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 Agenda item 20 (b)  
 Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian  
 and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations,  
 including special economic assistance: special  
 economic assistance to individual countries or regions

## International assistance for the economic rehabilitation of Angola

### Report of the Secretary-General

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## I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 50/58 D of 12 December 1995 on international assistance for the economic rehabilitation of Angola, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, called upon all parties to do their utmost to achieve the full and effective implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola (S/22609, annex), thus creating conditions conducive to the economic rehabilitation of the country. The Assembly expressed its appreciation to all States, United Nations organizations and other donors for the substantial humanitarian assistance rendered to Angola during the past two years, and appealed for continued and generous contributions in support of humanitarian activities facilitating the current transition to peace. Furthermore, the Assembly appealed to all Governments and international and private institutions that announced their contributions at the Round-Table Conference of Donors to honour their commitments, and encouraged the Government of Angola to proceed with its programme of economic rehabilitation, including through the implementation of the Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme, and to overcome its social, economic and financial crisis. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it at its fifty-second session on the implementation of the resolution.

2. The present report describes the humanitarian assistance activities carried out in Angola since the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary General on 12 September 1995 (A/50/424), and highlights the progress made in the implementation of humanitarian activities and the demobilization process in the context of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex). The report covers humanitarian activities up to 30 September 1997.

## II. Current situation in Angola

3. Significant developments have taken place in the sphere of humanitarian activities and especially in the quartering and demobilization of ex-UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) troops. During the last quarter of 1995 and the first quarter of 1996, progress was made in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol according to a schedule endorsed by the Joint Commission. However, the pace of implementation was considerably slower than planned owing to the long and difficult process of building political confidence. Continued political and military tensions impeded both the return of the displaced and refugees to their home areas and the implementation of the quartering and demobilization of UNITA soldiers.

4. The construction of 15 quartering areas by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), with the assistance of brigades of UNITA soldiers, commenced in September 1995 and was completed by June 1996. UNITA soldiers began arriving at the quartering areas on 20 November 1995 and the quartering process was finally completed at the end of 1996, with a total of 65,711 registered troops. To support this exercise, a comprehensive multi-sectoral humanitarian programme was implemented by 11 international non-governmental organizations (with the assistance of partner United Nations agencies and international organizations). This effort was coordinated in Angola by the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Angola of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which ensured that troops received basic humanitarian assistance during their quartering, demobilization and reintegration into Angolan society.

5. At the beginning of 1996, security risks declined and humanitarian activities began to expand into previously inaccessible areas in the country. At the same time, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations began to move from emergency to rehabilitation programmes. To facilitate the broadening of activities, UNAVEM engineering companies, United Nations demining brigades, the World Food Programme (WFP) and various international non-governmental organizations involved in mine tracing and clearance repaired destroyed bridges and cleared mines from principal roads. By July 1996, enhanced access allowed humanitarian agencies to deliver 70 per cent of humanitarian assistance by road, as compared to 1995 when 70 per cent was delivered by air. However, restrictions on the free circulation of people and goods continued to constrain some humanitarian activities.

6. Following the establishment of a Technical Working Group for Demobilization and Reintegration of the Joint Commission, and in consultation and coordination with the partners involved, including the Government of Angola, UNITA, UNAVEM III, United Nations agencies, donors and non-governmental organizations, the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Angola provided technical assistance to the Group in the design of a comprehensive national demobilization and reintegration programme. This culminated, on 15 August 1996, in the endorsement by the Council of Ministers of the National Plan for Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-military personnel, prepared by the Working Group. The Plan established the institutional and programmatic framework for the implementation of demobilization and reintegration in Angola, including the definition of the legal and ad hoc benefits to be provided by the Government and the

international community, respectively, for a target population of approximately 100,000 ex-military personnel (both ex-FAA (Forças Armadas Angolanas) and ex-UNITA), together with their dependants.

7. However, owing to delays in the implementation of other political and military tasks associated with the Lusaka Protocol, demobilization did not begin until September 1996. The first phase began with a special group of under-age UNITA military personnel, focusing on family-tracing activities. On 10 December 1996, UNITA declared that all its demobilization obligations had been completed, including the quartering of all its troops and the handover of all its weapons and ammunition to UNAVEM III. In addition, the Joint Commission received assurances on the same day from the Government that all political tasks would be concluded by 31 December 1996. These included UNITA deputies taking their seats in the National Assembly, the formation of a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, extension of state administration throughout the country and a decision on the special status for UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi.

8. At the end of 1996, United Nations agencies, which had received approximately \$132 million in response to the 1996 appeal, undertook a review of the progress made in the implementation of humanitarian activities. Participating agencies reported a variety of achievements, including the extension of humanitarian efforts to all but one fifth of the national territory; the repair of more than 55 bridges and the demining of over 5,000 kilometres of primary and secondary roads; the provision of food assistance to approximately 1.2 million beneficiaries; the provision of seeds and tools to more than 500,000 families; the delivery of health services, including expanded immunization activities benefiting some 2 million children with protection against polio and measles; the quartering of over 70,000 ex-UNITA troops and the provision of multisectoral humanitarian assistance to them, as well as to more than 130,000 family members; the commencement of humanitarian programmes in support of the military war-disabled in five special centres and the commencement of demobilization of under-age ex-UNITA military personnel.

9. By December 1996, more than 60 international and 58 national non-governmental organizations were involved in a mixture of emergency and rehabilitation programmes in the 18 provinces of Angola. Other organizations, such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Swiss Humanitarian Aid, were also active in Angola, particularly through transition programmes, with an emphasis on rehabilitation and reconstruction where possible.

10. On 11 December 1996, the Security Council adopted resolution 1087 (1996) and, while concerned about the delays in the consolidation of the military and political tasks stipulated in the Lusaka Protocol, authorized the Secretary-General to commence the progressive withdrawal of UNAVEM III formed military units.

11. In early 1997, United Nations agencies in Angola reviewed the humanitarian programme in order to develop a common strategy for the 1997 consolidated inter-agency appeal. The strategy for 1997 builds on that articulated in the 1996 appeal, with the focus on ensuring the continuity of support to the demobilization process; continued assistance to war-affected populations; developing a coordinated and phased approach to the return and reintegration of demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons and refugees; and improving access to vulnerable groups and delivery capacity to new areas.

12. During the first part of 1997, delays in the quartering and demobilization process and the failure of both parties to guarantee free movement of persons and goods, as well as to ensure viable security conditions, prevented the timely completion of the demobilization phase as well as the return of the majority of internally displaced persons. Specifically, illegal checkpoints remained throughout the country and the presence of mines on some primary and secondary roads continued to inhibit both the return of displaced populations and access for humanitarian organizations. Coordination of humanitarian operations was constrained by the absence of UNITA at provincial humanitarian coordination group meetings and the rare participation of UNITA in other coordination mechanisms in the provinces. Banditry and sporadic fighting between the civil defence and other armed groups caused the deaths of United Nations and non-governmental organization workers during the latter part of 1996 and the first months of 1997. In Benguela province, the escalation of attacks by armed groups resulted in the displacement of more than 10,000 people.

13. The commencement of the withdrawal of UNAVEM III forces brought forth the need to revise the calendar for demobilization originally envisaged in the Lusaka Protocol. As a result, a rapid demobilization plan was formulated in February 1997 by the Technical Working Group for Demobilization and Reintegration and endorsed by the Joint Commission in early April. Demobilization of excess UNITA troops from quartering areas in the central region began officially on 14 April 1997. The demobilization of under-age UNITA military personnel, which had commenced at an earlier stage, continued. The rapid demobilization plan was closely synchronized with the reduction of UNAVEM III troops and was planned to be carried out in six months,

ending in September 1997 (including one month contingency).

14. Increasing pressure by the international community resulted in a renewed effort by the two sides to consolidate peace. In particular, during the visit of the Secretary-General to Angola in March 1997, the Joint Commission announced that the selection of ex-UNITA troops for the United Armed Forces had been completed and the incorporation of those troops was under way. Furthermore, by the end of the visit, the UNITA deputies arrived in Luanda to take up their seats in the National Assembly and the National Congress voted on the new status of the leader of UNITA as the President of the largest opposition party. The Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was officially inaugurated on 11 April 1997.

15. In April 1997, positive political developments, including the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation, seemed to give a boost to the peace process. On 16 April 1997, the Security Council adopted resolution 1106 (1997), in which the two parties were urged to complete all other outstanding military and political tasks as stipulated in the Lusaka Protocol. In addition, the Council extended the mandate of UNAVEM III until 30 June 1997 to assist in the implementation of the remaining tasks. It also requested the Secretary-General to complete the withdrawal of UNAVEM military units as scheduled.

16. However, by mid-May 1997 and parallel with the events occurring in the former Zaire, the political and military situation began to deteriorate, with an increase in clashes between FAA and UNITA in the province of Lunda Norte. By the end of June, the security situation throughout the country had deteriorated significantly and a reported 8,000 people had been newly displaced to government controlled areas owing to the clashes in Lunda Norte. In addition, new internally displaced persons were reported in Benguela and Huila provinces as a result of banditry, and additional internally displaced persons arrived in the town of Malange (Malange province) owing to the actions of UNITA authorities, including forced conscription.

17. On 30 June 1997, the Security Council adopted resolution 1118 (1997), in which it established the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) in lieu of UNAVEM III. MONUA was mandated, *inter alia*, to facilitate the registration, verification and demobilization of the additional 6,052 armed personnel declared by UNITA to be under its control, including those in the security detachment of the President of UNITA, the "mining police" and "residual forces". These troops had been previously unknown, with the exception of the presidential guard.

Therefore, no provisions (programmatic, financial or otherwise) had been made for their demobilization within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol.

### III. Humanitarian assistance

#### A. General

18. Despite significant progress in expanding overland access since mid-1995, large stretches of road still remained to be opened, specifically in the eastern part of the country. By the end of 1995, increased military tension and insecurity resulted in a reduction of humanitarian activities as overland convoys were denied clearance, relief flights were restricted and road routes were closed in some areas owing to mine accidents which greatly inhibited humanitarian activities. In response to those incidents, the humanitarian community advocated strongly for the right of all civilians in need to receive humanitarian assistance, and pressured the parties to allow the resumption of activities.

19. Since 1996, the trend of humanitarian activities has shifted as United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations have been readjusting programmes to adapt to the new situation. This has mainly meant that rehabilitation is taking place on a very limited scale and resettlement programmes have been stalled in most of the provinces, except the southern and western areas of Huila, Benguela, Cunene and Namibe. In other parts of the country, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations are restricting their movements and in some cases reducing non-essential staff to avoid unnecessary security risks (this is especially relevant in the provinces of Malange, Uige, Moxico and the Lundas). Some agencies are limiting the scope of their reconstruction programmes (in terms of resources and geographical coverage), while others are being confronted with an increase of new displaced populations and are enhancing, when possible, their rapid response capacity. This is especially so in the provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul where, following the armed clashes of June 1997, more than 10,000 people have been displaced from UNITA areas into the government-held towns of Nzaji and Saurimo. Further displacement is also occurring owing to perceived or real insecurity in the provinces of Malange and Huila. In Benguela province, government authorities claim that 253,000 new internally displaced persons have been registered since February 1997. Additionally, the arrival of some 1,500 Rwandan and Burundese asylum seekers to the remote border town of Luau, in Moxico province, has necessitated the mobilization of both human and material

resources in order to address their immediate emergency requirements. For example, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had to start a special emergency response programme, while its ongoing returnee programme was progressing at a reduced pace owing to dwindling donor support and an uncertain political environment.

## B. Political and military developments affecting humanitarian relief efforts

20. During the reporting period and particularly by mid-1996, general insecurity seriously affected areas with large concentrations of at-risk populations, especially in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces. Events in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) in May 1997 led to further fighting between the Government and UNITA, particularly in areas along the border, affecting delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups in those areas. In mid-May 1997, UNAVEM reported that there were some 7,000 refugees, mostly women and children in poor condition, who had crossed into Angola from Zaire. However, lack of access by humanitarian agencies to the area did not enable the verification of those refugees and the Government later reported that they had repatriated the refugees to Zaire. Also, certain areas in Benguela and Huila provinces have been seriously affected by banditry, including acts of armed robbery which have been perpetrated by, among others, elements of the so-called civil defence corps. On several occasions, the Joint Commission called on the Government and UNITA to cooperate closely in stopping the spread of lawlessness, which put new populations at risk and set back ongoing relief projects. Nonetheless, there were numerous serious incidents, some of which claimed the lives of humanitarian personnel.

21. In April 1996, an ambush on the Benguela-Huambo road resulted in the death of two United Nations observers and an international staff member of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM). The impact on the humanitarian community was extremely negative and road transport in the area was suspended. In July 1996, two UNAVEM soldiers were killed and four injured in a mine accident on the Cacolo-Saurimo road in Lunda Sul province. The non-governmental organizations in the area subsequently suspended operations until authorities confirmed that the road was cleared of mines. During September 1996, humanitarian activities in Bie, Moxico and Uíge were reduced following an increase in security incidents, including harassment of

relief workers. The head of the WFP sub-office in N'dalatando was shot and killed in December 1996 while on a mission tracing families of under-age military personnel in Kuanza Norte province, and the coordinator from the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) was shot and killed on the road between Cubal and Benguela on 7 February 1997.

22. In May 1997, a peacekeeper was shot and killed while escorting a convoy in the province of Huambo. On 7 June 1997, humanitarian agencies in Luau, Moxico province, were held by UNITA authorities against their will. In the same month, ADRA international staff were beaten by UNITA armed personnel in Malange province. In addition, re-mining activities were reported, in some cases with the clear intention of doing harm to international humanitarian staff. Re-mining has also negatively affected the freedom of movement. Additionally, there was looting of relief stocks, particularly food, salt and other essential equipment, by UNITA personnel or civilians during the closure of some of the selection and demobilization centres.

23. Despite the various appeals addressed to both the Government and UNITA, incidents resulting from restrictions imposed by local officials on the movement of relief organizations continued to occur. One such incident took place on 4 September 1997 when a joint mission, composed of representatives of MONUA, WFP and the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance was denied authorization to proceed at a checkpoint on the river Luembe (Lunda Norte province). As a result, humanitarian assistance was suspended for several hundred internally displaced persons in the region. The humanitarian community remains very concerned about this incident, which has restricted access to populations in need.

## C. Demobilization and reintegration

24. A vital component of the Lusaka Accords required the quartering, demobilization and reintegration of more than 100,000 troops, including under-age and war-disabled military personnel. To support this process, a Demobilization and Reintegration Office was established in the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance on 1 February 1995.

25. On 20 November 1995, a year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the quartering of UNITA soldiers began in Vila Nova, Huambo province, under the supervision of the United Nations, and was progressively extended to the other 14 quartering areas throughout the country. The last quartering area, Muchinda, was established only in June

1996, after a long and difficult process. On 10 December 1996, UNITA declared that it had quartered all its troops, with the exception of the presidential guard, and had surrendered all its lethal war material. By 10 December 1996, a total of 65,686 UNITA soldiers had been officially registered and disarmed in the 15 quartering areas.

26. A comprehensive humanitarian programme was implemented in the quartering areas by non-governmental organizations which ensured that troops received basic assistance for their survival and reintegration into Angolan society. The programme included the identification and registration of more than 70,000 UNITA troops, their dependants, and vulnerable groups; collection of socio-economic data for the purpose of reinsertion and reintegration, and food and non-food assistance; health assistance and vaccination campaigns; civic training programmes on national reconciliation and human rights issues; family tracing for under-age soldiers; and orthopaedic assistance for the war-disabled.

27. In mid-1996 a Technical Working Group on Demobilization and Reintegration was established to formulate the institutional and programmatic framework for the demobilization process under the chairmanship of the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. The Working Group produced the National Plan for Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-military personnel, which was endorsed by the Angolan Council of Ministers on 15 August 1996. According to the Plan, each side was to demobilize approximately 50,000 soldiers. The Government was to contribute 63,700 men to the new Angolan Armed Forces, while UNITA was to provide 26,300, to form a combined military force of 90,000 men. The Plan also identified a total of 3,000 under-age soldiers (1,500 from each side) and 30,000 military war-disabled (15,000 from each side). By August 1997, some 10,933 UNITA troops had been incorporated into FAA.

28. The decision of the Security Council in December 1996 to start the withdrawal of UNAVEM III forces from the country brought forth the need to revise the strategy for demobilization originally established in the Lusaka Protocol. As a result, a rapid demobilization plan was formulated by the Working Group and endorsed by the Joint Commission on 20 February 1997. The initial schedule called for a February to June (July as contingency) 1997 exercise. As implementation only began on 14 April 1997, the planned completion date was extended to August 1997. The rapid demobilization plan also foresaw the simultaneous demobilization of the remaining vulnerable groups (under-age and disabled) and excess troops. The implementation of the rapid demobilization plan was to be undertaken following a

regional approach which coincided with the drawdown plan for the United Nations forces.

29. The first phase of the rapid demobilization plan was successfully concluded in mid-June 1997 with the closure of the first five selection and demobilization centres as well as three special centres for war-disabled military personnel. The second phase of the demobilization activities commenced in June at the selection and demobilization centres in northern Angola and the third phase commenced in mid-July in the south-east. As at 29 September 1997, a total of 23,535 ex-UNITA troops had been demobilized within the context of the ongoing rapid demobilization exercise. Taking into account the 4,475 under-age troops and the 3,284 military war-disabled that had already been demobilized, the total number of demobilized personnel as at the end of September 1997 was 31,294. Some 11,355 soldiers were still in the selection and demobilization centres awaiting demobilization, while 25,037 soldiers had deserted.

30. In the context of the social and economic reinsertion of demobilized troops, the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance is collaborating with the Government of Angola, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (through counselling and referral services and quick impact projects), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and non-governmental organizations, to finalize programmes. However, ongoing efforts to establish the reintegration network for demobilized personnel were affected by rising tensions and limited access to resettlement locations in the countryside. While demobilization is being implemented successfully from a technical and administrative viewpoint, the Unit has repeatedly brought to the attention of the Joint Commission and its partners concerns about periodic incidents affecting demobilization and about the future successful social reintegration of demobilized personnel.

31. The Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance has developed special programmes to facilitate and support the demobilization and reintegration of war-disabled and under-age soldiers. While it was initially planned that all military personnel would be quartered after an assessment on the ground, it was agreed that for humanitarian reasons it was better to conduct registration and demobilization in situ for war-disabled soldiers in seven special centres.

32. Demobilization began with the under-age soldiers in September 1996, but was temporarily suspended in October 1996 following reports of irregularities by UNITA, including human rights violations affecting the demobilized. A set of policies was developed by the Working Group stating that

basic human rights must be respected and stipulating that no under-age soldiers would be demobilized until families were identified or a responsible adult was appointed at reception points. In December 1996, after the Security Council had endorsed the basic principles articulated by the Working Group and called for those principles to be respected, demobilization re-commenced. The demobilization of under-age soldiers continued within the context of the rapid demobilization plan following a regional approach. As at 29 September 1997, 3,284 under-age and 6,113 war-disabled soldiers have been demobilized and three of the seven special centres were officially closed.

#### D. Refugees and internally displaced persons

33. The UNHCR repatriation and reintegration programme in Angola aims at repatriating the refugee caseload in neighbouring countries and is based on the assumption that progress in the peace process would inspire sufficient confidence among refugees in neighbouring countries to spark major movement. UNHCR has built up nine field offices with international staff in major receiving community areas in Angola to facilitate the reintegration process of returning refugees. Most of the field locations are in UNITA-controlled areas. Operational capacity in major countries of asylum has been strengthened to prepare for the repatriation of the refugee communities there. In providing assistance, UNHCR is taking an area-based approach by targeting communal infrastructure in order not to discriminate against other population groups resident in returnee areas.

34. Owing to the generally unstable and slow progress of national reconciliation, UNHCR neither promoted nor embarked on an organized repatriation of Angolan refugees from neighbouring countries. Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, which was initiated in 1995, continued at an increased rate in 1996. Well over \$12 million out of \$17 million disbursed under the Angolan repatriation and reintegration operation was spent in the asylum countries.

35. Major impediments to the repatriation process were the inaccessibility of many areas of return as a result of landmines, the absence of passable roads or bridges and security problems. Additionally, a lack of funding reduced the capacity of UNHCR and its partners to establish appropriate conditions for the reintegration of the returnees. In July 1997, UNHCR reviewed its programme and reduced its appeal from \$38 million to \$21 million. Consequently, UNHCR will not undertake any organized repatriation in 1997 but will continue to support spontaneous returnees.

36. In June 1997 there was a major influx of internally displaced persons to the town of Andrada, Lunda Norte province, owing to armed clashes in the north-eastern and southern part of the province. A number of humanitarian assessment missions visited the towns of Andrada, Malundi and Cossa and it was estimated that more than 7,000 people were newly displaced in the area. Humanitarian agencies have provided assistance to meet the emergency. However, limited resources and constrained access to those areas prevented assistance from being provided to all the affected population.

#### E. Relief food assistance

37. Throughout 1995 and 1996, the efforts of the World Food Programme were directed at reducing Angola's dependency on food aid. To increase food security, irrigation canals were built. WFP also distributed food, and at planting time seeds and tools were provided. More than 80,000 workers and their families benefited, on a monthly basis, from food channelled through food-for-work projects. It is estimated that the total number of beneficiaries was 4 million. In 1996, WFP delivered a total of 114,000 metric tons of humanitarian goods by road and by air, including over 14,000 metric tons of non-food items. From January through June 1997, WFP delivered 83,391 metric tons of food aid from WFP stocks, including the European Union, Save the Children (United States) and United States Agency for International Development food-for-peace donations.

38. WFP passenger aircraft supported the international and national humanitarian community by facilitating access to remote areas, rapid assessment missions and medical evacuations. WFP also actively supported the opening of roads during 1996 to encourage the overland transport of humanitarian supplies and to promote the free circulation of people, goods and services. A new protracted relief operation was approved by the WFP Executive Board in January 1997. The project includes a food-for-work component for the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, mainly in areas of resettlement.

39. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) continued to be the focal point for the assessment of crop and food supplies as well as for all activities related to food production and emergency assistance to the agricultural sector (including livestock and forestry). During the transition from relief assistance to rehabilitation, FAO will place greater emphasis on training and institutional capacity-building rather than on input distribution. Emergency interventions will be tailored to the needs of each region and target group, with particular attention to

supporting the return and resettlement of displaced populations. FAO is also developing programmes for the participation of demobilized soldiers in labour-intensive agricultural activities.

40. Since the resumption of its activities in Angola, FAO has monitored crop conditions and the food supply situation in the country through its Global Information and Early Warning System. An FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment mission visited Angola from 22 April to 12 May 1997 to estimate the 1996/97 harvest of food crops and cereal import requirements for the 1997/98 marketing year, including food aid. In 1997, in contrast to previous years, the mission was able to visit most provinces at harvest time. The mission forecast an estimated cereal production of 431,000 tons, which is 14 per cent lower than last year, mainly owing to insufficient rain.

41. One of the main objectives of FAO in Angola has been to support and assist the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Institute for Agricultural Development in coordinating and strengthening their participation in the emergency programme, as well as providing technical assistance to the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and non-governmental organizations in agriculture-related matters. Particular attention has been focused on the seeds and tools distribution programme.

## F. Non-food assistance

42. During the reporting period, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) provided assistance in the following areas: successful implementation of national immunization days for polio, increasing vaccination coverage to an estimated 80 per cent of women and children; further reductions in measles incidence in urban areas; expansion of salt iodization activities; support to the demobilization of under-age soldiers and reintegration with their families; support for internally displaced persons and the families of soldiers in and around quartering areas; strengthening national coordination capacity and increasing donor commitments in the water and environmental sanitation sector; expansion of mine-awareness activities, especially linked to schools; successful completion of a multiple indicator cluster survey; development of innovative approaches in providing emergency education; enhanced alliances with church and local opinion leaders with respect to social mobilization for child survival, development and protection; stronger collaboration with non-governmental organizations and increased focus on the essential drugs programme in revitalizing the primary health care system.

43. UNICEF interventions targeted a number of sectors and activities including advocacy efforts on behalf of Angolan children, particularly those in need of special protection measures. UNICEF and key non-governmental organizations played a prominent role in providing assistance to the Government in the difficult areas of psychosocial trauma and family reunification. UNICEF was also active in the promotion of an integrated approach to the problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance, linking mine-awareness and education activities with mine labelling, and rehabilitation and reintegration of disabled victims.

44. During the reporting period, the World Health Organization (WHO) was involved in a variety of activities, including providing technical assistance for the demobilization process to the Ministry of Health, UNITA and other United Nations and non-governmental organizations. A coordination team comprising health professionals from the National Public Health Bureau, the National Public Health Laboratory, supported by cooperation from the Government of Italy, WHO and the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance was set up to provide a quick response for the investigation and management of epidemics. WHO assisted the Government in developing policies on important health issues, including the national campaign against polio which was jointly implemented by the Ministry of Health and UNITA. In 1997, the strengthening of the surveillance and reporting system in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations continues to be a priority for WHO.

45. On 6 November 1995, the UNDP Trust Fund for Angola was established to enhance UNDP activities in support of the Government's Community Rehabilitation and National Reconciliation Programme as agreed at the Angola Round-Table Conference held at Brussels in September 1995. The purpose of the Trust Fund is to provide assistance to the Government for the rehabilitation of productive capacity, social sectors, infrastructure and roads, as well as institutional capacity-building. In support of the Programme, the UNDP project entitled "Belgium support to United Nations Volunteers: Multisectoral assistance" employed a cadre of national and international United Nations Volunteers to supply technical support to priority rehabilitation projects.

46. The UNDP Trust Fund also supported the programme for support to the reintegration of demobilized soldiers, involving 14 provincial offices, with social promoters, counselling and referral services coordinators and quick impact projects. In addition, the Trust Fund supports vocational training and micro-enterprise promotion for demobilized soldiers. These programmes were designed to



assist with the social reintegration of the demobilized soldiers into civil society.

47. Staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Luanda in November 1996 and May/June 1997 to carry out consultations on macroeconomic policies and to continue discussions on an economic stabilization and reform programme that could be supported by the Fund. The most recent mission verified encouraging progress in macroeconomic management: in contrast to the inflation rate of some 10,650 per cent during the 12 months ending in June 1996, inflation had been held to an estimated 95 per cent for the 12 months ending June 1997. In addition, the authorities have begun the development of a medium-term programme intended to address issues of liberalization, privatization and other structural reforms.

### G. Mine activities

48. Angola is one of the most mine-infested countries in the world. The number of landmines is estimated to be between 10 million and 15 million. UNAVEM III has conducted demining activities in Angola, with highest priority given to clearing roads to enable peacekeeping forces, humanitarian personnel and civilians to move freely. In total, the United Nations and its counterparts have cleared and verified about 9,500 kilometres of road. At the end of 1995, UNAVEM III established the Central Mine Action Training School, which was handed over to the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROE) in early 1997. Thus far, seven demining brigades, with 60 personnel each, have been trained.

49. The responsibility for mine clearance in Angola is vested in the Ministry of Social Assistance and Insertion and is carried out by INAROE. INAROE has been responsible for the coordination and undertaking of all mine-removal operations to facilitate human settlement and the free movement of people and goods. Since its formation, INAROE, on behalf of the Ministry, has established mine-clearance policies, strategies and priorities in cooperation with regional district authorities. Regional plans incorporate priorities for mine clearance, mine awareness, survey tasks and mined-area marking.

50. In order to provide a sustainable base for peace and economic development, UNDP approved the project on support to the development of mine clearance and awareness capacity involving INAROE. The full-scale project has a budget of \$25,400,000. Currently, funds amount to \$2.9 million, of which the United Nations has provided \$1.9 million and UNDP \$1 million. Additional contributions to the

Trust Fund are needed in order to carry out the project activities over the next two years.

51. In the forefront of the demining effort are international demining non-governmental organizations conducting mine clearance in support of the humanitarian agencies operating in Angola. The specialist mine-clearance non-governmental organizations are all expected to continue to undertake mine survey and clearance across the national territory in collaboration with INAROE.

## IV. Assistance by Member States and other donors

52. The United Nations Updated Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, covering the period from January to December 1996, sought a total of US\$ 187,294,074 in humanitarian assistance. Of this total, \$112,355,731 (60 per cent) was received in pledges and contributions. A new United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal was launched by the Secretary-General in March 1997, covering the period from January to December 1997. The Appeal seeks \$228,447,999. As at 22 September 1997, \$61,897,668 (28.7 per cent) had been received in pledges and contributions.

53. Since the previous report of the Secretary-General (A/50/424), the international community has made significant contributions to Angola and provided valuable support towards the peace process.

54. On 2 June 1997, the Secretary-General invited Member States and other donors to provide information on assistance extended to Angola in the framework of General Assembly resolution 50/58 D. Replies were received from six Member States.

### China

55. China provided 31,000 blankets, 63,000 garments, 12,000 flashlights, 600 gas lamps, 50,000 axes, 31,000 hoes and a consignment of stationary.

### Ireland

56. In 1996, Ireland provided 50,000 Irish pounds for emergency programmes and £169,070 for rehabilitation projects. An additional £409,645 has been provided in 1997 for rehabilitation projects.

### Luxembourg

57. Luxembourg has provided 10 million Luxembourg francs for return and resettlement assistance through IOM.

### Sweden

58. Sweden has had a development cooperation programme in Angola since 1975. During the period from June 1995 to June 1997, Sweden provided rehabilitation assistance to Angola, inter alia, in the following areas: repatriation of refugees, assistance to displaced persons, general humanitarian assistance, demining, road rehabilitation and demobilization of soldiers. Assistance in those areas during the period amounted to 233 million Swedish kronor. These funds have been channelled through UNHCR, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, UNDP, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a number of Swedish non-governmental organizations.

### Switzerland

59. In 1996, Switzerland provided approximately US\$ 3 million in humanitarian assistance to Angola. In 1997, Switzerland has contributed food aid and logistical support for the demobilization programme in the amount of \$912,000.

### United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

60. Since April 1996, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has contributed £5.6 million in humanitarian assistance to Angola. The Funds were committed to the following organizations: UNICEF, UNDP, the Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, WFP, WHO, IOM, Save the Children (United Kingdom), CARE International and Concern Worldwide.

## V. Conclusions

61. Following 30 years of war, the signing of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 was a signal of hope for the people of Angola. Throughout 1996 and 1997, the two parties to the conflict have been encouraged and urged by the international community to complete the tasks required by the Protocol. In late 1996 and early 1997, progress was made in satisfying the commitments of the Protocol, including the quartering of more than 78,000 UNITA troops. Additional progress was achieved in the demobilization of under-age military personnel and in initiating the rapid demobilization plan. On 11 April 1997, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was formed and efforts begun to transform UNITA from a guerrilla movement into a political party. However, clashes between government forces and UNITA in

the diamond-rich Lunda Norte province in May, have threatened the peace and raised questions regarding the commitment of the parties to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion.

62. Despite the prevailing tense situation throughout Angola and the recent stalemate in the peace process, humanitarian organizations have continued to implement their programmes, with a mix of both emergency and reconstruction projects under way in both government-controlled and UNITA-controlled areas. Unfortunately, increased insecurity has resulted in a slowdown of large-scale rehabilitation projects and has delayed the resettlement plans envisioned for the 1 million internally displaced persons and 300,000 Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries. Owing to these developments, United Nations agencies and their partners are currently planning for the remainder of 1997. They are holding regular and close consultations with government counterparts, the donor community and non-governmental organization partners in order to monitor the situation and make contingency plans for possible emergency response.

63. Peace, security and sustained commitment by all parties to honour the letter and spirit of the Lusaka Protocol are essential to enable the humanitarian community to deliver assistance to the Angolan people. Without these prerequisites, humanitarian assistance will continue to be constrained. More importantly, a successful transition to reconstruction, rehabilitation and development cannot occur. The Secretary-General calls upon all parties to actively demonstrate their commitment to peace in order to allow the Angolan people to realize a bright, secure and prosperous future.

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