Bahrain: Outside Influence or a Change in Tactics?
| Publisher | Jamestown Foundation |
| Author | Alexander Sehmer |
| Publication Date | 27 November 2017 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 22 |
| Cite as | Jamestown Foundation, Bahrain: Outside Influence or a Change in Tactics?, 27 November 2017, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 22, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a2118684.html [accessed 3 November 2019] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
Link to original story on Jamestown website
Bahrain's security forces reportedly foiled a planned series of terrorist attacks on oil pipelines in the Kingdom this month (Asharq al-Awsat, November 16). It follows an earlier explosion at a pipeline near the village of Buri, about 16 kilometers from the capital Manama. The pipeline carries crude oil from Saudi Arabia's offshore Abu Safa oil field.
Authorities claimed that the blast was the result of sabotage and "an act of terrorism" (The National [UAE], November 12). Bahraini Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed al-Khalifa blamed Iran, a sentiment echoed by other Bahraini officials and eagerly adopted by Saudi Arabia (Twitter, November 11). Iran called the allegation "childish finger pointing" (New Arab, November 12).
According to the Bahraini authorities, a five-man cell directed from Iran by Qassim al-Muamen, a convicted terrorist, planned the recently thwarted attacks. The group was reportedly also planning to carry out a series of assassinations (BNA, November 15).
While the Gulf States are typically quick to blame interference on outside forces, Bahrain, with its majority Shia population ruled over by a Sunni monarchy, has a number of its own disgruntled Shia militant groups that may operate autonomously but be receptive to Iranian influence.
The most significant of those groups is perhaps Saraya al-Ashtar (the al-Ashtar Brigades), three members of which were executed earlier this year over their involvement in a 2014 bomb attack (al-Arabiya, January 15). In March, two Saraya al-Ashtar members - Ahmad Hasan Yusuf and Alsayed Murtadha Majeed Ramadhan Alawi - were added to the U.S. Specially Designated Global Terrorist list (U.S. Department of State, March 17). Separately, Bahraini authorities saw some success in tackling the group in August, breaking up a ten-member cell and confiscating weapons and explosives (Gulf News, August 24).
Saraya al-Ashtar came to public attention in April 2013 when it released its first statement promising attacks against Bahrain's Sunni rulers. It remains unclear to what extent the group is supported from Tehran. However, there are certainly ideological sympathies, and the State Department's designation of Yusuf and Alawi makes clear that Iran has provided weapons, funding and training to groups in Bahrain.
Manama insists, however, that those alleged to have been plotting to bomb the pipelines arrived in the country from Iran. Certainly, attacks on oil infrastructure would mark a departure for domestic Shia militants - including Saraya al-Ashtar - which tend to favor targeting members of the security forces with homemade explosives.
