Can Tunisia's Jihadists Capitalize on Country's Economic Crisis?

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Two militants were killed and at least one member of the Tunisian security forces was injured on February 1 during clashes in Gabes province (al-Bawaba, February 2; al-Arabiya, February 2). The clashes began after three militants armed with assault rifles accosted local shepherds and in an attempt to steal their food. The shepherds then alerted the military who pursued the militants. The incident indicated that the militants were not from the area and were not able to rely on local contacts for support. Unlike many other recent incidents, the latest clashes did not take place in mountainous areas near the Libyan border, but rather in sparsely-populated desert-like areas, located closer to the Libyan border. Previously, in January, the Tunisian authorities said they had arrested nine extremists in Bizerte in northern Tunisia who were recruiting fighters to travel to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Al-Arabiya, January 27). The incidents show that Islamist militants in the country remain active, both seeking to operate domestically in guerrilla fashion in rural areas, and also working to provide manpower to Islamic State abroad.

These events occurred against a backdrop of social unrest elsewhere in the country, primarily over poor economic conditions and the country's chronic lack of jobs and opportunities for young people. Protests resulting from the unrest were concentrated in the country's poorer inland areas and were often led by unemployed graduates focused on provincial cities, and saw protesters seizing some local government buildings and blockading highways. In addition, on January 25, thousands of Tunisian police joined the protests, largely to ask for higher pay, a request partly motivated by the realization that they are now priority targets for Islamist militants (Al-Arabiya, January 25). Although this led to the country declaring an overnight curfew, casualties among both protesters and the security forces were light, primarily resulting from the Tunisian authorities opting to avoid the use of force against protesters out of the fear of escalating the situation and to steer clear of comparisons to to Ben Ali, the country's former strongman who was forced out by protests in 2011.

However, while the protests do not constitute a mortal threat to the government and are largely directed against the economic situation than against the country's democratic system of government, they underline that the country's poor economic situation may be exacerbating youth susceptibility to Islamist radicalization. Tunisia Prime Minister Habib Essid, gave a revealing interview in September 2015 for the Council on Foreign Relations in which he said that the country's radicals were generally motivated by either ideology or by money. He said: "Some of them, they think that through jihad they can go to paradise and things like that. […] but the most important part of them, they're there for economic reasons. They didn't have jobs" and "they couldn't have a normal life"; as a result have turned to jihadist groups who can offer to pay them a regular salary. [1] Given the high levels of unemployment in Tunisia - the World Bank estimates youth unemployment at 37.6 percent and graduate unemployment at 62.3 - much will depend on whether the government is able to take steps to effectively address these problems, and secondly whether the Islamic State and other militant groups will be able to find a way to capitalize on this discontent (The National, January 27). So far, youth dissatisfaction in Tunisia has been mainly directed against politicians and political parties, rather than against the country's new democratic system itself. However, this could change if the Islamic State is able to convince Tunisia's youth that democracy has failed them and that terrorist group's promised theocracy holds the solution to Tunisia's problems.

Notes:

[1] "Assessing Tunisia's Opportunities and Challenges: A Conversation with Habib Essid", Council on Foreign Relations. September 30, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/tunisia/assessing-tunisias-opportunities-challenges/p37055