

# Impact Evaluation

## **The Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations: its impact and role**

**ETHIOPIA**

**A Mixed Method Impact Evaluation**

**Vol. I Full Report**

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*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

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
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## Fact Sheet: Food Assistance for Refugees in Protracted Situations: Ethiopia

Type	WFP Project #	Title	Time Frame	Total WFP Cost	% funded
PRRO	10127.0	Food Assistance for refugees in Ethiopia and for refugee repatriation	7-2002 to 12-2004	41,245,423	61%
PRRO	10127.1	Food assistance to Somali, Sudanese, and Eritrean refugees	1-2005 to 12-2006	27,490,764	76%
PRRO	10127.2	Food assistance to Somali, Sudanese, and Eritrean refugees	1-2007 to 12-2008	42,970,156	61%
EMOP	10819.0	Response to Somali refugee influx	Feb-April 2009	266,056	51%
PRRO	10127.3	Food assistance to Somali, Sudanese, and Eritrean refugees	1-2009 to 12-2010	94,511,370	49%*

\* Resource Situation as of 19 December 2010  
Source: WFP Standard Project Reports and latest resource situations

### Planned vs. Actual number of WFP beneficiaries, by year




Source WFP Standard Project Reports 2002-2010

### WFP Operations by Activity

Operation	Supplementary Feeding	Therapeutic feeding	School Feeding	GFD	FFW participants
PRRO 10127.0	X	X	X	X	X
PRRO 10127.1	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10127.2	X	X	X	X	
PRRO 10127.3	X	X	X	X	

Source: WFP Standard Project Report  
\*IR-EMOP 10819.0 is not included



Source: WFP Standard Project Report  
\*IR-EMOP 10819.0 is not included

### Donors

United States, UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Finland, Canada, France (17 others)

### Partners

ARRA; International Rescue Committee (2003-09); Danish Refugee Council; Lutheran World Federation; Zusto Asia Refugee Care (2004-08), Zoa Refugee Care Netherlands (2003) OASIS; Ethiopian Orthodox Church/ Development & Inter Church Aid Commission (2003-04), Hope for the Horn (2003).

Sources: Business Warehouse, WFP Government Donor Relations Division; WFP NGO and Donor Relations Unit

# Executive Summary

## Introduction

1. This impact evaluation is one of four evaluations planned in different countries by WFP and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for 2011 and 2012. It aims to provide evidence and inspiration for future strategies to improve the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees in protracted situations. Its assessment of the impact of food assistance provided to refugees in selected Ethiopian refugee camps between 2003 and 2010 is intended to support evidence-based decision-making on appropriate forms of food assistance in protracted refugee situations.
2. The immediate objectives are to:
  - a. evaluate the impact of food assistance to refugees in relation to stated – intended – project objectives, and the effects, including unintended ones, on host populations, which may influence the potential for achieving durable solutions; and
  - b. make recommendations for minimizing negative effects and optimizing positive ones, to increase the potential for finding durable solutions.
3. The evaluation tests a theory of change, which is based on WFP and UNHCR policies and programme guidance and posits that UNHCR and WFP activities will produce short-term effects, including improved food security, increased access to livelihood opportunities, positive coping strategies and asset-building; intermediate outcomes, including improved nutrition, an appropriate food basket, successful income-generating activities, agricultural activities and improved education; and long-term impact, resulting in self-reliance, resettlement or repatriation.
4. The evaluation team employed a combination of data collection procedures to triangulate information gathered from a wide variety of sources, mainly refugees residing in camps in the Tigray and Somali regions of Ethiopia. Evaluation methods included a quantitative household survey of 1,180 refugee households; qualitative focus groups with 256 refugees and members of host populations; key informant interviews with implementing organizations and donors; positive deviant interviews; observation of conditions in the camps and warehouses; and analysis of secondary data.

## Context

5. For more than 20 years, Ethiopia has hosted large numbers of refugees. According to estimates at the time of this evaluation, the country's total refugee population was near 154,300 and rapidly rising;<sup>1</sup> Somali refugees were flooding into camps in the country's south, which was not part of the evaluation. The most protracted

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<sup>1</sup>UNHCR. 2011. Global Appeal 2011 Update. Ethiopia. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483986>

caseloads come from Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan; the steady repatriation of Sudanese refugees limited the evaluation's scope to the Eritrean and Somali protracted refugee contexts.

6. Somali camps are located in Ethiopia's southeast Somali region and currently host 91,100 refugees. The evaluation team visited Kebribeyah, the oldest camp, established in 1991, and Sheder, established in 2009. Eritrean camps are located in Tigray region, where the team visited Shimelba, the primary camp in Tigray, established in 2005, and Mai Ayni, established in 2009. Both of these camps have particularly high ratios of men to women.
7. The Government of Ethiopia has historically had an open policy of allowing refugees into Ethiopia, and has taken measures to protect their human rights, including the recent formal introduction of the "Out of Camp" policy for qualifying Eritrean refugees. However, refugees are generally regarded as temporary guests and have limited freedom of movement or access to education and employment opportunities.
8. UNHCR and WFP have a long-standing partnership committed to ensuring that refugees' food security and related needs are adequately addressed and that durable solutions are sought. In Ethiopia, UNHCR's chief responsibilities include supporting the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) with financial resources for the determination of refugee status and registration processes, and providing refugees with non-food items (NFIs), such as cooking utensils, blankets and soap, and complementary foods that make the main food commodities provided by WFP usable.
9. Since 2003, WFP's assistance has been channelled through a series of protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) and one emergency operation. WFP's main responsibility is to provide monthly food rations, which are stored in camp warehouses administered by ARRA. Food distribution is supervised by ARRA and monitored by WFP and UNHCR. Over the years, WFP has fine-tuned the food basket by including blended foods to address micronutrient deficiencies, and increasing the amount of cereals to compensate refugees for milling costs. WFP also provides food rations for supplementary and therapeutic feeding and school feeding.

## Results and Factors that Explain the Results

10. **Food consumption and food security.** WFP has provided a stable supply of nutritionally balanced food rations throughout most of the period under review, saving lives, protecting refugees in emergencies, and reducing hunger and malnutrition. Although WFP faced some problems in meeting delivery targets prior to 2008 – mostly resulting from transport inefficiencies and budget constraints caused by insufficient donor commitment to the programme – the

*"We would have died without support".*  
Women refugees – Mai Ayni and  
Shimelba camps

expected outcome of ensuring adequate food energy consumption has in large part been achieved, and food energy consumption has improved in recent years.


11. However, food insecurity intensifies for refugee families during the second half of each month. Most refugee households are able to eat two or three meals per day, but the quantity and quality of those meals declines in the latter half of the month, when diets include virtually no meat, fish or eggs. Single-member households have greater difficulty making their rations last. Fewer than one quarter consume cereal rations throughout the month, compared with 36 percent of multi-member households. Food rations often run out because refugees are compelled to sell up to half of them to pay for basic needs – NFIs, other food items and milling – which are often purchased at poor terms of trade. Although UNHCR provides most refugee households with a set of NFIs when they arrive in the camps, budget allocations and inadequate targeting and prioritization constrain further distributions of NFIs in protracted-refugee camps. In addition, WFP and UNHCR have not systematically delivered food and NFIs simultaneously, to ensure that food is consumed and not sold in large quantities to purchase NFIs.
12. The degree and intensity of chronic food insecurity vary by refugee group and type of household. Eritrean refugees consume diets that are more diverse than those of Somali refugees, as evidenced in differential household dietary diversity scores (HDDS), of 5.7 at Shimelba camp (Eritrean) and 4.9 at Kebribeyah camp (Somali). The higher HDDS depends on sales of food basket items, which allow Eritrean refugees occasionally to purchase a larger variety of food items, including green vegetables. The food consumption score (FCS)<sup>2</sup> of refugees varies significantly by ethnicity. Approximately two thirds of Tigrigna households (one ethnic group of refugees from Eritrea) consume an adequate diet, but fewer than one half of Kunama households (the other main ethnic group from Eritrea) and fewer than one third of Somali households attain “acceptable” food consumption. The FCS for most of these groups is borderline or poor.

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<sup>2</sup>The FCS measures the nutrient density and frequency of households’ food consumption, allowing nutrition analysis based on the frequency and types of foods consumed, indexed by higher values for animal protein foods, pulses and green vegetables, and lower values for oil and sugar.(WFP. 2009.Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines. Rome.)



**Figure: Food Consumption Category, by Ethnic Group and Camp**



13. Somali refugees also engage in more frequent and severe coping strategies in response to food insecurity during the second half of each month. Virtually all Somali households – 94 percent – commonly limit portion sizes and reduce meal numbers. Although these strategies are less frequent in Shimelba camp, 74 percent of households there still limit portion sizes, and 65 percent reduce the number of meals. Tigrigna single-person households, most of which are of single men, commonly employ the “11/5” consumption system: wake up late, because few people work, and eat a late brunch at 11 a.m. and an early dinner at 5 p.m. Approximately two thirds of all surveyed households regularly borrow food and eat less preferred foods, and nearly 60 percent occasionally seek meals at other houses.
14. Several other factors act against refugee food security throughout the month. First, large numbers of Somali and, to a lesser extent, Kunama refugees are convinced that the food distribution process undercuts their cereal rations through systematic under-scooping; WFP and UNHCR monitoring systems are not sufficiently intensive to verify the extent of this problem. Second, UNHCR has been unable to revalidate populations in the protracted camps for several years, so it relies on out-of-date databases to plan programme activities, creating the risk of inefficiencies in food and other refugee activities. Finally, camp warehouses are adequate but not fully up to WFP standards. Stack cards are not used at either Kebribeyah or Shimelba, and the ledger used to record Shimelba food commodity receipts, dispatches and distributions had some inaccuracies.
15. **Nutrition.** Nutrition in young children has improved in recent years, largely through the efforts of WFP and UNHCR to target malnourished children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women. Chronic malnutrition/underweight is negligible among Somali and, to a lesser extent, Tigrigna refugees. Malnutrition rates, measured as global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM), have gradually improved annually among Somali and Tigrigna refugees

and have been close to or below World Health Organization (WHO) benchmarks since 2008 and 2007, respectively. However, stunting and SAM rates remain unacceptably high among Kunama refugees, primarily because of inappropriate child feeding practices. This is not currently being addressed in programme modalities. Indicative of iron deficiencies in the diet, refugee anaemia rates have never fallen below the WHO benchmark of 20 percent for children under 5 in either camp. Although the prevalence of anaemia among refugees has gradually declined, its persistence can partly be explained by inefficient consumption patterns for fortified corn-soya blend.

16. **Livelihoods.** Income-generating opportunities are limited and vary significantly across camps and ethnicities and by sex. Among all refugee groups, only the Kunama, who are traditionally farmers, have access to small parcels of land through sharecropping arrangements. Agricultural production opportunities are severely restricted by the unwritten policy of limiting refugees' access to land, particularly for Somali refugees. Day labour represents the most important income source for all refugees. Very few refugees own businesses or engage in petty trade, and most business activities in and around the camps are owned by local residents. Refugee households' lack of grazing land poses a huge constraint to livestock production, as do restrictions on movements; few refugees own animals other than chickens. With few agricultural production opportunities, refugees are easily exploitable. Remittances play an important role in explaining food security differences: one third of Tigrigna refugees receive remittances from other countries, and another third receive other types of financial support, including gifts. In contrast, substantially fewer than one-tenth of Somali households receive remittances. Remittances can be a vital source of income for households striving to preserve their food rations, and are another explanatory factor for the relative food insecurity among Somali refugees.
17. Current programming does not include local integration as a potential durable solution, severely limiting an overall food security or livelihood programming strategy. UNHCR and WFP face resource and Ethiopian legal constraints to longer-term livelihood solutions, which contributes to maintaining a care and maintenance approach. In the period under review, donors devoted well over US\$100 million to WFP and UNHCR efforts to save refugee lives in emergency contexts in Ethiopia and to provide refugees with sufficient food and non-food items to protect their food security and nutrition status, while livelihood programming has attracted only a very small proportion of donor assistance. In addition, although WFP and UNHCR regularly engage in high-quality joint assessments and nutrition surveys, recommendations are not always followed up.
18. Although WFP has procured and transported a sufficiently stable supply of food assistance to reduce hunger and malnutrition among refugees in the camps, it has not linked its refugee food assistance to its high-profile, highly resourced food security and livelihood programme activities to benefit Ethiopian rural

communities in areas surrounding the camps, such as Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods (MERET), the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and school feeding. Many of these programmes have activities that are similar to those in the camps, but these opportunities for synergies are lost.

19. Although UNHCR offers strong protective services to vulnerable refugee households and supports ARRA, it lacks sufficient funding mechanisms to promote refugee self-reliance and durable solutions. Working primarily through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), few UNHCR resources are devoted to livelihood programming activities that create economic opportunities for refugees to meet their basic needs. This approach is not advocated among partners, NGOs are expected to raise funds separately, and livelihood strategies are developed long after the protracted refugee camp has been established.

NGOs are like “*lions in the bush – they come in very quickly, implement a few small activities and then disappear*”.

20. Linking livelihood outcomes to local durable solutions also requires the participation of host populations, which is currently lacking. UNHCR and its partners have introduced a few camp-based livelihood activities such as kitchen gardens and very limited activities to mitigate environmental impacts, which ostensibly involve host community participation. However, environmental mitigation activities are insufficiently intensive to replenish agroforestry destruction around the camps, which has undermined long-term livelihoods.
21. In addition, the long-term distribution of full rations, coupled with limited economic opportunities, has created a dependency syndrome that permeates all aspects of the programme. Refugees have not come close to achieving self-reliance. In their intervention priorities, both WFP and UNHCR have made resettlement and repatriation the two durable solutions, although repatriation will not be possible for either Eritrean or Somali refugees in the near future. In this context, refugees seek resettlement as their only viable durable solution, especially after living for up to 20 years in camps, with virtually no livelihood options. However, resettlement is a time-consuming resource-draining process that depends on the goodwill of a small number of donor countries. Only a few refugees can be resettled; for example, in 2010 – the year with the highest numbers resettled – only 3 percent of Somali refugees residing in Kebribeyah and 20 percent of Eritrean refugees in Shimelba were resettled.
22. Other external factors help explain why refugees have been denied livelihood opportunities within Ethiopia as a durable solution. As well as being the implementing agency responsible for food distribution and service provisioning within the camps, ARRA is a government regulatory agency concerned with security issues. It therefore oversees Government of Ethiopia policies that limit or deny refugees’ legal employment opportunities and access to land for agricultural

production. After 20 years in the camps, Somali refugees in particular still lack economic freedom to pursue livelihood options. UNHCR, WFP and major donors have not vigorously lobbied for policy changes that might expand refugees' economic rights, and thus durable solutions.

## **Gender Relations and Protection from Violence**

23. The UNHCR has provided high-quality, valued services in the camps to protect vulnerable refugees from violence. However, women and unaccompanied minors remain vulnerable. Women heads of household tend to be more food-insecure than men and lack income-earning opportunities. Women occasionally engage in transactional sex to support their food security – sex is even bartered for food. Women are also vulnerable to violence when in search of fuelwood and water outside the camps. Unaccompanied minors are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and food insecurity related to their living conditions – they live with other children in extremely crowded conditions – and depend on others to collect their rations, store the food and prepare meals, which were described as extremely repetitive and unappetizing.
24. Camp structures, such as food distribution committees, mirror Eritrean and Somali social patriarchy and deny women a voice in decision-making, even though women are responsible for ration collection and management in the household. This situation exacerbates mistrust, particularly regarding food distribution. Patriarchy also contributes to the very different reactions of men and women to counselling services provided in the Tigray camps.
25. Food assistance also affects marriage patterns. Both camps report that households marry off young girls to increase household support, including access to food assistance. Somali refugees have also devised polygamous marital relations – which are far more frequent among refugees than in the general population – as an important food access strategy. Another common marriage pattern involves Eritrean refugee men entering into cross-marriages with Ethiopian women, theoretically to strengthen resettlement prospects for both parties, and to create larger families to augment food rations.

## **Conclusions**

26. As noted, the theory of change evaluated here postulates that UNHCR and WFP programming would produce short-term effects, intermediate outcomes and long-term impact. The pathway for the theory of change was never completely achieved because several assumptions were not met. Through the stable supply of nutritionally balanced food rations, the agencies achieved most of the short-term effects, but did not move from saving lives, hunger mediation, security and protection to improved livelihood opportunities and asset-building.

27. The programme has successfully realized half of the intermediate outcomes, including appropriate food baskets; improved nutrition as measured by GAM and SAM, although Kunama children have unacceptably high stunting rates and anaemia remains problematic; and improved education opportunities, although teaching quality lags behind that in other Ethiopian schools and graduates have few opportunities to use their education.

*"We arrived at this camp like people with an arrow in our butt and another arrow in our hand. WFP and UNHCR have helped us to take the arrow out of our butt; so now we can sit down. But nobody has taken the arrow out of our hand. We still cannot do anything for ourselves, to help ourselves".*

Somali elder and respected refugee leader

28. Although WFP has delivered a full basket of food commodities to the camps, Ethiopian refugees are not food-secure throughout the month, have limited livelihood opportunities, are accumulating few assets, have few successful income-generating activities and are not self-reliant. A major factor contributing to these outcomes is that the refugee assistance and protection provided by WFP and UNHCR is dominated by a care and maintenance approach, which is based on the premise that the refugees are temporary guests who will soon be repatriated or resettled. External factors, including government policies, resource constraints and refugees' will to resettle, contribute to perpetuation of this approach.

29. Long-term impact has not been achieved over the past eight years, except in the resettlement of a few, mostly Tigrigna, refugees. It is therefore unlikely that refugees in camps in Ethiopia will achieve durable solutions without significant policy and programme changes.

30. The care and maintenance approach is appropriate in short-term contexts. For example, while this evaluation report was being written, UNHCR and WFP in Ethiopia were committing resources and efforts to respond to the emergency in southern Ethiopia, where severely malnourished Somali refugees were streaming across the border to escape catastrophic drought and security conditions in Somalia. In the protracted context of the refugee camps evaluated here, however, food assistance remains oriented primarily to maintaining minimal levels of food consumption, and not to protecting livelihoods, promoting livelihood strategies or managing risks, despite the corporate policy intentions of UNHCR and WFP. As a result, the refugees have become dependent on food aid and are less inclined to pursue alternative livelihood opportunities over time. Without large-scale investment in livelihood programming, UNHCR and WFP will simply be perpetuating chronic food insecurity in the hope that resettlement occurs sooner rather than later.

## Recommendations

31. The following recommendations are devised to assist WFP and UNHCR in promoting durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. They are presented as long-term, medium-term and short-term recommendations. The position of the recommendation does not imply its level of importance.

### Long-Term Recommendations Requiring More Than One PRRO to Implement

32. **Recommendation 1: WFP and UNHCR should develop a livelihood strategy by promoting policy and programme assistance that enables refugees to engage in legal economic activities, paid employment and private enterprise.** As international funding streams for care and maintenance models in camps begin to decline, refugees will need to rely more on their own economic activities in local communities. This strategy would be oriented to local development in which both refugees and the host population would benefit, and programmes would be implemented at scale. Such a strategy could serve as a model for promoting livelihoods at an early stage of refugee camp development, before a protracted situation evolves in which refugees and agencies focus on resettlement as the only durable solution option.
33. **Recommendation 2: Donors supporting the refugee programme should devote a larger proportion of resources to local durable solutions through livelihood programming. UNHCR and WFP cannot promote durable livelihood solutions without the support of donors.** To accomplish recommendation 1, donors should take a more proactive role in promoting livelihood approaches in protracted refugee camps. This should commence soon after emergency conditions have been stabilized. Donors would have to break some bureaucratic barriers that inhibit agencies or bureaux such as the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration from using resources to support long-term solutions, rather than exclusively for emergency humanitarian programmes, as is their current mandate.

### Medium-Term Recommendations to be Undertaken in the Next PRRO

34. **Recommendation 3: Scale up the livelihood programmes implemented by NGOs.** Livelihood programmes based on economic stimulus packages should be extended to host communities and should include agricultural and pastoral extension services, income-generating activities, vocational training and microfinance. For example, refugee-owned and -operated mills could generate resources that act as a catalyst for livelihood activities. These improvements would allow refugees to provide milling services for other refugee households, and would enable households to retain a greater proportion of their rations. Food processing also has good potential in the camps. Livelihood activities would be

tailored to the specific profile of the refugee population and would be initiated from the onset of refugee camp establishment.

35. **Recommendation 4: Improve collaboration and coordination for joint programming and funding activities, including advocacy efforts.** Given the costs involved, joint assessment missions should not be undertaken without agreed follow-up plans. Action plans would include a joint monitoring component to determine whether the actions proposed are actually implemented. Enhanced WFP–UNHCR collaboration would include increased advocacy with the Government of Ethiopia to bring about policy changes that enable refugees to pursue livelihoods more easily. These advocacy efforts should be assisted by donors. Through donor engagement, funding and advocacy can be combined using conditionality to lobby for more economic activities for refugees, and for policy changes such as the Out of Camp policy.
36. **Recommendation 5: Consider alternative food assistance modalities.** WFP employs many food assistance modalities in its global programming, and could consider employing food for work (FFW) to support refugee programmes. For example, FFW could support caregivers and cooks in improving the performance and outcomes related to unaccompanied minors; FFW and food for assets could support refugees' participation in environmental mitigation activities, the promotion of a watershed approach around camps and in host communities, or structural rehabilitation activities. Alternative food assistance modalities should be considered for single refugees who are not living with families. Consideration should be given to enabling young men to use a food voucher card to purchase their food from a local restaurant.
37. **Recommendation 6: Scale up environmental interventions that involve both refugees and the host population, to address environmental degradation created by the refugee camps and mitigate the negative consequences of climate change.** These interventions would be coupled with activities that seek to minimize the use of fuelwood. Donors should support this new approach; an advocacy campaign is essential for engaging Government and donors.
38. **Recommendation 7: Promote greater synergies in the implementation of WFP programme activities.** For example, environmental mitigation activities that have been successful in MERET and PSNP could be promoted in refugee settings to benefit host populations and refugees.
39. **Recommendation 8: Be more strategic and transparent in NFI distributions, given the realities of budget shortfalls.** To address weaknesses in the provision of NFIs, UNHCR should ensure that NFIs are readily available for new arrivals and are replenished in protracted refugee camps, based on needs assessments. The timing of NFI distributions must also

be appropriate, to reduce refugees' sale of food items to purchase NFIs, and should coincide with seasonal requirements and the timing of food distributions.

### **Short-Term Recommendations to be Undertaken Immediately**

40. **Recommendation9: UNHCR should undertake a revalidation process in the older camps, as soon as possible.** Although expensive, revalidation is essential given the inaccuracy of current camp databases for planning household food distribution and generating lists.
41. **Recommendation10:Increase women's participation.** To address the gender imbalance in the management of refugee committees, WFP and UNHCR should ensure increased women's participation in food distribution management and decision-making. This would improve food distribution efficiency, increase women refugees' input into programme prioritization in general and reduce mistrust. A sub-committee should be established specifically to address protection issues, including gender-based violence (GBV) associated with fuelwood and grass collection, the problem of transactional sex related to food insecurity, strategies for preventing GBV and female genital mutilation, and the protection of young girls and boys.
42. **Recommendation11:Intensify food distribution monitoring.** Both WFP and UNHCR need to be present at all food distributions. In cases where under-scooping is a potential concern, WFP should employ other monitoring tools, such as random spot checks, weighing of rations and testing of scoops, to determine whether the proper ration has been distributed to refugee households. WFP should also enhance ARRA's warehouse management practices and consider establishing a stronger presence in the vicinity of the Tigray refugee camps. UNHCR should base officers directly in the Tigray camps, where they currently spend insufficient time. UNHCR and WFP should regularly share monitoring reports to ensure effective inter-agency support and follow-up on reported problems.
43. **Recommendation12:Implement activities to improve child feeding practices.** This would link food distribution activities to parental training on appropriate nutrition and child feeding practices, implemented by partner NGOs and monitored or supervised by UNHCR nutrition teams.
44. **Recommendation13:Explore alternative milling options.** WFP and UNHCR should undertake a new improved feasibility study with the objective of instituting solutions for the milling conundrum.



# Map

## Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen

As of January 2010



**FIGSS**  
Field Information and  
Coordination Support Section  
Division of Operational Services

Sources:  
UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping  
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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Evaluation Features

### Rationale, objectives, and scope

1. This is the first in a series of four impact evaluations on this topic commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) during 2011 and 2012. The series aims to provide evidence and inspiration for future strategies to improve the contribution of food assistance to durable solutions for refugees and host populations in protracted refugee situations. The overall objective is to provide a detailed assessment of the impact of food assistance provided to refugees in selected refugee camps between 2003 and 2010. The findings are intended to be used to promote evidence-based decision-making on appropriate forms of food assistance in protracted refugee situations. The primary intended users of this first evaluation are staff from WFP and UNHCR Country Offices and the core implementing partner – the Administration for Returning Refugee Affairs (ARRA).
2. The immediate **objectives** are:
  - a. Evaluate the impact of food assistance to refugees in relation to stated project objectives (intended) and the effects (including unintended) of this on the host populations that may influence the potential for achieving durable solutions;
  - b. Make recommendations to minimize negative effects and optimize positive effects in order to increase the potential for finding durable solutions.

### Methodology and limitations

3. **Evaluation of Logic Model and Theory of Change:** This evaluation assesses outcomes and impacts of UNHCR and WFP activities and implementation strategy, as expressed in the logic model of WFP’s successive Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) and a WFP-UNHCR Theory of Change logic model (Annex 1).<sup>3</sup> A conventional counterfactual was neither possible nor in fact necessary. Instead, the evaluation used a theory-based approach, examined effects at times of pipeline breaks, and used a variety of methods to gather evidence from diverse sources in order to assess the contribution of food assistance to the intended outcomes and impacts.
4. The objectives of WFP’s contributions to the programme have shifted from “meeting the nutritional needs of refugees” (2002-04) to “ensuring daily nutritional needs of refugees, with special attention to women, malnourished children, and other vulnerable groups” (2005-06) to the current outcomes of:
  - Reducing and/or stabilizing acute malnutrition among refugees (outcome 1.1);
  - Reducing malnutrition amongst pregnant and lactating women, children under five, people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA), and vulnerable refugees with special nutritional needs (outcome 4.1);
  - Adequate food energy consumption for targeted beneficiaries (outcome 4.2);

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<sup>3</sup> Although WFP and UNHCR did not develop an overall Theory of Change model to guide inter-related food assistance activities, during the inception phase, the evaluation team created a Theory of Change model by integrating a variety of relevant documents which describe existing efforts to achieve long-term change for protected refugee populations. These sources include an existing WFP logic model; broader refugee policy; WFP-UNHCR’s MoU; and WFP Programme Guidance.

- Increased enrolment of children in WFP-assisted schools.

The Theory of Change evaluated here posits that UNHCR and WFP outputs and activities – rations for general distribution, supplementary feeding, school feeding, water supply, income-generating activities (IGA), non-food item (NFI) distribution – will produce short-term effects, intermediate outcomes, and long-term impact:

- Short-term effects should include improved food security, increased access to livelihood opportunities, positive coping strategies, and asset building.
- Intermediate outcomes should include improved nutrition, appropriate food basket, successful IGAs, agricultural activities, and improved education.
- Long-term impact should result in self-reliance, resettlement, or repatriation.

5. **Scope and sampling:** During the design and inception phase, the evaluation team and evaluation managers carried out extensive discussions with UNHCR, WFP, and ARRA senior managers and programme staff as well as other stakeholders about the scope and scale of the evaluation. Ethiopia hosts three protracted refugee populations – Eritrean refugees residing in Tigray region, Somali refugees residing in Somali region, and Sudanese refugees residing along Ethiopia’s western border. Time and financial resource constraints only allowed the evaluation team to focus its efforts on two of the three scenarios. Many of the Sudanese refugees are returning home to South Sudan (although one camp remains virtually full of refugees). Stakeholders agreed that the Somali and Eritrean caseloads must be included in the evaluation sample. The Sudanese case was therefore not considered as part of this impact evaluation.
6. **Selection of Refugee camps:** Somali refugees reside in three camps located between Jijiga and the northern Somalia border (although two additional camps have recently opened up near the Dolo area in the south, where logistical constraints are enormous). Eritrean refugees reside in three camps in the northwest part of Tigray region, close to the Eritrean border. Because this was an impact evaluation of food assistance in a protracted situation, the evaluation team selected the two oldest camps – Shimelba (population 8907 made up of 5191 households), which houses Eritrean refugees, and Kebribeyah (population 16,749 and 2138 households), which houses Somali refugees – as the refugee household sample. The team utilized quantitative and qualitative tools to answer the questions outlined in the evaluation from these two camps. In addition, the team selected two newer camps – Mai Ayni (population of 12,642) in Tigray and Sheder (population of 10,397) in Somali region, from where refugee and host community focus groups and key informants (KI) were interviewed, in order to qualitatively compare programme outcomes and impacts in relatively newer environments with those in more protracted scenarios. The quantitative sample was therefore taken from two camps and the qualitative sample from four camps.
7. **Sample Size:** The evaluation team developed a quantitative sampling strategy to randomly select refugee households to survey, allowing for comparison between three groups. The systematic random sample size was large enough (sample size calculation is outlined in Annex 2) to compare Kebribeyah Somali refugee outcomes with those of Shimelba Eritrean refugees. Within Shimelba camp, sample size allowed comparison between two predominant refugee groups – Kunama households, an agricultural-pastoral based group of people from Southern Eritrea, who comprise approximately 42 percent of the camp population, and Tigriña

speakers, comprising approximately 55 percent of the camp population who consist largely of a mix of urban and rural single-member households. The sample was drawn in this manner to allow the team to determine if the food-assistance programme had different effects on these three distinct populations.

8. **Data Collection:** The evaluation team employed a combination of data collection procedures in order to triangulate information gathered from a wide variety of sources and stakeholders, most prominently involving the participation of refugees residing in camps in the Tigray and Somali regions of Ethiopia. The mixed-methods approach generated quantitative interpretations of statistical representation of the effects and impacts of food assistance on the lives and livelihoods of two refugee populations living in a protracted context – Eritrean and Somali refugees residing in Ethiopian refugee camps. The statistically representative quantitative data garnered through interviews with refugee households was supplemented by qualitative data involving interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with a sample of all stakeholders (Annex 3 provides a list of persons interviewed). Evaluation methods included:
  - Quantitative household survey of 1180 Refugee households randomly selected in two camps using UNHCR data bases (The survey instrument is included as Annex 4);
  - Qualitative FGD with various types of refugee groups and committees and host populations disaggregated by sex (Topical outlines are included as Annex 5);
  - Key informant interviews with WFP, UNHCR, ARRA, partner non-governmental organizations (NGO), donors, in Addis Ababa, Shire, Jijiga, and four refugee camps – Shimelba and Mai Ayni, which house and support Eritrean refugees, and Kebribeyah and Sheder, which house and support Somali refugees;
  - Interviews with small business owners (positive deviants) in two camps;
  - Observation of conditions in the camps and warehouses;
  - Analysis of several secondary data sources, including Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) reports, agency reports, various assessments, and proposals.
9. The ToR for this impact assessment is included as Annex 6. Further details of the Evaluation Methodology are included as Annex 2 and Annex 7 (Evaluation Matrix).
10. **Limitations:** The data collection process proceeded remarkably free of problems, with one exception. The UNHCR camp databases used to establish and situate the household sample by zone within the camps are inaccurate and out-of-date, particularly in the Tigrigna zones of Shimelba camp. The evaluation team was compelled to spend time locating households in the sample for the interviews and replace a majority of the Tigrigna households who are no longer in the camp with other refugee households actually living in the camp. This process was repeated to a lesser degree at Kebribeyah, where UNHCR refugee household addresses are often inaccurate.
11. The interpretation of quantitative data is limited to the situation of refugees living in Kebribeyah and Shimelba camps and should not be generalized to all refugee camps or settlements within Ethiopia. The interpretation of qualitative data is limited to the dynamics of Kebribeyah, Mai Ayni, Sheder, and Shimelba camps, and should not be generalized to all protracted refugee situations.
12. Finally, the evaluation team received more documentation detailing WFP programming than UNHCR programming, limiting the extent to which the team

could analyze UNHCR's programming trends, resource allocation strategies, and previous evaluation findings.

## 1.2. Context

13. Ethiopia, one of Africa's most populous countries, hosts close to 91 million people (CIA 2011), many of whom live in poverty and struggle with hunger each day. Despite rapid economic growth from 1998 to 2007, the country ranks 157 out of the 169 countries that are included in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP 2011). Poverty has declined in Ethiopia over the last decade, yet 38 % of rural households still live below the poverty line (World Bank 2009).
14. Widespread poverty contributes to a high prevalence (44%) of undernutrition in the total population (UNDP 2011). Rural areas show higher rates of acute, chronic, and underweight malnutrition than urban areas (CSA 2006). A rating of 80 out of 84 in the Global Hunger Index (IFPRI 2010),<sup>4</sup> classifies the country with 'alarming' status.
15. Factors such as poor infrastructure, inadequate nutrition, prevalence of disease, and limited access to education, health services, and clean water place constraints on the ability of many Ethiopians to achieve food and livelihood security. These factors are exacerbated by environmental, climatic, and economical shocks, as well as regional instability and conflict, which have contributed to a significant refugee influx into Ethiopia.
16. **Refugee Populations:** For more than 20 years, Ethiopia has been host to large numbers of refugees. According to recent estimates, the current total refugee population in Ethiopia is near 154,300 and rising (UNHCR 2011c). Currently, the majority of refugees come from Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan and these are also the most protracted 'caseloads'.<sup>5</sup> After years in exile, Sudanese refugees have been steadily returning to their home country since 2006 and repatriation is expected to continue provided peace holds in Southern Sudan, which is not certain. In contrast, the influx of Southern Somalis and Eritreans is increasing due to deteriorating conditions in both countries (UNHCR 2011b; ARRA 2010). At the time of this evaluation, Somali refugees were flooding into camps in the south of the country (not part of the evaluation). The steady repatriation of Sudanese refugees limits the scope of this evaluation to the situation of Eritrean and Somali refugees (See ToR - Annex 6), thus, from this point forward, the evaluation report does not include contextual and background information relative to Sudanese refugees.
17. Somali camps are located in Ethiopia's southeast Somali Region and currently host 91,100 refugees (UNHCR 2011c). Camps include Kebribeyah, established in 1991 and located in the town of Kebribeyah; Aw-barre/Teferiber established in 2007 in the Woreda of Aw-barre, and Sheder, northeast of Jijiga, established in 2009 (UNHCR 2009).
18. Food and nutrition security is a challenge for many residents of the Somali Region. The 2005 Demographic Health Survey (DHS) reported a global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate of almost 28 percent and levels of child malnutrition (wasting and underweight) that were higher than national averages. Although reported GAM levels in standard nutrition surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010 at the *woreda* level were lower than 2005 DHS figures they were still consistently high (GAM >18%) (GoE 2010). Food insecurity in Somali region has been exacerbated by drought and

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<sup>4</sup> Based on data from 2003-2008.

<sup>5</sup> Smaller numbers come from Kenya and various countries in the Great Lakes region.

persistent dry conditions. Of the 2.3 million people who needed emergency food assistance during the latter half of 2010, almost one-third (29%) were from the Somali Region. However, most of the serious nutrition situations that required interventions by the DRMFSS occurred in the *woredas* of Hudet, Dolo ado, Dolo bay, and Filtu. These *woredas* are not in immediate proximity to the Somali camps.

19. The regions of Tigray and Afar are host to Eritrean camps. In 2004, following the closure of Wa'ala Nhibi camp, many Eritreans moved to the newly-established Shemelba camp, now the primary camp in Tigray Region. Shemelba has a particularly high male to female ratio, especially among the Tigrinya and Saho ethnic groups (UNFPA 2007). Mai Ayni Camp, established in 2009, is located relatively close to Shemelba (UNHCR 2011c).<sup>6</sup> Berhale Camp is located in the Afar region, and was established in 2008.
20. Tigre Region's poverty status is more serious than that of the national population. More than 58 percent the total population live in absolute poverty (earning less than a dollar a day), compared to the national average of 44 percent (WFP/TRG/UNICEF 2009). Food insecurity is also a challenge: in 2005, the GAM rate for the region was 11.6 percent (CSA 2006). Similar to Somali Region, food insecurity in Tigray has been exacerbated by drought, presenting obstacles to income opportunities for both host and refugee communities. Twenty-nine percent of the 2.3 million people who needed food assistance during the latter half of 2010 were from Tigray Region (DRMFSS/MoARD 2010; GoE 2010) The evaluation team will attempt to compare refugee GAM and SAM rates with those of the region as a whole, should the data become available. (DHS 2010 data, for example, have yet to be published.)
21. Host communities in the Afar region also struggle with food insecurity. 2005 standard nutrition surveys at the *woreda* level reported GAM rates of 19 percent in the *woreda* of Berhale,<sup>7</sup> where Berhale camp opened in 2008. Recent flooding in Afar region has created challenges for both host and refugee populations (DRMFSS/MoARD 2010).
22. Between 800 and 1000 Eritrean refugees arrive in Ethiopia each month (UNHCR 2011b). Many Eritrean refugees are high school and university students (WFP 2004 2005; UNHCR 2011b), yet camps do not have high schools or universities. Unaccompanied minors constitute a large proportion of the current refugee caseloads in Tigray, in Northern Ethiopia. The most recently established camps in Tigray (Shimelba, Mai Ayni) now constitute a unique refugee demographic environment; the camps are primarily single member households comprising young adult men as well as unaccompanied minors, both boys and girls. There are few short-term prospects for repatriation and limited opportunities for resettlement to a third country.
23. Competition for natural resources and the accompanying environmental degradation have often resulted in tension between the refugees and host communities, who also struggle with poverty and hunger (WFP/UNHCR/ARRA 2008).
24. **Government Policies:** Historically, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has had an open policy of allowing refugees into Ethiopia. Commitments to the implementation of international agreements and protocol on the rights of refugees have been part of this policy. Although the GoE has taken measures to protect the human rights of

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<sup>6</sup> The newly opened refugee camp at Adi Harush is outside the scope of this evaluation.

<sup>7</sup> Berhale camp did not open until 2008, so technically the *woreda* was not yet a host community.

refugees, they are generally regarded as temporary guests with limited freedom of movement. The signature of the 1951 Convention made reservations to Articles pertaining to refugees' rights to exemption from exceptional measures, to work, and to primary education, accepting these articles as recommendations only (UNHCR 2009). For most refugees the 1951 decision to withhold these rights still holds today; for many, these restrictions impact the ability to achieve self-reliance and limit chances of local integration (UNHCR 2008). The GoE has provided free primary education to refugee children in camps and urban areas, but, generally, has not allowed refugees to work, though some informal activity is tolerated. Until very recently nearly all refugees were required to live in camps near their respective borders with limited opportunities for re-establishing livelihoods.

25. Although refugee movement restrictions have been informally relaxed for several years (WFP/UNHCR/ARRA 2008), in August of 2010, the GoE formally introduced the "Out of Camp Policy" for Eritrean refugees who do not have a criminal record and who currently reside in camps (restrictions had gradually informally relaxed over the past few years). Eritrean refugees may now live in any part of Ethiopia, provided that they can sustain themselves financially or live with relatives and friends in Ethiopia who are willing to support them. The new policy includes the provision of health referrals, and educational and skills-training opportunities, including scholarships to national universities. The policy is expected to improve Eritrean refugees' access to services, form stronger ties with local communities, and following a full rollout, significantly reduce the Government's costs of looking after refugees (ARRA 2010; UNHCR 2011). Little is known about this group – UNHCR and WFP do not have information on their exact numbers – but ARRA estimates that over 500 hundred Eritrean refugees have taken advantage of the policy.

### **1.3. WFP's and UNHCR's Provision of Food Assistance to Refugees in Ethiopia**

26. The UNHCR and WFP have a long-standing partnership committed to ensuring that the food security and related needs of refugees are adequately addressed. The first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 1985. The fourth revision, signed in 2002, clarified the scope of cooperation of the two agencies and expanded it to strengthen their joint commitment to providing comprehensive support with food and related non-food items and services. In this MoU, increased focus was placed on and more efforts committed to "the pursuance of self-sufficiency of the beneficiaries, particularly through an active search for alternative food and income generation opportunities" and more emphasis was given to gender and age vulnerabilities (UNHCR/WFP 2002 p. 1). The most recent revision (2011) takes into account the latest developments within the global humanitarian arena (e.g., the Delivering as One initiative), which affect both policies and operations, and demonstrates the desire of both agencies to increase emphasis on durable solutions (UNHCR/WFP 2011). Annex 8 provides an overview of the evolution of WFP's and UNHCR's cooperation via MoUs 2002- 2011. Additionally, in protracted situations, WFP's Programme Guidance on refugees (n.d. cited in WFP/UNHCR 2011) and the UNHCR Handbook for Self-Reliance (UNHCR 2005a) have similar multi-year strategic plans for encouraging self-reliance. In Ethiopia, WFP and UNHCR collaborate with ARRA to jointly protect and assist refugees. The scope of this evaluation limits it to an assessment of food assistance.
27. As outlined in the 2002 MoU (the document valid for the period under evaluation), joint responsibilities of UNHCR, WFP and ARRA include maintaining contingency

plans; assessing the numbers of refugees and returnees eligible for food assistance; agreeing on the modalities and implementation food assistance efforts; periodic review through JAMs; addressing protection concerns resulting from tensions between refugees and local communities; engaging in advocacy for the inclusion of refugees in existing national nutrition and food security programs, as appropriate; and defining and implementing comprehensive livelihood support programs to encourage and build the self-reliance of both refugees and host communities (UNHCR/WFP 2002).

28. UNHCR's chief responsibilities include supporting ARRA in processes related to the determination of refugee status and registration of and provision of identity cards to refugees; providing care and protective activities for refugees; and, providing non-food items and complementary foods that make the main commodities usable. In 2006, UNHCR began to implement the Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) approach<sup>8</sup> in Somali camps with three aims: pursuing longer-term solutions; moving away from a purely humanitarian response; and, initiating joint activities with host communities. UNHCR provides substantial financial support to ARRA as well as limited funding to several NGOs who are implementing livelihood projects to promote long-term durable solutions.
29. ARRA oversees all activities related to refugees in Ethiopia and is physically present in all refugee camps in the country.<sup>9</sup> As a regulatory as well as implementing agency, ARRA is concerned with issues of security as well as refugee well-being. ARRA's key responsibilities are screening and registering new arrivals and departures using the UNHCR's Progress Data Base; storing food and managing food and non-food distributions; managing supplementary, therapeutic and school feeding programs; and providing the services in the camps such as education, health, water, shelter and security. ARRA does not receive funding from WFP for logistics and food management, and works independent of other GoE ministries that provide services related to health and education.
30. Under successive Strategic Plans since 2004, WFP's work on food assistance in protracted refugee situations has been regarded as a central activity contributing to Strategic Objectives aimed to save lives in emergencies and restore and rebuild livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations (WFP 2004; 2008a; 2010a). WFP has been providing food assistance to refugees in Ethiopia since 1988. WFP's key responsibility is the provision of food rations (cereal, pulses, sugar, vegetable oil, fortified blended food and salt). Since 2003, WFP's assistance has been channelled through a series of PRROs, and one Emergency Operation (EMOP) which responded to a vast influx of Somali refugees in April 2009 (See Fact Sheet). The yearly number of refugees assisted by WFP ranges from a low of 89,534 in 2008 to a high of 162,876 in 2002 (Table 1).

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<sup>8</sup> "DAR is a concept that attempts to move beyond the vital, but static, relief phase of an operation and towards improving the quality of life in asylum, building productive capacities of refugees (and preparing them for durable solutions) and contributing to poverty eradication in refugee hosting areas. DAR is solutions oriented, inclusive (it brings together the capacities of refugees, hosts, government, development and humanitarian partners, civil society and others) and is firmly in line with United Nations Millennium Development Goals" (UNHCR 2005b).

<sup>9</sup> Although ARRA's contributions to food assistance for refugees are not subject to this evaluation, as a core implementing partner, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the agency's operations and activities in order to better understand where the points of emphasis lie.



**Table 1: Refugees assisted by WFP (2003-2010) \***

Project	Year	Planned	Actual			% Actual vs Planned
		Total	Male	Female	Total	
PRRO 10127.0	2003	162,876	71,187	63,178	134,365	82%
PRRO 10127.0	2004	130,807	69,574	60,088	129,662	99%
PRRO 10127.1	2005	100,900	63,783	53,682	117,465	116%
PRRO 10127.1	2006	85,800	54,863	49,088	103,951	121%
PRRO 10127.2	2007	104,500	62,665	53,322	115,987	111%
PRRO 10127.2	2008	94,500	46,298	43,236	89,534	95%
PRRO 10127.3	2009	118,777	61,273	53,266	114,539	96%
PRRO 10127.3	2010	197,205	72,954	69,492	142,446	72%
IR-EMOP 10819.0	2009 (Feb-Apr)	25,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: SPRs 2002-2010

\*Includes Sudanese refugees who comprised 61- 74 % of planned figures from 2002 to 2008. In 2010 Sudanese refugees only comprised 15% of planned figures.

31. **Food Assistance Modalities:** The package of food assistance modalities has varied little between 2002 and the present, although WFP’s nutritional objectives have become more specific. Early operations aimed to generally ensure that daily nutritional needs were met; later operations specifically aimed to reduce or stabilize acute malnutrition.
32. The largest component is a monthly **General Food Distribution** (GFD) of full rations to help refugees meet their basic food requirements. This modality is augmented by school feeding, supplementary feeding, therapeutic feeding, IGAs, and efforts to mitigate environmental degradation.
33. Over the years WFP has modified its food basket in response to JAM and nutrition assessment recommendations. For example in 2007, blended foods were introduced to address micronutrient deficiencies observed in the 2006 food basket (WFP 2006). Also in 2007 2.5 kilograms (kg) of cereal per person (a 20% increase) were added to the food basket to compensate refugees for milling costs, which earlier studies had found to account for an average of 20 % of the total cereal ration—milling costs were reportedly as much as 30% of the total cereal ration in Kebribeyah camp. (WFP 2008, 2007; Black-Michaud, Mattai, and Tesfay 2006). In 2009, the distribution of micronutrient powder was piloted in one camp to determine the potential for extending it to all camps.
34. Factoring in the augmentation of 2 ½ kg of cereals, the current GFD ration basket includes:
  - 16 kg of cereals per month per person (wheat and sometimes sorghum);
  - 1.5 kg of pulses (beans, pinto beans, split peas, lentils, or other pulses);
  - 1.5 kg of corn-soya blend (CSB) (or Famix/faffa)
  - 900 grams of vegetable oil;
  - 450 grams of sugar; and
  - 150 grams of salt.

35. WFP, UNCHR, ARRA, and implementing partner NGO, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) collaborate to provide **supplementary take home rations** for moderate malnutrition cases and **therapeutic feeding** for acute malnutrition. From 2002-2006, supplementary and therapeutic feeding was implemented in camp health centres run by ARRA and financed by UNHCR. In 2007, the approach shifted from a clinic-based approach to community based therapeutic care. Targeted beneficiaries for supplemental feeding included children under five years old whose weight for height is 70-80 % of the median, pregnant and lactating women (PLW), and medical cases referred to by the doctor. Supplementary rations supply 32-36 grams of protein 32 grams of fat (fortified blended food, sugar, and oil) for a total of 1000 -1,061 Kcal/person/day. In the early years of the PRRO (2002-2004) planned figures for supplementary feeding were 4% of the total beneficiaries. Between the years 2007 and 2009, WFP planned to provide supplementary rations to 8 % of the total beneficiaries; 2010 planning figures are 3% of the total beneficiaries (WFP 2004a, 2008b). Targeting criteria for therapeutic feeding are children below 70% weight for height and children with oedema, and medical cases such as people suffering from tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. The therapeutic feeding rations provided by WFP from 2003-2006 supplied 47 g protein and 93 g fat for a total of 1,468- 1,769 Kcal (WFP 2002, 2004a). From 2002-2006 planned figures for therapeutic feeding were less than one percent of the total beneficiaries (WFP 2002, 2004a, 2007, 2008b). Following the transition to community-based therapeutic care UNHCR supplied special foods such as therapeutic milk, plumpy nut and ready use therapeutic food (RUTF) for children without medical complications (WFP 2008b; WFP/UNHCR/ARRA 2008).
36. **School Feeding:** WFP and UNHCR hoped to implement school feeding programs for primary aged girls and boys in all camps. By PRRO 10127.2 (2007-2008) WFP had attained this goal with the exception of the Somali camp of Kebribeyah. Planned numbers for households that will benefit from school feeding programs average 3% of the total number of beneficiaries (WFP 2002, 2004a, 2007, 2008b). Extending the activity to Kebribeyah proved problematic due to concerns about creating serious tension between refugees and the host community. Refugee and local children attend schools located in the same compound but not in the same classrooms – refugee teachers receive far less remuneration than do Ethiopian teachers. The refugee programme lacks sufficient budget to provide school meals to locals. Unlike Eritrean refugees, who eat hot lunches at school, Somali refugees at Kebrebeayah only take home oil rations (WFP 2006a; 2006b; 2008c; UNHCR/WFP/ARRA 2008).
37. PRRO 10127.3 attempted to address the lack of a school feeding programme for residents of Kebribeyah camp by adding a conditional take-home ration of 52 grams of oil 2009. To avert tension with the host community, the programme intended to provide refugee children in Kebribeyah with the oil in the camp, rather than at school; receipt of oil was conditional on 80 percent attendance (WFP 2008b).
38. Since the inception of the school feeding programme in 2002, the IRC has been in charge of administering the programme at Shimelba camp. The agency stores, prepares, and distributes the rations which consist of a mid-morning or mid-afternoon porridge composed of 100g CSB and 20g sugar). (UNHCR/WFP/ARRA 2003; WFP 2005; WFP 2006b; WFP 2008c).
39. **Livelihood Activities:** WFP carried out FFW activities during the first year of the PRRO (2002), but resource constraints precluded the implementation of activities in

2004. Although FFW activities were included in subsequent PRROs, they were never implemented due to the resource constraints.

40. Recognizing the importance of income generating activities, as well as the budgetary constraints that impacted the implementation of FFW activities, the 2007 PRRO (10127.2) placed greater focus on activities that could contribute to a higher degree of self-sufficiency and an easier transition to the life outside of the camps following repatriation. Two pilot activities were introduced to enhance self-reliance within the camps (WFP 2006). In collaboration with UNHCR, WFP promoted backyard gardening and school garden pilots in selected WFP-assisted schools.
41. WFP additionally tried to improve food security by reducing the proportion of cereals refugees were selling—in 2005 milling costs consumed an average of 20% of refugees' total monthly cereal ration, (Black-Michaud et. al 2006) estimated at 15 kilograms.<sup>10</sup> To do this, WFP supported grinding mill projects where refugees paid market prices to use milling services and were compensated for milling costs through a 20 percent top-up of their cereal ration (WFP2006a). Two years later, an evaluation of the performance of the milling schemes was carried out by a national consultant, who determined that the mills had not provided reliable services; most refugees instead used private mills for milling services. As a result, PRRO 10127.3 phased out milling activities (WFP 2008b). At the time of this study, refugees reported that as much as 50% of the total cereal ration (13.5 kg per month (WFP 2008b)) is allotted to compensate for milling expenses.
42. At the global level, UNHCR has developed an approach and set of guidelines for promoting durable solutions called Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR). The guidelines recognize the importance of livelihood activities in the promotion of durable solutions. The regional office in Jijiga has hired a livelihoods coordinator who previously worked for SAVE UK to oversee these activities.
43. UNHCR partners with NGOs to implement many of the camp activities.<sup>11</sup> For example, IRC is responsible for activities related to WATSAN (in both refugee and host communities), education, HIV support, gender-based violence (GBV) support, child protection and protection of unaccompanied minors. The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) works in the Somali camps on Water and Sanitation for Health (WASH) activities. Aside from these activities, these NGOs and others also engage in livelihood activities.
44. IRC's small-scale livelihood programming focuses on vocational training. Additionally, in collaboration with the Bureau of Agriculture in Kebribeyah, IRC implements a pastoral livelihood initiative for host communities that is focused on animal health training and destocking and restocking programs during droughts (IRC KI).
45. LWF works on small-scale agriculture and water systems projects (drip irrigation) in Somali refugee camps to improve household food security (LWF KI). LWF receives funds from UNHCR and other donors to implement multi-storied and kitchen gardens, tree plantations and poultry. LWF works with both the refugees and the host communities on its water projects.

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<sup>10</sup> Based on project documents which report 500 grams of cereal per day (WFP 2004).

<sup>11</sup> Three had a significant role in the subject of this evaluation: The International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF).

46. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) also implements a livelihood approach in the Somali camps focusing on IGAs, microcredit, and vocational training. Funded by the Danish Government, they have been operational for two years. The microcredit schemes require participating refugees to contribute 30 % into revolving funds. DRC promotes refugee soap manufacture and pasta making, and intends to support some women refugees in opening up a restaurant. Similar to other NGOs, DRC works with both refugee and the host communities.
47. Zuid Ost Azie Refugee Care (ZOA) was another NGO that once promoted a livelihood approach; however it was compelled to leave the camps following charges of fund misappropriation.
48. **Donors:** The major donors to WFP's food assistance efforts to refugees in Ethiopia have been the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN/CERF), and the Governments of the United States, Finland, Canada, France Australia, Saudi Arabia, Luxembourg, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. The United States has consistently been the largest donor (WFP SPR 2002-2010). Annex 9 provides a breakdown of WFP donor contributions from 2003 -2010 in US \$.

## **2. Results: Outcomes and Impact of Food Assistance to Refugees**

49. The evaluation team followed the evaluation matrix (Annex 7) to assess eight key questions. The initial key question, comprising four sub-components, forms the major substance of the evaluation results and will be comprehensively discussed in this chapter:


To what extent have refugees'

- a. Immediate food consumption needs and food security been re-established;
  - b. Nutrition status stabilized or improved;
  - c. Livelihoods been re-established; and,
  - d. Protection from violence been achieved?
50. The evaluation team analyzed the findings by:
    - Camp – Shimelba, home of Eritrean refugees, compared to Kebribeyah, home of Somali refugees from Somalia;
    - Ethnic groups – Kunama compared to Tigrigna, the dominant Eritrean refugees in Shimelba camp;
    - Male- and female-headed households;
    - Relatively large households as compared to one-member households;
    - Years households have lived in their camp (relevant only in Shimelba camp).
  51. Significant differences are apparent for nearly every variable by camp and by ethnic group. The differences are usually not significant by type of household head, size of household or relative years spent in the camps. The evaluation findings will indicate significant differences by camp, ethnic group, and household type. The qualitative research complements the quantitative findings in the two camps with observations from one additional camp housing Somali refugees – Sheder – and an Eritrean camp – Mai Ayni.
  52. **General Demographics:** Kebribeyah camp completely comprises Somali refugees, whereas Shimelba camp consists of Tigrigna households (58%), Kunama

households (42%), and a very small number of Tigray, Saho and other households (Figure 1).

53. Two distinct generations of individuals emerge from year of arrival in Shimelba camp. Nearly half (46%) of all households arrived prior to 2006; the other half of the camp (54%) have arrived since 2006 (figure 2). The vast majority of Kebribeyah households, on the other hand (91.3%) arrived in 1991.

**Figure 1: Ethnic composition, by camp**



**Figure 2: Year of arrival, by camp**



54. It would be difficult for the demographics of the two camps to be more different. Nearly two-thirds (62%) of the Kebribeyah household members have been born in the camp since 1991 (see Table 2). Far fewer children have been born into households at Shimelba, where two-thirds of the household members are original household members and the new household members usually represent people who have fled Eritrea to join family members rather than children born into the camp. A very large number of households in both camps are headed by women, extraordinarily so in the Somali context, where nearly two-thirds (63%) of all households are headed by women.


**Table 2: New household members since joining the camp**

	Ethnic group		Camp	
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
<i>Original household member</i>	64.5**	71.1**	67.0***	38.0***
<i>New household member</i>	35.5	28.9	33.0	62.0
<b>n</b>	874	685	1,605	4,332

\*\* differences are significant at the <.01 level  
 \*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

55. The Somali and Eritrean refugee contexts also differ significantly by household size. Kebribeyah camp has housed Somali refugees since 1991. More than 90% of all Kebribeyah refugees either fled Somalia


**Figure 3: Sex of household head, by camp and ethnic group<sup>12</sup>**



<sup>12</sup> Kebribeyah consists of Somali refugees; Shimelba consists of Tigrigna and Kunama refugees.

prior to or during 1991 or were born in the camp. The households have grown to be very large, averaging 8.5 members (Figure 4). On the other hand, Eritrean refugees have typically fled to Northern Ethiopia as single household members in recent years. Shimelba camp houses households averaging 2.7 members, including an extraordinary number of single-headed male households. Since 2006, more than half (55%) of new arrivals are single person households, significantly more than the prior years. Shimelba female-headed households are significantly larger than male-headed households (3.3 members versus 2.5 members). Kunama households are slightly larger than those of Tigrigna. Shimelba's unique household structure has created a unique food security (or food insecurity) context, explored below. Households in Kebribeyah have particularly unfavourable dependency ratios – many children and relatively few adults able to work – particularly female-headed households.


**Figure 4: Mean household size, by camp**



## 2.1 Food Consumption and Food Security Outcomes and Impact

56. The demographic context presented above offers an introduction to very different food consumption patterns and food security strategies and outcomes according to household type, ethnicity, and refugee context.
57. **Household food Basket Consumption:** WFP's PRRO stipulates "adequate food energy consumption over the assistance period for refugees" (Outcome 4.2). The normally stable supply of food commodities to the camps has allowed the WFP PRRO to successfully accomplish this outcome in large part (food pipeline deliveries, which constitute the output attached to this outcome, are discussed in chapter 3.2). Food insecurity however, intensifies for refugee families during the second half of month, when rations tend to run out or are consumed in smaller quantities. Most of the food basket items are completely consumed (although portions of some commodities are also sold) within half the month (Figure 5). Shimelba refugees report that wheat runs out within 25 days; the wheat lasts less than 20 days in Kebribeyah. Vegetable oil lasts for approximately 20 days in Shimelba and a little

**Figure 5: Mean number of days ration lasts, by ethnic group and camp<sup>13</sup>**




<sup>13</sup> Kebribeyah consists of Somali refugees; Shimelba consists of Tigrigna and Kunama refugees.

more than half the month in Kebribeyah. The other food items run out before half the month has elapsed, sugar most considerably, which lasts for less than ten days.

58. Single-member households have the most problems making their rations last (see Figure 6). While 36% of multi-member households manage to conserve their cereal rations for consumption throughout the month, less than one-quarter of single-member households consume their cereal rations throughout the month. This pattern holds true for all of the food items in the basket – beans last

**Figure 6: Percentage of households whose ration lasted an entire month**



the month only for 16 % of multi-person and four percent of single-person households; vegetable oil lasts the month for one-quarter of multi-person households and eleven percent of single-person households. Single-member households also sometimes struggle to efficiently prepare their food rations. Although IRC has given some Eritrean refugees an abbreviated version of hygiene training, refugee households have not received food preparation training, particularly affecting single-family food preparation efficiency. Refugees do not completely understand how to efficiently prepare CSB for example. Food basket consumption patterns do not significantly vary by sex of household head or by generation of household arrival in the camps.

59. **Food insecurity:** Refugee household are constrained by several factors (which are explored in detail in chapter 3) explaining why food rations do not completely support their food security throughout the month. Because refugees remain dependent on food assistance for the major portion of their food security needs and their food rations often run short during the month, refugee households normally struggle to meet the daily requirement of 2100 kcals (although, as we shall see below, malnutrition rates of children have improved in recent years, partly a result of intensive supplementary feeding regimens in the camps). The degree and intensity of chronic food insecurity varies by refugee group. The food assistance allows most refugee households to manage to eat two or three meals per day: Kebribeyah and Shimelba adults average 2.2 and 2.7 meals respectively; their children average 2.8 and 3.2 meals respectively. Adults often reduce their consumption patterns to allow children to eat more often as a coping strategy, as we shall see below. Although the number of meals do not decline significantly toward the end of the month, the quality and quantity of food consumed tends to decline. Most refugee food insecurity indicators do not vary by sex or generation.

60. **Dietary diversity** in the camps is highly dependent on the food basket. The refugee food basket has been devised to ensure nutrient adequacy, defined as a diet that meets the minimum requirements for energy and all essential nutrients. The HDDS



of 5.7 and 4.9 respectively at Shimelba and Kebribeyah camps (Table 3) represents an average number of food groups consumed by households in the sample during a 24-hour period, taken from a list of twelve food groups (12.0 is the perfect score). Shimelba multi-person households have slightly higher HDDS than do single-person households (5.8 vs. 5.6). For comparative purposes, a recent survey in two highly food insecure states of Southern Sudan revealed HDDS of 3.1 amongst households with limited access to food assistance (TANGO International 2009).

**Table 3: Food security indicators**

	Ethnic group		Camp	
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
HDDS	5.6	5.8	5.7***	4.9***
FCS	46.3**	42.9**	44.8***	38.8***
n	362	259	639	544

\*\* differences are significant at the <.01 level


\*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

61. The food consumption score (FCS) measures the nutrient density and frequency of household consumption, allowing a nutritional analysis based on the frequency and types of foods consumed, indexed by higher values for foods with animal protein, pulses, and green vegetables, lower values for oil and sugar. FCS standards<sup>14</sup> include:

- Poor food consumption – score of less than 21, or less than 28 when oil and sugar are included as part of
- the food assistance basket;
- Borderline food consumption – score of 21.5-35 or 28.5-42 (with oil and sugar);
- Acceptable food consumption – score of more than 35, or 42 (with oil and sugar).

62. Shimelba household diets normally fall into the “acceptable” range, averaging 45 FCS whereas Somali refugees normally consume a “borderline” diet, averaging 38 FCS (Figure 7). Within Shimelba camp, Kunama households consume a more borderline diet than do Tigrigna households – approximately two-thirds

**Figure 7: Food consumption category, by ethnic group and camp**



of Tigrigna households consume an adequate diet, but less than one-half of Kunama households and of more concern, less than one-third of Somali households consume an acceptable diet. Male-headed Shimelba households consume the most acceptable diet, averaging 46 FCS (as compared to 42 for female-headed Shimelba households). FCS or HDDS do not otherwise differ by sex of household head, refugee generation or household size.


63. The refugee diet varies little beyond the food assistance ration basket, dominated by cereals, oil and sugar, which are consumed nearly every day (Figure 8), although households face shortages by the end of the month. Meat, eggs and fish are virtually non-existent in the refugee diet. Shimelba households consume a more diverse diet

<sup>14</sup> WFP, *Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Guidelines*, Chapter 6, 2009



than do Somali Kebribeyah households, selling some of their cereal rations to purchase a larger variety of food items, including green vegetables; Kebribeyah refugees consume less than half the vegetable quantities of Shimelba households – for less than two days a week. Kebribeyah households consume only sugar and


**Figure 8: Seven day food consumption patterns, by camp**



milk, a mainstay of the Somali diet, in greater frequency than do Eritrean households. Within Shimelba, Tigrigna households have a slightly more balanced diet than do Kunama households, consuming vegetables and pulses more frequently.

64. **Coping Strategies:** Food insecurity, which intensifies during the second half of the month, when food from the food assistance rations dwindles and disappears for most refugee households, requires households to deploy a variety of coping strategies. Figure 9 presents the most widely deployed coping strategies in the two camps. All households commonly limit portion sizes and reduce meals numbers, including more than nine out of every ten Somali households. Tigrigna households employ a consumption coping strategy dubbed the “11/5 system:” Wake up late – because few people work – to then eat a late brunch at 11 and an early dinner; the rations don’t support daily three meals. Approximately two-thirds of all households borrow food regularly and eat less preferred food and nearly six of every ten households occasionally seek meals at other houses. Somali adults (nearly 80%) are far more willing to reduce their own consumption than are Eritrean households (32%), but 44% of Eritrean refugees sometimes purchase food on credit.


**Figure 9: Commonly deployed coping strategies, by camp**



65. The **Coping Strategies Index (CSI)** is a relatively simple and efficient indicator of household food security that corresponds well with other more complex measures of food insecurity. The basic premise in implementing the CSI is to measure the *frequency* and *severity* of consumption or adaptation coping behaviours, which together indicate that Kebribeyah Somali refugee households attain substantially

higher CSI scores than do Shimelba Eritrean refugees (28.6 versus 17.0), another indicator of relative intensive food insecurity in the Somali camp context (Figure 10). Within Shimelba, Kunama households resort to more frequent and severe forms of coping strategies than do Tigrigna households (19.4 versus 13.5). The CSI is normally contextualized and therefore difficult to compare across cultural and socioeconomic contexts; however, for comparative purposes, the South Sudan survey calculated CSI to be 35 in a highly food insecure environment (TANGO International 2009).

**Figure 10: Mean CSI, by ethnic group and camp<sup>15</sup>**



66. **Groups benefitting from food assistance:** Some refugee groups have benefited more than others from the food assistance.
67. Larger households benefit more than smaller ones: As noted above, single-member families struggle to manage their food rations, which run out at an earlier stage of the month than is the case for larger households. Small households must sell a larger proportion of their rations to purchase other items. Larger households can more efficiently manage the food rations. Single Tigrigna men in particular inefficiently manage their food rations, especially given their inexperience in food preparation – there is no food preparation training offered in the camps. Many single men have coped by banding together in groups of five to eight to pool resources and hire cooks to manage their rations and prepare meals. One person within a single-member household collecting rations on a ration card may also actually be representing more than one ration consumer, a problem that arises largely because UNHCR and ARRA ration card distribution and databases lag behind camp household composition changes.
68. Female-headed households, who tend to care for many children in households with relatively few income earners, must therefore cope with extremely high dependency ratios and few income-earning opportunities, limiting their chances of supplementing food rations. Female Somali FGD participants lamented their perception of diminutive food rations in relation to limited options to supplement the food rations with income from other sources.
69. People living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA) are disadvantaged, even in Shimelba camp, where fifty households receive an additional 15 kg of cereals, implemented by camp authorities after a prolonged lobbying campaign. Highly stigmatized and unable to work, PLHA do not enjoy food-sharing opportunities, and are virtually shunned from all other camp activities. Children are socially excluded from school or from visiting other households, depriving them of other food consumption sources as well as social capital. Tigrigna households, 15% of whom care for chronically ill individuals are particularly vulnerable. Virtually no Somali household faces this problem, but the ongoing intense stigma stifles discussion and probably understates its extent.
70. Unaccompanied minors, who also lack income-earning opportunities, are vulnerable to food insecurity as well as GBV. Arriving alone from Eritrea and placed in Mai Ayni

<sup>15</sup> Maximum CSI of 84 is possible


and Adi Harush camps in North Tigray, camps that also house significant numbers of young adult single men, unaccompanied minors are housed in groups of fourteen in single-room dwellings under the care of “house mothers.” Following the demise of OASIS, an NGO that was told to leave the camps after mismanaging food assistance and protection activities targeting unaccompanied minors, UNHCR has assumed responsibility for procuring and milling food, which is then handed over to cooks to manage and prepare rations for 70 unaccompanied minors each (five houses each accommodating fourteen children). FGDs revealed refugee suspicions that much of the rations were being siphoned by the cooks; the very unhygienic conditions of the stores, where rats were eating the rations; and their dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of the meals – “our *shiro* (chick pea *wat*) isn’t enough for us and has nothing else except a few potatoes, onions, and tomatoes.”

71. Finally, refugees believe that systematic under-scooping benefits food distribution supervisors – also refugees – at Kebribeyah camp (discussed in detail in Section 3.2).

## 2.2. Nutrition Status Outcomes and Impact

72. **Malnutrition Rates:** UNHCR, WFP, and ARRA undertake joint annual nutrition surveys, providing the evaluation team with excellent nutrition trend analysis. The programme has generally successfully “reduced and/or stabilized acute malnutrition in refugee children under five” (WFP PRRO Outcome 1.1); realization of this outcome however, has at times been problematic for some refugees. Indicative of serious malnutrition, Somali and Eritrean refugee child underweight and wasting were highly problematic during the early years of this evaluation; in 2003 Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) and Severe Acute Malnutrition rates (SAM) were higher than the UN GAM benchmark of 10 percent and SAM benchmark of 1.0 percent. GAM rates in the two camps approached 15 percent and SAM rates were 1.7 and 1.2 percent respectively in Kebribeyah and Shimelba. GAM and SAM rates dropped precipitously in Kebribeyah to 8% and 0.4% in Kebribeyah while increasing to 18% and 1.8% at Shimelba. By 2005, following a decrease in cereal rations of 30%, GAM rates had increased to more than 16% in both camps; SAM rates were at 1.5% and 1.1% at Kebribeyah and Shimelba. For comparative purposes, although higher than the UN benchmark, child malnutrition rates were still substantially better than those of the general Ethiopian population in Somali region and comparable to those in

**Figure 11: 2003-2011 Global Acute Malnutrition rates, by camp**




Sources: Joint UNHCR, WFP and ARRA Nutrition Surveys 2003-2011

Tigray region. The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2005 (the 2010 DHS has yet to be fully analyzed or published) indicated GAM and SAM rates of 23.7% and 5.1 for the Somali Region and 11.6% and 1.9% for Tigray.

73. Figure 11 indicates that GAM rates gradually declined in both camps since 2005 except for a spike in 2009. As discussed in Section 3, the food pipeline has gradually improved and the food basket has stabilized and remained nutritionally complete since 2007. GAM rates increased to 11.9% and 11.4% respectively in Kebribeyah and Shimelba in 2009; sorghum was sold in greater quantities by Tigrigna and Somali households and did not figure prominently in children’s diets or in meals favoured for children, except by the Kunama (see discussion in paragraphs 123 and 124 below). By 2010, GAM rates had stabilized in both camps; malnutrition rates do not vary by sex of child. SAM rates have continued to decline amongst Somali refugees (0.6%) but have increased in the past two years amongst Eritrean refugees, explained by differences between Tigrigna malnutrition rates, which are very low, and the stubborn persistence of Kunama malnutrition–SAM rates of 1.1% found during the latest (unpublished) nutrition survey (see figure 12)<sup>16</sup>.

**Figure 12: 2003-2011 Severe Acute Malnutrition(SAM) rates, by camp**



Sources: Joint UNHCR, WFP and ARRA Nutrition Surveys 2003-2011


74. **Child Feeding Practices:** Although all refugee groups report prioritizing feeding for children during household mealtimes, the Kunama engage in relatively poor child feeding practices (Treiber et al, WFP, 2007). Kunama mothers discard colostrum, deeming it unfit for newborns. Breastfeeding positions deliberately decrease milk flow; mothers erroneously believe that excessive milk will choke their children. Infants and young children are quickly shifted between breasts, denying them nutritious milk which flows later in the breastfeeding process. Continued breastfeeding is important for older infants and young children aged 6-23 months, contributing significantly to overall nutrient intake. For older infants (age 6-11 months), breast milk fills most of the energy needs and remains an important source of vitamin A and C, as well as essential fatty acids. In 2009, exclusive breastfeeding of children under six months was higher than 90 percent in both camps. However, low feeding frequency (<6 times in 24 hours) was as high as 73 percent in Shimelba (the data does not indicate the duration of each feeding at each breast to take advantage of all milk nutrients). More than half (51%) of children of 6-11 months continue to breastfeed and breastfeeding of young children aged 18-23 months was 38%. Many refugee women in Shimelba camp, particularly amongst the Kunama,

<sup>16</sup> Joint UNHCR, ARRA & WFP Nutrition Surveys, 2003 through 2010 (published) and 2011 (draft and unpublished)

however, introduce solid foods early, which are often poor quality complementary foods.

75. **Stunting:** Poor child feeding practices contribute substantially to problematic stunting rates (Figure 13). The


**Figure 13: Stunting Patterns (Eritrean camps 2011)**



recent (unpublished) 2011 nutrition survey conducted only in Eritrean refugee camps as of this writing uncovered stunting rates for children under 2 and 5 years of age of 32% and 40% respectively at Shimelba camp and 41% and 50% amongst the Kunama,<sup>17</sup> far above the WHO benchmark cut-off of 20%<sup>18</sup>. Stunting rates at Shimelba averaged 31%-40% between 2005 and 2010; in contrast, Kebribeyah stunting rates were only twelve percent in 2010 (the only year that KB stunting rates were available), indicating that chronic malnutrition is negligible amongst Somali refugees. Five-year old children subjected to poor feeding practices are particularly vulnerable to high stunting rates in relation to under two-year olds, who predominantly breastfeed; they are also vulnerable to incomplete supplementary feeding coverage and deficiencies in health unit follow up coverage.

76. **Anaemia prevalence** (haemoglobin less than 11g/dl) amongst under- five children has steadily improved in the Eritrean and Somali refugee camps compared to 2007 (from when this data was collected) but remains at stubbornly high levels, continuing to present a severe public health concern (Figure 14). Indicative of iron deficiencies in the diet, refugee anaemia rates have never fallen below the WHO benchmark of twenty percent for under-5 children. Malaria and parasite infections, such as worms, do not appear to be factors explaining high anaemia rates. Although improved anaemia levels can partly be attributed to improved special care afforded to malnourished children through supplementary and therapeutic feedings, its persistence can partly be explained by inefficient consumption patterns of fortified CSB, which contains bio-available iron. CSB as a supplementary ration is normally shared by household members. CSB is frequently not consumed or sold when deemed of poor quality. As detailed below (paragraph 127), a poor-tasting batch of CSB has depressed CSB consumption. Refugees also explained to the

**Figure 14: Percentage of children under 5 with iron deficiency anaemia (<11g/dl)**



Sources: Joint UNHCR, WFP and ARRA Nutrition Survey 2007-2010

<sup>17</sup> Joint UNHCR, ARRA & WFP Nutrition Survey, 2011 (draft and unpublished)


<sup>18</sup> WHO *Global Database on Child Growth and Malnutrition*, WHO website, 2011



evaluation team that they have never been taught how to efficiently prepare CSB for consumption.

77. **Supplementary and therapeutic feeding:** Selective feeding programme coverage is calculated based on the number of malnourished children identified by the WFH% score (based on the WHO 2005). Between the years 2007 and 2009 selective feeding coverage was above 90% in the majority of camps (UNHCR/ARRA/WFP 2007, 2008, 2009) however, coverage in Shimelba and Kebribeyah camps declined to 73% and 64% of eligible children in 2010 (UNHCR/WFP/ARRA 2010a; 2010b, 2010c). Therapeutic feeding programme (TFP) coverage has been satisfactory in Kebribeyah camp but declined to 14% in Shimelba in 2010, indicating that many malnourished children are not adequately enrolling in appropriate feeding programs. SFP and TFP ration utilization is problematic as well. Complementary and Supplementary food rations provided as dry take-home rations are invariably shared within households, particularly during the second half of each month when general food rations are in short supply. Inefficient CSB consumption was discussed above.
78. **Immunization:** Universal child immunization against diseases is crucial in reducing infant and young child morbidity and mortality. Measles and Vitamin A deficiency are closely associated with malnutrition and infection. Measles vaccination coverage was calculated for those children 9-59 months of age, while the coverage for Vitamin A children age between 6-59 months. The information is obtained from with EPI cards or confirmation from mother. Measles and Vitamin A coverage has consistently exceeded the UNHCR standard (> 90 percent) from 2007 through 2010.
79. **Mortality:** One of the most specific and useful indicators for monitoring the general health and nutritional situation of a population, mortality rates in the camps for the years 2007 till 2010 have consistently been below the rates usually found in developing countries, which is 1.0 and 2.0 /10,000 people/day for crude mortality rates (CMR) and under 5 mortality rates (U5MR) respectively (0.25 and 0.13 CMRs in Shimelba and Kebribeyah respectively; 0.47 and 0.14 U5MR in the two camps in 2010). The relatively low mortality rates for adults and children in the refugee camps reflect household access to adequate health services.
80. **Water and health care access:** Food assistance to the refugee programme indirectly contributes to health care and water protection. Despite the limitations of medicines, services and personnel, refugee and host communities agree that refugee health care quality exceeds that of health clinics outside of the camp. Refugees also access water in the camp, although Eritrean refugees access far better water services than do Somali refugees. Households in Kebribeyah access water provided by UNHCR through an “expensive” water system requiring piped-in water from several miles away, according to UNHCR interviews; the water system had broken down at least a month prior to the visit of the evaluation team and refugees were largely dependent on

**Figure 15: Per capita water consumption, by ethnic group and camp**




unsafe water from nearby *birkas* or ponds. Sheder was dependent on a water-tankering operation. Somali per capita water consumption was insufficient and approximately one-third that of Eritrean refugees – 12 versus 36 litres per day (Figure 15 ), less than the 15 to 20 litres per person per day stipulated by UNHCR guidelines as minimum maintenance allocation<sup>19</sup>.

### 2.3. Re-establishment of Livelihoods Outcomes and Impact


81. Many refugee households have overcome several obstacles (discussed in detail in Section 3) to pursue income-generating opportunities to supplement the invariable selling of food rations (see paragraphs 125-127). Nearly six out of every ten Shimelba households consist of at least one household member who engage in some form of livelihood activity; the figure is high in Shimelba camp primarily because 82% of Kunama households manage to gain some form of income (Figure 16). In contrast, 52% of Tigrigna households within Shimelba have income earners, compared to fewer than half of Kebribeyah Somali households. Kunama households average more than one income source whereas Tigrigna and Somali households average 0.5 income sources per household, indicating that substantially more Kunama household members access income sources than is the case for other refugee ethnic groups. Older generations of refugees (68%) have managed to create and build the necessary social capital to find employment opportunities – access income sources – compared to newer arrivals (51%). Multi-person households (62%) consist of more members able to pursue income-earning opportunities than do single-headed households (54%). Female as well as male-headed households within Shimelba manage to find paid work, whereas income-earning opportunities are more pronounced for male-headed households (59%) than female-headed households (49%) amongst Somali refugees in Kebribeyah. Male-headed Kebribeyah households manage to average 0.61 income sources, female-headed households only 0.44 income sources.

82. **Livelihoods and the dependency ratio:** Somali Kebribeyah households are particularly disadvantaged as measured by extremely

**Figure 16: Percentage of households with any income earners**



**Figure 17: Mean dependency ratio, by ethnic group and camp**



<sup>19</sup> UNHCR *Handbook for Emergencies*, 2000

high dependency ratios, 1.1 in Kebribeyah, an extremely high ratio in any context, as compared to 0.5 for Eritrean households (see Figure 17).<sup>20</sup> In contrast, WFP’s Developing Country profile calculates an average dependency ratio of 0.72.<sup>21</sup> The high Somali dependency ratio may be a key defining factor in explaining their greater susceptibility to household food insecurity. Whereas Somali Kebribeyah households are normally large with many children, most Tigrigna households consist of one male member; although Kunama dependency ratios are substantially higher than those of the small Tigrigna households, Kunama households far more aggressively pursue income-earning opportunities through crop production, as we shall see below. Dependents generally require special attention and resources while independents have higher productive capacity and are therefore more likely to be net contributors to household resources. The age dependency ratio therefore provides an estimate of the demand on household resources relative to the supply; the higher the dependency ratio, the greater demand on relative to productive capacity.

83. **Income earning options:** Livelihood or income earning opportunities vary significantly across camps and ethnicities and by sex (Table 4 and Table 5). The sale of food items represents the single most important source of income for refugee households. Beyond food sales, livelihood income earning options include agricultural production, homestead gardening, day labour (agricultural and non-agricultural), small business, livestock production, and remittances. Each is discussed in detail.

**Table 4: Primary source of income pursued by household members (% of HH)**

	Ethnic group		Camp	
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
<i>Sale of food ration items</i>	29.0	5.3	29.1	17.0
<i>Agricultural day labour</i>	11.4	20.4	36.5	11.4
<i>Salaried employment in business (working in shop, workshop)</i>	5.7	21.8	2.5	16.1
<i>Sale of crafts (baskets, textiles, handicrafts)</i>	6.2	20.9	6.1	13.9
<i>Non-agricultural day labour</i>	19.7	4.4	2.5	13.4
<i>Other</i>	12.4	2.4	9.0	7.1
<i>Business/service provision</i>	7.3	6.8	1.6	7.3
<i>Sale of animals &amp; animal products</i>	1.0	6.8	4.5	4.1
<i>Sale of non-food ration items</i>	4.1	3.4	1.6	4.1
<i>Sale of firewood, charcoal or other forest products</i>	2.1	5.3	1.6	3.6
<i>Sale of agriculture products</i>	0.5	2.4	2.0	1.5
<i>Petty trade</i>	0.5	0.0	2.9	0.5
n	142	196	244	411

<sup>20</sup> The age dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the number of “dependent” household members (individuals age 0-14 years or 65 years and older) by the number of “independent” household members (individuals age 15-64 years).

<sup>21</sup> WFP, *Food and Nutrition Handbook*, 2010, Annex 8.1, *Developing Country Annex*



**Table 5: Primary source of income (% of HH), by sex of HH head and camp**

	Kebribeyah		Shimelba	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
<i>Non-agricultural day labour</i>	35.4	37.2	13.5	5.1
<i>Sale of food ration items</i>	26.0	31.1	14.4	25.3
<i>Other</i>	12.5	6.8	8.3	3.0
<i>Salaried employment in business (working in shop, workshop)</i>	5.2	6.8	15.4	9.1
<i>Sale of non-food ration items</i>	4.2	4.7	3.5	6.1
<i>Petty trade</i>	2.1	3.4	0.6	0.0
<i>Agricultural day labour</i>	1.0	3.4	17.0	13.1
<i>Sale of crafts (baskets, textiles, handicrafts)</i>	4.2	1.4	8.0	30.3
<i>Sale of agriculture products</i>	3.1	1.4	1.3	2.0
<i>Business/service provision</i>	3.1	0.7	9.0	2.0
<i>Sale of firewood, charcoal or other forest products</i>	1.0	2.0	4.8	0.0
<i>Sale of animals &amp; animal products</i>	2.1	1.4	4.2	4.0
n	96	148	312	99

84. **Agricultural production:** Amongst all refugee groups, only Kunama households, who are traditionally farmers with sorghum crop production expertise, are able to access small parcels of land (generally 100 sq m), through sharecropping arrangements. At least thirteen percent of Kunama households sharecrop (Table 6), a process that requires sharecroppers to purchase all inputs and share half the harvest with the landowner, invariably a Tigray farmer living on lands surrounding or within the refugee camp. All of the agricultural cultivation at Shimelba is undertaken by women and men of first-generation refugee households. Agricultural production opportunities are severely restricted in all Ethiopian refugee contexts by the *de-facto* policy of limiting refugee access to land, particularly in the Somali context, where land use is more closely monitored (see paragraph 86 below).

85. **Homestead gardening:** The Ethiopia UNHCR/WFP programme has admirably introduced homestead gardening into Kebribeyah camp, where slightly more land is available adjacent to the refugee *tukuls* than in Shimelba. More than one-quarter of Kebribeyah households have adopted this initiative, growing small amounts of vegetables, which are usually consumed within the household and offer a means for Somali households to supplement their food rations with vegetables, otherwise a scarce food item in the Kebribeyah vicinity.

**Table 6: Percentage of households cultivating agriculture, by ethnic group and camp**

86. **Agricultural day labour:** Ranked as the most important income source by Eritrean refugees, primarily the Kunama, this income option is virtually nonexistent for Somali refugees. Host communities

	Ethnic group		Camp	
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
<i>Percent of HHs cultivating any field crops</i>	0.8***	13.1***	5.9***	0.7***
<i>Percent of HHs cultivating any homestead gardens</i>	3.6	3.9	3.6***	26.7***
n	362	259	639	544

\*\*\* differences are significant and the <.001 level

surrounding the Somali camps remarked to the evaluation team their preference to hire non-refugee Oromo labourers, who are more proficient agricultural labourers and, in the context of Oromo landlessness, more easily exploitable, accepting lower daily wages.

87. **Non-agricultural day labour:** This is the most important income source for all refugees except the Kunama, who have a wider variety of options given their involvement in agricultural cultivation. Somali refugees seek daily labour as maids or washerwomen for local households (only women) or as porters (both sexes) or construction workers (normally men) outside and within the camp. Women have also been employed by UNHCR, ARRA and partner NGOs to embroider and tailor clothes for school uniforms. In addition to collecting firewood and grass for sale, Eritrean refugees work in shops and workshops or are hired by NGOs as teachers or in other capacities. Tigrigna refugees have found non-agricultural labour opportunities outside of the camp in Shiraro or host communities, options disallowed to Kunama refugees, who face discrimination in the towns and villages outside of the agricultural context.
88. **Small or petty businesses:** Very few refugees own businesses or engage in petty trade. Business activities are far more common within the Eritrean camps than within the Somali camps, but most of the shops, bars, tea stalls or other businesses are owned by local residents either living outside or inside Shimelba camp, where Tigray non-residents have taken advantage of lax UNHCR oversight (see paragraphs 135-136) to move into camp houses. As noted earlier, the six Shimelba cereal milling operations are completely controlled by local entrepreneurs. The evaluation team met with one local generator owner living at Shimelba able to supply electricity to refugee households for seven hours a day at exorbitant rates, when compared to electricity costs in Tigray towns. Refugees are hindered by the lack of capital required for start-up costs and very few loan opportunities. ZOA once provided loans to refugee households but alleged organizational malfeasance forced them to shut up operations. DRC has begun to provide loans to very few Somali refugee households, but the loan amounts are small – no more than 1000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB). Two households interviewed by the evaluation team took loans from local merchants who have a stake in the business in order to start up the businesses – shops and a tea stall.

89. **Livestock production:** Camel and goat livestock production normally defines Somali livelihood systems; relatively few Somali refugees participate in this livelihood activity. Nearly one-quarter of all Somali Kebribeyah households keep chickens or goats and 17% of

**Table 7: Livestock ownership, by ethnic group and camp**

	Ethnic group			Camp
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
<b>Percentage of households owning any livestock</b>	13.1**	22.0**	16.6**	24.3**
Type of livestock owned				
<i>Chicken</i>	78.3	54.5	65.0	60.8
<i>Goats/sheep</i>	10.9	38.2	25.2	40.8
<i>Cows</i>	17.4	32.7	26.2	1.5
<i>Camels</i>	4.3	5.5	5.8	0.8
<i>Donkeys</i>	0.0	3.6	1.9	2.3
<i>Other</i>	4.3	1.8	2.9	0.0
n	46	55	103	130

\*\* differences are significant and the <.01 level

Shimelba households hold livestock, including 22% of Kunama households and only 13% of Tigrigna households (see Table 7). Although usually limited to poultry or small ruminants – sheep or goats – a few Kunama households own cows, which they struggle to graze, given the competition for grazing land with host communities, who control the land. First generation refugee households are more apt to own livestock – invariably chickens – than are newer arrivals (26% versus 8% respectively) and virtually no second-generation arrival owns a larger animal. Multi-person households are also more likely to own livestock – 23% versus 10% of single-person households. The lack of grazing land afforded to refugee households poses a huge constraint, as does restrictions on movements.

90. **Remittances:** Finally, remittances can provide households with potential income to support household food security (see Table 8). More than one-third of Eritrean refugees receive remittances from other countries and one-third of Tigrigna households (could include some of the other households) also receive other types of financial support, including gifts. In contrast, substantially less than one-tenth of Somali households receive any remittances, from within or outside of Ethiopia. This is a potentially vital source of food security for households striving to preserve their food rations but an option for very few Somali refugees. Male-headed Shimelba households (25%) are twice as apt to access other financial support as are female households (12%). Newer Shimelba arrivals access fewer remittances (32% versus 41% of first-generation arrivals). Single-person male households access gifts or other financial support in greater numbers than do multi-person households (26% versus 19%).

**Table 8: Percent of households deriving income from other sources**

	Ethnic group			Camp		
	Tigrigna	Kunama	sig.	Shimelba	Kebribeyah	sig.
<i>Remittance from country of origin</i>	0.0	0.0	-	0.0	0.4	
<i>Remittances from within Ethiopia</i>	5.0	1.2	*	3.4	8.3	***
<i>Remittances from other countries</i>	36.5	36.3		36.0	6.4	***
<i>Gifts/other financial support</i>	34.3	5.0	***	22.1	0.4	***
<i>Sales of assets</i>	9.7	33.9	***	19.5	0.7	***
n	362	259		639	544	

\* differences are significant at the <.05 level


\*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

91. **Differences in Livelihood Options:** Somali refugee economic opportunities in host communities are more limited than in the Eritrean camps. Somali refugees have fewer opportunities to engage in crop and livestock production when compared with refugees in Tigray. The host population in the Somali region has severely limited refugee land use relative to the Tigray context, although land is only available in the North on a sharecropping arrangement. This makes it difficult for Somali refugee households to supplement their ration through other income earning opportunities.


**Access to Education:** WFP’s current PRRO promotes the “increased enrolment of children in WFP-assisted schools” (Outcome 4.3) through the “timely provision of school food rations for refugee children and take-home rations in Kebribeyah camp” (Output 4.3.1). WFP successfully distributed sufficient quantities of CSB or Famix, sugar and oil, which together were used by partner NGOs – normally IRC – to prepare school meals for attending children, except in Kebribeyah, where vegetable

oil is provided as a take-home ration. Despite the normal complaint of the lack of variety of the cooked meals inherent in school feeding programs and a second, more problematic, complaint of poor teaching quality – refugee teachers are paid far less than are elementary school teachers in the Ethiopian school system – refugee children are attending school, in part a result of the supplementary food inputs. The survey results however, are not unambiguously positive. School attendance is significantly higher across all ages in Kebribeyah, where refugee children take home vegetable oil, which is invariably shared amongst all household members, than in Shimelba, where IRC prepares a hot lunch every day (Figure 18). Whereas eighty to ninety percent of Kebribeyah children between the ages of seven and fifteen attend school, only fifty to sixty percent of Shimelba children aged seven to twelve attend school and school attendance begins to fall off from age ten. Refugee youth FGDs revealed disappointment with the quality of education offered in the camps.

**Figure 18: School attendance rates, by camp and age of child**



**Figure 19: Percentage of children attending school, by camp and sex of child**



92. Girls’ school attendance continues to lag behind that of boys (Figure 19). Nearly eight of ten Kebribeyah school-aged boys actually attend school; fewer than seven of ten girls attend. Only 46% of Shimelba boys and 39% of girls actually attend school (these figures may be circumspect because numbers of children in the household survey are low). Girls continue to drop out of school at earlier ages than do boys to assist in house work, childcare, and a continuing worry, marry early, as reported in Somali and Kunama FGDs.

#### 2.4 Protection from Violence Outcomes and Impact

93. **Food assistance, transactional sex and vulnerability to GBV** – Women, especially women heading households, tend to be more food insecure than men. Income generating opportunities for women are few. FGDs in all four camps, particularly in the more recently established camps of Mai Ayni, housing Eritrean refugees, and Sheder, housing Somali refugees, revealed that refugee women occasionally engage in transactional sex to support their food security (the extent of this problem cannot be quantified). Sex is sometimes bartered directly for food

rations. Responsible for firewood and water collection, women are also vulnerable to GBV when wandering outside of the safer confines of the camp boundaries in search of needed household resources related to food preparation and other livelihood needs, especially in the context of host population discontent with refugee incursion on their resource bases (Bizzarri 2010). Focus group participants reported violent acts, including beatings and abuse of women outside and inside the camps. No FGD participant mentioned incidents of beatings of male refugees.

94. **Unaccompanied minors**<sup>22</sup> are vulnerable to sexual exploitation as well as food insecurity. After arriving alone from Eritrea, unaccompanied minors camps are placed in very crowded one-room houses with other children of similar age cohorts in camps that also house significant numbers of young adult single men. Fourteen children aged 6-13 are stuffed into one-room houses together; older children aged 14-17 are similarly housed together (substantially violating the UNHCR shelter standard or benchmark of 3.5 sq. m/person).<sup>23</sup> Unaccompanied minor FGDs revealed concern about potential GBV following attempts by young, sometimes drunk men, to climb into their houses at night or accost young children inside the camps; UNHCR measures to reduce GBV potential have successfully reduced the risk of sexual abuse. (Unaccompanied minor vulnerability to food insecurity was discussed earlier in paragraph 65.)
95. **UNHCR and partners protection mechanisms:** Well aware of the problems cited above, UNHCR and partners have implemented several mechanisms to protect refugees from violence, particularly gender-based and potential sexual exploitation. These include:
- IRC-implemented child protection and youth programmes, providing children and youth with child-friendly environments. These activities are apparently more effective in the Somali camps, where youth groups report great satisfaction with a plethora of activities, including sports, entertainment, and various awareness campaigns: “IRC allowed me to be a good girl.” Eritrean youth expressed less satisfaction in such services, which were deemed to be insufficient and ineffective.
  - Counselling and referral for victims and GBV and awareness campaigns against female genital mutilation (FGM). ARRA and other partners have attempted to enforce protection against GBV. IRC conducts awareness campaigns. These campaigns are important and are making some headway. Female FGDs however, revealed some frustration that IRC activities tended to focus on response, not necessarily root causes of the problem. Shimelba victims and their families remain unconvinced that action and protection have been effective. In a less protracted refugee scenario however, Mai Ayni women have established, with the assistance of UNHCR and partners, an effective support structure for women affected by violence. UNHCR has also promoted an awareness campaign against FGM, which was mentioned as a successful approach only in the Somali camps.
96. **GBV and Patriarchy:** Although UNHCR and partners are attempting to institute measures to combat FGM and GBV, the patriarchy that dominates social relations (discussed and transitioned in the next paragraph below) dampens progress. Focus group discussions revealed that GBV and FGM are significantly under-reported (though not quantifiable). The segregated male and female FGDs at Mai Ayni, for example, uncovered profound differences between men and women on this issue.

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<sup>22</sup> UNHCR definition: a child under the age of 18. UNHCR 1994

<sup>23</sup> UNHCR 2000

Men, on the one hand denied that any problem existed, although admitting that gender camp population imbalances could pose a problem, and expressed extreme discontent that camp counselling services were attempting to engage women and men on the subject of GBV (“the counselling activities are going against our culture and harming relations between men and women”). The women’s FGD, which included participants disclosing themselves as victims of GBV, were highly appreciative of counselling services. The patriarchal social structures within the camps (described below) help obstruct progress.

## **2.5 Effects of food assistance on gender relations and social structure**

97. Food assistance has impacted gender relations and social structures within the camp, between ethnic groups and within households, sometimes in profound ways.
98. **Patriarchy within camp structures:** Refugee social structures, including food distribution committees, which are entirely controlled by men, mirror the patriarchy of Eritrean, Somali and Ethiopian social systems. The Kebribeyah food distribution committee consists of one male distribution head, twelve male distribution supervisors (of whom only three were refugees), and 23 scoopers, including three men and 20 women. Although a vast majority of the scoopers are women, they are under strict instructions about scooping modalities. The problem of under-scooping was discussed above. The unequal gender relations within the committee is problematic not only because men control the entire distribution decision-making planning and implementation process but also because the relationships within the committee between men and women (as well as between ARRA and refugees) foment distrust in a context where women take responsibility for ration collection. The food distribution committee was not even functional at Shimelba camp at the time of the visit, but evaluation team members were told that the men who formed the committee had relatively recently departed from the camp. There too, scoopers are normally women. Other key camp committees reflect such patriarchal patterns. The Kunama and Tigrigna central committees are also entirely male dominated (the Tigrigna committees are apparently continuously in flux as refugee men leave the camps for resettlement or to seek better lives elsewhere). Women therefore have little voice on prioritising problems and issues within the camps.
99. **Food assistance and marriage patterns:** Food assistance affects marriage patterns. Both camps report that households marry off young girls to increase household support, including access to food assistance. This is especially prevalent amongst Somali households but also occurs amongst the Kunama. Focus group participants explained to the evaluation team that refugees have also devised polygamous marital relations, which occur in far greater number in the refugee context than in the general population, as an important food access strategy; women in polygamous marriages take ration cards under their name. Another common marriage pattern involves Eritrean male refugees entering into cross-marriages with Ethiopian women, for two primary purposes. Such marriage arrangements theoretically strengthen resettlement prospects for both parties, but as well create larger families to augment food rations.
100. **Vulnerability and female-headed households:** Related to the previous paragraph, Somali female-headed households, who outnumber male-headed households by nearly two-to-one (see Figure 3, Section 2.0), are relatively vulnerable to food insecurity. We have seen that households headed by women have extremely high dependency ratios. Women, who assume child and household responsibilities,

have few income-earning opportunities. Women are often listed as household heads to access food rations, which is considered the woman's domain; Somali men as well as women acknowledge that women are far more efficient in managing household food ration consumption and preparation strategies by efficiently deciding the mix of food rations to be consumed and sold or traded for other livelihoods or food needs. Somali women have also assumed ration management responsibilities to preclude the household sale of food rations to purchase superfluous items such as *chat (khat)*.

## **2.6 Effects of food assistance on the relationship between refugees and the host population**

101. **Environmental Depletion:** As a result of many years of hosting thousands of refugees, lands surrounding the Somali camps in particular, and to a lesser degree the Tigray camps, have suffered total environmental resource depletion. Soil erosion and water gullies are the result of numerous trees being cut down to construct shelters and produce charcoal for sale. This has had a negative impact on agricultural yield in local farmlands (UNHCR/WFP/ARRA). The initial influx of refugees into the camps caused profound environmental degradation as refugees collected firewood to cook their food rations, creating competition and conflict with the host population over natural resources. The UNHCR/ARRA programme attacked this problem more proactively in recently-settled camps, particularly Mai Ayni in Tigray (see discussion of environmental mitigation activities in paragraphs 107 and 110). The introduction of fuel-efficient stoves and stoves that rely on alternative fuel sources has reduced some of this pressure, but competition for limited fuel wood still exists.

*"We are destroying the land but we don't have any choice"*  
Male refugee- Kebribeyah camp

102. **Markets and Trading:** Because refugees are compelled to sell some of their food rations to purchase other foods and NFIs and mill their cereals, the host population is able to acquire food commodities from the ration at beneficial terms of trade (FGD host population). The host population is also selling goods and services to refugees, which has led to increased economic activity. Refugees are buying charcoal, wood and water as well as food items from the host communities. Small businesses established in the camps in Tigray benefit both the host and refugee households. Bustling markets within and outside of refugee camps, in part dependent on the influx of large influxes of refugee programme food and non-food commodities, have expanded profoundly as refugee populations have grown and encamped.
103. The increased economic activity between the refugees and host population has also contributed to some food price inflation for non-food ration commodities purchased by refugee households (Heinlein n.d). Because rations are insufficient, refugees find it necessary to buy other food to meet their consumption requirements and diversify their diets, contributing to price increases for cereals, vegetables, pulses and meat (FGD Mai Ayni camp).<sup>24</sup>
104. Merchants in host communities near Somali camps are loaning goods to refugees to sell in the camps benefiting both parties. Most businesses in the Tigray camps however, are controlled by local entrepreneurs able to sell services to refugees at relatively exorbitant prices. Because refugees are poor at negotiating prices for services and goods, local community residents sometimes take advantage of price

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<sup>24</sup> In general, Ethiopia is experiencing major food price inflation which has led to government policies that restrict WFP from making local purchases. This will exacerbate the rising cost of food stuffs that refugees need to purchase.

gouging; examples include high milling costs and electricity use from generators (FGD Shimelba Camp). Refugees are dependent on host community milling operations at high prices (50 cents per kg) relative to the normal Tigray market.

105. **Farming and Sharecropping:** In Tigray, Kunama refugees engage in sharecropping labour arrangements benefiting both communities. Several of the Eritrean refugees arrived at Mai Ayni with farming backgrounds, including technical expertise in irrigation, which has been appreciated by and of use to local farmers. In Kebribeyah, refugees are providing services through house help, as porters and clothes washers, to the host communities, in the process generating additional income.
106. **Services:** Host populations are benefiting from the establishment of schools, health clinics, water systems, school feeding, and supplementary and therapeutic feeding provided in the camps, although benefits of services continue to overwhelmingly accrue to refugees. NGOs and UNHCR are making a concerted effort to include host communities in livelihood activities and environmental mitigation initiatives.
107. **Ethnic differences** can still adversely affect refugees and host population relations in the Tigray region. Unlike the Somali or Tigrigna refugee populations, Kunama refugees are situated within the camp and surrounding host communities as strangers, culturally and socially very different, and often as unwelcome guests. Kunama refugees do not share social or political capital with Tigrigna refugees within the camp or with the host population outside (as well as inside) the camp. Kunama malnutrition rates are higher than those of other groups in protracted refugee situations. They have different food ration preferences than anyone else, preferring sorghum as a cereal base for example. Kunama refugee households assume unique food security strategies in response to food assistance. They sell some of their wheat rations to purchase sorghum. They seek sharecropping opportunities with local farmers as their only farming opportunity given their lack of access to land. They face intense discrimination when venturing outside of the camp in search of firewood required for cooking or grass used as an income-earning source; women who collect grasses and firewood are vulnerable to sexual violence or beatings when venturing outside of camp. Men frequently clash with landowners who control land within the camp over grazing rights and complain of losing their cattle to host communities. Unlike Tigrigna Eritreans, they are *de facto* forbidden from travelling outside of camp; when attempting to use local buses to travel to Shiraro to pursue livelihood opportunities or trade food rations, they may be told to get out or (better) sent to the back of the bus.

### **3. How Does Food Assistance for Refugees Create Impact?**

#### **3.1. The Role of Contextual Factors**

108. Several external factors influenced the outcome and impact evaluated in Section 2, including government policy, security in the Somali region, resource constraints combined with rising food costs, and ethnic and demographic differences amongst beneficiaries and host populations.
109. **Government policy:** The “Out of Camp” policy (see paragraph 20) has allowed an estimated 500 Eritrean refugees to pursue income-generating options. However, because the policy does not apply to Somali refugees, their movement for economic opportunities is still restricted, severely affecting their ability to fulfil livelihood strategies.




110. ARRA staff attitudes to development activities or durable solutions for refugees are mixed. ARRA officially promotes only two durable solutions for refugees – resettlement or repatriation. Many ARRA staff however, are receptive to vocational and occupational training for refugees because they see this as skill building in preparation for repatriation or resettlement. They do not feel that NGOs are bringing in sufficient resources to substantially address the livelihood needs of the vast majority of refugees. However they are more cautious as to whether Somali refugees should be able to work anywhere they like. Because ARRA is a regulatory as well as implementing agency, issues of security sometimes overwhelm the desire of the agency to promote refugee livelihood opportunities.
111. ARRA is also working closely with the Woreda Bureau of Agriculture in Tigray and Somali regions to promote environmental protection, although these programmes are very limited in scale and scope, particularly in the Somali case. Both refugees and the host communities are engaged in some environmental mitigation activities. Such an approach helps reduce the tension that exists between the host population and the refugees over land degradation caused by the placement of camps.
112. **Local Purchases:** Government policies are also having a dampening effect on WFP local purchases of food for camp distribution. WFP made a concerted effort to procure ration commodities locally to create wider opportunities for marketing locally-produced food (SPR 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006;2007;2008;2009). By 2006, local purchases constituted more than 75% of all the commodity purchases. However delivery delays were encountered; some local suppliers did not deliver food to WFP central warehouses on time per contractual obligations. Some suppliers defaulted altogether. This made it challenging to dispatch food to refugee camps in a timely fashion. The Government then (in 2007) placed restrictions on purchases of local cereals in an attempt to stabilize the spiralling cost of food commodities in the local market (SPR 2007). Since 2008, the Government has restricted local cereal procurement due to high local prices and limited available surpluses.
113. **Security** in the Somali region has been in constant flux since 2002, which has influenced the distribution of rations and NFIs. Local authorities apply more severe restrictions on Somali refugee activities than on Eritrean refugees out of security concerns and in the context of greater restrictions in the Somali region in general. Ambushes, random shootings and clashes between Somali factions and Ethiopia military troops as well as landmines have been the main threats to staff (SPR 2004, 2006). In May 2011, WFP staff were ambushed in the Somali region; one staff was killed, another was injured and two were kidnapped. These conflict situations have seriously inhibited the delivery of food to the Southern camps (non-protracted camps outside of the purview of this evaluation), having a negative impact on GAM rates (over 30 % in the Dolo Ado camps, where thousands of new refugees have descended in recent months to escape from the drought and insecurity of Somalia). The security situation has also made it difficult to retain qualified staff for monitoring the food distribution.
114. **Resource Constraints:** Opportunities for refugees to enhance their own household food and livelihood security are limited by lack of access to land for cultivation and livestock. Camps have been established in isolated areas away from large towns or markets and are non-conducive to income earning opportunities. Refugees have very poor access to physical, political, social and economic capital, making it difficult for them to engage in livelihood activities of a durable nature. Women are particularly hampered by the lack of livelihood opportunities, especially

female-headed households, who are responsible for child rearing and tend to be burdened by high dependency ratios.

115. Compounding this situation is competition for natural capital (e.g. firewood, grass for grazing and construction) and the accompanying environmental degradation, which has reportedly often resulted in tension between the refugees and host communities (WFP/UNHCR/ARRA 2008). As stated earlier, this is being partially addressed by ARRA and the *woreda* administration.
116. According to UNHCR, the development of kitchen gardens, which are undertaken only in Somali camps, has been restricted to less than 15 % of the population (UNHCR 2008), and for those who are allowed to grow, gardens may be as little as 45 m<sup>2</sup>, compared to an ideal size of 80 m<sup>2</sup> (WFP 2008). Production is apparently further limited by environmental factors; gardens are dependent on rainfall, which is unreliable in most refugee camps (WFP 2006).
117. **Cost per beneficiary:** WFP’s annual cost per beneficiary has gradually increased over the life of the program (Figure 20).<sup>25</sup> Several external factors likely contribute to this increase. Food prices began to dramatically increase in 2007, making it more expensive to obtain food commodities. Additionally GoE restrictions on local purchase (in response to the spiralling cost of food commodities) contributed to increased commodity costs. In 2006, WFP purchased 75% of all commodities locally; in 2007 local purchase only comprised 10% of all commodities. Each year, continued rising food costs and drought worsen. This year’s spike in food prices, exacerbated by drought, has severely intensified rising cost trends. Increasing beneficiary costs for food rations free up few resources for other livelihood programming.

**Figure 20: WFP cost per beneficiary per year, by PRRO**



Sources: SPR 2002-2009. Food Distribution Sheets 2009 and 2010. Data for total cost per beneficiary was not available for 2010.

118. **Donor resources for livelihood programming** in Ethiopia are limited. This is partially due to the fact that the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) is considered primarily an emergency humanitarian agency and is not supposed to engage in development activities in camps. Based on key informant interviews with United States (US) Government representatives, bureaucratic

<sup>25</sup> Although requested, UNHCR did not provide the evaluation team with internal documentation of costs incurred.

boundaries would have to be breached to have a more comprehensive approach to supporting durable solutions that could lead to turf battles with other USAID agencies. Programs need to be demonstrably worthwhile to overcome bureaucratic hurdles. In addition, since the number of beneficiaries in the camps is small compared to other food security programs being implemented in Ethiopia by the US government, management constraints related to oversight of small programs is a significant problem. Discussions with other donors – Japan embassy and Finish embassy – confirmed that donors appear less interested in committing resources for livelihood programming toward durable solutions than toward supporting the current care and maintenance approach.

119. **Ethnic Differences:** The ethnic composition of the camps can have an effect on the livelihood opportunities made available to refugee households. For example in Shimelba, Tigrigna refugees speak the same language and have the same cultural background as the host population. According to FGDs with the host population, this makes it easier for the refugees to integrate with the local population. However the Kunama, who are mostly agro-pastoralists, are not treated the same by the local population. Although they are respected for their farming skills, they are discriminated against when they venture into town. This is primarily because the Kunama compete with the local population for natural resources for grazing their animals, grass for basket making and firewood. This discrimination can affect their livelihood opportunities in the vicinity of the camps. As discussed above (2.2 – nutrition outcomes), one of the underlying causes of the persistence of malnutrition at Shimelba can be explained in terms of differential cultural feeding habits and child caring systems – Kunama mothers engage in poor child feeding practices.
120. **Demographic Differences:** There are significant differences in the demographics of the protracted refugee camps in the North (e.g., Shimelba) versus the East (e.g., Kebribeyah). Nearly two-thirds of all households in Kebribeyah are headed by women. Based on FGDs in the camp, this is largely because refugees have devised polygamous marital relations as an important food access strategy. Females are heading households to access food rations. Somali men as well as women acknowledge that women are far more efficient in managing household food ration consumption and preparation strategies; they decide the mix of food rations to be consumed and sold or traded for other livelihood or food needs. In addition, Somali refugees have been living in Kebribeyah since 1991. Over time the households have grown to be very large, averaging 8.5 members.
121. In Shimelba, the Eritrean refugees have typically fled to Northern Ethiopia as single household members in recent years. As a result Shimelba camp households are only averaging 2.7 members. There are also a large number of single-headed male households. Since 2006, more than 55% of the new arrivals are single person households. These single member households experience significant problems in properly using their rations and often run out long before the next distribution. In addition there are a significant number of unaccompanied minors in the Tigray refugee camps. As discussed earlier, care and support for this group has been problematic in recent years.
122. The external contextual factors presented above have significant programme implications for WFP and UNHCR. Differences in household types, ethnicity and context help to explain very

When asked about opportunity:  
*“People literally go crazy and go to bad habits like chewing chat, smoking cigarettes – there is nothing to do”.*

Youth refugee- Kebribeyah

different consumption patterns, food security strategies and potential livelihood opportunities. For example, differential access to remittances (discussed in chapter 2), a potentially vital source of food security for households striving to preserve their food rations, offers an explanatory factor for relative food insecurity amongst Somali refugees. The next section explores programming modalities that are used to address these contextual factors.

### 3.2. The Role of Implementation Factors

123. **Food Pipeline Delivery:** Output 4.2.1 of the PRRO mandates WFP to ensure the “timely distribution of food in sufficient quantity and quality to refugees” (which in turn supports the outcome “adequate food energy consumption”). Successfully accomplishing this output for most of the years covered by this evaluation, WFP has provided a food basket to meet the minimum per capita food security requirements of 2100 kilocalories, including 14% proteins and 17% fat, accepted standards established by WHO throughout the world.
124. WFP uses UNHCR data bases, which list the number of refugee individuals and households per camp, to allocate food commodities for disbursement to each camp by the end of every month, so that all commodities are in place in ARRA-managed camp warehouses prior to the distribution to refugee households, invariably scheduled to take place during the first week of the month. The evaluation team found that the full basket of food commodities has been delivered to the camps on schedule for most months since 2008. In FGD, refugees voiced numerous complaints related to food consumption and food security affecting their lives in the camps, but these complaints did not include the timeliness of the food distributions.
125. Prior to the middle half of 2007, refugees did not receive a full basket with sufficient nutritional value to provide a nutritiously balanced diet. WFP food distribution documents provide us with the following information on general distributions by camp since 2005:

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
10 months of cereal rations at Shimelba, 11 months at KB; full supply of salt and oil to both camps; no pulses for KB refugees; no sugar for Shimelba refugees; and no CSB in the general ration at all	Full basket of cereals, salt, and oil to both camps; no pulses for KB refugees; no sugar for Shimelba refugees; and no CSB in the general ration at all	Full basket of cereals, salt, and oil to both camps; pulses finally introduced to KB and sugar introduced to Shimelba in mid-2007; Famix added to general rations at both camps half way through the year	Full basket delivered to both camps, with the exception of only 10 months of sugar at KB; cereal was a combination of wheat, maize, and sorghum (introduced into the general ration in December)	Nearly full basket of commodities to both camps, with the absence of sugar and salt for two months; half of the cereal rations consisted of sorghum	Nearly full basket, except for one month shortages of vegetable oil, sugar and salt.

126. WFP faced some problems in meeting previous PRRO delivery pipeline targets prior to 2008, largely a result of transport inefficiencies and continual budget constraints caused by insufficient donor commitment to the programme (SPR 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005). Pipeline breaks seriously compromised WFP’s food delivery operations to the programme in 2004 and 2005, when cereal rations reductions increased

transitory food insecurity and probably contributed to high GAM rates in the camps. Food rations were slashed by 30 % for several months (WFP 2003; 2004b; 2004c; 2005; Black-Michaud et. al 2006). WFP admirably finessed the ongoing budget constraints to successfully deliver the food commodities provided in the basket to the camps nearly every month since 2005. WFP usually averted pipeline breaks and ration cuts to refugees by utilizing loan advances such as the Working Capital Fund (WCF) financing facility (WFP/ UNHCR/ARRA 2008) , although transport capacity constraints limited refugee receipt of sugar and salt in the summer of 2009 (WFP, 2009). Although the programme did not completely meet the PRRO output 1.1.1 – “timely distribution of food in sufficient quantities and quality to refugees” – WFP managed to deliver 74% of targeted commodities in 2009 (23,003 metric tonnes (MT) actually delivered versus 31,070 MT targeted in the PRRO) and 96% in 2010 (32,196 MT delivered versus 33,424 MT targeted in the PRRO). The 2008 JAM noted that WFP managed to resource 67% of the revised commitment of food commodities, but actually delivered 22,860 MT, which was 57% of the resourced commodities. By the end of May 2008, out of the total funds (US \$ 42 million) needed to cover the revised total food requirements, only 50 % were received (WFP/ UNHCR/ARRA 2008).

127. **Milling:** WFP and UNHCR had experimented over the years with various options to overcome the seemingly intractable milling problem. NGO partners have attempted to promote milling operations under the control of refugees (IRC, ARRA and WFP KIs). Operational costs were high, inappropriate milling machines were procured, refugees were poorly trained to effectively or efficiently operate the machines and manage the mills, milling machine operators experienced high turnover rates, machines broke down with no contingency plan in place to procure spare parts or fix the machines, and refugee-operated mills could not effectively compete with private mills. As a result, WFP and UNHCR decided, with ARRA’s consent, to compensate refugees for milling costs by providing an additional 2 ½ kg (a bit less than 20% increase from 13.5 kg) of cereals in 2007. The problem is that the milling costs, in addition to transport costs, are frequently more than the real value of 2 ½ kg of cereals, averaging eight ETB per capita cereal ration in KB and nine ETB in Shimelba, where six local millers control the market in the camps. Refugees must sell their rations at unfavourable terms of trade: wheat prices in the camps, which glut the local market, favour local merchant buyers and disfavour refugee sellers.
128. **Food basket preferences and selling patterns:** Asked to rank the importance of various food items in the basket, refugee informants overwhelmingly agreed that cereals – wheat – represent the most important food commodity. Vegetable oil and sugar are also important commodities, ranked second and third respectively in Shimelba and the other way around in KB, where the sugar ration is an important part of the Somali diet (normally added to tea) and tends to be consumed within the first ten days of the month, requiring the sale of other items to augment the sugar ration. Sugar costs 60 ETB per kg in the Shimelba market, expensive for refugees who struggle to balance their household budget expenditures every month. Cereals are important not only because of their consumption value but also as an income source when sold for other livelihood needs. Most households invariably sell up to half of their rations to support other livelihood needs or other foodstuffs, such as vegetables or condiments, which are not part of the food basket. Cereals are most frequently sold; 63% of multi-headed households and 80% of single-headed households sold part of their wheat rations during the April distribution. The proportion of cereals sold also depends on the type of cereal in the ration. A popular

food ration only for the Kunama, who traditionally grow the crop and regard it as their primary staple, sorghum as a food ration item is sold in far greater amounts by the Tigrigna and Somalis. In fact, the presence of sorghum as the cereal source from late 2008 through the first half of 2009 probably largely accounted for a spike in malnutrition rates in the two camps that year (corroborated by the UNHCR nutrition officer in Addis Ababa). Somalis also sell part of their cereal ration to purchase their favoured cereal of rice or pasta (at unfavourable terms of trade).

129. Although pulses are the second most frequent food basket item sold, the unpopular pinto beans are currently selling for only two ETB per kg in the Shimelba market. Pinto beans require longer cooking times and therefore more cooking fuel usage than other pulses and are less preferred than other pulses such as split peas. Famix (faffa) or CSB provides refugee households with the third food basket item sometimes sold to purchase other items, but the selling patterns depend largely on the quality of CSB, which varies. Somali refugees reported selling CSB in recent months, despite only obtaining one to two ETB per kg in the local market outside the camp, because “only donkeys could eat this faffa,” according to women in one FGD. A taste test at the ARRA warehouse, where two types of CSB were stored at the time, indeed revealed to the evaluation team a significant difference in quality between one South Africa variety and another batch of CSB emanating from the US. Other than cereals and to a lesser degree pulses and CSB or Famix, other food basket items – sugar, salt and vegetable oil – are invariably consumed in their entirety within the household.
130. **Refugee Food Basket Complaints:** Refugees perceive that they receive less than the full ration. Table 9 indicates that Somali refugees in particular and to a less dramatic extent, Kunama refugees, are convinced that the food distribution process undercuts their cereal rations by more than 20% – to 12.4 kg on average vs. 16 kg. However, analysis of perceived ration distribution by household size at Shimelba camp reveals that one-member households are far more likely to estimate higher rations that closely match the official ration scale. For example, one-member Shimelba households received 15.0 kg of wheat on average during the April distribution; multi-member households believed that they took home an average of 13.2 kg. It may be that one-member households, who take home far less amounts of rations on aggregate, are more aware of the exact quantity of rations they received. Scooping is probably more precise for one-member households as well.

**Table 9: Per capita rations received (kg), by ethnic group and camp**

	Ethnic group in Shimelba			Camp		
	Tigrigna	Kunama	sig.	Shimelba	Kebribeyah	sig.
<i>Wheat</i>	13.4	14.9	***	14.0	12.4	***
<i>Sugar</i>	0.4	0.5	**	0.5	0.4	***
<i>Vegetable oil</i>	0.8	1.0	**	0.9	0.8	
<i>CSB/Faffa</i>	1.1	1.1		1.1	1.0	*
<i>Salt</i>	0.2	0.3	**	0.2	0.2	
<i>Peas</i>	1.1	1.0		1.1	1.0	
<i>Beans</i>	1.8	1.3		1.4	1.0	**

\* differences are significant at the <.05 level

\*\* differences are significant at the <.01 level

\*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

131. **Food Distribution Process:** One of the biggest complaints of Somali KB refugees, and to a lesser degree (and only voiced in the FGDs) by Kunama men and women concerning obstacles to obtaining sufficient food – a theme echoed throughout all of the focus group discussions as well as the individual household interviews – focused on the food distribution system, described as unfair, discriminatory, and corrupt by two-thirds of all Kebribeyah participating survey households. Shimelba Eritrean households, in contrast, appeared relatively satisfied with the food distribution process (although Kunama refugees believe their cereals rations to be somewhat under-scooped). Somali refugees vociferously voiced opinions that the phenomenon of under-scooping is routine, systematic, and profound during the three-to-four day distribution. Scoopers, refugee women hired to scoop out food rations to households, apparently receive conflicting instructions prior to the distribution. According to the female scoopers (and corroborated in other FGDs), scoopers are instructed to under-scoop rations by scooping out less than a brimful of wheat or other cereals. They also believe that the scoops used measure out less of each commodity than proscribed by the programme guidelines. (Although one of the evaluators tested the scoops found in the front of one of the ARRA-managed rubb-halls, finding no problem with those particular scooping materials, refugees countered that the actual scoops used during the four-day distribution sit in the back of the warehouse. Indeed, the evaluation team discovered scoops in the back of the warehouse, which the camp management claimed were no longer in use. On the other hand, the scooping materials tested at Shimelba measured out less than 16 kg per person when flattened at the top.) If true, the problem of under-scooping may largely explain why Somali refugees are apparently more food insecure than Eritrean refugees, as evidenced by the differences in food security outcomes presented above. It is interesting that complaints about the food distribution process did not arise during FGDs in the substantially newer camp of Sheder. It is necessary during an evaluation such as this one to filter refugee complaints – refugees take the opportunity to voice their opinions by complaining about many subjects relating to their lives and hoping to improve their well-being, particularly Somali refugees living in a very protracted context, as is represented by Kebribeyah camp. The evaluation team nevertheless believes the food distribution complaints voiced loud and clear by refugees at Kebribeyah to be potentially valid and worth pursuing.<sup>26</sup>
132. **WFP Food Distribution Monitoring:** Part of the problem associated with the perception of under-scooping is that food monitoring carried out by WFP or UNHCR is not sufficiently intensive. For example, the WFP food monitor for the Tigray region is based in Mekelle. According to a key informant interview, the monitor spends 15 days a month travelling, monitoring the refugee programs and five other WFP programs carried out in seven *woredas*. The food monitor is only able to visit one refugee camp every three months, invariably visiting the warehouse, meeting with ARRA representatives, and only briefly observing the actual food distribution. Similarly, monitoring in Kebribeyah is not intensive, although WFP-Jijiga schedules

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<sup>26</sup> Subsequent and in response to this evaluation's findings, UNHCR and WFP, accompanied by ARRA based in the camp, undertook a joint assessment of scooping, randomly observing and testing the scooping materials used to distribute rations to twenty households of various sizes during two days of the July 2011 Kebribeyah distribution. The assessment team found no under-scooping to be taking place. The WFP/ARRA/UNHCR rapid assessment team also interviewed refugee committee members, who denied the phenomenon of under-scooping in the camp. A fine initiative, this rapid assessment does not necessarily disprove the evaluation findings, which include a triangulation of evidence from qualitative and quantitative data. The evaluation team has recommended the institutionalization of systematic monitoring (recommendation #12).

monthly monitoring plans, dispatching two monitors to observe food distributions in three camps. The monitoring is not sufficiently intensive to detect inappropriate food distribution. Time constraints thwart monitors from employing other monitoring tools, such as random spot checks during and after a distribution, random weighing of rations carried away from the distribution counters, or random testing of scoops used during the distribution, which used together might identify distribution problems as reported.

133. **Camp Warehousing:** Managed by ARRA, camp warehouses are adequate but not completely up to normal WFP standards. Stack cards are not used at either KB or Shimelba; the evaluation team discovered empty stack cards sitting in the Shimelba warehouse manager’s office. Stack cards are essential counter-references to commodity quantities and help to track warehousing principle of “first-in-first-out.” The ledger used to record Shimelba food commodity receipts, dispatches, and distributions had some inaccuracies, with commodity management operations recorded in wrong columns. Kebribeyah refugees complained of receiving CSB speckled with small mites. WFP KIs noted that ARRA warehouse managers had been trained but staff transfers negatively impacted on camp warehousing standards.
134. **Refugee obstacles to obtaining food:** Asked generally about obstacles in obtaining food, survey participants focused their answers on the food aid and food distribution process (Table 10), virtually dismissing other constraints related to other means of obtaining food from agricultural production or other income sources. Given the need to sell a substantial portion of their rations to fulfil other livelihood requirements, participating survey respondents universally complain that the food aid as well as household income is insufficient. Terms of trade disfavour refugee households, who sell their rations at low prices in camp or local community markets to purchase other items at relatively high and increasing prices. Somali refugee households intensively complain about the quality of food aid (particularly the quality of *faffa*, discussed above), the distribution of non-preferred items (Somalis prefer rice to wheat and would like to see milk in the ration mix) and even the waiting time required to collect the rations (a process that has actually improved immensely since the advent of earlier distribution modalities).

**Table 10: Obstacles in obtaining food, by ethnic group and camp<sup>27</sup>**

	Ethnic group		Camp	
	Tigrigna	Kunama	Shimelba	Kebribeyah
<i>Quantity of food aid</i>	81.6	97.7	88.2	94.3
<i>No money to buy food</i>	74.6	50.4	64.7	72.4
<i>Prices have increased/food too expensive</i>	63.4	39.8	53.3	62.9
<i>Discrimination/corruption in food distribution</i>	1.2	0.0	0.6	66.2
<i>Quality of food aid is poor</i>	9.5	3.9	7.1	39.2
<i>Non-preferred food is distributed</i>	4.0	0.0	2.7	27.4
<i>Lines are too long/too many people</i>	2.0	0.0	1.3	21.5
<i>Food aid arrives late</i>	9.8	1.2	6.3	15.6
n	347	256	639	544

135. Successive JAMs carried out since 2003 verify this evaluation’s findings that full general rations are still needed to meet basis food requirements for the vast majority of refugees continuing to confront limited possibilities for self-reliance. (UNHCR/WFP/ARRA 2003; UNHCR /WFP/ ARRA 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010).

<sup>27</sup> Kebribeyah consists of Somali refugees; Shimelba consists of Tigrigna and Kunama refugees.



Refugees continue to have limited livelihood and coping strategies, limited land access, and are restricted in their movements.

136. **Linking to other WFP Programs:** In addition to the refugee programmes, WFP implements a number of other programmes in Ethiopia, such as the Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions (MERET) programme (WFP 2008b), the Protective Safety Net Programme (PSNP), Targeted Supplemental Feeding, School Feeding, and Emergency Programming. Currently it does not link any of these programmes with the refugee programmes even though many of these programmes are implemented in the host communities in close proximity to the camps. Since many of these programmes have programming activities that are similar to activities being carried out in the camps, opportunities for synergies are lost. For example, to address the issue of environmental degradation (discussed in Section 2.6), WFP introduced environmental rehabilitation measures in PRRO 10127.3, hoping to increase a commitment to provide targeted refugees with tools, seeds, and technical expertise for gardening, and to facilitate linkages between refugees and WFP's existing MERET. Unfortunately these linkages were never made to MERET, an extensive programme focused on environmental protection activities similar to the ones being promoted by ARRA and the *woreda* administration.
137. **UNHCR Programming Modalities:** UNHCR is in charge of protection activities for refugees in the camps, which include interventions in health, education, supplementary food distribution, water, shelter and physical protection. Most of the programs can be characterized as “care and maintenance” (a term repeated in at least three UNHCR KIs); a very small proportion of UNCHR resources are devoted to livelihood activities primarily implemented by NGOs. UNHCR protection services are very good. UNHCR provides excellent support to ARRA's camp implementation.
138. **Databases and Ration Cards:** Accurate food targeting and ration card use relies on accurate household profiles. UNHCR refugee camp databases however, are currently inaccurate. Shimelba and Kebribeyah databases are out-of-date and require prompt revalidation. Revalidation is an expensive prospect, but UNHCR calls for revalidation every two years; the databases for these two camps have not been updated since 2008, resulting in confusing and inaccurate food distribution lists. The Tigray evaluation enumeration team lost one full day trying to verify sampling lists of households with Tigrigna central committee leaders and zone and block leaders, who verified that at least 80% of the UNHCR lists were inaccurate or completely bogus. Longstanding residents told evaluation team members that households had moved out of the camp or (better) transferred to another camp zone or block years earlier; some households remaining on the data bases had apparently resettled in a third country up to five years earlier. UNHCR appears to have a better handle on changing household population dynamics at Kebribeyah, but the database is quite inaccurate there as well. Such inaccuracies invite cheating and potential fraud.
139. A large part of the problem in the Tigray region derives from poor UNHCR presence in the Eritrean camps. UNHCR staff do not spend sufficient time in the camps, currently averaging less than three days per week. Programme oversight, monitoring, implementation, and liaison with partners have been severely adversely affected.
140. **Food assistance and NFIs:** It has been established that refugee households sell a substantial portion of their food rations to purchase other items, including firewood for cooking. Refugee households living in protracted camps must also purchase other non-food items, despite the UNHCR programme mandate to provide such

items as soap, clothing, sanitary pads, sleeping mats, blankets, mosquito nets, kitchen utensils, cooking stoves, housing materials, and jerry cans. Budget constraints have rendered NFIs in short supply in all of the camps under review. Table 11 outlines NFI access problems, which have been articulated most forcefully by Kebribeyah households. UNHCR is 45% under-resourced in relation to needs assessments carried out every year. New arrivals therefore do not always receive the full package of NFIs. In protracted refugee situations, such as at Kebribeyah and Shimelba, NFI redistribution either does not occur or occurs infrequently and haphazardly, depending on the NFI and the camp context. This is despite the existence of UNHCR standards stipulating NFI redistribution within specific timeframes, depending on the NFI. UNHCR key informants stated to the evaluation team that budget constraints had severely dampened their ability to systematically distribute NFIs. Refugee households therefore must frequently replenish their NFI supplies by selling some of their rations, increasing their food insecurity.

**Table 11: Percentage of households lacking adequate access to NFIs**

	Ethnic group			Camp		
	Tigrinya	Kunama	sig.	Shimelba	Kebribeyah	sig.
<i>Percentage of households lacking adequate access to NFIs</i>	98.1	86.1	***	93.3	98.0	***
n	342	249		639	543	
<i>Soap</i>	80.3	61.4	***	73.2	92.9	***
<i>Building materials</i>	65.6	58.9		62.8	92.3	***
<i>Blankets</i>	66.5	42.2	***	57.4	88.9	***
<i>Mosquito nets</i>	60.7	29.0	***	49.5	92.7	***
<i>Water jerry can</i>	54.6	34.5	***	47.3	77.5	***
<i>Sleeping mat</i>	24.7	36.6	**	29.1	93.4	***
<i>Clothing</i>	49.2	39.3	*	45.7	59.5	***
<i>Cooking pots &amp; utensils</i>	48.7	14.8	***	35.6	64.2	***
<i>Cooking fuel</i>	19.7	23.8		21.0	66.0	***
<i>Sanitary pad</i>	2.8	0.9		2.2	72.9	***
<i>Cooking stove</i>	32.4	39.3		34.8	35.5	
n	356	224		597	532	

\*differences are significant at the <.05 level

\*\* differences are significant at the <.01 level

\*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

141. One problem facing UNHCR is that refugees tend to also sell some of their NFIs, especially if distributed at inappropriate times. NFI distribution timing must be appropriate to deter refugees from selling items. For example, distributing plastic sheets at the wrong time of the year (outside of the rainy season) can induce refugees to sell sheets to the local population. Tarpaulins are frequently sold, currently dotting the landscape and structures of the town of Shiraro, forty minutes from Shimelba by vehicle. Shimelba refugees tell of receiving mosquito nets during the latter half of the malaria season. Mosquito net coverage is extremely deficient at Kebribeyah, where they are only found to serve five percent of adults and ten percent of children (see Table 12). Single member Shimelba households (83%) are much more apt to have access to sufficient mosquito nets than are multi-person households (56%).

**Table 12: Percentage of households with enough mosquito nets for adults and children, by ethnic group and camp**

	Ethnic group			Camp		
	Tigrigna	Kunama	sig.	Shimelba	Kebribeyah	sig.
<i>Percentage of households with enough mosquito nets for adults</i>						
	55.8	82.7	***	68.0	4.8	***
n	342	249		629	537	
<i>Percentage of households with enough mosquito nets for children</i>						
	64.2	78.6	**	66.9	9.8	***
N	148	103		269	491	

\* differences are significant at the <.05 level

\*\* differences are significant at the <.01 level

\*\*\* differences are significant at the <.001 level

142. Conducting its own recent NFI assessment, UNHCR found additional deficiencies relating to the following NFIs (UNHCR NFI Assessment, 2010):

- **Blankets and sleeping mats** were deemed to be of “bad to very bad” quality; sleeping mats had never been distributed prior to 2010 but were distributed following the UNHCR assessment; the quality of the blankets were judged to be irritating to the skin;
- **Clothing** had never been distributed, requiring purchases in the local market;
- **Soap** is distributed every month, but one bar per person was deemed insufficient for bathing and washing clothes, vociferously confirmed by refugees in each of the four camps visited by the evaluation team;
- **Cooking sets and stoves** were assessed to be of good quality and quantity in general. However, this evaluation’s FGDs revealed refugee dissatisfaction with the quality of the cooking fuel, distributed by an NGO and tending to cause fires – several people had been to a hospital with burns within the two weeks of the survey. Gaia Association, UNHCR’s local NGO partner, distributes ethanol, which is cheaper, locally produced and relatively environmentally friendly than is kerosene; the problem is that ethanol may be more fire prone, because refugee households apparently store ethanol containers in close proximity to their stoves. More intensive training might offer one solution. Refugee women often travelled hours in search of firewood in hostile and unsafe environments if their families couldn’t afford to purchase the firewood at the local market.
- **Tarpaulins** were in short supply despite being distributed during 2010. The evaluation visit coincided with closely with the onset of the long rainy season, and FGDs as well as observations revealed the need for tarpaulins at both protracted refugee camps.

143. **Support to Livelihood Activities:** UNHCR is committed to applying a livelihoods approach, which is promoted through DAR. The purpose of DAR is to facilitate local community and refugee development and enhance refugee and host community livelihoods through coordinated livelihoods activities, resulting eventually in a durable solution. However DAR is only implemented in the Somali camps, where a livelihoods coordinator has been hired to oversee DAR activities. While DAR is an interesting approach with great potential, a strategy and budgeting for livelihood programming is woefully insufficient. The UNHCR DAR budget is only US \$25,000;

UNHCR NGO partners are expected to access financial resources from other donors to finance major DAR initiatives. In addition, the DAR approach is poorly advocated amongst the partners to promote wider impact. For example, IRC staff in Kebribeyah had not heard of the approach when asked. UNHCR acknowledges the need to orient development partners, its own staff, donors and potential donors, and other stakeholders on the purpose of and need for DAR.

144. As described in Section 1.3, NGOs are engaged in a number of valuable services for refugees, including WASH activities, education, HIV support, GBV support, and child protection. NGOs also promote income generation and some livelihood activities. The small scale of these livelihood programming efforts however, has demonstrated limited impact. Programme partners are implementing too many small, unconnected activities at very low intensity to make a difference for the majority of the refugees. For example, interviews with IRC staff revealed that refugees in Kebribeyah receive vocational training in tailoring (18) and embroidery (32), computer use (70), and masonry (28). Refugees note that very few people are trained in relation to need and few trained refugees are actually able to apply their training. In each Somali camp, 300 refugee families have benefited from small-scale agriculture and water systems projects, implemented by LWF, yet using the population of Kebribeyah as an example, this figure represents as few as 14% of households. Similarly, the scale of IGA, microcredit, and vocational training activities offered by DRC is very small compared to the need. DRC has provided loans for 220 refugees, trained 45 in tailoring, and provided pushcarts for 45 refugees. It should be noted that both LWF and DRC plan to scale up livelihood activities in the future.

145. Several refugee FGDs revealed profound dissatisfaction with the overall impact or scale of the NGO activities. The refugees feel that NGOs are like “lions in the bush—they come in very quickly, implement a few small activities and then disappear”. Refugees and ARRA staff also feel that the planning and implementation of livelihood activities is not transparent. One exception was the approach of ZOA. Although no longer operating, host communities as well as refugees indicated that ZOA had implemented the most thorough, potentially long-lasting livelihoods approach of all implementing partner NGOs. Shimelba camp refugees as well as host community farmers appreciated the livelihood training on such subjects as homestead gardening, small livestock production, tree planting provided by ZOA and supplemented with material and technical follow on support. ZOA even promoted peace-building activities. The DAR NGO partners in the Somali camps are also applying a livelihoods approach, but scale and scope must be enhanced to realize impact.

*“The best tailors are found in the camp as a result of ZOA’s training. We prefer to get clothes from them instead of going to Shiraro”*  
Member of Shimelba Host community Mai Kuhli

146. **Interaction between WFP and UNHCR:** WFP and UNHCR meet monthly to regularly discuss programme issues. These monthly meetings include the other implementing partners such as ARRA and the various NGOs working in the camps. Pre and post-food distribution meeting are also held with the implementing partners at the camp level. WFP is not always present at these meetings due to scheduling constraints for the staff engaged in monitoring. Although these meeting take place on a regular basis, monitoring reports from WFP are not shared systematically with UNHCR. Recognizing this as an issue, senior staff from WFP indicated that this problem has already been addressed.

147. WFP and UNHCR also regularly engage in joint assessments and nutrition surveys. For example they carry out JAMs every two years and nutrition assessments every year. They also do participatory needs assessments in the camps every year. These assessments are of high quality. The problem is that follow up to these assessments does not always take place. Joint implementation or action plans did not follow from the 2010 JAM. UNHCR and WFP staff never mentioned their two agencies meeting together to write proposals to donors to secure funding for recommendations coming out of the assessments. As a result the same problems are repeated in consecutive JAMs.
148. The recommendations being put forward by the JAMs are also very low level. Recommendations are oriented to small adjustments in the programme rather than major shifts in programme directions. Livelihood interventions are not given a great deal of emphasis in these reports.
149. **Influence of UNHCR-WFP MOU on Programme Performance:** The existing Ethiopia refugee programme jointly implemented by WFP and UNHCR is not following MoU guidance. The 2002 MoU states that UNHCR and WFP will collaborate to encourage and build self-reliance of both refugees and host communities. It goes on to state that the programming of food and non-food assistance will support asset building, training, income generation, and other self-reliance activities. Despite these commitments, very few resources are used by UNHCR to support activities that promote self-reliance; WFP food distribution modalities focus on maintaining food consumption levels and not on longer-term food security solutions. The MoU also states that joint plans of action based on JAM recommendations will be developed to clearly set out mutually agreed upon goals, objectives, responsibilities, indicators and implementation arrangements (UNHCR/WFP 2002). However, there is also no clear follow up to the JAMs as stipulated by the MoU.

### 3.3. The Interaction between Factors

150. In the previous two sections we discussed the external and internal factors that help explain the findings discussed in Section 2. Next we will discuss the linkages between these factors and how they influence the key assumptions related to the theory of change posited to bring about durable solutions from the work of UNHCR, WFP, and their implementing partners. The theme of this section is that several factors, including long-term food assistance, internal linkages, and external factors, have together dampened the potential for durable solutions beyond resettlement for Ethiopian refugees.
151. **Long-term food assistance and durable solutions:** Faced with limited economic opportunity, Kebribeyah and Shimelba refugees remain entirely dependent on external food assistance in the form of long-term distribution of full rations. This is especially the case for Kebribeyah where refugees have been living in the camps since 1991, but also applies to Tigrigna refugees living in the Tigray camps. Because the food assistance is oriented to reducing malnutrition and maintaining an acceptable level of food consumption, and not oriented to protecting livelihood assets, promoting livelihood strategies or managing risk, the programme does not encourage self-reliance. For this reason, livelihood programming is more difficult to accomplish in protracted refugee settings than in

*“We depend on aid for every aspect of our lives”.*

Male refugee – Kebribeyah camp

more recently established livelihood camps where the dependency syndrome is less entrenched.

152. Refugee attitudes toward livelihood activities in protracted refugee contexts are also influenced by their desire to resettle rather than participate in recently introduced livelihood promotion activities. For example, in Shimelba, Eritrean refugees (especially the young males) are not interested in engaging in local income generating activities to any great extent because their main objective is to resettle to a third country. Although resettlement has gained substantial traction for Tigrigna refugees from Shimelba in recent years, relatively few refugees have resettled from Kebribeyah (See Table 13); this attitude therefore does not seem warranted amongst Somali refugees. The relatively small number of actual resettled refugees does not obviate the psychology of prioritizing resettlement over pursuing durable solutions within the refugee context. This mindset permeates refugee agency attitudes and prescriptions for intervention priorities as well.

**Table 13: Refugee resettlement from 2 camps – 2003-2011**

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total
<b>Shimelba</b>	0	125	437	264	823	261	1724	1967	573	<b>6474</b>
<b>Kebribeyah</b>	0	0	0	0	53	4	386	552	367	<b>1362</b>

Figures provided by UNHCR-Addis Ababa

153. **Linkages between internal implementing factors** by the two agencies can also negatively impact food security and livelihood opportunities. For example, shortages of NFIs being distributed by UNHCR can compel refugees to sell part of their ration to buy the NFIs they need. Because the ration is treated as income the refugees run out two weeks before the next distribution. Again the livelihood opportunities they have at their disposal are limited. This differs between the Northern camps and the Somali camps. Eritrean refugees receive more remittances and have greater freedom of movement than the Somali refugees.
154. **External factors, programme implementation, and durable solutions:** Several external and internal programming factors inhibit refugees from pursuing viable livelihood strategies. Externally, government policies limit the movement of refugees, particularly Somalis, to pursue economic activities. UNHCR and WFP have not sufficiently advocated for the economic rights of refugees. Internally, resources provided for livelihood programming are limited because the major thrust of programme modalities for both UNHCR and WFP are aimed at care and maintenance. WFP does not link its activities in the camp with its other livelihood related programming such as MERET or PSNP. UNHCR is providing NGOs with very few resources to promote livelihood activities and the impact on refugees is limited.
155. **WFP, UNHCR, JAMs, and durable solutions:** Finally, WFP and UNHCR do not collaborate to pursue donor resources aimed at durable solutions or in response to recommendations put forward by the JAMs, which offer very strong assessments of current programming inefficiencies and effectiveness insofar as the programme is being implemented but do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of funding livelihood activities through programme strategies aimed at prioritizing durable solutions.

## 4. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 4.1. Overall Assessment

156. One of the key tasks of this evaluation was to test the premise of a theory of change, which posits that the programme activities outlined and assessed in this report will produce:
- Short-term effects, including improved food security, increase access to livelihood opportunities, positive coping strategies and asset building.
  - Intermediate outcomes, including improved nutrition, appropriate food baskets, successful IGAs, agricultural activities, and improved education.
  - Long-term impact of self-reliance, resettlement or repatriation.
- Concurrently, the evaluation has sought to assess WFP's effectiveness and efficiency in achieving the two PRRO strategic objectives associated with this programme:
- SO1 – Save lives and protect refugees in emergencies, through reductions in acute malnutrition rates for children under five;
  - SO4 – Reduce hunger and malnutrition, through reduced malnutrition amongst pregnant and lactating women and children under five, adequate food energy consumption, and increased enrolment of children in schools.

The programme has managed to achieve most of the outcomes associated with the SOs, which are each focused on short-term effects – improved food consumption – and intermediate outcomes – improved nutritional status and increased child enrolment. However, although the programme successfully realized a portion of the short-term and intermediate outcomes, others were never achieved and the longer-term theory of change proved untenable; long-term impact in the form of self-reliance as a major durable solution, as a consequence, was never possible to achieve.

157. The pathway for the Theory of Change was never completely achieved because a number of assumptions were never met. The agencies managed to achieve some of the short-term effects, including improved food security and refugee reliance on coping strategies allowing for preservation of assets, through the stable supply of a dietary balanced basket of food rations, but never moved from saving lives and mediating hunger to realize improved livelihood opportunities and asset building – the other short-term effects posited. Although WFP has generally succeeded in delivering a full basket of food commodities to the refugees camps, Ethiopian refugees are not food secure throughout the month, have limited livelihood opportunities, are accumulating few assets, have few successful IGAs, and are not self-reliant. Refugees are compelled to set aside up to half of their rations for sale to meet their basic needs, which are purchased at poor terms of trade.
158. In the absence of viable livelihood strategies, the ration currently serves as a currency, essentially the main refugee source of income to purchase other food items, clothes, soap, and fuel. UNHCR has not systematically managed deliveries of non-food commodities to ensure that food is consumed and not sold in large quantities. As a result, many families run out of some of their food rations two weeks before they receive their next ration.
159. Food and nutritional insecurity varies by type of household, ethnicity, and camp. Female-headed households are particularly vulnerable and are sometimes forced to resort to negative coping strategies, such as firewood collection and sale and even



occasionally transactional sex, making them very vulnerable to violence, although UNHCR protection services have been comprehensive.

160. Although some of the assumptions hold for the short-term effects, others do not; not all of the intermediate outcomes therefore are achievable. The programme has successfully but not completely realized some of the intermediate outcomes, including improved nutrition as measured by GAM and SAM, appropriate food baskets, and improved education opportunities. Nutrition has improved through the efforts of both organizations to target malnourished children under 5 years and pregnant and lactating women. Malnutrition rates, as measured by GAM and SAM, have gradually improved amongst Somali and Tigrigna refugees, but stunting remains problematic for the Kunama, primarily because of inappropriate child feeding practices. This is currently not being addressed in programme modalities. As for improved education, many refugee children are going to school. Two problems associated with this outcome are: 1) the quality of the education due to the availability of good teachers in the camps; and 2) the opportunity of refugees to use the education to get gainful employment after they graduate from high school. Movement is still restricted for Somali graduates in particular. Other intermediate outcomes have fallen completely short of expectations – refugees have adopted few successful IGAs and virtually no agricultural activities, except by Kunama households.
161. The programme short-term effects and medium-term outcomes vary by type of household and ethnicity. Programming modalities do not take into account demographic differences cited above, including differential Kunama relations with host communities or their child feeding practices. Alternative food assistance modalities may be more appropriate for the large number of single male households in the Eritrean refugee camps who do not efficiently use the food aid. Somali refugees do not have access to Out-of-Camp opportunities or longer-term employment or agricultural opportunities within Ethiopia but outside of the camps. Women heading households full of children lack income-earning opportunities, particularly within highly patriarchal camp structure contexts.
162. Currently women are underrepresented or absent in refugee committee management positions. Committee gender imbalance enables men to control the entire distribution decision planning and implementation process. Women have been relegated to scooper positions with little input into the functions of the refugee committees. As a result women have little voice in prioritizing problems and major issues within the camps.
163. In terms of durable solutions, long-term impact has never been achieved, except in relation to some resettlement, mostly of Tigrigna refugees, during the past eight years. Refugees have certainly never achieved any semblance of self-reliance and remain dependent on food assistance. The long-term distribution of full rations with limited economic opportunity has created a dependency syndrome that permeates all aspects of the programme. The programme has treated resettlement and repatriation as the two durable solutions, but repatriation is not possible for either the Eritrean or the Somali refugees in the near future and resettlement depends on the good will of a small number of donor countries. Self-reliance is difficult to achieve because of many of the reasons previously discussed. As a result, it is not likely that refugees will achieve durable solutions in Ethiopia camps without significant policy and programme changes, supported by

*“We are not dead and not alive...we are in-between”.*

Male refugee – Kebribeyah camp



changes in donor practice.

164. A major factor contributing to these outcomes is that the refugee assistance and protection provided by WFP and UNHCR is dominated by a care and maintenance approach, which is based on the premise that the refugees are temporary guests who will soon be repatriated or resettled. Parallel services have been created to meet the education, health and water needs of the refugees, with minimal opportunities to pursue livelihood activities. Given that no refugees have repatriated back to Eritrea or Somalia in the last ten years and only a few thousand, mostly Tigrigna refugees, have been resettled in the last five years, neither of these options are viable durable solutions on their own. The care and maintenance approach carries substantial economic and social costs. As the programme has grown progressively more expensive over time, humanitarian budgets may begin to shrink and assistance levels decline as donor fatigue sets in (Jacobsen 2005). Refugee populations gradually become invisible to the public. The reality of shrinking resources should induce protracted refugee programmes such as this one to seek durable solutions in the form of livelihood as well as resettlement strategies.
165. Resource constraints include decisions about how to allocate resources, contributing to the care and maintenance approach. WFP has ensured the effective procurement and transportation of a stable and consistent supply of food assistance to the camps for distribution to refugees in order to successfully reduce hunger and malnutrition, but has devoted limited staff time to adequately monitor the food distribution, choosing to depute staff to other programmes of higher priority. WFP also does not link its refugee food assistance to its high-profile, highly-resourced food security and livelihood programme activities implemented outside of the camps. Donors have also never shown sufficient interest in supporting such a long-term approach.
166. UNHCR offers vulnerable refugee households, including women and unaccompanied children, with strong essential protection services; UNHCR also strongly supports ARRA, the primary implementing agency in Ethiopia. However, UNHCR databases have not been revalidated in recent years in the protracted camps, risking inefficient resource use or misuse. In terms of livelihoods, limited funding has deterred UNHCR from adequately promoting refugee self-reliance and durable solutions. However, few UNHCR resources are devoted to livelihood programming activities that can create economic opportunities for refugees to meet their basic needs, despite repeated recommendations in JAM's. JAMS are rarely followed up with action plans or funding proposals submitted to donors. The development of livelihood strategies also occurs late in the life of the protracted refugee camp cycle, certainly in the case of the two camps reviewed by the evaluation team representing protracted refugee contexts in Ethiopia.
167. Refugee programming decisions have not sufficiently included host population input or participation. School feeding modalities, as well as the quality of instruction, differ in the Somali host Kebribeyah community and next door in the camp. The protracted refugee populations have contributed substantially to the environmental destruction of agro-ecological habitats. Despite the attempt to implement some environmental activities to mitigate agro-forestry destruction, environmental programming has not proved nearly intensive enough to replenish the ecology. Refugee programme implementing agencies have yet to promote an approach that would comprehensively benefit long-term environmental and livelihoods of refugee and host population together.

168. The care and maintenance approach is also a result of external factors that have severely diminished livelihood options for durable solutions. As a government regulatory agency concerned with issues of security as well as implementing agency responsible for food and NFI distribution and service provisioning within the camps, ARRA is also heavily invested in maintaining the traditional relief camp model, which ensures the inflow of humanitarian assistance on which the agency depends to support its staff and infrastructure (Jacobsen 2005). Within this context, Government policies regarding legal refugee employment status and access to land for agricultural production, while highly problematic roadblocks to achieving livelihood durable solutions, are not surprising. After twenty years in the camps, Somali refugees in particular continue to lack economic freedom to pursue livelihood options. These are not completely external factors however, because UNHCR, WFP, and major donors can, if they choose, lobby for policies that support durable solutions.
169. Donors in Ethiopia have devoted millions of dollars over the years in support of UNHCR and WFP to save lives in emergency contexts and ensure that refugees are provided with sufficient food and non-food items to protect their food security and nutrition status. However, only a very small proportion of donor assistance has been devoted to livelihoods programming as a potential durable solution. Donors are often encumbered by bureaucratic barriers that deter them from taking a more comprehensive long-term approach, which may include durable solutions in the form of livelihood programming in lieu of a continuation of the care and maintenance approach. BPRM for example is mandated to provide emergency humanitarian assistance, which is interpreted by many within USAID as prohibiting funding for durable solutions.
170. Without large-scale investment in livelihood programming, UNHCR and WFP will simply be perpetuating chronic food insecurity in the hope that resettlement occurs sooner rather than later.

#### **4.2. Recommendations**

171. The following recommendations are provided to assist WFP and UNHCR in enhancing existing positive factors and managing or reducing negative factors to promote durable solutions in protracted refugee situations. The recommendations are structured as long-term, medium-term and short-term recommendations. The position of the recommendation does not imply its level of importance. Each recommendation is specified by agency at the country office, regional, and headquarters levels, although some of the recommendations apply at all levels.

#### **Long-term Recommendation (requires more than one PRRO to implement)**

172. **Recommendation 1: WFP and UNHCR should develop a livelihood strategy** by promoting policy and programme assistance to enable refugees to engage in legal economic activities, paid employment and private enterprise. As international funding streams begin to decline for care and maintenance models in camps, refugees will need to rely more on their own economic activities in local communities. This strategy would be oriented to local development where both the refugees and the host population would benefit. It is essential to involve host community development tangentially to a refugee livelihoods approach. Programs would be implemented at scale. Furthermore, the strategy should consider dividing camps into smaller integrated groups within an economically more resourceful

environment. To develop the strategy, UNHCR and WFP would have to hire programme staff with experience in livelihood programming. Once the strategy is developed it would be presented to donors to secure multi-year funding. Such a strategy could serve as a model for promoting livelihoods at an early stage of refugee camp development, before the camp evolves into a protracted situation where refugees and agencies are only focused on resettlement as the durable solution option. [UNHCR and WFP Ethiopia Country Offices, with financial and policy support from Headquarters and/or Regional Offices]

173. **Recommendation 2: Donors supporting the refugee programme should devote a larger proportion of resources to local durable solutions in the form of livelihoods programming.** In order to accomplish the proposed Recommendation # 1, donors should take a more proactive role in promoting livelihoods approaches in protracted refugee camps. This approach should commence at an early stage, after emergency conditions have been stabilized. Donors would have to break down some bureaucratic barriers inhibiting agencies or bureaus such as BPRM from using their resources to support long-term solutions and not exclusively emergency humanitarian programmes, which is their current mandate. This approach would support increased programming collaboration between UNHCR and WFP and would assist WFP in linking its environmental mitigation and livelihood programming activities outside of camps with its refugee programming strategy (Recommendations #4, 5, 6 and 7). UNHCR and WFP cannot move forward to promote livelihood durable solutions without the support of donors.

#### **Medium-term Recommendations (to be undertaken in next PRRO)**

174. **Recommendation 3: Scale up livelihood programs implemented by NGOs:** Livelihood programs in the form of economic stimulus packages should be extended to the host community and should include agricultural and pastoral extension services, income generating projects, vocational training and micro-finance. For example, refugee owned and operated mills could generate resources that could be used as a catalyst for livelihood activities. Although past attempts at promoting refugee milling operations have failed, the establishment of mills requiring spare parts and inputs easily accessible locally and intensive capacity development of refugee mill managers and operators could allow refugees to manage mills which could provide households with milling services, allowing households to retain a greater proportion of their rations. UNHCR could also promote the production of NFIs that could then be purchased by the agency to be used in the camps. Food processing also has good potential in the camps. Livelihood activities would be tailored to the specific profile of the refugee population. Such livelihood programming should be initiated from the onset of refugee camp establishment. [UNHCR and WFP – Ethiopia Country Office, with financial and policy support from Headquarters and/or Regional Offices]

175. **Recommendation 4: UNHCR and WFP should collaborate and coordinate more effectively in pursuing joint programming and funding activities, including advocacy efforts.** Given the cost incurred in conducting a JAM, new assessment missions should not be undertaken without the existence of agreed follow up plans to the previous ones. The development of an action plan would include a joint monitoring component to determine if actions proposed are actually implemented. Enhanced WFP-UNCHR collaboration would include increased advocacy efforts with the GOE to bring about policy changes that enable

refugees to pursue livelihoods more easily. These advocacy efforts should be assisted by donors and NGOs. Through donor engagement, funding and advocacy can be combined using conditionality to lobby for more economic activities for refugees. UNHCR, WFP and donors should begin this effort by advocating the GOE for a more comprehensive Out of Camp policy currently to apply to all refugees, not just the Eritreans. [UNHCR and WFP – Ethiopia Country Offices]

176. **Recommendation 5: Consider alternative food assistance modalities:** WFP employs many food assistance modalities in its global programming. Consider employing FFW to support refugee programming efforts. For example, FFW could support housemothers and cooks to improve performance and outcomes relating to unaccompanied minors. FFW and FFA could support refugee participation in environmental mitigation activities, promoting a watershed approach around camps and host communities, or structural rehabilitation activities. At the initial stage, FFW/FFA should be optional supplementing unconditional transfers, particularly for vulnerable groups such as female-headed households already overburdened by high dependency ratios. Alternative food assistance modalities should be considered for single refugees that are not living with families. Currently the rations provided to young men in the camps in the north are not being properly utilized due to ration sales and/or poor cooking skills. Consideration should be given to enabling these young men to use a food voucher card to purchase their food from a local restaurant. A cash voucher programme would not be appropriate at this time due to food price inflation currently affecting the Ethiopian economy. This effort, as well as more strategic and intensive livelihood programming efforts, does not imply that general food rations could be reduced in the short term. Only when the scale of livelihood programming increases and policies regarding livelihood opportunities change sufficiently to allow refugees to access alternative sources of income could the food transfers begin to decline. [WFP and UNHCR Country Offices]
177. **Recommendation 6: Scale up environmental mitigation interventions that involve both the refugees and host population,** to address the environmental degradation created by the refugee camps and help reduce the negative consequences of climate change. Programming should build on the lessons learned from UNHCR and Local Government collaboration and NRDP. These interventions would be coupled with activities that seek to minimize the use of firewood for cooking through intensified distribution of fuel-efficient or alternative energy stoves and sufficient amounts of environmentally friendly fuel. Refugees and host populations should be trained in the proper use of stoves and fuel. Donors need to support this new approach; an advocacy campaign is essential to engage government and donors. [UNHCR and WFP Country Offices, with policy advocacy support from Headquarters and/or Regional Offices]
178. **Recommendation 7: WFP should promote greater synergies in the implementation of its programme activities.** The refugee programme currently stands alone, completely unlinked to other WFP programs, such as MERET, PSNP, and School Feeding, which are frequently implemented in close proximity to the camps. Lessons learned from these programs could help strengthen programme activities in the camps. For example, environmental mitigation activities that have proven successful in the MERET and PSNP programs could be promoted in refugee settings to benefit host populations and refugees. Similarly, school feeding programs implemented in host communities near the refugee camps could combine resources to promote more efficient programmes with enhanced educational impact

on refugee and host community children. This new strategy is not possible without support from donors and government partners, necessitating advocacy efforts. [WFP Country Office]

179. **Recommendation 8: UNHCR should be more strategic and transparent in NFI distribution given the realities of budget shortfalls.** NFIs should be readily available for new arrivals and should be replenished for certain protracted refugees based on needs assessments. The timing of the distribution of the NFIs must also be appropriate to reduce refugee NFI sale of items, coinciding with seasonal requirements and food distribution timing. [UNHCR Country Office]

#### **Short-term Recommendations (undertake immediately)**

180. **Recommendation 9: UNCHR should undertake the revalidation process in the older camps as soon as possible.** Although an expensive enterprise, revalidation is essential given the inaccuracy of the current camp databases, which function to determine household food distribution planning and lists. [UNHCR Country Office with financial support from UNHCR-Geneva]
181. **Recommendation 10: Increase women's participation:** WFP and UNHCR should ensure increased women's participation in refugee camp committees, including food distribution management and decision-making, which would improve food distribution efficiency, increase women refugee input in prioritising programming in general, and reduce mistrust. Currently women are underrepresented or absent in refugee committee management positions. Committee gender imbalance enables men to control the entire distribution decision planning and implementation process. Women have been relegated to scooper positions with little input into the functions of the refugee committees. As a result women have little voice in prioritizing problems and major issues within the camps. The camp refugee committees should therefore also promote gender equality, including leadership positions for women. A sub-committee should be established to specifically address protection issues, including GBV relating to firewood and grass collection, the problem of transactional sex related to food insecurity, GBV and FGM prevention strategies, and protection of young girls and boys. [UNHCR and WFP Country Offices]
182. **Recommendation 11: Intensify food distribution monitoring:** Both WFP and UNHCR need to be present as collaborating partners at all food distributions. In cases where under-scooping is a potential concern, WFP should employ other monitoring tools to determine if the proper ration has been distributed to refugee households. Such monitoring tools would include random spot checks during and after a distribution, random weighing of rations as they are carried away, and random testing of scoops used during the distribution. WFP should also strengthen ARRA's warehouse management practices, including the proper use of stack cards, improved ledger management, and systematic periodic fumigation. WFP should consider establishing a stronger presence in the vicinity of the Tigray refugee camps. This would entail basing a WFP monitor in Shire, where she/he could possibly share office space in the UNHCR office (a move that would also signal enhanced UNHCR-WFP collaboration). UNHCR should base officers directly in the Tigray camps, where they currently spend insufficient time. UNHCR and WFP should regularly share monitoring reports to ensure effective inter-agency support and follow up of reported problems. [WFP and UNHCR Country Offices]

183. **Recommendation 12: UNHCR and its partner NGOs should implement activities to improve child-feeding practices.** This approach would link food distribution activities to training to parents on appropriate nutrition and child feeding practices, implemented by partner NGOs and monitored or supervised by UNHCR nutrition teams. [UNHCR Country Office]
184. **Recommendation 13: Explore alternative milling options:** WFP and UNHCR should undertake a new improved feasibility study with the purpose of instituting a solution to the milling conundrum, which is currently requiring additional rations to support costly milling in the camps. [WFP and UNHCR Country Offices]

## Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ARRA	Administration for Returning Refugee Affairs
BPRM	Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
CTC	Community-based therapeutic care
CSB	Corn-soya blend
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAR	Development Assistance for Refugees
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRMFSS	Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FGD	Focus group discussion
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GBV	Gender-based violence
GFD	General food distribution
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GSO	Global Strategic Objective
HDDS	Household dietary diversity score
IGA	Income-generating activity
IP	Implementing partners
IR	Inception report
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JAM	Joint assessment mission
KB	Kebribeyah
KI	Key informant
LECDB	Livestock Environment Crop Development Bureau
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions
MoARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric tonne
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NOW	Nutrition outreach workers
NRDEP	Natural Resource Development and Environmental Protection
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OE	Office of Evaluation

PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PLHA	People living with HIV/AIDS
PLW	Pregnant and lactating women
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SFP	School Feeding Program
SO	Strategic Objectives
ToR	Terms of Reference
WASH	Water and Sanitation for Health
WFH	Weight for height
WFP	World Food Programme
U5MR	Under 5 mortality rate
UN CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZOE	Zuid Ost Azie Refugee Care



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