Assessment for Arabs in Israel

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Perhaps the greatest risk to Israeli Arabs lies in the residuals of the Palestinian intifida which began in October 2000. In the beginning stages of the uprising, Israeli Arabs began protesting Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza more powerfully resulting in unrestrained force against protesters and many arrests. This is an addition to the systematic domestic spying and military saturation presence that has been employed in Arab villages for years. Yet, despite an outpouring of empathy for their Palestinian brethren, Israeli Arabs have chosen non-violent opposition, and this will likely remain the same; despite obvious discrimination, Israeli Arabs are relatively much better off economically than neighboring Arabs, and Israel has been their homeland for generations. However, as long as the intifida (with its link to domestic terrorism within Israel), and the relative lack of interaction between Jews and Arabs continues, Israeli Arabs will largely remain at the fringes of mainstream Jewish society.

Analytic Summary

Arabs in Israel comprise nearly one-fifth of the population, and the majority live in Arab towns in northern Israel while others are scattered in the few inter-ethnic cities of the country (e.g., Haifi, Nazereth) (GROUPCON = 2). Nearly all Israeli Arabs speak Hebrew (LANG = 3) as well as Arabic, but differ from the Jewish majority in their religious beliefs (BELIEF = 3; CULDIFX4 = 2), with most Arabs practicing Islam and some Christianity.

In 1992, for the first time in almost 2 decades, Israel's left wing Labor party won the election and took over the Kenesset. This had an immediate impact on how Israel dealt with the peace process already underway. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered a freeze on new settlements in the territories and began secret negotiations with the PLO in an effort to produce a Palestinian self rule agreement. In addition, 1992 marked the first election where the Arab Democratic Party was allowed to take part. They won two seats. Also, following his election, Prime Minister Rabin appointed two Israeli Arabs to his cabinet. In September 1993, Israel and the PLO recognized each other and signed a basic plan outlining the steps toward Palestinian self-rule. In May 1994 an agreement on Palestinian self-rule by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was signed. Violence resumed in 1999 and has continued through 2003, adversely affecting the Arabs within Israel. One result of the escalation of the intifada in the occupied territories has been a slight rise in inter-communal Jewish-Arab violence in Israel, such as the incident after the bombing by Palestinians at the Dolphinarium discotheque in 2001, when a crowd of several hundred Jews attempted to attack a mosque across the street from the site of the bombing.

Arabs in Israel, although full citizens under the law, suffer political discrimination based on decades of social exclusion (POLDIS03 = 3). As an ethnic democracy, the nationalism inherent in Israel's foundation as a "Jewish state" is at odds with its political basis of democratic governance vis-à-vis the Arab minority. Although there is no official policy of discrimination, Arabs are restricted from military service (POLIC696-03 = 2) and political organizing (POLIC496-03 = 1, as a 1985 law has required that to participate in elections Arab parties must accept the legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state). Israeli Arab parties include the Arab Democratic Party and the Progressive List for Peace, but because Arabs in Israel do not vote as a block, Arab presence in the Knesset is not proportional to their overall numbers. De facto discrimination also occurs against Israeli Arabs in the economic sphere (ECDIS03 = 3). Tangible benefits in housing, employment, taxes, and education are provided by the government upon completion of military service, yet Arabs are barred from the military. As a result, Arab Israelis have consistently demanded more employment opportunities and funding for its population. Following the demonstrations in September and October 2000, the Government passed an economic assistance plan for its Arab citizens to be phased in over 4 years; however Israeli Arab leaders criticized the plan because it was inadequate and was not based on a comprehensive survey of the economic needs of the Arab Israeli population and because only half of the total sum represented newly allocated money. The Government had still not implemented the plan by the end of 2002. Additionally, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organ of the voluntary, nongovernmental World Zionist Organization, owns a high percentage of Israeli land, and yet by established JNF policy, these lands can not be alienated to non-Jews. An Arab Israeli couple legally fought the JNF for not allowing them to purchase land, and the High Court ruled in 2000 that the JNF policies for developing public land were discriminatory. However, since the fund's bylaws prohibit the sale or lease of land to non-Jews, the High Court determined that differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in land allocation might be acceptable under unspecified "special circumstances." The Arab couple as of 2002 had still not been able to purchase a home.

In 2001 there was a sight worsening of political freedoms for Arab Israelis because Israeli authorities stepped up enforcement of censorship regulations and monitored Arabic newspapers based in East Jerusalem, sometimes ordering newspapers to halt publication of stories about the current intifada until the story first appeared in the Israeli media, or even closing newspapers down as in the case of the Arab publication Sawt al-Haqq Wal-Hurriya (POLIC1 = 1, POL#01 = -1). Nevertheless, Israeli Arabs still enjoyed the political freedom to demonstrate, which they exercised in protests against the past expropriation of their lands, against the violence employed by the military in the occupied regions, and in remembrance of the riots in October 2000, during which police killed 13 Arab citizens and injured hundreds of others (PROT01 = 4, PROT02 = 3). Protests were generally peaceful with police officials maintaining a low profile, though some limited force was used (REP1801-02 = 1).

In keeping with the democratic side of Israeli values, Arabs do enjoy almost the full gambit of cultural rights such as the right to practice their religion and attend Arabic-language schools, although cultural organizations which openly promote Arab culture are prohibited (CULPO103=0; CULPO703 = 2). Also, for security reasons, in 2001 and 2002, the Government did not allow male Muslim citizens under 30 to perform the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia) (CULPO401-02 = 1), although this restriction was lifted in 2003. Additionally, Arab Israelis married to Palestinians have long experienced difficulties in obtaining permits to get their spouses into Israel, forcing the couples to live apart, sometimes for decades. Since the beginning of violence in September 2000, the issuing of residence permits for Palestinian spouses has been effectively frozen. In 2002, the government formalized and expanded this policy, citing "security issues" as a reason to prohibit residency permits to Palestinian spouses, therefore restricting the family life of Arab Israeli citizens (CULPO602-03 = 2).

References

Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1990, "The Middle East Seventh Edition"

Congressional Quarterly, Washington D.C.

Degenhardt, Henry W. (ed.), 1987, Revolutionary and Dissident Movements:

An International Guide, A Keesing's Reference Publication (London: Longman)

Hooglund, Eric. (ed), Middle East Journal, 1990 - 1993, Chronologies of

Middle Eastern Events.

Keesing's Contemporary Archive, 1990-1993, Keesing Record of World

Events: Record of National and International Current Affairs with

Continually Updated Indexes, Keesing's Publications (London: Longman)

US State Department Human Rights Reports, 2001-2003.

Lexis/Nexis, Various wires, 2001-2003.

Amnesty.org, Various Reports, 2001-2003.