phase 1 priorities and challenges faced by beneficiaries had been translated into social and sectoral policies.

Data was then collected on areas identified by the stakeholders as of key importance. These included the targeting system, relationships between the hawalas, traders, elders, community leaders and other stakeholders, and lastly the need to better capture the perspective of the community, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

### Objectives of the qualitative data collection

- To examine the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the cash and voucher interventions.
- To determine whether the implementing partners adhered to agreed targeting criteria, and assess the level of beneficiary participation in the targeting process (i.e. whether implementing partners are accountable to themselves and to beneficiaries).
- To determine the effectiveness of the community feedback mechanism and how the implementing agencies respond to comments received (i.e. whether the project is accountable to beneficiaries).
- To substantiate as far as possible any reported claims of diversion of cash or food vouchers due to taxation, targeting inclusion, etc.
- To allow the problems and priorities of the beneficiaries to be heard.

### Selection and training of IFMs

In total, 32 IFMs were contracted to collect the qualitative data. A team of two independent field monitors was selected for each district where the CVMG was operational. The IFMs were chosen from individuals residing in the area, the intention being to utilise their local knowledge to enable detailed probing of answers, and to overcome potential difficulties related to translation. The overall responsibility for selecting the IFMs lay with SATG head office in coordination with the IFM Supervisor in each location.

While part of the objective of the data collection exercise was to build capacity at local level to carry out similar work in future, it was a requirement that the candidates have at

least some experience of participatory methodologies, have completed secondary education and be available for work for the duration of the exercise. Each location was assigned one IFM team, composed of two monitors – one team leader with experience in participatory methodologies and report writing, and one with basic participatory skills and data collection methodology.

Training sessions were undertaken in Mogadishu for all the IFMs, covering the tools and theoretical principles of the data collection exercise. SATG and ODI consultants conducted the training.

The IFM data are designed to complement the quantitative data findings and therefore contribute to the monitoring exercise by confirming (or not) the PDM findings, identifying issues for follow-up linked to diversion and targeting and providing more contextual information to elaborate on the PDM data findings.

The IFMs played a key role in collecting data that were completely independent from the NGOs; as such, the IFMs used their own transport to and within the project areas, and as far as possible they were responsible for arranging their own access to project locations with the local authorities,<sup>56</sup> although the NGOs provided introductions to the *hawala* agents and shopkeepers and assisted the IFMs by providing information about the locations of beneficiary communities and households (particularly those where quantitative data had already been collected), so that the IFMs could select which areas to visit.

The Phase 2 qualitative data were compiled into a Microsoft Access database by the SATG team. Unfortunately, as a result of a long delay in the disbursement of funds to SATG, only one round of qualitative data collection was carried out during Phase 2. Data were collected in December 2012 and January 2013, in some cases after the Phase 2 intervention had been completed.

### Quantitative monitoring

The quantitative data collection tools were revised for Phase 2 after the Interim Evaluation<sup>57</sup> made a number of recommendations for changes (see below). Like the qualitative data collection, it was expected that at least two rounds of quantitative impact data would be collected from each agency.

<sup>56</sup> In some cases, NGOs were reluctant to be seen to have an association with the IFMs due to fears that this might jeopardise their own access.

<sup>57</sup> Hedlund, K et al (2012) Interim Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.



## Annex 6 (continued)

### Planned vs. actual modifications to the monitoring system in Phase 2

		Phase 1: Aug–Mar 2012	Phase 2: Apr–Nov 2012
	Targeting and registration	Recognition of a range of ways in which Community Based Targeting & Nutrition Centre based targeting were undertaken  Geographic targeting examined district level only  Proxy indicators used to determine targeting accuracy at household level	Describe individual NGO Community Based and Nutrition Targeting Methodologies  <i>Review geographic targeting/coverage (by livelihood zone within districts)</i>  Review agency checks and balances for ensuring transparency and accountability in targeting
	Distribution/diversion	Information collected from NGOs, <i>hawala</i> agents, beneficiaries and traders and shopkeepers on the distribution systems, cash transfer size, frequency. Taxation and diversion data were also collected from NGOs and beneficiaries	Revision of tools but continued collection of existing indicators  Collection of information from a wider stakeholder base  <i>Review agency checks and balances for ensuring transparency and accountability in cash distribution</i>
	Complaints system	Complaints systems established and analysis of recorded complaints was undertaken on monthly basis. By April 2012, at least 55% of beneficiary households overall aware of NGO complaints systems (100% in some areas)	Describe individual NGO complaints systems  Consolidate Phase 1 IFM household information on the complaints process and complement with FGDs  Individual agencies to work on awareness-raising and inclusion of wider stakeholder feedback
	M&E	Post-distribution monitoring by NGOs  Market price monitoring by NGOs  Independent Field Monitors interviews with households and focus groups, and <i>hawala</i> agents, traders/shopkeepers and other trusted contacts  IFMs and NGOs reporting on possible diversions	Additional analysis of Phase 1 PDM data and IFM data.  <i>Continue PDM monitoring in a similar format to enable analysis of trends over time</i>  Compare market data in main markets with subsidiary markets  <i>Strengthen diversion monitoring</i>
Impact monitoring		Changes noted: household expenditure, number of meals and dietary diversity, nutrition, coping with severe food insecurity, debt/credit; longitudinal household case  Impact on traders, <i>hawalas</i> and communities including non-beneficiaries	Trend analysis of PDM data; link to seasonal calendars of income, debt, etc.  Discontinue collection of MUAC data  Introduce Coping Strategy Index  Continue to utilise FSNAU and NGO nutrition data/feeding programmes statistics

NB. Plan in italics were not realised.

As a result, some of the recommendations were incorporated while others were not, due to fear of respondent fatigue, time constraints or lack of agreement from CVMG partners. These changes are detailed in the table above.

During Phase 1, the CVMG agencies used MUAC to attempt to measure the changing nutritional status of children in the operational areas. However, as described in the Phase 1 report, the data

collection was not practical and data were not reliable. As a result, MUAC was removed from the monitoring system for Phase 2.

The Interim Evaluation recommended the use of Individual Dietary Diversity Scores to strengthen the ability of the monitoring system to detect changes in children's nutritional status.<sup>58</sup> However, the CVMG partners felt that this was not  
58 As used by ACF 2011.

## Annex 6 (continued)

### Interim evaluation recommendation for project implementation and monitoring

Recommendations	
Interim evaluation	Done?
Based on agency-specific reports consider re-targeting, particularly given concerns about exclusion of minority clans, changing food security conditions among IDPs in Mogadishu, those targeted more than six months ago in nutritional programmes, and as Gu rains were erratic specifically in Southern agro-pastoral areas. <sup>59</sup>	No agency conducted a full re-targeting exercise for Phase 2, but some added new households.
If beneficiaries are not re-targeted, consider reducing the size of the cash transfer in Mogadishu <sup>60</sup> given declining food prices, the majority of beneficiaries spending less than 50% of their income on food and relatively high dietary diversity (>6 for both men and women).	Size of transfers was modified to reflect the reduced cost of the MEB.
Outside of Mogadishu, maintain present MEB-based transfer in the case of cash and at least 70% of food costs in the case of vouchers. Particularly in light of unchanged food security conditions in rural areas and the fact that, with the exception of the target groups, households are still spending more than 70% of their income on food. This includes Gedo where implementing agencies are considering reducing the size of the transfer. <sup>61</sup>	To a limited extent this was followed. The voucher NGO operational there distributed vouchers giving over 70% of the MEB calorie content. The NGO implementing cash transfers did not become operational until January 2013.
Reinforce qualitative data collection and analysis, particularly to capture targeting errors and diversion including the independence of third-party field monitors, implement regular quality assessments of quantitative data and an improvement plan led by ODI within the CVMG, hold agencies accountable for poor data.	This was done.
A review of monitoring systems needs to be undertaken and best practice drawn out to inform the establishment of more effective monitoring of cash and voucher interventions in the future.	Done. Best practice recommendations can be found after the conclusions.

practical (too time-consuming) and therefore the Household Dietary Diversity Score has been retained.

Another recommendation from the Interim Evaluation was to replace the Household Hunger Index with a livelihood-based Coping Strategies Index (CSI), with a view to comparing changes over time. However, only one round of quantitative

impact data was ultimately collected and the CSI has not be utilised to its full potential. The CSI that has been used was developed by FSNAU.

<sup>59</sup> FSNAU (2012a).

<sup>60</sup> With the exception of Wadajir and Waberi where vouchers are being implemented and dietary diversity remains below 4.

<sup>61</sup> If budget restrictions demand a reduction in the transfer size, UCG should not be less than 100USD per household.

# Annex 7

## Monitoring challenges and limitations

### Qualitative data collection

A number of limitations and difficulties were faced in the field during qualitative data collection, many of which were dealt with as they arose in each specific location. Most were isolated experiences; however, they do offer areas for potential improvement in the later rounds of the exercise, and many were dealt with during the training sessions. Likewise, challenges that arose in a number of locations will inform improvements in the methodology for future work.

These constraints are common problems encountered during qualitative data collection. They are not specific to cash programming, nor are they specific to Somalia. It is clear that, in all situations, monitoring tools are only as good as the people that implement them.

### Quantitative data collection

Aside from the compromise of having the NGOs collect their own monitoring data (discussed in the Phase 1 report), the main challenges to the monitoring activities stemmed from delays in the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. Delays in the collection of quantitative data were linked to delays in the implementation of the projects. Delays in the collection of the qualitative data by the IFMs partly related to delays in project implementation, but were also due to communication issues between the monitoring team and the NGOs regarding access to project locations in order to interview their partners and beneficiaries. The length of these delays varied among the different implementing partners, and resulted in each CVMG partner undertaking monitoring

activities according to their own timetable, leading to delays in the compilation of the overall combined report. Decision-making and contractual problems with the formal inclusion of one CVMG partner also meant that the monitoring for this NGO was based on its own timetable. In short, it was not possible for all CVMG partners to adhere to the joint timetable that had originally been planned.

In addition, there were agency, time (and seasonal) differences in project baselines and in the amount of cash distributed – even within agencies. Some agencies that were able to secure funding to start Phase 2 relatively quickly kept their Phase 1 baseline. Others felt that the gap between projects was too long and therefore repeated their baseline survey. Other agencies only joined the CVMG in Phase 2 and therefore conducted their first baseline survey before starting implementation in 2012, while other agencies did not conduct any baseline survey at all.

The different baseline schedules, together with the challenge of different implementation schedules, made data analysis particularly difficult and comparison of overall programme impact impossible. As such, this report focuses more on qualitative data. The quantitative impact is better understood by looking at the individual NGOs on a case-by-case basis. The figure below shows the timeline of all the CVMG monitoring activities. For the purpose of this report, six CVMG agencies provided PDM data, which are included in the process findings section, and three agencies collected impact data (quarterly monitoring). No data are included in this report for the three cash interventions that started late in Phase 2.

### Lessons and limitations of the qualitative data collection

Quality and experience of IFMs	The IFMs were of a satisfactory standard, even though in some areas it was difficult to find people with sufficient experience to act as team leaders for the exercise. Training helped, but difficulties persisted with some team members who were used to statistical data having problems accepting the principles associated with the exercise (i.e. participatory approaches rather than quantitative surveys).
Documentation	Despite this being an area of focus during the training sessions, some team members found it difficult to report exactly what the beneficiaries and other stakeholders said, choosing instead to interpret it. Triangulation with other team members and the senior supervisor helped overcome any difficulties.
Use of checklists (data collection tools) as a questionnaire	In some instances the data collection tools were used simply as questionnaires, meaning yes/no answers were recorded, rather than the deeper probing that was supposed to emerge. Much of the additional information was captured in notebooks provided by SATG and this information was also used for reporting purposes.
Length of data collection tools – prohibiting detailed investigation of particular areas	A number of IFMs reported that covering several areas in the research did not allow for the in-depth probing they would have liked to undertake. This resulted in respondent fatigue.

# Annex 8

## Locations of qualitative data collection

Region	District
Banadir	Dharkenley
	Hodan
	Wadajir
Hiran	Beletweyne
Bay	Qansaxdhere
	Dinsor
Middle Juba	Buale
	Sakow
Lower Juba	Afmadow
Gedo	Dolow
	Ceel Waaq
	Bardera

# Annex 9

## Process monitoring tables

### Travelling time to distribution site (cash)

Cash transfer location	Time to distribution site		Total
Cash Rural	Unknown	n	1,146
		%	29%
	<0.5 hours	n	1,117
		%	28%
	>2.5 hours	n	573
		%	15%
	0.5–1 hour	n	406
		%	10%
	1–1.5 hours	n	502
		%	13%
	1.5–2 hours	n	185
		%	5%
	2–2.5 hours	n	21
		%	1%
Cash Urban (Banadir)	Unknown	n	374
		%	19%
	<0.5 hours	n	537
		%	28%
	>2.5 hours	n	7
		%	0%
	0.5–1 hour	n	793
		%	41%
	1–1.5 hours	n	148
		%	8%
	1.5–2 hours	n	57
		%	3%
	2–2.5 hours	n	8
		%	0%

### Travelling time to distribution site (cash)

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1
% of households reporting that the travel time to distribution site was acceptable	Rural	n	1,794	225	150
		%	86%	60%	40%
	Urban	n	207	296	615
		%	52%	74%	82%
	Total N cash rural	2,076	375	375	
	Total N cash urban	400	400	750	

(continued)

## Annex 9 (continued)

### Travelling time to distribution site (vouchers)

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2
% of households reporting that travel time to distribution site was acceptable	Rural	n	174	181	447	706	
		%	54%	97%	97%	96%	
		Total N rural voucher	325	187	461	737	
	Urban	n				742	732
		%				99%	98%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Acceptability of frequency of cash distribution

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1
% of households reporting that the distribution frequency suited their needs	Rural	n	1,828	375	375
		%	88%	100%	100%
	Urban	n	127	77	284
		%	32%	19%	38%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		400	400	750

### Acceptability of frequency of voucher distribution

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2
% of households reporting that distribution frequency suited their needs	Rural	n	201	41	48	598	
		%	61%	22%	10%	81%	
		Total N rural voucher	328	186	468	739	
	Urban	n				653	636
		%				87%	85%
		Total N urban voucher				750	746

### Cash households reporting identification issues with hawala

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1
% of cash households reporting they experienced problems with identification by <i>hawala</i> staff	Rural	n	10	0	1
		%	1%	0%	0%
	Urban	n	2	1	1
		%	1%	0%	0%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		312	400	750

## Annex 9 (continued)

### Voucher households reporting identification issues with staff

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2
% of voucher households reporting that they experienced problems with identification by staff	Rural	n	1	181	8	4	
		%	1%	97%	2%	1%	
		Total N rural voucher	140	186	464	734	
	Urban	n				2	6
		%				0%	1%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Overall rating of security at cash distribution site

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1
% of households ranking security at distribution site as 'good'	Urban	n	372	371	742
		%	94%	93%	99%
	Total N cash urban	398	400	750	

### Overall rating of security at voucher distribution site

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2
% of households ranking the level of security at the distribution site as 'good'	Rural	n			341	655	
		%			82%	94%	
		Total N rural voucher			416	697	
	Urban	n	698	698	698	100%	
		%	100%	100%	100%	698	668
		Total N urban voucher				93%	89%

### Rating of overall process of cash collection

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1
% of households ranking ease of cash collection as 'good'	Rural	n	1,885	229	304
		%	91%	61%	81%
	Urban	n	390	386	728
		%	98%	97%	97%
	Total N cash rural		2,071	375	375
	Total N cash urban		399	400	749

## Annex 9 (continued)

### Rating of overall process of voucher collection

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that the process for collecting their vouchers was 'good'	Rural	n	0	65	375	688	
		%	0%	36%	90%	99%	
		Total N rural voucher	138	183	416	697	
	Urban	n				721	694
		%				96%	93%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Issues specific to cash distribution projects

#### Households reporting a preference for food assistance over cash

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>
% of households reporting that they preferred food to cash	Rural	n	131	0	0
		%	6%	0%	0%
	Urban	n	50	59	106
		%	13%	15%	14%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		400	399	750

#### Households reporting receipt of expected cash value

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>
% of households reporting they received the amount of cash they expected	Rural	n	2,045	375	375
		%	99%	100%	100%
	Urban	n	181	252	674
		%	45%	63%	90%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		400	400	750

#### Households reporting problems with cash collection by a family member

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>
% of households reporting problems with sending another family member to collect the money	Rural	n	525	0	0
		%	25%	0%	0%
	Urban	n	0	151	0
		%	0%	38%	0%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		399	400	750



## Annex 9 (continued)

### Households reporting problems with voucher redemption by a family member

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that they experienced problems sending other family members to redeem vouchers	Rural	n	0	29	35	112	
		%	0%	16%	8%	15%	
		Total N rural voucher	140	186	465	734	
	Urban	n				128	48
		%				17%	6%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Households reporting other problems with cash collection

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round		
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>
% of households reporting other problems with collecting the cash	Rural	n	5	0	0
		%	0%	0%	0%
	Urban	n	0	0	0
		%	0%	0%	0%
	Total N cash rural		2,076	375	375
	Total N cash urban		399	399	750

## Issues specific to voucher distribution projects

### Households reporting voucher quantity met needs

Process indicator	Location	Monitoring Round	Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that the food quantity provided by the vouchers was sufficient to cover their needs	Rural	n	109	27	103	557	
		%	61%	14%	22%	75%	
		Total N rural voucher	179	187	468	739	
	Urban	n				518	454
		%				69%	61%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Households reporting a preference for cash over vouchers

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that they would prefer cash to vouchers	Rural	n	163	51	187	211	
		%	50%	27%	40%	29%	
		Total N rural voucher	327	187	468	739	
	Urban	n				109	50
		%				15%	7%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

## Annex 9 (continued)

### Households reporting voucher value was as expected

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that the value of the voucher was what they expected	Rural	n	228	51	361	736	
		%	70%	27%	78%	100%	
		Total N rural voucher	325	187	464	739	
	Urban	n				738	738
		%				98%	98%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

### Households reporting paying someone in order to receive their voucher/s

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that they had to pay someone to receive their voucher/s	Rural	n	0	0	1	2	
		%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
		Total N rural voucher	225	186	449	661	
	Urban	n				2	1
		%				0%	0%
		Total N urban voucher				749	375

### Household receipt of expected quantity of commodities

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round		
			PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that they got the quantity of commodities expected	Rural	n	57	221	
		%	88%	100%	
		Total N rural voucher	65	221	
	Urban	n		749	748
		%		100%	100%
		Total N urban voucher		750	748

### Households reporting traders changed prices as a result of voucher project

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM <sub>1</sub>	PDM <sub>2</sub>	PDM <sub>3</sub>	QM <sub>1</sub>	QM <sub>2</sub>
% of households reporting that traders changed their prices as a result of the voucher scheme	Rural	n	0	0	1	11	
		%	0%	0%	0%	2%	
		Total N rural voucher	321	187	467	727	
	Urban	n				3	2
		%				0%	0%
		Total N urban voucher				750	726

# Annex 10

## A brief overview of key programme stakeholders

Many of the underlying problems that the cash and voucher distributions seek to address fall outside of the control of the programme. As a result there is a need to understand and engage with numerous programme stakeholders (including non-beneficiaries) to create an environment that is supportive of the objectives of the programme, and to address some of the sustainability challenges that the programme is facing. Reaching the programme's target of improving food security depends on good relationships with a range of people and organisations with a stake in helping the poor and others who are negatively affected by drought and other emergencies.

Analysis of the qualitative data included an examination of the existing relationships among the various programme stakeholders, including how they interact, cooperate and coordinate the implementation of the programme. The results obtained from focus group discussions on this topic are unfortunately not conclusive, and in fact often contradictory. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries interviewed appeared to have little information on the relationships between and among the various stakeholders. Some beneficiaries suspected that there could be family or clan relations among the various groups, although this could not be verified.

Information gathered by the SATG informants also tried to explain how the relationships among the various groups

operate. The figure below shows the hierarchy of an IDP camp in Mogadishu.


**Camp owner:** The person owning the land on which the camp sits often initiates the establishment of an IDP camp. This 'camp owner' may put in place some rudimentary, low-standard facilities to accommodate IDPs and other marginalised groups looking for a place to stay.

**'Gatekeeper':** In the context of a Somali IDP camp, 'gatekeeper' is the name given to the person (or people) in charge of security, policing and imposing all necessary restrictions on camp residents on behalf of the camp owner. The camp owner engages the gatekeeper as the 'manager' of the camp. In most cases, the gatekeeper is a member of the family of the camp owner. The gatekeeper fulfills tasks assigned to him/her by the camp owner.

**Camp leader:** The third key individual linked to camp management is the camp leader. He/she is responsible for recruiting and settling IDPs at the camp. The camp leader and the gatekeeper explain to camp residents the conditions that they have to agree to before they are allowed to reside at the camp.

The relationship between the camp owner, gatekeeper and camp leader is clear in that the camp is a business. This

### The hierarchy of an IDP camp



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business is often not intended for humanitarian purposes but simply a money-making venture. This is an important point as it highlights the different objectives of the NGOs and the camp leadership.

*Links between the camp leader and NGOs*

In many cases, agencies operating in Mogadishu intended to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to households living in IDP camps. In order to target IDPs, NGOs must liaise with camp management to some degree.

Camp leaders request support from the NGOs. In some cases NGOs would then conduct an assessment to determine the needs of the IDPs before they commit to support the camp residents. In other cases, before the camp is established the camp owner, gatekeeper and camp leader agree with the NGO that they are going to establish a camp and expect to be supported by the NGO.

In this case the relationship between the camp leader and the NGO could be seen as a business relationship that benefits the NGO and the camp management. This relationship may also be based on clan or family links.

*Links between service providers (traders and hawalas) and other stakeholders*

The selection of service providers is done by the NGOs with no involvement from beneficiaries or clients. In the case of hawalas they are selected by the NGO's head offices in Nairobi, which decide which mechanism is to be used to distribute cash to the beneficiaries. Contracts or agreements are signed between *hawalas* and NGOs and implemented at local level.

The same process is followed for the selection of traders/shops in the case of vouchers, with the only difference being that local NGOs are asked to collect the list of traders/shops available in their areas and submit them to their head offices for selection and signing of the agreement.

The last stage sees the NGOs link service providers with beneficiaries, where the beneficiaries are told where to collect cash or vouchers.

Collection of information about how satisfied the beneficiaries were with service providers (either *hawala* or traders) has not been included in the monitoring system, and this should be included in future.

*Links between the various stakeholders and local authorities*

Regardless of whether the local authorities are from the Federal Government or from militia groups such as Al Shabaab, they play an important role in facilitating or hindering the effective implementation of any programme. In theory they can provide information on people's priority needs. However, in practical terms, due in part to their weak institutional capacity, they are unable to provide such information. As a result, the process is more likely to be led by NGOs rather than the local authorities.

In many cases the local authorities and their militias are seen as hindering the implementation of the programme through their damaging and corrupt management.

At the rural village level, the situation may be even more complicated than in the camps. Individuals may appoint themselves, or are elected as leaders either because of their religious status or clan affiliations. Leaders then form a kind of tribal democracy by electing a committee to run the entire village operations needed to provide services to the community. These 'committees' work and negotiate with agencies intending to implement programmes in the area.

In the villages under the control of Al Shabaab, the village leader is a member of Al Shabaab, as are the committee members. Any NGO interested in implementing programmes in that location will have to work under the rules of Al Shabaab. Direct negotiations are required between Al Shabaab and NGOs, that either have to sign or have an unwritten agreement to implement their programme using local staff who are also Al Shabaab members or their affiliates.

Some agencies reported that they operate in Al Shabaab-controlled areas by 'working with a low profile'. However, IFM findings indicate that this is not possible. Interviews indicate that Al Shabaab is aware of all activities in their locations.

# Annex 11

## Quantitative data – awareness of complaints mechanism

### Awareness of the project complaints mechanism (cash)

Indicator	Location		Monitoring round			
			PDM1	PDM2	QM1	
% of households reporting that they were aware of the complaints mechanism	Rural	n	1,890	375	375	
		%	91%	100%	100%	
	Urban	n	239	169	555	
		%	60%	42%	74%	
	Total N cash rural		2076	375	375	
	Total N cash urban		400	400	750	

### Awareness of the project complaints mechanism (vouchers)

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round				
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2
% of households reporting that they are aware of the complaints mechanism	Rural	n	177	54	420	177	
		%	54%	29%	90%	24%	
		Total N rural voucher	328	187	468	739	
	Urban	n				684	670
		%				91%	89%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750

# Annex 12

## Additional data on social impacts

### Beneficiary households inviting others to eat

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round					Total
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2	
% of households reporting that food allowed them to invite non-household members to eat	Rural	n	216	60	423	164		863
		%	66%	32%	90%	22%		50%
		Total N rural voucher	328	187	468	738		1,721
	Urban	n				610	504	1,114
		%				81%	67%	74%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750	1500

### Households reporting community jealousy

Process indicator	Location		Monitoring Round					Total
			PDM1	PDM2	PDM3	QM1	QM2	
% of households reporting that other community members are jealous of them	Rural	n	101	58	433	532		1,124
		%	31%	31%	93%	72%		65%
		Total N rural voucher	328	187	467	739		1721
	Urban	n				301	516	817
		%				40%	69%	54%
		Total N urban voucher				750	750	1,500

# Annex 13

## Baseline survey

### CASH / VOUCHER DISTRIBUTION: BASELINE QUESTIONNAIRE v10 230911

A: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS									
A1	Questionnaire #		A2	Beneficiary ID #					
A3	Beneficiary Registration #		A4	NGO					
A5	Name of Enumerator		A6	Date of Interview					
A7	District		A8	Village					
A9	Gender of interviewee (1= male, 2 = female)		A10	Gender of head of hh (1 = male, 2 = female)					
A11	Total number of people in household		A12	Number of children in hh under 5 years old					
A13	Targeting criteria for beneficiary		Codes for A13: 1 = Nutrition Centre Card, 2 = Pregnant /Lactating Mother, 3 = Women headed HH, 4 = IDP, 5 = Community Based Targeting						
B: INCOME AND LIVELIHOOD									
B1	Which best describes your household's status? 1 = normally resident in this area, 2 = moved here due to drought, 3 = moved here due to conflict, 4 = moved here for other reasons								
B2	What is your household's usual livelihood strategy		1 = pastoralist, 2 = agro-pastoralist, 3 = agriculture, 4 = urban, 5 = other						
B3	What were your household's three main sources of income last month?						1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	3 <sup>rd</sup>
Codes for B3: 0 = no income source, 1 = crop sales, 2 = livestock sales, 3 = salary, 4 = remittance, 5 = casual labour, 6 = Cash for work programme, 7 = petty trade; 8 = Skilled trade/artisan; 9 = Begging; 10 = Rental income; 11 = Firewood / charcoal sales; 12 = Milk / Dairy product sales; 13 = Other Livestock products (eg skins, honey); 14 = Natural resources (eg: salt, gum, incense) 15 = Fishing; 16 = Brick making; 17 = Other									
B4	How many people contributed to household income last month?								
B5	What was your total household income last month? (Somali Shillings)								
B6	How much debt does your household owe? (Somali Shillings)								
B7	Which of the following have you or members of your household received from NGOs or projects in the past one month? (1 = yes, 0 = no)								
	a. Plumpy Nut		b. CSB+oil+beans		c. Rice+oil+beans		d. Food voucher		
	e. Cash or CFW		f. Medicine		g. Water or water voucher		h. NFI / other		
B8	What is your source of water for human consumption?				1 = capped well, 2 = dam, 3 = river, 4 = lake, 5 = vendor, 6 = tap, 7 = uncapped well				
B9	In the month prior to receiving the first transfer, how much did your household spend on the following (SoSh)								
	a. Food		e. Debt repay		i. Clothes / shoes		m. Saved		
	b. Water		f. Gift / share		j. Livestock		n. Business investment		
	c. Transport		g. Rent / shelter		k. School fees		o. Household items		
	d. Firewood		h. medical		l. Ag inputs		p. Other		
C: ASSET OWNERSHIP									
C1	What type of house is your household currently living in?				1 = Dhagax, 2 = Baraako, 3 = Mudul ama Aqal Soomali, 4 = Cariish, 5 = Coosh ama Buul				
C2	Is this house owned by a member of the household, rented, or rent-free?				1 = self-owned, 2 = rented, 3 = rent-free				
C3	Does your household own any land? (1 = yes, 0 = no)				C4	If yes, how many hectares?			
C5	How many hectares did your household cultivate in the last Gu season?								

(continued)

## Annex 13 (continued)

<b>C6</b>	How many of the following livestock assets do you or household members own (enter number owned)										
a. cattle		b. camels		c. donkeys		d. sheep		e. goats		f. chickens	
<b>D: FOOD CONSUMPTION AND COPING STRATEGIES</b>											
<b>D1</b>	How many meals did adults in your household eat <u>yesterday</u> during the day and night?										
<b>D2</b>	How many meals did children in your household eat <u>yesterday</u> during the day and night?										
<b>D3</b>	Which of the following food stuffs did you or a hh member eat as part of a meal or snack <u>yesterday</u> ? (tick box)										
a) Cereals		e) other vegetables		i) eggs		m) oil					
b) Vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables		f) Other fruit		j) Fish		n) sweets					
c) White tubers or roots		g) Flesh meat		k) Legumes		o) spices					
d) Dark green leafy greens		h) Organ meat		l) milk							
<b>D4</b>	Please think of the foods your household has eaten over the <u>past week</u> . How many days out of the past 7 days have you or someone in your household eaten the following foods? (Write 1-7)										
a) Cereals		e) other vegetables		i) eggs		m) oil					
b) Vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables		f) Other fruit		j) Fish		n) sweets					
c) White tubers or roots		g) Flesh meat		k) Legumes		o) spices					
d) Dark green leafy greens		h) Organ meat		l) milk							
<b>Examples of foods in categories:</b>											
<b>Cereals:</b> maize, rice, sorghum, wheat flour, pasta, anjera, <b>White tubers or roots:</b> white potato, cassava											
<b>Vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables:</b> yellow/orange potatoes, carrots, pumpkin, papaya, ripe orange mango											
<b>Other vegetables:</b> tomatoes, onions, cabbage, light green lettuce <b>Other fruits:</b> unripe green mangos, banana, orange, apple, dates, wild fruits <b>Sweets:</b> sugar, honey <b>Flesh meat:</b> Cow, goat, sheep, camel, chicken meat											
<b>Organ meat:</b> Liver, kidney, heart <b>Legumes:</b> cowpeas, groundnuts, beans, peanuts, plumpy nut, pumpkin seed, wild nuts											
<b>Milk:</b> full milk portion, does not include small amount for tea											
<b>D5</b>	How much money did your household spend on food last week? (SSH)										
<b>D6</b>	In the <u>last one month</u> , was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food? (Yes=1, No=0)										If No, skip next question
<b>D7</b>	If yes, how often did this happen? <b>Rarely = 1</b> (once or twice in past month); <b>Sometimes = 2</b> (three to ten times in past month); <b>Often = 3</b> (more than ten times in past month)										
<b>D8</b>	In the <u>last one month</u> , did you or anyone in your household go to sleep hungry at night because there was not enough food? (Yes=1, No=0)										If No, skip next question
<b>D9</b>	If yes, how often did this happen? <b>Rarely = 1</b> (once or twice in past month); <b>Sometimes = 2</b> (three to ten times in past month); <b>Often = 3</b> (more than ten times in past month)										
<b>D10</b>	In the <u>last one month</u> , did you or anyone in your household go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was not enough food? (Yes = 1, No = 0)										If No, skip next question
<b>D11</b>	If yes, how often did this happen? <b>Rarely = 1</b> (once or twice in past month); <b>Sometimes = 2</b> (three to ten times in past month); <b>Often = 3</b> (more than ten times in past month)										
<b>E: MUAC - Measurements for all children in hh between 12 months and 5 years old</b>											
	<b>Age</b>		<b>MUAC</b>		<b>Age</b>		<b>MUAC</b>				
<b>E1</b>				<b>E2</b>							
<b>E3</b>				<b>E4</b>							
<b>E5</b>				<b>E6</b>							

End of Questionnaire

# Annex 14

## Monthly post-distribution monitoring survey (cash)

### MONTHLY CASH POST DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FORM

Questionnaire Number :    – M  –

VER 6 120911

#### A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1	ID Number	<input type="text"/>		
A2	District	<input type="text"/>		
A3	Village	<input type="text"/>		
A4	NGO	<input type="text"/>		
A5	Date of interview:	<input type="text"/> / <input type="text"/> / <input type="text"/>	A6	Gender of respondent (1=m, 2=f) <input type="text"/>
A7	Gender of the head of the hh (1=m, 2=f)	<input type="text"/>	A8	Size of hh <input type="text"/>
A9	Number of children in the hh <5 years old	<input type="text"/>	A10	Targeting criteria for beneficiary <input type="text"/>

#### Codes for A10 :

1 = Nutrition Centre Card, 2 = Pregnant / Lactating Mother, 3 = Women headed HH, 4= IDP, 5 = Community Based Targeting, 6 = Other

A11	Hawala agent used	<input type="text"/>
A12	Name of Enumerator	<input type="text"/>
A13	Which best describes your household status?	<input type="text"/>

#### Codes for A13 :

1 = normally resident in this area, 2 = moved here due to drought, 3 = moved here due to conflict, 4 = moved here for other reasons

A14	What is your household's usual livelihood strategy (code)	<input type="text"/>
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#### Codes for A14:

1 = pastoralist, 2 = agro-pastoralist, 3 = agriculture, 4 = urban, 5 = other

#### B: COLLECTION OF CASH

B1	How many hours did you take to travel to the cash distribution site? (code)	<input type="text"/>
B2	How long did you have to wait at the distribution site to get cash? (code)	<input type="text"/>

Codes for B1 & B2: 1 = <0.5 hours, 2 = 0.5 – 1 hour, 3 = 1 – 1.5 hours, 4 = 1.5 – 2 hours, 5 = 2 – 2.5 hours, 6 = >2.5 hours

B3	The length of time I spent travelling to collect cash was acceptable (code)	<input type="text"/>
B4	The frequency with which the cash is distributed suits my household's needs (code)	<input type="text"/>
B5	The transfer is sufficient to cover my household's basic food needs (code)	<input type="text"/>
B6	I would prefer food or food vouchers rather than cash (code)	<input type="text"/>
B7	I am aware of a complaints mechanism to report problems with the programme (code)	<input type="text"/>
B8	Traders have increased their prices as a result of the cash transfers (code)	<input type="text"/>
B9	Control over the cash has caused conflict within my household (code)	<input type="text"/>
B10	Other members of the community are jealous of me because of the cash transfer (code)	<input type="text"/>

Codes for B3 – B10: 1 = agree, 2 = no opinion, 3 = disagree, 4 = N/A

B11	How much cash did you receive? <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> USD	B12	Was this the amount you expected? (1 = yes, 2 = no) <input type="text"/>
B13	How long ago did you receive your last cash transfer? (code)	<input type="text"/>	

Codes: 1 = <1 week, 2 = 1 – 2 weeks, 3 = 2 – 3 weeks, 4 = 3 – 4 weeks 5 = >4 weeks

B14	How much did you spend on transport to and from the distribution site?	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> SoSh
B15	Did you have to pay anyone in order to receive your cash? (1 = yes, 2 = no)	<input type="text"/>
B16	Rank the ease with which you collected your cash (code)	<input type="text"/>
B17	Rank the level of security at the cash distribution site (code)	<input type="text"/>

Codes for B16 & B17: 1 = good, 2 = fair, 3 = poor



# Annex 15

## Monthly post-distribution monitoring survey (vouchers)

Monitoring Round PDM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher PDM Phase 2 VER10 300512

### **VOUCHER MONTHLY POST DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FORM VER10 300512**

A: PERSONAL INFORMATION								
<b>A1</b>	ID Number		<b>A2</b>	District		<b>A3</b>	Village	
<b>A4</b>	GPS Location (for IDP camps)	N						E
<b>A5</b>	NGO		<b>A6</b>	Date of interview				
<b>A7</b>	Gender of respondent (1 = m, 2 = f)			<b>A8</b>	Gender of the head of hh (1 = m, 2 = f)			
<b>A9</b>	Size of hh		<b>A10</b>	Number of children in hh <5 years old				
<b>A11</b>	What Targeting method was used		<b>Codes for A11:</b> 1 = Nutrition Centre Card, 2 = Community Based Targeting,					
<b>A12</b>	What criteria were used for CBT		<b>Codes for A12:</b> 1 = Pregnant /Lactating Mother, 2 = Female or child headed HH, 3 = IDP, 4 = Elderly, 5 =malnourished, 6 = lack of assets, 7 = other					
<b>A13</b>	Name of Enumerator							
<b>A14</b>	Which best describes your household's status? <b>Codes:</b> 1 = normally resident in this area, 2 = moved here due to drought, 3 = moved here due to conflict, 4 = moved here for other reasons							
<b>A15</b>	What is your household's usual livelihood strategy (code)		1 = pastoralist, 2 = agro-pastoralist, 3 = agriculture, 4 = urban,					
<b>A16</b>	Did you get any of the following in the last 4 weeks (tick)							
a.	Nut support Plumpy Nut		b.	CSB		c.	Food relief	
							Food voucher	
e.	Cash or CFW		f.	Medicine		g.	Water or water voucher	
						h.	NFI / other / livelihood voucher	
B: COLLECTION AND CONTROL OF VOUCHERS								
<b>B1</b>	How many hours did you take to travel to the voucher distribution site? (code)							
<b>B2</b>	How long did you have to wait at the distribution site to get vouchers? (code)							
<b>Codes for B1 &amp; B2:</b> 1 = <0.5 hours, 2 = 0.5 – 1 hour, 3 = 1 – 1.5 hours, 4 = 1.5 – 2 hours, 5 = 2 – 2.5 hours, 6 = >2.5 hours								
<b>Record the respondents' views on the following statements B3 – B11 - 1 = yes, 2 = no</b>								
<b>B3</b>	Was the length of time spent travelling to collect the voucher acceptable?							
<b>B4</b>	Did the frequency with which the vouchers are distributed suit your household's needs?							
<b>B5</b>	Was the voucher distribution sufficient to cover your household's basic food needs?							
<b>B6</b>	Would you prefer cash rather than vouchers?							
<b>B7</b>	Are you aware of a complaints mechanism to report problems with the programme?							
<b>B8</b>	Has control over the vouchers caused conflict within your household?							
<b>B9</b>	Did the transfer allow you to invite non-household members to come and eat at your household?							
<b>B10</b>	Are other members of the community jealous of you because you receive vouchers?							
<b>B11</b>	Was the value of the voucher what you expected.							
<b>B12</b>	How long ago was the last voucher distribution? (code) <b>Codes:</b> 1 = <1 week, 2 = 1 – 2 weeks, 3 = 2 – 3 weeks, 4 = 3 – 4 weeks 5 = > 4 weeks							

## Annex 15 (continued)

Monitoring Round PDM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher PDM Phase 2 VER10 300512

<b>B13</b>	How much did you spend on transport to and from the distribution site	SoSh	
<b>B14</b>	Did you have to pay anyone in order to receive your voucher? (1 = yes, 2 = no) If yes go to question B15, If no skip to question B16		
<b>B15</b>	<b>Amount paid</b> (if paid in USD, enter SoSh equivalent)	<b>Reason</b> (code)	
	<b>Choice</b> (code)		
	How much did you pay? (enter up to 3 reasons)	A	SoSh
	B	SoSh	
C	SoSh		
<b>Reason codes: 1 = protection, 2 = community tax, 3 = sanitation, 4 = rent, 5 = gratitude for registration, 6 = other</b>		<b>Choice codes:</b> 1 = voluntarily, 2 = involuntarily	
<b>B16</b>	Rank the ease with which you collected your vouchers (code)	Codes for <b>B16 &amp; B17</b> : 1 = good, 2 = fair, 3 = poor	
<b>B17</b>	Rank the level of security at the vouchers distribution site (code)		
<b>B18</b>	Did you experience any problems with identification by distribution staff? (1 = yes, 2 = no)		
<b>B19</b>	Did you experience any problems with sending another family member to collect the vouchers? (1 = yes, 2 = no, NA)		
<b>B20</b>	Did you experience any other problems with collecting the vouchers? (1 = yes, 2 = no) if yes, <b>explain below</b>		
<b>C: REDEMPTION OF VOUCHERS AND MARKET BEHAVIOUR</b>			
<b>C1</b>	Did you get the quantity of commodities you expected when you exchanged your vouchers (1 = yes, 2 = no)		
	Oil	Sorghum / maize	
	CSB	sugar	
	rice	flour	
	pulses		
<b>C2</b>	How much of the commodities did you receive in exchange for your voucher	kg	
<b>C3</b>	How much did you consume in the household?	kg	
<b>C4</b>	How much did you sell?	kg	
<b>C5</b>	If sold, how much did you sell for (Som Shillings)		
<b>C6</b>	How much did you give away / share?	kg	
<b>C7</b>	How much do you still have in stock?	kg	

## Annex 15 (continued)

Monitoring Round PDM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher PDM Phase 2 VER10 300512

<b>C8</b>	Traders have changed their prices as a result of the voucher scheme (code) <b>Codes : 1 = increased, 2 = no change, 3 = decrease</b>	
<b>C9</b>	How long did you have to wait at the shop to redeem vouchers (code) Codes: <b>1 = &lt; ½ hour, 2 = ½ - 1 hour, 3 = 1 – 2 hours, 4 = &gt;2 hours</b>	
<b>C10</b>	Did you sell your vouchers? Code: <b>(1 = yes, 2 = no)</b>	
<b>C11</b>	If yes to C10, how much did you sell for	SoSh
<b>Record the respondents' views on the following statements C12 – C18 using the codes 1 = agree, 2 = disagree</b>		
<b>C12</b>	The food I get in return for the vouchers is sufficient to cover my household's basic food needs (code)	
<b>C13</b>	There are sufficient traders to satisfy the needs of all people redeeming vouchers (code)	
<b>C14</b>	The trader always exchanges the voucher for the correct quantities of food (code)	
<b>C15</b>	The trader always treats me with respect when I go to exchange my voucher (code)	
<b>C16</b>	The trader's premises is located an acceptable distance from my house (code)	
<b>C17</b>	The food that I get in return for the voucher is of an acceptable quality (code)	
<b>C18</b>	The trader allows me or other beneficiaries to exchange the vouchers for cash (code)	
<b>C19</b>	If C18 = yes, how much cash did you get?	SoSh

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE

# Annex 16

## Monthly post-distribution monitoring survey (vouchers)

### MONTHLY CASH POST DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FORM

Questionnaire Number :    - M  -

VER 6 120911

#### A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1 ID Number

A2 District

A3 Village

A4 NGO

A5 Date of interview:  /  /

A6 Gender of respondent (1=m, 2=f)

A7 Gender of the head of the hh (1=m, 2=f)

A8 Size of HH

A9 Number of children in the hh <5 years old

A10 Targeting criteria for beneficiary

#### Codes for A10 :

1 = Nutrition Centre Card, 2 = Pregnant / Lactating Mother, 3 = Women headed HH, 4 = IDP, 5 = Community Based Targeting, 6 = Other

A11 Name of Enumerator

A12 Which best describes your household status?

#### Codes for A12:

1 = normally resident in this area, 2 = moved here due to drought, 3 = moved here due to conflict, 4 = moved here for other reasons

A13 What is your household's usual livelihood strategy (code)?

Codes for A13: 1 = pastoralist, 2 = agro-pastoralist, 3 = agriculture, 4 = urban, 5 = other

A14 How many people contributed to household income last month?

A15 What was your total household income last month? (Somali Shillings)

A16 How much debt does? (Somali Shillings)

A17 Which of the following have you or members of your household received from NGOs or projects in the past month? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)

a. Plumpy Nut  b. CSB + oil + beans  c. Rice + oil + beans  d. Food voucher

e. Cash or CFW  f. Medicine  g. Water or water voucher  h. NFI/other

#### B: COLLECTION OF CASH

B1 How many hours did you take to travel to the cash distribution site? (code)

Codes for B1 & B2: 1 = <0.5 hours, 2 = 0.5 - 1 hour, 3 = 1 - 1.5 hours, 4 = 1.5 - 2 hours, 5 = 2 - 2.5 hours, 6 = >2.5 hours

B2 How much did you receive?    USD

B3 Was this the amount you expected? (1=Yes, 2=No)

B4 How long ago did you receive your last cash transfer? (code)

Codes for B4: 1 = <1 week, 2 = 1-2 weeks, 3 = 2-3 weeks, 4 = 3-4 weeks, 5 = >4 weeks

B5 How much did you spend on transport to and from the distribution site     SoSh

B6 Did you have to pay anyone in order to receive your cash? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)

B7 Rank the ease with which you collected your cash (code)

B8 Rank the level of security at the cash distribution site (code)

Codes for B7 & B8: 1 = good, 2 = fair, 3 = poor

B9 Did you experience any problems with identification by Hawala Staff? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)

B10 Did you experience any problems with getting correct banknotes? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)

B11 Did you experience any problems with sending another family member to collect the money? (1 = Yes, 2 = No)

B12 Did you experience any problems with collecting the cash? (1 = Yes, 2 = No) if yes explain in B13 below

B13

B14 Did you feel safe transporting your cash from the site? (1 = yes, 2 = no)

# Annex 17

## Quarterly post-distribution monitoring surveys (voucher)

Mon Round: QM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher Quarterly Monitoring Form **VER9 300512**

### **VOUCHER QUARTERLY POST DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FORM VER9 300512**

<b>A: PERSONAL INFORMATION</b>									
<b>A1</b>	ID Number		<b>A2</b>	District		<b>A3</b>	Village		
<b>A4</b>	Registration Type		<b>A5</b>	Village type					
	Codes for A4: 1 = Old registration from Phase I, 2 = New registration for phase II			Codes for A5: 1 = Urban, 2 = Rural					
<b>A6</b>	NGO		<b>A7</b>	Date of interview					
<b>A8</b>	Gender of respondent (1 = m, 2 = f)			<b>A9</b>	Gender of the head of hh (1 = m, 2 = f)				
<b>A10</b>	Size of hh		<b>A11</b>	Number of children in hh <5 years old					
<b>A12</b>	Targeting criteria for beneficiary		Codes for A12: 1 = Nutrition Centre Card, 2 = Pregnant /Lactating Mother, 3 = Women headed HH, 4 = IDP, 5 = Community Based Targeting, 6 = other						
<b>A13</b>	NGO distributing voucher		<b>A14</b>	Name of Enumerator					
<b>A15</b>	Which best describes your household's status? Codes: 1 = normally resident in this area, 2 = moved here due to drought, 3 = moved here due to conflict, 4 = moved here for other reasons								
<b>A16</b>	What is your household's current livelihood strategy (code) (important for section E)		1 = pastoralist, 2 = agro-pastoralist, 3 = agriculture, 4 = urban, 5 = other						
<b>A17*</b>	How many people contributed to household income last month?								
<b>A18*</b>	What was your total household income last month? (Somali Shillings)								
<b>A19*</b>	How much debt does your household owe? (Somali Shillings)								
<b>A20*</b>	Which of the following have you or members of your household received from NGOs or projects in the past month? (1 = yes, 0 = no)								
	a. Plumpy Nut		b. CSB		c. Other food aid (rice, oil, etc)		d. FFW		
	e. Cash or CFW		f. Medicine		g. Water or water voucher		h. NFI / other		
<b>B: COLLECTION AND CONTROL OF VOUCHERS</b>									
<b>B1</b>	How many hours did you take to travel to the voucher distribution site? (code)								
<b>B2</b>	How long did you have to wait at the distribution site to get vouchers? (code)								
Codes for B1 & B2: 1 = <0.5 hours, 2 = 0.5 – 1 hour, 3 = 1 – 1.5 hours, 4 = 1.5 – 2 hours, 5 = 2 – 2.5 hours, 6 = >2.5 hours									
Record the respondents' views on the following statements B3 – B10 using the codes 1 = agree, 2 = disagree									
<b>B3</b>	Was the length of time spent travelling to collect the voucher acceptable?								
<b>B4</b>	Did the frequency with which the vouchers are distributed suit your household's needs?								
<b>B5</b>	Was the voucher distribution sufficient to cover your household's basic food needs?								
<b>B6</b>	Would you prefer cash rather than vouchers?								
<b>B7</b>	Are you aware of a complaints mechanism to report problems with the programme?								
<b>B8</b>	Has control over the vouchers caused conflict within your household?								
<b>B9</b>	Did the transfer allow you to invite non-household members to come and eat at your household?								
<b>B10</b>	Are other members of the community jealous of you because you receive vouchers?								
<b>B11</b>	Was the value of the voucher what you expected? (1 = yes, 2 = no)								
<b>B12</b>	How long ago did you receive your last vouchers transfer? (code) Codes: 1 = <1 week, 2 = 1 – 2 weeks, 3 = 2 – 3 weeks, 4 = 3 – 4 weeks 5 = > 4 weeks								

## Annex 17 (continued)

Mon Round: QM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher Quarterly Monitoring Form **VER9 300512**

<b>B13</b>	How much did you spend on transport to and from the distribution site							SoSh
<b>B14</b>	Did you have to pay anyone in order to receive your vouchers? (1 = yes, 2 = no)							
<b>B15</b>		<b>Amount paid</b> (if paid in USD, enter SoSh equivalent)			<b>Reason</b> (code)		<b>Choice</b> (code)	
	How much did you pay? (enter up to 3 reasons)	A	SoSh					
		B	SoSh					
		C	SoSh					
		<b>Reason codes:</b> 1 = access to distribution site, 2 = protection, 3 = community tax, 4 = sanitation, 5 = rent, 6 = gratitude for registration, 7 = other				<b>Choice codes:</b> 1 = voluntarily, 2 = involuntarily		
<b>B16</b>	Rank the ease with which you collected your vouchers (code)						<b>Codes for B16 &amp; B17:</b> 1 = good, 2 = fair, 3 = poor	
<b>B17</b>	Rank the level of security at the voucher distribution site (code)							
<b>B18</b>	Did you experience any problems with identification by distribution staff? (1 = yes, 2 = no)							
<b>B19</b>	Did you experience any problems with sending another family member to collect the vouchers? (1 = yes, 2 = no)							
<b>B20</b>	Did you experience any other problems with collecting the vouchers? (1 = yes, 2 = no) if yes, <b>explain below</b>							
<b>C: REDEMPTION OF VOUCHERS AND MARKET BEHAVIOUR</b>								
<b>C1</b>	Did you get the quantity of commodities you expected when you exchanged your vouchers (1 = yes, 2 = no)							
		Oil	Sorghum / maize	CSB	sugar	rice	flour	pulses
<b>C2</b>	How much of the commodities did you receive in exchange for your voucher	l		kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
<b>C3</b>	How much did you consume in the household?	l		kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
<b>C4</b>	How much did you sell?	l		kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
<b>C5</b>	If sold, how much did you sell for (Som Shillings)							
<b>C6</b>	How much did you give away / share?	l		kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
<b>C7</b>	How much do you still have in stock?	l		kg	kg	kg	kg	kg
<b>C8</b>	Traders have changed their prices as a result of the voucher scheme (code) <b>Codes :</b> 1 = increased, 2 = no change, 3 = decrease							
<b>C9</b>	How long did you have to wait at the shop to redeem vouchers (code) Codes: 1 = < ½ hour, 2 = ½ - 1 hour, 3 = 1 – 2 hours, 4 = >2 hours							
<b>C10</b>	Did you sell your vouchers? Code: (1 = yes, 2 = no)							
<b>C11</b>	If yes to C10, how much did you sell for						SoSh	

## Annex 17 (continued)

Mon Round: QM \_\_\_\_\_ Questionnaire Number \_\_\_\_\_ Voucher Quarterly Monitoring Form **VER9 300512**

<b>C12</b>	The food I get in return for the vouchers is sufficient to cover my household's basic food needs (code)		
<b>C13</b>	There are sufficient traders to satisfy the needs of all people redeeming vouchers (code)		
<b>C14</b>	The trader always exchanges the voucher for the correct quantities of food (code)		
<b>C15</b>	The trader always treats me with respect when I go to exchange my voucher (code)		
<b>C16</b>	The trader's premises is located an acceptable distance from my house (code)		
<b>C17</b>	The food that I get in return for the voucher is of an acceptable quality (code)		
<b>C18</b>	The trader allows me or other beneficiaries to exchange the vouchers for cash (code)		
<b>Codes for C12 – C18: 1 = agree, 2 = disagree,</b>			
<b>C19</b>	If C18 = yes, how much cash did you get?	SoSh	
<b>C20</b>	How much cash did you spend on food last month?	SoSh	
<b>D: FOOD INTAKE AND DIETARY DIVERSITY</b>			
<b>D1</b>	How many meals did adults in the household eat yesterday?		
<b>D2</b>	How many meals did children in the household eat yesterday?		
<b>D3</b>	Which of the following food stuffs did you or another household member eat yesterday (tick)		
	a. rice	g. Fruit	m. Milk, milk products
	b. other cereals	h. Flesh meat	n. Oils
	c. Vitamin A rich vegetables	i. Organ meat	o. Sugar, sweets, honey
	d. White tubers or roots	j. Eggs	p. Spices, salt, tea, coffee
	e. Dark green leafy greens	k. Fish, seafood	
f. Other vegetables	l. Legumes, seeds, nuts		

# Annex 18

## Weekly market price monitoring survey

### CASH/VOUCHER INTERVENTIONS: MARKET PRICE MONITORING FORM

Questionnaire Number :

V1.1

#### A: PERSONAL INFORMATION

A1 : Name of Data Collector

A2 : District

Date  /  /  NGO

Region

Name of market

Date of start of most recent cash distribution  /  /  Date of end of most recent cash distribution  /  /

	Item	Quantity	Available 1 = yes, 0 = no	Price (SoSh)
1	White maize	50kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
2	Yellow maize	50kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
3	Imported red rice	1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
4	Red Sorghum	50kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
5	Wheat flour	1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
6	Sugar	1kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
7	Veg. oil	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
8	Cow milk	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
9	Camel milk	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
10	Water	20 litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
11	Tea leaves	1 kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
12	Cowpeas	1 kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
13	Salt	1 kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
14	Meat (goat)	1 kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
15	Soap (Laundry Bar)	1 piece	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
16	Grinding Cost (of cereals)	Per kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
17	Kerosene	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
18	Firewood	1 bundle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
19	Charcoal	1 sack (50kg)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
20	Petrol	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
21	Diesel	1 Litre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
22	Daily labour rate (unskilled)	1 day	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
23	Camel	Local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		Export quality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
24	Cattle	Local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		Export quality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
25	Goat	Local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		Export quality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
26	Sheep	Local	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
		Export quality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
27	Exchange rate SoSh/USD		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>
28	Exchange rate( border areas only) SoSh/Kenya Shilling		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="text"/>



# Annex 19

## Qualitative monitoring – IFM interview forms

Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

Focus group discussion

Beneficiaries Group

Phase 2 v4 141112

### 1. Group details

1.1 Name of Independent Field Monitor			
1.2 Date		1.3 Time at start of interview	1.4 NGO
1.5 District			1.6 Village

Targeting			
Question	Yes	Yes, to some extent	No
1. Are you aware of the system used to select beneficiaries?			
<i>Describe the system of targeting used to select beneficiaries</i>			
2. Did you or any member of the community participate in the selection of the beneficiaries?			
What was your/their involvement?			
3. What specific criteria were used to select beneficiaries?			

Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

Focus group discussion

POOR  
(Non -Beneficiaries)

Phase 2 v2 140812

### 1. Group details

1.1 Name of Independent Field Monitor			
1.2 Date		1.3 Time at start of interview	1.4 NGO
1.5 District			1.6 Village
1.7 Composition of the FGD participants – <b>ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST BE NON-BENEFICIARIES</b>			
Male		Female	

## Annex 19 (continued)

### Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

#### Focus group discussion

#### Non -Beneficiaries

#### Phase 2 v3 141112

#### 1. Group details

1.1 Name of Independent Field Monitor				
1.2 Date		1.3 Time at start of interview		1.4 NGO
1.5 District			1.6 Village	
<b>1.7 Composition of the FGD participants – ALL PARTICIPANTS MUST BE NON-BENEFICIARIES</b>				
Name	Contact: ID, Telephone, camp, village	Male	Female	Livelihood group

## Annex 19 (continued)

### Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

# BENEFICIARY HOUSEHOLD CASE STUDY INTERVIEW FORMAT

Phase 2 – v3 141112

#### 1. Household, Income and Livelihood Details

If possible, the quarterly monitoring forms relating to the households to be interviewed: much of the household profile data required below is contained in these.

1.1 Name of M&E field officer		1.2 HH name or number (as used in Phase 1)	
1.3 Date	1.4 Time at start of interview	1.5 NGO	
1.6 District		1.7 Village	
1.8 HH type	MHH / FHH	1.9 Livelihood type	
1.10 Total Number of people in HH (including children)		1.11 Number of children <5 in HH	
1.12 Is this household a beneficiary of the cash/voucher project? YES NO If yes, how many cash transfers / vouchers have been received under current project to date?			
1.13 Other assistance received by HH members since last IFM visit <b>(Circle as applicable)</b>  Plumpy Nut / therapeutic feeding; CSB + oil + beans; Rice + oil + beans; food vouchers (other than current project); cash (other than current project); cash for work; medicine; water; or water vouchers; Non Food Items			
1.14 Hawala agency used (Cash recipients only)		1.15 Amount received last transfer (US \$) (Cash recipients only)	
1.16 What were the household's three main sources of income last month? Indicate which members of the HH contributed to each source (relationship to HH head), and approximately how much was earned in the past month. <b>This should include the cash transfer value if that is a main source of income</b>			
	Income source (including cash transfer)	HH member(s) (Relationship to HH head)	Approximate income (SoSh)
1			
2			
3			
1.17 What was your total household income last month? (Somali Shillings) – including the cash transfer			

## Annex 19 (continued)

Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

Key informant interviews

### Nairobi and Mogadishu (business people, traders)

Semi-structured interview guide  
Phase 2 V4 141112

#### General information

Question	Yes	Yes, to some extent	No
1. Are you aware of the existence of a program of cash and voucher distribution in South Central Somalia?			
<i>Describe details of the program</i>			
2. Looking forward 2-3 years, what impact do you expect this program might have (positive or negative) to the cash/voucher levels in Somalia?			
<i>Describe your expectations</i>			
3. Which areas (location and programmatic) would you advise the program to focus in the near future, and why?			
<i>Describe your suggestions and provide some justifications</i>			

## Annex 19 (continued)

### Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

#### HAWALA AGENT INTERVIEW FORM

Phase 2 – v3 180812

1.1 Name of IFM		1.2 Name of Hawala company	
1.3 Position of Hawala staffer interviewed			
1.4 Phone contact for Hawala staff			
1.5 NGO		1.6 Date	1.7 Time at start
1.8 Town		1.9 District	

### 2 Staff resources and cash availability

	Question	Yes	Yes to some extent	No	NA
2.1	Have you experienced difficulties in getting enough cash to your offices / distribution sites on time?				
	<i>Describe</i>				
2.2	What have been the main difficulties that you face with this programme and how have you dealt with them?				
2.3	Has the transfer process become more efficient since the beginning of the programme? <i>Describe</i>				
2.4	Does your office have sufficient staff to deal with its normal workload as well as this project? <i>Describe</i>				

## Annex 19 (continued)

Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

# NON BENEFICIARY HOUSEHOLD CASE STUDY INTERVIEW FORMAT

phase 2 – v3 141112

### 1. Household, Income and Livelihood Details

If possible, the quarterly monitoring forms relating to the households to be interviewed: much of the household profile data required below is contained in these.

1.1 Name of M&E field officer		1.2 HH name or number (as used in Phase 1)	
1.3 Date		1.4 Time at start of interview	1.5 NGO
1.6 District		1.7 Village	
1.8 HH type	MHH / FHH	1.9 Livelihood type	
1.10 Total Number of people in HH (including children)		1.11 Number of children <5 in HH	
1.12 What were the household's three main sources of income last month? Indicate which members of the HH contributed to each source (relationship to HH head), and approximately how much was earned in the past month. <b>This should include the cash transfer value if that is a main source of income</b>			
	Income source	HH member(s) (Relationship to HH head)	Approximate income (SoSh)
1			
2			
3			
1.13 What was your total household income last month? (Somali Shillings)			

## Annex 19 (continued)

### Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group

#### TRADER/SHOPKEEPER INTERVIEW FORMAT

#### Phase 2 – v4 141112

### 1. Background Information

1.1 Time at start of interview		1.2 Name of Independent Field Monitor	
1.3 Name of trader interviewed		1.4 Contact phone number	
Location of Shop	1.5 Village / Town	1.6 District	1.7 Region
1.8 Shop type (code)	Codes for 1.8: 1 = kiosk, 2 = retailer, 3 = wholesaler		
1.9 NGO		1.10 Date	
1.11 Number of staff employed in shop		1.12 Approximate size of shop M <sup>2</sup>	
1.13 Additional storage space M <sup>2</sup>		1.14 Weekly Turnover (SoSh)	
1.15 Number of regular suppliers used		1.16 Why were you selected to take part in the voucher scheme (voucher scheme traders only)	

### 2. Factors affecting food prices

Rank the factors that have affected food prices in this area in the past 30 days. Start by asking which factor has the most impact on food prices – this will be ranked as '1'. The second most important factor will be ranked '2', etc. Please add additional factors, as necessary. Rank the top five factors that impact on price.

Factors affecting price	Ranking in order of importance (1 = most important)
Cost of fuel and Transport	
Seasonal Harvest	
Security conditions	
Number of checkpoints	
Condition of roads	
Taxation by local authorities	
Currency fluctuations	
Increase in demand due to cash/voucher intervention	
Distribution of food aid	
Other (specify)	
Other (specify)	
Other (specify)	

# Annex 20

## Household sampling methodology for baseline, PDM and QPDM surveys

### Instructions for sampling for the baseline survey

Each implementing partner will need to sample 375 beneficiary households per region where they are implementing cash or voucher interventions.

#### **We are only sampling beneficiary households, not non-beneficiary households.**

This number will allow us to draw conclusions based on a representative sample of beneficiaries. Where possible, within the 375HH you should select households from different locations (districts) and from areas with different livelihood groups are present (pastoralist; agro-pastoralist; farmer; urban livelihood).

#### **1. Within each region**

*Choose your districts to be sampled*

If you are only working in one or two districts then select beneficiaries from each district.

If you are working in 3 or more districts then choose half the districts (and round up as per table below) to choose your sample from. The actual districts to be selected should be based on security and access considerations and also on the range of different livelihood types represented.

Number of districts working in per region	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 or more
‡Number of districts to be sampled	1	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5

If possible, estimate the proportion of project beneficiary households coming from each district.

e.g. If you have selected 3 districts for sampling and you feel that each one has a similar number of beneficiary households then you will need to select 125 HH from each district (375 total households / 3 districts).

#### **2. Within each district**

Divide the total households for each district (e.g. 125HH) according to estimated proportions of livelihood group.

- e.g. if 50% of beneficiary households are pastoralists and 50% are from urban areas then you need 50% x 125 HH to come from pastoralist villages/settlements and 50% x 125HH to come from urban areas.
- e.g. if 100% of beneficiary households are farmers then you need 100% x 125 HH to come from agricultural areas.

*Choose the villages or settlements to be sampled*

- Select villages based on logistic and security concerns (if any) ensuring that you include villages from each livelihood group. Get beneficiary households from different villages as much as possible to include the different livelihood groups.

#### **3. Within each village/settlement/camp**

*Choose the households to be interviewed*

- If you are conducting the baseline prior to the first payment ‡ Select every SECOND household on the registration list from that village/settlement/camp until you get the number you need.
- If a consolidated registration list is not available ‡ Go to every SECOND house along each 'street' or footpath in the village and sample those that are registered as cash beneficiaries.
- If you are conducting the baseline at the time of the first payment ‡ select every SECOND household that comes to collect their money until you get the number you need from that payment site.



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## **Instructions for sampling for the 1st monthly PDM and quarterly PDMs – (Months 1, 3, 6 & 9)**

These instructions are for sampling for the first monthly Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) survey and both of the quarterly PDMs. The detailed sampling procedure is the same as the sampling for the Baseline Survey.

As far as possible, the SAME districts and villages/settlements that were previously sampled for the baseline should be sampled for the first monthly PDM and also for both quarterly PDMs. If it's possible to sample the same beneficiary households, that would be good, but not essential – there is no need to waste time trying to re-locate the same households that were previously sampled.

As with the Baseline Survey, each implementing partner will need to sample 375 beneficiary households per region where they are implementing cash or voucher interventions.

## **Instructions for sampling for the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th & 8th Monthly PDMs**

These instructions are for sampling for the second, fourth and fifth monthly Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) surveys. The detailed sampling procedure is the same as the sampling for the Baseline Survey.

Each implementing partner will need to sample 200 beneficiary households per region where they are implementing cash or voucher interventions.

We are only sampling beneficiary households, not non-beneficiary households. As far as possible, try to select DIFFERENT districts and villages each time you sample for the 2nd, 4th and 5th monthly PDMs. These should be different to those sampled for the Baseline Survey, and different for each of the previous monthly PDMs

# Annex 21

## Weightings used for Coping Strategies Index

In the past 30 days, if there have been times when you did not have enough food or money to buy food, how often has your household had to:

Livelihood group	Coping Strategy	Severity	Weighting	
Agro pastoralist	Shift from high priced/high quality varieties to low priced/low quality varieties*	Mild	1	
	Borrow food on credit from shop (Deyn)*	Moderate	2	
	Adults reduce number of meals in a day*	Moderate	2	
	Reduce home milk consumption and sell more of milk produced	Moderate	2	
	Stop all home milk consumption and sell all milk produced	Severe	5	
	Rely on "gift" of food from close relatives (Qaraabo)	Severe	5	
	Rely on "gift" of food from clan/close neighbors/friends (Kaalmo)	Severe	5	
	Gone an entire day without meals (no consumption)	Severe	5	
	Community has identified you HH as "in need of food" and give support (Qaraan)	V. Severe	8	
	Send household children (over 5 years) to live/eat with relatives	V. Severe	8	
	Urban	Shift to less preferred (low quality, less expensive) foods (from osolo to obo)?	Severe	5
		Limit the portion/quantity consumed in a meal (Beekhaamis)?	Moderate	3
Take fewer numbers of meals in a day?		Severe	5	
Borrow food on credit from the shop/market (Deyn)?		V. Severe	7	
Borrow food on credit from another household (Aamah)?		Moderate	3	
Restrict consumption of adults in order for small children to eat?		V. Severe	7	
Rely on food donations from relatives (Qaraabo)?		Mild	2	
Rely on food donations from the clan/community (Kaalmo)?		Mild	2	
Seek or rely on food aid from humanitarian agencies?		Mild	2	
Send household members to eat elsewhere?		Moderate	3	
Beg for food (Tuugsi/dawarsi)?		V. Severe	8	
Skip entire days without eating (Qadoodi)?		Severe	5	
Consume spoilt or left-over foods		Moderate	3	
Pastoralist		Reduce home milk consumption and sell more of mild produced	Mild	1
		Consume less expensive (less preferred) cereals*	Mild	1
	Borrowing food on credit from another household (Aamah)	Moderate	2	
	Reducing number of meals per day*	Moderate	2	
	Reducing portion size at meal times*	Moderate	2	
	Rely on "gifts" of food from clan/close neighbors/friends (Kaalmo)	Severe	6	
	Consume weak/unsaleable animals (caateysi)	Severe	6	
	Send household members elsewhere to eat/for food	Severe	6	
	Gone an entire day without meals - no consumption (qadoodi)	V. Severe	8	
	Begging for food (tuugsi/dawarsi)	V. Severe	8	
	Rely on hunting for food (ugaarsi)	V. Severe	8	
	Agriculture	Shifting to less preferred foods (white maize to yellow maize)*	Mild	2
Reducing the portion/quantity consumed in a meal*		Mild	2	
Consumption of poor quality foods (unsafe, rotten, spoiled)		Mild	2	
Reducing the number of meals by one only per day (from 3 to 2)*		Mild	2	
Reducing the number of meals by two per day (from 3 to 1)*		Severe	6	
Wild food consumption and fishing (from the river)		Moderate	3	
Consumption of immature crops (fruits and cereals)		Moderate	3	
Feeding particular members (children/aged) at the expense of other HH members*		Severe	6	
Consumption of seeds meant for future planting		V. Severe	8	
Borrow food for consumption (to be repaid with food in future - inkind)*		V. Severe	8	
Eating unacceptable/prohibited foods (animal skins, grass & roots, clotted blood, tree leaves, warthogs)		V. Severe	8	

Source: FSNAU

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# Annex 22

## Calculation of the Consumer Price Index (CPI)

Sum of mean prices in MEB x each item's weighting/1,000

<b>Weightings used</b>	
Rice	200
Sorghum	210
Wheat flour	170
Sugar	150
Vegetable oil	100
Milk	55
Meat	55
Tea	25
Salt	20
Cow Peas	15
Total	1,000

Prices for October 2011 are used as base (100), so changes are expressed as percentage change on this figure.

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# Annex 23

## Documentation related to the CVMG programme

Bryld, E. et al. (2013) Gatekeepers in Mogadishu: Research Consultancy. The Somalia Cash Consortium.

Hedlund, K. et al. (2012) Interim Evaluation of the Unconditional Cash and Voucher Transfer Programmes in Southern and Central Somalia. Humanitarian Outcomes.

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Index Consultants (2013) Access to Credit and Unconditional Cash Transfers in South Central Somalia. The Somalia Cash Consortium.

Kweyu, B (2013) Lessons Learnt From A Consortium Approach: Cash Transfers in South Central Somalia. The Somalia Cash Consortium.

Longley, K., Dunn, S & Brewin, M (2012) CVMG Final monitoring report of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme. Phase 1: September 2011 – March 2012. Humanitarian Policy Group. Overseas Development Institute.

Longley, K., Dunn, S & Brewin, M (2012) Monitoring results of the Somalia cash and voucher transfer programme: Phase I. Issue 55, September 2012 *Humanitarian Exchange*.

Scek, A et al. (2013) Cash and voucher monitoring group Phase 2: Perspectives of the beneficiaries and their stakeholders on cash and voucher intervention in South Central Somalia. SATG and UNICEF.

Wasilkowska, K (2012) Gender Impact Analysis: Unconditional Cash Transfers in South Central Somalia. The Somalia Cash Consortium.





