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Butt v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

Publisher United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority
Author Immigration Appeal Tribunal
Publication Date 1 November 1979
Citation / Document Symbol [1979-80] Imm AR 82
Type of Decision TH/46490/79(1623)
Cite as Butt v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1979-80] Imm AR 82, United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, 1 November 1979, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_AIT,3ae6b62728.html [accessed 4 November 2019]
DisclaimerThis is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

BUTT v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, TH/46490/79(1623)

Immigration Appeal Tribunal

[1979-80] Imm AR 82

Hearing Date: 1 November 1979

1 November 1979

Index Terms:

Deportation -- Illegal entrant -- Entry under assumed name, probably in 1971 -- Convictions in 1978 of theft and criminal damage -- Suspended sentence but no recommendation for deportation -- Decision by Secretary of State to make deportation order on ground that "conducive to the public good" -- Removal as illegal entrant possible under sch 2 to the Immigration Act but no bar to deportation under s 3(5)(b) -- Opportunity to appeal before removal afforded by alternative of deportation -- Advantage to appellant on his wish to object to removal to Pakistan -- Immigration Act 1971, ss 3(5)(b), 15(1); sch 2, para 9.

Illegal entrant -- Illegal entry in 1971 -- deportation following convictions of crime after several years' residence -- Decision to deport as "conducive to the public good" -- Alternative to removal as illegal entrant under para 9 of sch 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 -- Deportation decision affording opportunity to appeal before removal -- Immigration Act 1971, ss 3(5)(b), 15(1), 33(1); sch 2, para 9.

Held:

The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, entered the United Kingdom illegally under an assumed name, probably in 1971. In 1978 he was convicted of 8 offences of theft and one of criminal damage; he was given a suspended sentence and no recommendation was made for his deportation. The Secretary of State however deemed that it would be "conductive to the public good" to deport the appellant and notice of intended deportation was accordingly served upon him under s 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971.

On the facts set out in the determination below together with the full submissions of counsel appearing for the appellant, the Tribunal held that the Secretary of State's decision was entirely justified as being in the public interest. The Tribunal noted that the appellant as an illegal entrant was removable under the provisions of sch 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 but that this was no bar to his deportation under s 3(5)(b), and in adopting the latter course the Secretary of State had afforded the appellant a right of appeal exercisable in this country -- this was important to the appellant, since (as appears in the determination) he wished to object to removal to Pakistan.

Counsel:

F.J.F. Gordon, counsel for the appellant.

D. A. Birks for the respondent.

PANEL: D. L. Neve Esq (President Sir John Rankine, Sir Gordon Whitteridge

[1979-80] Imm AR 82

Judgment One:

THE TRIBUNAL: The appellant Abdul Rahman Butt is a citizen of Pakistan, 38 years of age, who appeals to the Tribunal at first instance against the decision by the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against him by virtue of s 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971 n1.

n1 Section 3(5)(b) provides that "a person who is not patrial shall be liable to deportation... (b) if the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good".

It is not now disputed that he entered this country illegally under an assumed name -- probably in 1971. Neither is it disputed that he is wanted by the authorities in Pakistan in connection with the illicit supply of firearms and the forgery of firearms certificates. On 27 January 1978 at Gloucester Crown Court he was convicted of eight offences of theft and one of criminal damage. He was sentenced to a total of 12 months' imprisonment, suspended for two years, and ordered to pay @ 149 compensation and costs. The Judge declined to make a recommendation for deportation. Having regard to all the relevant circumstances, however, the Secretary of State decided that it would be "conducive to the public good" to make a deportation order against him and to give directions for his removal to Pakistan.

Initially it was claimed that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution for political reasons if returned to Pakistan, and Mr Gordon called him to give evidence to this effect. After an adjournment to enable the appellant's representatives to investigate this aspect of the matter, however, the claim to political asylum was abandoned.

Mr Gordon put in evidence a letter from the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants relating to an interview by their representative with the appellant, and in his submissions to us he made the following main points:

1. With regard to the offences for which the appellant is wanted in Pakistan, at the outset of this appeal Mr Birks stated that he did not rely heavily upon them. The appellant does not deny that he is wanted for them, but the offences, in Mr Gordon's submission, were more of a military than a criminal character. It is consequently highly unlikely that he will repeat them in this country. This is important, since the Home Office statement gives as one of the Secretary of State's reasons for his decision that he "could not be satisfied that, if allowed to remain in the United Kingdom, the appellant would not again turn to crime". No extradition has been applied for but the appellant fears that, if returned to Pakistan, he will not receive a fair trial and in view of the ferocious regime there will probably be killed.

2. With regard to the offences of which he was convicted in this country: the appellant had been here some years (albeit illegally) when they were committed, and they were his only convictions. The offences themselves were of limited seriousness, as evidenced by the sentence passed. The appellant had abided by his bail conditions, had paid the restitution and legal costs, and no recommendation for deportation had been made.

3. The appellant's job in Gloucester is still open to him. He is buying a house on mortgage and has some roots in this country.

[1979-80] Imm AR 82

4. The appellant might have been granted permission to remain under the 'amnesty', and he applied for it.

5. The Home Office was aware of the appellant's existence in this country for 18 months before the decision to deport was taken.

In reply Mr Hunter pointed out that this delay was largely attributable to necessary investigations into the appellant's name and the circumstances of his arrival in this country. Had he applied for amnesty it appears doubtful whether he would have been granted it, but -- even if he had been -- he would, as a foreign national, still be deportable. The length of his residence in this country is immaterial, since it was illegal. Whilst conceding that the Pakistan offences are perhaps less likely to be repeated in this country, Mr Hunter submits that they are indicative of the appellant's criminal propensities, and although the English offences were of limited seriousness, taken together with the appellant's illegal entry and the fact that he is wanted in Pakistan, the Secretary of State's decision was justified.

We have carefully considered these submissions. At one stage it seemed to us that this appeal might be misconceived, since as an illegal entrant as defined in s 33(1) the appellant was removable under the provisions of the Second Schedule to the Immigration Act 1971. However, as Mr Hunter pointed out to us, this is no bar to a decision by the Secretary of State under s 3(5)(b) (as it would be under s 3(5)(a)) and in adopting this course the Secretary of State has afforded the appellant a right of appeal (under s 15(1) of the Act) which he would not otherwise have had.

Having regard to all the evidence before us we are left in no doubt that the Secretary of State's decision to deport the appellant was entirely justified as being in the public interest.

DISPOSITION:

Appeal dismissed.

SOLICITORS:

Teynton & Son, Gloucester

Copyright notice: Crown Copyright

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