



# Security Council

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## Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

### I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2018 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in taking forward the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (see [S/2015/364](#) and Add.1) and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it.

### II. Major political developments

2. The political and security situation has significantly deteriorated since my previous report ([S/2017/478](#)) and the adoption of resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#) on 29 June. The resumption of fighting between the signatory armed groups in northern Mali, growing insecurity in the centre of the country and mounting political turmoil surrounding the constitutional review process have delayed the implementation of the Agreement. In response to these challenges, MINUSMA extended its good offices to assist Malian parties in finding solutions to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement. Progress was made with the signature of a truce between the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups on 23 August and of a document of commitments that includes a definitive cessation of hostilities. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita also decided to stay the constitutional referendum on 18 August.

#### A. Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali after the end of the interim period

3. Building on the positive momentum registered during the previous reporting period, the Government and the signatory armed groups committed to prioritizing the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali beyond the expiration of the interim period on 20 June. In this regard, the High Representative of the President of the Republic of Mali for the Implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement, supported by the international mediation team and MINUSMA, facilitated dialogue between the signatory parties within the consultation framework agreed upon at the high-level meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 10 February. In addition, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali organized separate meetings with the signatory



armed groups to forge a consensus on the operationalization of interim authorities in Kidal; the return of the Governor to Kidal; and the deployment of the Operational Coordination Mechanism and mixed patrols in Kidal and Timbuktu. On 12 June, the signatory parties reached an agreement on a revised road map for the implementation of the Agreement and decided to establish the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal by 20 July. This did not materialize, as violent clashes erupted between CMA and the Platform in the Kidal and Ménaka regions on 6 and 11 July, respectively.

4. The Agreement Monitoring Committee met again on 11 July, and members of the international community and the Government strongly condemned the resumption of hostilities and called for an immediate truce. The Committee welcomed the decision taken on 22 June by the Government to establish a good offices mission for Kidal and the Niger Delta led by Mahmoud Dicko, head of the High Islamic Council. The good offices mission held meetings with traditional leaders and civil society representatives affiliated with CMA in Kidal on 27 July and those affiliated with the Platform in Gao on 1 August. Both groups issued communiqués following their respective meetings with Mr. Dicko. While CMA advocated for the initial deployment of a partial operational coordination mechanism to Kidal, excluding Platform elements, the Platform insisted on its full-fledged deployment, as well as a regional power-sharing arrangements. No agreement was reached on the matter.

5. The Special Representative continued to lead the international community's good offices efforts in support of the Government's initiative to obtain an immediate cessation of hostilities. After weeks of fighting, resulting in a significant number of casualties and the displacement of hundreds of families in the Kidal region, on 23 August the armed groups signed a document committing them to a 15-day extendable truce, which was renewed for one month on 6 September. Following reconciliation talks between CMA and the Platform, held from 15 to 20 September in Bamako, the signatory armed groups signed a document of commitments, which provided for, among other measures, a definitive cessation of hostilities and the relaunch of the finalization of the timeline for the full implementation of the Agreement. MINUSMA military observers and the mixed monitoring and verification teams conducted investigations into allegations of ceasefire violations in the Kidal and Ménaka regions. Conclusive evidence was difficult to obtain, since the clashes had occurred in remote areas without a permanent MINUSMA presence.

6. On 22 July, the working group on the independent observer, chaired by the High Representative of the African Union for Mali and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, submitted a list of three qualified candidates for the post of independent observer. Consultations are ongoing.

7. On 5 September 2017, the Security Council adopted resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#), which imposed a travel ban and an assets freeze on individuals or entities designated as threatening the peace, security or stability of Mali. The resolution also established a new Sanctions Committee, mandated to monitor implementation of the sanctions measures and to designate individuals and entities subject to those measures, as well as a panel of experts, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate, through periodic reporting.

#### **Political and institutional measures**

8. The full operationalization of the interim authorities continued to be hampered by internal rivalries and limited administrative, budgetary and planning capacities. Nonetheless, the interim authorities in Gao, Ménaka, Taoudenni and Timbuktu adopted a priority action plan aimed at enabling access to State funds for the

delivery of basic services. In Kidal, disagreements between the armed groups over the establishment of mixed patrols prevented the return of the Platform members who were members of the interim authorities, thereby delaying their operationalization. On 28 June, the Peacebuilding Fund launched a capacity-building project for the Ménaka and Taoudenni interim authorities on aspects relating to territorial division, public works and the provision of basic services.

9. Owing to the prevailing insecurity, there was no progress with regard to the redeployment of the civil administration to northern and central Mali. Despite a slight increase in judicial officers, low deployment rates of State officials continued to adversely affect the delivery of basic social services and undermined citizens' confidence in the State. As at 11 September, only 30 per cent of State officials were present at their duty stations in the northern regions and Mopti, compared with 38 per cent in January. On 23 August, the Government announced the appointment of new governors for the Gao and Mopti regions, following months of mobilization by civil society calling for the replacement of the governor in Gao. Also on 23 August, the governor for Kidal conducted a three-day working visit to Kidal, the first since his nomination in February.

10. On 21 June, the Council of Ministers postponed the constitutional referendum planned for 9 July, to allow the Constitutional Court to consider a petition filed by opposition members of Parliament challenging the legality of the constitutional review process. On 4 July, the Constitutional Court ruled that the process was compliant with the constitution but proposed amendments to a number of articles, which the Government accepted. On 9 August, following months of growing tensions and demonstrations in Bamako, the platform "An tè a banna! Touche pas à ma Constitution" comprising, inter alia, political opposition members, civil society and trade union representatives, issued an ultimatum to President Keita requesting that he withdraw the draft constitution. On 18 August, President Keita announced that he was staying the referendum on the Constitution in the nation's higher interest, to preserve a peaceful social climate and to avoid confrontations. Throughout this period, the Special Representative held several meetings with senior government officials, majority and opposition political parties and civil society groups as well as leaders of "An tè a banna! Touche pas à ma Constitution". He urged them to exercise restraint and called for constructive dialogue on the constitutional revision process.

11. The charter for peace, unity and national reconciliation was submitted to President Keita on 20 June. Drawing on the conclusions of the conférence d'entente nationale (conference for national harmony), the charter described a common vision, shared values and guiding principles for the country and a Malian nation State. CMA immediately rejected the charter as a reaction to the Government's decision not to refer to Azawad as a political and institutional entity in it. President Keita dismissed the conference's recommendation that the Government enter into negotiations with terrorist groups.

### **Defence and security measures**

12. Progress on the implementation of interim defence and security measures was slow, owing to a lack of trust between the signatory parties, the volatile security situation and the absence of clearly defined integration criteria, including a decision on rank harmonization. The failure by the signatory armed groups to submit lists of their combatants continued to remain the main obstacle to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process scheduled to start on 15 October 2017. Signatory armed groups demanded quotas for the integration of their elements into all security institutions, not only the armed forces as initially agreed. This request had yet to be addressed by the Government. In Gao, poor conduct and discipline on

the part of the mixed patrols contributed to growing discontent among the population, as well as, in some cases, the creation of vigilante groups.

13. On 8 June, an expert-level discussion on security sector reform was held in New York to assess the status of the implementation of the security and defence provisions of the Agreement and strengthen international support in that area. The aim of a high-level meeting planned to take place in Bamako in October is to adopt a Malian-owned partnership framework on security sector reform, outlining the respective roles of Mali and its partners, as well as expected contributions.

14. On 27 July, the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and the Integration Commission confirmed that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process would commence with elements of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in October, followed by deserters from the Malian armed forces from the 2012 crisis, elements from signatory armed groups, and the disarmament of civilian armed groups, in that order. The two commissions also confirmed that the cantonment process would start at the eight existing cantonment sites constructed by MINUSMA, for which the Mission is upgrading security features to mitigate threats during the demobilization process.

15. The first phase of the rehabilitation of the Operational Coordination Mechanism camp in Kidal, with a capacity to host approximately 600 combatants, was completed on 26 July. Given the complexity of the environment, command and control issues, logistical requirements and the need for coordination, the Mission proposed to the Government and signatory armed groups a phased deployment of their combatants to the Kidal Operational Coordination Mechanism. The commanding officers of the Malian armed forces, CMA and the Platform deployed in Kidal on 28 July to plan and organize the arrival of their respective elements.

16. The Technical Commission on Security met on 16 August and decided on the adoption of rules of procedures for the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Gao and the imposition of disciplinary measures following acts of misconduct by its personnel. The signatory armed groups were requested to remove elements that had been involved in criminal acts. CMA responded positively, dismissing six of its members. Commission members and the leadership of the Operational Coordination Mechanism leadership agreed to conduct regular monitoring visits to raise awareness of these matters. The Technical Commission on Security met again on 30 August and agreed on measures to enforce the truce, including movements of troops, vehicles and heavy weapons.

17. The Mission continued the implementation of 34 community violence reduction projects to create conditions conducive to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, obtaining support from the communities and assisting the restoration of State authority and services in remote areas. MINUSMA increased its coordination at both the national and regional levels with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. MINUSMA and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) organized training for 64 members of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Commission on Integration and the National Council for Security Sector Reform on gender mainstreaming with the support of the Peacebuilding Fund. The Government and signatory armed groups also held three workshops on the criteria and the quota requirements for signatory armed groups to qualify for integration into the Malian defence and security forces. However, the integration criteria had yet to be validated by the National Council for Security Sector Reform.

18. In anticipation of the development by the Government of Mali of a policy on the territorial police, the Mission devised a community-oriented policing and

training module to bring the police, gendarmerie, National Guard and civil protection closer to the people and trained 54 elements of the security forces, including 15 women. UN-Women supported the national police in developing an action plan against gender-based violence with the financial support of the Peacebuilding Fund.

## **B. Support for the Malian defence and security forces**

19. The memorandum of understanding between MINUSMA and the Government on the Mission's support for the Malian armed forces remained pending for signature. The Mission provided training, logistics, intelligence sharing, air transport and medical evacuation to Malian defence and security forces. Frameworks for security coordination between MINUSMA and the Malian armed forces were put in place in Gao and Timbuktu. In line with the Mission's mandate to support the redeployment of the reconstituted Malian defence and security forces to the north and centre of the country, the Mission's camp in Léré, Timbuktu region, was handed over to the Malian armed forces on 7 September.

20. In response to a Government request for support in strengthening security for prisons detaining suspected extremists, MINUSMA supported the rehabilitation of two high-security wings in the main prison in Bamako where presumed terrorists were held. On 4 August, this support, together with advice on prison security, led to the adoption of an interministerial order requiring each prison to develop a security plan.

21. International partners continued to conduct joint operations with Malian forces. More than 15 Malian-French operations were conducted during the period, with three main transborder operations along the borders of Mali with Burkina Faso and Niger. The European Union Training Mission continued to train Malian armed forces. During the reporting period, MINUSMA trained 269 personnel of the Malian defence and security forces, including 42 women, in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu on combating terrorism and organized crime. On 29 June, a coordination mechanism was established between MINUSMA, French forces, the European Union Training Mission and the Malian armed forces.

## **C. Mine action, weapons and small arms**

22. The Mission has trained 283 Malian defence and security forces personnel in explosive threat mitigation since February 2017. The Malian police explosive ordnance disposal team conducted 14 interventions in Bamako. The Malian defence and security forces weapons and ammunition management capacity was reinforced with the training of 98 personnel in safe and secure weapons and ammunition storage and inspection.

23. The Mine Action Service raised awareness of explosive hazards among vulnerable populations in conflict-affected areas, reaching 13,621 individuals (3,890 women, 3,216 men, 3,325 girls and 3,190 boys).

## **D. Other political developments**

24. On 12 June, the Prime Minister, Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga, presented his policy statement to the National Assembly, which adopted it on 15 June in a vote of confidence. The statement set out the Government's priorities until the presidential elections in July 2018, namely, the full implementation of the Agreement, the easing

of social tensions, the implementation of the Presidential Social Emergency Programme and a review of the country's position and role in subregional, regional and international affairs.

25. Although a new date for the constitutional referendum was not announced, the Ministry of Territorial Administration acquired all the required electoral materials, with the exception of ballot papers, to hold the referendum. These materials were deployed to electoral districts, with the exception of Gao. Additionally, materials for the local by-elections, district and regional polls were purchased. In the absence of a new basket fund, the Government faced a financial gap of approximately \$32.3 million.

26. In line with the recommendations of the electoral needs assessment mission conducted in April 2017, the United Nations Development Programme and MINUSMA prepared a draft electoral assistance project document to support the 2018-2019 electoral cycle. The draft, on which national and international stakeholders were to be consulted in October, included capacity-building initiatives for electoral management bodies, voter awareness and civic education campaigns and the training and payment of polling station agents. The Mission held four workshops in June with key stakeholders on election-related conflict prevention and mitigation mechanisms. In addition, the Mission built the capacity of electoral management bodies, media, civil society organizations and political party leaders on gender mainstreaming in elections. In July and August, the same groups were briefed on the 2016 Electoral Law by the Mission.

## **E. Regional developments**

27. Insecurity in Mali continued to have significant subregional repercussions, in particular in border areas with Burkina Faso and Niger, where militant groups affiliated to various degrees with Mali-based violent extremist groups claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on security forces and civilians. Four attacks in Soum province in northern Burkina Faso in March and June were claimed by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, as was an assault on 25 August in Abala in Niger, close to the border with Mali. A major terrorist attack on a restaurant in Ouagadougou on 13 August, resulting in 19 deaths, was also suspected to be linked to these networks.

28. On 14 June, the Ministerial Platform for the Sahel met in N'djamena and agreed to revitalize the Platform and its support mechanisms, including through linkages between its working groups and the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

29. On 21 June, the Security Council adopted resolution [2359 \(2017\)](#), welcoming the deployment by the States members of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) of a joint force to help restore peace and security in the Sahel. On 2 July, Heads of State of the G-5 Sahel and the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, met in Bamako for an extraordinary summit to discuss the operationalization of the joint force. The final declaration of the Summit acknowledged the need to accompany military initiatives with long-term development efforts to address the root causes of insecurity.

30. In line with resolution [2364 \(2017\)](#), MINUSMA deployed staff officers to Mopti to ensure and facilitate coordination with the G-5 Sahel Force headquarters, located in the Malian armed forces camp in Sévaré, Mopti region.

31. MINUSMA, in partnership with the European Union Common Security and Defence Policy mission in Mali, the International Organization for Migration and

G-5 Sahel, continued its advocacy and planning work for the development of a national border security and management strategy. The Mission focused its advisory role on practical border security measures at Anderamboukane, Labezanga and Léré on the Mali-Niger and Mali-Mauritania borders respectively. A Peacebuilding Fund project, aligned with the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel to support communities and address security concerns on the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, was signed by the Governments concerned on 29 August.

### **III. Major security developments**

32. The security situation significantly deteriorated. Since mid-July, the situation in Kidal has worsened, with armed clashes between CMA and the Platform as both groups vied for control of Kidal. Meanwhile, asymmetric attacks continued against MINUSMA and international forces, notably in the Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions. Attacks against the Malian defence and security forces almost doubled as compared with the previous reporting period.

#### **A. Asymmetric and other attacks**

33. Violence spiked even more during the reporting period. Violent extremist groups and terrorist elements conducted 75 attacks (44 against Malian defence and security forces, 21 against MINUSMA and 10 against Barkhane), as compared with 37 attacks in the previous reporting period (23 against Malian defence and security forces, 11 against MINUSMA and 3 against Barkhane). These figures represent an increase of 102.7 per cent for all attacks. Casualty figures also increased, with 15 MINUSMA and MINUSMA-related personnel deaths (6 peacekeepers, 1 civilian personnel member and 8 contractors), another 34 injured (25 peacekeepers, 2 civilian personnel and 7 contractors). In the previous reporting period, four peacekeepers were killed and five injured. Similarly, 39 members of the Malian defence and security forces were killed and another 44 were wounded, compared with 33 killed and 54 injured in the previous reporting period. As regards international forces, no French soldiers were killed, while 17 were injured, compared with 2 injured during the previous reporting period.

34. Most asymmetric attacks were claimed by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims. Meanwhile, the violent extremist splinter group, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, which is currently operating in the Mali-Niger border area, seemed to be exploiting existing inter-community tensions. On 1 June, a mortar attack against the bases of MINUSMA and the French armed forces in Timbuktu city, resulted in the death of one peacekeeper and the wounding of three Malian and eight French peacekeepers, as well as damage inside the camp. The attack was the fourth such attack in Timbuktu in four weeks. On 8 June, assailants launched 15 mortar shells at the MINUSMA camp in Kidal town, and killed four and wounded five peacekeepers in an attack on a Mission position in the city. On 18 June, 5 people died and 10 were wounded in an attack on a hotel near Bamako. On 14 August, armed assailants attacked a MINUSMA camp in Douentza, Mopti region. One peacekeeper and one member of the Malian armed forces were killed, while another peacekeeper was injured. On the same day, unidentified armed men attacked the MINUSMA headquarters in Timbuktu city. Four assailants infiltrated the compound, before being killed. Five security guards, one national contractor and one Malian gendarme died in the attack, and another six MINUSMA peacekeepers were wounded.

35. To address the increasingly volatile and complex security environment, in August, the Government initiated the development of a national action plan on preventing and fighting violent extremism and terrorism, with specific child protection provisions. MINUSMA also continued to support the Malian integrated strategy for the central region by developing a pilot project on community-oriented policing, as well as a dedicated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plan. MINUSMA continued to provide support to Malian specialized units dealing with terrorism and transnational organized crime, including investigative and forensic support through the co-location of the Malian Specialized Judicial Unit on Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. The latter charged nine persons with taking part in acts of terrorism during an ambush on a MINUSMA foot patrol near Aguelhok, Kidal region, in which two peacekeepers were killed on 23 May.

## **B. Protection of civilians**

36. The protection of the situation of civilians significantly deteriorated in the Ménaka and Mopti regions. The limited presence and capability of Malian defence and security forces to respond to threats continued to put civilians at greater risk, as did the ceasefire violations and clashes in the Gao and Kidal regions and the unstable situation in Ménaka.

37. In Koro district, Mopti region, intercommunity violence following the 16 June murder of a prominent Dogon community member resulted in up to 39 fatalities and forced an estimated 3,000 civilians to resettle in nearby areas. A local conflict mediation commission with members of the two main Dogon and Fulani civil society associations travelled to the affected areas to mediate between communities and prevent a new outbreak of mass violence. The commission recommended that Malian defence and security forces did not deploy to the area, given the risk that their presence could aggravate tensions.

38. Other districts in the central region continued to be affected by the presence of violent extremist groups. For the first time in 2017, this type of threat was observed in the Bandiagara district of Mopti. In Mopti district itself, on 4 July, 100 armed elements arrived in Dialoubé to assert control of the town, and on 20 August, armed elements reportedly flogged a dozen women who were not wearing the veil. On 20 July, a wedding party was assaulted and 10 women were beaten 5 km from Mopti town. In early September in Ténenkou district, over 30 civilians, including women, were abducted by presumed violent extremists, seemingly because of the civilians' opposition to previous incursions by these armed elements. All the abductees were subsequently released over the following days further to mediation by traditional authorities.

39. In Timbuktu region, extremist armed elements used intimidation tactics, including one beheading and three kidnappings, which instilled a climate of fear and insecurity. Since July, the repeated presence of elements allegedly affiliated to Hamadou Kouffa, one of the leaders of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, in the Niafunké district, indicated the potential spread of a threat mostly recorded to date in the Mopti region.

40. Four children were killed in crossfire during clashes between signatory armed groups and during armed incidents involving unidentified armed groups, while four others were killed and eight injured by explosive remnants of war in the Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Mopti regions. Additionally, two adult civilians were killed and eight others injured by improvised explosive devices in the Gao and Kidal regions.

41. From 7 to 10 June, escalating tensions in the Kidal region prompted MINUSMA to conduct Operation Castor, with approximately 300 peacekeepers



deployed to secure the city day and night, including 80 peacekeepers allocated to neighbourhoods assessed as particularly vulnerable. A similar operation was conducted in Aguelhok. In parallel, MINUSMA engaged local community leaders to reduce tensions.

#### **IV. Human rights situation**

42. The human rights situation remained of serious concern. Violent clashes involving signatory armed groups and non-compliant armed groups in the Kidal and Ménaka regions were linked to serious abuses, including enforced disappearance and the use and recruitment of children. The rights and fundamental freedoms of local communities, including the freedoms of religion, expression and movement, were also increasingly threatened in the Mopti and Ségou regions by the presence of violent extremist groups.

43. MINUSMA documented 112 cases of human rights violations and abuses across the country, involving 348 victims, of whom 3 were women and 21 were children, compared with 66 cases and 115 victims in the previous reporting period. The cases included 13 instances of extrajudicial and arbitrary killings, 9 of enforced disappearance, 15 of ill-treatment, 9 of child recruitment and use, 4 of conflict-related sexual violence and 31 of unlawful and arbitrary detention. Signatory armed groups and some members of the Malian defence and security forces remained among the main alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses.

44. On 5 August, the Mission issued a press release on some of the gravest cases documented, announcing that it had confirmed 34 allegations of human rights abuses in the Kidal region, including enforced disappearances and recruitment and use of children. MINUSMA further confirmed the existence of two larger graves, as well as individual tombs, in Anéfit, containing the corpses of individuals reportedly killed at the time of clashes in the region. The Mission is verifying the status and identities of those killed, as well as the circumstances leading to the killings.

45. The Malian authorities arrested 116 individuals on terrorism-related charges, of whom 106 were released, including 5 boys and 2 females. Among the 116 arrested, 22 claimed to have been ill-treated, while 60 were detained by the gendarmerie without an arrest warrant. As at 11 September, 239 individuals held on terrorism charges, including 5 boys, remained in detention in State institutions. CMA and the Platform detained at least 70 individuals (37 on conflict-related matters and 33 on law enforcement-related matters) in areas under their control. The total number of individuals who were still being detained by signatory armed groups was at least 21 civilians and 43 combatants from opposing signatory armed groups, including those detained during previous periods.

46. MINUSMA continued to assist the Government to combat impunity and promote reconciliation. In August, MINUSMA shared 151 cases of human rights violations and abuses verified in 2017 with the Ministry of Justice for review and follow-up. The Mission has established a similar sharing mechanism with the Chief of Staff of the Malian Armed Forces to address cases allegedly involving Malian armed forces. MINUSMA monitored the trial of the former self-proclaimed commissioner of the Mouvement pour l'unification et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) Islamic police in Gao, which opened on 18 August, for crimes committed in northern Mali in 2012 and 2013. On 21 August, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for the illegal possession of weapons of war, criminal conspiracy and aggravated assault and for breaching national security.

47. MINUSMA continued to raise awareness among Malian defence and security forces of human rights principles. The Mission trained 45 members of the Malian armed forces deployed to Mopti on human rights and international humanitarian law. As part of the European Union Training Mission in Mali training sessions, MINUSMA sensitized 181 Malian armed forces elements based in Koulikoro. In July, MINUSMA organized a two-day conference, attended by 13 members of the diplomatic corps and regional organizations and 35 high-ranking Malian defence and security forces officers, on the implementation of the Due Diligence Policy on Human Rights.

48. MINUSMA continued to support the operationalization of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, including at the regional level. As of 11 September, 1,585 individuals had made statements to the Commission, bringing the total for 2017 to 5,303.

49. During the first semester (January to June 2017), the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System recorded 1,368 cases of gender-based Violence. With a view to addressing conflict-related sexual violence, MINUSMA continued to engage parties to the conflict on concrete commitments, through sustained advocacy and technical assistance. On 7 July in Kidal, CMA signed a unilateral communiqué to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence, for which they are listed in my reports on conflict-related sexual violence. Similarly, MINUSMA continued to provide capacity-building for the Platform to implement its communiqué, signed on 30 June 2016.

50. It was confirmed that, during the August clashes in Kidal between CMA and the Platform, nine children were recruited by the Platform. They were detained by CMA, then handed over to MINUSMA and UNICEF for interim care pending family tracing and reunification on 11 August. Seven child casualties as a result of crossfire incidents and explosive hazards in the Gao, Kidal and Mopti regions were documented.

## **V. Humanitarian situation**

51. The deteriorating security situation in Mali further negatively impacted the dire humanitarian situation. Given the limited presence of State authority and the lack of sustainable development gains in central and northern Mali, humanitarian needs persisted. Humanitarian actors therefore continued to play an essential role in meeting the basic needs of vulnerable people.

52. Displacements continued to occur regularly owing to violence in the Kidal and Ménaka regions and intercommunity violence in the Mopti region, increasing the number of internally displaced persons from some 52,000 in May to approximately 55,400. Since January 2017, more than 30,000 people have been newly displaced. The number of Malian refugees in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger declined from some 141,500 to approximately 140,900.

53. As part of the Government-led national response plan to food insecurity during the lean season, the United Nations, in collaboration with partners, provided seasonal food assistance to 267,500 people out of 601,000 severely food-insecure people in the crisis-affected areas. The United Nations also provided emergency food and nutritional assistance to newly displaced persons.

54. Since the previous report, the overall number of closed schools remained at 500, resulting in 150,000 children out of school in the Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti, Ségou and Timbuktu regions. The closures were mainly due to insecurity and threats against education personnel.

55. A total of 43, mostly crime-related, security incidents affecting humanitarian actors, such as direct attacks, break-ins at humanitarian compounds and vehicle theft, were registered, compared with 27 cases in the previous reporting period. On 21 August, a vehicle belonging to a United Nations agency travelling in the Timbuktu city was attacked by unidentified armed assailants and two United Nations personnel were injured. Two non-governmental organization workers were killed and seven others injured in separate incidents. Armed groups temporarily blocked humanitarian assistance to the northern regions, including food assistance to some areas of the Kidal and Ménaka regions. The presence of explosive hazards targeting armed forces in the main areas of humanitarian intervention continued to threaten access to the affected population. In a new trend, humanitarians are coming under direct attack by armed men within city limits.

56. Humanitarian funding continued to be inadequate to meet current needs and provide life-saving assistance. The budgetary requirements of the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, which provides for assistance for 1.56 million people, were reviewed in August to reflect increased needs related to food insecurity during the lean season. The funding requirements increased from \$293 million to \$304.7 million, of which only 26.3 per cent had been received as at 11 September.

## **VI. Economic development and cultural preservation**

57. While Mali succeeded in sustaining economic growth and subduing inflation, the majority of the population continues to live below the poverty level. The International Monetary Fund extended its \$43.96 million national financial programme until July 2018. However, prevailing insecurity continued to undermine the rule of law and provision of basic social services, particularly in the north and parts of central Mali.

58. The Government held a workshop in Bamako from 17 to 19 July to further define the development strategy for the northern regions. The workshop called for additional stakeholder consultations on the establishment of a sustainable development fund and for the Ministry of Economy and Finance to report on the status of pledges received pursuant to the International Conference for the Economic Recovery and Development of Mali, held in Paris on 22 October 2015.

59. The United Nations country team and MINUSMA supported the consolidation of peace through a range of socioeconomic initiatives aligned with the Government's development objectives. The World Food Programme reinforced social protection for vulnerable populations, the United Nations Children's Fund supported school education for children, in particular girls, and the United Nations Population Fund worked on integrated reproductive and sexual health services. During the reporting period, 34 quick-impact projects were implemented to strengthen the capacity of the State and address the basic needs of the population in the north and centre of the country. These included training on administrative and legal procedures for local government officials in Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti, Taoudenni and Timbuktu and the provision of office equipment and material to the regional development agencies in Gao and Mopti. Projects were also used to provide access to safe water for about 3,000 people in the Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Timbuktu regions; education for 610 children in the Gao and Taoudenni regions; and health care for 17,940 people in remote areas of the Kidal and Mopti regions.

60. On 5 July, the Peacebuilding Fund steering committee selected governance and intercommunity conflict as priority issues for its 2018-2020 project phase and added the Mopti and Ségou regions to its areas of intervention.

## **VII. Mandate implementation and transition planning**

61. MINUSMA has begun developing a mission-wide strategic plan, comprising a phased approach to mandate implementation, a transition strategy and an exit strategy. Key considerations include prioritization and sequencing of the mission's core mandated tasks, taking into account evolving realities on the ground, while also ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent and based on best practices, as well as further integration with and the handover of specific tasks to the United Nations country team. Given budgetary constraints, the Mission is also considering how to best harness commitments of other stakeholders including the Government and signatory armed groups, which must be fully engaged in the peace process.

## **VIII. Capacities of the Mission**

### **A. Military**

62. The force level of 13,289 military personnel comprises 40 military observers, 486 staff officers and 12,763 contingent personnel. As at 11 September, 11,273 personnel, or 85 per cent of the authorized strength, had been deployed. Women account for 2.2 per cent of military personnel.

63. A technical review conducted by the Office of Military Affairs from 14 to 25 July identified a series of measures to increase operational forces through reorganization of units, review of command and control capabilities, medical coverage and reduction in the number of camps, thereby reducing static guard requirements. The Mission is looking to improve intelligence gathering by deploying reconnaissance capabilities at the sector and battalion levels.

64. While little progress was made on force generation, important steps were taken in preparation for the deployment of key assets to improve the force's mobility, intervention and deterrence capabilities. The advance party of the quick reaction force arrived in Mopti on 10 August, while the main body and helicopter detachment are scheduled to deploy later this year. A construction party arrived in Gao in June to begin the camp construction which would accommodate one combat convoy company, with works scheduled to be completed in October. The deployment of at least two other combat convoy companies is planned for October and December. Progress was made in generating pledges for an explosive ordnance disposal company, a special forces company, airfield support units and armed and military utility helicopter units. The lack of armoured personnel carriers remained a major obstacle to the Mission's operations; meanwhile some troop-contributing countries made progress in reducing their shortages. MINUSMA continues to require an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance company for Kidal. Insufficient contingent-owned equipment and the self-sustainment capabilities of some infantry units also remain a concern. The lack of air assets compromised the Mission's response across its area of responsibility, including in support of its protection of civilians mandate. Only three out of seven helicopter units, or six out of nine attack helicopters and four out of fourteen medium utility helicopters, are deployed or operational. The medium utility helicopter unit deployed to Kidal, which was damaged in the attack of October 2016, was unable to resume operations and is scheduled to be repatriated by the beginning of October. The military fixed-wing air transport unit based in Gao, which was damaged in the attack of November 2016, was unable to resume operations and will be repatriated. MINUSMA has deployed commercial air transport resources to address the support requirements in each location. Regrettably, the Mission lost an attack helicopter and its crew members during a crash on 26 July.

**French forces**

65. In accordance with resolution 2364 (2017), French forces continued to intervene in support of MINUSMA within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment.

**B. Police**

66. The ceiling of 1,920 police personnel comprised 345 individual police officers and 1,575 formed police personnel. As at 11 September 2017, 1,685 personnel, or 88 per cent of its authorized strength, had been deployed, of whom 84 per cent were individual police officers (17 per cent of whom were women) and 74 per cent formed police unit personnel (4 per cent of whom were women). MINUSMA police continue to require an additional 12 armoured personnel carriers for formed police units, six armoured cars for individual police officers, as well as 45 individual police officers with specialized expertise, including in forensics, investigations, riverine police capacity, security sector reform, counter-terrorism, serious organized crime and drug trafficking.

**C. Civilian personnel**

67. As at 11 September, 79 per cent of all MINUSMA civilian staff had been deployed, including 80 per cent of international staff, 77 per cent of United Nations Volunteers and 79 per cent of national staff. Women held 26 per cent of the international posts, 32 per cent of United Nations Volunteer positions and 19 per cent of national staff posts.

**D. Camp construction and securing supply routes**

68. The Mopti camp for the quick reaction force was completed on 11 August and occupied by the advance party. The construction of the Mopti integrated super camp is under way and scheduled for completion in February 2018. Works to upgrade the Gao airport runway have commenced and are scheduled to be completed in April 2018.

69. A prototype for overhead protection for sleeping quarters for personnel operating under the United Nations security management system was developed and tested in August. Revised accommodation layouts for Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu have been completed and roll-out is expected to start in the next quarter. The redesign of the layout of Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Tessalit and Timbuktu camps is under way. Major upgrades to defence works in all Mission camps are expected to be completed by December 2017. These works include the installation of swing and boom gates in Ménaka, upgrades to the ditch and berm around Kidal camp, the construction of new bunkers in Timbuktu, reinforcement of the main gates, ditch and berm around the super camp in Gao and the construction of a ditch and berm around the new camp in Mopti.

70. Two transportable armoured air traffic control towers were delivered to Gao and to Kidal, using the Cotonou-Niamey-Gao convoy route. The Togolese formed police unit moved its contingent-owned equipment from Niamey to Ansongo for deployment to Ménaka. Between July and August, 44 containers of Chinese contingent-owned equipment were moved to Gao along this route.

## **E. Environment**

71. MINUSMA finalized its Mission-wide environmental action plan. Regional environmental committees were established and waste/environmental focal points identified in each military and police camp to support the Mission's environmental management system. An environmental awareness session was included in the Mission's mandatory induction training.

## **IX. Safety and security of United Nations personnel**

72. The programme criticality assessment was reviewed and updated in August 2017. MINUSMA took measures to enhance its information collection and analysis capacity by establishing a Mission secured network. The merger of Force Headquarters Intelligence Branch and the former All Sources Information Fusion Unit was completed.

73. MINUSMA has taken key steps to improve its security infrastructure, as described in paragraph 69. The Mission currently has sense-and-warn systems deployed in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Plans are under way to install similar systems in other locations. The indirect fire attack of 8 June on the MINUSMA camp in Kidal demonstrated the value of sense-and-warn systems, which enabled personnel to seek shelter in bunkers while multiple shells exploded within the camp. Some of the equipment was severely damaged during attacks in Kidal and Timbuktu, prompting the temporary relocation of non-essential staff. The security of United Nations premises and personnel was also reinforced by means of additional patrols and escorts, as well as the deployment of quick reaction forces. Integrated defence plans were also finalized for the regions and Bamako.

74. In response to the asymmetric threats faced by the Mission's logistics convoys, MINUSMA continued to provide training on the identification and mitigation of improvised explosive device threats to 370 Mission military personnel and delivered a training course on leading these operations in an asymmetric threat environment for convoy commanders to 43 personnel.

75. The Mission's capacity to conduct prompt medical and casualty evacuation remained constrained by the shortage of night operation capable military attack and utility helicopters in Kidal and Mopti region, limiting the ability of the civilian specialized aeromedical evacuation helicopters and teams to operate in combat situations. The Mission increased the number of civilian MI-8 helicopters in Timbuktu to maintain full casualty/medical evacuation coverage. One MI-8 was stationed in Ménaka to provide the Mission with immediate evacuation capability in the region.

## **X. Conduct and discipline**

76. In addition to the two allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse received in January and June 2016, which are both pending investigation by the relevant troop-contributing country, a third allegation was reported in August, also pending investigation. MINUSMA continued its prevention activities, including training, public information and outreach activities to inform the local population about the United Nations standards of conduct, in particular the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

## XI. Observations

77. I am deeply concerned by recent developments in Mali, in particular the resumption of violent clashes between the signatory armed groups and the political turmoil surrounding the constitutional referendum. These developments are indicative of deeply rooted rifts within Malian society that need to be addressed in order to bring new momentum in the peace process. Regrettably, almost no progress was made in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. As the country enters an intense electoral period, culminating in the 2018 presidential elections, the signatory parties' unwavering support for and commitment to the peace process is a prerequisite for preventing a descent into a vicious cycle of violence and chaos, jeopardizing the future of Mali and its chances for lasting peace.

78. The gains in the peace process could easily be reversed if not rapidly consolidated. Lack of progress in the operationalization of the interim authorities and establishment of the Operational Coordination Mechanisms in Kidal and Timbuktu sends the wrong message. Insufficient progress has been made on the institutional reforms that would allow for the implementation of key provisions of the Agreement, such as comprehensive security sector reform or the adoption of a revised constitution. Time is of the essence now.

79. The resumption of hostilities exacerbated security risks in northern Mali. While I welcome the signing of a truce, the armed groups must now demonstrate that they remain truly steadfast in their commitment to the peace process and the restoration of State authority and services. I call upon these groups not only to respect the definitive cessation of hostilities but to contribute proactively to the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Agreement. Their commitment must include a submission of their finalized lists of candidates for the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and (re)integration processes, so that these processes can commence in earnest. Stabilization and peacebuilding in northern Mali will otherwise remain unattainable, and the most vulnerable populations will continue to suffer from the absence of long overdue peace dividends. In this regard, I take note of the adoption of resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) and will make the necessary arrangements to support the new Sanctions Committee and the prompt establishment of the Panel of Experts and to ensure close cooperation with MINUSMA.

80. I welcome President Keita's decision to stay the constitutional referendum to appease social tensions and prevent a further escalation of protests. It is the Government's responsibility to quickly determine the modalities for a new constitutional review process that is as inclusive and as participatory as possible. The peace process can be successful only if Malians assume full ownership and responsibility for it. In this regard, the inclusion of women in the process remains essential. The benchmark matrix developed between the Government and MINUSMA should be used among the Malian parties to ensure greater accountability and ownership. I call upon signatory parties to step up their commitment, but also upon opposition parties to demonstrate wisdom and unity of purpose, while the Government needs to embrace its unique leadership role in the peace process.

81. Delays in the redeployment and extension of State authority throughout the country and the decrease in the number of State officials across northern and central Mali are alarming. I am deeply worried by the increase in security incidents by armed elements and extremist armed groups across central Mali, particularly in the Mopti and Segou regions. Here, the emergence of vigilante groups to respond to

unaddressed security threats, particularly in remote areas, is also troubling. This situation is likely to fuel additional violence and deepen existing fissures between communities. I therefore call upon the Government to strengthen the presence of the civilian administration and defence and security forces in these areas and to effectively tackle the rising insecurity, while respecting international human rights obligations. MINUSMA is committed to reinforcing its support to the Malian defence and security forces and the signature of the memorandum of understanding with the Malian armed forces will be an important step towards the consolidation of this support.

82. The situation in northern and central Mali requires more than security measures alone. To effectively address the complex challenges and bring security, stability and development to these regions, a multidimensional approach is needed, encompassing justice, development, security, education and job creation, especially for disaffected youth and young people in general. In that regard, MINUSMA remains engaged in support of the Government's multidimensional strategy for the central regions in collaboration with United Nations agencies and key donors.

83. Meanwhile, the recent deployment of the Mission's quick reaction force is an encouraging development. Its full deployment will further increase the Mission's mobility and deterrence capabilities. The Secretariat is doing its utmost to complete force generation, to implement the recommendations of the last military technical review and to help the Mission reach full operational capability.

84. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team are also committed to continuing to support the consolidation of peace and the delivery of peace dividends through a range of socioeconomic initiatives, in line with the Government's development priorities. The finalization of the development strategy for the northern regions is vital for supporting Malian authorities. I urge the Government to adopt this strategy without delay and call upon the international community to deliver on their pledges.

85. I am disturbed by the cross-border dimension of insecurity in Mali and the growing threat posed by terrorist groups to neighbouring countries, including Burkina Faso and Niger. I condemn in the strongest terms the despicable crimes perpetrated by these groups. I welcome the enhanced regional ownership of peace and security-related initiatives, including efforts towards the deployment of the G-5 Sahel joint force, which can also contribute to an enabling environment for MINUSMA to fully implement its mandate. The success of the joint force, and that of MINUSMA, is intrinsically linked to the progress of the Malian peace process. I appeal to the international community to support this regional undertaking, with predictable financial and logistical support.

86. The prevailing insecurity undermines the rule of law and the provision of basic services, particularly in the north and in some parts of the centre. The window of opportunity for the Government to provide long-awaited peace dividends is slowly narrowing. The humanitarian situation continues to worsen. I am extremely concerned by the great number of schools that remain closed and increasing food insecurity in the crisis-affected regions. I call upon international partners to contribute generously to the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan, which remains significantly underfunded, to address the needs of the most vulnerable.

87. I commend humanitarian actors for continuing to support the Government in the provision of basic social services to the people in need against a backdrop of increasing attacks on their personnel. Such attacks constitute war crimes and I call upon all parties to contribute to the creation of a safe humanitarian space. Ensuring unhindered humanitarian access will remain an essential task of the Mission.



88. I remain concerned about the numerous allegations of serious human rights violations and abuses, particularly in the Kidal and Mopti regions. The Mission will continue to support the Malian authorities in their efforts to combat impunity. The establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry offers the opportunity to enhance judicial access for the numerous victims and families affected by the conflict.

89. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team are committed to continuing to support the consolidation of peace and the delivery of peace dividends through a range of socioeconomic initiatives, in line with the Government's development priorities. The finalization of the development strategy for the northern regions is vital for supporting the Malian authorities. I urge the Government to adopt this strategy without delay and call upon the international community to deliver on their pledges.

90. I am deeply saddened by the considerable loss of life among Malian defence and security forces and United Nations peacekeepers. I express my heartfelt condolences to the people and Government of Mali, MINUSMA troop-contributing and police-contributing countries and the bereaved families of the victims. No efforts must be spared to improve the safety and security of MINUSMA personnel, including through the installation and full operationalization of medical and casualty evacuation capabilities.

91. Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the Special Representative, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, for his indefatigable work and dedication. I also wish to pay special tribute to the men and women of MINUSMA for their continued commitment to peace in Mali despite the extremely difficult circumstances. I commend the members of the international mediation team for their sustained support for the Malian parties and encourage Algeria, as the lead mediator, to support renewed impetus to the implementation of the Agreement through the Agreement Monitoring Committee. I express my gratitude to multilateral and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as well as non-governmental organizations and all other partners, for their important contributions in support of peace and stability in Mali.

## Annex I

[Original: French]

## Benchmarks for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
<b>1. Political and institutional matters</b>				
Significant progress in the implementation of an institutional architecture designed to guarantee the participation and inclusion of all Malian citizens and enable the restoration of State authority throughout the country				
1.1 Establish an institutional architecture based on the principle of free administration and increased representation of communities within national institutions	1.1.1 The interim authorities responsible for the administration of municipalities (communes), districts (cercles) and regions in the north are operational	Ongoing	2017	The interim authorities were installed in the five regions of the north on 20 April 2017
	1.1.2 The Government of Mali has established territorial communities, elected through universal suffrage and with extensive authority, by amending Act No. 93-008 on free administration and Act No. 2012-006 on the administrative organization of the territory	Ongoing	2017	The texts have been drafted but have not yet been approved
	1.1.3 For every region the Government has established a Regional Assembly, elected by direct universal suffrage, to which authorities and resources have been transferred	Ongoing	2017	Adoption of the new election law; the law on territorial communities is being drafted
1.2 Define the authorities of territorial communities by specifying their respective roles and responsibilities, and those of the State	1.2.1 The Government has ensured that each region is able to establish and manage collective infrastructure and basic social services	Implemented		
	1.2.2 Every region has developed an economic, social and cultural development plan and will be responsible for land management	Implemented		

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	1.2.3 Every region is responsible for establishing and implementing a tax system suited to its economic structure and development objectives, in accordance with current legislation	Not implemented		

## 2. Defence and security aspects

Implementation and progressive functioning of inclusive defence and security forces that are accountable to citizens and comply with human rights and the rule of law, thereby strengthening national cohesion and contributing to the promotion of regional security

2.1 Implement reform of the security and defence sectors	2.1.1 Decrees are adopted defining the make-up, role and operation of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Commission on Integration and the National Council for Security Sector Reform	Implemented		The decrees have been adopted by Cabinet
	2.1.2 The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Commission on Integration and the National Council for Security Sector Reform are established in an inclusive manner and are operational	Implemented		All the commissions are operational
	2.1.3 The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, the Commission on Integration and the National Council for Security Sector Reform have developed a new national vision of defence and security, taking	Ongoing		Completion expected

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	relevant local, national and international factors into account			
2.2 Implement cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for combatants, in accordance with the guiding principles of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and in keeping with international standards	2.2.1 The National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission has drawn up a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and cantonment programme, with the support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other partners	Implemented		The programme was validated in December 2016
	2.2.2 The Commission on Integration has set up a support programme which defines the measures necessary for the reintegration of ex-combatants and takes into account cross-cutting issues (gender equality, human rights and the protection of civilians)	Ongoing	First half of 2017	An outline of the integration benchmarks and technical quotas has been drafted for approval by the National Council for Security Sector Reform
2.3 Reconstitute and progressively redeploy defence and security forces throughout national territory	2.3.1 The Technical Commission on Security and the Operational Coordination Mechanism have submitted an implementation plan for security arrangements in the north, with the deployment of joint patrols to provide security for the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process	Implemented		

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	2.3.2 Under the aegis of the Operational Coordination Mechanism, joint units of combatants from signatory parties and the defence and security forces, including special counter-terrorist units, are operational and carrying out joint patrols that contribute to the restoration of security	Ongoing	First half of 2017	The battalion of the operational coordination mechanism has been established in the Gao region, but it is not fully operational owing to a lack of heavy weapons  The refurbishment and equipping by MINUSMA of the operational coordination mechanism camps in Kidal and Timbuktu is ongoing
	2.3.3 The gradual redeployment throughout Mali of reconstituted defence and security forces is in effect and guarantees that security and public order are maintained	Ongoing		Planning is ongoing

### **3. Humanitarian assistance, socioeconomic and cultural development and the provision of basic social services**

Establishment of structures and mechanisms designed to achieve inclusive, participatory and sustainable local development

3.1 Create the conditions necessary to facilitate the return, repatriation, resettlement and socioeconomic reintegration of all displaced persons and refugees; enable communities to benefit from peace dividends; and strengthen social cohesion and humanitarian assistance	3.1.1 Establishment of monitoring mechanisms for displaced persons and refugees, in accordance with regional and international instruments	Ongoing		Identification of 30 return zones in 20 priority municipalities by the Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action, with the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)  The third meeting of the Mali-Mauritania-UNHCR tripartite commission for the voluntary repatriation of Malian refugees in Mauritania was held on 21 July 2017
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<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	3.1.2 Neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance is delivered in areas impacted by the crisis to those most vulnerable (residents, returnees, displaced or repatriated persons), enhancing their means of subsistence and resilience	Ongoing		<p>At the end of July 2017, the total required for the humanitarian response plan was increased by 4 per cent to \$304.7 million. As at 4 September 2017, only 26 per cent of the plan had been financed</p> <p>Projects totalling \$7 million financed by the Central Emergency Response Fund have continued to be implemented in the Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, with a focus on the following areas: shelter/ non-food items, water/ hygiene/sanitation, nutrition, food security and health</p> <p>UNHCR is delivering food to repatriated adults and children in the Gao, Ménaka, Mopti and Timbuktu regions</p>
	3.1.3 With the support of humanitarian and development partners under the 2015-2017 emergency humanitarian plan and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, peace dividends are brought to communities in order to reduce socioeconomic disparities among regions, with increased access to basic services in the poorest regions	Ongoing		<p>The humanitarian and development component has been established with different technical and financial partners. The aim is to develop sustainable solutions that will benefit people living in areas affected by the crisis</p>

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
3.2 Mobilize the resources necessary to implement the specific development strategy for the northern regions of Mali	3.2.1 Establishment of a northern development zone with an interregional advisory council, comprising representatives of Regional Assemblies, and with a specific development strategy relevant to the sociocultural and geographic realities and the climate of the region	Ongoing		The specific development strategy for the north was drafted at a national workshop held from 17 to 19 July 2017
	3.2.2 Establishment of a sustainable development fund, comprising the resources pledged during the International Conference for the Economic Recovery and Development of Mali, held in October 2015, with the support of technical and financial partners	Ongoing	2017	It was recommended during the above-mentioned workshop that technical consultations should be held with the signatory movements regarding the sustainable development fund
	3.2.3 Establishment of a regional development agency in each region for programme management and monitoring implementation of the commitments undertaken by the Government to benefit the regions, under the authority of the President of the Regional Assembly	Ongoing		Regional development agencies cannot be established in the Ménaka and Taoudenni regions until the draft law establishing the territorial communities in those regions has been signed
	3.2.4 Programme agreements are concluded between the State and the regions for the implementation of multi-year investment programmes, with the participation of the territorial communities concerned	Ongoing	2016	The planning contract was signed between the State and the Gao region in July 2017. With no regional development agencies in place, those of Ménaka and Taoudenni are pending

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
<b>4. Justice and reconciliation</b>				
Prevent impunity and promote genuine national reconciliation by ensuring legal and judicial assistance and access through the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms and comprehensive justice sector reform, in accordance with international standards				
4.1 Organize a national reconciliation conference on the underlying causes of the conflict	4.1.1 An inclusive national reconciliation conference on the underlying causes of the conflict is organized, with the support of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, to ensure genuine national reconciliation	Implemented	March 2017	The national reconciliation conference was held from 27 March to 2 April 2017
	4.1.2 A charter for peace, unity and national reconciliation is drawn up on the basis of consensus and based on the outcomes of the national reconciliation conference	Partially implemented		The Charter for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation and a mapping of all lands in Mali were submitted to the President of the Republic on 20 June 2017. However, the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad has rejected the Charter in its current form
4.2 Establish transitional justice mechanisms	4.2.1 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission is operational and has regional offices throughout the country	Ongoing		Five regional offices out of six are operational A total of 5,267 statements from victims and witnesses have been recorded
	4.2.2 An international commission of inquiry is established and operational	Ongoing		The instrument officially establishing the commission is being prepared
4.3 Reform the justice system and strengthen the rule of law in order to enhance traditional and informal justice mechanisms, improve access to justice for perpetrators and victims, and end impunity	4.3.1 The justice system is strengthened to improve access to justice to justice for perpetrators and victims	Ongoing		Following the appointment and reassignment of judges around the country, judges in the northern regions are gradually taking up their posts. However, the security situation is forcing some to relocate temporarily to other regions



<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	4.3.2 The perpetrators of human rights violations are prosecuted and convicted in accordance with international standards	Ongoing		<p>Since January 2017 and as part of the mechanism for sharing information between MINUSMA and the Ministry of Justice:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Two meetings have been held</li> <li>– A total of 151 documented cases of human rights violations and abuses were transmitted between January and May</li> <li>– A technical adviser to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Justice has been appointed to monitor the assistance provided by the judicial authorities.</li> </ul> <p>In 2017, of 102 cases that were brought to trial in criminal court, four individuals were convicted of offences constituting human rights violations or abuses</p>
	4.3.3 The victims of human rights violations, including sexual or gender-based violence, are treated fairly by the justice system, receive reparations and benefit from new judicial protection measures	Ongoing		<p>From 2013 to 2016, at least 132 persons filed complaints of offences constituting conflict-related sexual violence committed between 2012 and 2013 in the northern regions of Mali. As at 31 August 2017, judges had questioned at least 52 of those complainants. No trials have yet begun</p>
	4.3.4 Traditional and customary mechanisms are integrated into the justice system, without prejudice to the sovereign right of the State	Ongoing		<p>A workshop to discuss the issue of traditional justice and the institution of the <i>cadi</i> was held on 27 and 28 July 2017. The aim was to clarify the jurisdiction and role of <i>cadis</i>, with a view to their institutionalization</p>

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<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Progress indicators</i>	<i>State of implementation</i>	<i>Deadline</i>	<i>Comments</i>
	4.3.5 Institutions regulating and protecting specific rights, such as freedom of expression, of the press and of communication, are in place or strengthened and work effectively	Implemented		
	4.3.6 The Anti-Corruption and Financial Crime Commission is established	Implemented		

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## Annex II

**Military and police strength of the United Nations  
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali  
as at 31 August 2017**

Country	Military component						Police component					
	Staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Armenia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Austria	3	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	1 527	12	1 539	–	–	–	280	–	280	280	–	280
Belgium	17	3	20	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Benin	261	1	262	13	1	14	140	–	140	153	1	154
Bhutan	3	–	3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Burkina Faso	1 673	46	1 719	30	1	31	134	6	140	164	7	171
Burundi	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	–	3	–	3
Cambodia	296	7	303	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cameroon	2	–	2	17	–	17	–	–	–	17	–	17
Chad	1 392	6	1 398	3	4	7	–	–	–	3	4	7
China	389	14	403	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Côte d'Ivoire	149	3	152	8	2	10	–	–	–	8	2	10
Czechia	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Denmark	60	5	65	5	–	5	–	–	–	5	–	5
Egypt	74	–	74	5	–	5	140	–	140	145	–	145
El Salvador	93	11	104	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Estonia	10	–	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ethiopia	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Finland	5	1	6	7	2	9	–	–	–	7	2	9
France	20	1	21	8	1	9	–	–	–	8	1	9
Gambia	4	–	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Germany	544	15	559	12	4	16	–	–	–	12	4	16
Ghana	221	–	221	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Guinea	847	10	857	10	9	19	–	–	–	10	9	19
Guinea-Bissau	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Hungary	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	1
Indonesia	8	–	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Italy	1	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Jordan	1	–	1	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Kenya	5	4	9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Latvia	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Liberia	66	7	73	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Lithuania	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Madagascar	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Country	Military component						Police component					
	Staff officers and units			Individual police officers			Formed police units			Total police		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Mauritania	5	–	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Nepal	151	4	155	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Netherlands	270	9	279	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Niger	855	7	862	19	14	33	–	–	–	19	14	33
Nigeria	69	16	85	1	–	1	118	22	140	119	22	141
Norway	14	2	16	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Portugal	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Romania	1	–	1	7	–	7	–	–	–	7	–	7
Senegal	814	13	827	16	–	16	259	9	268	275	9	284
Sierra Leone	8	–	8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sri Lanka	7	–	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sweden	192	21	213	4	2	6	–	–	–	4	2	6
Switzerland	5	–	5	4	–	4	–	–	–	4	–	4
Togo	912	28	940	1	8	9	265	13	278	266	21	287
Tunisia	–	–	–	53	2	55	–	–	–	53	2	55
Turkey	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2	–	2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United States of America	21	5	26	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Yemen	4	–	4	8	–	8	–	–	–	8	–	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>11 015</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>11 267</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>1 336</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>1 386</b>	<b>1 579</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 679</b>

