Iran: Striking Back at Islamic State
| Publisher | Jamestown Foundation |
| Author | Alexander Sehmer |
| Publication Date | 30 June 2017 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 13 |
| Cite as | Jamestown Foundation, Iran: Striking Back at Islamic State, 30 June 2017, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 13, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/595f4af54.html [accessed 5 June 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
Link to original story on Jamestown website
A coordinated attack in the Iranian capital of Tehran, supposedly by Islamic State (IS), has prompted a furious response from the Iranian government. Among other things, this attack highlighted the sectarian risks engendered by Tehran's efforts in Syria and elsewhere.
On June 7, gunmen wearing suicide vests attacked the Iranian parliament and the mausoleum of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini, killing at least 13 people and wounding more than 50 others (al-Arabiya, June 7). The events were shocking, not least because Tehran has not seen such violence since the attacks by the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in the years after the 1979 Revolution, but also because the targeted sites, both highly symbolic, are considered to be well protected.
IS quickly claimed that it was behind the attack. In response, Tehran launched a ballistic missile strike on IS bases in Syria and vowed further retaliation (YJC, June 21). Such future retaliations will likely also take place in Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, in Iran, the intelligence services claimed to have rounded up at least 40 people connected to IS (FNA, June 21).
Over the years, Iran has developed a significant and ruthless domestic counter-terrorism operation, in large part a legacy of the MEK's activities in the 1980s. Following the attacks in the capital, Mahmoud Alav, Iran's intelligence minister, was at pains to stress that this has largely been a successful operation, disrupting 25 terror cells in the months prior to the assault on the parliament building (YJC, June 11).
Even so, Iran might have done more to anticipate IS activities within its borders, especially given its role in conflicts abroad, its treatment of minorities at home and IS' avowed anti-Shia ideology. The group appears to have been actively recruiting in Iran since 2014. It also appears to have received backing from Iranian Kurds, who are thought to have been involved in the Tehran attacks (al-Monitor, June 9). Added to this, the Iranian military has reported several instances over the last year in which it has killed supposed IS recruits in Kermanshah, a majority Sunni-Kurdish province in western Iran (al-Arabiya, August 16, 2016).
Unsurprisingly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) insisted that Saudi Arabia must also be complicit, vowing in a statement that the "spilled blood of the innocent will not remain unavenged" (al-Jazeera, June 7). Some Iranian officials have extended this threat to the United States and Israel (FNA, June 20). Many see the attack in the light of international attempts to curb Iranian regional influence, coming as it does at a time when Saudi Arabia is punishing Qatar, at least in part, over its friendlier relations toward Tehran.
A more measured Iranian response, however, will be one that examines its own policies in the light of regional sectarianism, which is an issue that is much closer to home.
