



Joint evaluation by the
Government of Canada and
UNHCR of the deployment
of RCMP officers to refugee
camps in Guinea

Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit

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1. Executive Summary

This evaluation is an assessment of what turned out to be an eighteen-month deployment - initially planned for one year - of two two-man teams of Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Guinea from January 2003 to June 2004. The deployment, which had been recommended for a second year extension to compensate for initial obstacles, was terminated prematurely when the requisite collaboration and anticipated results failed to materialize.

The evaluation team concludes that three primary elements explain the project's falling short of its objectives and early termination. First, the Government of Guinea, through its responsible agency, the BNCR, did not honour the Protocole d'Accord between itself and UNHCR and failed to staff the BMS with persons with the necessary basic skills and experience with whom the RCMP could work without excessive difficulty. Second, by the time the RCMP arrived in the field, the situation in the region, especially around Kissidougou, had calmed and the objective of capacity building for the security force no longer held the degree of importance for the UNHCR field offices it had when the project was conceived one year earlier. Finally, the UNHCR operation in Guinea had been hampered by difficulties in staffing posts, resulting in a short post occupation rate, compromising continuity. This unstable situation was further aggravated by a sex scandal that disrupted normal operations and distracted the attention of UNHCR Guinea from the project.

The RCMP deployment was a pilot project for both UNHCR and Canada. Unfortunately the obstacles encountered during the eighteen months of the RCMP deployment precluded a fair testing of the objectives and the methodology of the pilot.

Yet, despite what can only be described as a disappointing, although a well-intentioned demonstration of international solidarity from Canada to UNHCR and the host government, the evaluators feel that core elements of the endeavour involving burden sharing and a three-way partnership between UNHCR and national and external police are worth trying again elsewhere. A much stronger commitment from the host government is essential. This is fundamental. In addition, greater assurances are necessary from the key partners, including their field offices, to ensure that: the team is integrated and adequately resourced to do its work; community policing incorporates support to refugee volunteer elements, where feasible; and training is more focussed on commissioned officers than rank and file to better institutionalize the input. In certain situations the terms of reference should permit adequate flexibility to allow experienced secondees greater opportunity to adapt to changing circumstances and lend direct support to UNHCR operations where required.

A list of specific issues raised by the Terms of Reference (TORs) for this evaluation concerning the structure, implementation and results of the deployment are addressed where appropriate in the report text, as well as separately in greater detail in Section 5.

Map of Guinea



List of Acronyms

BMS	Brigade Mixte de Sécurité
BNCR	Bureau National de Coordination des Réfugiés
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
EPAU	Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (UNHCR)
ESS	Emergency and Security Services (UNHCR)
FAC	Foreign Affairs Canada (Formerly part of DFAIT)
FSA	Field Safety Advisor
GOC	Government of Canada
GOG	Government of Guinea
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RSLO	Refugee Security Liaison Officer
RSTO	Refugee Security Training Officer
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ESS	Emergency and Security Service

2. The Evaluation

2.1 Realization of the Evaluation

*This evaluation is an end-of-project analysis of a project earlier assessed in the **Mid-term review of a Canadian security deployment to the UNHCR programme in Guinea**, undertaken by Canada (DFAIT/RCMP) and UNHCR (EPAU/ESS), ref: EPAU/2003/04, published October 2003, on UNHCR's website:*

<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opedoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3f8d0ede4&page=publ>

2.1.1 Research for this evaluation began one year after the RCMP deployment to Guinea was terminated in June 2004. The delay presented time for reflection for those involved in the initiative. While many of the expatriates who were involved with the RCMP had left Guinea, they were interviewed in person outside of the country, or by telephone; all the primary participants, and most of the secondary participants were interviewed, and many had opportunity to comment on earlier drafts of this document. The interview exchanges allowed the interlocutors to look back and reconsider the premise of the project, how it was implemented and what now remains. Their visions were as diverse as their perceptions and recall.

2.1.2 The interviews were preceded by the preparation of an evaluation work plan and semi-structured interview guides for meetings with the various categories of interlocutors that included staff from the governments and organizations involved in the initiative in Conakry, Guinée forestière, Geneva and Ottawa and with NGOs. (See Annex 2)

2.1.3 The two evaluators, Roy Herrmann, from UNHCR, and Hubert LeBlanc, an independent consultant from Ottawa, under contract with CIDA on behalf of the Government of Canada (GOC), did the field work in the following sequence: Geneva, three days, Guinea, eight days, and Ottawa, three days, from June 28 to July 20, 2005. A file review in Ottawa and Geneva preceded the field work. The evaluators shared all aspects of the evaluation, including the views expressed in this report.

2.2 Reasons for the Evaluation

2.2.1 Under the Treaty that governs the secondment, it is agreed that “the goals and objectives of the RCMP officer” deployment to Guinea “...be the subject of a mid-term review and an end-of-project evaluation to be conducted jointly by the Parties.” A mid-term assessment in July 2003 concluded that an extension of the pilot project was warranted in light of obstacles encountered, in order to fully test the parameters identified in the original terms of reference, including with respect to sustainability, and because of the lessons the pilot could have for other refugee contexts.¹

¹ It should be noted, however, that little was done to implement the recommendations from the Mid-Term Review, designed to correct problems in project implementation to that point (see Section 5 for more detail).

2.2.2 The purpose of this "end-of-project" evaluation is to understand more fully the complexity of issues involved in a capacity-building project intended to strengthen the capability of local security forces and refugee communities to anticipate and respond to the multitude of threats that can menace refugee communities.

2.2.3 Although the secondment was a response to the situation in Guinea at the time, and a direct request from UNHCR Conakry, the deployment provides an important new element for consideration in UNHCR's evolving security packages toolbox. Such an evaluation will contribute to the discussion about refugee security in general, and should also be useful for engaging other States who may be interested in undertaking similar partnerships with UNHCR in support of refugee camp security and in buttressing the ability of host states to fulfil their refugee protection responsibilities.

3. The Project

3.1 Project Background

3.1.1 The right to asylum is the fundamental principle governing refugee law and the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Sometimes, as was the case in Guinea between 1999 and 2002, asylum alone was not enough to ensure the safety and well-being of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees residing in the refugee camps there.

3.1.2 Triggered by events in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa during the mid-1990s, sectors of the international humanitarian community reflected on how to enhance the civilian nature of refugee camps through a series of conferences, workshops and working papers. UNHCR, in collaboration with key States, elaborated a "Ladder of Options" which gauged the possible risks to refugees and the range of responses the host governments and the international community might undertake to protect the refugees.

3.2 Project Description

3.2.1 It was against this backdrop that the country representative of UNHCR in Conakry, Guinea, made a request to his headquarters in late 2001 for support to improve the security conditions in the camps in Guinée forestière near Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. The most acute security threats, which included the killing of one UNHCR expatriate and the abduction of a second, had been greatly reduced when the camps were relocated to safer regions of Guinea in the early summer of 2001 from the salient Languette region, which protrudes into Sierra Leone and close to the Liberian border. But it was felt further actions were needed to inculcate a more professional attitude among the Brigade Mixte de Sécurité (BMS), the amalgam of Guinean police and gendarmes and irregulars tasked with providing security to the camps.

3.2.2 Given the Government of Canada's (GOC) commitment to the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, it was reasonable for UNHCR to approach Ottawa with

the request for technical support². The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) sent out a reconnaissance team to assess conditions and they reported back in favour of the effort. Subsequently, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), on behalf of the GOC, responded positively, offering to deploy two officers of the RCMP to Guinea to help train the BMS.

3.3 The Deployment

3.3.1 The field deployment occurred in two phases: the first two officers served from January 2003 to December 2003; then another two from January 2004 to late June 2004. The activity cost the GOC approximately C\$ 1 million, plus the substantial efforts of all involved.

3.3.2 At the time that the first two Canadian officers arrived, UNHCR was reporting about 57,000 Sierra Leonean refugees and 122,000 Liberians distributed through seven camps. Later in 2003, the refugee population began to lessen with the beginning of the repatriation to Sierra Leone. The departure of Charles Taylor from Monrovia that same summer virtually ended the out-flux of Liberians to Guinea and opened the door for repatriation.

3.3.3 The deployment, from the initial request for technical support from UNHCR Conakry to when the first two RCMP arrived in the field in January 2003, took over one year. There had been discussions between Canada and UNHCR on technical support dating back even further. Once the deployment had been agreed upon, RCMP Headquarters had difficulty identifying French-speaking officers with the necessary skills who were available for overseas duty. The five-man reconnaissance (recce) team from the GOC (four persons) and UNHCR (one person) travelled to Guinea in April 2002 to assess and plan the administrative, health and security aspects of the deployment, but were not tasked with assessing the feasibility of the deployment. Upon their return, there followed considerable inter-departmental discussions and consultations, involving DFAIT, CIDA, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the RCMP and the Solicitor General's Office.

3.3.4 The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), which manages the Canadian Police Arrangement under which this deployment functioned, and which would normally assess the feasibility of a foreign assistance project for capacity development, was invited to participate in the mission, but due to other demands was unable, leaving the field portion of the initial project assessment in the hands of DFAIT and the RCMP. However, CIDA participated throughout the life of the project via the inter-departmental working group.

3.3.5 Subsequently, the two parties, the GOC and UNHCR, determined that a formal treaty was required to govern the project. This relatively simple, but novel,

² The Government of Canada (GOC) sponsored a workshop in 2000, in Ottawa, on the role of international police in refugee camp security, and co-sponsored with the Government of the United Kingdom a workshop in 2001 on the role of the military in refugee camp security. The GOC was also central in the sponsorship and drafting of UNSC Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as EXCOM conclusion no. 94.

treaty took many months to put in order and ultimately, by its nature, required an Order in Council and Cabinet approval on the Canadian side. Details such as insurance, entitlements and the working status of the RCMP attached to UNHCR needed to be considered and resolved by lawyers for both sides. UNHCR had addressed camp security through several "security packages" in other countries, but this intervention had elements that the partners thought might serve for further security capacity building. Thus, it was viewed by UNHCR and DFAIT as a template for possible future use elsewhere, generating enthusiasm in Ottawa, Geneva and, initially, Conakry.

3.3.6 The RCMP would function as "experts on mission" to UNHCR, paid by Canada, but embedded in UNHCR, working out of the two sub-offices in Kissidougou and Nzerekore, but reporting to the UNHCR representative in Conakry. They would initially be based in Kissidougou, because it was the more central of the two field offices and would travel to the all of the camps as required. The Refugee Security Training Officer (RSTO) would focus on adapting existing RCMP training materials to the Guinean context, and presenting them to the BMS, while the other, the Refugee Security Liaison Officer (RSLO), would liaise with the Guinean governmental organization responsible for the refugees, the bureau national de coordination des réfugiés (BNCR), as well as the BMS, NGOs, and UNHCR Field Safety Advisors (FSAs), whose principal responsibility was staff security. Neither job description contemplated direct contact with the refugee communities.

3.3.7 By the time the details of the Treaty were ironed out, however, much of the focus of UNHCR's attention had shifted from camp security to the approaching repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees, as circumstances there improved. In this context, it is difficult to judge the appropriateness of the Terms of Reference (TORs) outlining the RCMP officers' functions. The dramatic change in circumstances on the ground, compounded by other difficulties as explained in the next section, represent sufficiently mitigating circumstances to make judgement on this issue difficult. The same can be said of the value of the RSTO and RSLO roles. The RSTO function was clearly important given the objectives of the project, but the RSLO role could not be fully exploited in a situation of inadequate support and uncertain commitment from local partners.

3.3.8 Although the length of time required to finalize the treaty allowed the situation on the ground to change enough to affect the mission, the agreement was essentially workable for a situation such as that in Guinea, and would likely have provided, or at least contributed to, an adequate enabling environment for the project, but for the Guinean government's failure to honour it. Where conditions are deemed to be sufficiently conducive (i.e. where the parties are willing to cooperate and honour the agreement, and it can be put in place expeditiously), it represents a potential model for similar efforts in future.

3.3.9 Moreover, despite this deployment experience not representing a sufficient test of the RCMP secondment model owing mainly to the many impediments encountered, it has the potential for replicability in other refugee situations. Where certain key criteria (such as adequate partner commitment) are likely to be met, proper planning, flexibility and patience may facilitate easier management of risks and surmounting of obstacles inherent in such exercises.

3.4 RCMP in the Field: a Difficult Situation

3.4.1 On arrival in January 2003, the RCMP found a situation in which the current BMS contingent – what we will refer to as the First BMS contingent - had become too comfortable in the camps, exploiting their authority while fuming about not having been paid for several months. One of the first steps taken was to request that BNCR rotate the current team with a new group selected from the national roster of the police and gendarmerie. This was consistent with a recommendation by a UNHCR assessment team that visited Guinea in June 2001 and suggested that the BMS contingents, except for officers, be rotated out every six months to avoid complacency and limit the likelihood of abuse.

3.4.2 Well intentioned and reasonable, the rotation was nonetheless the first factor that was to undermine the effectiveness of the project. Until May 2003, the BMS had been largely composed of trained and experienced men, with a few women, from Guinea's police and gendarmerie, with a few *stagiaires* (trainees), included. (At the height of the insecurity on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean border, Guinean army regulars protected the most vulnerable camps, but were replaced by the time the RCMP arrived.) The contingent that replaced them in the spring of 2003, the Second BMS contingent, was another entity altogether.

3.4.3 The Second BMS contingent was largely comprised of non-police and non-gendarmerie men without any prior security training whatsoever. Moreover, a large proportion of them were functionally illiterate. The primary focus of the deployment, to hone the technical skills of the BMS in basic procedures, community policing methods and humanitarian issues, became a distant objective for these irregular security personnel. The basic assumptions of the training needed to be reconsidered and adjusted. But this proved too much of a challenge within the initial one-year project life, given the limited institutional field support behind the two RCMP officers.

3.4.4 UNHCR disputed the composition of the Second BMS Contingent at the highest levels in the government, asking the ministry to reconstitute the BMS with those with the necessary competencies, and the Canadian Embassy encouraged the GOG to appoint an appropriate liaison officer to reconcile such issues; but to no avail. This Second Contingent remained until many months *after* the RCMP had left Guinea.

3.4.5 The selection of the problematic Second contingent of the Brigade appears to have been made mostly on the basis of squaring of political debts, especially for the Guinean “volunteers,” civilians and irregular elements armed to defend the border a few years earlier against militias from neighbouring countries. Another important element was the incentive in the guise of the top-off provided by UNHCR for the normal salaries the police and gendarme receive. Further, at this time the Guinean forces were overextended, with many of their best elements deployed on the tense eastern borders or undergoing training by Western forces.

3.4.6 The second factor that affected the success of the RCMP deployment stemmed from the decision to initially base them in Kissidougou. Given the terms of reference for the RSLO and RSTO, the centrality of the town was practical. The complication grew out of the perception by the Nzerekore sub-office that its security needs were more acute and should, therefore, be the seat for the RCMP activity. This, in retrospect, made sense, but the fundamental premise of the RCMP deployment was that it was there to primarily build capacity and not provide direct security support. The liaison function might have contributed in this way had it been more hands-on in design and better integrated with the sub-offices' protection and field safety staff. And, in any case, separating the two RCMP officers ran against RCMP practice and, with the emphasis clearly on training, they did most of their activities as a team in Kissidougou. Their operating as a close team, which spilled onto their travelling together during their entitled leaves, against the requests of some UNHCR staff, brought criticisms.

3.4.7 The problems generating from the poor calibre of the Second BMS contingent distracted attention beyond Kissidougou, requiring a rethinking of the RCMP approach and the project's objectives. Should they teach reading and writing to prepare the BMS for the Module IV on basic security management and incident reporting which was scheduled to be the first lesson, or adapt the modules to the new situation? Or, if they waited, would the BNCR replace the Second contingent with competent personnel as per the MOU between UNHCR and the GOG?

3.4.8 Left without a clear response, but keen to salvage something from their deployment, they decided to shift their focus to training trainers who would be able to transfer their knowledge as BMS teams were rotated. Still, getting the BNCR to officially assign five competent police/gendarmes for training functions, complete with the attendant titles and responsibilities, proved too complex.

3.4.9 Meanwhile, the persistent security problems around Nzerekore could not be ignored. The UNHCR sub-office at Nzerekore responded as best it could with the resources immediately available to it. By the time the RCMP arrived in Nzerekore to present Module IV, in September 2003, the value and immediacy had diminished. This affected their stature and relevance to the sub-office, a negative situation from which they would never really recover. When the second RCMP team arrived in Nzerekore in January 2004, even though they were based there, they were given the bare minimum in office space, furniture, equipment and transportation and were essentially left to make do for themselves.

3.4.10 Finally, there is a third factor, related to the above, which stunted the development and success of the effort. While the impetus for the deployment grew out of a call for support from the UNHCR Branch Office in Conakry, the two Guinean field offices never reached the level of buy-in required for such a challenging operation to succeed. There were too many distractions, with frequent staff turnover, and a sex scandal, to allow the field offices to provide the attention that was required. Ultimately there was inadequate ownership of the project in the field, leaving the impression that it was a Headquarters-to-Headquarters creation.

3.4.11 Similarly, the decision by UNHCR to hire a highly competent BMS captain to assist the Field Safety Advisor in Nzerekore, concentrating on staff security, instead

of seeing the benefit of keeping him in the BMS as a counterpart to the RCMP, reflects the conflicted priorities.

3.4.12 Three out of four of the RCMP officers had experience working with the UN in another overseas operation, but not in Africa and not with UNHCR or refugees. That experience, in Haiti, was a much more structured deployment, involving larger teams, an administrative support structure and the requisite equipment. In Guinea they faced a steep learning curve, requiring adjustments that ranged from understanding the complexities of refugee issues, and adapting to a highly alien social, cultural and institutional environment. Also, they were hindered in their movements by the tendency to pair RCMP officers in the field and hampered by the lack of direct control of an operational budget to procure the necessary equipment.

3.4.13 The RCMP officers, no doubt, enjoyed the collaboration of sympathetic BNCR and UNHCR staff, but the administrative weakness of BNCR and the insularity of UNHCR presented a constant barrier. In this situation, proper integration of the RCMP RSLO and RSTO into UNHCR was not possible. Communications between the RCMP and UNHCR were *ad hoc* and cumbersome, with the RCMP reporting directly to the Conakry office, but coordinating their work with the sub-offices. This appears to mirror a degree of similar communication difficulty between the UNHCR sub-offices, and between each of these and the Conakry office. Moreover, in spite of initial good intentions in the UNHCR office in Conakry, the sub-offices in particular failed to accommodate or cooperate with the RCMP adequately, especially as their priorities shifted away from BMS training in response to changing circumstances. A similar lack of cooperation was attributed to BNCR.

3.4.14 The failure to facilitate the RCMP was typified in the inability to provide the rudimentary operational requirement: security equipment for the camps. The simple task of purchasing a sufficient number of raincoats, boots, flashlights or bicycles, for the BMS and the refugee volunteers, highlighted by the RCMP early in the deployment, and many times afterwards, has still not been satisfactorily sorted out. These inexpensive inputs, most of which are available in local markets, are critical for the community police to do their patrolling at night and in the rain. The UNHCR Office in Conakry possessed the necessary funds and could have easily procured them.

4. Findings

4.1 Sadly, the legacy of some 36 person/months is mostly fond memories of the RCMP held by those who worked directly with them. Although there appears to have been some improvement in general refugee security within the camps from the time of the RCMP engagement (see Section 5), evidence of other positive impacts is slight. With regard to reporting or general security management, the government and the BMS officials who were in place early in the project were unanimous in their praise of the incident reporting system brought by the RCMP, but there was relatively little evidence of lasting impact in this area. Some concrete remnants were encountered in Lainé camp near Nzerekore, where the incident logs and the supporting forms are still being systematically used. However, in the other two camps, except for a few loose sheets found in a dusty cabinet, the incident reporting

system was unknown to the BMS on duty and record keeping was done in a casual manner in locally bought notebooks. A copy of the training manual developed and adapted by the first RCMP team could not be located in any of the offices visited, although hard copies and a compact disk are known to have been left behind. In the BMS 2004 annual report, the only reference to the RCMP is in the inventory of the BMS "furnishings" where the annual report notes the existence of "Canadian archives". The five Guinean trainers instructed by the RCMP are no longer in contact with the BMS and refugees.

4.2 A table on all of the training given by the RCMP is contained in Annex 3. In late 2003, module IV was dispensed in all of the camps during a four-month period. In six months of 2004, while the RCMP was still deployed, there was limited training, mostly reinforcement and monitoring of Module IV, which had been presented the year before. Gender-based violence, refugee and basic human rights were prominent on the RCMP list of subjects. However, delays in deployment of the RCMP caused most of this training to be delivered by UNHCR staff and local NGOs. Later, the RCMP appear to have intervened regularly with the BMS on these matters. UNHCR did not provide refugee protection or human rights training to the BMS during the RCMP deployment, nor did the RCMP. Because it is normally standard practice for UNHCR to provide such training to government and security officials, it appears that UNHCR had assumed that this would be a standard component of RCMP training (though it is not), and so would not be necessary.

4.3 Because the training that the RCMP were offering was no longer critical to the UNHCR field offices, the teams often found that their plans were on the back-burner. One bitter memory revolves around a detailed training programme that was to be done in 2004 in tandem with one of the UNHCR staff particularly skilled in human rights issues. For months the training was put off due to other priorities and ultimately this episode convinced the RCMP that their time would be better used back in Canada.

4.4 When the RCMP left in June 2004, there was little in the way of institutional structure to affect a proper transition, with the transition itself clearly unsuccessful. Perhaps as a final irony, the untrainable Second BMS unit that was sent to the camps in May 2003 was finally replaced in April 2005 with a properly constituted Third BMS contingent, composed mostly of trained police and gendarmes. The Guinean trainers who had been personally instructed by the RCMP have not been called on to train the new BMS squad as was hoped and planned. In fact, the new Brigade Mixte leadership in Nzerekore appeared hostile to their Canadian-trained predecessors; it seems that envy and competition are to blame. Valuable Guinean human resources that would strengthen camp security are being wasted and UNHCR and BNCR need to come to a common understanding why this is so and work to rectify it.

5. Evaluation Findings on Specific Issues of the Terms of Reference

5.1 The TORs for this evaluation pose a series of specific questions on the structure of the deployment, its implementation and the observable results. This section attempts to address these issues separately.

5.2 The structure, content and appropriateness of the 'Agreement' between the Government of Canada and UNHCR in the context of the situation in Guinea;

The governing agreement is a satisfactory document for an application such as the Guinean deployment. The greatest problems related to the length of time it took to finalize, when the frequency of security incidents dating from the conception of the project to actual deployment declined.

On the positive side, the existing Agreement can now be used as a template for future secondment, taking into account specifics for other situations.

5.3 The extent to which the TORs developed for the respective RCMP officers' functions were appropriate for achieving the objectives outlined in the Treaty;

We are reluctant to comment definitively on the officers' functions since circumstances were radically altered between the initiation and the deployment, and were then aggravated by the Second Rotation of BMS and the difficulties associated with integration of the RCMP into the UNHCR field offices. In a more sympathetic environment, the detailed functions outlined in their TORs could have been amended to accommodate the unanticipated obstacles and greater results might have been salvaged.

5.4 The extent to which the integration of the RSLO and RSTO proceeded within the elapsed timeframe, with attention to a) their absorption into the existing programmes of UNHCR; b) the availability of the resources to ensure an effective implementation of their terms of reference; and c) the communication and liaison linkages required at the various levels;

a) The potential value of the RCMP at the sub-office level was largely overlooked as priorities shifted, and training of the BMS was no longer a priority. Other secondees embedded in UNHCR offices have also had difficulty integrating. This seems to be a fairly common institutional problem.

b) Placing a small, accessible account in the hands of the RCMP would certainly have facilitated the purchase of inexpensive inputs for the security bodies. Alternatively, had there been greater support from within the UNHCR offices, these needs could also have been achieved.

c) The RCMP, technically, reported directly to the representative in Conakry, and coordinated their daily work with the field offices. There was also a focal point in the branch office in Conakry who was tasked with supporting them. For a variety of reasons, these arrangements did not work smoothly within the UNHCR context, despite evidence of good intentions. At the field level, outside of the UNHCR context, the RCMP seemed to work effectively, to the extent possible, with the BMS, BNCR, NGOs and the refugees, and they were very well liked. This seems to be an achievement of their own making, and the benefits would likely have multiplied if their efforts had been effectively linked and coordinated with other UNHCR activities.

The input and linkages involving the focal points with the two headquarters was *ad hoc*, supportive, but not neatly integrated into the field chain of command. Normally, there would be no reason to link the deployees once they were in the field with their respective headquarters, except for internal administrative purposes. However, with the arising problems, and the general desire to avoid failure, the respective headquarters were used as a last source of support for the RCMP. This was awkward, but understandable given the sequence of events.

5.5 Analyze the extent to which refugee community involvement, with community policing by refugee security volunteers, were advanced and their effectiveness relative to other security mechanisms;

The camp committees seem to play an integral role in the normal functioning of the camps, sharing most of the interests of UNHCR and the GOG. Membership on the committee does carry opportunities for financial betterment, but this does not seem to have superseded the ultimate objective of camp welfare.

The refugee security volunteers seem to have been an under-utilized resource. It is difficult to say definitively the extent to which internal refugee politics were advanced and manipulated by camp committees, through the volunteers. Still, they seemed to serve as an effective link between the community and the BMS, and many instances reported that they contributed significantly to the day-to-day stability in the camp. Their value and role in the camps was not adequately acknowledged in the training.

5.6 The extent to which the legal framework between the Government of Guinea and UNHCR (Protocole d'Accord) created an enabling environment for the pilot project and the nature of the Government's commitment to ensuring refugee security throughout the territory, and its support to the Brigade Mixte and RCMP programme;

The Protocole d'Accord was a *pro forma* agreement between UNHCR and the Government of Guinea that would normally signal a commitment to the means and objectives of the project. The strategy to import the RCMP to strengthen the capacity of the BMS was, like many other contributions, a further input related to the assistance for refugees. Normally one would expect that all parties would respect the objectives and work, as best they could, to achieve the stated aims. In this case, with the haphazard Second BMS Contingent, the best interests of the project were not a priority for the GOG. UNHCR tried to redress the problem, without effect, despite the mutual understanding of the consequences. Even if the Accord had been more specific as to the composition of the BMS, there is no reason to believe that a similar problem would not have occurred.

5.7 The contribution of the RCMP towards more structured and routine reporting by the Brigade Mixte and general [refugee] security management systems in the camps;

When we visited the camps, we found that in one camp the BMS continued to employ the reporting system introduced by the RCMP, while in the other two camps visited there was nothing to be found of the RCMP's passage. While the new BMS leaders in Nzerekore and Kissidougou were unaware of the existence of the system,

the Government and former BMS officials who were in place early on in the project were unanimous in their praise of the reporting system as it brought much-needed structure to a very loose system.

5.8 To the extent possible, to assess local attitudes relating to perceived improvements in refugee security and adherence to law and order within the camps during the period where the RCMP were engaged and afterwards;

During the visit of the Mid-Term Review team, local authorities commented that the level of crime and insecurity in the camps around Kissidougou was less than what was encountered outside of the camps. This is certainly the impression now. Based on the available incident reports, the occurrence of crimes seems low. Lainé camp reported nineteen mostly minor episodes, i.e. fights, drunkenness, during the first six months of 2005, in a population of about 24,000 persons. The records in the other two camps were too disorganized to report with a similar degree of precision, but incidental commentary suggests similar rates of disturbances.

5.9 The value of an expatriate RSLO and an /RSTO in their separate functions aimed to assist the host-state / Brigade Mixte in refugee camp security;

This question was not fully tested. The RSTO function was obviously imperative given the objectives of the project. The RSLO role might have been exploited more if there had been more independence and a more receptive environment, working in greater coordination with the FSAs and protection staff, and with a BNCR and BMS hierarchy more collaborative and open to suggestion.

5.10 The adequacy of resources available for the RSLO and RSTO to effectively undertake their work;

As noted several times above, the failure to better support the RCMP materially was a significant issue that got the deployment off on the wrong foot, and was never satisfactorily reconciled. This began when basic administrative courtesies were initially refused to the first two RCMP, and continued to be a problem throughout the deployment, when basic tools, like rubber boots and hand torches were not purchased, despite assurances that they would be.

5.11 The flow of communication and the level of co-operation between the various elements: RSLO/RSTO, central and local government authorities, the refugee communities and their representative committees, NGO partners and UNHCR (all units) in the support of the 'Agreement' goals for improved refugee security in Guinea;

Concerning the level of cooperation, we encountered nearly consistent positive comments, but the evidence indicates that, at least for UNHCR and the BNCR, other priorities took precedence. As for communication, other parts of the report indicate that communications were a problem, and this was clearly singled out in the two Mid-Term Review reports (" It did appear to the Review team that there was a serious disconnect between the two sub-delegation offices and between those offices and Conakry." - Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) internal mission report).

5.12 Applicability and equity of security measures with noted attention to be given to gender-based and social issues;

The issues of gender-based violence, refugee and basic human rights were high on the agenda of the RCMP. Unfortunately the noted delays prevented an early introduction of these issues into the training of the BMS, and when they were presented it was mostly by cooperating NGOs and UNHCR staff. There were incidental comments in the course of the interviews which showed that the RCMP did intervene regularly, though informally, to guide and advise the BMS on the importance of these issues, mostly on a case by case basis.

5.13 Degree to which recommendations made in the Mid-Term Review were applied;

Following the Mid-term Review, despite assurances, little was changed to the extent that momentum could be created to get the project on track. There was distinct progress when the first structured training sessions began in September 2003, and were held in all the camps. Had the training advanced from there and not bogged down, conclusions might have been different. But much of the momentum was lost with the change of Canadian teams and the disappearance of the chief Guinean trainer during the change and for the first quarter of 2004. After the Review, the RCMP became more active in Nzerekore, but by that time the perceived need for their input was lost and was never fully surmounted. Issues related to improved support from UNHCR were not adequately reconciled.

5.14 Appropriateness of transitional strategy for the handover of the capacity-building training with the withdrawal of the secondees;

Our inability to locate copies of the training manual, the limited use of the incident reporting format, and the fact that the trainers instructed by the RCMP were not brought in to train the most recent Third contingent suggest that the transition was a disappointment. In truth, when the RCMP departed Guinea in June 2004, it was already evident that there was very little institutional structure on which to "hang" the handover to achieve sustainability.

5.15 Parallels and potential replicability of the RCMP secondment model to other UNHCR programmes where refugee security concerns are significant;

The concept and the applicability of the project were not adequately tested in Guinea to pass judgment critically, one way or another. We left the research phase feeling that the niche for capacity building for security contingents is broad and something along the lines of the Guinean model should be tested again, but this time trying to avoid the impediments encountered there. Of course, obstacles may materialize in many forms and often cannot be anticipated. It is probably true to say that in programmes where there is the greatest need for such interventions, the likelihood for problems is highest. This is an endemic challenge that is best dealt with by planning, flexibility and patience, mostly by persons in the field. The need for genuine cooperation between the principals is a given for any hope for success.

6. Conclusions

6.1 Rereading the Mid-term Review, with the benefit of hindsight, there is a question as to how appropriate was the original premise of the project. A number of questions have risen from the field visit to Guinea:

6.2 Given the chronic operational difficulties encountered by most other projects in Guinea, was it a reasonable choice to launch a pilot project there? Elementary acts, such as payment of BMS stipends, became issues of contention. In this case responsibility was effectively dumped on the RCMP when irregularities on the service rosters prevented UNHCR from disbursing the salary bonuses. In another example, UNHCR refused to release all but a small number of bicycles sitting in a warehouse for use by the BMS and refugee volunteers out of concern that the bicycles would be misused.

6.3 The deployment seems to have been, at the same time, too much and not enough; overly ambitious and under-resourced:

- It was too much in that even a one-year project, with the two RCMP, was too grand given the actual role that the BMS play in camp security and the poor quality of its members. Why send the RCMP to train a BMS brigade that essentially provides perimeter security for the camps? Granted, with greater training there is the hope that they might play a more proactive role. However, their role in community policing, as such, was and remains very limited, except on food distribution days. As proof, the Brigade Mixte cannot enter the camps after 18:00 hours, except in emergencies, fundamentally to protect the refugees from possible abuses. The six-month rotation urged by UNHCR is further indication of an overall lack of confidence in their reliability.
- On the other hand, hoping for the RCMP to reverse this would have been unlikely under the plan of just one year. Institutionalizing change would have required more substantial inputs, a longer timeframe, and greater commitment by the Government of Guinea. In reality, this deployment of one trainer and one liaison person was too little in terms of resources: two officers cannot provide training, and constant follow-up and reinforcement, of ten elaborate training modules adapted from the RCMP training school, to six widely-dispersed and inaccessible camp brigades, comprising some 120 semi-literate BMS agents in an erratic and unpredictable working environment.

6.4 The six-month rotational cycle under which the BMS were posted was in conflict with the logic of the original training plan, since, at best, the RCMP would have only two training cycles, at which time the trainees would then be returned to their parent services. The training of trainers concept, which was adopted in response to the poor calibre of the Second contingent, offers the hope of greater sustainability and carryover. In subsequent projects, focusing training on the officer corps of the services would probably have greater sustainability and carry beyond the confines of the camps, into border areas where refugees arrive seeking asylum.

6.5 The issue of refugee security is of paramount importance to UNHCR. Yet it is incomprehensible how UNHCR has failed to provide basic, inexpensive equipment

to the BMS and the volunteers required to do their job. Fearing misuse of resources cannot justify withholding inexpensive bicycles, raincoats and boots; better organization and management is the response to pilfering, not turning off the tap where refugee security is concerned. Volunteers receive a stipend of approximately three dollars per month, but some use part of that to purchase batteries for flashlights to do their patrol rounds because the allocation of three batteries every four to six months is not adequate. Despite the initial list of equipment required from the preliminary missions and pleas going back to early 2003, volunteers in the Kissidougou camps still only have self-made paper badges to distinguish and acknowledge them as volunteers and most of the very limited equipment that they have is in pitiful state. With USD\$25,000 set aside by UNHCR, the RCMP could have overseen the purchase of field security equipment and office supplies that would have greatly facilitated their work and helped empower the BMS and refugee volunteers.

6.6 At the time of the RCMP deployment, UNHCR's field safety advisors (FSA) focused on staff security, with some efforts made to introduce a code of conduct and knowledge on refugee rights. More recently the trend has been for FSAs to undertake more responsibility in camp security. Had there been a better integration of the RCMP into the UNHCR offices, there would likely have been more synergy with the sub-offices' protection units to develop a stronger integrated response to the refugees' security.

6.7 When the RCMP shifted the objective of their work to develop a cadre of trainers, they entered into the reserved domain of the Guinean security forces. This would appear to be justifiable in the interest of leaving behind a durable asset, but instead it stirred up personal and institutional jealousies within the Guinean services that marginalized the trainers that they had groomed. Had there been a knowledgeable colleague from UNHCR and/or the Government to advise, they might have counselled the RCMP against venturing into issues that affect promotion and posting, and the attribution of stipends from UNHCR. The feared backlash was evident during our visit to Guinea

6.8 To a certain extent, we cannot avoid the notion that the deployment was a mutually engaging opportunity for a partnership between Canada and UNHCR in an important area of shared concern. This was impetus enough to generate the project. The nuts and bolts details were somehow underestimated with the want to move beyond UNSC resolutions and do something tangible.

7. Lessons Learned

7.1 Senior planners and managers within UNHCR, and a supporting Government like the GOC, need to better iron out the details and secure clearer commitments from the host country and UNHCR, specifying with more precision the required inputs such as transportation, office space, applicable human resources and operational budget, and who is responsible for each;

7.2 Project objectives need to be stated, shared and supported, not just at the headquarters-to-headquarters level, but also at the field level;

7.3 The security capacity building objectives need to be integrated with other UNHCR/NGO routine activities. UNHCR's protection staff should coordinate and reinforce the human rights and protection principles hand-in-hand with all policing training provided in the camps.

7.4 Objectives need to be realistic and feasible. Needless to say, simple objectives are more likely to be achieved. There was a fundamental incongruity that best summarizes the project: during the deployment, UNHCR supported three Guinean officials, with one UNHCR staff member, to travel to Tanzanian and Zambian refugee camps as a security information-sharing exercise. Then, despite great pains to establish a foundation for the project and build capacity and partnership, the BNCR shortly thereafter sent in the unskilled Second BMS contingent, and UNHCR failed to provide the basic equipment for the security volunteers and BMS. No doubt the deployment received serious thought in the beginning, but things started unravelling fairly early and never managed to get back on track.

7.5 In retrospect, the Mid-Term Review should have been more creative and flexible and looked beyond the terms of reference for possible opportunities to score impact once some of the initial assumptions had eroded.

7.6 The Refugee Security Assistants, though not without their own set of problems, were, and still are, an under-appreciated component in camp security. While it is difficult to estimate precisely what their contribution to refugee community involvement was, they at least were an effective communications link between the community and the BMS, and helped to maintain stability in the camp. Their importance should have been recognized by UNHCR and the RCMP, built on and exploited. And, with the benefit of hindsight, the RCMP should have been detailed with greater contact with the refugee communities.

7.7 A clear management structure by UNHCR is necessary to support the deployment, reconcile any problems and re-orient objectives, should the need arise. Management of a small deployment does not demand a full-time project manager, but does require more proactive support than a focal point. Adequate lines of authority and accountability need to be defined.

7.8 A deployment that aims at capacity development in a taxing work environment needs to be administered along the principles of classic project management. This requires, first, a thorough assessment of feasibility, undertaken jointly, that considers absorptive capacity, detailed training needs and sustainability. This needs to be current, not well before the actual initiation of the project, and calls for participation in detailed planning by donors such as CIDA or other organizations well-practiced in capacity development. Then, there should be on-going risk analysis accompanied by mitigation measures, as well as an elementary implementation and monitoring plan detailing who does what, when and how. Field monitoring needs to be enhanced, preferably by an external monitor. (In fairness to those involved with the conception of the deployment, it is unlikely that any feasibility analysis would

anticipate the depth of the weakness of the Second Contingent that the BNCR provided just after the RCMP arrived.)

7.9 This particular project was greatly compromised by the RCMP's lack of access to a small operational budget that would have allowed the purchase of basic inputs required by security patrolling in particular.

7.10 Managers have an obligation to smooth the integration of seconded persons into their units. All institutions tend to be insular, but an organization like UNHCR, which depends so much on external support, needs to do more to integrate those who want to help it fulfill its mandate.

8. Annexes

Annex 1: Chronology of the RCMP Secondment

9 December 1999: NFF, UNHCR Representative, re: meeting at DFAIT, refers to discussion on Canada's intention to convene a seminar on: the role of civilian police, operationalising "middle options" on "the Ladder of Options," and Canadian technical secondments are discussed.

March 2000: Workshop in Ottawa sponsored by the Canadian Government on the Potential Role of International Police in Refugee Camp Security.

September 2000: Security in the Languette region, Guinée forestière deteriorates markedly. Head of UNHCR sub-office killed in Macenta, another staff member abducted.

May 2001: Relocation of camps from the Languette to Albadariah, beyond Kissidougou, begins.

15 May 2001: UNHCR representative, Guinea, shares internal memorandum with Emergency Service head identifying need for technical police input to strengthen Guinean capacity for security, judiciary and prison system vis-à-vis refugee situation. Memorandum points out that police support is "somewhat alien to the core functions of UNHCR," necessitating external bilateral or multilateral expertise.

July 2001: Governments of Canada and United Kingdom sponsor seminar on Exploring the Role of the Military in Refugee Camp Security, Eynsham Hall, UK.

23 July 2001: Wijninga, Peter; Wordley, Geoff mission report Proposals for Camp Security Arrangements in Guinea; recommends an external specialist to advise UNHCR to upgrade security response.

30 July 2001: Letter S. Jessen-Petersen, UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner to Ambassador Christopher Westdal seeking secondment of Liaison Officer for Camp Security Arrangement in Guinea (CS/LO/Guinea).

28 October 2001: Mission Report, Mr. Bob van Thoor, FSA, to Ms. Janet Lim, ESS Head, concludes "I consider the present troops as completely useless."

14 November 2001: Geddo, Bruno Mission report speaks of sending three Canadian liaison officers to Guinea to assist UNHCR with security.

November 2001: email request from UNHCR Representative, Guinea, to ESS, requesting technical support to deal with security issues in refugee camps/requests a HSO.

February 2002: Refugee Security Assessment Mission to Guinea, Faubert, Carol, (Commission for Human Security); Hall, Iain (UNHCR).

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April 2002: DFAIT/RCMP Assessment Mission to Guinea (reports "overall security situation in the camps is good, but the potential for a deteriorating environment exist.").

December 2002: Agreement between Government of Canada and UNHCR for the purpose of Deploying Two Royal Canadian Mounted Police Officers to the Republic of Guinea signed.

7 January 2003: Two RCMP deployed to Kissidougou, Guinea.

May 2003: First BMS Contingent replaced with problematic Second Contingent containing 70% *stagiaires*.

July 2003: Mid-term Review mission, DFAIT, RCMP, UNHCR; report published October 2003.

23 January 2004: Project extended by one year, second RCMP two-man team sent to Nzerekore, Guinea.

22 May 2004: Meeting between DFAIT and UNHCR (ESS and Bureau) at UNHCR Headquarters to discuss future of RCMP project.

24 June 2004: Termination of secondment, RCMP return to Canada.

Annex 2: Persons met

Geneva 29 June- 2 July 2005

UNHCR

Mr. David Kapya (former UNHCR Representative, Conakry)
Mr. Michel Gaudé, Head of Guinea Desk
Maja Ilic, Desk Officer, Guinea
Ms. Clémentine Nkweta-Muna (former Assistant Representative {Protection} Conakry)
Mr. Iain Hall, Senior Policy Officer, Emergency and Security Service
Mr. Alan Vernon, former Senior Partnership Coordinator
Ms. Erica Mulder, Senior Administrative Clerk, ESS
Mr. Cesar Pastor-Ortega, former Head, Sub-Office, Nzerekore (meeting at the Geneva Airport)
Mr. Claude Vadeboncoeur, former UNHCR FSA, Kissidougou

Canadian Mission

Ms. Leslie Norton, Counsellor, Canadian Mission, Geneva

Guinea 3-11 July 2005

UNHCR

Mr. Stefano Severe, UNHCR Representative, Conakry
Ms. Rosaline Indowu, UNHCR Deputy Representative, former Head, Sub-Office, Kissidougou
Mr. Gilbert Loubaki, Head, Sub-Office Kissidougou
Mr. Fodé Touré, Assistant FSA
Ms. Louise Aubin, Assistant Representative, Protection
Mr. Mbaye Diouf, former FSA, Nzerekore
Mr. Victor Nyiernda, former Head, Sub-Office, Kissidougou (telecon)
Mr. Eddie O'Dwyer, Protection Officer, Nzerekore
Mr. Osman Camara, Assistant FSA, Nzerekore
Mr. Salif Kagni, Head, Sub-Office, Nzerekore
Mr. Mohammed Barry, Assistant FSA, Kissidougou
Mr. Olivier Beer, Protection Officer, Nzerekore

Government of Guinea

Mr. Alhousseine Thiam, Director, SENA
Mr. Sekouba Nansoko, Assistant Principal, BNCR, Ministère de l'administration du territoire et de la décentralisation
Mr. Bayo Kamano, Special Advisor to Minister, Ministère de l'administration du territoire et de la décentralisation
Lt. Francois Beavogui, Gendarmerie. Former coordinator of training for the project in 2003
Captain N'famara Bangoura, National Coordinator, BMS, Nzerekore
Mr. Mustafa Conte, Deputy Field Coordinator, BNCR, Nzerekore
Lt. Suleiman Ibrahim Sory Camara, BMS Nzerekore, Training coordinator
Captain Zeo Gaspard Kolomo, former Deputy Commander BMS, Gendarmerie, former Assistant FSA, UNHCR, Nzerekore

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Mamadou Sadio Sow, BMS, Kouankan Camp
Mr. Kema Samoura, Coordinator, BCR, Kissidougou
Mr. Mohammed Mawner Conte, Field Coordinator, BCR, Kissidougou
Captain Alpha Camara, Commander, BMS, Kissidougou
Lt. Abdul Cani Manet, Deputy Commander, BMS, Kissidougou
Lt. Mohammed Coivogui, Former Deputy Coordinator, Information
Lt. Ali Distel Sylla, Assistant Programme Officer, BCR, Kissidougou
Sous Lt. Diarra Mara, Commandant, Telikoro Camp
Sous Lt. Bomde Oura, Telikoro Camp
Mr. Souro Millimouno, BCR Deputy Administrator, Telikoro

Canadian Embassy

Ms. Isabelle Paris, Second Secretary, Development

NGOs

Sister Cova Orejas, Jesuit Relief Service, Lainé Camp, Nzerekore

Ottawa 18-21 July 2005-08-08

Jacques Marcheterre, RCMP, former RSTO, 2003
Bernard Lettre, RCMP, former RLSO, 2003
Gilles Brunet, RCMP, former RSLO, 2004
André Pelletier, RCMP former RSTO, 2004
Jean St. Cyr, RCMP, Superintendent, Former Director, International Peacekeeping
Cpl Bob Hart, RCMP, International Peacekeeping
Ms. Elissa Golberg, Senior Policy Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs, DFAIT
Ms. Natalie Patenaude, CIDA

Annex 3: Training Given by the RCMP in Refugee Camps in Guinea 2003-2004

Table 1 - List of Modules – I to X - developed by RCMP for Training of BMS

- I Protection Internationale et les droits de la personne
- II Violence Sexuelle et Séxospécifique (GBV)
- III Services de police communautaire
 - Modèle CAPRA - Introduction
 - Modèle opérationnel
- IV SYSTÈMES DE GESTION DE LA SÉCURITÉ
 - Système de rapport d'Incidents / fiches des sujets
 - Système de contrôle des pièces à convictions
 - Système de contrôle des personnes en "garde-à-vue"
 - Système de classement et procédures de diffusion
- V TECHNIQUES JUDICIAIRES DE GESTION DE LA SÉCURITÉ
 - Étapes d'une enquête
 - Usage du calepin de notes
 - Déclarations des témoins
 - Procès Verbal
 - Fouilles des personnes et saisie de pièces à conviction
 - Arrestations et Garde-à-vue
 - Contrôle des scènes de crimes
 - Enquêtes d'accidents routiers
 - Services de sécurité / patrouilles et interventions
 - Escortes des convois
- VI IDENTITÉ ET ROLE DES ONG / PARTENAIRES
- VII CODE DE CONDUITE - (GRC / UNHCR)
- VIII RÉOLUTION DES CONFLITS
- IX MODÈLE D'INTERVENTION POUR LA GESTION DES INCIDENTS
- X PATROUILLES DE CITOYENS (Assistants de Sécurité).

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Table 2 – Training done in year 2003, First Deployment of RCMP

CALENDRIER DE FORMATION DES BRIGADES MIXTES										
SEPTEMBRE A DECEMBRE 2003										
Camp		SEPTEMBRE					OCTOBRE			
	Effectifs	1 au 5	8 au 12	15 au 19	22 au 26	29 au 3	6 au 10	13 au 17	20 au 24	27 au 31
Télikoro	9			Mod. IV				Mod. I	Mod. II	
Kountaya	19			Mod. IV				Mod. I	Mod. II	
Boréah	18				Mod. IV				Mod. I	Mod. II
Lainé	24					Mod. IV		Mod. I	Mod. II	
Kola	6					Mod. IV		Mod. I	Mod. II	
Kouankan	35						Mod. IV		Mod. I	Mod. II
Nonah	6						Mod. IV		Mod. I	Mod. II
Formateurs										
Congé MARS										
Camp		NOVEMBRE					DECEMBRE			
	Effectifs	3 au 7	10 au 14	17 au 21	24 au 28	1 au 5	8 au 12	15 au 19	22 au 26	29 au 2
Télikoro	9	Mod. IV					Mod. V-2			
Kountaya	19	Mod. IV					Mod. V-2			
Boréah	18		Mod. IV						Mod. V-2	
Lainé	24							Mod. V-2		
Kola	6							Mod. V-2		
Kouankan	35			Mod. IV	Mod. IV					Mod. V-2
Nonah	6			Mod. IV	Mod. IV					Mod. V-2
Formateurs						Mod. V-2				
Fin de mission										

NOTES sur le tableau 2

Module IV : Systèmes de Gestion de la Sécurité (Le Module IV contient 4 leçons prévues sur 5 jours de formation)

Module I : Protection Internationale et les Droits de la Personne

Module II : Violence Sexuelle et Sexo-spécifique

Module V-2 : Techniques judiciaires - Usage du calepin de notes

NOTES : Chaque poste sera divisé par la moitié; une moitié en formation et l'autre aux opérations. Les postes situés près l'un de l'autre peuvent être jumelés ensemble

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Table 3 – Training done in 2004 by Second Deployment of RCMP

Date	Subject	Location	Duration by Location	Trainees Quality, number	By whom
March-May 2004	Gender-based violence (Module II)	The 4 camps of Nzerekore Kouankan Lainé Kola Nonah	4 days 4 days 2 days 2 days	57 BMS members 108 Refugee Security Volunteers 4 Guinean trainers Total of: 169 trainees	International Rescue Committee under guidance of Second team of RCMP