Assessment for Avars in Russia

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

The position of the Avars is one of precarious advantage. While they no longer dominate the local politics of the republic, they remain the most powerful ethnic group politically and economically. They still maintain some advantages based on their traditional positions in the hierarchy of Dagestan, although these positions are now shared with the Dargins and Kumyk. Together, these three groups share the advantages based on their numbers, their unity as a people, and their economic positions. To date, Avar leaders have not pressed their advantages and have yielded considerably to the other groups; they have even disbanded the Avar National Movement, Imam Shamil, apparently as a demonstration of their commitment to ethnic harmony. They seem to recognize the necessity of maintaining an ethnic balance in order to avoid a situation like that which led to wars in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Their interests are best served by a stable Dagestan, which can only be maintained if no one group tries to better its position.

The ethnic unrest in neighboring regions creates an enormous risk factor for the Dagestanis. A decade of Chechen incursions into Dagestan and Russian military placements to counter these attacks has led to increased tension and militarization in the republic. In addition, there are indications that the Russians are selectively arming some ethnic groups to combat the Chechens, while leaving others unarmed. The Avars, always among the privileged, have benefited from the Russian military largesse, for example, while the Laks have not.

The second round of fighting that erupted in August of 1999 in Chechnya did not upset the fragile ethnic balance in Dagestan. One trigger for the renewed warfare was an incursion into Dagestan by Chechen irregulars in the hope of finding support for their cause from other Caucasian mountain peoples. No such support materialized. In fact, Avars and Laks actively resisted the Chechen incursions, which foolishly targeted mountain villages instead of Russian military outposts. The ferocity of the ongoing war in Chechnya has seemed to serve as a deterrent to violence for other ethnonationalist movements of the region.

The severe level of unemployment among young Dagestanis is the one problem that seems to have a potential to create social, and perhaps ethnic, unrest. Ironically, in the long run, democracy in Dagestan, because of its uncertainties and potential to marginalize some groups, may turn out to be less stable than the strict quota system maintained by the Soviets. To date, however, the precarious ethnic balance of Dagestan has remained remarkably stable – the Avars seem content to retain their position without seeking further advantages, while other ethnic groups of Dagestan have neither the numbers nor the will to provide a serious challenge to the status quo. Nevertheless, a decision by Russian federal authorities in 2002 to introduce the post of president for Dagestan, with direct elections scheduled for 2006, has increased tension among ethnic groups. It is feared that a president representing only one ethnic group would threaten the current ethnic balance within the republic's executive and legislative bodies. In 2007, parliamentary elections will also take place under a new system that abolishes current ethnic quotas.

Analytic Summary

The Avar are a mountain-dwelling Islamic people that comprise the largest single nationality in the complex autonomous Republic of Dagestan in Russia (see note below). They have played a very important role in the North Caucasus for centuries (TRADITN = 1). Historically, they have dominated commercial relations in the region, especially in Dagestan, but in general, compared with Russians in the rest of the country, the Avars are relatively less well off (ECDIFXX = 2). Also, it was an Avar spiritual leader, Imam Shamil, who led the revolt against Russian expansion into the Caucasus in 1834. For 25 years, he led the Muslim inhabitants of the Caucasus, Avars, Chechens, Kumyks, Dargins and others in the revolt that was finally put down with his capture in 1859. Since then, the Avar have prided themselves on their heritage of resistance, much like their kindred, the Chechens.

The Avar live mainly in the mountains of Dagestan with small settlements in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, elsewhere in Russia, and Central Asia (GROUPCON = 2). Their origins predate the Mongol invasions and even the Arab invasions of the 8th century A.D. After being incorporated into the Golden Horde, the Avar broke from the Mongols and formed the Avar Khanate in the 14th century. This khanate acquired considerable power in the 16th and 17th centuries when many neighboring principalities paid it tribute, but even during this period, tribal loyalties were very strong. It is these tribal loyalties which survive today in Dagestan among the Avar. They are also among the most fiercely loyal to their Muslim faith (BELIEF = 3) and ethnic identity (COSHESX9 = 5).

The Avar are not Turkic, though their language does have some Turkic influences (as well as Arabic and Persian) (LANG = 1). Among the Avar, over 99% speak one of the four mutually intelligible Avar dialects (LANG = 2). Interestingly, only about 60% speak Russian as a first or second language. This is probably due to the lack of interest Russia showed in colonizing their mountainous areas. Relatively few Russians live in Dagestan even today and most positions of authority have historically gone to Avars and Dargins.

As the Soviet Union began to collapse, the Avars formed a national movement named after their famous 19th century leader. The formation of the Imam Shamil movement (Avar National Movement) was in large part a reaction to the creation of Tenglik, a movement representing Kumyk national interests. After a decade of relative inactivity, the Imam Shamil disbanded in December 2000 because "its continued existence could increase the likelihood of clashes between Dagestan's various ethnic groups," according to its leaders. However, when its former leader, Gadzhi Makhachev, was shot in 2003, the "executive committee" of the movement issued a statement asking people not to gather and "create trouble" out of the attempted assassination; this suggests both that the group is still active to some degree and that, at present, it is still committed to maintaining the status quo and overall ethnic harmony in Dagestan.

DAGESTAN

The Republic of Dagestan is located in one of the most ethnically complex regions of the world. Its two million inhabitants are divided into approximately 36 different nationalities and speak more than two-dozen mutually unintelligible languages. Dagestan, approximately twice the size of Maryland, is situated on the northern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains in southwestern Russia between Chechnya and Georgia to the west and the Caspian Sea to the east. Despite its ethnic diversity, it is relatively peaceful today compared to its Caucasian neighbors. Most of the ethnic groups in Dagestan seem to be satisfied with the present make-up and multi-ethnic character of their republic. The general acceptance of Russian dominance is likely a result of several factors: the examples of Chechnya and Abkhazia; the strong acceptance of Communism in most Dagestani cultures; and the stabilizing (and subsidizing) role the Russian Federation plays in its inter-ethnic politics.

Throughout most of the Soviet era, the non-Russian ethnic groups of Dagestan were subjected to cultural manipulations. Moscow went through periods of promoting Arabic and Turkic as their "official" cultures and languages, as well as a period of promoting the diversity of the region. However, shortly after World War II Soviet authorities began to impose Russian as the only language of choice in schools and government offices. These manipulations exacerbated the anti-Russian feelings of most groups and they resisted Russification just as they had under the czars. The very formation of Dagestan as an administrative unit was a manipulation designed to group together the ethnic groups into an ethnic cauldron which Moscow could control. As a result, their cultural traditions probably are as strong today as they were a century ago.

The primary problem facing Dagestan as a whole today is massive unemployment (over 80% of whom are Lezgins because of the concentration of the defense industry in Lezgin areas) and resulting crime. This has, in turn, increased interest in a new, strict, and militaristic form of Islam, sometimes called Wahhabism. Several Islamic militias have arisen in the mountainside, paying youths to join and fight for Islam in Chechnya and Dagestan. Many ethnic groups primarily reside in rural areas and unemployment has not hit the mountainous areas as hard as urban areas. The economy runs largely as it did under the communists as most of the communist-era officials have held onto their positions. The peoples of this area continue to practice arranged marriages and other Muslim traditions.

During the Soviet era, Moscow implemented a power-sharing system based on strict quotas for the major ethnic in groups in Dagestan. Historically, the Avars and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Kumyks have been the socially, economically and politically privileged groups of Dagestan. In the 1980s, an Avar held the post of secretary-general in the Dagestan Communist Party and violated the quota system by appointing Avars to most positions of power. Since the fall of the USSR, however, the Avars have lost their status, and many administrative positions, to Kumyks and Dargins.

The current political structure is based on the republic's 1994 constitution. The republic is ruled by a State Council, in which all major indigenous ethnic groups are equally represented, and there is a regional parliament, called the People's Assembly, for which electoral districts are formed according to the ethnic majority in each locale. In 2002 the Russian federal government made the decision to hold direct presidential elections in Dagestan in 2006 and to transform the parliament by 2007 into a smaller, unicameral body that will not use the current system of ethnic quotas; these changes led to increased tension among ethnic groups. However, in late 2004, President Putin announced constitutional changes that would see all regional presidents appointed, not elected. It is unclear, as yet, how this will affect the inter-ethnic relations.

Dagestan itself is built on an Islamic identity, as all of its indigenous groups are Muslim. Many people view Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, as the center of Islam in the North Caucasus. Many of the large demonstrations in Dagestan in 1991 were religiously based and national in character. Most groups in Dagestan follow the Sufi school of Islam, which is steeped in mysticism. The people follow this tradition very devoutly and Sufism played a large role in the revolt of Shamil, but it is not clear what role it is playing today in the inter-ethnic balance.

All Dagestani groups seem to be linked together by three factors. First, each uses Russian as the only lingua franca of Dagestan, especially in government. Second, Russian subsidies to the Dagestani economy are crucial for all of the groups' survival. And, third, each wishes (to varying degrees) to maintain the precarious ethno-political balance, not only in Dagestan, but throughout the Northern Caucasus. There are very few Russians in Dagestan and, as such, most positions of authority have historically been filled by indigenous people, even under Soviet rule. These leaders seem to realize that exacerbation of ethnic divisions would be to the detriment of all groups. Since it is impossible to contemplate the division of such a small and complex territory into anything resembling independent states, at present most groups seem more or less committed to working within the system to realize their social, political and economic objectives.

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