

**REFUGEE STATUS APPEALS**  
**AUTHORITY**  
**NEW ZEALAND**

**REFUGEE APPEAL NO 75094**

**AT CHRISTCHURCH**

**Before:** R P G Haines QC (Chair)  
C M Treadwell (Member)

**Counsel for the Appellant:** J B Taylor

**Appearing for the Department of Labour:** No Appearance

**Date of Hearing:** 16 April 2007

**Date of Decision:** 27 August 2007

---

**DECISION BY C M TREADWELL**

---

**INTRODUCTION**

[1] This is an appeal by a single Sinhalese man from Sri Lanka, aged in his early thirties, against a decision of a refugee status officer declining him the grant of refugee status.

**Delay**

[2] We record our regret at the lengthy delay in bringing this appeal to a conclusion. The apologies of the Authority have already been conveyed to the appellant, both in a Minute, dated 27 February 2007, and personally at the appeal hearing on 16 April 2007.

[3] The appeal was first brought on for hearing on 22 November 2004, the appellant having arrived in New Zealand on 23 April 2003. It was heard by a different panel of the Authority which, as explained in the Minute dated 27 February 2007, became incapable of delivering a decision.

[4] By the time it became apparent that a decision could not be delivered, the passage of time led us (the freshly-convened panel) to conclude that, in the interests of fairness to the appellant, it was appropriate to re-hear his evidence in full. While a transcript recording the evidence and oral submissions from the November 2004 hearing have been made available to the appellant and to us, we have heard the appellant's evidence *de novo*.

### **Background**

[5] The crux of the appellant's claim is that he is homosexual. He says that, as such, he is at risk of being persecuted by the Sri Lankan authorities and/or by members of the Sri Lankan community, against whom the government will not, or cannot, protect him.

[6] As to the authorities, he points to the criminalisation of homosexual activity in Sri Lanka and his past encounters with the Sri Lankan police. As to the general community, he points to his past experiences with members of the public and with members of his own family.

[7] The central issue on appeal is the question whether the appellant's anticipation of being persecuted is well-founded. In other words, whether there is a real chance of him suffering serious harm, against which he cannot obtain state protection, if he returns to Sri Lanka.

### **THE APPELLANT'S CASE**

[8] The account which follows is a summary of the evidence given by the appellant on appeal. It is assessed later.

[9] The appellant and his sister are the only children of a Sinhalese plantation manager and his wife, from Colombo. The family are Buddhist.

[10] The appellant was, by his own account, a slight and "feminine" child, prone to being bullied and teased at the primary school at which he boarded, to such an extent that he ran away from school on one occasion in the mid-1980s.

[11] At high school, the harassment and bullying of the appellant increased, as he developed, he says, increasingly effeminate mannerisms. He became self-conscious about his appearance, to the extent that he would wear baggy clothing

in public. Even so, other youths would regularly call out homophobic slurs as he walked past. His father would call him “a girl” and derided his lack of physical prowess and athletic ability.

[12] By the time he left school, the appellant knew with certainty that he was homosexual. He did not discuss this with family or friends but he describes himself as having been “one hundred per cent” sure of his sexual orientation.

[13] On leaving school, the appellant was unemployed for a year before, in 1996, finding employment as a bank officer at a bank in Colombo. There, the bullying and belittling resumed. Male staff members would touch him inappropriately and would make suggestive comments mockingly. He would frequently hear, in stage whispers, remarks about the need for more “male” staff and fewer “men like women”.

[14] In public, the appellant continued to be the object of derogatory remarks by strangers, in the street and on public transport. He was particularly aware of people mocking the way he walked and other mannerisms, to the point that he began to refrain from going out.

[15] The appellant did not know any other homosexuals and did not discuss his sexuality with his family for fear of their reaction. He believed that his father, in particular, would be outraged and angry – so much so that the appellant expected that he would be disowned.

[16] By 1999, the appellant had become depressed and miserable. He had no male friends and still knew no-one gay to whom he could talk or to whom he could relate. He attempted to correspond with a number of the men who advertised for male friends in various local magazines but his parents found some of his letters and he was compelled to abandon the idea.

[17] Eventually, the appellant sought professional help for his deteriorating mental health. After trying several counsellors, he saw a psychologist with whom he felt he could be open about his homosexuality. The psychologist was sufficiently concerned about the appellant’s state of mind that he had him sign an undertaking not to commit suicide.

[18] As part of his treatment, the psychologist introduced the appellant to a gay Australian man, Matthew Tyne, who worked with the United Nations in the areas of

AIDS and sexual awareness. Mr Tyne, in turn, introduced the appellant to a homosexual support organisation in Colombo, Companions on a Journey.

[19] Companions on a Journey was registered as a 'social group' because of the criminality of homosexual activity in Sri Lanka. On joining, the appellant discovered that it had approximately 1,000 members, of which the appellant personally saw perhaps 100-200. He would visit the organisation's premises in Colombo several times a month and was able to peruse gay literature and videos and to socialise with other gay people. He attended a number of workshops on sexual awareness and took part in trips and social events.

[20] At this time, the appellant experienced his first sexual encounters with other men. In retrospect, he considers that his mental health improved from about the time he was introduced to Companions on a Journey.

[21] The appellant's membership of Companions on a Journey did not cause him any difficulties, save for several anonymous telephone calls in the late 1990s, warning him to leave the organisation or be 'outed'. The appellant was frightened by these calls but nothing further eventuated. He never learned who had made them and they were not repeated.

[22] One evening in early 2000, the appellant and a male friend went to Wellawatte beach – known as a 'cruising area' for gay men. On the beach, they were stopped by two policemen and questioned as to their presence there. The police officers indicated that they would take the pair in for questioning but the appellant's friend, who worked in a government Ministry, told the police that the Minister was a personal friend and would take a poor view of their detention. At this, the policemen dropped the matter.

[23] The appellant was questioned by police officers on Wellawatte beach on two further occasions, over the ensuing few months. On each occasion, he was alone and was compelled to give his personal details to the officer before being allowed to go on his way.

[24] As well as Wellawatte beach, the appellant frequented malls known to be 'cruising areas' and, though he did not experience any difficulties himself, saw other gay men being questioned and moved on by security staff.

[25] Although the ability to meet with other gay men had helped with his depression, the appellant still felt that his life was being controlled by others and

that he was compelled to be someone other than his real self. In particular, he felt apprehensive about his parents' desire that he marry a woman and start a family. His mother had, by this stage, had the appellant's horoscope done, in preparation for an arranged marriage.

[26] In mid-2000, the appellant decided to undertake a hospitality course. He quit his employment at the bank and, after undertaking a short course in Sri Lanka, travelled to France where he enrolled in a one-year course at the University of Angers.

[27] After completing his course, the appellant remained in France, studying French and English until early 2003, when he decided to visit New Zealand. He arrived here in May 2003.

[28] In New Zealand, the appellant met a Dutch traveller, AA. They began an intimate relationship and moved in together. In October 2003, AA left New Zealand for South America, where he remained until November 2004. He and the appellant kept in touch during his travels and he returned to New Zealand for the express purpose of resuming their relationship.

[29] The appellant's own family remain unaware of his homosexuality. He describes his parents as very traditional and determined that he should marry. If they were to learn that he is gay, he is certain that they would react by disowning him and exiling him from the family. Such consequences, he says, would be difficult for him to cope with emotionally. His present self-imposed exile from Sri Lanka is, he says, as much because he wishes to spare them anguish as it is to enable him to live a gay life openly.

[30] The appellant does not believe that he and AA could return to Sri Lanka to live as a couple. Apart from the fact that his partner does not have a permit to reside in Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan immigration policy does not recognise homosexual relationships, the appellant does not consider he would be able to avoid his parents learning of the relationship. He also has concern that the general public would learn of it quickly, because the fact of a Sri Lankan and a white man sharing accommodation and being seen together would excite public interest.

### Evidence of AA

[31] The appellant's partner also gave evidence to the Authority. He describes himself as bisexual, rather than homosexual, but confirms that he is in an exclusive relationship with the appellant.

[32] As to the possibility of the appellant accompanying him to the Netherlands to live, AA is emphatic that this is not an option for the couple. He himself does not wish to return to the Netherlands, in part because he finds Dutch society intolerant of gays and in part because he has not been able to tell his own parents of his bisexuality.

[33] Since the appeal hearing, the Authority has been advised that AA has been granted permanent residence in New Zealand. His residence application did not include the appellant as his partner, because of the restriction imposed by s129U of the Immigration Act 1987.

### Documentary evidence

[34] In support of his appeal, the appellant has produced, *inter alia*:

- (a) A copy of the New Zealand Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986;
- (b) A copy of the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993;
- (c) A copy of the head-note for *VXAB v MIMA* [2006] FMCA 857, a decision of the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia;
- (d) An extract from the United States Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sri Lanka* (6 March 2007);
- (e) *Refugee Appeal No 75013* (21 March 2005);
- (f) A letter dated 24 March 2007 from the appellant's mother to the appellant, relevantly stating:

"Son, I got a reading of your horoscope. According to this, you are to get married this year or next year. What it indicated, in particular, is that you are getting married to someone with some issue.

My kind request to you is that you find an educated, attractive, obedient, modest and moral girl who truly loves you and is compatible with you."

- (g) A letter dated 4 April 2007 from the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department to the appellant, confirming his employment;
- (h) An extract from an Australian website "Lesbian and Gay Solidarity", at [www.zip.com.au/~josken/glasylum.htm](http://www.zip.com.au/~josken/glasylum.htm);
- (i) An extract from a website "Sodomy Laws" at [www.sodomylaws.org/world/sri\\_lanka/sri\\_lanka.htm](http://www.sodomylaws.org/world/sri_lanka/sri_lanka.htm);
- (j) An email dated 11 April 2007 from the appellant to counsel, forwarding an email from the Ex-President of Gay Sydney Nudists (GSN) Inc. about the recent granting of refugee status in Australia to a gay Malaysian man.
- (k) An email dated 22 May 2007, from the appellant to counsel, attaching an undated statement from Matthew Tyne;
- (l) An email dated 30 May 2007, from AA to counsel, advising that he has been granted permanent residence in New Zealand.

[35] The Authority and the appellant have been provided with the file of the Refugee Status Branch, including copies of all documents submitted by the appellant at first instance. At the appeal hearing, the Authority provided counsel with a copy of its decision in *Refugee Appeal No 74665* (7 July 2004) and granted leave for closing submissions and further documents to be made in writing by 7 May 2007. In the event, the submissions and documents were received by the Authority by two letters dated 7 May 2007 and 12 June 2007.

## **THE ISSUES**

[36] The Inclusion Clause in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention relevantly provides that a refugee is a person who:

"... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

[37] In terms of *Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96* (17 September 1996), the principal issues are:

- (a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted if returned to the country of nationality?
- (b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?

### **ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT'S CASE**

[38] The appellant's account is accepted as truthful.

### **Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted if returned to Sri Lanka?**

[39] In summary, the appellant says that should he return to Sri Lanka he will face the following:

- (a) prosecution and imprisonment;
- (b) harassment and detention by the police;
- (c) discrimination and harassment from members of the public, as well as work colleagues and acquaintances, including derogatory remarks, ostracism and ridicule; and
- (d) discrimination and rejection by his family.

[40] While each of these elements requires separate analysis, the Authority acknowledges that these are but separate strands of a single case and that it is not only the cumulative effect of these separate elements which must ultimately be assessed in determining whether the appellant has established a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Rather, the issue is whether a person of his characteristics facing these particular situations can be properly described as having "a well-founded fear of being persecuted".

[41] The appellant's case is that it is his sexual orientation which exposes him to these forms of harm. His case is also that the risk is increased by reason of his relationship with a European man.

[42] As can be seen from *Refugee Appeal No 74665/03* [2005] NZAR 60 it is accepted that where there is a real chance of an individual being persecuted for



reason of his or her sexual orientation, it is appropriate for refugee status to be recognised. In adjudicating a claim to refugee status based on sexual orientation a decision-maker does not apply any special rules of interpretation. Rather, the exercise is a conventional one of applying the language of the Convention to the facts as found. In this exercise the phrase “being persecuted” is to be understood as the sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection. As it is sometimes expressed, Persecution = Serious Harm + The Failure of State Protection. See *Refugee Appeal No 74665/03* at [41] and [53]. Understanding “being persecuted” in these terms requires the presence not only of the breach of a fundamental human right, it also requires a risk of serious harm. The breach of a fundamental human right on its own is insufficient to satisfy the “being persecuted” limb of the definition. The breach of the right must be accompanied by the risk of serious harm and the failure of state protection.

[43] The point can possibly be illustrated by addressing the first element of the appellant’s case, namely the risk of prosecution and imprisonment simply because of his sexual orientation.

### **The Penal Code**

[44] We accept that homosexual practices are illegal in Sri Lanka. See sections 365 and 365A of the Sri Lankan Penal Code, which prescribe a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment for “carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man” (some commentators say twelve years but the point is academic) and two years for “any act of gross indecency with another person”.

[45] As the appellant acknowledges, however, these provisions are not, in fact, enforced in Sri Lanka. According to Sherman de Rose, the founder of Companions on a Journey and a long-standing advocate for homosexual law reform in Sri Lanka, reported in UNHCR’s “Response to Information Request: Update to LKA35952.E”, dated 16 May 2003, no homosexual has been prosecuted in Sri Lanka under these provisions since 1950.

[46] We acknowledge that the criminalisation of homosexual activity breaches the core rights of non-discrimination and privacy. The refugee analysis, however, requires more. The right must not only be breached at its core, it must also be accompanied by a risk of serious harm before the “being persecuted” element is established. The point is well-illustrated by the need for the criminalisation of

homosexual acts to be enforced, not merely nominal. As was succinctly put in *Refugee Appeal No 74665* (7 July 2004), at [103]:

“Drawing on this discussion of various rights certain conclusions can be drawn. In the context of the Refugee Convention, *Toonen* establishes that the prohibition by law of consensual homosexual acts in private offends a core human rights obligation .... [A] prohibition of consensual homosexual acts, if accompanied by penal sanctions of severity which are in fact enforced, may well found a refugee claim. There is no easy formulation. It cannot be said that criminalisation of consensual homosexual acts is on its own sufficient to establish a situation of “being persecuted”. See further *Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs* (2000) 178 ALR 742 at [22] - [25] (Mansfield J).”

[47] Thus, the fact that Sri Lankan law continues to criminalise sexual activity between consenting male adults might impinge on the core rights of non-discrimination and the right to privacy. But because the law is not enforced and has not been enforced for the past 56 years, the mere presence of the law on the statute books cannot constitute serious harm.

### **Harassment and detention by the police**

[48] The Authority has given close consideration to the two statements submitted by Mathew Tyne and to the other evidence produced by the appellant in which harassment and detention of homosexuals by the police in Sri Lanka is described. We intend here to refer only to Mr Tyne’s statement attached to the appellant’s email of 22 May 2007 addressed to his immigration consultant. In this most recent statement Mr Tyne comments that homosexuals in Sri Lanka are at risk of being arrested under the Vagrants Ordinance, “a law that is used to prevent people from loitering”.

[49] Two sections of the Sri Lankan Vagrants Ordinance 1981 are potentially relevant – sections 2 (disorderly behaviour) and 7 (soliciting and acts of indecency in public places):

“2. Every person behaving in a riotous or disorderly manner in any public street or highway shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five rupees: Provided nevertheless that every person convicted four times of such conduct shall, for every subsequent offence, be punishable in the manner declared in the following section respecting idle and disorderly persons.

7. (1) The following persons, that is to say-

(a) any person in or about any public place soliciting any person for the purpose of the commission of any act of illicit sexual intercourse or indecency, whether with the person soliciting or with any other person, whether specified or not;

(b) any person found committing any act of gross indecency, or found behaving with gross indecency, in or about any public place ;

(c) any person found -

(i) in any public enclosure contrary to any local by-laws or regulations prescribing the use of such enclosures ; or

(ii) in any enclosure belonging to the State , without the permission of the person in charge thereof; or

(iii) within any private enclosure attached to any dwelling house, except upon the invitation of any inmate of the premises,

under such circumstances that it is reasonable to infer that he is there present for immoral purposes, unless he is able to explain his presence to the satisfaction of the court by which he is tried, shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment of either description for a period not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees, or to both.

(2) In any case in which any person who has been convicted of an offence under paragraph (a) of the last preceding subsection shall subsequently be convicted of another such offence, he shall, if a male, in addition to any other punishment to which he may be sentenced by the court, be liable, at the discretion of the court to be whipped.”

[50] Two points are immediately clear from the language and context of sections 2 and 7.

[51] First, the Ordinance is non-discriminatory. Matthew Tyne concedes, for example, that other loiterers, such as sex workers, are also detained under the Vagrants Ordinance. Sexual orientation is irrelevant to the offence.

[52] Second, the Ordinance does not, on its face, breach the right to privacy. Not only is it limited in its effect to acts committed in a public place (or in a private place, without permission to be there), but the acts complained of must be acts of riotous or disorderly behaviour or of illicit sexual intercourse, indecency or gross indecency. Such conduct, in public, is well within the sphere of activity which a state is entitled to proscribe, regardless of the sexual orientation of the perpetrator. This view is consistent with the limits on the right to privacy recognised by Sachs J in *National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice* (supra):

“[119] The choice is accordingly not an all-or-nothing one between maintaining a spartan normality, at the one extreme, or entering what has been called the post-modern supermarket of satisfactions at the other. Respect for personal privacy does not require disrespect for social standards. The law may continue to proscribe what is acceptable and what is unacceptable even in relation to sexual expression and even in the sanctum of the home, and may, within justifiable limits, penalise what is harmful and regulate what is offensive ....”

[53] The appellant's past experiences with the police do not suggest that the Vagrants Ordinance is employed by the police in breach of core human rights. On every occasion on which he was spoken to by the police, he was in an area which he acknowledges is well-known as a 'cruising area' and the police were entitled to speak to and, if warranted, detain any person who gave them cause to believe they may be loitering for one of the reasons in the Vagrants Ordinance.

[54] Nor is it the case that frequenting 'cruising areas' is vital to the ability of gays in Sri Lanka to meet partners or to engage in expression of their sexual orientation – circumstances which might raise the issue of the sufficiency of state protection. On the appellant's evidence, men are able to meet other men by advertising in local publications and have available to them organisations such as Companions on a Journey. They are also able to meet other men through the normal human interactions in which we all engage on a daily basis. It simply cannot be said that enforcement of the Vagrants Ordinance to prevent soliciting operates, even inadvertently, to extinguish or even seriously affect the expression of sexual orientation among the gay community. Once again the evidence adduced by the appellant fails to satisfy the Serious Harm limb of the "being persecuted" element of the definition. It should also be said that based on his own experiences there is no real chance of his being arrested under the Ordinance.

### **Discrimination and harassment by the public, work colleagues and acquaintances**

[55] We accept that there is a real chance that the appellant will suffer occasional acts of discrimination and harassment by members of the public, work colleagues and acquaintances if he returns to Sri Lanka. Such treatment is to be regretted. The issue, however, is whether such breaches of the right to non-discrimination and the right to privacy constitute serious harm, in the context of "being persecuted".

[56] Past experiences are not, of course, of themselves determinative of the future risk to a person but they are a helpful indicator of what might happen in the future. In this context, we do not overlook that, in his early twenties, the appellant reached such a low point in his mental health that he sought counselling. Nor do we forget that his counsellor was sufficiently concerned about his state of mind that he had the appellant sign a 'non-suicide' agreement. But the discrimination

and harassment he had received from others (including members of his family) was not the sole cause of his state of mind at that time.

[57] On his own evidence, he was beset at that time by wide-ranging pressures, including his own self-discovery, his unwillingness to tell his family of his homosexuality, his sense of loneliness at having no other person with whom he could seek solace or counsel and, in particular, his inability to meet other gay men with whom he could find both empathy and relationships. Verbal sneers and bullying by strangers, work colleagues and family members formed but a part of the corrosive influences on his state of mind in the late 1990s.

[58] For the most part, such pressures on the appellant will not recur if he returns to Sri Lanka. As well as being considerably older and more worldly-wise than he was in the late 1990s, the appellant is now aware of the extent of homosexuality in the Sri Lankan community, knows of and is able to access support networks and organisations such as Companions on a Journey and has experienced a long-term gay relationship. He is simply no longer the vulnerable and isolated youth who reached the point of requiring counselling in the late 1990s.

[59] Our view is reinforced by the appellant's evidence that, following his introduction to Matthew Tyne and to Companions on a Journey, his state of mind improved considerably as the pressures of isolation and introspection evaporated.

[60] We are satisfied that, even if the appellant is to suffer occasional derogatory comments and slurs about his sexual orientation from others on return to Sri Lanka, such treatment will cause no more than transient and short-lived feelings of hurt and rejection. They will not amount to serious harm, such as to constitute "being persecuted".

### **Discrimination and rejection by his family**

[61] The appellant fears rejection and ostracism from his family, should they become aware of his homosexuality. Even if we were to accept that there is a real chance of that happening (and the outcome is far too conjectural to say that it is anything but speculative), the right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with a person's family (Article 17 of the ICCPR) and to the protection of the family unit by society and the state (Article 23 of the ICCPR) are predicated upon the normal desire of a family to remain cohesive and internally supportive.

Those Articles have, as their focus, unwarranted interference in the family by external influences. They are not intended to address internal discord between adults within the family unit itself, even if such rifts reach the extreme of ostracism and are unreasonable. In other words, no state is required by international human rights law to compel adults to associate with one another, even within the family. To do so would clearly raise potential conflicts with the Article 22 right to freedom of association as well as the Article 17 right to privacy.

### **The appellant's relationship with a European man**

[62] Finally, we intend to comment briefly on the appellant's concern that he cannot maintain a homosexual relationship with his current partner in Sri Lanka, because their visibility would be so great that their homosexuality and relationship would quickly become public knowledge, putting him at risk of the forms of harm already canvassed herein and possibly aggravating them.

[63] It is not necessary to embark on an assessment of whether or not the presence of AA in Sri Lanka as the appellant's partner would exacerbate any of the other concerns which have been considered here. It is an entirely conjectural question because he does not have a right of residence in Sri Lanka and, on the evidence before us, the question whether he could obtain it is entirely speculative. Unlike many other countries, including New Zealand, Sri Lankan immigration law does not include same-sex partnerships as grounds for permanent residence – predictable of course, given the current criminalisation of homosexual acts. As to the grounds upon which residence can be sought, see the website of the Sri Lankan Department of Immigration and Emigration at [www.immigration.gov.lk/html/visa/residence.html](http://www.immigration.gov.lk/html/visa/residence.html).

[64] The issue of AA residing in Sri Lanka simply does not appear to arise here on the facts.

[65] For the sake of completeness, we record that even if it were established that AA *could* reside in Sri Lanka, the appellant's concern at the possible visibility of their relationship and the aggravating effect it might have on his treatment by the community is wholly speculative and is not grounded on any objective evidence.

**Conclusion on the “being persecuted” and well-foundedness issues**

[66] Having examined each of the strands of the appellant’s case separately and cumulatively we find that none of them on their own or taken together satisfy the Convention requirement that there be a well-founded fear of being persecuted. We have also separately considered whether a person having all of the characteristics of the appellant facing the particular circumstances he has identified would face a real chance of being persecuted in Sri Lanka. For the reasons given, we have concluded that the answer is “No”. The appellant does not face a real chance of being persecuted should he return to Sri Lanka.

[67] It follows that the second issue raised by the Convention definition, namely that of the reason for the anticipated harm, does not arise for consideration.

**CONCLUSION**

[68] For the foregoing reasons, the appellant is not a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Convention. Refugee status is declined. The appeal is dismissed.

“C M Treadwell”

C M Treadwell  
Member