



Displacement as challenge and opportunity

Urban profile:
Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community

Duhok Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq

August 2016

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DISPLACEMENT AS CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

URBAN PROFILE OF REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND HOST COMMUNITY

DUHOK GOVERNORATE, KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

ئاواره‌یی: گرت و دهرفهت
پروفایلی شار و شاروچکه‌کان
په‌نابه‌ره کان و ئاواره‌کانی ناوخو و کومه‌لگای خانه‌خوئی
پاریزگای دهوک - هه‌ریمی کوردستانی عێراق

النزوح السكاني: تحدي وفرصة
تحديد مواصفات (بروفايل) المناطق الحضرية
اللاجئين والنازحين و المجتمع المضيف
محافظة دهوك ، إقليم كردستان العراق

August 2016

FOREWORD

Over the last 4 years, since the onset of the displacement crisis affecting the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, there has been ample information and analysis on the situation of IDPs and refugees sheltered in camps. With this strong focus on camp-based interventions, the situation of out-of-camp populations and the host community has been long overlooked. In the Kurdistan Region, the majority of refugees (60% out of 250,000) and IDPs (80% out of more than 1 million) live in urban areas, co-existing with host communities, sharing the often scarce resources.

To address displacement out-of-camp and their effect on host community adequate and specific information is required about all populations of concern, with the aim to promote more resilient communities. This is the objective of the present urban profiling exercise. Today, the Duhok Governorate and the whole of the Kurdistan Region is facing a multi-faceted crisis, consisting of ongoing conflict, protracted displacement, a financial crisis, and significant development challenges. There is a need to shift the focus of planning from emergency to medium-term interventions. For this, it is also necessary to have the whole displacement picture, see the whole picture of the displacement situation, applying an area-based approach and including IDPs and refugees, alongside the host communities.

It pleases me to note the collaborative effort taken to carry out this assessment which complemented the comprehensive registration of displaced persons (CRDP) that was conducted by Ministry of Planning-KRSO in 2015 and its data was used in listing framework for this survey. The urban profiling has been conducted by our specialised government institutions, such as the Duhok Statistics Office, the Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs, and supported by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other UN agencies, and the Geneva-based Joint IDP Profiling Services (JIPS).

On behalf of the Ministry of Planning, whose mandate is to deal with the current displacement challenges, I would like to express my appreciation for the efforts of all those who diligently worked to produce this relevant and interesting document. I am looking forward for a continuing collaboration in implementing the jointly developed recommendations.

Ali Sindi



Minister of Planning
Kurdistan Regional Government

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This profiling assessment has been conducted in June 2016 in order to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation of refugees, internally displaced persons, and host communities in the Duhok Governorate. We hope that this profiling assessment will contribute to establishing an evidence base and will help the Kurdistan Regional Government and the humanitarian and development partners to develop comprehensive, long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns and to improve the living standards of all population groups living in the urban areas of the Duhok Governorate.

Beginning from its initiation, this assessment received the support of his Excellency, Ali Sindi, the Minister of Planning of the Kurdistan Regional Government. We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to him.

The work undertaken is a result of a partnership between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Duhok Statistics Office (DSO), and the Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA). The Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) offered technical support throughout the exercise.

Finally, we would also like thank all the participants involved in the research process, from its inception to the fieldwork and its implementation.

Gratitude is also owed to the workshop participants: the Duhok Governorate's DG of Urban Planning, the DG of Water, the DG of Violence Against Women, the DG of Health, the DG of Municipality, as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), Welthungerhilfe (WHH), the Japan Emergency NGO, Peace Winds Japan, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), and the International Medical Corps. A special thanks is extended to the Duhok Governorate's Department of Health for providing us with an insightful understanding of their operational challenges.



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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

WHY A PROFILING STUDY?

A crisis context

The Duhok Governorate, with a total host population of 1.47 million people as well as 718,000 displaced people (IDPs and refugees aggregated), lies at the western side of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, bordering with Turkey and Syria. It is the main entry door by road of both people and goods from these two countries. It also borders the Mosul Lake, which separates the Nineveh Governorate from Duhok. This geographic position has placed the Duhok Governorate as the principal shelter for Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict in the northern areas of Syria in 2012, as well as for families displaced after the fall of Mosul, Nineveh, in June 2014. In August 2014, after the fall of Sinjar, Duhok received large numbers of Yazidi IDPs, often fleeing and transiting through the Sinjar Mountains and Syria, before settling in the Duhok Governorate.

While the host community and the local authorities have endured the impact of displacement in the first years, the deterioration of security in the rest of Iraq and the pervasive financial crisis affecting the public and private sectors of the economy are placing the governorate under enormous strain. Budget disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Iraq's Federal Government led to the KRG receiving irregular and intermittent funds from Baghdad for the last 3 years. In addition, due to a lack of an adequate taxation system in the Kurdistan Region to fund the public budget,

the Kurdistan Regional Government has been almost completely dependent on its own oil exports to cover costs. These revenues, however, have diminished drastically after international oil prices dropped by around 70%, starting mid-2014, which has limited and paralysed any further development of public service provision, mainly education and health care.

Conflict, displacement, and a weak economy are negatively impacting government functions, household resilience, private sector survival, and public service provision in the Duhok Governorate and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in general.

Taken together, conflict, displacement, and a weak economy are negatively impacting government functions, household resilience, private sector survival, and public service provision in the Duhok Governorate and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in general.

Solutions to redress the situation must stem from a holistic analysis. This profiling exercise takes place within a complex environment, affected by many layers of external and internal shocks. It is therefore crucial to complement the significant amount of information available on the families sheltered in camps for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) with a new and comparable analysis of those residing out of camps, in urban areas. It is also relevant to include a review of the needs of the host community living alongside these populations, so that the strategies to mitigate the effects of displacement can benefit all.

For these reasons, the profiling exercise has been conducted; it aims to address the need for an in-depth analysis of the urban displacement situation as it relates to both displaced and host populations in the Duhok Governorate.

Why an urban approach?

As mentioned by the Minister of Planning, Ali Sindi, in his foreword to this report, the shift of focus from an emergency response to a longer-term one has to include urban areas in its core. Even though the governorate has a relatively high percentage of refugees and IDPs in camps compared to the rest of Kurdistan's governorates, the majority of refugees and IDPs live in urban areas, as explained in the following section.

The case of the Duhok Governorate, with 33% of the total population now being IDPs or refugees, is especially relevant given the fact that the displacement did not primarily stem from within its boundaries, like in the case of the Anbar Governorate, but originates from different governorates. Therefore, an additional number of households compete for the available resources in urban areas across the governorate and require public services in addition to the local population.

Urban areas, ultimately, offer newly displaced populations a very dynamic environment in which to develop their own livelihood strategies. Frequently, these households prefer to establish themselves in urban areas in spite of the challenges in terms of living costs, employment, and social cohesion.

Duhok's Board of Relief and Humanitarian Affairs (BRHA), for instance, reported on the difficulties in encouraging people to move into camps, including families living in unfinished buildings, who are not willing to abandon the opportunities that urban areas offer.

Urban areas, ultimately, offer newly displaced populations a very dynamic environment in which to develop their own livelihood strategies.

Objectives of the profiling

The overarching aim of the assessment is therefore to establish an evidence base for policy and practice recommendations for the governorate authorities and humanitarian and development actors in developing comprehensive, long-term responses to out-of-camp displacement concerns. The specific profiling objectives are:

- To provide demographic profiles disaggregated by sex, age, displacement status (i.e., refugees, IDPs, and host community), and diversity in the targeted areas;
 - To provide profiles of the different urban areas with a high concentration of out-of-camp displaced populations;
 - To analyse the capacities, vulnerabilities, and coping mechanisms of the populations residing in the targeted areas;
 - To analyse the resilience of urban areas in relation to the availability and limitations of services and livelihoods;
 - To provide a dataset available to the KRG and the humanitarian / development community.
- Preliminary findings were shared and validated with Governorate stakeholders, UN agencies, and NGOs in a workshop held in the Governor's office in July 2016. The recommendations for the report were subsequently jointly discussed by all parties. This report is, in effect, a joint effort between all the stakeholders playing a significant role in the humanitarian response to the displacement crisis in the Duhok Governorate.

2. METHODOLOGY

Introduction and methodological considerations

Introduction and methodological considerations
The profiling exercise takes an area-based approach in order to provide an analysis of the different urban areas hosting displaced populations. It looks at all population groups impacted by displacement living in these locations (i.e., Syrian refugees, IDPs, and host community).

The aim is to analyse not only the differences between the target populations, but also the diversity within the urban areas of the governorate; each territorial part of the governorate present different dynamics and different socio-economic realities.

A mixed-methods approach is used, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection methods: desk review, household survey, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs).

Coverage of the area-based approach

The profiling covers urban and peri-urban areas across the governorate with a large concentration of refugees and IDPs¹. For the area-based analysis, these areas are grouped on the basis of their population density (i.e., densely populated areas in terms of inhabitants per square kilometre compared to more scarcely populated areas) and geographical proximity to each other, hence forming three different strata:

- **High-density districts: Duhok and Sumel.**
- **Medium-density districts: Zakho.**
- **Low-density districts: Amedi, Akre, Bardarash, and Sheikhan.**

survey

A sample of 1,205 households was selected for the survey (409 from the host community, 394 IDP households, and 402 refugee households), stratified by population group and urban stratum (Figure 1).

The survey was conducted in May 2016 by the Duhok Statistics Office and it covered the following topics:

- **Household composition (age, gender, family relations)**
- **Education (school attendance, education achievements, literacy)**
- **Employment (work status, occupation, industry, income, employment methods)**
- **Housing (dwelling, sharing, evictions, rent costs)**
- **Livelihood strategies (income sources, expenditure, debts, coping strategies, assets)**
- **Mobility (migration history, future intentions, return)**

A mixed-methods approach is used, combining quantitative and qualitative data collection methods: desk review, household survey, key informant interviews, and FGDs.

The sample drawn from each of the targeted subdistricts was proportionate to the size of each population group in that subdistrict (Table 1). Population figures for the host community and IDPs were facilitated by the Duhok Statistics Office based on an internal census carried out in 2015, which included IDPs pre- and post-2014; figures for refugees were facilitated by UNHCR. Population weights were subsequently applied during the analysis in order to obtain results applicable to all urban areas at the governorate level.


The sample size used allows for an extrapolation of statistically representative results with a 5% margin of error for each geographical stratum. The results are also representative for each population group with a 5% margin of error. Results at district level are only statistically representative with a 10% margin of error due to a smaller sample size (therefore, without the possibility to disaggregate into population groups within each district).

Table 1. Sampling of households interviewed per population group and stratum

Stratum	Host community	IDPs	Refugees	Total sample	Total population
High density areas	207	185	211	603	1,113,000
Medium density areas	100	100	100	300	750,000
Low density areas	102	109	108	319	2,000,000
Total sample	409	394	402	1,205	1,863,000

1. The coverage areas include 'areas of concern' by UNHCR's operations that do not necessarily correspond to the official administrative boundaries.

Figure 1. Distribution of the households interviewed in the coverage area by geographical stratum



Focus group discussions (FGDs)

The FGDs aimed at providing in-depth and contextualising information on some of the topics addressed by the household survey. Based on preliminary findings from the survey, the additional information gathered in FGDs explored inter-community relations and perceptions in order to better understand the degree of social cohesion between (and within) the communities, as well as future intentions on migration.

For the purpose of this assessment, FGDs with the host community in particular were conducted in two geographical areas: 4 FGDs with groups of women, men, and students in the Duhok District Centre (area of high density with the ethno-religious background of the IDPs partially differing from the host community), and 4 FGDs in Sheikhan (area of low density with a partially similar ethno-religious background of the IDPs to the host community).

These FGDs were conducted by UNHCR in May and June 2016. Insights from groups of IDPs and refugees were obtained from previous UNHCR's regular FGDs with women, men, adults, and youth, carried out during 2015.

Limitations

It is important to note that the findings for the host community do not allow for generalization at the governorate level, but only for the urban areas of the subdistricts covered.

A specific note applies for the districts of Akre and Bardarash. Due to an insufficient sample size, the analysis of these two districts must be done by merging the observations; therefore, in the assessment, Akre and Bardarash will be analysed as a combined group.



Peshkhapour boarder crossing point from Syria to Kurdistan Region Iraq, Duhok

3. WHO AND WHERE ARE THE DISPLACED?

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

In spite of Duhok being the governorate that has established most camps for refugees and IDPs, the displacement crisis has a distinctly urban face.

About 39% of the 93,000 Syrian refugees and 68% of the 625,000 IDPs hosted in the Duhok Governorate are living out of the camps, the majority in urban areas, which are the focus of this assessment.

This gives a combined percentage of 64% of the displaced population in Duhok living in host community settings. With a host community of around 1.47 million people, this implies that the total population has increased about 31% in the last 4 years (49% if we also include the displaced people hosted in camps).

The urban areas covered in this assessment encompass about 1.1 million people (79% being host community members, 17% IDPs, and 4% refugees). These areas have been divided into three strata for the assessment: high-density, medium-density, and low-density areas, based on the total density of population living in each area. The high-density areas, which correspond to the districts of Duhok and Sumel, host around 50% of IDPs and refugees. These families have predominantly sought shelter in Sumel, which has experienced an increase of 50% of its population, while the increase in Duhok has been only 13%.

Sumel offered lower living costs, more available space and a location close to the two economic centres of the governorate (Duhok and Zakho). The medium-density areas correspond mainly to the district of Zakho. It lies next to the Syrian and Turkish borders and hence it is the main entry door into Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. For this reason, the majority of Syrian refugees entered Iraq through this district. Finally, the low-density areas mainly host IDPs, especially in the areas of Sheikhan and Bardarash, which also have experienced population increases of about 50%.

These areas border the Nineveh Governorate, which is the home of 99% of the IDPs now hosted in the Duhok Governorate. These areas are also marked by great ethnic-religious diversity, with a significant population of Christians and Yezidis, thus hosting IDPs from these same religious communities that fled Nineveh.

While the vast majority of Syrian refugees are Kurds, thus sharing the same ethnic belonging as the host community, the population of IDPs is more diverse in terms of their ethnic-religious background. A total of 85% of IDPs are also Kurds (either Sunni or Yezidi), while 8% are Arabs, 5% Christians, and the remaining divided into other minorities such as Turkmen and Shabaks.

The three population groups (host community, IDPs, and refugees) show similar demographic characteristics. The average population size for host-community and IDP households is slightly more than 6 members on average, while refugee households consist of 5 members.

There is no large variation across strata. Furthermore, exactly half of the population is under 19 years of age. In sum, household size is consistently large and the population very young even in urban areas. As a hybrid society between traditionalism and urbanism, large family networks provide the necessary cohesion and wellbeing to its members – to the young and the old.

A further factor contributing to the large household size is the situation of displacement, conflict, and unemployment. As a result, the data indicates that 15% of the total refugee population and 5% of the total IDP population have been born in displacement.

1. DISPLACED POPULATION IN CAMPS AND OUT OF CAMPS: REFUGEES AND IDPs

The Duhok Governorate has received the largest influx of displaced population, both refugees and IDPs, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis.

According to data from UNHCR (31st May 2016), the governorate hosts a total of 92,831 Syrian refugees, 38% of the total number of refugees in Iraq, although during the very first years of the crisis, it hosted the majority of refugees as they were entering Iraq through Duhok's border.

Syrian refugees share not only the ethnic background with the Kurds in Duhok but also the Kurdish dialect, which plays a role in facilitating co-existence.

The governorate also hosts 625,169 IDPs, according to estimations by BRHA (taking into consideration only persons displaced post-2013/2014 and including the districts of Akre and Sheikhan). This is about 19% of Iraq's total IDP population. Virtually all the IDPs in the Duhok Governorate are originally from other governorates of Iraq, which poses an additional number of population to be provided with public services.

The area of Duhok has historically held close ties with Nineveh and its diverse ethnic-religious make-up. Indeed, the cities of Duhok and Mosul are only separated by 75 kilometres.


Therefore, the population distribution in the Duhok Governorate has significantly changed after the latest waves of displacement (Figure 2). A total of 67% of the population is formed by the host community, 29% by IDPs, and 4% by refugees.

A significant proportion of the displaced population is hosted in camps established by the governorate authorities and international partners. There are 22 camps in the governorate (4 for Syrian refugees and 18 for IDPs).

However, the majority of the population lives outside of the camps (Figure 3), mixed with the host communities in either urban or rural areas; this highlights the importance of carrying out an analysis focusing on the out-of-camp living situation vis-à-vis the host community.

**There are 22 camps in the governorate
(4 for Syrian refugees and 18 for IDPs)
However, the majority of the population lives outside of the camps, mixed with the host communities in either urban or rural areas.**

Figure 2. Distribution of the total population in the Duhok Governorate between host community, IDPs, and refugees



2. POPULATION FLOWS IN URBAN AREAS

Distribution of the urban population

Focusing only on the urban areas in the Duhok Governorate and based on the planning figures used for this assessment, the number of the displaced² population is 186,100 IDPs (or 29,900 households) and 44,200 Syrian refugees (or 9,200 households). This is added to an urban host community of 895,800 inhabitants. The total urban population covered in this assessment is 1,126,100 individuals, corresponding to 4% refugees, 17% IDPs, and 79% host community (Table 2)³.

Some districts witnessed a significant increase of the population in a very short time period (3 to 4 years) due to the arrival of displaced households. In some locations like Sheikhan,

Bardarash or Sumel, the population increase has been 50% or more, highlighting a potentially great impact on the local socio-economic structure.

In addition, an extensive rural area also hosts IDPs and refugees. This population living in rural areas frequently interact with their closer urban centres in order to access livelihoods or public services. In addition, the Duhok Governorate also hosts a small population of refugees originally from Turkey and Iran that are not included in the assessment as separate groups.

Table 2. Population distribution in the profiling coverage areas (urban areas in the Duhok Governorate) by stratum and district

Stratum	District	Host community	IDPs	Refugees	Total population	% population increase due to displacement
High density	Duhok	822,000	88,700	4,800	915,500	13
	Sumel	157,000	50,000	17,500	324,500	50
Medium density	Zakho	107,000	21,000	14,000	142,000	25
	Akre	75,000	10,700	200	85,900	14
Low density	Ansul	31,000	3,000	1,800	35,800	18
	Sheikhan	88,700	29,900	12,000	130,600	50
	Bardarash	11,000	15,200	500	26,700	50
TOTAL		895,800	186,100	44,200	1,126,100	16%

2. Data facilitated by the Duhok Statistical Office; estimations corresponding to 2015.

3. The figures in this section (and hence the ones used for the household survey design and for the rest of the report) are the planning figures used by the Duhok Governorate, based on their own census of the displaced population, which, for IDPs, includes displaced persons prior to 2014. The figures here have been adapted to include only IDPs and refugees in the coverage areas.

Clusters of displaced population across the strata: a social and geographical explanation


The clustering of both refugees and IDPs in specific areas within the governorate follow some patterns that can be linked to social and historical factors. High-density areas host around 50% of the displaced households (both IDPs and refugees taken together).

This geographical area corresponds to the two main cities of the governorate (Duhok and Sumel), and therefore it tends to offer more opportunities than other areas.

Within this area, most households are settled in Sumel, which offers lower living costs, more available space and a location near Duhok, the governorate capital city. Both cities of Sumel and Duhok can be regarded as an interrelated social ecosystem.

Due to past waves of displacement from Syria, Turkey, and the rest of Iraq, the migrant families in Sumel have created strong and informal economic networks where even the host community finds cheaper products and more reliable services.

Figure 3. Distribution of refugees and IDPs between in-camp and out-of-camp population



Influx of displaced households from Syria and Iraq

The Syrian refugees currently hosted in the Duhok Governorate began to be displaced from Syria in 2011, but the majority of refugee households were displaced between 2012 (35% of the households displaced that year) and 2013 (46%). The remaining 15% were displaced between 2014 and early 2016 (Figure 4).

Regarding the IDP population, it should be noted that about 13% of the households currently hosted in the urban areas of the Duhok Governorate were displaced before the current internal conflict in Iraq (i.e., pre-2014, mostly displaced during the sectarian violence of 2006–2007). For the remaining IDPs, virtually all of them were displaced during 2014.

In addition, almost without exception all IDP households are originally from the Nineveh Governorate (further divided into 54% from Mosul City, 39% from Sinjar, and the remaining 7% from Telkaif, Hamdaniya, and Telafar).

A note on the ethnic belonging of the displaced households: while virtually all Syrian refugees are Kurds, the IDP population is more diverse. About 85% of the IDP households are Kurd (which encompasses mostly Sunni Muslims as well as Yezidis), followed by 8% Arabs, nearly 5% Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, and Armenians), 1% Turkmen, and 1% labelled as 'other'. Almost without exception all IDP households are originally from the Nineveh Governorate (further divided into 54% from Mosul City, 39% from Sinjar, and the remaining 7% from Telkaif, Hamdaniya, and Telafar).

Medium-density areas, mainly the town of Zakho followed by the surrounding areas of Rizgari and Derkar, also host a significant number of Syrian refugee households.

These urban centres are virtually next to the Syrian and Turkish border and they are the main entry door into Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Zakho used to be one of the most crucial commercial hubs in Iraq between 1991 and 2003, thanks to its Ibrahim Khalil Border Crossing at a time when Iraq was embargoed.

It still remains a significant centre, offering a wide range of economic opportunities, although it has lost some of the importance as other border crossings have been opened over the past 10 years.


Finally, low-density areas mainly host IDPs. These areas are extensive farmlands in the eastern side of the governorate, close to the Erbil Governorate and the current frontline.

It is hence the main entry door for IDPs fleeing the conflict from the rest of Iraq. As such, urban centres such as Sheikhan and Bardarash, on the way to Mosul, host most of the IDPs and have experienced drastic population increases, of about 50%.

These areas are also marked by a great ethnic-religious diversity, with a significant population of Christians and Yezidis, thus hosting IDPs from these same religious communities that fled Nineveh.

Almost without exception all IDP households are originally from the Nineveh Governorate (further divided into 54% from Mosul City, 39% from Sinjar, and the remaining 7% from Telkaif, Hamdaniya, and Telafar).

Figure 4. Number of families displaced in the areas covered by the assessment of the Duhok Governorate, by year of displacement



3. HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

Age, gender, and heads of household

By gender categories, the total urban population comprises 52% men and 48% women. There are no significant differences between population groups or by geographical strata.

The structure of the population by age groups is very similar in all population groups (Figure 5). Exactly half of the individuals are under 19 years of age. In particular, refugees have a higher proportion of children aged 0 to 9 years.

Regarding data for heads of household specifically, 10% of the IDP households are female-headed, compared with 6% of both refugee and host community households. In addition, refugee households tend to have the youngest heads of household, with an average age of 39, compared to an average of 44 years for IDP households and 46 for the host community⁴.

Household size


The largest households in terms of size are those in the host community: the average size is 6.6 members (ranging from 6.4 in high-density areas up to 7.1 in low-density areas). IDP households comprise on average 6.2 members and refugee households, 4.8 members.

For these last two groups, there is no significant difference in household sizes between the high-, medium-, and low-density areas of the Duhok Governorate.

These numbers are not different from the average size estimated in other areas of the Kurdistan Region.

Exactly half of the individuals are under 19 years of age. In particular, refugees have a higher proportion of children aged 0 to 9 years.

Figure 5. Distribution of population groups by age



4. The average age of female heads of household is significantly higher compared to male heads, with more than half of them above the age of 50.

4. URBAN SPACES AND COHESION

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The main factor influencing refugees and IDPs when deciding in which specific area or neighbourhood to seek shelter was the presence of relatives or other families also originally from their area of origin; the most recent displaced households also mentioned factors such as security and affordability of the place. Most refugees and, especially, IDPs arrived in locations where neighbourhood ties were particularly strong and rigid, and concepts such as trust and comfort were based on this long-standing acquaintance between neighbours.

The arrival of displaced families and the realisation that this was a protracted displacement altered – and deteriorated – the dynamics and the day-to-day environment of most neighbourhoods in urban areas. Protracted displacement was added in addition to other factors such as the influence of a war being waged next door and a deep financial crisis that reduced the disposable income of most families as well as the capacity of the authorities to supply an adequate level of services.

As a consequence, creating the conditions for a peaceful sharing of the urban space has become a challenge as well as an opportunity. The main analysis on this issue covers three structures: the housing structure, the social structure, and the public services structure.

Housing constitutes a large part of the analysis. The overall housing situation in urban areas is relatively optimal, in the sense that up to 94% of the households live in either individual houses or apartments. There is, however, a relatively large pocket of IDP families in the areas of Sheikhan, Bardarash, and Zakho who live in unfinished buildings or informal settlements.

Only 10% of the host community are tenants (the rest mainly owning their dwelling), while the percentage of tenants is as high as 60% and 90% for IDPs and refugees, respectively (the rest mainly being hosted or, in the case of IDPs, living in unfinished buildings). This draws particular attention to the rental market in urban areas, as the influx of displaced households drastically changed its configuration. Out of the total number of families that rent, only 41% are host community families, 40% are IDPs, and 19% are refugees, on average, in all strata. In areas of heavy displacement, such as Sumel or Sheikhan, up to three quarters of rented houses are inhabited by refugees or IDPs.

Housing undeniably emerges as one of the key challenges of protracted displacement, as this situation is conducive to negative effects, especially in the form of overcrowding and evictions. On the one hand, regarding overcrowding, up to 45% of the IDP households share their dwelling with other families (the percentage is as low as 25% for refugees and the host community), with the associated impact on family relations (e.g., deteriorating domestic bounds, increasing domestic violence, etc.).

Evictions, on the other hand, are on the rise, with an estimated total of 3,500 IDP families (12% of total IDPs), 1,400 host community families (2%) and 550 refugee families (6%) having been evicted in the last 6 months, half of them due to an inability to continue paying rent. The fact that written rental agreements are not a general practice certainly contributes to the high number of evictions.

Regarding the social structure, a lack of interaction between groups and a lack of understanding each other's needs and respective hardships increasingly polarises the host and displaced communities. This is happening to the extent that many focus group participants felt they were not being treated equally and with the same rights in their day-to-day co-existence in the urban space. Security perceptions, although still very positive, were also linked to nuanced feelings of fear between population groups.

There were, however, positive examples in these FGDs of close interactions between host community and IDP families that created a positive relationship of trust among them.

Finally, a note on the return of IDPs and refugees to their areas of origin. The data indicate the extent to which this is a protracted displacement situation.

A total of 22% of IDP households and 29% of refugee households stated that they are unwilling to return back under any circumstance, at this moment. In addition, 9% of the IDPs and 17% of the refugees imposed the reconstruction of the area as the main condition for return, once the area is re-taken from ISIS. In sum, this implies that about 35% of the total displaced population is likely to remain in their current location in the Duhok Governorate for the next 5 to 10 years.

Even for those households willing to return, the feasibility of returning is seriously limited by external factors such as reconstruction needs, the financial cost, and legal land and property disputes.

1. CHANGING DYNAMICS IN URBAN AREAS

Changes seen by the host community

Although the influx of Syrian refugees reached its peak in 2013, with Duhok welcoming large numbers, the magnitude of IDP arrivals in 2014 again quickly mobilised the host community to respond to the crisis. Discussion in focus groups showed how neighbourhoods and communities opened the doors to assist the newly displaced population.

“In the beginning of the crisis, we had IDPs everywhere, even in our schools. We used to help them and tried to make them not feel strange. Even in the centre there were around 700 children, and we did our best to help them and make them forget about what they had been through.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men’s group).

“Each family provided some items to the IDPs; food, TVs, blankets... at the start, Syrian people came, and we assisted them. And likewise when people came from Nineveh, irrespective of their ethnicity or religion. But the IDP situation has been ‘heavy’ on our community.” FGD with host community in Sheikhan (men’s group).

However, it quickly became clear that the situation would become protracted. Host community members saw how IDPs who settled in their neighbourhoods would not be able to return quickly as the conflict in Iraq expanded, while at the same time, the financial crisis increased the burden on everyone. All these factors altered the dynamics and the day-to-day environment of most neighbourhoods in the urban areas.

It must be taken into account that the majority of host community families have been residing in their neighbourhoods either ‘always’ or since before 2010, according to the survey data⁵. This indicates longstanding community networks. The impact on the local social and trust network was thus felt, and perceptions and comfort quickly deteriorated.

“Psychologically people are tired, not because of the IDPs, but because nobody is engaging with us properly. Questions are not answered.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men’s group).


Host community members saw how IDPs who settled in their neighbourhoods would not be able to return quickly as the conflict in Iraq expanded, while at the same time, the financial crisis increased the burden on everyone.

“The displacement, the [financial] crisis, all this has an effect on our feelings, not only on our everyday life. We were satisfied before the crisis, and now we are struggling for our daily life.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men’s group).
“Many things changed since the arrival of IDPs. There is no freedom anymore, our parents do not let us go out at night. The displacement situation has taken control of our lives because we used to go out, take walks, and now it is not easy to do that because our parents said that it is not safe.” FGD with host community in Duhok (girls’ group).

“Because of the economic crisis, people are scared of each other. Many people who are much affected by the economic crisis try to find other ways of living, even if through bad ways.” FGD with host community in Duhok (women’s group).

Taken together, the impact of displacement as perceived by the host community has many vectors: (a) the influence of a war being waged next door; (b) the deep financial crisis that reduced the disposable income of most families; (c) the impact of IDPs, both negative (additional burden on limited public services) and positive (additional consumption for local businesses).

5. Around 7 out of 10 families in high- and medium-density areas and 9 out of 10 in low-density areas have lived in their current neighbourhood either always or before 2010 – a very small degree of internal mobility. This implies very deep and old relations within the neighbourhoods.



Duhok city park used by Refugees, IDPs and Host Community. Jassem Dosky, Freelance photographer, 2016

As a consequence of such reactions and of the urban nature of the displacement, creating the conditions for sharing the urban space has become a challenge as well as an opportunity.

“No one expected this huge number of IDPs coming to our city, everything became a mess. There was no plan to take care of the IDPs and, honestly, they should all be in camps instead of staying in the urban areas.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men’s group).

“Their camps should have been separated. Everywhere you go, you will see places that are left out and dirty. There are new people, more IDPs, they are strangers to us.” FGD with host community in Duhok (women’s group).

The following sections aim to focus on the dynamics that have created these perceptions across most of Duhok’s neighbourhoods.

Reasons by IDPs and refugees to move and live in their current neighbourhood

Different narratives emerge regarding the reasons that motivated both refugees and IDP households to settle in their current neighbourhood. In general, families that have been displaced for a longer period (and hence have had time to find certain stability in the area) tend to have chosen the location based on two factors: better employment opportunities they provide, and the proximity to relatives (Figure 6).

The impact of displacement as perceived by the host community has many vectors:

- (a) the influence of a war
- (b) the deep financial crisis
- (c) the impact of IDPs,

creating the conditions for sharing the urban space has become a challenge as well as an opportunity.

On the other hand, recently displaced families tend to prioritise safer locations above all (probably this is indicative of these households not yet having found a more permanent destination within the Kurdistan Region). Seeking affordable housing is also important, pointing to secondary displacements after the original displacement due to deteriorating financial capacity.

Figure 6. Reason of IDP and refugee households for choosing their current neighbourhood, by displacement period from origin

Reason	Time of displacement									
	Before 2012		2012		2013		2014		2015	
Better employment	●	15%	●	44%	●	34%	●	14%	●	15%
Relatives, friends are also here	●	51%	●	18%	●	26%	●	25%	●	14%
Better affordability	●	9%	●	21%	●	24%	●	12%	●	25%
Safer location	●	22%	●	9%	●	9%	●	38%	●	26%
Other	●	3%	●	8%	●	7%	●	11%	●	20%
Total		100%		100%		100%		100%		100%

2. HOUSING AND LIVING CONDITIONS

Housing / shelter situation


The overall housing situation is relatively optimal as 94% of the total households in urban areas, on average, live in either individual houses or apartments. However, some pockets of inadequate shelter situations persist, especially in medium- and low-density areas, where there is a significant number of IDP households living in either informal shelters or unfinished buildings (Figure 7).

Written rental contracts are not a general practice in urban areas.

Only 15% of households that rent a house or an apartment actually have a written and signed contract

Tenancy is predominant in high- and medium-density areas (28% and 31%, respectively, aggregated for the three population groups) as compared to low-density areas (14%). Only 1 out of 10 host community households are tenants, while the rest principally own their house or apartment (Figure 8).

Figure 7. Type of housing in urban areas per stratum and population group




The situation is the opposite for refugees and IDPs, who predominantly rent (9 out of 10 refugee families, 6 out of 10 IDP families). The situation is similar in all strata, except for IDPs in low-density areas, who have a significant percentage of house ownership.

Written rental contracts are not a general practice in urban areas.

Only 15% of households that rent a house or an apartment actually have a written and signed contract. The rest presumably rely on verbal agreements. Written contracts are virtually non-existent in medium- and low-density areas. The data by population group indicates that only 1% of the refugee households, 15% of the IDPs, and 20% of the host community households do have a written contract.

Figure 8. Property status of housing in urban areas per stratum and population group



Families sharing the dwelling

The reasons for sharing a house or flat with other families are presumably linked to the high costs of renting (particularly in Duhok), as well as to the lack of available housing as compared to the influx of displaced households (particularly in Sheikhan and Zakho). The percentage of households sharing a house or flat is only relatively high among IDP households, with 45% of house sharing. This is predominant in the areas of Zakho, Duhok, and Sheikhan. The percentage for both refugees and the host community stands at around 25% on average, which is a moderately low level.

The average size of the shared dwellings that displaced households occupy is 3.2 rooms in high-density areas, 3.8 in medium-density areas, and just 2.9 in low-density areas. This must be compared with the average household size of 6 members. The housing units that tend to be shared are frequently the smallest and the least adequate to host multiple families. This has an impact on family relations, deteriorating domestic bounds, and increasing domestic violence, as was revealed in focus group discussions with IDPs.

“We feel extremely uncomfortable sharing rooms with other men and women. There is little space for everyone and some of us are forced to sleep in corridors or kitchens.” FGD with IDPs (women’s group).


Rent and cost of housing

Displacement created a strong pressure on the rental market. Out of all the households that rent a house or apartment in the urban areas, 41% are IDPs, 40% are host community households, and 19% are refugees (no difference across strata). The highest rent costs are found in the Duhok urban centre, with an average rent of 353,000 IQD/month (\$282/month)⁶. For the other locations, there is very little variation in the average rent, ranging from a minimum of 206,000 IQD/month (\$165/month) in Akre, to 228,000 IQD/month (\$182/month) in Sheikhan. When the average rent paid by the different population groups are compared, the data suggest that refugees and IDPs tend to rent the cheapest housing available in the market. Some participants in FGDs with Syrian refugees, however, indicated that they were often the target of abusive pressure by landlords who allegedly take advantage of their more vulnerable status, adding that there are no complaint mechanisms through which to address rental disputes.

The ratio of rent over total household expenses (only for those who pay rent) is 29% for all urban areas taken together. There are no significant differences between strata, as they range between 28% in high-density areas and 35% in low-density areas, although it is critically high in Sheikhan (Figure 9). As regards population groups, however, refugees make up for the highest ratio, with 34% of the total expenses dedicated to pay rent, compared to the 28% ratio for IDP and host households.

The percentage of households sharing a house or flat is only relatively high among IDP households, with 45% of house sharing. This is predominant in the areas of Zakho, Duhok, and Sheikhan.

Figure 9. Ratio of rent over total household expenses by district



6. Based on an exchange rate of \$1 = 1,250 IQD.

3. CAPACITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES (EDUCATION AND HEALTH)

General public services provision


Employment data from the survey were used to estimate the number of persons employed in key public services (provision of health care, education, and utilities such as water, electricity, and waste collection). In the urban areas, 3.9% of the total population were found to be employed in these public services – in other words, nearly 4 employees are servicing every 100 residents (including host community, IDPs, and refugees).

Great differences emerge between districts, with the urban areas in the districts of Sheikhan and Zakho critically below the governorate average,

Great differences emerge between districts (Figure 10), with the urban areas in the districts of Sheikhan and Zakho critically below the governorate average, and Amedi nearly doubling the average value⁷. Those locations with a heavy influx of displaced people (i.e., Sumel, Sheikhan, and Zakho) tend to have a lower ratio than other areas.

The expansion of service provision, in terms of capacity and quality, came to a halt during 2014 due to the financial crisis. It left many new educational and health care facilities unfinished, and the increase of the public service staff had to be discontinued.

Figure 10. Percentage of people employed in the public health care, public education, and utilities sectors



7. The case of Amedi is explained by the fact that towns and villages are highly dispersed across the district, which requires a higher number of teachers and medical staff to guarantee health and education services in each town.

Education services in urban areas

The provision of education services in urban areas is measured here by the percentage of children that reported not attending school due to 'no easily accessible facility'; therefore, this refers to constraints in the access to education (note that other reasons not linked to service provision are explored in the final section of this report). A total of 10% of the children between the age of 6 and 14 in the district of Zakho do not attend school due to access constraints⁸.

For the rest of the strata, this percentage is relatively low; only in Sheikhan it is slightly above 4%. Of children aged 15 to 18, 10% in Sumel cannot attend school due to access constraints, followed by 5% in Zakho. The percentage in the rest of the locations remains below 3%.

However, it is important to separate school access issues between population groups: 10% of the IDPs and 10% of the refugees between ages 6 and 14 reported problems with school access. However, in the case of refugees, these problems are more frequently found in Akre-Bardarash, Amedi, and Sheikhan, where up to 30% of the children of this age reported no access to school.

For IDPs, access issues are frequent mainly in Zakho, with 25% of the children unable to attend school. For the host community, access constraints affect 2% of the children. In the age group of 15 to 18 years, 15% of refugees reported no access to schools in general, compared to 8% of IDPs and 3% of host community members. In particular, again, Zakho and Amedi have more educational access problems for IDPs and refugees.

Information from FGDs with IDP groups in urban areas corroborated these data. Many families pointed to obstacles in terms of access to service provision. Distance to schools was frequently mentioned, in addition to an inability to afford for the transportation costs. Also, many IDP families indicated that they had no information about how to register their children at schools because they did not know whom or where to ask.

As mentioned, this section referred only to issues in the provision of education services. Other issues not linked to access, such as a lack of willingness to study, dissatisfaction with the service, barriers such as language, etc., are referred to in the final section of this report.

Health services in urban areas

The general satisfaction ratio regarding access to health services in urban areas indicates that 3 out of 4 respondents qualify access in positive terms (8% as very good and 68% as good)⁹. There is no significant difference between the ratings given by refugees, IDPs, and host community members.

There are, however, pockets of dissatisfaction in some of the low-density areas, the most rural ones, especially in the districts of Akre and Bardarash (31% of households, in total, rating access levels as insufficient).

The two main reasons for the low ratings in these areas are attributed, first, to a decrease in service quality linked to the financial crisis and, second, to long distances between the house and the health facilities. In the rest of the urban areas in the governorate, the levels of dissatisfaction are generally very low.

In general, however, alternatives such as private health care are reportedly not viable options due to a lack of affordability, according to FGDs held with IDPs and refugees.

Data available by the Duhok Governorate's department of health pointed out that households' out-of-pocket spending on health services has become the highest compared to other Middle Eastern countries. This poses a high burden on households' domestic budget.

**A total of
10% of the children between the
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do not attend school due to access con-
straints.**

**Of children aged 15 to 18, 10% in Sumel
cannot attend school due to access
constraints, followed
by 5% in Zakho.**

8. Most of the remaining children attend school without problem and a remaining minority do not attend school but due to other reasons not linked to access problems (i.e., because they are working or parents decided not to take them to school).

9. It has to be noted that this is an open question about general access. More information would be necessary to better understand specific issues such as access to primary, secondary, or tertiary health services.

4. SOCIAL COHESION AND INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COMMUNITIES

Interaction between the groups

The testimonies gathered in the FGDs point to a negative state of interactions between some of the IDP communities and the host community.

Interactions are often minimal or even negative in some cases. Language barriers are significant (many Kurds do not speak Arabic, and most of non-Kurd IDPs do not speak Kurdish), but it is not the only factor explaining the lack of interaction.

The initial welcoming in 2014 gradually turned into distrust as the displacement became protracted. In some cases, positive outcomes have emerged through children's interaction, as shown in the final testimony below.

“We only interact with them if they come and beg for things. Otherwise we stay far from them because our husbands have told us to stay away from IDPs and to not trust them.” FGD with the host community in Duhok (women's group).

“At the beginning we were not very comfortable with the arrival of IDPs to Sheikhan, when we saw strange faces in the city. Then, after that, we became close friends with the IDP girls, and our families became closer to each other.” FGD with the host community in Sheikhan (girls' group).

From the point of view of IDPs, the FGDs showed similar results. They reported that, after the initial demonstration of support and empathy, the hosts tended to have no interactions with them anymore. Several FGD participants perceived themselves as strangers within their new community.

Perceptions of community belonging matter, when trying to understand the interaction between the different population groups.

The comments received in the FGDs with the host community in Sheikhan regarding interaction and co-existence with IDPs were remarkably more positive than the general feeling in Duhok's FGDs. While most of the IDPs in Sheikhan share the ethno-religious identity with the host community (Christians and Yezidis), a significant proportion of the IDPs in Duhok were Sunni Arabs.

In the FGDs with the different ethno-religious communities of IDPs, it was noticed that there are tensions and grievances between Sunni Arabs, the host community, and the other minorities.

After the initial demonstration of support and empathy, the hosts tended to have no interactions with them anymore.

Several FGD participants perceived themselves as strangers within their new community.

Minorities refused to live in the same locations with other groups, especially Arabs, due to past grievances. At the same time, FGDs with Sunni Arab IDPs showed how they tend to live in isolation from other groups and from the host community because of their alleged role in Iraq's conflict.

They reported to only interact with their extended family members in the governorate.

Sense of safety in everyday life

Based on the survey data, only one respondent reported feeling unsafe in their location. This suggests a positive sense of safety (virtually all households indicate a good or very good sense of safety).

Regarding cases of street harassment, there is only a relatively significant percentage in medium-density areas.

There, nearly 4% of the respondents pointed out that a member of the household had experienced harassment – no significant difference across population groups.

However, topics such as safety, violence, and co-existence between population groups are difficult to assess based solely on household survey findings, due to limitations of exploring such perceptions through a questionnaire. More nuanced reports are given by the focus group participants. Host community participants reported a gradual deterioration in their security feelings directly linked to the arrival of refugees and IDPs.

Overall, the sense of security has remained strong but, as indicated by the quotes below, the described lack of interaction is linked to an increasing distrust between the communities.

“Now we have many IDPs in our neighbourhood. We do not know who they are, where they come from. That is why we do not feel as secure as before.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men’s group).

“Many of the IDPs must have a residence guarantee from Asayesh [local security], and this is making us comfortable about them staying among us.” FGD with host community in Sheikhan (men’s group).

FGD participants from other groups of IDPs such as Arabs, Turkmens, or Shabaks, share similar concerns about safety and security, unlike, for instance, Kurdish IDPs. These groups reported being scared of harm, and accounted for security incidents they had encountered after displacement.

Sometimes this causes families to prevent children from attending school due to a fear of threats and attacks (although the survey data did not show that this is a prevalent issue), which further isolates these communities and obstructs any cohesion.

Divides between communities

Although previous sections highlighted specific and particular issues related to co-existence, the different population groups did not express, in general, large divides between the communities now living together in the urban areas.


Just 13% of the host community households responded that there are issues dividing the groups (18% for refugees, 9% for IDPs), but the large majority did not point to major issues placing co-existence in the Duhok Governorate at risk.

In particular, in the high-density areas of Duhok and Sumel, more respondents (an average of 17% for all groups) pointed to co-existence issues. In these large cities, the pressure on services is felt more keenly and competition for jobs is more intense, as described in the following section.

Regarding the specific issues that generate these divides, answers vary by population group. Host community respondents tend to point to a diverse set of issues, from unfair competition for jobs (56% of the respondents that indicated divides pointed to this issue in particular) and the way assistance is given to IDPs and refugees only (54%), to cultural differences between communities (48%). In the case of refugees and IDPs, respondents pointed uniquely to two similar issues: the way aid and assistance is targeted (58%) and competition for jobs (52%).

It is interesting to note that the way assistance is given emerges as a clear point of divide. This points to a direct link between assistance targeting and social tensions, due to a perceived unfairness on how aid is given by international organizations. Each community perceives themselves as the victims of this situation without considering that the entire population irrespective of origin are in need of support.

Each community perceives themselves as the victims of this situation without considering that the entire population irrespective of origin are in need of support.



Zakho District, Duhok, Living conditions of IDPs, Nov. 2014, Jozef Merckx, UNHCR

5. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PUSH FACTORS: EVICTION, MIGRATION, AND RETURNS

A negative push: evicted families

Up to 12% of IDP households report having been evicted in the last 6 months (approximately 3,500 families), as well as 6% of refugee households (approximately 550 families).

The average percentage for the host community is less than 2% (approximately 1,400 families). In relative terms, evictions tend to be more frequent in Akre-Bardarash, Duhok, and Sumel (Figure 11)¹⁰.

The reason for most of the eviction cases is related to an inability to continue paying rent (49% of the eviction cases)¹¹. The second most cited reason for eviction, especially frequent in low-density areas, is the property owner's intention to undertake new development projects and tear down the building (21% of the eviction cases).

An ambiguous push: migration abroad


In almost 1 out of 10 families (7%) there is at least one member who stated having plans to leave the household unit. Half of them have intentions to move abroad, to Europe. This is not only limited to refugees and IDPs, but the same proportion of host community members indicated such plans.

A range of reasons for attempting the migration path are indicated, but the most cited ones refer to willingness to seek better employment, better education, and safety.

The data was further corroborated through the FGDs. Participants pointed to an increased trend to migrate during the last two years as the overall situation in Duhok had deteriorated further. They also predicted an increase in the rate of migration to Europe as soon as there was enough money available to do so.

**Up to
12% of IDP households re-
port having been evicted
in the last 6 months
(approximately 3,500 families),
as well as 6% of refugee households
(approximately 550 families).**

Figure 11. Proportion and total number of families evicted per location



10. If only considering eviction rates among households that rent (excluding those that own or live in informal housing), the percentages are the following: 16% of IDP households, 7% of refugee households, and 6% of host community households have been evicted in the last 6 months.

11. Those households that were evicted due to not paying rent now allocate 26% of their total household expenses to rent, which indicates a more adequate ratio of rent costs.

Many participants also cited the recent problems in health care provision as the main cause for migration: the fact that it is no longer possible to go to Turkey for medical reasons without a visa has increased the willingness to migrate permanently.

“It is mostly young boys leaving, even if they have good grades in school. But recently, after ISIS came, girls started leaving too. Before it was almost only men leaving. This year, also, more under 18 than before are travelling illegally.” FGDs with host community in Sheikhan.

“Many families are thinking to move abroad but they cannot do it right now due to financial reasons. As soon as these families save enough money to move, they will do it.” FGDs with host community in Duhok.

Special attention must be given to religious minorities. Most of the Christians and Yezidis in the FGDs expressed their wish to leave the country and seek safety abroad. As reported in these FGDs, they stated in general that they do not see any future for themselves in Iraq and they have no hope in the situation getting better.

After losing all their belongings and being specific targets in the conflict, they reported not being able to trust people in the country anymore nor ever being able to feel safe in the country.

For these reasons, migration either through smuggling or through asylum is accentuated among these minorities.

A positive push: willingness and feasibility to return to place of origin

A significant majority of the displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable, although there is still a substantial percentage of IDPs and refugees who at this moment do not have any wish to return (Figure 12).

With respect to refugees, 71% of households reported that they would consider going back to Syria, but 29% (about 2,700 families) were unwilling. Similarly, 22% of IDP households were also unwilling to return (about 6,500 families).

Within the group of IDPs, it is mainly those originally from Mosul who report a higher unwillingness to return (32%), while only 10% of those from Sinjar are unwilling to return.

As a condition for the return to take place, virtually all households (only those willing to return) stated that the primary condition for return is the ‘liberation’ of their place of origin.

As a second condition, however, about 50% of the IDPs highlighted the ability to reclaim property in the place of origin as the main condition.

This is frequently entrenched in legal and political issues and usually out of the hands of the families themselves. Responses do not vary depending on whether the IDP household is originally from Mosul or from Sinjar.

A significant majority of the displaced households view their return as feasible and desirable, although there is still a substantial percentage of IDPs and refugees who at this moment do not have any wish to return. All indicators point to a protracted displacement even if there is a willingness of the household to return.

12. Such responses on return have to be seen in light of the actual history of forced displacement that took place in the 1970s and 80s, especially in the Nineveh Governorate. Many of the IDPs currently hosted in Duhok were also forcibly displaced at that time by the former regime and were reallocated in collective towns (especially in the case of Yezidis). Therefore, a return to these collective towns may not be perceived as a return to the “true” place of origin. This is an issue that is linked with the ability to reclaim back the original properties before the displacement in the 1970s and 80s.

Regarding refugees in particular, responses are equally spread across the possible conditions (financial assistance, reconstruction of property, and the reclaiming of property), with a relative preponderance on financial assistance¹².

All indicators point to a protracted displacement even if there is a willingness of the household to return. The area of Sinjar, for example, is now liberated but it has suffered from insecurity and it is heavily damaged. In this case in particular, plans exist to build a new town next to the destroyed old town.

“I returned to my town in Sinjar, to check the situation. I found my house destroyed and found that some relatives were killed by ISIS. The area was empty, and there was some demining team working there.” FGD with IDPs (Yezidis).


FGDs with the host community also showed an understanding of the situation and an acceptance of the fact that return is part of a bigger and complex process.

All FGD participants showed knowledge of the conditions in most liberated areas that would make daily life challenging. As a consequence, there was a relatively positive reaction to hosting the displaced population.

“Whether we want them to stay or not, we will treat them as guests for as long as they stay. They cannot go back now, so we are aware that they will have to stay even though it will further impact our area.” FGD with host community in Sheikhan (men’s group).

“As long as IDPs cannot go to their places, we will continue helping them as we consider them part of our community.” FGD with host community in Sheikhan (women’s group).

Figure 12. Distribution of households by willingness to return and area of origin¹³



13. Apart from Syria, only the Iraqi districts of Mosul and Sinjar (pertaining to the Nineveh Governorate) are highlighted in the figure because 94% of the IDPs in the assessment’s coverage area come from these two districts in Iraq.

5. EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN AREAS

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Duhok remains the governorate with the highest percentage of population searching for work and the lowest percentage of population working, compared to the rest of the Kurdistan Region. The influx of IDPs and refugees only had a partial effect on this situation, because employment and unemployment for the host community was at similar rates prior to the arrival of IDPs.

In this matter, it must be taken into account that the working-age population in Duhok has substantially lower education levels (e.g., 58% of the adults working do not have a basic education degree). Employment for the Syrian refugees, on the other hand, is extraordinarily high, with rates for the adult male population at about 75%. IDP households have the same percentage of population employed than the host community (63% for men and 11% for women), but a higher number of people searching for work.

This situation is, however, compensated partially by IDPs' access to public transfers by the Federal Government of Iraq for their previous employment in their place of origin (although only if working for the public sector).

The dynamism of the private sector is a key aspect in this protracted displacement situation, as refugees and IDPs cannot usually work for the government (although some exceptions exist for teachers and health care personnel).

Nevertheless, in Duhok most employment is generated by the public sector, with 55% of the employed host community working for the government or public companies.

Half of the IDPs and refugees working in the governorate are employed in construction, and daily-waged labour in agriculture is the second most common job. In a geographical sense, private sector jobs are generally more available especially in the areas of Zakho and Akre, as well as Sumel, which are also the areas with the largest influx of displaced persons.

The percentage of unemployed population, however, is very significant across the governorate and it poses some challenges for integrating them back into the labour market.

Although the host community has the lowest percentage of people unemployed in relative terms, in absolute terms 67% of all the individuals unemployed belong to the host community. Most livelihood interventions, in this sense, have frequently not targeted the host community.

Furthermore, for livelihood purposes, it must be taken into account that half of the unemployed individuals are between 15 and 24 years of age, and the integration of youth into the labour market is one of the most crucial challenges facing Duhok.

Education levels are also a challenge, in the sense that the population searching for work generally have very low education levels, with 72% having none or only basic education and 21% being illiterate. Finally, in geographic terms, Amedi, Sheikhan, and Sumel are the areas facing much higher unemployment than other locations, while Zakho has very low unemployment levels.

This indicates that the private sector in Zakho (mostly informal) has been able to absorb the newly arrived population, while the other areas have struggled more (Sheikhan and Sumel had the highest population increase due to displacement, and Amedi has the lowest levels of private sector development).

As regards the employment of women, the proportion of women working is extremely low and few opportunities exist outside of public sector jobs. This derives in large part from traditional cultural norms and beliefs across communities regarding the role of women. Most women currently at working age, displaced or not, are illiterate, which virtually excludes them from the labour market.

Young women are gradually accessing higher education levels and will be seeking to enter the labour market. Their entrance will be critical to the growth of the economy in the area, but will pose a challenge for the labour market if it is not modernised and if jobs are not diversified to allow access for young women.

1. WORK STATUS OF THE POPULATION

Explanation of concepts

The work status of the population is analysed through three different indicators. First, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have been employed at some point during the month preceding the survey, either as self-employed or paid employees, full-time or sporadically ('employed').

Second, through the percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who have not been working but have been actively searching for a job, either for the first time or after losing their previous job ('searching for a job').

Third, through the remaining percentage of individuals between the ages of 15 and 64 who are outside of the labour force, which means that they are full-time students, disabled persons unable to work, home-makers, early retired persons, or simply persons unwilling to work. These individuals are 'economically inactive' and do not count as part of the unemployed population ('out of the labour force'). The three categories sum up to 100%. The traditional concepts of employment and unemployment rate do not fully apply to the context of the Kurdistan Region and to a complex displacement setting as the present one.

The traditional concepts of employment and unemployment rate do not fully apply to the context of the Kurdistan Region and to a complex displacement setting as the present one.

The definition of employment is an example of this: informal employment or underemployment is common within this context, which means that individuals may not have worked for the full month, but rather sporadically in different places, for some days. In the survey approach for this report, such an individual is counted as employed, even if s/he has only worked for one week during the

month and spent the remainder of the time searching for a job. Underemployment is thus not visible in the data. In addition, self-employment is also a fluid category that in many cases hide precarious employment situations.

Therefore, the boundaries of unemployment are difficult to define, especially because there are no safety nets for someone officially declared unemployed or jobless, as is seen in other countries.

Finally, some additional limitations apply for the data on work status of the IDP population related to the lack of clarity regarding current employment in the Duhok Governorate, as many IDPs have retained their public posts in their places of origin and are being paid their salary¹⁴.

For all of the above reasons, the analysis of the population's work status is divided into the following three indicators: 'employed', 'searching for a job' and 'out of the labour force'. Gender plays an important role in this analysis, as the percentage of women out of the labour force is extremely high as compared to men. Therefore, work status here is always disaggregated by gender, and information on women's participation in the labour force is provided later in this section.

14. An IDP survey respondent, when asked about his/her employment situation, might have answered that he/she is employed, but at their place of origin, not in the Duhok Governorate. His/her employment status is maintained, especially in the case of public employees. For instance, a teacher from Nineveh would declare he/she is employed and still receiving salary, although not actually working anymore due to displacement. Technically, this person does not work in the Duhok Governorate. However, other IDPs may be working in fact as employees within the Duhok Governorate. This distinction cannot be made with the survey data available.

Data on work status

The average percentage of individuals employed in the areas covered by the assessment, taking together men and women of adult age, and independently of the population group, is 39%. This is disaggregated into 64% for men and 14% for women. The average rate is slightly lower than that of the Sulaimaniya and Erbil Governorates, which stands at 41%.

By population group (Figure 13), there is a very high percentage of employment among male Syrian refugees, with only a very small number of them out of the labour force (i.e., less full-time students, disabled or inactive people than in other groups). The host community and IDPs, on the other hand, have a similar labour force participation, but the IDP group has a higher number of individuals searching for work. In comparable terms, the total amount of individuals searching for work is relatively high, especially affecting the displaced population.

By geographical stratum, all areas tend to show similar employment levels among the population. The main difference is that the rate of individuals searching for work

increases gradually as we move from higher-density areas to lower-density areas. In these latter areas, the rate of unemployment is double compared to Duhok and Sumel, on average. The percentage of people out of the labour force is also higher in Duhok and Sumel than in other areas, mainly due to a higher number of full-time students.

By age group, the lowest employment levels are found among youth (15% on average for both genders), mainly because most of them are still full-time students. This age group also shows higher rates of people searching for work than the older age groups, affecting mostly both IDPs and refugees. Employment rates for individuals older than 25 years are particularly high, nearing 90% for men and around 15% for women.


There is a very high percentage of employment among male Syrian refugees, with only a very small number of them out of the labour force.

The host community and IDPs, on the other hand, have a similar labour force participation.

Regarding the type of employment for those individuals with a job, on average 2 out of 3 workers are paid employees in the urban areas¹⁵. Most of the remaining are employers and business owners (i.e. mainly small shops), and a minority work as self-employed. Self-employment in particular is very prominent in high-density areas but less relevant in the rest of the governorate.

15. The data also shows that the vast majority of paid employees (in the private sector) are working within the informal economy. The rate of workers with a written labour contract does not exceed 8% in any of the geographical strata.

Figure 13. Work status of the individuals between the age of 15 and 64, by gender, population group, stratum, and age group



2. GEOGRAPHIC PATTERNS ON EMPLOYMENT

Jobs in the public and private sectors

Slightly more than half of the employment available in both high- and low-density areas is primarily in the public sector (exactly 55% of the employed population work for the government or public companies).

Conversely, in medium-density areas such as Zakho, the private sector generates up to 69% of the jobs (31% for the public sector).

An analysis of the jobs created by the private sector in each district shows that there are no significant differences within the governorate (with the exception of Amedi, where few private sector jobs are available), with similar values across all locations (Figure 14) – although Zakho and Akre deviate positively from the rest of the urban areas (i.e., the private sector is more developed in these two locations).

Regarding private sector employment, each geographical area presents a different narrative. In high-density areas, agriculture is the primary employer in the private sector, providing a significant amount of daily-wage labour in nearby locations. Another relevant sector is construction. Both agriculture and construction employ around half of the working population in the private sector. In medium-density areas, the most developed sectors are construction and retailing, together accounting for half of the employment in the private sector.

This is the only area with a relevant presence of jobs in manufacturing, even if generating only 10% of private sector jobs.

In low-density areas, construction is clearly the most prominent sector, with agriculture and retailing having a more minor role compared to other areas.

Where are the IDPs and refugees employed?

It must be taken into account that virtually all of them can only access jobs in the private sector (except those IDPs still holding their public posts in the place of origin, for which they receive a salary, even if irregularly).

Construction is the most relevant sector, employing nearly half of the working IDPs and refugees in some locations. Agriculture (daily-waged labour) is the second most common occupation for working IDPs and refugees, especially in high-density areas. Other sectors such as retailing and the food sector are also relevant employers, although to a lesser degree.

Lack of jobs

Low-density areas show a relatively high ratio of individuals searching for jobs (Figure 15). Historically, these areas have been the least developed in terms of investments, infrastructure, and private sector capacity. In particular, Sheikhan, Amedi, and Sumel face much higher unemployment than other locations. All other areas have similar – and relatively low – ratios of the population unable to find work (including areas such as Zakho, one of the districts with the largest influx of refugees and IDPs, which is nevertheless able to absorb additional workers thanks to its dynamic private sector).

Slightly more than half of the employment available in both high- and low-density areas is primarily in the public sector. Conversely, in medium-density areas such as Zakho, the private sector generates up to 69% of the jobs

Figure 14. Percentage of the adult population employed in the private sector





Figure 15. Percentage of individuals searching for work over total adult population by district urban areas



3. INTEGRATING THE POPULATION INTO THE LABOUR MARKET

Who are the unemployed?

The segment of the population that is unemployed and looking for a job is here disaggregated into different demographic and socio-economic categories, such as population group, age, education and experience, and poverty situation (Figure 16).

Although the level of unemployment is relatively higher for IDPs and refugees than for the host community, in absolute terms the majority of unemployed people belong to the host community. Of all the individuals unemployed, about 67% are host community members.


Furthermore, about half of them are within the middle socio-economic class; only 28% of the unemployed individuals are from the poorest segment of families (5th expenditure quintile).

Of all the individuals unemployed, about 67% are host community members. Furthermore, about half of them are within the middle socio-economic class.

In light of demographic data, about half of the unemployed individuals are between 15 and 24 years of age. The second largest group comprises individuals aged 25 to 44 years (42% of the unemployed individuals), with the remaining 11% being individuals older than 45 years. This indicates that the integration of youth into the labour market is one of the most crucial challenges in the governorate, especially when also considering the fact that 58% of the unemployed population has never worked before and holds no professional experience.

Another challenge for the integration of the unemployed population is their very low human capital levels (further discussed below). Nearly 3 out of 4 individuals looking for a job have not completed any formal education degree. Only 16% of the unemployed population has a higher education diploma. In addition, 21% of the unemployed are illiterate. This calls for further emphasis on vocational formation that is more closely linked to manual labour.

Figure 16. Characteristics of the group of population currently searching for job in the Duhok Governorate’s urban areas



Challenges of human capital (education, skills, and occupation)

The labour force (host community, IDPs, and refugees aggregated) is mostly characterised by low levels of human capital.

For instance, nearly 19% of the individuals either working or searching for work is illiterate – unable to read or write. This population mostly works in construction and agriculture, but a significant proportion also within low-skilled positions in the public administration.

In addition, 58% of the individuals in the labour force have not completed all grades of basic education (up to Grade 9), 18% have obtained a basic education level, 7% a high school education level, and 17% have completed university studies.

Both high- and low-density areas have the most educated population, while medium-density areas have the lowest levels of human capital. In terms of population groups, host community members tend to hold higher education levels than the other two groups, although the difference is not great.

In terms of occupation, the data suggests that there is a scarcity of semi- or, especially, high-skilled positions (Table 3). Even individuals with higher education levels are actually working in either unskilled or semi-skilled positions.

This is indicated by the low ratio of individuals with university or technical studies in high-skilled positions (26% for the host community, 28% for IDPs). Only refugees seem to be occupied extensively in highly specialised job positions.

Table 3. Type of occupation held by the employed population by population group and education level

Population group	Education level	Low-skilled	Semi-skilled	High-skilled	Total
Local community	None or up to Grade 4 basic education	22	27	1	100
	Grade 5 to 9 school	20	27	14	100
	University, technical studies or beyond	27	27	20	100
IDPs	None or up to Grade 4 basic education	22	27	1	100
	Grade 5 to 9 school	19	24	7	100
	University, technical studies or beyond	25	27	28	100
Refugees	None or up to Grade 4 basic education	12	21	27	100
	Grade 5 to 9 school	22	22	24	100
	University, technical studies or beyond	10	28	21	100

Note on the definition of each occupation segment: high-skilled occupations include managers, professionals, and technicians; semi-skilled occupations include clerical workers, service and sales, skilled agricultural workers, and craft workers; low-skilled occupations include machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations. People in armed forces are excluded.

Women's participation in the labour force

The vast majority of the employed women are in the public sector (9 out of 10 women, virtually all of them being host community members). Within this sector, most women work in education (66%) and health (8%). In the private sector, agriculture is the main employer (45% of women).

However, employment rates for women are extraordinarily low – not only in the Duhok Governorate, but across the entire Kurdistan Region.

A first explanation for this situation is the lack of adequate education levels among adult women. For instance, regarding literacy rates, the data shows similar, very low levels for all population groups: about 57% of women older than 35 years cannot read or write. The majority of working women tend to have high education levels, such as university degrees. FGD participants pointed to education, but also referred to cultural norms as the second main obstacle that prevents a higher rate of women working.

“This is the way society thinks. Our society does not accept women to work in most jobs, and much of this is realistically difficult to change. Women can be teachers and doctors. If women work, they experience a lot of difficulties. Their families often do not allow it, or family members make negative comments about that.” FGD with host community in Sheikhan (boys' group).

However, the current crisis and the need to bring additional revenue to the house is changing the social dynamics and gradually incorporating women into the labour force, as shown by the final testimony below.

“I think it is not true that women are not participating in the labour force. We have many indicators that show that the community has advanced a lot and it is much better than 15 years ago. It is true that women in our society cannot perform all kinds of jobs because it is culturally not acceptable. They cannot work in restaurants or drive taxis. But the economic crisis is forcing many families to let their women work to help the family.” FGD with host community in Duhok (men's group).



Duhok City Overview, R. Rasheed, UNHCR

6. FINANCIAL SITUATION AND HOUSEHOLD VULNERABILITY

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

The weakening of the financial situation of households in the Duhok Governorate primarily originates from the financial crisis in the Kurdistan Region and the general deterioration of the economic outlook of Iraq as a whole, more than it does from the displacement crisis.

Salaries in the public sector (both for the host community working for the government and IDPs still receiving payment from the Federal Government) were not fully paid in the preceding year due to budget restrictions and other irregularities and delays, and wage earners are in a precarious situation due to employment insecurity and increased competition. The average household expenditure per capita (one of the most frequently used indicators for financial vulnerability) stands at \$174/month for the host community. This is about a 40% higher than the \$124/month for refugee and IDP households.

However, this indicator covers concerning dynamics, affecting all population groups equally, that place also the host community into a very vulnerable position. In particular, these dynamics include two aspects: indebtedness and income sources.

As regards indebtedness, the percentage of households having borrowed money reached very high levels. A total of 59% of the refugee households, 40% of the host community households, and 37% of the IDP households have outstanding debts.

Indebtedness is especially high in Zakho and the high-density areas. The host community is largely indebted due to previous long-term loans linked to asset purchases (houses, cars, etc.), which still remain due. As regards IDPs and refugees, the vast majority of households have borrowed money for emergency and coping purposes, that is, for sustaining domestic consumption and helping in paying rent.

However, the key aspect that illustrates the extent of vulnerability across all groups are income sources. This also includes the host community in spite of it having a relatively higher household expenditure. On average, nearly 40% of the income that households received or generated in the preceding month of the survey came from borrowing and family support.

Other non-sustainable sources of income, such as coping strategies (e.g., selling assets), comprise, on average, about 7% of the total income sources. Salaries, wages, business earnings, and pensions, therefore, only account for slightly more than half of the total income of an average family.

This aspect is not captured by simply examining household expenditure per capita, but such a situation, as a consequence of the financial crisis, places many 'middle-income level' households across all groups at risk of poverty if they must continue sustaining their consumption through debts, asset sale, assistance, or income from insecure employment.

Finally, this section develops a household vulnerability analysis, using consumption poverty as the measure of vulnerability. The model identifies factors contributing to household vulnerability and it allows an overall area-based assessment of the most vulnerable locations.

The narrative emerging from the assessment indicates three areas of special vulnerability: first, the area compressed between Sheikhan and Akre; second, the district of Zakho; and third, to a lesser extent, Sumel and its outskirts.

1. HOUSEHOLD BUDGET

Economic situation at stratum level

The average household expenditure per capita, which is the most common measure used to evaluate a household's living standard, stands at 204,000 IQD/month (\$163/month) for the governorate's urban areas.

Compared to this average, the Duhok District Centre has the highest expenditure per capita compared to other areas (272,000 IQD/month, or \$217/month) (Figure 17).

In Sumel, the value is nearly 40% lower, indicating a worse welfare situation in spite of the close proximity to the city of Duhok. Regarding the other areas, the expenditure per capita in medium- and low-density areas is nearly the same on average, around 166,000 IQD/month (\$132/month).

Both medium- and low-density areas tend to have a higher proportion of poorer families than high-density areas.


31% and 32% of the households in medium- and low-density areas, respectively, are within the lowest (and poorest) expenditure quintile

Both medium- and low-density areas tend to have a higher proportion of poorer families than high-density areas. In particular, 31% and 32% of the households in medium- and low-density areas, respectively, are within the lowest (and poorest) expenditure quintile, whereas only 11% of households in high-density areas are in the poorest quintile.

Conversely, about 27% of the households living in high-density areas are within the richest expenditure quintile.

The opposite situation holds true to the area of Zakho, where only less than 10% of households represent the richest quintile.

Figure 17. Average household expenditure per capita in urban areas per district (data in IQD/month)



Economic situation across population groups

IDP and refugee households have a very similar household expenditure per capita, both with an average of 155,000 IQD/month (\$124/month).

In contrast, host community households on average have an expenditure per capita of 217,000 IQD/month (\$174/month), about 40% higher (Figure 18). However, it is important to highlight that the current levels of expenditure per capita for the host community are significantly lower than the levels of 2012, before the onset of Iraq's conflict and financial crisis. In 2012, the average household expenditure per capita was 265 IQD/month (\$212/month)¹⁶.

This deterioration of the host community's economic situation is directly attributable to a lower income available; as discussed in the following sections, most of the households underwent a cut or withholding of their salaries and wages during 2015 and 2016, especially if working for the public sector.


When examined in more detail by population group (Figure 19), the data shows significant differences between hosts, IDPs, and refugees regarding the distribution of households across expenditure quintiles (a methodological note on the analysis of quintiles is provided in Box 1).

The situation is especially challenging for IDP households, as 40% of them are concentrated in the poorest quintile across the urban areas (this is the case for only 18% of the refugee households and 15% of the host ones).

Conversely, very few refugee or IDP households are in the richest quintile (less than 10%)¹⁷ – in fact, refugee households tend to be clustered in the medium-level quintiles (second, third, and fourth quintile), showing a relatively robust financial situation.

IDP and refugee households have a very similar household expenditure per capita, both with an average of 155,000 IQD/month (\$124/month)

Figure 18. Comparison of household expense per capita and total household expense by population group



16. Figure in nominal terms. The real terms should be adjusted taking into consideration the inflation rate, for which data is not available.

17. Interestingly for the case of IDPs, there is no actual difference between the distribution across expenditure quintiles of those IDP households displaced pre-2014 and those displaced as a consequence of the current Iraqi conflict, indicating that there is no visible improvement for households displaced about 10 years ago compared to the most recent ones.

Box 1. How to analyse quintiles

- Quintile**
- 1st: 20% richest households
 - 2nd: 20% second richest households
 - 3rd: 20% middle income households
 - 4th: 20% second poorest households
 - 5th: 20% poorest households

The use of quintiles is a common and explicative way to statistically compare the characteristics of households according to their wealth levels, that is, between the poorer and the richer households. Here, “expenditure quintiles” are used. To calculate them, all households have been ordered from the richest to the poorest according to their house-

hold expenditure per capita. Then, the households are divided into 5 groups of the same size, each of them representing 20% of the total. The first group, or quintile, contains the richest 20% of households; the second quintile contains the next richest 20% of households, and so on.

With this grouping, it is possible to analyse whether the households in the richer quintiles have any differentiating characteristic when compared to the poorer quintiles (e.g., the majority of households in the richest quintile are male-headed households, while the majority of households in the poorest quintile are female-headed households). A number of characteristics are evaluated in the following sections.

Figure 19. Distribution of households across expenditure quintiles, by population group



The total household expenditure showed in Figure 18 is disaggregated below into the different expense items that comprise the family budget (Table 4). The disaggregation is relatively similar for all population groups. The main expense item that absorbs between 35% and 39% of the total household expenses is food purchase.

The next item is rent payment or house purchase instalments, which accounts for between 25% and 33% of the household budget. Both items, food and rent, make about 70% of the total household expenses on average.

2. INDEBTEDNESS

The current percentage of households in the host community with outstanding debt is 40%. The percentage is similar for IDP households (37%), while for refugees it is higher, at 59%.

The current percentage of households in the host community with outstanding debt is 40%. The percentage is similar for IDP households (37%), while for refugees it is higher, at 59%.

Other relevant expenses correspond to health care (about 10% of total expenses) and fuel and transportation (about 6%). However, it must be taken into account that the absolute numbers (in IQD/month) vary for each population group: for instance, while IDP and refugee families spend about 46,000 IQD/month/person (\$37/month/person) on food, host community families spend 60,000 IQD/month/person (\$48/month/person). Similarly, total health expenditure per household ranges from the 70,000 IQD/month (\$56/month) of refugee families to 125,000 IQD/month (\$100/month) of host community families.

In the host community, the most common purpose of loans are long-term asset purchases, such as housing (38% of total debt purposes), consumer durables such as vehicles (15%), or business establishments (7%). A minority of host community households hold debt for emergency and coping purposes, such as sustaining domestic consumption (17%) or helping in paying rent (5%).

Table 4. Total monthly household expenses distributed by item, in IQD/month and in percentage over total

		Food	Rent	Health	Energy & water	Fuel & Transport	Education	House repairs	Debt pay-back	Other	Total
Host community	Total HH expense	393	320	124	67	64	84	32	78	134	1,294
	Percentage over total	34%	25%	9%	6%	6%	6%	2%	4%	8%	100%
IDPs	Total HH expense	279	192	88	38	46	42	32	38	103	860
	Percentage over total	39%	24%	10%	5%	6%	5%	1%	2%	8%	100%
Refugees	Total HH expense	235	215	70	38	30	15	8	10	35	658
	Percentage over total	38%	33%	9%	6%	5%	2%	1%	1%	5%	100%

For IDPs and refugees in particular, the households living in high- and medium-density areas tend to be more frequently indebted than those living in low-density areas. In these low-density areas, the percentage of households indebted stands below 25%.

The vast majority of indebted IDP and refugee families have borrowed money for emergency and coping purposes (42% for sustaining domestic consumption and 23% for helping in paying rent – IDPs and refugees aggregated). Only 5% of the indebted families borrowed money for establishing a business, 7% for housing, and 4% for purchasing consumer durables¹⁸.

3. VULNERABILITY ACROSS THE URBAN AREAS

Methodology and household/area factors determining vulnerability

In most vulnerability analyses, household vulnerability (and hence the eligibility for assistance programs such as cash support) has been evaluated by taking into account household-centred factors (e.g., disability, gender of the household head, dependency ratio, etc.). Other factors affecting households, including geography and the socio-economic context, have been overlooked. The framework described below therefore combines both approaches, household-based and area-based factors, in order to understand vulnerability across urban areas in the Duhok Governorate. This is a first attempt to integrate both approaches.

This section, therefore, develops a statistical model and a subsequent analysis on the factors that are expected to influence household vulnerability. The model is described in Annex D and it shows in greater detail the regression coefficients, which indicate the possible presence and magnitude of a causal effect.

In most vulnerability analyses, household vulnerability (and hence the eligibility for assistance programs such as cash support) has been evaluated by taking into account household-centred factors.

The sections below do not enter into a statistical discussion of these effects for each factor, but they provide information on the differences between the richer and the poorer households, and they map the locations of the vulnerability. Consistent with the area-based approach used in this assessment, vulnerability exists across all population groups and hence emphasis is given to a geographical comparison.

The household factors evaluated are:

- Gender of the household head;
- Dependency ratio;
- House overcrowding;
- Rent paid over total household budget;
- Indebtedness for emergency purposes;
- Non-sustainable household income sources.

The area / district factors evaluated are ¹⁹:

- Private sector development;
- Intensity of the financial crisis;
- Human capital levels;
- General unemployment;
- Influx of displaced households.

The indicator used in this model to categorise households according to their expected vulnerability is household expenditure per capita (as showed in Figure 17).

18. The relatively high percentage of households with debt contrasts with the low amount of expenditure allocated to debt repayments (Table 4). This is explained with the vast majority of households borrowing money from their wider family network – formal debts are a minority except for the funds obtained from the government for property purchase. It should not be assumed that all financial support from family is expected to be repaid.

19. The last two area-based factors were found to be statistically not significant in the statistical model. This indicates that no dependence relation was found between these factors and the likelihood of a household to be relatively poor. Therefore, they are not discussed in the sections below.

This indicator is frequently used in similar vulnerability assessments²⁰. However, it presents some limitations for fully understanding vulnerability and the dynamics related to this concept.

Household per capita is used to explain poverty or, more specifically, consumption poverty. Another type of vulnerability is more closely linked to household resilience, or the ability to withstand shocks. From this perspective, a household might be vulnerable but not necessarily poor; however, it might be at risk of falling into poverty in the event of an external shock. In the context of the Kurdistan Region, this is equally alarming.

For instance, host community households have a relatively high expenditure per capita, but the fact that many households underwent salary cuts implied that they are engaging in negative coping strategies in order to sustain their expenditure levels. A prolonged period in this situation may place the household at risk of heavy indebtedness, inability to pay rent, and potential eviction and relocation to less well-off districts. Similar situations are experienced by refugee and IDP households.

Presumably, this latter type of vulnerability is not accurately measured by household expenditure per capita, for the reasons stated above. However, some discussion is provided in the sections below on specific factors more closely linked to resilience, such as non-sustainable income sources.



Zakho District, Duhok. Living conditions of IDPs, Nov. 2014, Jozef Merckx, UNHCR

20. Jordan's Vulnerability Assessment Framework, an initiative of UNHCR's response to the refugee crisis in that country, considers (predicted) household expenses as the proxy to identify those families that require assistance. UNHCR's models used in Egypt and Lebanon follow a similar framework.

Gender and vulnerability

Levels of household expenditure per capita are significantly different between male-headed and female-headed households.


In particular, the distribution of households across expenditure quintiles shows that about 47% of the female-headed households are concentrated in the two poorest quintiles and are significantly underrepresented in the richest quintiles (Figure 20).

The distribution of households across expenditure quintiles shows that about 47% of the female-headed households are concentrated in the two poorest quintiles and are significantly underrepresented in the richest quintiles.

The poorest female-headed households are also characterised by having relatively young heads of household (below the age of 40) or a household size of 7 or 8 members, on average. This is opposed to the relatively richer female-headed households, which have older heads and an average household size of 3 to 4 members.

Geographically, it can be observed that the areas of Sumel and Zakho have the highest percentage of female-headed households when compared to the other districts (Figure 21).

Figure 20. Female-headed households distributed by expenditure quintiles



Dependent members and vulnerability

The number of dependent members within a household (i.e. either below the age of 15 or above the age of 64) is also a significant determinant of its financial situation. In simple terms, poorer households are characterised by having more dependent members than relatively richer households. For instance, households in the poorest quintile actually have more dependent members in the family unit than non-dependent members. On the contrary,

in the richest quintile, there are almost 2 non-dependent members on average for each dependent member (Figure 22).

Highly vulnerable households can be characterised as having, for instance, at least 2 dependent members for each non-dependent member. Geographically, households with this characteristic are more frequently found in the area of Zakho. There, around 22% of the households have twice as many dependent members as non-dependent.

Figure 21. Mapping of the female-headed households in the Duhok Governorate




Figure 22. Households' dependency ratio distributed by expenditure quintiles





Figure 23. Mapping of the households with a relatively critical dependency ratio



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).

House overcrowding and vulnerability

The ratio of household members per room in the house (excluding bathrooms) is used here as a proxy to evaluate the effect of housing conditions and potential overcrowding on financial well-being.


The data suggest that a higher number of people per room is indicative of the household being relatively poorer than others, controlling for other variables.

For instance, the average ratio for households in the richest quintile is 1.2 people per room, while for those in the poorest quintile, the ratio is about double, 2.6 people per room (Figure 24).

Therefore, a situation of overcrowding that could be determined by having 3 people per room is more frequently seen in Sheikhan (31%) than in other districts (Figure 25). The average across urban areas in the governorate is 11%.

The average ratio for households in the richest quintile is 1.2 people per room, while for those in the poorest quintile, the ratio is about double, 2.6 people per room.

Figure 24. Households' ratio of members per house room by expenditure quintiles



Renting and vulnerability


Households' financial vulnerability is also explained with the amount of rent paid as a proportion of the total household expense. The statistical analysis indicates a relationship between households that allocate an elevated proportion of their total expenditure to rent and a relatively poorer status. In particular, households in the poorest expenditure quintile allocate on average about 35% of their budget to rent, while this ratio is 23% for those in the richest quintile (Figure 26).

It is generally understood that allocating half or more of the total expenditure to rent can be deemed as a critical and concerning situation

The ratio is critically high in the area of Sheikhan. 44% of households use more than half of their total expenditure to pay rent.

It is generally understood that allocating half or more of the total expenditure to rent can be deemed as a critical and concerning situation. On average, 11% of the households across urban areas are in this situation – this number excludes non-tenants. The ratio is critically high in the area of Sheikhan. There, 44% of households use more than half of their total expenditure to pay rent. Zakho and Duhok also have a significant percentage in this aspect, although to a lesser extent (Figure 27).

Figure 25. Mapping of the households in a situation of overcrowding



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).

Figure 26. Households' ratio of rent costs over total expenses by expenditure quintile





Figure 27. Mapping of the households in a situation of rent vulnerability



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).


Debts for emergency purposes and vulnerability

Poorer households are also characterised by a tendency to borrow money for emergency and coping purposes more frequently than relatively richer households. This type of debt is aimed at sustaining domestic consumption and helping in paying rent, as seen in the previous section. Therefore, the data indicate that 53% of the households indebted

for these purposes are situated in the two poorest segments, while only 8% are in the richest quintile (Figure 28).

On average, about 13% of households in urban areas are indebted for emergency purposes. Again, in Zakho, the proportion of households is above average (20%). Conversely, the areas of Amedi and Sheikhan have virtually not a single household in this situation.

Figure 28. Households with emergency debt distributed by expenditure quintiles




Non-sustainable income and vulnerability

The main source of income for most households in urban areas is the money obtained from wages or salaries. However, as a consequence of the financial crisis, in reality only half of a household's average income share is obtained from wages or salaries; virtually all households complement this with other

As a consequence of the financial crisis, in reality only half of a household's average income share is obtained from wages or salaries; virtually all households complement this with other income sources.


income sources. Loans or borrowing are the second most important source, followed by business revenues and pensions, assistance from the government or NGOs being relatively significant only in the case of IDPs. Refugees, in particular, are heavily indebted if compared to the other population groups, as was observed in the previous section.

Figure 29. Mapping of the households with emergency debt



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).

Figure 30. Break-down of households' total income sources by population group



In order to fit this factor within the vulnerability assessment, a ratio is created that denotes the dependence of the household on income sources that are not sustainable, and therefore may imply a significant degree of vulnerability.

Such sources are remittances, support from family members, assistance from the government or NGOs, charity, or begging. The ratio thus divides non-sustainable income over total household income (but excludes savings, sale of assets, and money borrowed, because these are one-off revenues and may distort the analysis).


The statistical analysis indicates that the higher the percentage of non-sustainable income over total income, the lower the household's expenditure. In simple terms, poorer households rely more frequently to non-sustainable income sources.

The situation is relatively more critical for IDPs, as 15% of these households obtain more than half of their income from non-sustainable sources. For refugee households, the percentage stands at 9% and, for host community, at 4%.

In general, nearly 7% of households across the urban areas are in a situation where half or more of their total recurrent income comes from non-sustainable sources (Figure 31).

This situation is particularly predominant in the areas of Akre, Bardarash, and Zakho. The situation is relatively more critical for IDPs, as 15% of these households obtain more than half of their income from non-sustainable sources. For refugee households, the percentage stands at 9% and, for host community, at 4%.

Figure 31. Households' ratio of non-sustainable income sources over total income



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).

Private sector development and vulnerability

Private sector development is the first area-based factor discussed within the household vulnerability assessment.

This factor aims to evaluate whether living in a location with a relatively prominent presence of private sector jobs makes a difference in households' financial situation. The statistical analysis suggests that household expenditure per capita tends to be higher in locations that have a larger and more developed private sector.

Presumably, this can be linked to the presence of more diverse and dynamic opportunities in terms of livelihoods that can be beneficial for the overall welfare of households in these areas. In other terms, where there is less economic development, households tend to be relatively poorer and therefore more vulnerable.

A discussion of the actual figures on private sector jobs per location was presented in previous sections (Figure 14). The data by district indicated that it is more frequent to find private sector jobs in the areas of Zakho and Duhok (high- and medium-density strata).


In locations where the financial crisis has had the strongest impact, the average expenditure per capita is significantly lower

Financial crisis and vulnerability

Data for this second area-based factor indicates that, in locations where the financial crisis has had the strongest impact, the average expenditure per capita is significantly lower.

The impact is measured here in terms of salary reductions or job losses (as asked in the household survey); salary cuts were introduced in the Kurdistan Region's public sector in January 2016 due to the financial crisis of which the region currently suffers.

Figure 32. Ratio of households directly impacted by the financial crisis



Note: areas of heavy displacement (Sumel, Sheikhan, and Bardarash/Akre); areas of medium displacement (Zakho); areas of light displacement (Duhok and Amedi).

The impact is different depending on the location, as the intensity of the financial crisis has been different across locations. In areas such as Sumel, Zakho, or Sheikhan, up to 40% of households have suffered an economic shock through loss of jobs or salary reductions. In these areas, expenditure per capita is lower than in other, less affected areas.

The data by population group also indicate that the impact is widely felt in host community households. Up to 70% of the host community members that are employed have experienced a reduction of salary/wages or have salaries pending to be paid by the employer. Similar problems have affected 42% of working refugees and 59% of working IDPs.


Levels of human capital and vulnerability

The general levels of human capital (defined as the proportion of adult individuals with completed basic education) of a given location also hold a certain relation with the households' wealth.

The data indicates that a household is more likely to be relatively poorer if they live in a location with relatively low levels of human capital than if they live in a location with high human capital.

While the generally low levels of human capital in urban areas have been discussed above, in terms of location, Sheikhan, Zakho, Akre, and Bardarash stand out compared to the other districts due to critically low levels of education attainment by the adult population (Figure 33).

Figure 33. Percentage of adult individuals without completed basic education



Summary and trends of the vulnerability model

Once the particular components of vulnerability are analysed, the emerging narrative indicates three areas of special vulnerability: first, the area compressed between Sheikhan and Akre; second, the district of Zakho; and third, to a lesser extent, Sumel and its outskirts.

These areas have a relatively larger influx of displaced households, a stronger impact of the financial crisis on the domestic economy, and much lower education levels in the adult population. More than 50% of the households living in these districts are situated in the two poorest expenditure quintiles, pointing to an alarming consumption poverty. Vulnerability, however, manifests differently in each area.

The area between Sheikhan and Akre, in particular, is the worst-off across the governorate's urban areas. It has the lowest level of expenditure per capita. Overall, it also has fewer available jobs and a relatively lower public services provision. However, the advantage it has over other areas such as Zakho is that households in Sheikhan have much stronger safety nets, provided by the family or the community – linked probably to the stronger ethnic bounds between IDPs and the host community (mostly Kurdish as well as Christian and Yezidi).

This aspect can explain why there is a higher percentage of IDPs owning a house in these areas, very few rates of evictions, very few households indebted for emergency purposes, and more overcrowding due to family hosting.

Households in Zakho, on the contrary, may be able to access more opportunities for employment thanks to the more dynamic private sector.

However, a significant part of the employment is informal, subjected to an increased competition, and social capital in the area in general is much lower. The ratio of non-dependent working-age individuals is also relatively lower.

Consumption poverty is thus generally high. Households mostly experience financial difficulties in the form of rent unaffordability, increasing debt levels, and an increasing reliance on income from non-sustainable sources.

Finally, Sumel seems to consistently fall in the middle ranks of all indicators for vulnerability. While not facing an extremely bad situation in any of the indicators, it does not fare well, either. This holds true, for instance, for indebtedness levels, dependency ratio, or overcrowding.

Three areas of special vulnerability: first, the area compressed between Sheikhan and Akre; second, the district of Zakho; and third, to a lesser extent, Sumel and its outskirts.

These areas have a relatively larger influx of displaced households, a stronger impact of the financial crisis on the domestic economy, and much lower education levels in the adult population.

7. THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION

DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

Here, education data is analysed by way of gross school enrolment rates, which show the percentage of students enrolled in each grade regardless of whether they are in the official age group corresponding to their current level of education.

This is done because students in this context do not follow a direct path from basic to intermediate education to university, but rather intersperse their schooling with periods of being out of school.

Drop-out rates between basic education and high school are high, but most students re-enter high school in later stages in life. For instance, half of the students in grades 10 to 12 are actually 3 to 5 years older than the official age group for this level (15 to 17 years old).

Enrolment rates in basic education are relatively high and adequate in the high-density areas. However, they drop significantly in medium-density and, especially, in low-density areas. The lower rate in these areas is linked to a relatively lower school capacity, but also to a higher portion of households being financially constrained and unable to afford the cost associated to education (from materials to transport, apart from the opportunity cost, in some cases, of the child having to work).

An important characteristic, in addition, is the fact that the enrolment of girls is on a par with that of boys – or even higher, for instance, in the case of high school education (i.e., girls attend high school in a higher proportion than boys).

In general, school attendance remains relatively high in spite of the financial constraints faced by the public education system, in terms of a lack of sufficient funds to pay salaries to teachers and, where needed, to expand the education infrastructure (for instance, by increasing school facilities).

These constraints have an impact on a greater class overcrowding and on maintaining the quality of the education provided.

The refugee children, however, comprise the greatest challenge for authorities and humanitarian partners in the field of education.

When in displacement, Syrian households do not send children to school, with enrolment rates at 73% and 16% for basic education and high school, respectively, for the male population, and 81% and 18% for basic education and high school for the female population.

On aggregate, the situation is alarming in the sense that 44% of the children aged 6 to 17 are outside of the formal education system, posing serious concerns to their future human development.

The main questions that remain are why this group does not attend school as opposed to similar cohorts within the host and IDP communities, and how to bring these students back to school.

Enrolment rates by stratum

School attendance is analysed by way of gross enrolment rates into basic education and high school²¹.

In this context, it is preferable to rely on gross rates due to the fact students in both basic and intermediate levels are frequently older than the age cohort that technically corresponds to that grade.

Drop-out rates are high, but many students re-enter education in later stages of their lives (a regret effect). It is then normal, and desirable, to see enrolment rates above 100% in basic education, for instance. For this reason, an examination of net rates only would largely underestimate school attendance²².

While enrolment in basic education (grades 1 to 9) seems to stand at relatively appropriate levels on average, there is a significant decline in terms of enrolment in high school (grades 10 to 12) with rates being about 30% lower (Figure 34).

This decline is expected, as there is a significant number of male and female children that either enter the labour force or help in domestic work.

A critical characteristic of school enrolment rates is the large variation between the different strata as regards basic education. In medium- and, especially, low-density areas, enrolment rates are significantly sub-optimal; for instance, only 78% of the male population attend basic education in these areas.

Regarding high school rates, the decline is only significant in low-density areas, especially for boys, which is indicative of a relatively lower interest in pursuing formal education (and higher incentives to join the labour force).

In medium- and, especially, low-density areas, enrolment rates are significantly sub-optimal; for instance, only 78% of the male population attend basic education in these areas.

Regarding high school rates, the decline is only significant in low-density areas, especially for boys.

21. Gross enrolment is obtained by dividing the number of students, independently of their age, in each grade (in basic education or high school) by the total number of children of the age group corresponding to each grade. In contrast, net enrolment divides the total number of only those students whose age corresponds to the grade they should be attending, by the total number of children of that age group. Gross enrolment, in practice, includes children that are attending a specific grade 'out of their corresponding cohort'. For instance, a 19-year-old attending high school would be included in gross enrolment but not in net enrolment rates.

22. Technical age cohorts for primary education (grades 1 to 9) would correspond to children between 6 to 14 years old. For high school (grades 10 to 12), age cohorts would correspond to children between 15 and 17 years old.

Enrolment rates by population group

There is a clear division between Syrian refugee children and other groups (Figure 35).

Enrolment rates for refugees are substantially low, which indicates a very high proportion of children out of school at an early age. In particular, 28% of the children between 6 and 14 years of age do not attend any kind of formal education.

The situation is especially critical at the high school level, where a minority of refugee households choose to enrol their children; in other words, 79% of the children between 15 and 17 years of age do not attend school.

Regarding the other population groups, enrolment rates for IDP children also tend to be relatively low, although without reaching the critical levels of the refugee group.

Rates for the host community remain high in spite of the financial constraints faced by the education system, in terms of a lack of sufficient funds for teachers' salaries and for maintaining the quality of the education provided (in some cases, these challenges have led to the temporary closures of schools).

There is a clear division between Syrian refugee children and other groups. Enrolment rates for refugees are substantially low, 28% of the children between 6 and 14 years of age do not attend any kind of formal education 79% of the children between 15 and 17 years of age do not attend school.



Dabin city, Zakho, Duhok, Urban IDPs living in unfinished buildings. 2014- R. Rasheed, UNHCR

Figure 34. Gross enrolment rate in basic education and high school per stratum and gender





Figure 35. Gross enrolment rate in basic education and high school per population group and gender²³.



23. Basic education for the case of IDPs integrates primary education (grades 1 to 6) and intermediate education (grades 7 to 9).

8. CONCLUSIONS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. HOUSING SITUATION

- **Local authorities should create incentives for the development of affordable housing.** Low-income families are significantly affected by the lack of access to housing with affordable rents and, as a consequence, overcrowding and eviction rates tend to be high.

One way to decrease average rents in urban areas is to increase the supply of housing. In the past, governorate authorities initiated new housing projects for low-income families in Duhok, but the investment ceased due to the financial crisis.

One solution to this situation would be to create financial incentives and regulations in order to involve private stakeholders in starting such housing developments. Local authorities have also issued new ordinances aiming to request landlords to automatically reduce their rents. This point deserves more attention as to how it might be best implemented.

- **Humanitarian actors should scale up support to vulnerable families that rent.** Many families, whether IDPs, refugees, or host community members, are currently struggling to pay their rent, which leads to indebtedness or constant relocation, in search of cheaper housing.

In order to prevent this through support, two instruments can be used that have already been tested in some areas: targeted cash-for-rent programmes²⁴, and medium-scale rehabilitation or refurbishment of buildings in exchange for temporary rent-free housing (with the involvement of governorate authorities in reinforcing the trust of property owners). This must be matched with greater support from donors for predictable and longer-term funding for well targeted cash assistance.

- Shelter and protection actors should scale up legal assistance for families to report eviction situations, and local authorities should regulate and promote written rental agreements. The districts of Duhok and Sumel have the highest rate of households evicted, especially affecting IDPs (20% households evicted in the last 6 months).

For displaced households, access to legal support is relatively more difficult, and evicted households would benefit from legal assistance to report unfair evictions or to find a negotiated solution with landlords, as well as to find new accommodation.

In addition, as most rental agreements are verbal throughout the governorate, there needs to be advocacy from public authorities to enforce written agreements that would better protect both tenants and property owners.

- Property owners, shelter actors, and local authorities must collaborate in generating adequate solutions for households living in unfinished buildings, especially in Sheikhan and Akre.

A total of 31% and 17% of IDP households in these districts, respectively, live in unfinished or abandoned buildings.

Some NGOs have launched programmes for installing doors, windows, and water/sanitation facilities in these locations, but the involvement of all parties can support these families to access a more adequate housing situation.

24. Such cash programmes must ensure that they do not generate inflationary effects on the rental market or trigger a surge of potential renters into already overcrowded areas. See for instance, ALNAP (2015) "Technical guidelines: Conditional cash for rent".

2. SOCIAL COHESION IN URBAN AREAS

- **Local authorities are encouraged to facilitate spaces and events for interaction between host and displaced communities, in order to strengthen the relations between neighbours, mitigate social tensions, and enable peaceful co-existence.**

FGDs with host community members and IDPs revealed a significant lack of trust between these communities in urban areas. The role played by communal spaces and joint events (such as community halls, sport activities, or youth/women's groups) as points of connection between residents of all groups can be further developed.

It is also important to carry out projects that benefit the whole community, as some of the divisions between groups pointed out in the assessment were linked to a perceived 'unfairness' of the assistance. Humanitarian actors can also contribute to this effect through the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that create physical spaces that benefit the entire community.

The feedback from implementing partners suggested, however, that QIPs are not yet systematised effectively in order to cover the general needs of the population.

- Local authorities, with the support of civil society organisations, should promote programmes offering Kurdish language classes to IDPs. A frequent comment in the FGDs with the host community and IDPs referred to language barriers as a reason for the lack of interactions between the communities.

Offering and encouraging Kurdish-language learning would ease the adaptation of IDPs into the new environment and enhance interactions and co-existence.

3. DURABLE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

- Livelihood actors should partner with the local chamber of commerce in order to enhance vocational training programmes.

Given that a majority of the adult population currently unable to find employment have very low education levels and do not have labour experience, their re-enter into the labour market, either as employees or self-employed, can be aided by providing training on craftsmanship and manual skills (and funding for basic equipment if necessary).

- **UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and the local chamber of commerce can cooperate in order to facilitate refugees to develop joint ventures with host community members.**

Given their refugee status, Syrian individuals cannot set up businesses in non-camp settings. An alternative system for entrepreneurial refugees is to create joint ventures with local entrepreneurs.

This requires a platform that supports refugees in identifying, linking, and partnering with locals, ensuring at the same time the legal protection of the refugee partner.

- A stronger presence of micro-finance actors in the governorate is necessary for longer-term livelihoods. Although the absence of micro-finance actors is an extended problem in the whole of Iraq, livelihood interventions in the area of business development would strongly benefit from this type of funding.

4. CASH ASSISTANCE MECHANISMS

- **Humanitarian and development actors together with local authorities have to work on the coordination of different cash mechanisms and on ensuring its sustainability in the longer term, while avoiding double social protection systems.**

Cash assistance is quickly becoming one of the most important response mechanisms to the displacement crisis in the Kurdistan Region. In the Duhok Governorate, many programmes implemented by different partners co-exist: cash for rent, cash for education, cash for food, cash for work, and unconditional cash payments.

This funding is provided in addition to the payments that the local authorities give to vulnerable families in the host community as part of the public safety net. As the amount of money disbursed and the number of families targeted increase, it is important to strengthen the coordination between partners and gradually converge to a common understanding.

Feedback from participants in the analysis workshop held in Duhok with all partners including local authorities indicated that there is plenty of room for further collaboration and coordination.

In addition, to guarantee the sustainability of these safety nets and avoid the proliferation of parallel structures, discussions should be initiated between humanitarian and development actors and the governorate's Department of Labour and Social Affairs (DOLSA) in order to better link and converge the different cash mechanisms with existing governmental social protection systems.

- Humanitarian actors working in cash assistance should consider implementing a holistic area-based programme and target vulnerable families across population groups, independently of their being IDPs, refugees, or members of the host community.

The data on the living conditions of the host community has been increasing recently, and it has revealed that there is a significant percentage of the population in a relatively vulnerable situation (showing that vulnerability is present across all groups).

This warrants the targeting of host community households in addition to IDPs and refugees through an area-based approach. Innovative strategies can be applied that focus on well-targeted pockets of poverty across the Duhok Governorate, where all population groups face similar situations. Coordination with planning authorities such as the statistics office can be sought for this purpose.

- The Duhok Governorate's DOLSA is encouraged to methodologically enrich their current welfare system and criteria in order to adequately target the vulnerable population and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its programming.

Previous reviews²⁵ highlighted the need of DOLSA to upgrade the functioning of their safety net by easing, clarifying, and simplifying the procedure by which a household is entitled to assistance. Collaboration with humanitarian partners delivering cash assistance in the Duhok Governorate can generate useful lessons for DOLSA.

25. See for instance World Bank (2015), Economic and social impact assessment of the Syrian crisis and ISIS on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

5. EDUCATION CHALLENGE

- **Local authorities should collaborate with education partners in order to implement bridging programmes that facilitate re-enrolment into education (either formal or non-formal) for children and youth not currently attending school.**

Many children have lost one or two years of education due to displacement. Re-enrolment poses a challenge due to the need to adapt courses to their needs (e.g., intensive courses offered over shorter durations, remedial courses to allow students to make up learning they have missed, holding classes in the evening after work, etc.).

In some cases, re-enrolment may pose a challenge due to bureaucratic procedures required to access educational programs (e.g., proof of education achievements in Syria or the rest of Iraq to re-access education).

Efforts in this direction would significantly contribute to the achievement of the goals of the initiative ‘**No Lost Generation**’, which was launched by a number of international actors with respect to the Syrian crisis, but which can be extended to cover also Iraq’s displacement crisis.

- Humanitarian actors should evaluate how to scale up programmes providing incentives to families in order to prevent students from missing school.

The percentage of children not attending school remains prominent for IDPs and dramatically high for refugees. While some reasons are linked to obstacles in access, such as insufficient capacity or availability of education facilities, other reasons refer to an inability to afford costs linked to education as well as a preference to work instead of studying (often children are forced by their family to the latter).

Work is on-going through some programmes in the Duhok Governorate that provide households with cash in exchange of taking the children to school, as well as other programmes offering households assistance in terms of school materials and transportation.

Other solutions could consist of generating a possibility for the children to divide their time between work in a more protected, less abusive environment, and a flexible attendance to school.

- Local authorities, in partnership with humanitarian actors, should expand the provision of education in Sheikhan, Bardarash, Akre, but also in Zakho, by building quick, temporary, and cost-effective facilities.

These areas present important bottlenecks for the provision of education, especially to IDPs and refugees, who follow a different education curriculum than the host community.

The need to increase the facilities is urgent in this sense, and well-targeted investments by humanitarian actors such as Quick Impact Projects in the field of education can contribute to increasing the provision of public education services in the most unserved areas, as part of a rapid, emergency response.

6. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING FOR A MEDIUM- / LONG-TERM RESPONSE

- **Development actors are encouraged to support their counter-parts in governmental departments in terms of infrastructure, hardware, or technological support, gradually phasing out other financially non-sustainable assistance.**

The development of many new public facilities in the areas of health care, education, or water provision have been paralysed due to the financial crisis, and it may become problematic in a crisis situation, especially in the case of health care.

It has to be taken to account that the majority of IDPs and refugees are expected to remain in the Duhok Governorate for the next decade at least, given the high percentage of households not willing to return or only willing to return upon reconstruction of the infrastructures.

Longer-term support to Duhok's institutional capacity can come in the form of infrastructure (rehabilitation of facilities or quick development of new ones) or operational capacity (e.g., for health care, it may involve mobile medical clinics, ambulances, equipment, while for education it can involve transportation funding offered to teachers).

This requires a gradual shift from the short-term funding of public functions (e.g., payment of incentives for work, or funding of solid waste collection – although it may be currently inevitable in order to avoid major problems such as health issues) to longer-term aims such as the ones described here.

- Development actors are also encouraged to collaborate with their government counter-parts in providing upgrades to their technical capacity and expertise.

Apart from supporting public authorities in upgrading their physical capacity, it is important to contribute to the building of capacity by placing technical experts and qualified staff within government agencies. Human resources are an important component of service delivery and, therefore, this recommendation aims to achieve an institutional change from within the system by the transfer of skills, methods, and procedures.

- International actors are encouraged to work more closely through local NGOs and local civil society organizations when it comes to implementing programmes. A longer-term approach to responding to the crisis would also benefit from a gradual reorientation of activities away from direct implementation by international actors, to a more enabling role that allows local non-governmental actors to upgrade and develop their capacities²⁶.

Even though it means ceding some 'power' on the ground, local actors are the ones that will continue the action in the coming years.

26. See for instance ODI (2016) Time to let go, a three-point proposal to change the humanitarian system.

7. STAKEHOLDER COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION IN PLANNING

- **UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities should enhance their communication efforts with beneficiaries and communities in general in order to increase awareness, legitimacy, effectiveness, and accountability to aid recipients.**

Keeping a sense of fairness in the assistance distribution, improving participation by the communities, and carefully explaining the work implemented can also be key aspects in shifting programs into long-term approaches.

The perceptions of both the host community and the displaced population on humanitarian intervention can sometimes be negative due to a lack of communication. The displaced population in urban settings reported that there is sometimes a lack of clarity on how assistance is delivered, usually distorted by rumours.

It was suggested by some groups that temples, mosques, or public spaces such as hospitals should be used as centres for information dissemination. Most importantly, in the case of the host community, FGDs showed that they generally felt neglected when it came to assistance or attention, and this creates mistrust.

In this sense, it was strongly suggested that both local authorities and NGOs keep regular FGDs with host communities as well as their regular communication with direct beneficiaries. Additional efforts are needed in order to develop strong 'Communication with Communities' strategies.

- UN agencies and international NGOs should communicate and advocate with donors for a longer-term commitment and a shift in funding priorities. Funds allotted to programming are frequently targeted to emergency purposes, which in some cases hinder the shift into longer-term interventions. Therefore, it is important to communicate the needs and benefits that more development-oriented programmes can bring to ease the crisis in the Duhok Governorate, and in Iraq in general. For this to happen, it is also important that, inside UN agencies and the NGOs, the operational areas dedicated to emergency responses and those dedicated to development and stabilisation are better coordinated.

- Humanitarian actors should integrate the local authorities (and related agencies) as often as possible in their programme design and implementation in order to avoid parallel structures.

This also creates benefits in terms of producing more sustainable programmes that can later be better integrated into the work of public authorities, in addition to ensuring a greater buy-in of the local population.

- All stakeholders should gradually move towards a greater harmonisation of data needs and a coordination of the data available. Data dispersion, conversely, negatively affects programme planning. For instance, generating and sharing data in order to track the movement of refugees and IDPs, and updating lists of beneficiaries, can be helpful to eliminate duplicate cash assistance.

In this sense, stakeholders would benefit from collaboration between different information management offices and actors such as the Duhok Statistical Office (which has a longer-term focus in data gathering) and the REACH Initiative (which is relatively more focused on emergency and needs assessment).

ANNEXES

A. Household Survey Questionnaire

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Cover	Location	A1	Filled by enumerator prior to interview: A1_1 Governorate: A1_2 District: A1_3 Subdistrict: A1_4 Neighbourhood: A1_5 Type of household: A1_6 Household number:	A1_1: Duhok A1_2: Pick from list A1_3: Pick from list A1_4: Pick from list A1_5: 1.Refugee, 2. IDP, 3. Local A1_6: [coding to be defined]	n/a
		A2	Name of enumerator Number of enumerator		n/a
	Meta data	A3	Introduction of survey & consent for interview		n/a
		A4	Interview logistics: Would you allow us to do an interview with you?	1. Yes 2. No	n/a
		A4	Filled by enumerator: Who is the respondent? (in relation to the household head)	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. Brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
Roster	Household composition (ROSTER)	B1	What is the first name - starting with the head of the household.		All
		B2	What is [Name's] relationship to the head of household?	1. Head 2. Spouse of head 3. Son/daughter 4. brother/sister (sibling) 5. Father/mother 6. Son/daughter in law 7. Grand child 8. Father/mother in law 9. Other relatives 10. No relation	All
		B3	Is [Name] male or female?	1. Male 2. Female	All
		B4	How old is [Name]?	0- less than a year 95+ over 95 years old 99+ don't know	All
		B5	What is [Name's] marital status?	1. Never married 2. Married 3. Widowed 4. Separated 5. Divorced	All Age 12+
		B6	During the past 12 months, how many months did [Name] live in this household?	Number of months write 0 if less than 1 month	All
		B7	What is [Name's] nationality? (multiple response)	1. Iraqi 2. Syrian 3. Other	All
		B8	What is [Name's] main ethnic or cultural background?	1. Kurd 2. Arab 3. Turkman 4. Chaldean 5. Syriac 6. Assyrian 7. Armenian 8. Other 9. Prefer not to answer	All
	Education: 6+	C1	Can [Name] read and write?	1. can read and write 2. can read only 3. cannot read nor write	All Age 6+
	C2	Is [Name] currently attending school?	1. yes, 4 days a week or more 2. yes, less than 4 days a week 3. no	All Age 6+	

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Roster (cont.)	Education: 6+ (cont.)	C3	(if yes) what level?	1. Primary (1-6) 2. Secondary (7-9) 3. Highschool (10-12) 4. Institute 5. University 6. Postgraduate	All Age 6+ Attending
		C4	(if less than 4 days a week, or not attending & less than 18 years) What is the main reason for not attending school regularly, or not attending at all?	1. No easily accessible school 2. Teaching is of poor quality/ teachers absent 3. School time is not flexible 4. Mistreatment by the instructor or other students 5. Has to work to support the family 6. Family disapproves/does not think the child needs to study 7. Early marriage 8. Sickness or disability, 9. Helping in house chores 10. Schools were full 11. Schools were not accepting the student 12. Schools are mixed gender 13. Does not understand the language 14. It costs too much 15. Missing documentation 16. Current situation is perceived as temporary 17. Schools are not functioning/closed 18. Other reasons	All Age 6 - 18 Irregularly attending
		C5	What is the highest level of education ever completed by [Name]?	1. None 2. Primary (1-6) 3. Secondary (7-9) 4. Highschool (10-12) 5. Institute 6. University 7. Postgraduate	All Age 6+
		C6	Has [Name] ever attended any kind of vocational training? (e.g. sewing, carpentry, mobile phone repair)	1. Yes 2. No	All Age 15+
	Employment: 15+	D1	What is [Name's] main work status in the last 30 days?	1. Employer 2. Self-employed (Kurdish: working owner) 3. Paid employee 4. Unpaid family worker 5. Student who also works 6. Full-time student 7. Home maker 8. Don't work, looking for work (has worked previously) 9. Don't work, looking for work (never worked before) 10. Not looking for a job because of lack of papers 11. Not looking for a job due to frustration/discouragement 12. Not interested in working 13. Retired / too old 14. Disability/illness 15. Under age 16. Other	All Age 15+
		D2	What is [Name's] occupation in main job during the last 30 days?	1. Managers 2. Professionals 3. Technicians and associate professionals 4. Clerical support workers 5. Service and sales workers 6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 7. Craft and related trade workers 8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers 9. Elementary occupation 10. Armed forces occupation	All Age 15+ Labour force active

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Member (cont.)	Employment: 15+ (cont.)	D3	D3_1 In what industry did [Name] work in his/her main job during the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2. Mining and quarrying 3. Manufacturing 4. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 5. Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 6. Construction 7. Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles 8. Transportation and storage 9. Accommodation and food service activities 10. Information and communication 11. Financial and insurance activities 12. Real estate activities 13. Professional, scientific and technical activities 14. Administrative and support service activity 15. Public administration and defense, compulsory social security 16. Education 17. Human health and social activities 18. Arts, entertainment and recreation 19. Other service activities 20. Activities of households as employers, undifferentiated goods and services-producing activities of households for own use 21. Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 	All Age 15+ Labour force active
			D3_2 In which sector has [name] worked in the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Public sector 2. Local private sector 3. International private sector 4. Mixed sector 5. Local non-governmental/non-profit organization 6. International non-governmental/non-profit organization 	
		D4	D4_1 What was [Name's] total cash income (actual or expected) from the work last month? (ICD)?	D4 Amount	All Age 15+ Labour force active
			D4_2 Has [name] experienced any of the following problems concerning payment of salaries/wages during the past 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Delay of payment/non payment 2. Reduction of payment 3. None 	
		D5	D5 Does [Name] have a written work contract or permanent employment for the main work the last 30 days?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know 	All Age 15+ Labour force active
		D6	D6 What is the main method [Name] used when searching or finding a job?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contacted employment office 2. Placed/answered job advertisements 3. Asked friends, relatives or other personal connections 4. Contacted employer directly 5. Tried to find land, workplace, equipment, financial resources/credit to start own business, applied for relevant licenses, permits, etc 6. Went door to door looking for employment 7. Other 	All Age 15+ Labour force active Job seeking
		D7	D7 What is the main reason for why [Name] finds it difficult to, or don't want to, find a job?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Too many people searching for jobs 2. Education/qualifications not matching available jobs 3. Legal issues 4. Available jobs are too far away 5. Discrimination 6. Lack of personal or political connections 7. Don't have enough time to look for work 8. Wages are too low 9. Disability or chronic illness 10. Language barriers 11. Other 	All Age 15+ Labour force active Non job seeking

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population	
		#	Questions	Answer options		
Shelter	Dwelling type	E1	What is the main type of dwelling the household lives in?	1. Apartment/flat 2. House/villa 3. Informal settlement/ tent/ makeshift shelter 4. Caravan 5. Collective center 6. Unfinished/abandoned building 7. Hotel/motel 8. Religious building 9. School 10. Garage/ house annex 11. Other	All	
		E2	Does your household share this dwelling with other households?	1. Yes 2. No	All	
	Tenure conditions & security	E3	What is the main tenure status of this dwelling?	1. Owned 2. Rented 3. Housing provided as part of work 4. Hosted with rent 5. Hosted for free 6. Provided dwelling for free 7. Occupied/squatted	All	
		E4	[If owned, or rented] Does someone in the household have a written document for ownership/renting the dwelling?	1. Yes 2. No	All Renting or owning	
		E5	[If dwelling is rented] how much rent in IQD do you pay each month to stay in this dwelling including both rent on the dwelling and the land underneath?	Amount	All Renting	
		E6	How many rooms total does this dwelling have (including bathrooms/toilet)?	Total number of rooms	All Except living in tent	
		E7	How many rooms are used for sleeping?	Total number of rooms	All Except living in tent	
		E8	Has your household experienced eviction from its dwelling during the past 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All	
		E9	[If experienced eviction last 12 months] What was the main reason for eviction?	1. Haven't paid rent 2. Rent was increased 3. Owner no longer wanted to rent out 4. Demolition 5. Development projects 6. Neighbourhood pressure to leave 7. Other	All Evicted	
		E10	[If experienced eviction last 12 months] From which neighborhood was your household evicted? Second line (neighbourhood/area and city/town)	free text in Kurdish/ install kurdish keyboard on the tablet		
		Access to services	Access to health	F1	How do you rate your household members' access to private or public health centres/hospitals?	1. Very good 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Insufficient 5. Not accessible
	F2			What is the main reasons for rating low on access to health care?	1. Very good 2. Good 3. Satisfactory 4. Insufficient 5. Not accessible 6. Too far from household location 7. Can't afford 8. Too low capacity of clinic 9. Low quality of services provided 10. Services provided is not relevant 11. Language barrier 12. Discrimination 13. Health facility not functioning/closed 14. Other	All Low rating of access

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Access to services (cont.)	Access to energy	F3	What is the main source for energy of cooking for your household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public grid electricity Shared generator Private generator Gas Other sources No cooking 	All
		F4_1	What is the primary source of energy for heating for this household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public grid electricity Shared generator Private generator Gas Kerosene stove Other sources No heating 	All
		F4_2	If any, what is the secondary source of energy used for heating for this household?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Public grid electricity Shared generator Private generator Gas Kerosene stove Other sources No heating 	
Livelihoods and coping mechanisms	Household economy (income sources, expenditures, debts)	G1	Which of the following sources of money did your household have in the past 30 days, and how much money did you have from each source in the past 30 days? (IQD) (If the household did not have an indicated income source write 0/zero blank), otherwise write the amount in IQD besides each source.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Income from wages/salaries Income from business earnings (incl very small and household enterprises) Support from family members abroad (remittances) Pensions Assistance (in cash) from government/UN/NGO Income from renting out Selling off own assets Using loans (formal and from family/friends) Using savings Charity (e.g. Zakat or support from neighbours etc...) Begging Other 	All
		G2	Do any of the members in your households have outstanding loans/ borrowed money that he/she has to repay?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No 	All
		G3	What is the main purpose of the household loan(s)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Business-related Personal consumption needs (e.g. food and clothes) Purchase and improvement of dwelling Religious/wedding/burial Consumer durables (e.g. car) Cash-lending Farm/agriculture purpose For paying housing rent Other Don't know 	All indebted
		G4_1	During the last 12 months did your household receive any assistance in cash or kind?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Yes No 	All Received assistance
		G4_2	(if yes) What is the main source of assistance that your household received?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> UN aid programs Government benefit NGO Charity Friends or relatives Other Did not receive any 	

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Livelihoods and coping mechanisms (cont.)	Coping mechanisms	G5	Did your household experience any of the following economic crisis during the past 12 months? if more, select which of the following had the economically most severe impact for your household second line (read through the whole list to the respondent)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Unexpected loss of job or shutdown of business 2. Involuntary reduction in working hours 3. Non-payment or delay in payment of wages 4. Cut-off or decrease in support from friends/relatives (remittances) 5. Increase in cost of housing rent 6. Forced eviction or loss of assets 7. Loss of livestock, crops, or other agricultural assets 8. Death of a household member 9. Serious illness or injury to a household member (including yourself) 10. Involuntary breakup of family 11. Reduced or suspended assistance 12. Savings ran out 13. Other 14. No severe crisis 	All
		G6	What was your household's main response to this crisis in order to cope?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Depended on cash or in-kind assistance from others 2. Relied on own savings 3. Reduced food purchases 4. Reduced expenditures on health/education 5. Employed HH members took on more work or, if not working, household member started working 6. Child taken out of school 7. HH members (inc. children) migrated 8. Loans 9. Sold assets (buildings, land, gold, etc.) 10. Begging 11. Nothing 12. Other 	All With shock
		G7	Did your household have difficulties in paying (housing) rent over the past 6 months?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 	All Renting
	Expenditure	G8	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Food in the past 7 days (in IQD)	Insert amount	All
		G9	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Healthcare (Includes medicines, treatment) past 30 days (in IQD)	Insert amount	All
		G10	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on water and electricity (as utilities) (Water as utility or purchase of water for drinking) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	Insert amount	All
		G11	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Fuel (Propane for cooking; kerosene for heating) and Transportation (Taxis, bus, etc) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	Insert amount	All
		G12	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Education related expenses (School fees, uniforms, supplies) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	Insert amount	All

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Lifelihoods and coping mechanisms (cont.)	Expenditure (cont.)	Q13	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on House/shelter repairs in the past 30 days (in IQD)	insert amount	All
		Q14	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on repaying loan(s) in the past 30 days (in IQD)	insert amount	
		Q15	Please give an approximate amount of your household spending on Other needs in the past 30 days (in IQD)	insert amount	All
Daily interactions	Relations between population groups	H1	What issues are causing divisions between Syrian refugees, IDPs and host community in your area? Second line (select up to two most important issues)	1. There is no division 2. Housing shortages/rent increase 3. Job shortages 4. Overstretched resources (water, food, electricity, etc.) 5. Overstretched public services (education and health) 6. Targeted aid and foreign assistance 7. Ethnic/religious differences 8. Cultural differences	All
	Perceptions of safety and trust	H2	Has any household member experienced being physically harassed within the past 6 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All
	H3	How safe do you consider your neighbourhood?	1. Very safe 2. Safe 3. Unsafe 4. Very unsafe	All	
Migration history and future plans	Migration history	I1	Has your household ever been displaced from your place of origin?	1. Yes 2. No	all
		I2_1 [(if yes) Where is your place of origin?	I2 date	I2_1 all pop	
		I2_2 Which governorate in Iraq is your place of origin?	I2 Governorates of Iraq		
		I2_3 From which district?	Districts dropdown	All displaced from Ninawa, Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah Aldin	
		I3_1 [(if yes) When was your household displaced from your place of origin? Second line (the date of the most recent displacement)	take off the whole calendar and keep only the year try again and again		
		I3_2 [(if Iraq and displaced) was your household displaced from your place of origin after December 2013?	1. Yes 2. No		
		I4 [(if displaced) Did your household come directly to your current location?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqs displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced	
I5 [(if no) how many times have you in total moved?					
I6 [(if displaced) Did all the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, arrive with you to Duhol Governorate?	1. yes 2. no	Iraqs displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced			

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Migration history and future plans (cont.)	Migration history (cont.)	I7	[(if no) Which of the people who composed your household before being displaced from your place of origin, did not come with you? [Multiple answers allowed]	1. Spouse / cohabitant 2. Sons/daughters 3. Parents/Grandparents 4. Siblings 5. Other relatives 6. Others non-relatives	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Household split
	Mobility	I8	When did your household arrive to this location/neighbourhood?	1. 2016 2. 2015 3. 2014 4. 2013 5. 2012-2010 6. Before 2010	All
		I9	What was the reason for your household to choose the current location for residence? [(For displaced households)]	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also here 7. Cost of living/rent in this location is lower 8. Better safety location 9. Bigger/better home 10. Location is safer 11. Other	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		I10	Are there persons in your household who have left to live in another place within the last 12 months?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		I11	[(if yes) why did this person(s) move?]	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also there 7. Marriage 8. Cost of living/ rent is lower 9. Location there is safer 10. Bigger/better home there 11. Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility 12. His land and/or house there 13. Other	All With moved members within last 12 months
		I12	Does anyone in your household have firm plans to move away from your current location within the next six months? (either within KRI or abroad)	1. Yes 2. No	All
	Future plans	I13	[(if yes) Where are you/other household members planning to go? (if more members are moving to different places, answer this question about the most economically active member)]	1. Within KRI 2. Elsewhere in Iraq 3. Neighbouring countries 4. Return to place of origin 5. Europe 6. Other	All Plan to move
		I14	What is the main reason for choosing to move there?	1. Better employment opportunities 2. Availability/better quality of education opportunities 3. Availability/better quality of health services 4. Availability of humanitarian assistance 5. To join other family members 6. Relatives/friends are also there 7. Marriage 8. Lower rent there 9. Location there is safer 10. Expecting to be evicted by landlord 11. Expecting to be evicted by municipality or local government 12. Bigger/better home there 13. Do not feel comfortable here/experience discrimination/hostility 14. His land and/or house there 15. Other	All Plan to move
		I15	[(if displaced) Would you consider returning to your place of origin?]	1. yes 2. no 3. don't know	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced

A. Household Survey Questionnaire (Cont.)

Theme	Sub-Theme	QUESTIONS FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY			Responding population
		#	Questions	Answer options	
Migration history and future plans (cont.)	Future plans (cont.)	I16_1	(If yes) What is the most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	1. Liberation of area 2. Reclaim of house/ land 3. Reconstruction of house 4. Financial/ in kind assistance 5. Other	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced Consider return
		I16_2	What is the second most important condition that should be in place, before your household would consider returning to your location of origin?	1. Liberation of area 2. Reclaim of house/ land 3. Reconstruction of house 4. Financial/ in kind assistance 5. Other	
Documentation	Documentation	J1	Does the head of household have any of the following documents? (multiple response)	1. nationality certificate (Iraqis) 2. civil ID (Iraqis) 3. passport (ALL) 4. POG card (Iraqis) 5. residency permit (IDPs and Refugees) 6. Household card of address (Information card) (Iraqis) 7. UNHCR certificate (Refugees) 8. none (all)	All
		J2	(For refugees and IDPs who do not have a residency permit) What is the main reason for not having a residency permit?	1. Unaware of the process 2. Don't know how to apply 3. Cost, distance or difficulty of reaching the Assaysh/issuing office 4. See no benefit in having a permit 5. Waiting for the permit 6. Application rejected 7. Planning to apply 8. Missing documents 9. Other	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 and Syrian Refugees
Housing, Land and Property	Housing, Land and Property	K1_1	Did your household leave any assets in your place of origin?	1. Yes 2. No	Iraqis displaced after Dec. 2013 Syrians displaced
		K1_2	Which of the following assets did your household leave in your place of origin?	1. housing 2. non agricultural land 3. agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment 4. business assets 5. jewelry/savings/cash 6. car(s) 7. other 8. prefer not to answer	
		K1_3	(If yes) Did you leave \$(asset) in the care of someone else?	1. Yes 2. No	All
		K1_4	Do you have proof of ownership (and currently in safe hands) to reclaim or recover \$(asset)?	1. Yes 2. No	
	Assets in current location	K2	Do you currently own any of the following Assets in your current location?	1. housing 2. non agricultural land 3. agricultural land/livestock/farm equipment 4. business assets 5. jewelry/savings/cash 6. car(s) 7. other 8. prefer not to answer 9. Don't own	
		K3	Do you wish to participate in Focus Group Discussions related to the study in about two months?	1. Yes 2. No	
End		K3_2	Phone number?		
		L1	Register GPS coordinates		

B. Focus Group Discussion Question Guide

Topic 1	Questions
Daily life in the neighbourhood- cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In which ways do you think that your neighbourhood has changed over the past few years? And how do you explain this change? • How safe is your neighbourhood? Are these situations where you or others family members do not feel safe? Has your neighbourhood become more or less safe the past years, and how do you explain this? • How do you think that the arrival of IDPs affects the neighbourhood? • In which ways/situations do you interact with the IDPs? • Do you see the return of IDPs as a realistic option? If not, which options do you see? • If the IDPs stay for several years, what would be the best way to allow for it? • Are there situations where you are treated differently than others in the community? For example: Do you think that employers treat people differently? Do you think that schools treat people (parent, students) differently? Do you think that health centers treat people differently? In which ways? • What is important in order to get a job? Who in this neighbourhood finds jobs easier than others and why? • We have found out from a recent household survey that very few women are working; why do you think this is the case?
Topic 2	Questions:
Migration intentions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who are planning to move abroad, e.g. to Europe? • Are there people/families in this neighbourhood who have already migrated? • When you think about the families you know/hear about, which family members are usually migrating?
Topic 3	Questions:
Views on the economic situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When you think about the current economic crisis, what are the most important effects on the everyday life of families in this neighborhood? • How do families cope with the difficult economic situation? • What do you think are the main reasons for the current economic crisis?

C. Statistical Analysis of the Factors Affecting Willingness to Return to Area of Origin

The household and area-based factors that determine the relative household vulnerability situation are explored with a basic linear regression model. The independent variable of the model is the household expenditure per capita (used as a proxy for vulnerability). The set of explanatory variables used are the following:

- Gender of the household head, binary variable comparing female headed-households with male-headed ones.
- Dependency ratio, a value dividing dependent household members and non-dependent members.
- Overcrowding ratio, a value dividing the rooms in the house by the household size.
- Rent costs ratio, a percentage dividing the monthly rent (if household is renting) by total household expenses.
- Emergency indebtedness, binary variable comparing households with emergency debts (as a coping mechanism) and the rest of households.
- Non-sustainable income ratio, a percentage dividing the recurrent income from non-sustainable sources by total household income.
- District's ratio of private sector jobs, a value for the number of individuals in the private sector per each 1,000 inhabitants.
- District's impact of financial crisis, a percentage of households that experienced job losses or salary reduction.
- District's human capital levels, a value for the number of adult individuals without completed basic education per each 1,000 adult inhabitants.
- District's unemployment levels, a value for the number of adult individuals searching for a job per each 1,000 inhabitants.
- District's influx of displaced persons, a percentage of the total number of IDP and refugee households over total location's households.

Results of the regression model:

Explanatory variable	Coefficient	Standard error
Female headed-household	-0.117 **	0.057
Dependency ratio	-0.063 ***	0.019
Overcrowding ratio	0.630 ***	0.036
Rent costs ratio	-0.279 ***	0.107
Emergency indebtedness	-0.158 ***	0.044
Non-sustainable income ratio	-0.404 ***	0.072
District's ratio of private sector jobs	0.014 ***	0.005
District's impact of financial crisis	-0.027 ***	0.007
District's human capital levels	-0.003 ***	0.000
District's unemployment levels	0.015 **	0.006
District's influx of displaced persons	0.002	0.000
Number of observations (N)		1,157

Note: dependent variable is the log of household per capita expenses; * denotes significance at 10% margin of error, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.

D. Selected Data Overview

Variables, Percent	Total				High density areas				Medium density areas				Low density areas				
	Total	Idjega	EP	Host	Total	Idjega	EP	Host	Total	Idjega	EP	Host	Total	Idjega	EP	Host	
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS (HOUSEHOLDS)																	
Household size (persons)	1 - 3	12	27	14	11	11	27	11	9	16	28	18	11	11	18	18	7
	4 - 5	44	56	43	43	48	59	48	47	37	47	46	37	40	54	34	47
	6 - 9	20	15	32	35	31	10	31	33	35	23	26	39	36	18	38	36
	10 and above	11	2	11	12	19	2	11	11	11	2	11	13	14	3	12	16
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households by sex of household head	Average sex	8.4	4.8	6.2	6.6	6.2	4.7	6.2	6.4	6.3	4.9	6.0	6.5	6.8	6.1	6.5	7.0
	Male	92	92	92	93	92	92	92	94	92	92	92	92	92	92	92	92
	Female	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION B: DEMOGRAPHICS (INDIVIDUALS)																	
Population by sex	Male	52	51	52	52	53	50	53	53	52	52	52	49	52	48	51	53
	Female	48	49	48	48	47	50	47	47	47	48	48	47	47	50	49	47
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population by age (completed years)	0 - 4	14	19	15	14	14	18	14	14	16	20	15	18	14	20	16	13
	5 - 9	8	9	10	8	8	10	8	8	10	8	13	10	10	12	11	10
	10 - 14	12	10	14	13	13	9	12	13	14	11	16	14	14	16	14	14
	15 - 19	11	8	10	10	11	8	10	10	10	8	10	10	12	7	11	12
	20 - 24	12	13	13	11	11	13	14	11	12	14	16	13	12	9	15	12
	25 - 29	7	10	8	7	7	9	8	7	7	11	7	7	7	15	8	7
	30 - 34	14	14	12	14	14	11	12	16	12	11	14	12	11	18	11	13
	35 - 39	10	8	8	10	10	8	8	11	8	9	7	10	11	8	8	10
	40 - 44	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	4	2	3	5	4	4	4
	45 - 49	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2
	50+	2	2	2	3	2	1	2	3	4	2	4	4	2	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (8 years+) by ethnicity	Kurd	96	100	96	98	94	99	81	90	87	100	84	100	98	100	96	100
	Arab	2	0	0	1	4	1	13	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Christian	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Other	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Prefer not to answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
**The Jews/Christian/Agribusiness/Children/Refugees/Returnees and Americans																	
SECTION C: EDUCATION																	
Population (8 - 24 y. a.) by full attendance or with less than attendance of school	Yes, 8 days a week or more	25	40	38	37	36	40	38	36	36	40	45	33	31	34	36	39
	Yes, less than 8 days a week	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	No	26	60	42	59	26	60	32	34	34	60	51	37	29	66	64	21
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (8 years+) currently attending school by level	Preschool, grade 1-4	47	37	54	44	44	35	50	43	37	33	57	49	49	54	62	45
	Intermediate, grade 5-8	28	16	23	26	27	16	23	26	26	16	24	25	23	9	22	23
	High school, grade 10-12	10	8	17	30	26	6	20	20	19	8	16	20	19	0	11	21
	Technical	2	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	3	0	2	3
	University	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	7	4	2	2	5	7	0	2
	Postgraduate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (15 years+) by highest level of school/level completed	None	26	26	36	27	18	24	24	17	41	26	30	42	36	38	47	38
	Intermediate, grade 1-4	24	31	28	23	29	20	26	23	21	26	37	24	24	34	31	32
	Intermediate, grade 5-8	21	21	17	23	24	15	22	25	26	17	12	21	17	18	12	18
	High school, grade 10-12	12	13	10	13	18	14	14	17	6	14	5	8	9	8	7	10
	Technical	6	4	4	7	8	4	6	10	2	4	2	3	5	3	2	6
	University	7	5	5	7	8	0	8	8	3	2	2	4	8	3	1	8
Postgraduate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION D: EMPLOYMENT																	
Population (15 years+) by main work status last 30 days	Employer	7	0	0	7	9	2	11	8	6	4	4	9	5	0	7	4
	Self-employed	0	0	2	5	4	0	3	7	3	1	2	3	3	0	1	4
	Paid employees	26	34	24	25	26	32	22	24	26	41	35	26	27	28	27	28
	Unpaid family worker	1	3	1	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	2	1
	Student who also works	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Full-time student	24	3	18	37	26	3	23	26	19	4	12	21	24	0	12	37
	Home maker	30	38	38	28	26	35	31	27	35	43	40	33	38	40	37	28
	Unemployed, looking for work (has worked previously)	2	0	4	2	2	0	2	2	2	2	4	1	4	0	0	3
	Unemployed, looking for work (never worked before)	2	0	2	2	2	7	2	1	2	1	2	3	2	4	2	2
	Not looking for a job because of lack of papers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Not looking for a job because frustrated, discouraged	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Not interested in working	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
	Out-of-town	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Unusually ill	2	0	4	2	2	0	4	1	1	4	3	3	3	2	3	2
Under age	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Population (15 years+) by occupation at main work last 30 days	Manager	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Professional	0	25	6	6	16	40	10	13	0	0	0	0	4	2	1	6
	Technical and associate professional	4	0	4	4	5	7	2	5	4	10	6	3	4	20	6	3
	Chemical support workers	7	1	6	7	6	1	6	10	6	2	3	6	3	4	3	3
	Service and sales workers	14	10	11	15	5	3	6	5	27	16	15	31	20	23	14	23
	Field agricultural, forestry and fishery workers	4	3	3	5	6	1	1	6	2	4	0	4	3	17	8	1
	Craft and related trade work	10	16	27	11	4	10	8	4	36	17	16	20	16	17	27	18
	Plant and machine operators and assemblers	3	3	4	3	2	2	3	2	8	6	9	8	1	2	3	1
	Elementary occupation	27	10	26	26	37	15	14	37	4	5	1	4	25	12	13	29
	Armed forces occupation	17	4	10	18	16	4	10	17	13	5	11	14	27	3	16	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

Data are weighted. Source: DHS/INMCR 2016

D. Selected Data Overview (Cont.)

Variables Percent	Total				High density areas				Medium density areas				Low density areas			
	Total	Rutgers	EP	Host	Total	Rutgers	EP	Host	Total	Rutgers	EP	Host	Total	Rutgers	EP	Host
SECTION D (cont.)																
Population (15 years+) by total actual or expected income from work last 30 days (200)	0 - 99	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	100 - 499	53	50	57	53	50	51	49	49	57	70	62	52	57	60	60
	500 - 999	26	30	25	24	27	49	26	27	25	22	31	36	23	27	26
	1000 - 4999	16	1	9	12	12	1	11	12	8	0	7	12	9	3	9
	5000 and more	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (15 years+) by problem experienced in payment of salaries/wages last 30 days	Delay of payments / non-payment	38	17	35	38	38	21	28	42	34	0	25	24	34	38	25
	Reduction of payment	32	25	33	32	26	34	24	27	28	28	35	38	28	44	24
	None	30	58	49	29	36	45	43	29	38	55	40	36	27	19	38
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Population (15 years+) by having a written contract for the main work last 30 days	Yes	43	9	24	32	42	32	30	48	21	1	19	24	33	21	27
	No	57	91	75	68	58	68	70	52	79	99	81	76	67	79	73
	Do not know	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION E: HOUSING																
Households by share of dwelling with others	Yes	28	29	46	23	29	25	42	24	31	36	53	23	21	24	41
	No	72	71	54	77	71	75	58	76	69	64	47	77	79	76	59
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households by written documentation for the income ownership / renting	Yes	60	1	27	73	66	0	29	79	42	3	9	57	64	4	41
	No	40	99	73	27	34	100	71	21	58	97	91	43	36	96	59
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<small>Households such as in rural areas or institutions, camps and other non-permanent resident households are excluded.</small>																
Households by experience of eviction from their dwelling last 12 months	Yes	9	0	12	2	5	7	10	2	2	4	3	3	3	0	1
	No	91	100	88	98	95	93	91	98	98	96	97	98	97	100	99
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households that experienced eviction from dwelling last 12 months by main reason for eviction	Could not pay rent	49	71	68	26	56	62	61	53	39	40	33	0	46	33	66
	Damages to be repaired by renter	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	11	40	67	0	0	0	0
	Eviction	11	4	15	10	14	0	14	20	4	20	0	0	0	0	0
	Development projects	7	0	4	15	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	100
	Neighborhood pressure by owner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Other	28	17	28	26	27	36	29	27	46	0	0	100	26	47	26
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION F: HEALTH ACCESS																
Households by rating of their access to private or public health centers/hospitals	Very good	0	0	0	0	10	2	12	10	0	4	0	1	0	0	2
	Good	88	70	72	92	83	80	85	82	57	40	70	53	40	44	40
	Satisfactory	17	21	18	16	2	0	0	2	23	40	12	30	29	48	23
	Insufficient	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Not accessible	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Households that rate access to private or public health centers / hospitals as insufficient or not accessible by reasons	Too far from home	12	0	20	0	2	20	0	0	14	0	0	0	14	0	26
	Control absent	12	30	34	0	40	80	30	20	0	0	0	0	11	21	26
	Too low capacity of clinic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	0
	Low quality of services provided	66	55	30	76	58	0	36	67	67	30	100	67	66	0	21
	Services provided out of hours	0	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	37	0	17	0	40	0
	Lack of language barrier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Discrimination	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SECTION G: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY																
Share of household income by source in the last 30 days	From salaries/wages	48	45	46	49	48	44	47	48	38	42	37	38	50	71	47
	From business services	7	2	5	7	8	2	6	9	0	0	0	0	34	0	56
	From support family members/influences	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	3	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
	From pensions	4	0	4	4	5	0	0	6	2	0	2	2	2	0	4
	From assistance (government / UN / NGOs)	2	4	12	0	2	2	11	0	3	7	12	0	5	10	14
	From renting out	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	From selling of assets	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	3	0	0
	From using loans (formal and family/friends)	30	40	25	24	31	40	23	31	34	40	61	66	2	0	10
	From savings	1	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	1	0
	From charity	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
	From beggars	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	From other sources	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	2
	Total household income	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Data are weighted. Source: DHS/UNHCR 2016

D. Selected Data Overview (Cont.)

Variables: Percent	Total				High-density areas				Medium density areas				Low density areas					
	Y1	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host	Total	Refugee	IDP	Host		
SECTION G (cont.)																		
Households where one or more members have outstanding loans	Yes	40	34	37	36	40	38	37	30	38	29	35	34	22	23	23	22	
	No	60	66	63	64	60	62	63	70	62	65	65	66	77	77	77	78	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households where one or more member has outstanding loan/borrowed money by purpose of loans	Business related	8	0	3	1	3	1	1	1	12	10	4	11	2	0	0	0	
	Personal consume plan related	24	28	46	17	22	19	46	16	37	38	46	26	27	58	36	14	
	Purchase & improve merit of building	30	1	30	30	28	1	8	38	25	0	10	33	64	0	18	64	
	Religions, wedding, burial	4	2	2	4	4	1	1	1	2	5	2	2	8	0	4	8	
	Consumer durables, e.g. car	12	8	8	15	14	0	10	18	9	0	0	13	8	0	4	10	
	Overriding	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	9	3	0	0	5	
	Earn, agriculture purposes	2	8	1	2	1	0	1	1	3	6	0	4	3	0	4	3	
	For young housing project	16	36	17	5	12	38	17	7	9	30	20	2	3	15	8	8	
	Other	13	28	10	11	13	37	8	10	14	18	18	13	4	15	0	0	
	Do not know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Distribution of total household expenses per item in the last 30 days	Food expenses	34	32	38	34	33	41	36	33	38	31	34	36	40	41	42	39	
	Rent / house maintenance	26	33	25	26	28	30	24	26	26	40	32	24	20	26	24	24	
	Health expenses	9	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	0	13	8	12	9	11	13	
	Fuel and transport expenses	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	7	2	9	1	9	4	9	9	
	Water and electricity expenses	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	
	Other expenses	18	9	10	20	21	11	30	20	17	10	14	19	16	11	12	17	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION H: SAFETY																		
Households by experience of safety in their neighbourhood	Very safe	32	41	26	38	26	24	30	28	14	19	11	12	22	9	18	24	
	Safe	68	59	74	62	73	76	70	71	86	21	89	88	78	91	82	76	
	Unsafe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Very unsafe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
SECTION I: MOBILITY																		
Households that experienced displacement by if all members have arrived to the current location	Yes	88	76	83	-	77	88	83	-	88	85	77	-	81	90	82	-	
	No	12	24	17	-	23	12	17	-	12	15	23	-	19	10	18	-	
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	
Households by year of arrival to the current location	2016	1	26	4	1	4	32	7	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	
	2015	4	6	8	3	5	9	13	2	4	3	5	6	1	2	1	1	
	2014	18	17	10	3	10	19	16	2	23	14	18	3	20	12	19	1	
	2013	8	32	4	7	9	23	5	1	14	40	2	13	5	40	1	4	
	2012 (2011)	12	34	4	12	17	17	0	30	0	30	3	1	2	38	1	1	
	Before 2011	56	1	11	75	52	0	6	48	56	2	11	84	71	0	21	92	
		Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
	Households by the reasons for choosing to live at the current location	Better employment opportunities	10	40	13	38	38	42	30	40	21	38	14	21	34	38	18	40
		Availability, better quality of education opportunities	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	2	0
		Availability, better quality of health services	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0
Availability of humanitarian assistance		0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	
To join other family members		4	6	3	4	0	3	0	0	10	12	8	10	8	2	4	10	
Relatives, friends are also here		14	29	28	12	11	28	13	10	25	38	42	14	18	16	41	11	
Cost of living, rent in the location is lower		7	25	10	4	9	23	16	4	2	5	0	0	0	16	9	5	
More safety		16	8	17	11	16	8	16	10	25	17	16	20	9	28	11	4	
Began better home		22	1	8	39	28	0	11	10	16	1	0	22	21	0	1	28	
Other		9	9	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
Households where one or more household member have firm plans for changing their residence location	Yes	7	9	9	0	8	0	10	0	11	10	16	9	1	7	2	0	
	No	93	91	91	100	92	100	90	100	89	90	84	91	99	93	97	100	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Households where one or more household members have firm plans for changing residence location by destination	Within/Out Governmental	10	8	13	9	12	13	9	13	0	0	5	0	8	0	10	0	
	Within/Out	38	54	54	31	0	0	28	0	39	86	100	100	15	100	0	0	
	Elsewhere in Iraq	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Neighboring countries	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Return to place of origin	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Europe	49	38	27	40	80	87	98	87	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
Households currently displaced by if they consider moving back to the location of origin	Yes	75	76	77	75	75	77	80	57	70	84	85	84	87	81	88	-	
	No	25	24	23	25	25	23	20	43	30	16	15	16	13	19	12	-	
	Do not know	1	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	
	Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
Households displaced by events left behind at the location of origin	Yes	90	87	86	-	78	84	87	-	74	87	77	-	84	88	85	-	
	No	10	13	14	-	22	16	13	-	26	13	23	-	16	12	15	-	
	Total	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	100	100	100	-	

Data re-weighted Source: ICG (UNPCR) 2014

