Supporting Democracy Abroad - India

Note: Covers the period June 2012 to May 2014.

Executive Summary

India's foreign policy is primarily driven by strategic, economic, and political interests. However, as the world's largest democracy, India is sensitive to the ideological values of democracy and human rights. India is also gradually emerging as a hub of training and dissemination of democratic best practices in its region. During 2012-14, India has grappled with disruptions in the democratic processes in Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Maldives. It has also tried to gently nudge the Burmese government toward reconciliation with democratic forces and to improve its record on protection of human rights.

However, India has maintained a careful silence on cases outside its immediate region. Moreover, its positions on human rights violations in countries like Sri Lanka and Syria have been shaped by its sensitivity to sovereignty as well as its competing interests. In China and Pakistan, India has not responded robustly to human rights violations and curbing of civil liberties.

Introduction

As the world's most populous democracy, India is instinctively supportive of democracy elsewhere. The rise and growth of democracy in other countries is seen as conducive to India's wider national interests. However, the Indian government has not viewed active promotion of democracy and human rights as integral to India's economic, political, and strategic interests.^[1]

India has traditionally stood against interference by outside powers in the internal affairs of independent countries. During the cold war, India was a leader of the nonaligned movement and took independent positions on critical issues, many of which were also supported by the Soviet Union. Today, India has become one of the leading non-Western democracies, and continues to be at odds with the West on a range of international issues.

India's support for democracy and human rights is discernible at three levels. First, India supports democratic processes in its immediate neighborhood of Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, the Maldives, and Afghanistan. Second, it supports electoral processes, both in its region and elsewhere. And third, it promotes democracy through international institutions dedicated to this cause. India has participated continuously in programs and initiatives of the Community of Democracies. It has also been part of the Bali Democracy Forum since its establishment in 2008 – although it only did so once at the ministerial level, in 2010. India cofounded the UN Democracy Fund along with the United States and is currently its second-largest contributor.^[2]

India has been quite active in supporting evolution and consolidation of democracy in its neighborhood. Four of India's immediate neighbors have faced recent challenges in this regard, all rooted in internal political conflicts and rivalries. In Nepal and Myanmar, difficulties arose over the writing of constitutions. In Bangladesh and the Maldives, the hurdles were related to power transition through elections. India engaged the main political actors in all of these countries through diplomatic channels and exchange of visits, helping them reach consensus.

While it has taken positions on human rights issues at the United Nations on critical situations such as those in Syria and Sri Lanka, the Indian government has distanced itself from the West on issues of sovereignty and use of force. It has played the role of facilitator in the resolution of internal political obstacles that were interfering with democratic advancement, and has extended material and institutional assistance to ensure smooth conduct during elections around the world. Thus, rather than a proactive promoter of the concept of democracy, India has been a sympathetic supporter of emerging and evolving democracies, mostly in its close neighborhood.

Foreign Policy Objectives

Though India is sensitive to the cause of democracy promotion, its stance has been one of noninterference. The word "democracy" did not appear when, in September 2012, the foreign secretary listed India's priorities at the 67th UN General Assembly session in New York. Nor did democracy promotion figure among the foreign policy objectives in the Ministry of External Affairs Annual Reports for 2012-13 and 2013-14, although in specific chapters India's support for democracy was emphasized in relevant neighbors and other countries.^[3] India has consistently made clear its preference for secular, multiparty, parliamentary democracy but avoids active promotion.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh officially underlined a link between democracy and India's foreign policy when he addressed the Annual Conference of Indian Envoys in New Delhi in November 2013. Prime Minister Singh listed five defining principles of India's foreign policy, the last of which was, "Our foreign policy is not defined merely by our interests, but also by the values which are very dear to our people." However, the thrust in promoting democracy was limited to the fact that India's economic development within a democratic framework "has inspired people around the world and should continue to do so."^[4]

This refrain on doing little more than "inspiring" democratic change has been consistent in India's policy. In December 2013, Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid said:

We are in favour of democratic pluralism and religious moderation but it is up to the people of the region to decide the pace and the means to achieve those goals, keeping in mind their traditions and history. We are also against armed conflict or external intervention as a way of resolving political issues in the region or elsewhere in the world.^[5]

Referring to a "democratic upsurge in South Asia," Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai (the administrative head of the Ministry of External Affairs) told a gathering in July 2012 that "We can best influence this by being an example – rather than trying any policy presumption."^[6] As for the potential for democracy in the Arab world, he said:

India's policy towards the region and developments there, and our posture in the Security Council have also been guided by our principled desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of States and being non-prescriptive.... We are absolutely clear ... that societies cannot be re-ordered from outside through military force and that people in all countries have the right to choose their own destiny and decide their own future.^[7]

On April 2, 2014, his successor, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh, observed that in South Asia, "Democracies are still nascent in many respects but they bring with them larger constituencies for peace, for economic progress, and for development."^[8]

India's membership in the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) helps in its push toward democratization of the world order, especially in terms of the governance of international institutions. This group is not active on democracy-related issues of specific countries.

Development Assistance and Trade

India has not proactively used economic policy instruments such as trade and development assistance to promote democracy and human rights abroad. The trade-democracy relationship appears only incidentally and occasionally. For example, in its trade relations with Pakistan, India has an unexpressed hope that economic ties, while helping to normalize relations, will also boost the strength of democratic forces and the civilian regime in Pakistan. Although this has not been argued officially by India, well-respected analysts and commentators have drawn attention to it.^[9]

In the case of Bhutan, India withdrew a subsidy on liquefied petroleum (cooking) gas cylinders and kerosene during the final phase of parliamentary elections in 2013. The decision to stop subsidies followed the end of their terms under Bhutan's Five Year Plan on June 30, 2013. However, when the ruling party in Bhutan was then defeated on July 13, some commentators considered this a setback to democracy and interference by India in Bhutan's nascent democratic evolution.^[10] India has maintained that the decision was nonpolitical.

In Afghanistan, India's support has built infrastructure, institutions, and capacities to sustain democratic functioning, with total assistance exceeding $2 billion. For example, India constructed Afghanistan's Parliament house, and provided training in administration, farming, and the health and educational sectors.^[11]

India's development assistance tends to be at the multilateral level. India annually contributes $50,000 to the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), which is committed to democratic capacity building around the world. India also contributes regularly to the United Nations Democracy Fund. In total, India has contributed $31.56 million to this fund since its inception.^[12]

Elections

India considers free and fair elections as an essential part of the institutionalization and reinforcement of democracy. Thus, India is in the process of becoming a hub for training and support of efficient and transparent democratic electoral management. This is being conducted through the India International Institute on Democracy and Electoral Management (IIIDEM), developed as a collaboration between the government, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and intergovernmental organizations such as International IDEA.^[13] IIIDEM's goal is to provide "meticulous, accurate, voter friendly implementation of election processes by committed, competent, credible, and skilled managers and associated groups." In June 2013, it agreed to provide training to Commonwealth officials in various aspects of electoral management.^[14] It also facilitated visits from seven African and Middle East countries to observe India's state elections in November 2013, and from 20 countries to witness the management of India's massive parliamentary elections in April to May 2014.

India also has trained election officials from other countries, sent Indian election officials to assist in the conduct of polls, sent election observers abroad, and supplied electronic voting machines, vehicles, and other material. For example, India has committed to provide 10 vehicles, along with indelible ink and training, to election officials in Fiji for elections scheduled for September 2014.^[15] Such support has also been extended to Afghanistan, Bhutan, and the Maldives, as well as Egypt and Tunisia.

Though no electoral support was extended to Pakistan, in 2013 India hailed the first peaceful transition of power there, which brought Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League to power. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh congratulated Sharif for his "emphatic victory," and Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid hoped that India and Pakistan would "continue to have good relations under Sharif's leadership."^[16] The then-opposition Bharatiya Janata Party also welcomed the change in Pakistan.^[17]

India's commitment to supporting free and fair elections faced a formidable challenge in the case of Nepal's Constituent Assembly elections in November 2013. Nepal's outgoing prime minister had refused to resign in the face of political paralysis and increasing instability, and the other major parties said they would participate in elections only under a neutral, interim arrangement, all of which called into doubt whether elections would be held at all. India's diplomatic efforts contributed to the March 2013 establishment of an independent interim election government led by Chief Justice Khilraj Regmi for conducting elections. India also provided 764 vehicles that helped ensure peaceful conduct at the polls.^[18]

In the Maldives, Indian efforts contributed to the holding of free, fair, and inclusive elections in November 2013, after a controversial Supreme Court annulment of the first round of polls held in September of that year.^[19]India officially expressed disappointment about the court's decision to annul the results – which was seen as a politico-judicial intervention against Mohamed Nasheed of the Maldives Democratic Party, who in February 2012 had been forced to resign as president. India subsequently worked with the international community to ensure the declaration of a new schedule and the efficient completion of the electoral process to avoid political instability.^[20]

In Bangladesh, the ruling regime and the main opposition were in conflict over the mechanism for holding elections that took place January 5, 2014. India and the wider international community initially strove for participation of all major political players through a process of reconciliation. This included a visit by India's foreign secretary to Bangladesh to try to persuade the contending political forces to take part,^[21] and an invitation to opposition leader Khaleda Zia for discussions at the highest political levels in India as a part of "our ongoing engagement with a democratic and multiparty polity in Bangladesh."^[22]

As a result of these and other international efforts, the Awami League-led government agreed to form a multiparty government for holding the election under their party's leadership. However, the opposition insisted on an interim administration, which had been used in the past under a constitutional provision that had since been amended. In a detailed explanation of India's role, Zia told an Indian newspaper in June 2014:

Their foreign secretary [Sujatha Singh] came here, and said publicly that H. M. Ershad [leader of the smaller Jatiya Party] should participate, otherwise ... the fundamentalists will come to power. She tried to convince us also but could not.... I don't know whether the [Indian] Congress-led government played a role; many believe that [it did].... In fact, Ershad said later that the foreign secretary put pressure on him.^[23]

In this stalemate, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Nations thought that elections should be delayed until the main opposition would participate. India, however, stood by the constitutional process and recognized the election, sparking criticism from Bangladesh and others. India felt that ignoring the amended constitutional provision by holding elections under an interim government would lead to the emergence of radical and militant forces. As India's foreign secretary stated, "Democracy also means the ability to resolve differences through dialogue and peaceful means, without recourse to violence."^[24]

Disruptions of Democratic Processes

India tends to treat disruptions of democratic processes as internal developments in which it is not involved, generally maintaining existing relations after coups take place. In Thailand, for example, the removal of the elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra by the Constitutional Court in May 2014 and the military's subsequent takeover was a setback to both democracy and India's relations with Thailand. However, in reaction to the coup, India simply "noted the recent developments in Thailand" and hoped that "the people of Thailand resolve the political situation peacefully through dialogue and uphold the rule of law."^[25] India recalled its troops from Thailand, where they had been participating in a military exercise, and cautioned its citizens to take security precautions.^[26] Events in Thailand took place at the time of India's own change of power after national elections in April and May. The new government, led by Bharatiya Janata Party leader Narendra Modi, has maintained relations with the military regime in Thailand.

India had a similarly subdued response to the military's takeover of Mohamed Morsi's government in Egypt in July 2013. India only said, "We are closely monitoring the evolving situation in Egypt.... [We urge] all political forces to abjure violence, exercise restraint, respect democratic principles and the rule of law, and engage in a conciliatory dialogue to address the present situation."^[27] The Indian government kept silent on the violence the military rulers unleashed on the ousted president's supporters, and then welcomed the new Egyptian foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy, in December 2013, arranging meetings with the vice president and the minister of external affairs. After the 2014 elections in Egypt, the Indian government extended its congratulations to President-elect Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the chief of the military regime. Meanwhile, Indian Muslim leaders had condemned the 2013 coup and asked India to place an embargo on Egypt.^[28]

India's stance on Myanmar likewise reflects its principle of noninterference, as well as its close relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member. India has worked toward reconciliation between the government, led by President Thein Sein, and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, but has declined to pressure the government to improve on democracy and human rights. During his visit there in May 2012, Prime Minister Singh visited Suu Kyi. In a subsequent press conference, the prime minister said that "India is very appreciative of the efforts being made by the President of Myanmar for national reconciliation and democratisation." He also said that he told Suu Kyi "that we would be very happy to engage with the Government and people and civil society of Myanmar. Not that we have ... to tell Myanmar what to do or what not to do but to work out joint common pathways to find productive, mutually acceptable solutions to these difficult problems of development and inclusion."^[29]

In August of that year, Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai explained that "India remains committed to extending all possible assistance and support to the process of national reconciliation and the further strengthening of democracy in Myanmar. Our own experience is that in fact these processes are interlinked and democracy helps take national reconciliation forward."^[30] However, Suu Kyi subsequently expressed dissatisfaction that India was content to work within the framework of reconciliation as initiated by the Burmese president, rather than pressure Myanmar as strongly as she desired.^[31]

After the invasion of Crimea in February 2014 and amid ongoing violence in Eastern Ukraine, India generally remained silent and did not take a strong stance, reflecting India's endorsement of Russian interests in Ukraine. As India's national security adviser Shivshankar Menon said on March 6, 2014, "There are, after all, legitimate Russian and other interests involved and we hope those are discussed, negotiated and there is a satisfactory resolution to them."^[32] However, India did not approve of the separation of Crimea from Ukraine as managed by Russia. Moreover, India was torn between its strategic friendships with the United States and Europe on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

Gross Human Rights Violations

India's stance on gross violations of human rights has been mixed, affected by considerations of sovereignty, terrorism, economic and strategic interests, and India's approach to its own domestic human rights issues. Over the past two years, this has been evident in India's position on violations in Sri Lanka and Syria.

On Sri Lanka, India had voted in favor of U.S.-sponsored resolutions in 2012 and 2013 at the UN Human Rights Council on the gross violation of human rights by the Sri Lankan armed forces in the final phase of eliminating the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, in March 2014, it abstained from voting on the U.S.-sponsored resolution that sought to independently investigate the human rights violations. This inconsistency in India's vote generally has been explained on the basis of domestic politics: the Indian Tamil community pressured the Indian government to take a tough stance against Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-led government. However, it is also possible to argue that India's position was consistent, as it underlined the country's distaste for provisions of resolutions that militate against sovereignty. India believed that while Sri Lanka needed to do more to work toward "broad-based, inclusive, meaningful, and genuine reconciliation with the minority Tamil community," an intrusive resolution was unacceptable. In 2012 and 2013, India ensured that the original resolutions were amended to remove provisions that it saw as intruding on Sri Lanka's sovereignty, such as imposing international investigations on the conduct of the Sri Lankan army; but in 2014 it failed to achieve such revisions. In explaining its vote in 2014, India said that "the means of addressing human rights violations" should be through "robust national mechanisms" and not imposed from outside. India firmly believed that

Adopting an intrusive approach that undermines national sovereignty and institutions is counterproductive.... Any external investigative mechanism with an open-ended mandate to monitor national processes for protection of human rights ... is not reflective of the constructive approach of dialogue and cooperation envisaged by [the] UN General Assembly resolution[s].^[33]

Nevertheless, India's restraint also emanated from its extensive economic and strategic stakes in Sri Lanka.

The question of sovereignty was also at the core of India's approach to the conflict in Syria. India has kept consistently cordial relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime, which supports India's position that Kashmir is a bilateral issue. India also strives to maintain a delicate balance in Syria by remaining engaged with mutually competing powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.^[34]

On Syria, India's position was that all sides – the regime as well as the rebels – had resorted to violence and "undermined the efforts for a political solution to the crisis." ^[35] India did not approve of the use of force, even under the UN umbrella, but supported UN efforts. For example, India supported efforts by Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi to bring about a political resolution of the Syrian crisis, although he ultimately failed to do so.^[36] India also welcomed the Geneva-II meeting of the "Action Group" and all Syrian parties, initiated by Russia and the United States. At this meeting, held in Monteux on January 22, 2014, Foreign Minister Khurshid reiterated that there was no "military solution" to the crisis in Syria and he supported "an all-inclusive Syrian-led process to chart out the future of Syria, its political structures, and leadership." He also said that "India was fully prepared to play its part in the peace process in any manner required of it, conscious of its larger regional and global responsibilities."^[37] India had, in December 2013, pledged assistance of $1 million and technical experts to assist in the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons.^[38]

Civil Liberties

Wed to the principle of sovereignty, India has refrained from taking positions on the suppression and restraint of civil liberties in other countries. In Sri Lanka, for example, India has not commented on the killings and persecution of journalists and restraints on freedom of expression. In China it has not taken any official note of the suppression of democratic protests, control of media and social networks, or violent state repression.

India has also ignored China's hardhanded methods to control protests in its restive regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. In Xinjiang, India has disapproved of the violent acts of Uighur Muslims fighting for autonomy and independence, joining China's official position that they are terrorists. In response to one such act of violence on May 22, 2014, a spokesman for external affairs said, "We strongly condemn the terrorist attack which took place earlier today at Urumqi, China. India opposes terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We extend condolences to the families of the victims."^[39] Delhi had no reaction to the widespread arrests of Uighur people in Xinjiang since May 2013, or the execution of 13 Xinjiang "militants" on June 16, 2014. Meanwhile, India has welcomed various business delegations from Xinjiang officially sponsored by China in support of direct trade and economic links with India.

In the case of Tibet, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao appreciated India's neutral position during serious Tibetan uprisings in 2008.^[40] However, India does not restrain the activities and cultural affairs of the Tibetan government-in-exile in India, nor prevent international contacts of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees. Against China's wishes, India allowed the Dalai Lama to address the International Buddhist Sangha Conference held in Patna, Bihar, on January 5, 2013.

Marginalized Communities

India has raised its voice against violence, persecution, and discrimination against minorities in neighboring countries, but has done so in a guarded and selective manner. While the treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka is a major issue between India and Sri Lanka,^[41] India had no official reaction to the violence against Muslims in Sri Lanka in June 2014.

In the spring of 2014, the plight of Muslims in Myanmar's Rakhine state drew international attention, as communal clashes with Buddhists led to a humanitarian crisis. Human Rights Watch and others have accused the Burmese government of complicity in the violence.^[42] However, India spoke in support of the government's effort toward "restoration of law and order and ensuring peace and stability in the areas affected by the violence and in meeting the needs of relief and rehabilitation of all the affected communities."^[43] In view of Myanmar's "improvement of the human rights situation" and cooperation with the United Nations, India asked the Human Rights Council in March 2014 to take Myanmar off its agenda.^[44] In December 2012, the Indian external affairs minister had committed $1 million toward "religious tolerance, communal harmony, peace, and reconciliation between the two communities" in Myanmar.^[45]

India has occasionally raised the question of the treatment of Hindus in Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also has drawn attention to violations of the human rights of the Baluchis in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. Pakistan accuses India of interference in Baluchistan and support for what it calls an insurgency there.

About the Author: S.D. Muni is professor emeritus at Jawaharlal Nehru University and distinguished fellow at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

1 For a general discussion of India's role as a democracy promoter in the world, see, S. D. Muni, India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension (New Delhi: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009); Oliver Stuenkel and Jabin T. Jacob, "Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion: The Case of Brazil and India," Third World Quarterly, 30, no. 2 (2013): 339-55; Jan Cartwright, "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?" Asian Survey, 49, no. 3 (2009): 403-28; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Reluctant India," Journal of Democracy, 22, no. 4 (2011); Maya Chadda, "Human Rights and Democracy in India's Emerging Role in Asia," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/09021_bsa_chadda.pdf; Madhavi Bhasin, "India's Approach to Democracy Promotion," Foreign Policy Blogs, March 16, 2011, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/16/indias-approach-to-democracy-promotion/; and Jörg Faust and Christian Wagner, "India: A New Partner in Democracy Promotion?" German Development Institute, Briefing Paper, March 2010.

2 "Democracy Fund," Permanent Mission of India to the UN, https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=11.

3 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Reports, http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Report_2012-2013_English.pdf.

4 The text of the prime minister's speech from Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22428/Highlights+of+Prime+Ministers+address+at+the+Annual+Conclave+of+Indian+AmbassadorsHigh+Commissioners+abroad+in+New+Delhi.

5 Text of the address on December 8, 2013, Middle East Institute New Delhi, "India Speaks," http://www.mei.org.in/front/cms/publicationsDetail.php?id=ODEz.

6 "Remarks by Foreign Secretary at the Launch of IDSA Report – 'India's Neighbourhood: Challenges in the Next Two Decades,'" prepared by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, July 13, 2012, http://www.mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?20120/Remarks+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+the+Launch+of+IDSA+Report++quotIndias+Neighbourhood+Challenges+in+the+Next+Two+Decadesquot.

7 "Foreign Secretary's inaugural address at the Conference 'The Arab World: March Towards Democracy and its Implications' at Mahatama sic Gandhi University, Kottayam," February 4, 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/21152/Foreign+Secretarys+inaugural+address+at+the+Conference+The+Arab+World+March+Towards+Democracy+and+its+Implications+at+Mahatama+Gandhi+University+Kottayam.

8 "Inaugural address by Foreign Secretary at the 5th India-Bangladesh Security Dialogue at Observer Research Foundation," April 2, 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/23271/Inaugural+address+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+the+5th+IndiaBangladesh+Security+Dialogue+at+Observer+Research+Foundation.

9 See for instance, Arvind Gupta and Smruti S. Pattanaik, "Will it be a new phase in India-Pakistan Relations?" Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, May 16, 2013, http://idsa.in/idsacomments; Khaled Ahmed, "Afraid of Free Trade?" The Indian Express, April 25, 2014; and Khaled Ahmed, "The Trade Highway to Peace," The Indian Express, December 14, 2013, http://indianexpress.com/profile/columnist/khaled-ahmed/.

10 Sangey of Haa Wangcha, From the Readers forum, "The After Effects of Indian Intervention in Bhutan Election," Kuensel Online, August 8, 2013, http://www.kuenselonline.com/forums/topic/the-after-effects-of-indian-intervention-in-bhutan-election/.

11 See chapter on "India's Development Assistance to Afghanistan," Radha Kumar and Dayanand Palkar, eds., Afghanistan and Its Neighbours: Regional Views (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 2014), 67-73.

12 Based on information provided by the Ministry of External Affairs, Division of UN and International Organisations, Government of India.

13 "Press-Note" no. ECI/PN/40/2011, Election Commission of India, New Delhi, June 17, 2011. This Press-Note was issued on the occasion of the IIIDEM launch.

14 The Economic Times, New Delhi, June 23, 2013.

15 MEA Press Release, June 16, 2014.

16 The Times of India, May 13, 2013.

17 This statement was made three days after Nawaz Sharif assumed the role of prime minister for the third time. Niti Central, June 8, 2013, http://www.niticentral.com/print-post.php?p=87238.

18 The Hindu, July 9, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/india-commits-support-to-nepal-elections/article4897595.ece.

19 J. J. Robinson "Maldives Top Court Annuls September 7 Presidential Vote, Sets New Election," http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/07/us-maldives-election-court-idUSBRE9960S320131007.

20 Amitabh Pashupati Revi, "India Disappointed at Postponement of Maldives Presidential Elections," NDTV, September 30, 2013, http://www.ndtv.com/article/cheat-sheet/india-disappointed-at-postponement-of-maldives-presidential-elections-424284.

21 Indrani Bagchi, "Maldivian President Yameen to Visit India on December 22," Times of India, December 3, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Maldivian-President-Yameen-to-visit-India-on-December-22/articleshow/26805321.cms.

22 Media briefing by MEA officials on Khaleda Zia's visit on October 30, 2012. Bhasin, op. cit, p. 886.

23 This interview was published in The Indian Express, July 1, 2014.

24 "Statement by Foreign Secretary at the Meeting with Editors in Dhaka," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 4, 2013, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22556/Statement+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+the+meeting+with+Editors+in+Dhaka.

25 Press Release, Indian Embassy in Thailand, Bangkok, May 21, 2014. See also "Thailand Coup: India Withdraws Troops from Bilateral Exercise," Indian Express, May 24, 2014, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/thailand-coup-india-withdraws-troops-from-bilateral-exercise/#sthash.rTg2csGL.dpuf.

26 The Times of India, May 22, 2014.

27 Statement by the Ministry of External Affairs on July 4, 2013, as quoted in Rajeev Sharma, "Why Is India Staying Silent on the Bloodbath in Egypt?" Firstpost, August 16, 2013, http://www.firstpost.com/world/why-is-india-staying-silent-on-the-bloodbath-in-egypt-1037315.html.

28 All India Muslim Majlis-E-Mushawarat, Statement on August 19, 2013, http://www.mushawarat.com/news.asp?id=637. Also see Radiance, Views Weekly, New Delhi, September 1, 2013.

29 Text in Bhasin, op. cit, p. 82.

30 Text in Bhasin, op. cit, p. 3.

31 "Aung San Suu Kyi Urges India's Support for Democracy in Burma," Voice of America News, November 14, 2012, http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/11/14/aung-san-suu-kyi-urges-indias-support-for-democracy-in-burma/.

32 Ankit Panda, "India Will Not Support Western Sanctions Against Russia," The Diplomat, March 20, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/india-will-not-support-western-sanctions-against-russia/

33 "India's Explanation of Vote Before the Vote," Permanent Mission of India, Geneva, March 27, 2014, http://www.pmindiaun.org/pages.php?id=903.

34 Tanvi Ratna, "India's Syria Venture," The Hindu, January 28, 2014. Also Kabir Taneja, "India's Syria Juggling Act," The Diplomat, November 14, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/indias-syria-juggling-act/?allpages=yes?allpages=yes.

35 India's statement on Syria in Human Rights Council, Permanent Mission of India to the UN, Geneva, May 29, 2013.

36 See his interview in Spiegel Online June 7, 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-former-un-peace-envoy-to-syria-lakhdar-brahimi-a-974036.html.

37 Press Release by India's Permanent Mission at Geneva on January 22, 2014, http://www.pmindiaun.org/pages.php?id=896.

38 "Address by Minister of External Affairs on 'International Interests in Middle East Security and Non-Proliferation' at IISS Manama Dialogue," December 8, 2013, at the Middle East Security Conference, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22592/Address+by+Minister+for+External+Affairs+on+International+Interests+in+Middle+East+Security+and+NonProliferation+at+IISS+Manama+Dialogue.

39 Official spokesperson's comments, May 22, 2014.

40 The Economic Times, New Delhi, March 18, 2008.

41 For a detailed reiteration of India's position on Sri Lankan Tamil issues, see the statements of external affairs minister in Rajya Sabha in February 2013, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/21245/Statement+in+Rajya+Sabha+by+External+Affairs+Minister+in+response+to+Calling+Attention+Notice+tabled+by+Dr+V+Maitreyan+MP+Rajya+Sabha+and+others+regarding+quotPlight+of+Tamils+in+Sri+Lankaquot.

42 "Burma: End 'Ethnic Cleansing' of Rohingya Muslims," Human Rights Watch, April 22, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims.

43 "Intervention by Foreign Secretary at the Meeting of the Group of Friends of the Secretary General on Myanmar," Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, September 28, 2012, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20640/Intervention+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+the+Meeting+of+the+Group+of+Friends+of+the+Secretary+General+on+Myanmar.

44 India's statement on the "Resolution on Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar," at the Human Rights Council, 25th Session (March 3-28, 2014), Permanent Mission of India, Geneva, http://www.pmindiaun.org/pages.php?id=916.

45 Press Release, Embassy of India in Myanmar, Sittwe, Myanmar, September 3, 2013.