Religious persecution and extremism fosters discontent in Central Asia

David Montgomery: 8/30/02

A EurasiaNet Partner Post from The NIS Observed

As the crackdown on minority faiths and more extremist trends in Islam continues, groups complaining of religious persecution find cause to resist the established political order. While the focus of large-scale resistance has been Islamic extremism, which has a remarkably broad network, Christian and Jewish groups are being denied the opportunity of political expression. Together, the repression of religious expression fosters discontent with the governments in power and does little to yield stability to the existing political structures.

In Uzbekistan, some evangelical Christian churches have been closed for operating without permits. Independent Muslims have been imprisoned for alleged connections with Wahhabist groups. And the state has barred minority faiths (faiths with a minority of adherents in Central Asia) from preaching in Uzbek. Furthermore, anti-Semitism is advocated by fundamentalist Islamic groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT). Though HT is watched closely by the Uzbek government, the reason for the monitoring is not its anti-Semitic agenda but the fact that HT poses a threat to the existing government.

While minority faiths are a nuisance to the government regimes, the small number of adherents makes them less threatening than groups such as HT, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Democratic Party in Kyrgyzstan (IDP) or the Islamic Revival Party in Tajikistan (IRP). [For more information, see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The governments of Central Asia tend to justify the crackdown on Islamic extremist organizations by using bureaucratic tactics to keep opposition illegal.

In Kyrgyzstan, the newly established IDP predicted that it would be able to attract upwards of 100,000 members to challenge the current Akaev government. While the supporters predominately consist of the poor and oppressed, thus making them more likely to embrace radical means for change, it is assumed that IDP will have problems registering as a political party given the religious and confrontational bend of its ideology.

In Tajikistan, groups such as the IRP are quick to distance themselves from any Islamic activities that threaten their voice within government, by claiming that the Tajik citizens who fought with the Taliban were not members of IRP. It is worth noting that the IRP was at one time part of the United Tajik Opposition and banned by the government. Since 1998, however, it has been registered and entered the political mainstream with a membership numbering 2,000 and representation in the Tajik parliament. Said Abdullo Nuri, leader of the IRP, even has gone so far as to claim that any political participation by Muslim clerics is inappropriate and that clergy should abide by the state laws.

Nuri's comments appear related to the Tajik government's Council on Religious Affairs and the Council of Islamic Scholars which was sent to the north of the country to determine the familiarity of the clerics with state laws. President Rahmonov, who visited Sughd Oblast' in July, complained of militant activities by Islamists and criticized the construction of mosques (specific concerns included HT). The resulting visit of the investigatory councils was the banning of 10 clerics from the northern Isfara district. While political regulations were used to control the clerics and content of their message, and while the labeling of a political opponent as a religious extremist (or Wahhabi) allows the oppression of political opposition, the banning of some clerics for political messages risks making them more popular with the population dissatisfied with the government.

The cells of the resistance movements are quite extensive and, without addressing the root causes of opposition, the discontent is likely to proliferate beyond the national borders. For example, a captured member of the IMU admitted to participating in resistance campaigns in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, he spoke of an extensive network of persons responsible for transiting militant religious extremists. This network includes general provisions of food and health services as well as more elaborate arrangements such as the bogus marriage of Uzbek Makhmudzhon Satimov to a Russian woman (thus granting him Russian citizenship and affording him the opportunity to preach and gain support for his extreme religious views outside of Uzbekistan).

The denial of an effective outlet for expressing political opposition, in conjunction with the denial of religious expression, has led to more radical resistance movements that are organized and unsatisfied. While no solution immediately presents itself, it is clear that the roots of discontent must be addressed and the simple squelching of opposition is not the answer.

Posted August 30, 2002 © Eurasianet