Case Law

The case concerned media access to reception facilities for asylum-seekers. The applicant in the case, a journalist for an Internet news portal, complained about the authorities’ refusal of his request to carry out interviews and take photographs at the Debrecen Reception Centre, thus preventing him from reporting on the living conditions there. The Court stressed that research work was an essential part of press freedom and had to be protected. It was not convinced that restricting the applicant’s ability to carry out such research work, which had prevented him from reporting first-hand on a matter of considerable public interest, namely the refugee crisis in Hungary, had been sufficiently justified. In particular, the authorities had only given summary reasons, namely possible problems for the safety and private lives of asylum-seekers, for their refusal, without any real weighing up of the interests at stake.

8 October 2019 | Judicial Body: Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights | Legal Instrument: 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) | Topic(s): Freedom of expression | Countries: Hungary

Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that, in circumstances, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, where a first-instance court or tribunal has found — after making a full and ex nunc examination of all the relevant elements of fact and law submitted by an applicant for international protection — that, under the criteria laid down by Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the protection granted, that applicant must be granted such protection on the ground that he or she relied on in support of his or her application, but after which the administrative or quasi-judicial body adopts a contrary decision without establishing that new elements have arisen that justify a new assessment of the international protection needs of the applicant, that court or tribunal must vary that decision which does not comply with its previous judgment and substitute its own decision for it as to the application for international protection, disapplying as necessary the national law that would prohibit it from proceeding in that way.

29 July 2019 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Administrative law - Effective remedy | Countries: Hungary - Russian Federation

I suggest that the Court reply to the Pécsi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság (Administrative and Labour Court, Pécs, Hungary) as follows: – Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, in conjunction with the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, is to be interpreted as meaning that a model of judicial review in matters of international protection in which the courts are endowed with a mere cassational power but in which the judicial guidance they issue in their annulment decisions is effectively being disregarded by the administrative bodies when deciding on the same case again, such as demonstrated in the case in the main proceedings, fails to meet the requirements of effective judicial review set out in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 and interpreted in the light of the first paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter. – A national court, deciding in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, must set aside the national rule limiting its power to the mere annulment of the relevant administrative decision. That obligation arises when the clear assessment contained in a judicial decision annulling a previous administrative decision has been disregarded by the administrative authority deciding the same case anew, without the latter bringing any new elements that it could have reasonably and legitimately brought into consideration, thus depriving the judicial protection provided for under the invoked provisions of any practical effect.

30 April 2019 | Judicial Body: European Union: Court of Justice of the European Union | Topic(s): Administrative courts - Effective remedy | Countries: Hungary - Russian Federation

These applications for judicial review involve a constitutional challenge to a part of the Designated Countries of Origin [DCO] regime established under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. This Court has previously determined that one aspect of this regime withstands constitutional scrutiny. Other cases have found that the differential treatment of refugee claimants from a DCO is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. In this case, the Applicants challenge paragraph 112(2) (b.1) of the IRPA on the basis that it infringes subsection 15(1) of the Charter. This paragraph precludes a refugee claimant from a DCO from applying for a pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA] before 36 months have elapsed from the last determination of their risk before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] or the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB].

20 March 2019 | Judicial Body: Canada: Federal Court | Topic(s): Safe country of origin | Countries: Canada - Hungary

paragraph 112(2) (b.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, is declared to be inconsistent with subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, insofar as it concerns nationals of countries designated pursuant to section 109.1(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act; and the following words - “or, in the case of a person who is a national of a country that is designated under subsection 109.1(1), less than 36 months,” - in paragraph 112(2) (b.1) shall have no force or effect with respect to such nationals;

20 March 2019 | Judicial Body: Canada: Federal Court | Topic(s): Constitutional law - Equality before the law - Safe country of origin | Countries: Canada - Hungary

31 May 2017 | Judicial Body: Switzerland: Tribunal administratif fédéral | Topic(s): Asylum-seekers - Refugee / Asylum law - Refugees - Safe third country | Countries: Congo, Democratic Republic of the - Hungary - Switzerland

14 March 2017 | Judicial Body: Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights | Legal Instrument: 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) | Topic(s): Appeal / Right to appeal - Effective remedy - Freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment - Prison or detention conditions - Refoulement - Right to liberty and security - Safe third country | Countries: Bangladesh - Hungary