



***Report on fact-finding mission to Cairo, Khartoum
and Nairobi***

***Human rights situation, military service, and entry and embarkation
procedures in Sudan***

8 to 19 August and 20 to 23 November 2001

Contents

BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION.....	3
INTRODUCTION.....	5
1. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION	9
1.1 THE SECURITY SERVICE AND THE OCCURRENCE OF TORTURE.....	10
1.2 SITUATION FOR THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION, THE MEDIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ...	14
1.3 CHRISTIANS, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES.....	30
2. CONSCRIPTION	35
2.1 CONSCRIPTION AND RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES.....	35
2.2 THE RISK OF CONSCRIPTS BEING SENT INTO ACTIVE WAR SERVICE AGAINST THEIR WILL.....	44
3. CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY AND EXIT	54
3.1 ENTRY TO SUDAN	54
3.2 EXIT FROM SUDAN AND PASSPORT ISSUING PROCEDURES	56
PERSONS, ORGANISATIONS AND AUTHORITIES CONSULTED	58
ABBREVIATIONS	60
ANNEXES	63
ANNEX 2: MAP OF THE OIL PRODUCTION AREAS IN SUDAN (CHRISTIAN AID, MARCH 2001)	65
ANNEX 3: STATEMENT BY THE SUDANESE CHURCHES ON THE OIL FACTOR IN THE CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN, 12 APRIL 2000	66
ANNEX 4: THE NATIONAL SERVICE ACT FOR 1992.....	67
ANNEX 5: POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES ACT 1989	75

Background to the mission

In January/February and in March 2000 the Danish Immigration Service carried out fact-finding missions to Cairo and Geneva to shed light on the situation regarding human rights, conscription, etc. in Sudan. As mentioned in the report¹ on that mission, the Sudanese authorities refused to allow the Immigration Service delegation to enter Sudan. However, in the spring of 2001 the Sudanese authorities informed the Danish Embassy in Cairo that they would now agree to allow a Danish delegation including Immigration Service representatives to visit Khartoum.

The Immigration Service therefore decided to carry out a mission to Khartoum in August 2001. It was also decided that the delegation should gather additional information on the situation in Sudan from international organisations, human rights organisations, organisations of Sudanese exiles and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Cairo and Nairobi.

The mission was carried out in August and November 2001 and follows on from the mission to Cairo and Geneva in 2000. This report is accordingly an update of information concerning conscription, the situation of the political opposition and other human rights aspects, and conditions for entry to and exit from the country.

The mission to Cairo took place from 8 to 11 August and from 20 to 23 November 2001. Some of the sources consulted in Cairo wished to be anonymous.

The mission to Khartoum was from 11 to 14 August 2001, with the participation of a representative of the Danish Embassy in Cairo. The delegation's meetings with official representatives in Khartoum were arranged by the Danish Embassy in Cairo, in cooperation with the protocol service of the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The delegation's other meetings in Khartoum were arranged by the delegation itself.

¹ Report on the fact-finding mission to Cairo (Egypt) and Geneva (Switzerland) – human rights situation in Sudan and position of Sudanese nationals in Egypt, 29 January to 12 February and 3 to 7 March 2000, Copenhagen, April 2000.

The mission to Nairobi took place from 15 to 19 August 2001. In Nairobi the delegation received assistance from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA recommended sources and helped to arrange some of the delegation's meetings in Nairobi.

In Cairo, Khartoum and Nairobi the delegation held meetings with NGOs, international organisations, human rights organisations, embassies, the Sudanese authorities and the Sudanese political opposition (see list of persons, organisations and authorities consulted). Several of the embassies, international organisations and NGOs with which the delegation held meetings requested anonymity, but otherwise had no objection to the information provided to the delegation being included in a published report.

It should be stressed that nearly all the sources consulted by the delegation pointed out that it can be difficult to give clear and precise information about the human rights situation in Sudan.

Significant changes to the situation may arise in a very short time. For example, the recruitment procedures and the scale of recruitment to the armed forces may vary depending on the time of year, the advance or retreat of rebel forces at the fronts and the general military situation. Then there are the authorities' apparently spontaneous and arbitrary human rights violations, which it is not possible to explain in purely logical terms. For instance, several sources expressed great surprise at the authorities' harsh intervention against Christian demonstrators in Khartoum at Easter 2001.¹

It should be noted that this report does not contain a complete overview or a full analysis of the human rights situation in Sudan. It simply updates the description of some of the aspects discussed in the Immigration Service report of April 2000 (see above). The present report should therefore be seen in the context of other reports from UN organisations, local and international human rights organisations, etc.

The UN's Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Sudanese human rights organisations such as the Sudanese Victims of Torture Group (SVTG) and the Sudan Human Rights Organisation (SHRO), international NGOs, the US State Department and several other bodies publish reports on the human rights situation in Sudan; the UN news service Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) publishes current news and background information about the situation and developments in Sudan.

¹ Abel Alier: Events at the Green Square and in All Saints' Cathedral, Khartoum, 14 April 2001.

Introduction

Since the Immigration Service mission to Cairo in the spring of 2000 exploitation of Sudanese oil resources in southern Sudan has been significantly stepped up. In its report *The Scorched Earth* published in March 2001 the NGO Christian Aid describes how civilians are being killed and villages burned down in Sudan's oil-producing areas¹. The inhabitants are caught up in an oil war which is part of the broader civil war between northern and southern Sudan. Since oil production began on a larger scale two years ago, oil has, as it were, taken the war to a new level, in which the Government is using scorched earth tactics in the oil-rich regions. The aim is to clear civilian inhabitants from planned oil production areas and make way for foreign companies to extract the oil.

The Christian Aid report states that the Sudanese Government earns approximately USD 1 million a day from the oil, which is close to the amount it spends every day on conducting its war in the country. As one result of this, the Government is steadily clearing civilians from an increasingly large area. As an example of the consequences of this policy the report describes the situation in the eastern Upper Nile (see Annex 1), where 48 villages have been burned to the ground and 55 000 people driven from their homes. This happened in those parts of the Upper Nile region where foreign oil companies began to operate in March 2001 (see Annex 2). The complicated civil war in southern Sudan is being exacerbated by oil production and its consequences. This is not least because the Government has succeeded in playing ethnic groups off against one another. Several sources consulted by the delegation pointed out that the armed conflict between various ethnic groups in southern Sudan is far more serious for communities in the area than the long-running conflict between the Government in the north and the rebels in southern Sudan. Several Christian NGOs in Sudan have severely criticised the Sudanese Government and the foreign oil companies operating in Sudan. For example, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) have pointed out that income from oil production in Sudan is being used to buy weapons and other military equipment. These weapons are used to drive

¹ Christian Aid: *The Scorched Earth, Oil and war in Sudan*, London, March 2001.

out and kill civilians in the oil-producing areas of southern Sudan (see Annex 3). Other sources have pointed out that bartering is also taking place, with the Sudanese Government exchanging oil for weapons.

In his *Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan* dated September 2000, the UN Special Rapporteur Leonardo Franco points out that oil production in the western Upper Nile region has seriously exacerbated conflict in the area. Leonardo Franco refers to a Canadian Government mission to the area. The aim of the Canadian mission was to examine the connection between oil production and human rights violations, particularly in connection with expulsions in those areas. The Canadian study took place towards the end of 1999 and confirmed information possessed by the UN Special Rapporteur, namely that the human rights situation had got worse, including significant depopulation, and that the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the conflict had decreased as a result of oil production. Leonardo Franco also pointed out that "*although the information received strongly emphasised the seriousness of the displacement, owing to problems of security, logistics and the Government hindering access, it was very difficult to gather precise information on the number of people affected*".¹

At the time of the Immigration Service mission to Cairo and Geneva in the spring of 2000, the UN's Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Leonardo Franco, was consulted in Geneva. His personal views on the human rights situation in Sudan are set forth in the abovementioned report on that mission.

At the end of December 2000 Gerhard H. Baum was appointed as the UN's Special Rapporteur for Sudan. Baum carried out a fact-finding mission to Khartoum and Nairobi in March 2001. The information Baum collected and his personal views on the human rights situation in Sudan were published in the *Oral Statement on the Human Rights Situation in the Sudan by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Sudan*² in April 2001.

¹ United Nations General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, A/55/374, 11 September 2000.

² Commission on Human Rights, 57th session, 19 March to 27 April 2001: Oral Statement on the Human Rights situation in the Sudan by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human

Baum's assessment, as set out in the above document, was that despite a number of signs of positive developments in Sudan, there were still grounds for serious concern about the human rights situation.

Baum explained that some of the most serious human rights violations in Sudan were the arbitrary arrests and detentions which took place without those concerned being brought before a judge. This situation has been further aggravated by the state of emergency declared by President el-Beshir in December 1999 which has subsequently been extended until the end of 2001 ¹.

The state of emergency has led amongst other things to the 1999 National Security Forces Act being amended to make it possible to detain people for up to six months without their being brought before a judge. Baum believed that these changes increased the risk of human rights violations in Sudan. A result of the changes has been a strengthening of the state security apparatus. According to Baum, this apparatus should be brought under stricter control in order to guarantee fundamental freedoms. Opponents of the Government and others are facing a fundamental threat to their freedom, as there is a tendency to criminalise their political activities. In his statement Baum condemned the recent targeting of members of the Popular National Congress party (PNC) led by Dr Hassan al-Turabi. Baum was unable to visit al-Turabi as he was in prison. Baum also condemned the use of torture in Sudan, including long-term imprisonment in isolation. Baum concluded that many injustices and human rights violations in Sudan were closely linked with the current conflict in the country including conflicts between ethnic groups. These violations are committed by both the Government and its agents, and by the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and allied rebel groups.

Baum presented his most recent human rights report to the UN General Assembly at the beginning of November 2001. That report states that the Murahilin militia is deeply involved in abductions and other offences against civilians in Sudan. Baum states that *"Above all, the government needs to exercise all its influence on the Murahilin, who are responsible for human rights abuses, such as*

Rights in the Sudan.

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), SUDAN: IRIN Focus on human rights, 14 November 2001.

mass killings, torture, rape and abductions".¹ Baum added that the Sudanese Government shares responsibility for these offences since the Sudanese army tolerates the injustices and has incorporated the Murahilin militia into its operations. The army also finances and equips the militia and decides where it is to be deployed.

Several sources consulted by the delegation in Cairo, Khartoum and Nairobi also emphasised that the human rights situation in Sudan is to a great extent determined by the long-running civil war in the country, and that it has been exacerbated by the production of oil, including the presence of Government-backed militia and foreign oil companies.

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), SUDAN: IRIN Focus on human rights, 14 November 2001.

1. Human rights situation

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Cairo processes Sudanese asylum applications on behalf of the Egyptian authorities. UNHCR reported that Sudanese were by far the largest refugee group in Egypt, other than the approximately 70 000 Palestinians who have been recognised as refugees by the Egyptian authorities. On 31 October 2001 there were 4 535 UNHCR-recognised Sudanese refugees in Egypt. In the period 1 January to 31 October 2001 the UNHCR recognised 2 746 Sudanese asylum applicants as refugees, a recognition rate of 47%.

A well-informed local source in Cairo believed that there had been a general worsening of the human rights situation and an escalation of the military conflict in Sudan in recent months. He believed that the most prominent members of President Omar el-Beshir's Government were still hard-liners, and that what might be seen as an opening up to the outside world was merely window-dressing. There was still outright civil war in southern Sudan, people were being driven from their homes in parts of the country where oil was being produced, and the Government was bombing and shooting at villages and killing civilians using helicopter gunships. In addition there were reports of famine in some areas. The source explained that overall this meant that the general situation in Sudan had got worse.

The source highlighted three overriding factors affecting the situation in Sudan:

- at political level there had perhaps been a slight improvement in the situation. For example, there had been a slight improvement in conditions for the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA), whose members were perhaps no longer subject to the same degree of targeted persecution as had previously been the case.
- on the military level the situation had got clearly worse. For example military activities had been markedly stepped up in areas where oil production was taking place or was planned.
- on the human rights and humanitarian front the situation had generally got worse. People

were being expelled from areas where oil was being produced. In those areas there were numerous instances of whole villages being burned to the ground, the men being killed, the women raped, and civilians being captured and abducted.

However, this and nearly all other sources stressed that it was very difficult to say anything unambiguous and lasting about the human rights situation in Sudan, as it was unpredictable and could change at very short notice.

1.1 *The security service and the occurrence of torture*

The Sudanese human rights organisation Sudanese Victims of Torture Group (SVTG), which has offices in Cairo and London, was granted permission in June 2001 to open an office in Khartoum too. A Sudanese human rights organisation in Cairo said that this had happened following pressure from the European Union (EU). The SVTG receives financial support from a number of organisations abroad. Since the SVTG office was opened in Khartoum its employees have occasionally been detained by the Sudanese authorities. This had happened most recently in mid-November 2001. A human rights organisation in Cairo reported that the detained employees had not been tortured.

The same source further reported that the extent of the use of torture in Sudan had decreased in the last year as a result of the split between President el-Beshir and the PNC leader al-Turabi, and of international pressure on the Government. However, this situation could change suddenly. The well-known Sudanese human rights lawyer Ghazi Suleiman had previously been able to hold e.g. press briefings, but this had changed without warning and he had been arrested and tortured. There were invisible limits which if overstepped could put someone in a serious situation. However in general it was those in a poor financial situation, students and those who were not publicly known, who were primarily at risk of assault and torture. There was no great risk for the Government in persecuting poor and unknown people. The source added that there had been many cases of internally displaced persons who lived by brewing beer in Khartoum being whipped.

In its annual report for 2000¹, SVTG stated that the organisation was continuing to receive

¹ The Sudanese Victims of Torture Group, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, March 2000 – March 2001, London.

information about torture in Sudan. This confirmed that torture was part of a systematic security policy. Nevertheless, fewer cases of torture had been reported in 2000 than in 1999. The SVTG believed that this was because of national and international pressure and publicity about cases of torture. However, as regards methods of torture, there had been an increase in the use of psychological torture, forced exercise and deprivation of sleep and/or food. The majority of the victims of torture in Sudan were students.

The Amal Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Physical and Mental Trauma in Khartoum is SVTG's clinic. The Amal Centre provides free help to victims of torture in Sudan. The head of the Amal Centre is Dr Nageed Nagmeldin el-Toum. He is also a member of the SVTG network and former Secretary-General of the Sudanese Doctors Union, which has now been banned. El-Toum was arrested on 11 March 2001 in the Amal Centre, and the security service confiscated the Centre's computers, archives and documents, as well as documents from el-Toum's home. El-Toum has been arrested seven times since 1989 and has spent a total of more than four years in prison during that period. During his imprisonments el-Toum has been tortured in the form of whippings and beatings, and has been blindfolded for long periods. El-Toum's arrest in March was two days before he was due to meet UN Special Rapporteur Gerhard Baum on 13 March 2001. The meeting never took place, and the security service accused el-Toum of drawing up a list of victims of torture for the UN Special Rapporteur.

A well-informed local source in Cairo and several other sources pointed out that to a large extent the security service operated on its own behalf in Sudan and was not subject to the Government's control. This meant that members of the security service were not held answerable for their actions, and thus there was general impunity for members of the security service. The human rights situation in Sudan was determined by the security service and the Government's attitude more than by existing legislation in the area.

Hedwig Waltmans-Molier, Second Secretary at Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Khartoum, confirmed that the whole Sudanese security apparatus was an institution to itself. The Government found it difficult to control the service. Officials in the service who had committed human rights violations generally escaped punishment. In reality all employees of the security service had freedom from prosecution.

As regards the situation for the political opposition and human rights in northern Sudan and

particularly in Khartoum, a well-informed local source in Cairo explained that there were a number of units within the Sudanese security service which dealt with "political" cases, i.e. cases involving suspected opponents. The Sudanese security service consisted of five units:

- Public Security Police
- State Security Police
- Economic Security Police
- Military Intelligence
- Revolutionary Security

The source explained that the State Security Police and the Revolutionary Security unit were known to be behind assaults on and the torture of detainees. Torture took place in "ghost houses" (i.e. temporary, secret torture centres), but could also occur elsewhere. It was stressed that the use of torture against political prisoners still occurred in Sudan. Torture occurred in all the regions controlled by the Government.

An employee of an international humanitarian organisation in Nairobi stressed that there could be no doubt that the authorities in Sudan still used torture and other forms of violence. As an example he described how he had himself spoken to a prisoner only a few weeks ago who had now been released, and who two or three months ago had witnessed torture in a prison in Khartoum. The prisoner had repeatedly heard the screams of fellow prisoners who were being tortured. The source stressed that torture definitely was still taking place in Sudanese prisons, etc. but could not comment on its extent.

A representative of an international humanitarian organisation in Khartoum confirmed that torture of prisoners was still occurring in Sudan. Johannes Lehne, Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Khartoum, could confirm this to some extent, although he found it difficult to verify information about torture. However, he expressed surprise that torture should be as widespread as the Immigration Service had been informed in the spring of 2000 by the Al-Nadim Centre in Cairo.¹

¹ Danish Immigration Service, Report on the fact-finding mission to Cairo (Egypt) and Geneva (Switzerland), 29 January to 12 February and 3 to 7 March 2000, Copenhagen, April 2000, pp. 44 to 48.

Saif el Nasr Idrees Ishag, Chairman of the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), Egypt Branch, Cairo, described how he himself had been subjected to serious torture during a stay in prison in Sudan. Torture of political opponents was still generally occurring in Sudan, and Idrees Ishag was sure that torture would continue to occur in Sudan as long as the current regime was in power. He was aware of a particular form of torture developed for use against political prisoners in Sudan. This involved prisoners being entirely banned from talking, except for a particular letter, e.g. "T", which would then be the only sound the prisoner could utter during his entire time in prison.

According to SVTG Sudanese criminal law is based on the Government's interpretation of the Islamic Sharia law, and includes amputation and the death penalty including the crucifixion of the executed. According to the 1991 criminal law there are now nine offences in all for which the accused may be sentenced to death:

Article 50: Attack on the power of the State and undermining the constitution

Article 51: Making war on the State

Article 53: Spying against the country

Article 126: Apostasy (converting from Islam to another religion)

Article 130: Murder

Article 146: Adultery

Article 148g: Homosexuality

Article 168: Armed robbery

Article 177: Embezzlement.

A well-informed local source in Cairo explained that the authorities made particular use of the 1991 Criminal Act, the 1992 Press and Publication Act and the 1994 National Security Act in their attempts to restrict the activities of the opposition or of suspected members of the opposition in the country.

Members or suspected members of the opposition were only seldom detained by the authorities as the result of a court judgment. The authorities also made use of partial arrests of opposition members, when they were ordered to present themselves at the security service headquarters in the larger towns every morning. These people were detained from morning until night and prevented from carrying out their daily activities, and stopped being able to function normally. This often

happened without the detainees being questioned or investigations taking place.

The source added that the length of detention would often be determined by the type of accusation being made against the detainee. The most usual accusation against persons who were otherwise politically inactive was spying and contact with members of the opposition, or providing food to supporters of the SPLA. In such cases the detention would often be of short duration, from a few days to a few weeks. Besides the poor conditions in the detention cells a detainee would often risk being subjected to beatings, isolation, threats, humiliation, harassment, frequent interrogations and being forced to carry out hard physical exercise. There were also many reports of detained women being raped.

A person accused of substantial political activities, particularly for the armed section of the opposition, was in a significantly worse position. In such cases arbitrary arrest could last from several months to several years. Violence against such detainees was also much more serious. Many of these inmates were subjected to serious torture in the form of electric shocks, maiming of the genitals, branding and/or were prevented from sleeping.

Generally a person who was suspected of carrying out political activities for the opposition would automatically be regarded as a security risk and his case would therefore be a matter for the security service.

1.2 Situation for the political opposition, the media and human rights activists

A Sudanese human rights organisation in Cairo explained that members of Hassan al-Turabi's party, the Popular National Congress (PNC), were the most vulnerable group in Khartoum, whereas the situation for other members of the opposition depended on what actual political activities they had been involved in. The source added that even those who made disparaging or critical comments about the Government, e.g. on public transport, could risk arrest. If the authorities felt that a person was a threat to the Government, i.e. if he was regarded as a security risk, he would be in serious danger of being subjected to severe torture.

A well-informed local source in Cairo claimed that only members of that part of the Umma Party (UP) – called the "mainstream UP", which had made an agreement with the Government in

Khartoum in November 1999, were not at risk of persecution and injustices by the authorities. The UP had split and the party withdrew from the opposition NDA in March 2000 as a result of the agreement with the regime in Khartoum. The UP does not participate in governmental cooperation with the el-Beshir Government. Since the agreement with the regime a number of members of the UP have chosen to return home from exile abroad. Some of these have reportedly had their confiscated property returned to them. According to the source, several human rights organisations have consistently reported that returnees had not had any form of security problems after their return. The relationship between the UP and other members of the NDA had worsened as a result of the UP's agreement with the regime in Khartoum.

The Government's adoption of the Political Organisation Act in March 2000 led to 33 political parties being registered under that law. However, despite the law there are several restrictions on party political activity in Sudan. In his report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN's Special Rapporteur writes: "*..the impositions of conditions on parties wishing to register that they adhere to the ideology of the ruling party, does not reflect the guarantees set forth in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*".¹

It was remarked in this connection that the 1991 Sudanese Criminal Act bans gatherings of more than five persons if prior consent has not been obtained from the authorities.

A well-informed local source in Cairo stated that members of the PNC were still the victims of persecution and injustices in Sudan. A Sudanese human rights organisation in Cairo added that the security service used torture in more or less all cases of detention of PNC members. The security service was much harsher towards members of the PNC than towards members of other parties opposing the Government. The source added that Hassan al-Turabi remained under house arrest.

A well-informed source in Cairo explained that the authorities chiefly persecuted the more militant members of the opposition, including militant members of the opposition alliance NDA. All members of the armed opposition in Sudan were at serious risk of persecution by the authorities and risked serious violence if they were ever detained.

¹ Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression: Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Sudan in accordance with the

Idrees Ishag explained that the opposition NDA consisted of the following opposition political parties and rebel movements ¹:

BC – Beja Congress

BP – Baa'th Party (Iraq faction)

BP – Baa'th Party (Syria faction)

DUP – Democratic Unionist Party (Mirghani faction including groupings of that faction)

SAF – Sudan Alliance Forces

SANU – Sudan African National Union

SCP – Sudanese Communist Party (Mohammed Ibrahim Nogud faction)

SFDA – Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance ²

SFP – Sudan Federal Party

SNP – Sudanese National Party

SPDF – Sudan People's Democratic Front

SPLM/A – Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

TL – Three Lions ³

Idrees Ishag added that other parties or movements might be found in the NDA but that at present he could only name those listed here. He explained that the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), the Baa'th Party (BP) and the Umma Party (UP), which is no longer a member of the NDA, are split parties.

Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/36, 3 March 2000.

¹ A well-informed local source in Cairo said that the DUP and the SFDA were now the two main players in the opposition NDA, but that the DUP was the dominant party. The NDA consists of an "internal" and an "external" part. The leader of the NDA is Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, who is also the leader of the Mirghani faction of the party.

² Idrees Ishag described SFDA as one of the few political movements in Sudan to have a clearly coherent and transparent political agenda. The SFDA's political goal is to make Sudan a federal state, in which the current political, social and economic dominance of the central power is abolished in favour of regional self-government. The state should be based on a complete separation between state and religious institutions.

³ Idrees Ishag explained that Three Lions (TL) is an armed Arab rebel group led by Mabrouk Mubarak. TL operates in eastern Sudan in the area between Kassala and Port Sudan.

Besides being split into the Hindi and Mirghani factions, the DUP is also divided into a number of smaller factions. DUP-Mirghani is in opposition to the Government. DUP-Hindi supports the Government and is not a member of the NDA. Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani is the leader of the DUP's Mirghani faction and is also leader of the NDA.

According to a well-informed local source in Cairo, the DUP and the UP are the two major traditional parties in Sudan. Each is based on its own religious order. The base of the DUP is the Khaymiyya order, while the Ansar movement is the base for the UP.

Both the DUP and the UP are marked by splits. After representatives of the UP's leader Sadiq al Mahdi and President el-Beshir had signed a conciliation agreement in November 1999 known as the "Nation's call", the UP was criticised by the NDA opposition alliance which the UP then left in March 2000. The UP defended itself by explaining that it could not accept that the leader of the DUP was also the leader of the NDA. There is opposition to the UP's agreement with the Government within the UP. That part of the UP which supports the agreement is called the "mainstream UP". On the other hand, the split in the DUP is more historic and is partly related to the question of the party's attitude to Sharia law in Sudan.

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) is split into at least two factions led respectively by Mohammad Ibrahim Nogud and Al Khatim Adlan. Adlan's faction is not a member of the NDA, but both factions of the SCP are banned in Sudan and both are under surveillance by the authorities. Idrees Ishag stressed that members of both factions of the SCP were at risk of persecution and injustice.

According to a well-informed local source in Cairo, the SCP traditionally found its support amongst students and trade unionists. The SCP had support in both southern and northern Sudan, and was opposed to the religiously based parties DUP and UP. The SCP has in the past had major influence on Sudanese politics. In 1971 the SCP was banned by President Nimeiri who accused the party of backing an attempted coup. Several hundred leading members of the SCP were imprisoned and a few were executed. After Nimeiri's fall the SCP was reorganised and it won three seats at the parliamentary elections in 1986. Since the coup in 1989 the SCP has been behind one of the most effective opposition campaigns against the regime. The Secretary-General of the SCP,

Babikr al Tijani al Tayib, fled from house arrest in Sudan to Ethiopia in 1990.

The pan-Arab Baa'th Party (BP) is divided into pro-Syrian and pro-Arab factions, but members of both factions are at risk of attack. It was possible that members of the pro-Iraqi branch of the BP were not subject to the same degree of persecution during the Gulf war as they are now, since Sudan was on Iraq's side in that conflict.

Idrees Ishag believed that all the parties which had themselves registered in 2000 were "in the hands of" the Government. None of the parties and movements mentioned above as part of the NDA has been officially registered. Members of parties which are marginalised in Sudan, i.e. parties which are not registered, may risk persecution and violence by the authorities. Particularly those who have a public profile are at risk of persecution by the authorities. Idrees Ishag particularly mentioned members of the SCP and its factions.

The SVTG's annual report¹ pointed out that seven members of the NDA secretariat had been arrested together with a US diplomat by the security service in Khartoum on 6 December 2000. The detained NDA members had taken part in a meeting between the NDA and the US diplomat, the latter being ordered to leave Sudan immediately afterwards.

The SVTG's annual report also pointed out that throughout 2000 the security service continued to oppress opposition leaders and political activists in Sudan. In the first three months of 2001 the security service carried out a large number of arrests of members of the opposition in various towns in Sudan. The report states that members of the NDA, SCP, DUP, PNC, USAP and BP were imprisoned. At the beginning of 2001 it was particularly members of the PNC who were imprisoned. The SVTG has published the names of a total of 63 persons belonging to the above parties who were imprisoned in the period 24 May 2000 to 14 March 2001.

The SVTG believed that human rights activists, defence lawyers, trade unionists, students, journalists, cultural personalities and prominent members of civil society in general were at risk of violence and persecution by the authorities in Sudan.

¹ The Sudanese Victims of Torture Group, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Sudan, March 2000 – March 2001, London.

The September/October 2001 edition of the SVTG newsletter SVTG News ¹ stated that the authorities had carried out a number of campaigns against civil society organisations in October 2001. The following cultural institutions and human rights centres saw their leaders arrested and questioned by the security service: Centre for Sudanese Studies, Abduulkareem Margani Cultural Centre, Gender Centre for Research and Development, Amal Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Physical and Mental Trauma, Khartoum Centre for Human Rights Studies and Abdelmageed Imam Centre for Culture and Humanity Studies. The security service campaign against these institutions took place between 9 and 11 October. Some of these centres had received permission from the authorities to register as late as June or July 2001. The campaign therefore came as a surprise to most. The above institutions received notification after about a week that they could continue their activities, but were warned at the same time that in future they would be closely watched by the security service. The SVTG believes that the decision to allow the institutions to resume their activities was because of pressure on the Government by both the EU and the British Embassy in Khartoum.

The SVTG regarded the security service's campaigns as a serious backward step in relation to the positive steps which had happened in that area in recent months. The organisation believed that the campaigns were intended to spread fear amongst individuals and groups and suppress their commitment to work on human rights questions in Sudan.

In common with several other sources, the SVTG felt that there was a "red line" which could not be crossed. Despite some concessions and a certain degree of opening the Government did not tolerate criticism. The SVTG reported that in 1996 President el-Beshir had publicly declared that *"when we talk of having power to the people, we mean the people will be within certain limits but no one will cross the red lines which are aimed at the interest of the nation"*. The SVTG and other organisations therefore had to work secretly and under the constant risk that workers for their organisations would be arrested by the security service. However, in recent years the Government had sporadically relaxed conditions for some of these organisations and their staff. It added that even registered organisations were subject to extreme restrictions on their work.

In its annual report for March 2000 to March 2001 the SVTG expressed the opinion that Sudan's current Government was dominated by the security branch of the Islamists (National Islamic Front)

¹ SVTG News, Issue 29, September/October 2001, London.

as a result of Hassan al-Turabi's political-ideological branch losing in the power struggle between the NIF and President el-Beshir. Thus ten of the Ministers appointed by el-Beshir in his new Government were security people, of whom several had served in prominent posts in different parts of the security service. The SVTG therefore concluded that the Sudanese Government was dominated by the security service more than ever before.

Regarding the situation for human rights activists, the SVTG annual report described how the well-known human rights lawyer Ghazi Suleiman, who is Chairman of the Sudan Human Rights Group (SHRG) and of the National Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (NCRD), has been repeatedly targeted by the authorities. In 2000 alone he was arrested six times. Suleiman was arrested on 9 December 2000 as he and 19 other lawyers had sent a complaint to the Sudanese Ministry of Justice about the arrest of seven NDA members on 6 December 2000. Suleiman had also published an open statement in a newspaper in which he criticised the Government for arresting the seven NDA members. The SVTG has reported several other cases of lawyers who have taken on the defence of political opposition figures being imprisoned. The SVTG believes that the repeated harassment and imprisonment of Suleiman over recent years should be seen as an expression of the Government's continuing repression of human rights activists in Sudan. The aim of the imprisonments is to give a warning to other human rights activists.

The SVTG has reported a large number of abuses against students in Sudan. In its annual report it stated that throughout 2000 there had been numerous injustices involving students, at least six of whom had been killed, many arrested, and some tortured. By far the largest group of victims of torture was students. In 2000 at least one student died as a result of torture and 15 others were subjected to it. The perpetrators were not punished in any of these cases. The SVTG reports that Islamic student militia operating under the protection of the security service had abducted and tortured student activists. Most attacks against and arrests of students happened as a result of their political activities. There had also been examples of the National Islamic Student Militia issuing a *fatwa*, i.e. an order that someone should be killed without risk of punishment, against named students who had arranged a seminar with leaders of the DUP and the SCP. The seminar was arranged by the student organisation Democratic Front (DF). Some of the organisers were tortured during their detention and there have been several examples of students who belong to the DF being targeted. There have been a number of instances of students being detained, undergoing various forms of torture and having their heads shaved before release. In many cases the security forces

have fired live rounds against demonstrating students and several students have been killed by the security forces.

The SVTG report recounts numerous cases of harassment, threats, arrests and the imprisonment of journalists, and several newspapers have been prevented from appearing. This often happens if a newspaper contains articles criticising the Government, reports about the SCP, NDA, SPLA, PNC or other opposition parties, or about trade union elections, strikes or human rights activities. In some cases journalists have been ordered to appear daily before the security service. On 10 February 2001 the security service sent a communiqué to the editors of all newspapers, in which the papers were ordered not to publish any news about trade union elections, the NDA or the PNC. Under the law any person who incorrectly accuses the Government of corruption or other illegal acts is subject to fines or imprisonment from two months to life. The SVTG newsletter for September/October 2001 ¹ reports that there are still cases of editors and journalists being arrested by the security service. For example, an editor and a journalist on the newspaper Khartoum Monitor were arrested on 24 October. Both were accused, without being questioned, of offences against the State. The Khartoum Monitor was closed three times in 2001, and its journalists have been subject to constant harassment and surveillance by the security service.

Idrees Ishag explained that anyone who spoke negatively in public about the Sudanese Government or who generally said anything of which the Government did not approve was at risk of ending up in prison. However, he added that just now there were some signs that the authorities were adopting a slightly more lenient attitude to the DUP. He mentioned that a brother of the leader of the DUP's Mirghani faction had just returned home to Khartoum from abroad. This brother had promised the authorities in advance that he would no longer support the armed struggle against the Government.

Idrees Ishag observed that anyone who carried out public political opposition activities in Sudan would be at risk of coming to the authorities' attention and therefore also risk being targeted. He believed that less prominent political figures were at greater risk of being targeted than personalities who were known to the public. Leading opposition politicians were known by the public and by the outside world, which could give them some form of protection. Attacks against less known political activists would not gain the attention of the press to the same extent as those against known personalities. He stressed that even ordinary active members of the opposition parties, who for

¹ SVTG News, Issue 29, September/October 2001, London.

example distributed pamphlets or took part in demonstrations, were at risk even of very serious attack by the authorities.

Journalists and editors risked harassment, abuse and persecution by the authorities. Thus a journalist who the day before the meeting between the Immigration Service and Idrees Ishag, had written a critical article on the use of out-of-date medicines in Sudan had had his newspaper closed down by the authorities the same day. As a result the newspaper's 20 employees went to the Sudanese Ministry of Information to make a complaint but were all arrested.

Idrees Ishag could not provide details of the number of inmates who could be described as political prisoners in Sudan. He could not rule out the possibility that the number of publicly known political prisoners could be under 100, but he believed that there were several hundred if not more than a thousand political prisoners in Sudan. By far the majority of those prisoners were just not known to the public.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country informed us in October 2001 that there had been no form of open party political activity in Government-controlled Sudan since June 1989, when the armed forces, supported by the National Islamic Front (NIF) had taken power. From then until March 2000, when the Government adopted its Political Organisation Act, all party political activity had been banned.

He also explained that any asylum applicants who claimed to have been persecuted by the authorities because of party political activities in the period from 1989 until March 2000, when a certain degree of party political activity was allowed, could hardly be telling the truth, unless they were at least 30 to 35 years old. The Sudanese parties had not taken on new members since June 1989, which meant that it was improbable that persons under the age of 30 could have carried out party political activity in Khartoum. The source added that there was no chance that illegal political parties in Khartoum had had an opportunity to carry on their activities in secret. Such activities would be impossible, as the various security services including the Popular Committees¹ and people in general could not fail to notice them. The source therefore insisted that only political figures over the age of 30 to 35 might be at risk of persecution and targeting by the authorities, and

¹ According to a well informed local source in Cairo, the Popular Committees consist of people who spy on and monitor suspected opponents on the Government's behalf.

in such cases this would only concern leading figures in the political parties.

The above source also said that political parties had been reestablished under the Political Organisation Act, but that they had nearly all boycotted the elections in 2000. Despite this the authorities had to some extent tolerated the parties' political activities since then. Even the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which was the largest opposition group in Sudan and included large parts of the northern opposition and of the southern Sudanese rebel movement SPLA/M, was represented in Sudan, and the organisation campaigned against the Government. However, the NDA and other opposition parties were subjected to intimidation in the form of fear campaigns and threats from the authorities, especially when the opposition publicly accused and censured the Government for corruption.

The same source stated that six members of the NDA had been released from prison on 1 October 2001. The case against the six had already begun and they were accused of being involved in plans for a coup allegedly backed by the USA. Two members of the NDA had earlier been released on bail. The six who had been released were all senior members of the NDA's internal section. They had been arrested in December 2000 after holding a meeting with the political observer at the US Embassy in Khartoum.

The source believed that the human rights situation had improved in those parts of central and northern Sudan which were within about a 500 km radius of Khartoum. This particularly applied to the freedom of speech and the freedom of association. As an example he mentioned that the former Prime Minister and current leader of the UP, Sadiq al-Mahdi, had returned to Khartoum from exile in Cairo. Despite the fact that the human rights situation in central and northern Sudan had improved in relation to the situation between 1989 and 1998, with the exception of the situation of the minorities and internally displaced persons in the Three Towns (i.e. Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North), there were only signs of a slow improvement in the human rights situation.

In general, he added that it was difficult to present a clear picture of the human rights situation in Sudan. Sudan was a large country with significant regional and ethnic variation. It was also varied as regards circumstances such as war and peace. Some regions had been affected by long-lasting warlike situations under various governments, SPLA/M forces, tribal militia and gangs of bandits (this applied in the "war zones") whereas others had been relatively stable (central Sudan including

the capital Khartoum). This variation was reflected in various degrees of war-related human rights violation, which he was convinced was the main reason for the serious human rights situation in Sudan.

The UN's Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Gerhard Baum, commented in early November 2001 to the UN General Assembly that "with the extension of the state of emergency to the end of this year, restrictions on NGOs and the media, and a campaign of harassment, intimidation and persecution of political opponents of the government, political freedom had actually been restricted rather than relaxed this year. What had appeared to be serious efforts to democratise Sudan were discontinued at the end of 2000 (when president Umar Hasan al-Bashir declared a state of emergency after a political struggle with the former Speaker of parliament, Hasan al-Turabi), with some security laws tightened and the security police stepping up their activities". Baum added that the human rights situation in Sudan had become even worse in recent months. This had happened in parallel with an escalation of military activity in the country.¹

A representative of an international humanitarian organisation in Khartoum believed that the Sudanese Government had officially expressed a resolve to improve the human rights situation in the country, but that in real and practical terms not much had happened in this area. The source found it difficult to point to concrete examples of improvements of human rights and only observed that the political climate had improved, inasmuch as some parties had been registered and ordinary members of the parties were generally not persecuted by the authorities. For example, ordinary members of the PNC, i.e. the party formed by the former leader of the National Congress (NC) party, Hassan al-Turabi, in May 2000, were no longer more liable to be persecuted than members of other parties. Nowadays ordinary members of the PNC were not arrested just because they were members of the party. The source explained that in the period February to May 2001 even ordinary members of the PNC had been at risk of persecution by the authorities.

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), SUDAN: IRIN Focus on human rights, 14 November 2001.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country informed the Immigration Service in October 2001 that 35 senior members and supporters of the PNC had been arrested on 2 October 2001, when trying to hold a press conference. Amongst those arrested was the PNC's Secretary-General Abdullah Hassan Ahmad. The PNC leader Hassan al-Turabi was still being detained despite the fact that the accusations against him had been withdrawn.

The former Chairman of the Sudanese National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), Dr Ahmed el Mufti, now Permanent Secretary at the Sudanese Ministry of Justice and a member of the Advisory Council of the NCHR, denied that the Sudanese authorities practised harassment or persecuted or detained members of the opposition in Sudan. Even members of the political parties which were not officially registered in Sudan, such as the Umma Party and a number of others, were not persecuted. El Mufti stressed that this applied to all parties in Sudan including the SCP and the DUP. All parties in Sudan could openly criticise the Government for example in the press, and free political debate was taking place in Sudan.

Hedwig Waltmans-Molier, Second Secretary at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Khartoum, confirmed that the UP was not a registered party, but added that the party was to a large extent controlled by the Government. A number of the other opposition parties therefore had a poor relationship with the UP, with which they did not cooperate. In 2000 a new law had allowed all parties to hold political meetings and public demonstrations. This applied whether the parties were registered or not. There were no illegal political parties in Sudan. Thus the Sudanese Communist Party was also not illegal.

Waltmans-Molier added that the Netherlands immigration authorities examined asylum applications from Sudanese from northern Sudan individually and in detail. Those who came from southern Sudan generally received a temporary residence permit in the Netherlands for three years on the basis of the general security situation in that part of Sudan. Those Sudanese who came from northern Sudan often cited as grounds for asylum a fear of recruitment to the armed forces and/or membership of an opposition party (though seldom the UP). Many members of the UP had returned home from exile abroad in recent years.

The Netherlands authorities often used local lawyers, human rights organisations and their networks, as well as the opposition parties in Sudan itself, in order to verify politically based

asylum applications. This was generally the only means of achieving clarity in these cases.

Waltmans-Molier is as an Immigration Officer at the Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum. Besides reporting home about the security and human rights situation in Sudan, she also answered specific questions from the immigration authorities at home in the Netherlands.

Regarding the position for members of the political opposition, Waltmans-Molier explained that the fact that a person was a member of an opposition party was not in itself a problem. If a person was an active member of an opposition party and spoke openly about the political situation, etc., then he could be at risk of persecution by the authorities. Those members of opposition parties who for example distributed pamphlets were hardly at risk of being targeted. It was the more prominent members of the opposition who risked harassment and abuse from the authorities. For example, the authorities might demand that such persons should show up repeatedly for questioning, and there was also a risk that they could be subject to physical violence such as beatings, etc. However not all prominent members of the opposition were subject to such attacks, but there was a risk that this could happen if someone was publicly known and therefore also known to the authorities.

Waltmans-Molier was not aware whether the frequently discussed "ghost houses" were still to be found in Sudan.

When asked about the risk of detention and abuse of members of the opposition, Waltmans-Molier said that only active members of the opposition were arrested. The duration of their detention usually varied from a few days to a week or so, but there was a risk that a detainee could also be subjected to violence including torture. She stressed that anything could happen to someone in the custody of the authorities. Those who took part in demonstrations organised by the opposition (including Christians) could be at risk of being targeted. There had been examples of mass arrests in connection with demonstrations. For example, a large number of demonstrators were arrested in connection with a demonstration held by Christians in Khartoum at Easter 2001.

There had earlier been reports of people in the custody of the authorities disappearing. The well-known human rights activist Ghazi Suleiman has claimed that up to 300 people have disappeared while in the custody of the authorities. However, Waltmans-Molier had not heard of any disappearances in recent years.

Johannes Lehne believed that the human rights situation in Sudan had generally not changed for the

better in recent years. However, there had been periods of relative press freedom, although this was very variable. Just at present (August 2001) there was a relatively high level of freedom of the press. On the whole it could be claimed that there were inmates in Sudanese prisons who could be described as political prisoners. The leader of the NDA was being held in prison on political grounds. He was accused of being a threat to the constitution. Some trade union leaders were also in prison. Independent trade unions had previously been abolished in Sudan. There were also members of the communist party in prison, as well as officers who had allegedly been behind an attempted coup. Lehne believed that about 80 people were being held in prison in Sudan on political grounds¹.

He added that it was only high-profile members of the opposition, who were behind activities which the authorities feared could lead to public unrest, who risked imprisonment. Ordinary members of the opposition parties were usually not imprisoned, although there had been occasional instances of members of the communist party and Hassan al-Turabi's party PNC being imprisoned. The imprisonment of PNC members was on preventive grounds and took place especially before public demonstrations. Those imprisoned risked spending up to about nine months in jail, although between three and six months was usual. The higher a person's profile the greater the risk that he would be imprisoned. Lehne added that generally care should be exercised in examining asylum applications in which the application included substantial political grounds for asylum such as membership of the SCP, the two Baa'th parties, the DUP and possibly other parties.

Lehne also mentioned that Sudan's National Security Act had been tightened in March 2001 and again in June 2001. As a result, it was now possible to detain people for up to nine months instead of the previous six months. This was particularly aimed at members and supporters of Hassan al-Turabi's party.

Lehne reported that 23 political parties were now registered in Sudan. There were three Ministers from the DUP in the Government. All had previously been in exile. Lehne stressed that all three

¹ A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country informed the Immigration Service in October 2001 that currently there were approximately 95 people in Sudanese prisons who could be described as political prisoners. This figure included a number of army officers who took part in an attempted coup in 1992. The source explained that there had been a significant reduction in the number of political prisoners in Sudan, given that in the period 1989 to early 1996 there had been more than 3000 political prisoners in Sudanese prisons.

belonged to a minor faction of the DUP led by Zayn al-Abidin el-Hindi (also known as Sharif el-Hindi). This faction of the DUP is also known as DUP-Hindi. The main branch of the DUP, known as DUP-Mirghani, is not in the Government.

Parties which are registered can carry on political activities without prior permission, but those which are not registered have to seek permission to do so. The latter cannot participate in elections. Finally, a number of parties and movements are banned in Sudan. Primarily this is the southern Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A and its factions, along with the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF). Lehne was unsure whether the communist SCP, the two Sudanese Baa'th parties and trade unions were covered by a ban.

Jurkuch Barach, Representative of the SPLM/A in the Middle East and the Gulf, and Akoth Ngot, Chairman of the Cairo Chapter of the SPLM/A, both in Cairo, said that members of the SPLM/A could not show themselves in public in any part of Government-controlled Sudan. If a member of the SPLM/A is detained there is a high risk that he will be tortured or perhaps killed by the authorities. The SPLM/A is regarded by the authorities as a terrorist organisation, and since the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001 the Sudanese Government has included the SPLM/A on its list of terrorist organisations.

Barach and Ngot regarded Sudan as an "Islamic dictatorship" and described the situation of the political opposition as very difficult. Less prominent politicians ("junior politicians") very rarely spoke in public. Those who did so risked being targeted by the authorities. Such persons were under surveillance by the authorities, who tapped their telephone calls, and they were constantly at risk of being arrested.

Asked whether there were inmates in Sudanese prisons and detention cells who could be described as political prisoners, el Mufti explained that right now two cases were under way against prominent members of the Islamic party PNC and the opposition alliance NDA. El Mufti explained that the accusations against the detained members of the PND and NDA only related to criminal offences, and that the accused had free access to defence lawyers. Both cases related to accusations of terrorist activity and according to el Mufti were not political cases.

El Mufti stressed that there was not a single prisoner in Sudan who could be described as a "political prisoner" and added that there was a general amnesty for all opposition people in Sudan including those who had taken part in armed rebellion against the Government, including members of the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF). There were no accusations against members of those groups. El Mufti added that this amnesty had been repeated several times and was still in force.

Asked whether the wanted list kept by the police at Khartoum airport (see section 3) included the names of persons sought for political reasons, el Mufti explained that only civil proceedings could lead to the Sudanese Ministry of Justice including people on that list. He excluded quite categorically the idea that people could feature on the list on political grounds.

Summing up, el Mufti said that there had been a significant improvement in the human rights situation in Sudan recently. Formerly people had been imprisoned on political grounds but this was no longer the case. El Mufti referred to the arrest during the visit by the UN Special Rapporteur to Sudan in February 2000 of a number of people all with connections to the Amal Centre for Rehabilitation of Victims of Physical and Mental Trauma, mentioned earlier. El Mufti said that the arrests were of a political nature. But that same month, i.e. at the end of February 2000, those arrested had been released. El Mufti insisted that this was the last occurrence of politically motivated arrests in Sudan.

An employee of an international humanitarian organisation in Nairobi who worked in southern Sudan, but who was also acquainted with conditions in Khartoum and northern Sudan, described Sudan as to a certain extent being a police state. The Sudanese enjoyed freedom until they exceeded a certain limit, at which point the authorities stepped in. He believed that those who publicly criticised Government policy in the press and who did not have advantageous family connections were at risk of persecution by the Government. He added that the regime was unpredictable and that it was therefore almost impossible to give a categorical opinion of who might be at risk of persecution and targetry by the authorities.

He also explained that the traditional parties in Sudan, i.e. those that had existed there up to the military coup in June 1989, had been completely discredited and had lost their credibility amongst the country's middle classes and educated elite. This was the real tragedy in Sudan and formed the basis for the take-over of power by the armed forces and the Islamists in 1989. The traditional

parties were sectarian and clan-based and had not managed to offer a credible and sustainable alternative to the existing regime in Sudan.

He added that to a large extent the human rights situation in Sudan was determined by the long-running civil war there. He stressed that the conflict was not just a question of religion between the Muslim north and the Christian south, but to a considerable degree was a battle between the central state power and the people in the regions over who should have control of the country's resources. This complicated the human rights situation significantly, amongst other things because ethnic identity could have an influence on a person's security, e.g. in Khartoum. Thus it could be risky for members of the *fur* and *beja* people to speak openly about their political views in Khartoum. It should be noted that both the *fur* and the *beja* people are in conflict with the Government in Khartoum. The source also pointed out that the fact should not be ignored that the SPLA rebel movement was also behind serious human rights violations in Sudan.

The source also observed that the Sudanese do not have the same well-developed networks as for example Somalis. So Sudanese who have gone abroad to seek asylum will normally have travelled by themselves and not, as can often be the case with other refugee groups, with the help of agents or networks. Sudanese generally have a well-founded and real reason for seeking asylum. It was therefore important that Sudanese asylum applications should always be processed individually and in detail.

1.3 Christians, internally displaced persons and ethnic minorities

A well-informed local source in Cairo reported that Sudanese Christians in Khartoum were subject to arbitrary arrests. Even the relatives of those who attracted the attention of the authorities were in danger of arrest.

He explained that besides the units of the security service mentioned above there was also a police force called the Public Order Police (POP). The POP dealt with cases concerning e.g. un-Islamic behaviour, including being unsuitably dressed, the production and sale of alcohol, prostitution, etc. This police force is known to be behind the many raids in the camps around Khartoum for internally displaced refugees from the war zones in southern Sudan.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country told the Immigration Service in October 2001 that there had been a general relaxation of POP's demands regarding dress, including the requirement that women should have their faces covered, be separated from men in public transport and have permission to take part in public meetings. On the whole POP's watch over women had decreased.

The source drew attention to the fact that according to the Sudanese criminal law of 1991, a Muslim converting to another religion could suffer the death penalty. Non-Muslims, however, could convert freely to Islam. In 1998 the Government brought criminal charges against a person from Nuba, Faki Koko, who had converted from Islam to another religion. He was released in 1999 and obtained permission to leave Sudan allegedly because of a need for medical treatment. There was uncertainty about Faki Koko's condition and his whereabouts. The source added that there were only very few cases concerning conversion from Islam to another religion. Most converts were from areas of southern Sudan such as the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile, which had a large Christian population.

The source also described how over the last ten years the Government had destroyed 30 to 50 Christian churches, centres and schools in the slum quarters of Khartoum with bulldozers, allegedly because no official building permits had been granted for them. In reality the Government only seldom granted building permits for plans backed by Christians. On the other hand permits were given freely to, for example, mosques.

The Government confiscated the Catholic Club at the end of 1998. Two churches and a school in a suburb of Khartoum belonging to the Episcopal Church, where 1 400 children were being schooled, were later destroyed by the Government. Five Catholic schools in Khartoum North with a total of 3 800 pupils were meant to be torn down, but the children and their parents protested and opposed the demolition. In August 2001 Government plans emerged to close all Catholic churches, which were providing free elementary education for 48 000 pupils. Most of the pupils came from southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains and lived in the poor slum quarters in the Khartoum area.

Finally the source described the targeting of Christians in connection with a religious meeting organised by the Church authorities in early April 2001. Forty-seven Christians who had gathered at All Saints Cathedral in Khartoum were arrested on 10 April. On 11 October 2001 the detainees were brought before a court but the judge refused to allow their defence lawyer to conduct the case.

The trial lasted less than one hour, and six women and three children were sentenced to 15 and 20 lashes respectively. They were whipped the following day and then released. The remaining detainees were sentenced to 20 lashes each and between seven and twenty days in prison. In February 2001 the police intervened and broke up an Islamic demonstration outside the Coptic church in Khartoum. At the same time Islamic students attacked a display of Christian books at the University of Khartoum. Four Christians and three Muslims were injured on that occasion.

A well-informed local source described the situation in the refugee camps for internally displaced persons in the Khartoum area as generally difficult, although the source found it hard to distinguish between phenomena such as the direct persecution of inhabitants of the camps and what was described as ordinary harassment. It was noted that the inhabitants in the camps only stayed there because they had no other flight alternatives from the civil war in the southern part of the country. It was a deliberate Government policy to direct the flow of refugees from southern Sudan northwards to camps near Khartoum.

The authorities in Khartoum told the delegation that the fact that so many internally displaced persons from the civil war in southern Sudan were in the Khartoum area reflected the fact that the Government was tolerant and accepted all Sudanese citizens whatever their ethnic or religious background.

An employee of an international humanitarian organisation in Nairobi confirmed that conditions in the camps for internally displaced south Sudanese in the Khartoum area were difficult. Some of the inhabitants of the camps had been moved to much worse camps far-removed from the capital and thus from sanitary facilities, medical assistance, educational facilities and opportunities to earn money, etc., which had a major effect on their daily lives. The source explained that for Sudanese in general the question of good educational facilities was fundamental. The lack of educational facilities could make families desperate. In general south Sudanese had very few opportunities to earn a living in northern Sudan. There was religious discrimination and many women were dependent on the income they could receive from the production of alcohol, which was illegal in northern Sudan. Religious discrimination had to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, as individual persecution of Christian Sudanese was not normal. This was confirmed by a humanitarian NGO in Nairobi.

Regarding the question of religious freedom in Sudan, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan informed the UN General Assembly in early November 2001 that it was not true, as some Christian fundamentalists claimed, that a war of religious persecution was taking place in Sudan. There were grounds for concern about restrictions on religious freedom, discrimination and the growing (Islamic) dominance in the education system and civil life, but there was no systematic oppression of the Christian churches.¹

Idrees Ishag described how members of the ethnic minorities in Sudan could also be at risk of attack and persecution by the authorities. He himself, who came from Darfur and had been severely tortured, pointed out that the combination of belonging to an ethnic minority and at the same time having a high political profile could have very serious implications. In Darfur in western Sudan lived the *fur* people, who are of non-Arabic origin. As recently as 25 or 27 July 2001 three politicians from Darfur – Idrees Mohammed Ahmed, Adballa Ibrahim and Mohammed Ibrahim – had been arrested by the authorities in Khartoum, as they were trying to spread information about the Government waging ethnic war against the *fur* population in Darfur. Idrees Ishag described the three detainees as political prisoners. All had been subjected to serious violence in the form of knife wounds, hanging, cigarette burns, electric shocks, etc.

A well-informed local source in Cairo confirmed that simultaneously belonging to an ethnic minority and participating in opposition political or religious activities could lead to serious difficulties with the authorities. There were numerous reports showing that the Government deliberately targeted those from southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, the *beja* people and non-Arab minorities from Darfur. Idrees Ishag particularly mentioned the *fur*, *zaghawa*, *masalit* and *tama*, but explained that the problem really concerned all non-Arab tribes in Darfur. These non-Arab tribes had been victims of expulsions by the authorities. There were about 40 tribes in Darfur of which 28 were non-Arab. Homes were being burned down, particularly in western and northern Darfur. The source could confirm that the Sudanese armed forces and its militia had attacked civilians in Darfur. Some sections of the *fur* people were allied to the Government but the majority were against it.

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), SUDAN: IRIN Focus on human rights,

Idrees Ishag also stated that he knew that Sudanese from the ethnic minorities, e.g. persons from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and other places, could have difficulties accounting for their grounds for asylum in a convincing manner. Many *fur* who had now fled Darfur had little or no education and were therefore often unable to explain their situation in a convincing manner. There would be a risk that such people would neglect to give information about the attacks they had suffered and would therefore find it difficult to achieve protection or asylum abroad.

A well-informed local source in Cairo commented that members of the ethnic minorities in Sudan were often regarded as second-class citizens and had been the victims of war crimes and other serious human rights violations committed by the warring parties in the conflict. Human Rights Watch (HRW), SVTG and SHRO and many others have repeatedly reported violence against these groups in Sudan. This could involve, e.g. the bombardment of villages, attacks by the armed forces or militia, looting, abductions and the torching of villages. These groups, which in many cases are not Muslims, have also been the targets of Arabisation efforts which have contributed to the destruction of their own cultures. Many local leaders from the minority population groups have helped create or have joined organisations connected to the opposition NDA.

14 November 2001.

2. Conscription

2.1 *Conscription and recruitment procedures*

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile 2001, Sudan, the growing scale of fighting in Sudan since 1996 has forced the Sudanese army to make increasing efforts to recruit soldiers, particularly amongst university students. However, this has proved especially unpopular, and there are frequent reports of desertions. Besides the regular Sudanese army the National Congress (NC) party has its own military branch called the Popular Defence Forces (PDF). Despite the fact that the PDF is officially a political fighting force, PDF forces are also deployed at the front in the fighting against the rebels. The EIU states that in the period 2000 to 2001 there were approximately 15 000 active soldiers in the PDF and 85 000 reservists. By way of comparison the ordinary state National Army consists of approximately 100 000 soldiers, of which 20 000 are conscripted.¹

A source in an international humanitarian organisation in Khartoum stated that all those who had completed secondary school were meant to perform Compulsory National Service (CNS). This happened by means of arbitrary recruitment in the form of "round-ups" in the towns, in which military personnel in civilian dress even stopped cars and buses. The authorities forced those passengers who were believed to be the right age for conscription and who could not prove that they had in fact already performed their military service to go with them to military training camps. Many of those who were recruited did not even have an opportunity to contact their parents or relatives to inform them of what had happened. It was particularly those from the more vulnerable social groups who were at risk of being recruited in this manner.

The source also pointed out that the rules on military recruitment were not observed, which meant that even those who were not covered by the obligation to perform military service risked being recruited. Thus there were examples of even foreigners and people older or younger than stated in the rules being forcibly recruited. The source added that any recruit risked being sent on active

¹ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2001, Sudan, London 2001, p. 14.

service in Sudan.

A Sudanese human rights organisation in Cairo observed that the Government wanted to be able to control the country's intellectuals, including the students at Sudanese universities. Conscription and the military training camps were ideal for this purpose, as these institutions made it possible to "break" the young students, whether they were Christians or Muslims. The time spent at these training camps could be a very offensive experience for Christian students since the training including a large element of Islamisation. It was possible that this had been relaxed slightly in recent times, but if so this was simply because of the Government's desire to please the outside world. In the source's opinion this was purely a question of window-dressing.

Idrees Ishag explained that "southerners", which usually meant internally displaced Christians, were not being recruited to the same extent as before, as there was a great risk that they would desert and go over to the SPLA as soon as they had an opportunity to do so. Ishag added that some younger *fur* had fled to northern Sudan, including Khartoum. Like many others, they and other ethnic minorities also risked being forcibly recruited into the armed forces. Idrees Ishag mentioned the *zagawa*, *masalet* and *nuba* in this context. Those who had been forcibly recruited were taken to training camps and trained for eight to ten weeks, and then sent to the front in southern Sudan. These recruits were poorly trained and large numbers of them therefore died in the fighting. This had meant that many tried to flee the country, but this could only be achieved by obtaining a passport illegally. Such people could not get passports through official channels. Idrees Ishag explained that this was because the authorities wanted to use these refugees as servants or soldiers in the army.

A well-informed local source in Cairo told us the following about conscription in Sudan:

There are three possible ways of performing military service in Sudan. Besides the regular Sudanese Army, there is also conscription into CNS and the PDF.

All those between the ages of 18 and 33 are obliged to perform CNS. The usual period of service is 24 months. Military service became obligatory for all state employees in 1994/95. The period of service is reduced to one year's service plus two months of training for "university graduates", and is 18 months for those who have completed secondary school, who are known as "university

students". The CNS force has grown as the regular Sudan Army has shrunk. The same source reported that women were now also being recruited for CNS. The 1992 National Service Act is attached as Annex 4.

The PDF, which has existed since 1989, is an Islamic jihad unit in which the recruits normally undergo a 45-day training period besides the period of service which is of between 12 and 18 months. Students who go into the PDF before entering further education have to serve 12 months, while those who have not yet been accepted for further education or who have not completed secondary school have to serve for 18 months. State employees and those working in state-owned companies have to undergo a 45-day training programme. In practice they are all called up for subsequent shorter periods of service in the PDF. The source added that within the PDF is a special unit called the oil unit, which he described as an elite unit consisting of Islamic jihad fighters.

Under the 1989 Popular Defence Forces Act (attached as Annex 5), PDF recruits must be at least 16 years old and Sudanese citizens. In 1992 service in the PDF became obligatory for all students, both male and female. Completion of service was a precondition for entering further education. The above source most strenuously denied rumours that the PDF had ceased to exist. The PDF still existed and was controlled by the Sudanese army. The PDF training contained a considerable element of Islamisation, and many Christian students therefore had serious problems when they were recruited to the PDF. The source added that round-ups still took place for recruitment to the PDF. This form of forcible recruitment occurred especially when there was an escalation in the fighting in Sudan. The source stressed that this was still the reality in Sudan nowadays. Students in particular were recruited into the PDF whereas it was largely state employees who were recruited for CNS.

Finally, the source insisted that there had been no essential changes to the Government's recruitment practices between 1995 and the present day. He denied most strongly that there had been any significant scaling down of forced recruitment by the Government. He observed that it was business as usual and had heard no rumours that previous recruitment practice had been stopped or restricted.

Asked whether the existence of the Murahilin militia and other Government-backed militias had limited the Government's need to carry out forced recruitment to the armed forces, the above source replied that the Murahilin militia, which consisted of Arab tribes, had existed for the last twenty years. Therefore nothing had changed. Jurkuch Baroch and Akoth Ngot confirmed that the Murahilin militia had been established as long ago as 1984/1985. The existence of those militia in Sudan had not meant that the need for ordinary soldiers had been reduced. They added that the civil war had become more intense. Just at present (November 2001) there was an intensification of military activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Government troops were on the offensive, and thus their losses were also most severe. The two sources explained that the heaviest losses were often incurred by the side carrying out an offensive. Government troops in Bahr-el-Ghazal included PDF and CNS soldiers.

El Mufti explained that there were three forms of military service in Government-controlled Sudan. Firstly, there were the regular armed forces, the Sudanese National Army. This consisted entirely of volunteers. Then there was the PDF, which was controlled and supported by the National Army. El Mufti claimed that the PDF also consisted entirely of volunteers. The third form of military service was CNS. Recruitment for CNS was annual and el Mufti explained that it was then that the round-ups took place, i.e. people were forcibly recruited from the streets against their will. El Mufti said that about two months ago all "secondary school graduates" had been called up and the recruits were going through a 2-month training programme. All the recruits were over 18 years of age.

El Mufti stressed that only volunteers were recruited into the National Army and the PDF. The PDF was controlled and supported by the Army. CNS applied to all over the age of 18. It was in connection with enlistment for CNS that forcible recruitment in the form of round-ups had taken place. However, it had been officially announced in the Sudanese press a few days before the delegation's visit to Khartoum that no-one would be sent into battle against his will any more, and that all recruits had therefore been sent home from the training camps. El Mufti explained that only volunteer soldiers in the army and the PDF were sent on active service to the front. He added that the press announcement had been greeted with great relief by families in Khartoum and the rest of Sudan who had children of conscript age. He was well aware of the fear many families had felt that their children might be recruited for war service and said that he himself had felt great relief at the announcement.

Mario Muor Muor, Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Bahr el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA), which has offices in Nairobi, Kenya and in Mapal, Bahr el-Ghazal, Sudan, commented on the above information from el Mufti in Khartoum. Muor Muor believed that only the future would show whether the Government would stand by its announcement, of which he had otherwise not heard. Possibly this was a Government concession to the UP, which had wanted to stop forced recruitment. There could also be tactical military considerations behind the announcement, as the Government now had the Murahilin militia and more advanced military equipment at its disposal. Muor Muor thought that the announcement was merely another attempt to improve the government's reputation just at present and could therefore suddenly be changed. A well-informed local source in Cairo said in November 2001 that it was not aware of the Sudanese Government publishing this announcement.

Jurkuch Barach and Akoth Ngot said that people between the ages of about 18 and 30 were normally recruited to both the PDF and CNS. There were periods in which nearly all men in that age group were recruited. Nowadays it was even possible for people outside that age group to be recruited. Women were also recruited into the PDF but only as volunteers, and they were not sent on active service to the front. There were women's battalions which stayed behind the front lines where recruits worked as nurses, etc.

Barach and Ngot said that there were numerous examples of forced recruitment to the PDF and for CNS. Recruitment was still taking place on the streets in Sudan. This happened at checkpoints, in people's homes, in schools and in public places, etc. Those who had been recruited were transported to military training camps for 30 to 35 days of training. Barach and Ngot described this training as insufficient, and therefore the recruits were in great danger when they were subsequently sent to the front to fight the rebels. The SPLA had taken many prisoners of war and most of these had claimed to have been forcibly recruited and sent to fight against their will.

The forced aspect was generally that these recruits could not receive their secondary school certificates until they had performed military service. The certificate was essential to obtain a place for further education or at university. The certificate was issued only when a student had performed military service for at least one year. Barach and Ngot added that there was, however, some possibility of obtaining an examination certificate by means of bribery. Conditions in the military

training camps were very difficult and there had been a number of cases of recruits fleeing from them.

Even after military service had been performed there were those who were called up a second time. This could happen whenever the armed forces believed that it needed further recruitment. Anyone in the age range mentioned above was at risk of being recruited whatever their religious, geographic or ethnic origin. Both southern and northern Sudanese were recruited.

A well-informed local source in Cairo explained that besides the recruitment of northern Sudanese for the regular Sudan Army there was also significant recruitment of internally displaced men from the war zones in Sudan. They were often recruited as volunteers as it was a means for them to support themselves in Sudan.

The various military units in Sudan were all used to carry out Islamisation of the population. This particularly applied to the PDF and the various militia forces controlled by the Government. One result of this Islamisation was that even Christian Sudanese were forced against their will actively to participate on behalf of the Government in what was described as a jihad against their co-religionists in the country. The army and the other military forces in Sudan were all under the political control of the Government.

Waltmans-Molier confirmed that recruitment to the armed forces by means of round-ups of young Sudanese in Khartoum was still taking place. However, this did not happen as frequently as in the past. Formally the age for performing military service was 18 to 33 but in reality boys down to the age of 14 were taken on the streets of Khartoum and put on buses to the training camps. If a person could not immediately prove that he had served his CNS he would be taken along to a military training camp. Waltmans-Molier had herself seen boys be taken and driven away in broad daylight. These round-ups almost always took place on a Saturday morning and on these occasions the Netherlands Embassy had warned its own staff against leaving the Embassy area. Round-ups were carried out by military staff in civilian clothes who forced those detained into waiting buses which took them to the military training camps. Waltmans-Molier did not know whether these camps were the official training camps for those performing CNS.

Waltmans-Molier added that there probably was no longer forced recruitment to the PDF.

Recruitment to the PDF began in 1989 and ended in 1997. Now there was only recruitment for CNS, as the PDF and CNS were merged in 1997. However, Waltmans-Molier would not exclude the possibility that there might still be some recruitment to PDF elite forces, but she did not have any further information about this. There were still PDF forces fighting at the front in the civil war but officially the authorities would probably deny that there were still PDF forces in Sudan. Waltmans-Molier told us that secondary school students had to serve 18 months' CNS. Students at universities and higher educational institutions had to serve for 12 months, and all others had to serve for 24 months. To be accepted by a university or other higher educational institution everyone had to undergo a 45-day training period.

Waltmans-Molier explained that the recruitment of university students formally took place by the Sudanese Ministry for Education giving the names of those students who had finished their education to the military authorities. They then had to perform 12 months, military service.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country informed us in October 2001 that, since Sudan had compulsory military service for all those of the appropriate age, there was in principle no opportunity for Sudanese to refuse to perform such service. However, there had been a significant fall in the scale of arbitrary forced recruitment of young men on the streets. For one reason or another there seemed to be a constant stream of Sudanese who were willing to be recruited to the army in the full knowledge that they would end up fighting in the civil war in southern Sudan or elsewhere in the country.

A representative of an international humanitarian organisation in Khartoum claimed that to some extent the civil war was being fought by agents for the warring parties. On the Government side a number of ethnic groups, largely nomadic Arab tribes, were fighting, who were together known as the Murahilin i.e. "those who travel around". These groups consisted amongst others of the *baggara*, *fartit*, *zaghawa* and *misariya*.

Waltmans-Molier said that many people were fighting as volunteers on the Government's side, including the Murahilin militia, but she dismissed the claim that the great majority of those actively fighting on the Government's side were tribals or belonged to clan-based militia. She described this as grossly exaggerated.

A worker for an international humanitarian organisation in Nairobi explained that there was antagonism between the Government and the Sudanese middle classes. The Government's recruitment practice and the Islamisation of education had clearly impoverished the whole level of education in Sudan, which had caused frustration particularly amongst the middle classes. He believed that if it could be confirmed that the Government had indeed announced in the press (as claimed by Ahmed el Mufti in Khartoum) that it would no longer recruit to the armed forces by means of round-ups or send recruits to the front against their will, then this was more because of the Government's need for a new image than because of any genuine intention. A Government announcement in the press should not be taken for anything other than a declaration of intent. He added that it should still be seen as a fully legitimate and understandable ground for Sudanese asylum applicants to cite their fear of being forcibly recruited and sent to the front. This was precisely one of the compelling reasons for so many Sudanese seeking asylum abroad. Jurkuch Barach and Akoth Ngot confirmed this point.

However, the above source was also certain that the straitened economic circumstances in Sudan contributed to Sudanese seeking to leave the country. Until recently, forced recruitment had been the chief problem for many Sudanese families, as it had disturbed or destroyed their children's educational opportunities. Then there were the very poor conditions in the military training camps and the risk of being sent to the front and into battle. In practice the parents of those who had been forcibly recruited were not informed of their children's' fate. Many parents were therefore particularly seriously concerned for their children's' futures as it was a requirement that they should perform military service in order to get an education. This applied whether the family was of south Sudanese or north Sudanese origin.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country said 73 of 231 Christian secondary school pupils who had recently been recruited for CNS in Khartoum had been denied the chance to continue their compulsory military service. Some of them had also been the victims of assaults and harassment during their training. The source explained that you had to complete your compulsory military service to be accepted for university studies or to achieve promotion as a public employee. As well as the Sudanese Government, the rebel movement SPLA has been criticised for human rights violations in Sudan. The SPLA has particularly been criticised for recruiting child soldiers, i.e. children under the age of 18, who have been used in fighting between the SPLA and

Government troops. Jurkuch Barach and Akoth Ngot admitted that there had been human rights violations in SPLA-controlled areas from time to time, but insisted that these violations had taken place on an individual basis, i.e. that it had been particular individuals and not the SPLA which had been behind such violations. On the question of the recruitment of child soldiers, Barach and Ngot explained that this was because of the nature of the civil war in Sudan. When the Murahilin militia attacked villages in Sudan it was normal for many civilians to be killed, driven away or abducted. Many children were effectively orphaned as a result. These refugee children were vulnerable and often had no other means of survival than to let themselves be recruited into the rebel forces where they could get food and some degree of protection. This was how the phenomenon of child soldiers had arisen. Often these children were kept behind the front lines and away from the actual fighting, but some insisted on being proper soldiers and being trained in the use of weapons. The alternative for many of these children would be either to be killed by the Government militia or to be abducted as slaves. Barach and Ngot stressed that it was no longer SPLA policy to recruit child soldiers but admitted that it could be difficult to live up to this as many minors wanted to possess a weapon, whether a spear or a gun. They added that many of these children became adult much earlier than was the case in the rich parts of the world, and that they were brought up to contribute actively to the family's protection long before they reached the age of 18.

A humanitarian NGO in Nairobi (B) stated that it was working with the SPLA/M and the Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF) on the release and demobilisation of child soldiers in Sudan. The SPLA/M and SPDF had admitted that there were child soldiers in their ranks, but in practice the movements had not shown any great desire to solve the problem. The NGO reported regularly on the use of child soldiers, but there was a serious problem in that there was no way of dealing with the phenomenon in purely legal terms. There was no means of punishing those who forcibly recruited or abducted children. There was no legal system to solve the problem. Customary law normally applied only in cases involving murder, but not in cases concerning the recruitment of children for military tasks. Some prisoners of war were children but their position was subject to customary law, which generally meant that they would be exchanged soon after they had been captured. Usually, captured child soldiers were treated relatively well, because they were children. However, this only applied to the internal fighting between tribes in southern Sudan.

The source observed that child soldiers had not necessarily been forcibly recruited. Many were volunteers and did usually not take part directly in battle but functioned as bearers and did whatever

work came up for the more regular soldiers. It was usually the very poor security and humanitarian situation which made children become soldiers. The dissolution of families, separation of children and parents and a lack of food made many children susceptible to being recruited. Traditional structures had been disturbed by the civil war and that had weakened traditional society in southern Sudan.

2.2 The risk of conscripts being sent into active war service against their will

On this point, Waltmans-Molier stated that any conscript in Sudan was at risk of being sent to the front.

Lehne could not dismiss the possibility that people were sent into active war service against their will. However, it was particularly southern Sudanese who were sent south into the war zones. Two representatives of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in Nairobi said that Sudanese Government troop involvement in direct fighting against rebel forces in southern Sudan was known and could be documented. They had just seen film made by a former Government soldier of action between Government troops and rebel forces. The film had fallen into the hands of the SPLA/M.

NSCC added that the majority of the Government soldiers who had been taken as prisoners of war by the SPLA were of African, i.e. south Sudanese, origin. These soldiers were generally young men who because of their difficult circumstances had allowed themselves to be recruited into the Government army. There were many examples of these recruits being sent to war zones in Sudan without the military authorities informing them where in the country they were being deployed. NSCC said that in the past a large number of Government soldiers had been taken prisoner in Yei and New Khush. A large number of these were of north Sudanese, i.e. Arab, origin, and there were more than a hundred of them. These war prisoners were typically quite young men from the age of 15 and up. NSCC representatives had visited prisoners of war in southern Sudan as recently as May to June 2001.

The NSCC was also aware of round-ups in Khartoum, in which young Sudanese were taken off the streets and sent directly to military training camps. This had happened in both May and June 2001.

A representative of a humanitarian organisation in Nairobi (A), which was operating in Bahr el-Ghazal in the north-west and in Equatoria, and which also had an office in Khartoum, explained that the organisation had a comprehensive network in Sudan and had been able to document numerous cases of Government soldiers being forcibly recruited and sent into battle against their will. This was still the situation, and the organisation received daily reports of what was happening on the spot in Sudan. He stressed that this information was not based on theories or speculation but on facts collected on the spot in Sudan. He insisted that it was still the reality now that people were being forcibly recruited and sent into active war service against their will. The source had himself visited prisoners of war in the towns of Yei, New Khush and Pajajok in southern Sudan in 1998. The prisoners were very young, down to 15 years of age or so. The prisoners all spoke Arabic and judging by their appearance were of Arab origin. They had explained that they were students who had finished secondary school. After being recruited into the armed forces they suddenly found themselves in Juba. From there they were at once sent on to Rejaf near Juba and to Mogiri where they were trained for one or two months. Then they were sent directly to the war zone. The prisoners had been taken by the SPLA in Liria. The source said that the prisoners were terrified when he interviewed them in the town of Mogore.

The source stressed that it was nonsense to claim that there was hardly any risk of students and others being forcibly recruited and sent on war service against their will in Sudan. During a visit to the front line the representative and colleagues from his organisation had seen many young soldiers, particularly of south Sudanese origin, and officers of north Sudanese origin in military units belonging to the Government. Many of these young soldiers had been forced into service. He described an example of this in his own family.

He explained that the regular Government army consisted of a relatively smaller force whereas the PDF forces were much bigger. The PDF was where the forced recruits were to be found. The PDF consisted partly of volunteer mujahedin forces, recruited students and others from northern Sudan. The mujahedin were a voluntary Islamic elite force consisting of religious jihad fighters. The representative was convinced that forced recruitment was still taking place, i.e. young men were being rounded up for the PDF, particularly amongst students in northern Sudan. Forced recruitment was always stepped up when the rebel movement SPLA had had successes in the war. The military training recruits received was insufficient and they were sent straight into battle at

short notice. Girls were also recruited for the PDF but they worked in health and social care and therefore were not on active war service at the front. Both girls and boys were indoctrinated in the name of Islam during their service in the PDF. The representative said that his own son had been forced to undergo a training session in the desert in northern Sudan, where he had been exposed to wholesale religious indoctrination. The representative described this religious indoctrination as out-and-out brainwashing. Many died in the training camp; the recruits received little food, of bad quality, and sanitary conditions were very poor, which led to serious illnesses and deaths amongst the recruits.

The representative stressed that forced recruitment to the PDF was still taking place, and that those recruited were forced to participate in active war service against their will. As a further example that this was still happening, the representative mentioned that when the town of Gogriol north of Wau fell to the SPLA on 24 April 2000 a total of 58 Government soldiers were taken prisoner by the SPLA. All were PDF soldiers. The representative's organisation protected the prisoners and spoke to them. Most were of Arab origin from northern Sudan. Some had deserted to the SPLA themselves, but others had been taken as prisoners of war. Nearly all said that they had been forcibly recruited and sent into battle against their will. They also explained that they had been recruited by the authorities at checkpoints and schools, etc. in Khartoum.

The representative explained that schools in Khartoum close in April for the summer months, and that the university term started in September. The recruitment of young people into the PDF therefore usually happened in April and May, when the schools were closed. Emergency recruitment also took place. In practice this could happen at any time, for example when advances by the SPLA and the other rebel groups were announced.

The representative entirely rejected claims that the civil war in Sudan was mostly just being fought by agents, i.e. members of various tribes fighting on behalf of the Government or the rebels. There were still many recruits in the Government forces who were being forced to fight against their will.

Muor Muor explained that the civil war in Sudan was being complicated by the fact that many southern Sudanese were being forced into the conflict on the Government's side. Thus they came to fight their own "brothers" and to be involved in the jihad. Force and indoctrination were thus decisive elements of the mobilisation. In addition, captured southern Sudanese became slaves and

some southern Sudanese were abducted and forced into the Government army. Finally, there was the Murahilin militia, which was backed by the Government. The establishment of the Murahilin and other Government-controlled militias and the weakening of the SPLA had further complicated the war. The regular army had almost ceased to exist, and the role of the PDF and the Murahilin militia had therefore become decisive. The PDF consisted largely of persons who had just been recruited on the streets of Khartoum and had only been through a three-month training programme. Muor Muor stressed that the most serious problem in the war was that many secondary school pupils were forcibly recruited into the armed forces. The SPLA had taken many prisoners of war who were indeed secondary school pupils. Many of these had been forced to the war theatres in southern Sudan.

Muor Muor observed that forced recruitment had been a normal occurrence between 1991 and 1996 but that since then the Government had to some extent relied on the Murahilin and other militias, largely consisting of people from southern Sudan, i.e. militias cooperating with the Government army. Forced recruitment still took place but to a lesser extent than before. There were two factors to explain this:

- The production of oil had increased the Government's military capability. The war had been modernised as the Government had become able to buy technologically advanced weaponry. China, Iraq and Iran were selling modern weapons to the Government. The arms trade with China was based on a barter system of oil for weapons. The oil was financing the war and contributing to its continuation.
- The establishment of the Murahilin and other militias had reduced the Government's need to recruit by force to the PDF and other military units.

However, he stressed that forced recruitment was still taking place, and that those who had been forcibly recruited were being sent on active war service. This was generally known, but there were also those who volunteered for military service. On several occasions BYDA had interviewed prisoners of war taken by the rebel forces. Many claimed that they had been forced to fight against their will. Muor Muor said that he personally had met prisoners of war who had given this explanation but added that naturally it was obvious that a prisoner of war would claim to have been forced to fight. Muor Muor was nevertheless convinced that it was beyond doubt that many of the

prisoners of war really had been sent into battle against their will. Forced recruitment was a double-edged sword, and the Government would like to avoid the need to recruit soldiers by force. There was a greater risk that soldiers who had been recruited against their will would desert and go over to the rebels.

Nonetheless, the extent of forced recruitment had clearly fallen in recent years, not least because to some extent the Government was using its income from oil to get agents (Government-backed militia) to fight on its behalf.

Muor Muor cited several reasons why Sudanese from northern Sudan were fleeing abroad:

- to avoid forced recruitment and military service
- for fear of being tortured or otherwise abused if they fell into Government custody
- generally poor living conditions brought about by the Islamic regime.

In southern Sudan people fled particularly for the following reasons:

- the bombing and burning down of villages, and the expulsion of the population
- poor humanitarian conditions and a lack of opportunities to provide for themselves.

Jurkuch Barach and Akoth Ngot believed that the armed forces in Sudan were far from being able to recruit enough volunteer soldiers and that therefore forced recruitment to the PDF and for CNS was still taking place. The Government's oil income did not mean that it had been able to make up for the low number of volunteer soldiers by buying more advanced weapons. The need for recruits to the armed forces had not decreased as a result of the oil revenues and the acquisition of modern weapons. In 1999 President el-Beshir had announced that the Government would soon be able to produce its own weapons. Barach and Ngot explained that Sudan did now have its own arms factories but added that the Government also bought modern weapons, particularly from China. International arms dealers in Russia and Ukraine also sold arms to Sudan.

Adele Sowinska, Deputy Director of the Southern Sudan Program of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Nairobi, said that the main conflict between rebels and Government troops

took place in southern and eastern Sudan. She claimed that there was a tendency to ignore the fact that the civil war in Sudan was not just a north-south conflict. Clashes in eastern Sudan between Government troops and armed groups under the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) were still occurring, particularly in areas around the town of Kassala.

Sowinska explained that the Beja Congress (BC), which was linked to the opposition NDA and was based amongst the Beja people of north-eastern Sudan, was still fighting Government troops in eastern Sudan. However, Johannes Lehne told the delegation that his information was that the BC had given up the armed struggle against the Government. This was confirmed by a well-informed local source in Cairo, who denied that the BC was fighting Government troops in Sudan. The BC did not have an armed section and did not possess weapons. However, he did say that the rebel group Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) which had its base in Ethiopia and in areas near the town of Kassala in eastern Sudan, was one of the militarily strongest rebel groups in that part of the country. The SAF had links with the opposition party Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFSA), which was also a member of the NDA.

Sowinska had also received reports of forcible recruitment in both Khartoum and other parts of northern Sudan. These suggested that it was especially internally displaced persons and others from southern Sudan who were forcibly recruited or allowed themselves to be recruited into the Government forces. She knew of cases where parents had sent their children to school but the children had been forcibly recruited en route, taken to training camps and sent on to serve at the front without their parents being informed. However, she could not document young Sudanese from northern Sudan, i.e. who were of Arab origin, including students from Khartoum, also being forcibly recruited and sent to the front against their will. She had, however, heard of soldiers in the Government army being forced to fight against their will, and that sometimes they deserted to the rebels. To sum up, Sowinska could not document that there were soldiers of north Sudanese origin fighting against their will at the fronts, but could confirm that forced recruitment was still taking place in northern Sudan. Sowinska was therefore surprised by the information received from Ahmed el Mufti in Khartoum that that Government had announced in the press that forced recruitment to the armed forces would no longer take place and that no-one would be sent on active war service against his will.

A humanitarian NGO in Nairobi (B) had heard rumours that the Government was using "external

forces" in the civil war, i.e. soldiers from Afghanistan and certain Arab countries, as well as soldiers from southern Sudan and Uganda, including rebels from the notorious Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA). By these means the Government was playing on ethnic rivalries in the war zones. The source was also aware that the Government-backed Murahilin militia carried out forced recruitment and that these militia took southern Sudanese prisoner and used them as slaves. The military task of the Murahilin militia was to carry out the first violent attacks on the villages while the Government troops fought the more conventional battles against rebel forces for the control of particular areas. A great number of sources described the Murahilin militia as being behind some of the most serious and gruesome human rights violations in the war zones in Sudan.

2.3 Desertion and draft evasion

The UNHCR in Cairo explained that its practice on asylum in relation to desertion and draft evasion in Sudan was based on the UNHCR's *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status*. The UNHCR referred particularly to paragraph 170 of the Handbook. Paragraphs 170 to 172 read as follows:

"There are, however, also cases where the necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim to refugee status, i.e. when a person can show that the performance of military service would have required his participation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral conviction, or to valid reasons of conscience".

"Not every conviction, genuine though it may be, will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or draft-evasion. It is not enough for a person to be in disagreement with his government regarding the political justification for a particular military action. Where, however, the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution".

"Refusal to perform military service may also be based on religious convictions. If an applicant is able to show that his religious convictions are genuine, and that such convictions are not taken into

account by the authorities of his country in requiring him to perform military service, he may be able to establish a claim to refugee status. Such a claim would, of course, be supported by any additional indications that the applicant or his family may have encountered difficulties due to their religious convictions".¹

A well-informed local source in Cairo said that deserters were not normally punished with imprisonment. If a deserter was caught he would be sent to the front under genuine threat of harassment and under close supervision. Otherwise the sentence for desertion was three years, but there had been very few examples of deserters being sentenced to three years in prison.

The source also explained that a person's ability to avoid military service in Sudan would depend very much on his and his family's connections to the regime, and the social and economic position of his family in Sudan. Those who had good connections to the regime stood a much better chance of ensuring that they were not posted to the less attractive parts of the war zones. On the other hand, those without such connections were at great risk of being posted to battle areas. The source denied rumours that, whatever their personal connections to the regime, it was usual for people to be able to bribe their way out of compulsory military service.

Jurkuch Barach and Akoth Ngot believed that a person's ability to avoid military service depended entirely on the connections he and not least his family might have with Government circles in Sudan. Sons of Ministers, of prominent or wealthy families or the sons of families with other close connections to the Government would generally all be able to avoid military service. It was stressed that these forms of connection with Government circles did not necessarily have to be of a political nature. Finally, there was some possibility simply to bribe one's way out of performing military service. This was especially because state employees in general were very badly paid and could therefore be open to bribery.

Barach and Ngot confirmed that deserters were not usually imprisoned but were often sent directly to the front under close supervision. Deserters risked being subjected to serious humiliation and

¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Reedited. Geneva, January 1992, p. 40. See also paragraphs 168 to 169 of the Handbook.

could be at great risk of being pushed into the front line. Many young Sudanese therefore fled to Egypt or to one of the Gulf States.

Waltmans-Molier confirmed this information regarding the possibilities of bribing one's way out of military service but added that southern Sudanese did not have such opportunities. It was only north Sudanese with good connections to the Government, or those who belonged to prominent and wealthy families, who did not necessarily have to possess any form of political influence, who were able to bribe their way out of performing military service.

A source in an international humanitarian organisation in Khartoum believed that family relationships had more effect on the chance of avoiding compulsory military service than the ability to bribe one's way out of it. A hundred US dollars meant less than the right family connections.

Muor Muor believed that only those with good connections with the Sudanese Government were able to avoid military service.

Lehne said that compulsory military service covered both men and women. Until recently it had been normal practice to carry out round-ups of students and others and send them straight to training camps. It was also common knowledge that in such situations some parents of those who had been forcibly recruited had been able to buy their children out of military service.

The penalty for avoiding military service was between two and three years in prison. In practice the military authorities did not insist on such sentences and those who wanted to evade military service did therefore have some opportunity to do so.

Lehne believed that only a few people were able to bribe their way out of military service. The price could be between 20 000 and 50 000 dinars.¹ However, he was aware of only two examples of this happening.

A representative of a humanitarian NGO in Nairobi (A) believed that there was some opportunity to evade military service but described this as difficult. The price to bribe one's way out of military service could be between USD 50 and 100. An "exemption certificate" proved exemption from

¹ In 1999 the Sudanese pound (S£) was replaced by the dinar (SD). In the first half of 2001 the average official exchange rate was SD 255 to 260 for USD 1 (Economist Intelligence Unit

service. This certificate could be bought by bribery but the source believed that this would be difficult. He only knew of one example of a person succeeding in doing so. He added that for e.g. doctors, engineers, teachers and others the armed forces believed they needed, it would be nearly impossible to bribe one's way out of military service, i.e. to get an exemption certificate.

El Mufti was not aware of cases of deserters or draft evaders being punished for their actions. If the authorities caught such people they would simply demand that they returned to service.

A Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country observed that nearly all those who were children of the Sudanese middle classes would be able to avoid military service. This applied particularly to families which had good connections with Government circles and the military authorities. Many of these would also be able to bribe or buy their way out of military service. The source believed that almost none of the Sudanese men who sought asylum in Europe and who cited as grounds for seeking asylum their fear of having to perform military service were actually at risk of having to perform military service against their will. He described a large proportion of the young Sudanese men who sought asylum in western Europe as the children of the middle classes.

3. Conditions for entry and exit

3.1 Entry to Sudan

Abdulbagi Albushra Abdulhay, Major General, Director of Passport and Immigration, General Administration, Khartoum, denied that Sudanese citizens who had stayed abroad for some time would be arrested or questioned by the authorities on their return home. He said that no Sudanese would be questioned about his circumstances while abroad, however long he had been away, and whether he had been in Western Europe, the USA or other countries, with the exception of Israel. If a person had been in Israel he would be questioned.

He also explained that Sudanese who worked abroad were obliged to pay tax on their foreign income either at a Sudanese Embassy or to the tax authorities in Sudan. Abdulhay said that no Sudanese had been arrested or even questioned on their return from abroad unless they had some unresolved business with the Sudanese tax authorities or were suspected of previous criminal activities in Sudan.

Abdulhay explained that the airport police at Khartoum airport had a register of all wanted persons. The airport police showed these lists when the delegation visited the airport. The lists contain information about approximately 1700 Sudanese citizens who are wanted by the authorities. The lists are drawn up manually and there is no wanted persons database. Abdulhay also said that any foreigner could enter Sudan freely. Even former militant members of the opposition who had fought against the Government could enter without having problems with the authorities. He added that there was an amnesty for such people in Sudan.

Anyone entering the country who appears on the list and is identified by the authorities will immediately be arrested and handed over to the Detective Police/Central Intelligence Department (CID) at the airport, which after further investigations may hand him over to the security service. A source at the airport police said that this happened three or four times a month. However, the head of the CID, Colonel Emad Kalafalla M. Khier, said that five or six people were handed over every day. This figure included those travelling on false passports.

Waltmans-Molier said that the Netherlands Embassy did not follow up any deportations of rejected asylum applicants from the Netherlands. There was no form of monitoring and the Embassy therefore did not know what subsequently happened to those who had been returned. The Embassy was not informed in advance by the Netherlands authorities about forthcoming deportations, nor was it told if these were happening with or without a Dutch police escort.

Waltmans-Molier was not aware of the existence of an alleged Sudanese decree called Decree No 4/B/307 from the head of the general security apparatus to senior border guards¹. However, she knew that it was the practice for Sudanese citizens who had been away from the country for a couple of years or more and who were now returning home to be questioned by the Sudanese police on their arrival. Often this would be because of a failure to pay tax. The Netherlands Embassy was not aware of any examples of people suffering any harm while being questioned.

Questioning was carried out by the immigration authorities or by the security service and was, according to Waltmans-Molier, quite normal. She mentioned a case in which a Sudanese woman had been returned from the Netherlands to Khartoum. The woman claimed to be the member of an opposition party but could not give any account of its ideology, and had been repeatedly questioned by the security service. The woman complained to the Netherlands Embassy but the matter was not felt to be serious and the Embassy had not heard that the woman had come to any harm.

Waltmans-Molier did not have information about the number of Sudanese citizens sent back from the Netherlands in the last year.

A well-informed local source in Cairo said that Sudanese citizens in possession of a valid national passport could enter Sudan without any difficulty. However, if they only had a temporary travel document they would be questioned about their circumstances on arrival in Sudan. This applied only to those returning voluntarily to Sudan. The source had no information about conditions on entry for Sudanese citizens who were being forcibly repatriated to Sudan.

Johannes Lehne said that Germany had never had problems with the deportation of rejected asylum

¹ See the Immigration Service report on the fact-finding mission to Cairo (Egypt) and Geneva (Switzerland) from 29 January to 12 February and from 3 to 7 March 2000, Copenhagen

applicants to Khartoum, either on entry or following entry. In the previous year a total of 15 people had been sent back to Sudan from Germany. Only in some individual cases had the deportation been followed up.

3.2 *Exit from Sudan and passport issuing procedures*

Abdulhay explained that Sudanese national passports were issued by the Passports and Immigration Department in Khartoum. Any Sudanese citizen could have a national passport issued to him if he could produce valid proof of nationality and an identity card. There were two types of passport which were normally used, one for business travellers (pale blue cover) and one for ordinary travellers (green cover). From 2002 new technically improved passport types would be issued to replace the above, which were relatively easy to falsify.

For a person to leave Sudan legally his passport had to contain an exit visa. There were two types of exit visa for Sudanese citizens. One was only for those who were travelling abroad to work, and the other was for everyone else. These two types of exit visa have been in use since May 1998. To obtain an exit visa for countries which required a visa for entry, then that entry visa had to be produced. It was noted that Syria, Malaysia and Eritrea did not require a valid entry visa to be obtained by Sudanese citizens before travel. Those countries issued entry visas on arrival at the border controls.

It was possible in law for the authorities to refuse a person an exit visa. The decision was taken by a court which informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the immigration authorities about its decision.

Sudanese citizens who were staying abroad and whose passport had expired could apply to the nearest Sudanese Embassy or to the passport issuing authorities in Khartoum for a new passport.

The procedures on departure from Khartoum airport are relatively straightforward.

Colonel Ismail H. Rasoul of the Khartoum Airport Police told us that immediately after the first baggage check the traveller has to present his passport with an exit visa. The visa is stamped and a departure form is completed by the traveller himself. This is registered on computer. In addition, a

April 2000, pp. 22 et seq.

check is made to see whether the traveller appears on the airport police's list of wanted persons. His baggage is then checked by the customs authorities. Before a person gains access to the plane his passport is checked once again. The traveller may then go on board and depart. The same procedure is followed as for those entering the country if they are wanted by the authorities (see section above on entry).

Asked whether those who had not performed their compulsory military service in Sudan could leave, Rasoul replied that a dispensation was given to those who had obtained a scholarship to study abroad, those who had a proven need for medical treatment abroad, those who had jobs there and also those who could produce an invitation for a visit abroad. These could each constitute grounds for waiving the rules that a person should have performed his CNS before leaving Sudan. The dispensation was given in the form of a "Travel Card". This card had to be left with the airport police and was then sent to the military authorities to keep. Anyone between the ages of 18 and 40 who had not performed his military service had to be able to produce a valid Travel Card if he wanted to leave the country.

Rasoul also pointed out that female Sudanese citizens could only leave Sudan if they were accompanied by their husband or a close relative. El Mufti was able to add that the authorities were currently discussing whether it would be possible to change this condition. He explained that his own female colleagues were already able to travel without being accompanied by their husband or a near relative and that he himself often travelled with female colleagues.

Persons, organisations and authorities consulted

Abdulhay, Abdulbagi Albushra, Major General, Director of Passport & Immigration, General Administration, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Khartoum.

Barach, Jurkuch, Representative, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the Middle East and the Gulf, Cairo.

El Mufti, Ahmed, Dr., Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice & Advisory Council of National Commission for Human Rights, Khartoum.

Elkhalifa, Hamdi, Colonel, Khartoum Airport Police, Khartoum.

Humanitarian NGO in Nairobi (A).

Humanitarian NGO in Nairobi (B).

Idrees Ishag, Saif el Nasr, Chairman, Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA), Egypt Branch, Cairo.

International humanitarian organisation in Khartoum.

International humanitarian organisation in Nairobi.

Khider, El Rasheed, Ambassador, Head of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum.

Khier, Emad Kalafalla M., Colonel, Central Intelligence Department (CID), Khartoum Airport, Khartoum.

Lehne, Johannes, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Khartoum.

Muor Muor, Mario, Chairperson of Board of Directors, Bahr el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA), Nairobi.

Mutasim, A. Rahman A. Allah, Head of Police Forensics, Science Lab, Khartoum.

Ngot, Akoth, Chairman, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Cairo Chapter, Cairo.

Rahman Yagoub, A., General, Civil Registration Dept., Ministry of Interior Affairs, Khartoum.

Rasoul, Ismail H., Colonel, Khartoum Airport Police, Khartoum.

Salih, Hashim Abdel Razig, Dr., Minister Plenipotentiary, Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khartoum.

Sowinska, Adele, Deputy Director, Southern Sudan Programme, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Nairobi.

Sudanese human rights organisation in Cairo.

Sudanese professor working in exile in a European country.

The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), Nairobi.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Cairo.

Well-informed local source in Cairo.

Waltmans-Molier, Hedwig, Second Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Khartoum.

Abbreviations

BC – Beja Congress

BP – Baa'th Party

BYDA – Bahr el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency

CID – Central Intelligence Department

CNS – Compulsory National Service

DF – Democratic Front

DUP – Democratic Unionist Party

EIU – Economist Intelligence Unit

EU – European Union

HRW – Human Rights Watch

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation

IRC – International Rescue Committee

IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Network

LRA – Lords Resistance Army

NC – National Congress (NC replaced the NIF in 1998)

NCHR – National Commission for Human Rights

NCRD – National Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy

NDA – National Democratic Alliance

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NIF – National Islamic Front

NSCC – New Sudan Council of Churches

OCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OLS – Operation Lifeline Sudan

PDF – Popular Defence Forces

PNC – Popular National Congress

POP – Public Order Police

SAF – Sudan Alliance Forces

SANU – Sudan African National Union

SCC – Sudan Council of Churches

SCP – Sudanese Communist Party

SFDA – Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance

SFP – Sudan Federal Party

SHRG – Sudan Human Rights Group

SHRO – Sudan Human Rights Organisation

SNP – Sudan National Party

SNP – Sudanese National Party

SPDF – Sudan People’s Democratic Front

SPLA – Sudan People’s Liberation Army

SPLM – Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SVTG – Sudanese Victims of Torture Group

TL – Three Lions

UN – United Nations

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UP – Umma Party

USAP – Union of Sudanese African Parties

Annexes

1. Map of Sudan.
2. Map of oil production areas in Sudan (Christian Aid, March 2001).
3. Statement by the Sudanese Churches on the Oil Factor in the Conflict in the Sudan,
12 April 2000.
4. The National Service Act, 1992.
Popular Defence Forces Act, 1989.


Annex 1: Map of Sudan



Map No. 3707 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS February 1999

Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

Annex 2: Map of the oil production areas in Sudan (Christian Aid, March 2001)



Annex 3: Statement by the Sudanese Churches on the Oil Factor in the Conflict in the Sudan, 12 April 2000


STATEMENT OF THE SUDANESE CHURCHES ON THE OIL FACTOR IN THE
CONFLICT IN THE SUDAN


The Sudanese Churches believe that the oil, found in the southern Sudan (Bentiu, Pariang, Melut, Jonglei etc) is a national resource that should be used to develop all the people of the Sudan. Since it started the exploitation of the oil last year 1999, the government of the Sudan has however not used the revenues from the oil for the development of the people of Sudan and in particular those in the oil areas who throughout history were neglected in terms of equitable allocation of the national resources. Instead, the oil revenues have been used for the purchase of military necessities and weapons used for killing and displacing people in these oil areas. The government's military capacity is strengthened with these revenues and it seems that the government has assumed that it can end the conflict militarily.

Further, the government is using the roads and airstrips of the multi-national oil companies engaged in the production of oil in the Sudan, for military purposes, carrying out aerial bombardment on civilian targets (Hospitals, Schools, markets, Churches etc) in the southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile.


In the past the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has issued a statement with its partners calling for establishment of a Trust Fund to receive the oil revenues for the Sudan government. It was proposed that these revenues be apportioned fairly in accordance with an agreement to be developed by the IGAD. Such an arrangement has proven unworkable.

As the Shepherds of the population in the Sudan and eye witnesses to the on going genocide in the above mentioned areas, we call upon peace loving people and the international community to take immediate actions to **STOP** the on going genocide in the Sudan. This includes the withdrawal of the oil companies helping the government of the Sudan to confidently pursue the war and a call for No-fly zone for military aircraft's over the southern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile, which should be monitored. This is to reinforce our call for the same through FECCCLAH forum in Limuru (Kenya) on the 23rd of March 2000.


Rev. David Dembe
Chairman
Sudan Council of Churches (SCC)


Rev. Enoch Tombe Stephen
General Secretary
SCC.


Rev. John Okunin
Chairman
New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC)


Rev. Dr. Haruufi L. Ruon
Executive Secretary
NSCC.

Geneva, 12th April 2000

Annex 4: The National Service Act for 1992

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
The National Service Act for 1992

In accordance with the third constitutional order for the year 1989, the National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council issued the following Act:

A. The First Chapter

Preliminary Provisions:

Name of the Act and its date of Enforcement:

1. This Act is called "The National Service Act for the year 1992; it shall be effective on its endorsement date.

Cancellation:

2. This Act cancels the 1989 National Compulsory Service

Interpretation:

3. In this Act, and unless the text stipulates otherwise:-

- * The Minister; shall mean the Defence Minister
- * The Council; shall mean the Administrative Council of the National Service
- * The General Commander; shall mean the Commander General of the Armed Forces
- * The Director; shall mean the Director of the National Service Administration
- * The Administration; shall mean the administration of the National Service
- * The Regular Forces; shall include all regular Forces established in accordance with a law
- * The Service; shall mean the National Service carried-out according to this Act
- * The Recruit; shall mean the person who carries-out the national service according to this Act

Objectives of the National Service:-

4. The National Service aims for the following;
 - a. to build the desire for struggle and enlarge the models of combatants and championship, self-assurance, readiness for martyrdom, dismiss inactivity and fear of danger;
 - b. to build the desire for discipline and commitment to the organized and harmonized group, and develop qualities of obedience, cooperation, leadership and dismiss selfishness and paranoia;
 - c. to establish the desire for attachment and association to the group, the country and the religion, and to overcome being fanatic to family, sector or region;
 - d. preparation of organized forces for military and defence work, development activities, social service or any other activity for the general welfare;
2. to educate and frame-up the youth to be medically fit and in good conduct, or to prepare them by educational methods, cultural methods and orientation guidance; or be trained for some professions, or job, or to develop their abilities and initiative.

Establishment of the Council and its Formation

- 5.1. A Council to be established and called 'The National Service Council' and contains;
- | | | |
|----|--|--------------------|
| a. | Defence Minister | President |
| b. | Chief of Staff | Member |
| c. | Director of Police | " |
| d. | General Security Director | " |
| e. | Commander of popular Forces | " |
| f. | Under-Secretary, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning | " |
| g. | U/S, Ministry of Education | Member |
| h. | " " Health | " |
| i. | " " Agriculture | " |
| j. | " " Works & Public Utilities | " |
| k. | U/S, Chamber of service Affairs | " |
| l. | Director, National Service Administration. | Member & Secretary |

2. The Council with the consent of the Minister may nominate three persons to the membership of the Council.

3. The Regulations will organize the Council's meetings, provision of recommendations and approval of decisions.

The Duties of the Council

6. The Council shall have the following duties:
- to issue recommendations in the matters concerning the implementation of the recruitment plan for the National Service;
 - to issue recommendations concerning orientation courses, training, guidance and education of the recruits, and their place of employment;
 - to recommend to the Minister the rules and regulations and necessary orders required for the implementation of this Act;
 - to advise and give opinion in any matters presented by the Minister concerning the National Service.

B. The Second Chapter

Imposition of Service

7. Every Sudanese who completed eighteen years and did not exceed thirty three years of age shall submit to the imposition of the National Service.

The Service Places

- 8.1 The Recruit shall do the service in any of the following places:
- the Armed Forces;
 - Police or other regular forces;
 - Govt. or public sector units;
 - Public projects in development, economic or social service.

2. Division of Service, Organization, distribution of recruits to sites, shall be according to the regulations issued by the Minister.

Duration of the Service

- 9.1 The duration of the service is 24 months
2. duration of the service for University graduates, high institutes or equivalent shall be reduced to twelve months - it shall also be reduced to eighteen months for those who completed the high secondary school level or equivalent.
3. The director, shall specify, with the consent of the Minister, the service period for those recruits in the previous 1989 compulsory service law, or similar other service, provided that it shall not exceed twenty four months.
4. The service reduction period for the recruit shall be considered on the basis of the academic qualification at the start of the service.
5. It is possible to reduce the service period by deducting any previous military service for the recruit in accordance with law regulating and evaluating that previous service.

Exemption from Service

10. The following persons shall be exempted from the order of article (7) of this Act:-
 1. The officers, sub-officers, and soldiers of the Armed Forces, police forces and other Regular Forces.
 2. The students of colleges and institutes preparing for graduation of armed forces officers, police forces or other regular forces, on condition that the student shall continue in his study until graduation; or he should report within 30 days of his cancellation of his study prog, to the specified recruitment region authority.

Pardon from Service

- 11.1. Any person who is medically unfit to do any service duty is completely pardoned from the service.
2. Those persons who are completely medical fit shall carry-out the service that suit their abilities.

Postponement of Service

- 12.1. The service shall be postponed for the sole supporter of the father, or the husband, the son or the brother until it is provided for him from any public finance what was originally provided for his family.
2. The service might be postponed for those academics doing their scholarship until they receive their first degree on condition that the age did not reach 32 years.
3. The service might be postponed for a reasonable time for the following persons provided they did

not reach 32 years of age;

a. those holding final degrees, should the nature of their certificates require continuation of study or training.

b. those working in any public service unit whose nature of work in that unit necessitates his stay for an orientation period according to the request of the concerned minister.

4. The above mentioned persons whose service period were postponed should report to the concerned recruitment region within 30 days from the cessation of the cause of postponement or upon reaching 32 years of age.

Applications for Pardon or postponement

13.1. The Director is the authority to decide on applications for full exemption, partial or temporary. The Minister decides on postponement.

2. Sudan Ambassadors and counsellors abroad has the authority for temporary decisions on applications for postponement of service for those residents abroad, and they have to notify the Administration immediately for final decision.

c. The Third Chapter

Recruitment and Service Activities

Regions of National Service

14. For the purpose of the National Service, the Govt. of Sudan is divided into regions; the regulations will specify the region and their duties.

15. Presence at Recruitment Centres

(1) Every person who is called for service should present himself to the Region Recruitment administration within his residence area on the date specified by that authority; the Recruitment administration should verify identity and hand him the "Service Identity Card", and inform him of the date he will be called for service and mark his I.D. card by the assignment prepared for him.

(2) Under-Secretary of ministries, directors of corporations, government departments heads, universities, institutes and schools directors, companies directors, business owners, employers, administration and public officials, should report to the Regional Recruitment Commander in their area on centre the names and address of those attached to them who were called for the service.

The Service I.D. Card

16.1. Everyone who was called for the service shall obtain an I.D. service card which he should keep regularly, and replace immediately if it has been lost, and he cannot carry more than one I.D. card.

16.2. Holders of the service I.D. card should present their cards to their new area of residence service

administration within two weeks from the date he changed his area of residence.

- 16.3. The regulations shall specify the order of the service I.D. card and necessary fees.

Appeals from Recruitment Service

17.1. Appeals from the area commander service recruitment decisions are presented to the Director whose decision is final.

17.2. Appeals from the Director's decisions is submitted to a committee formed from one member from the Attorney General Chamber and two army officers. The Minister shall issue an order for the formation of this committee and its regulations. Decisions of the committee are final.

17.3. Appeals should be presented within two weeks from knowledge of the reason for the appeal.

Medical and other Committees

18. The Director shall form the necessary medical committees, cultural or professional committees, exemption and post ponement verifications committees. The Minister shall form higher committees to revise and regulate the work of those committees.

19. Those who are subject to the National Service recruitment shall be called gradually every year according to age and sex; the regulations shall organize how to be called-in, how to treat non-comers. The Minister decides on the number to be recruited or give certificates for those who will join later. The service period of the Recruits commence on the date the regional commander accept them for National Service.

The Fourth Chapter

20.1. The Recruits are subject to the laws of the Armed Forces during their service period.

20.2. The rules and regulations of the Recruit service place shall be applied in such cases as death, martyrdom, loss or any accident attributed to the service, during the service or the call-in periods.

21. Those who were called-in for service are not allowed to leave the country for any reason without receiving a certificate of exemption, pardon or relief, fullfilment or postponement of service and recruitment.

Students of Universities, Institutes and Schools

22. Those who were called-in for service are not allowed to join any university, college, institute, schools in Sudan, or attached to any, or remain in any, or receive graduation certificate, unless he is carrying

an I.D. service card or any of the other certificates stipulated in article (27) of this Act.

Employment

23. Those who were called-in for service are not allowed to be employed, or remain in his job or work, or be given a licence to do any work or profession, or registered in the employment cadre, unless he is carrying an I.D. service card or any of the other certificates stipulated in article (27) of this Act.

Reservation of the Recruits, job and position

- 24.1. Institutions which employ more than 50 persons should reserve the job for those who were recruited from their work place and re-employ them after the service period without losing any benefit or promotion because of it, and should consider it as an actual work period for the after-service benefits; provided re-employment application is presented within thirty days from end of service period.
- 24.2. Universities, Institutes and Schools should reserve the recruit's place, or his right to join or graduate from them, provided not to disrupt their study system and his application is presented within reasonable time.

Continuation of Service with the Armed Forces

25. After completion of his National Service period, the recruit has the right to continue his service with the Armed Forces as a volunteer and with new conditions prevailing in the Armed Forces; his period of service as a recruit shall be calculated for pension purposes. Should the recruit choose not to volunteer, he will be registered for the reserve service according to its laws.

Priority of nomination for the Recruit

26. The recruits who were not employed or nominated shall have the same chance as their colleagues at graduation, when taken for employment at the public sector for the first time after the completion of service, provided they prove that their recruitment has hindered their employment with their colleagues and that they fulfil the required employment conditions.

Certificates issued by the Ministry of Defence

27. The Ministry of Defence shall provide the following certificates for holders of service I.D. cards who meet the conditions of this Act, after payment of fees:-
- a. exemption of service certificate according to article (10);
 - b. pardon from service certificate according to article (11);
 - c. postponement of service certificate according to article (12) of this Act.

General Laws; Penalties

- 28.1. Whoever contradicts this Act shall be punished by imprisonment period not exceeding three years, or shall be fined, or with both penalties.
- 28.2. Above penalties apply to any person, except the husband, who purposely assist someone to avoid or postpone the service recruitment, either by withdrawing, deleting or dropping his name intentionally from the lists, or causing or helping to cause him a malignant accident, or by giving false information, or embracing his personality, or hiding him or using any other tricks.
- 28.3. Any person subject to do the service shall be punished with imprisonment for a period not less than two years and not exceeding three years who does not present himself for recruitment, or tries to avoid the service through deceit, or by inflicting any harm to himself. This person will immediately join the service after completion of penalty period upon the request of the commander of Recruitment.

Recruitment Administration Powers

29. The Director and his deputies shall have the powers and authorities of the police force regarding the implementation of this Act or any regulations issued through it.

Freezing of the criminal accusation

30. Criminal claim will cease according to this Act against service recruits if they reach the age of 50.

Regulations and Orders

31. The Minister shall issue the regulations and orders necessary to implement this Act.

Issued under my endorsement on the 6th of Shaaban 1412 Higria corresponding to the 20th of February 1992.

Lt. Gen. Omer Hassan Ahmed el Bashir Chairman of the National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council.

Ministry of Defence
 General Command of the Armed Forces
 Military National Compulsory Service Admin.

Recruitment Area:..... Serial no.:.....

Date:.....

RECRUITMENT MEMO

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth		
		town/village	council	province
Personal/family ID card no.....		Reg. Office.....		province
Compulsory service ID card no.....				issued at
Remarks:				

ADMINISTRATION

The Administration of the Military National Compulsory Service decided to treat the above-mentioned person as follows:

1. This memo is not an exemption of service document.
2. He should present himself to this Recruitment area when notified through any type of media.
3. Date of his recruitment is.....
4. He is allowed to leave the Country.....
5. He is allowed to obtain identity documents.....
6. No objection for his employment.
7. Valid for six months from date of issue.

Director General

Stamp:

Military National Compulsory Service Administration.

Annex 5: Popular Defence Forces Act 1989

POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES ACT 1989

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL DECREE FOR 1989 THE NATIONAL SALVATION REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) APPROVED THE FOLLOWING ACT;

1. THIS ACT IS CALLED ' POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES ACT FOR 1989 ' AND SHALL BE IN FORCE ON THE DAY OF ENDORSEMENT.
2. THIS ACT CANCELS AND REPLACES PREVIOUS SIMILAR ACTS.
3. DEFINITIONS;
 - COMMANDER GENERAL COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
 - COMMANDER COMMANDER OF THE POPULAR FORCES
 - POPULAR FORCES FORCES ESTABLISHED BY THIS ACT
4. A SEMI-MILITARY FORCES TO BE FORMED FROM SUDANESE CITIZENS, CALLED 'POPULAR DEFENCE FORCES.
5. THE OBJECTIVES OF FORMING THE POPULAR FORCES ARE:
 - TRAIN CITIZENS ON MILITARY & CIVIL CAPABILITIES
 - RAISE SECURITY AWARENESS, AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE AMONG THEM, IN ORDER TO ACT AS A BACK-UP FORCE TO THE OTHER REGULAR ONES ON REQUEST
6. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POPULAR FORCES;
 - TO ASSIST THE POPULAR FORCES ON REQUEST
 - PARTICIPATE IN DEFENDING THE COUNTRY AND HELP IN RELIEF & EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
 - ANY OTHER FUNCTION REQUESTED BY THE COMMANDER GENERAL
7. * THE COMMANDER OF THE POPULAR FORCES TO BE APPOINTED FROM THE ARMED FORCES WITH A RANK OF A BRIGADIER OR ABOVE
* THE COMMANDER GENERAL MAY APPOINT ANY NUMBER OF OFFICERS FROM THE ARMED FORCES TO WORK UNDER THE COMMANDER
* THE " COUNCIL " MAY APPOINT, AFTER THE AGREEMENT OF THE COMMANDER GENERAL ANY NUMBER OF PERSONS FROM THE OTHER REGULAR FORCES TO WORK UNDER THE COMMANDER AT THE HEAD QUARTERS OF THE POPULAR FORCES
8. THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER;
 - TO ISSUE THE ANNUAL TRAINING CALENDER
 - TO ISSUE PERMANENT RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE POPULAR FORCES
 - TO ISSUE THE PROPER INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOOD CONDUCT, DISCIPLINE & PERFORMANCE OF THE POPULAR FORCES
9. THE SET-UP OF POPULAR FORCES (COUNCIL)
 - * ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF PRESIDENT
 - * POPULAR FORCES COMMANDER SECRETARY
 - * DIRECTOR OF POLICE
 - * DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
 - * DIRECTOR OF CIVIL DEFENCE
 - * PUBLIC SERVICE CHAMBER UNDERSECRETARY
 - * SUDAN SECURITY FORCES REPRESENTATIVE
 - * LOCAL GOVT. RULE REPRESENTATIVE
 - * ANY OTHER SUITABLE PERSON APPOINTED BY THE COMMANDER

10. FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL;
 - * TO ADVISE THE COMMANDER GENERAL ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THE POPULAR FORCES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE FOLLOWING;
 - LOCATIONS OF TRAINING FIELDS
 - MATTERS CONCERNING MILITARY, CULTURAL, & NATIONAL TRAINING
 - MATTERS CONCERNING DUTIES & ACTIVITIES OF THE POPULAR FORCES
11. CONDITIONS FOR ENLISTING;
 - * SUDANESE NATIONALITY
 - * NOT LESS THAN 16 YEARS OF AGE
 - * MEDICALLY FIT
 - * WITH A RECORD OF GOOD CONDUCT
12. THE COMMANDER GENERAL MAY ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL UPON THE POPULAR FORCES IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES;
 - * TRAINING PURPOSES
 - * DISASTERS & EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
 - * WAR OR EXPECTATION OF WAR
13. ALL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS DIRECTORS, PUBLIC & PRIVATE SECTOR CORPS., OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYER SHOULD GIVE LEAVE OF ABSENCE FOR THOSE CALLED-IN TO JOIN THE POPULAR FORCES
14. TRAINING OF POPULAR FORCES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE TO THE ANNUAL TRAINING CALENDAR ISSUED BY THE COMMANDER (ITEM NR.8 OF THIS ACT) IN THE FOLLOWING FRAMEWORK;
 - MILITARY TRAINING
 - CIVIL DEFENCE
 - NATIONAL COUNSELLING
 - CULTURAL COUNSELLING
15. THE RATIO OF ENLISTED EMPLOYEES TO THE POPULAR FORCES SHOULD NOT EXCEED 25% OF THE WORK FORCE IN ANY ONE ORGANIZATION
16. RIGHTS & DUTIES OF THE RECRUIT;
 - * RIGHT OF EMPLOYMENT, SALARY, INCREMENTS, AND PROMOTION DURING HIS CALL-IN & TRAINING PERIOD, IN THE PUBLIC & PRIVATE SECTOR. THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO CONTINUE SALARY PAYMENT OF THE RECRUIT UPTO THREE MONTHS
 - * THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE EDUCATION IS PRESERVED FOR THE STUDENT RECRUIT
 - * TRAINING & RECRUITMENT PERIODS WILL BE CONSIDERED FOR CIVIL SERVICE PURPOSES.
17. THE POPULAR FORCES ARE SUBJECT TO THE MILITARY RULES & COURTS
18. THE RECRUIT MAY BE EXEMPTED FOR ANY OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS;
 - * MEDICAL
 - * DISCIPLINE
 - * FAMILY
 - * SECURITY
19. THE POPULAR FORCES WILL HAVE AN AUTONOMOUS BUDGET UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER GENERAL
20. THE COMMANDER GENERAL MAY ISSUE THE NECESSARY RULES, REGULATIONS & ORDERS CONCERNING THE OVERALL SET-UP & ORGANIZATION OF THE POPULAR FORCES, & MAY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ACTS;

- * PERIOD & EXTENSION OF SERVICE
- * TRAINING EQUIPMENT & UNIFORMS
- * MONTHLY REMUNERATION
- * LIVING & LODGING EXPENSES
- * RECRUITMENT PROCEDURES

ENDORSED BY
OMER H. A. AL-BESHIR

PRESIDENT RCC
