



TRIPOLI CITY PROFILE

2016

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FOR A BETTER URBAN FUTURE



TRIPOLI

CITY
PROFILE

2016

Updated Sep 2017

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UN-Habitat Mandate

UN-Habitat is mandated by the UN General Assembly to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities, and adequate housing for all, and is the lead agency within the United Nations system for coordinating activities in the field of human settlements. It is mandated through the Habitat Agenda to take the lead in disaster mitigation, and post-crisis rehabilitation capabilities in human settlements.

UN-Habitat's global responsibilities in emergencies, humanitarian, and post-crisis response are to support national governments, local authorities, and civil society in strengthening their capacity for managing human-made and natural disasters affecting human settlements. Experience has shown that the potential for development gain is high in the aftermath of a crisis, and this is a key principle underlying UN-Habitat's efforts to deploy at the earliest opportunity following a disaster. UN-Habitat added value is that it is the UN agency specialized in working in cities and human settlements.

Since 2006, the agency has been present in Lebanon, first involved in recovery and reconstruction efforts in Southern Lebanon, Beirut, as well as Northern Lebanon (Nahr el Bared crisis response), and in efforts to improve the living conditions in the 43 Palestinian out-of-camp concentrations. Since 2013, UN-Habitat has been involved in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.

Credits & Acknowledgements

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Foreword

UN-Habitat Lebanon is pleased to present the Tripoli City Profile, one of a series of urban profiles being undertaken for the country's major cities. The current refugee crisis in Lebanon, which has seen an influx of nearly 1.5m registered and unregistered displaced people, is in important ways an urban crisis. Unfolding in a nation that is 88% urbanised¹ against a backdrop of pre-crisis urban stresses and socio-economic polarisation, post-2011 refugees have concentrated in urban areas with a high share in the biggest cities. They have located alongside the Lebanese poor in low-cost, deprived neighbourhoods characterised by deteriorated building conditions and inadequate service provision.

UN-Habitat City Profiles are a multi-sectoral spatial tool to improve understanding of vulnerabilities in specifically urban settings and to inform the response. Developed in close collaboration with unions, municipalities, humanitarian partners and other stakeholders, the profiles are based on currently available data and will be updated online to take account of new information, including that from UN-Habitat Neighbourhood Profiles and reported activities of crisis response partners from the 2016 year end and beyond.

We look forward to receiving feedback in order to maximise the resonance of City Profiles with the reality on the ground.



Tarek Osseiran
UN Habitat Lebanon Programme Manager

¹ World Bank (2015) Urban population as % of total. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

Introduction

Purpose

UN-Habitat City Profiles are formulated to offer a cross-sectoral perspective on urban vulnerabilities that will inform holistic and inclusive interventions by local authorities, humanitarian partners and others to respond to needs and alleviate poverty amongst host and displaced populations. They also aim at contributing to an analytical knowledge base that will facilitate nuanced medium to long term public sector planning and investment agendas.

Themes

Concerned with the status of urban infrastructure and services and how these interplay with the distribution and socio-economic characteristics of host and refugee populations across the city, UN-Habitat City Profiles are structured around the four themes of space, governance, population and services. National and city-specific data is presented against each theme followed by identification of gaps and challenges.

The last theme, services, is divided into economy, basic urban services and social services. For each of these sectors, relevant activities reported by partners to the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan in the online portal ActivityInfo is included, forming part of the evidence base against which gaps and challenges are suggested². The two full reporting years of 2014, 2015 and 2016 are currently included; 2017 will be added at the year end, with the run-up to that point typically showing a surge in reported activities.

Methodological outline

Data collection is primarily desk-based, with some supplementary primary data collection and surveying where necessary.

In defining the study area, continuous built-up area is used as an imperfect morphological proxy for the functional urban area³. This methodological choice is aimed at facilitating analysis of the city in terms of its active spatial interactions as opposed to its historic administrative boundaries. To illustrate, topics optimally addressed at this scale elsewhere typically include economic development, mobility including public transport infrastructure, spatial planning including housing, and implementation structures. Selecting the study unit in this transparent, replicable way allows for comparison between cities on a like-for-like basis.

Falling in the category of 'area-based' approaches, characterisable not only as geographical and multi-sectoral but also participative, UN-Habitat City Profiles are developed through a collaborative and consultative process that engages from the outset the local authorities (unions of municipalities and municipalities), NGOs and other UN agencies. 'Round tables' facilitated by UN-Habitat are convened by the local authorities at key profile development stages for consultation

and endorsement purposes. Information and validation is gained from services providers as well as the humanitarian sector leads for the relevant territory.

In terms of human resources, a dedicated field-based area coordinator works in collaboration with a central office lead urban researcher/planner to compile and analyse data in conjunction with mapping stakeholders.

Structure

Following an outline of the city's historic and developmental context, the four themes are addressed in turn. Each theme begins with key summary points, followed by discussion in terms of their national and urban dimensions. Conclusions are then drawn, focussing first on resounding findings and second on policy and research implications. The latter incorporates a set of suggested projects of potential strategic impact which may respond to some of the challenges identified.

² A tailored selection of ActivityInfo indicators was selected for the purpose of City Profiles. Short-term impact interventions such as cash for food were omitted, with medium to longer-term impact projects.

³ Ideally functional urban areas are defined not only on morphological parameters but also on direct functional ones, particularly travel-to-work trips for mapping economic integration across the urban margin. Such functional data does not exist in Lebanon.

TRIPOLI

CITY PROFILE




Figure 1 Tripoli's location in Lebanon. Source: UN-Habitat (2016).

Context

Former regional capital

- 8th Century: The Phoenicians founded Tripoli. It originally comprised three neighborhoods situated in the current location of Al Mina. It was the centre of a Phoenician confederation with Sidon and Tyre and Arados Island, hence the name "Tripolis", meaning "triple city".⁴
- 10th Century: The Fatimid Caliph, Al-Muiz, conquered the city. It became an independent province encompassing Lattakia (Syria), experiencing a commercial and cultural boom that rendered it a significant centre of Shiia.
- 1109: Tripoli was conquered by Raymond de Saint Gilles, Count of Toulouse. It became the capital of Tripoli County, one of the main Crusader states, and remained under domination by the Franks for almost two centuries under the name "Triple".
- 1258: The Mameluks were victorious over the Crusaders. The Crusader city located on the peninsula was razed and a new city developed near the citadel 2km east of the previous site to protect the Mameluks from invasions. The medina (now the old town) with its narrow alleys was also designed to prevent military invasions. Henceforth, the city grew separately from the port of Mina. It became the second most important Mameluk city after Cairo, and the third Syrian city after Damascus and Aleppo.

⁴ <http://phoenicia.org/cities.html> visited in 2016.

- 1516: The Ottomans were victorious over the Mameluks. The citadel was reinforced. The souks continued to play their traditional role. City growth continued but at a slower rate relative to the preceding Mameluk era.
- 19th Century: Competition between the ports of Tripoli and Beirut increased, with Beirut prevailing from around 1860.
- 1909: A road link was created between Tripoli and Beirut.
- 1911: A rail connection was created between Tripoli and Aleppo.
- 1920: The State of Great Lebanon was declared by General Gouraud, and Lebanon came under a French mandate. The inclusion of Tripoli in this entity was not well accepted by its people.
- 20th Century [first half]: Tripoli underwent continued population growth fed by a rural exodus. Rural immigrants tended to settle in Tabbaneh and the souks, whilst well-off existing residents moved out of the historical city.
- 1955: The Abu Ali river flooded. Following the flood, a concrete channel was built leading to the demolition of around 2000 residential units, displacing many towards the historic centre⁵. It affected the socio-economic composition of the neighborhoods in generating migrations of the middle class from Tabbaneh and the old city to the new neighborhoods. Simultaneously, socio-spatial segregation deepened in the city.

The Civil War and its aftermath

- 1970s: The city witnessed progressive deindustrialization. Major infrastructure services ceased to operate with the war (rail connections, fair and refinery).
- 1980: The first violent clashes took place between Jabal Mohsen and Tabbaneh. The military intervention of the Syrians rooted the conflict. Syrians shelled Bab al Tabbaneh because of its popular support for the PLO⁶. On its side, Jabal Mohsen is assimilated to the Syrian regime (particularly as the youth of Jabal Mohsen became involved with the Syrian forces). Thus began the "retaliation game". This antagonism was marked by the 1986 slaughter when Syrian forces killed 300 people in Bab al Tabbaneh.
- Tabbaneh suffered deeply from the war, experiencing heavy destruction and migration of a third of its population.

⁵ Nahas, C (2001) "Stakeholder Analysis and Social Assessment for the Proposed Cultural Heritage and Tourism Development Project" / http://charbelnahas.org/textes/Amenagement_et_urbanisme/Cultural_Heritage_Report/E-Tripoli_64-106.pdf

⁶ PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization.




Figure 2 Timeline City Population Growth - 1920 - current. Source: UN-Habitat, 2017.

- The city lost its multi-confessional nature with the out-migration of the Maronite Christians (especially to Zghorta). At the end of the civil war, the urban agglomeration comprises more than 90% Sunni Muslims. Orthodox Christians live in Al Mina and the Alawi minority lives in Jabal Mohsen.
- With the development of new neighborhoods along the road linking Tripoli to Mina (Azmi, Miatein and Mina Avenue), the two poles are connected in terms of continuous built up area. However, this has been accompanied by a polarising segregation between the poor 'old city' of Tripoli and the more prosperous 'new city'.

Historic urban growth

- The old city (Tripoli) and the port areas (El-Mina) started to develop in the first half of the 20th century simultaneously. The old city was designed as a deterrent to military invasions. It is a commercial and craftsmanship hub articulated around the mosque which grew separately from the port- Al-Mina. It has a number of protected buildings and sites.
- Located 3.6km to the west, the neighborhoods of Al Mina grew as did the harbour serving the city, with a major ship-building, trade and commercial centre for silk and agricultural produce, especially citrus and sugar cane.
- Approximately 3km north-east of the city centre is the Palestinian camp Beddaoui. The camp was formed in 1955 and spreads over an area of 1km², with an estimated current population of almost 30,000⁷. The camp witnessed a huge population

⁷ UNRWA Lebanon website: <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon/beddawi-camp>

influx from Nahr el-Bared (NBC) after the clashes between the Lebanese army and radical militant group, Fatah Al-Islam, which in fact forced 27,000 refugees to flee NBC in 2011⁸, increasing the population in Beddaoui from 15,000 to the double. Beddaoui Camp is managed by UNRWA, and still mostly follows the borders set in 1955, but has also spilled over adjacent neighborhoods that now provide low income housing over the years to Palestinian refugees and individuals of different backgrounds and nationalities, more recently Syrian refugees.

- During the early 1950s, the city grew exponentially due to rural-urban migration. The rural population settled in Tebbaneh and the souks, from neighboring Sunni Dinniyyeh and Akkar while the richer population moved out of the historical city.
- The introduction of customs duties by Syria at its frontiers affected the activities of the Port of Tripoli.
- During the civil war from 1975 to 1990, the city witnessed further population movements and displacements that changed the demographic profile of the city. The civil war was also responsible for stopping the oil refinery and the rail train. This further segregated both physically and economically segregated the city from its hinterlands as well as from Beirut, which contributed to raising poverty levels within the city. Additionally, this gave way to an increase in illegal construction and the development of poor enclaves in the city due to deteriorating economic conditions.

⁸ UNRWA website/ Lebanon/ Camp Profiles/ Beddawi.

Divided city

- Tripoli is a city marred by neighborhood conflicts dating to the Lebanese Civil War period and occasionally erupting since the 1980s. Political-sectarian divides are deeply rooted in the history of the city.
- In 2007-2008, the city witnessed increased tension and clashes between Jabal Mohsen and Tebbaneh⁹ after the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, which instigated a forced exit of the Syrian forces in Lebanon. This in effect split the country politically into two opposing political blocs: March 8th and March 14th. March 8th is composed of Shia'a Muslim Hezbollah, Amal and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement. In essence, the March 8th coalition supports Alawites regime in Syria, the right to arms and the resistance to Israel. Its opposing bloc, March 14th alliance, includes the Sunni Muslim Future Movement and Christian Lebanese Forces among other minorities. In Tripoli, this political divide is expressed at the neighborhood level, with sporadic violence and street fights.

Population change

- Historically, the city population grew at a rate of 4% between 1920 and 1950 from 36,000 to 115,000.
- In 1920 the city also witnessed an influx of immigrants and migrants as the economy was booming since oil pipelines were installed and industries flourished. The city grew outwards and inhabitants of the center moved to new extensions in Qobbe, Abu-Samra and Al-Zahrieh.
- Further, in 1951, and with Palestinians fleeing the threat of war and the formation of the Beddaoui Palestinian camp, the city accommodated for more than 5.000 Palestinian refugees that now count up to 30,000¹⁰. Accordingly, Tripoli then had a majority of Sunni population (80%), a Christian minority community (approximately 11% with other minorities) and the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (9%).¹¹
- By the end of the civil war and due to deteriorating conditions and over crowdedness, inhabitants of the old city moved to the suburbs that were experiencing a construction boom, leaving the urban historic centre to decay. As the city population grew, business flourished and the city expanded outwards and inhabitants of the center moved to new extensions in Qobbe, Abu-Samra, Al-Zahrieh.

⁹ CONFLICT AND ENVIRONMENT IN NORTH LEBANON Vulnerability and resilience from a multi-disciplinary perspective - Report 2015 (International crisis group report 2010), p.114.

¹⁰ Fafo (2007): a socio-economic profile of the Nahr El-Bared and Beddawi Refugee Camps of Lebanon (based on the 2006 Labor force Survey among Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon).

¹¹ Union of Municipalities of Al-Fayhaa (2011) Report.



THEME 1

Space



أمانة
المجالس
أمانة





Tripoli urban area

3 municipalities, 17 cadastres

32% built-up area

24.7 km²

Location in Lebanon

The Tripoli urban area is located on the eastern Mediterranean shore. It is the northernmost of the string of seaboard hubs anchoring Lebanon's coastal economic spine (**Figure 2**). Lebanon's second-largest city¹², Tripoli is known as the capital of the North and is located around 85km by road from Beirut. It is also home to Lebanon's most northerly and second-largest seaport.

Tripoli urban area, defined by the city's continuous built-up extent, covers an area of 24.7km², incorporating 13km of coastline (**Figure 4**).

The urban boundary echoes the area's topographical relief, which rises up to the south and east to act as natural constraints to the city's historical expansion. The urban area itself lies on a coastal plain not exceeding 10m above sea level (**Figure 3**).




Figure 3 Contour map of Tripoli. Source: Interpolated from Lebanon Atlas 50m contour map (2016).

¹² There is general consensus that Tripoli is the second-largest city in Lebanon in population terms after Beirut, though the exact population figures vary by geography and source.






Figure 4 Boundary map of urban area. Source: UN-Habitat [2016]

Governorate & districts

Lebanon is territorially divided into eight ‘mohafazah’ or governorates¹³ containing a total of 25 ‘caza/qada’a’ or districts. Tripoli is considered the capital of the North Governorate, which comprises six districts¹⁴ and 141 ‘baladiyah’ or municipalities¹⁵. The district of Tripoli along with the governorate’s other five districts are referred to as ‘T5’ (Figure 5). Data and operations relevant to the public and humanitarian sectors are often aggregated to the T5 geography. The Tripoli urban area spans two of the governorate’s six districts - Tripoli¹⁶ and Minnieh-Dennieh¹⁷.



Figure 5 T5 relative to urban area. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

Cadastrés

In Lebanon and elsewhere, land registration, real estate rights and related information are ordered by territorial units known as cadastrés¹⁸.

In Lebanon, a cadastre may correspond to a municipality; it may alternatively comprise multiple municipalities or indeed make up a part of one municipality. The cadastral data framework is important for the current purpose because demographic data is available at this level.

¹³ Aakkar, Baalbek-Hermel, Beirut, Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, North Lebanon and South Lebanon.

¹⁴ Tripoli, El Koura, El Batroun, Bcharre, Zgharta and Minieh-Dennieh.

¹⁵ <http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-tripoli-governorate-profile-11-august-2014>

¹⁶ Tripoli and Mina municipalities.

¹⁷ Beddaoui municipality.

¹⁸ According to Fares (2002:3) the word ‘cadastre’ is derived from the Greek ‘katastrikton’ meaning ‘line by line’.

The Tripoli urban boundary takes in 18 cadastrés (Figure 6), 16 of which are included in their entirety. For the remaining two, around half of the cadastre Tripoli Zeitoun to the south is encompassed, the excluded part comprising agricultural/unbuilt land. At the eastern urban boundary, a 0.3km² margin of the cadastre Mejdlaya is also part of the urban area. Data aggregated from the cadastral level in this profile is drawn from 17 cadastrés (Table 1), omitting the minor Mejdelaya fraction.

Tripoli municipality, containing the contemporary urban core, comprises 12 cadastrés, allowing for fairly granular spatial analysis via cadastral data. Mina municipality, containing the peninsula and adjacent inland areas, is subdivided into four cadastrés. Beddaoui municipality to the north-east of the urban area, though larger in area than Mina, is but one cadastre (Figure 6).

Areas

The cadastrés vary in area from almost 7km² (Tripoli Zeitoun on the periphery of the urban area) down to 0.04km² (Tripoli Al-Remmaneh in the core of the old city) (Table 1). These figures underpin population density calculations in Theme 3 (Population).



© Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.




Figure 6 Cadastres by municipality and urban area boundary. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

Municipality	Number of Cadasters	Cadaster Name	Area (km ²)	
			Cadaster	Municipality
Tripoli	12	18 Majdalaya	6.95	14.99
		15 Tripoli Zeitoun	6.05	
		6 Tripoli Al-Tal	0.51	
		16 Tripoli Al-Kobbé	0.38	
		7 Tripoli Al-Haddadin	0.37	
		11 Tripoli Al-Tabbaneh	0.22	
		14 Tripoli Al-Souéka	0.15	
		10 Tripoli Al-Zehrieh	0.14	
		8 Tripoli Al-Nouri	0.08	
		13 Tripoli Al-Mouhaitra	0.054	
		12 Tripoli Al-Hadid	0.051	
		9 Tripoli Al-Rammaneh	0.04	
Mina	4	4 Al-Mina Jardins	2.72	3.8
		1 Al-Mina No.3	0.45	
		2 Al-Mina No.2	0.4	
		3 Al-Mina No.1	0.25	
Beddaoui	1	17 Al- Beddaoui	5.53	5.53
			24.4 ¹⁸	

Table 1 Municipalities & cadasters of Tripoli urban area, with cadastre areas (km²).

¹⁹ This total excludes the 0.3km² portion of Majdlaya cadastre which is omitted from cadastre-based population calculations in this document. Majdlaya plus the tabulated cadastres make up a total urban area of 24.7km².



Figure 7 Neighbourhoods and sub-neighbourhoods of Tripoli Urban Area. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

Neighbourhoods

At the local level, neighbourhoods and sub-neighbourhoods were identified through municipality advice and community-based field-work, extending a list of ‘localities’ maintained by UNHCR. Across the urban area, 58 neighbourhoods have been identified²⁰ (Figure 7). To date, 11 of these neighbourhoods have been further disaggregated into sub-neighbourhoods. Together, this offers a fine-grained geographic reference framework for both spatial analyses and partner coordination. Neighbourhoods and sub-neighbourhoods are listed by cadastre are shown in Appendix 1.

Land cover

Satellite image analysis suggests the following breakdown of Tripoli’s land cover:

- 32% Urban/Built up
- 27% Agricultural
- 13% Roads
- 12% Empty land
- 7% Industrial / Commercial
- 4% Informal Area
- 5% Other

Remote land cover analysis (Figure 8) shows a built-up core straddling Abu Ali river, linking the old city centre with the Mina peninsula to the north-west and to Beddaoui to the north-east. These spines are supported by the arterial road network.

²⁰ Neighbourhoods are currently mapped as points only with comprehensive boundary definition being a longer-term endeavour.




Figure 8 Major land cover categories in urban area. Source: Remote analysis from 2014 satellite imagery (UN Habitat, 2016).

Industrial uses are concentrated near the harbour and also along the north-facing coast. They are mostly buffered from the built-up area by an agricultural land.

The distribution of unused land suggests physical development capacity²¹ concentrated to the west of the urban area between the inoperational Tripoli International Fair and the coast, as well as intra-urban densification potential south of the fair and between Beddaoui Camp and the old town east of the river.

The unused western coast strip between the fair and the coast is parcelled, priced and zoned for prime real estate development. Some isolated structures have been built but the stretch remains largely unexploited. Current understanding is that the no employment-generating uses are planned for the area. The coastal location means that as well as offering opportunities for high value residential uses, it could alternatively be geared towards tourism for regeneration, and/or locally orientated amenity.

²¹ Physical development potential does not of course equate to market-based or policy-based development potential.





The Rashid Karame Fairground (RKF) is located close to the central business district and 600m from the seaside. It was nearing completion when civil war broke out in 1975 and has not been worked on significantly since. Whilst it occupies a strategic location in the urban setting, which should be optimally utilised, it has remained unused for most of its lifetime. It is owned, operated and managed by the Ministry of Economy & Trade. Its unfragmented public ownership means it may be amenable to legal amendments which modify permitted uses to offer an opportunity for infill development and/or temporary uses.

Informal building typologies are found in four main concentrations:

- North-west of the Fair in planned-for, but as yet otherwise unused land.
- At the southernmost extent of the urban area in agricultural surroundings.
- On the north and west margins of Beddaoui Palestinian Camp stretching as far north as Beddaoui municipality offices.
- On the margins of the easternmost built up area in Beddaoui municipality adjacent to a significant strip of industrial activity to the north.

Palestinian concentrations outside camps

Another spatial feature of the Tripoli urban area which has attracted humanitarian and research attentions are Palestinian settlements outside camps. The term ‘gathering’ has been used (UN-Habitat & UNDP, 2015) to reference concentrations of Palestinians living outside camps.²² Some such communities originated soon after the 1948 Palestinian exodus. Nationally, 42 have been identified, accommodated in 25 municipalities²³. Five ‘gatherings’ have been noted in Tripoli urban area, with all three municipalities hosting at least one (**Table 2**).

²² The commonly used definition of ‘gathering’ is that of Fafo (2003, in UNDP [2015 Aug] “Improving Living Conditions in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities”. Gatherings are defined as a minimum of 25 Palestinian households living in proximity and identifying as a distinct social group in a geographically defined area. (Chaaban et al, 2016:35).

²³ Municipalities however do not provide basic urban services to ‘gatherings’. UNWRA, which provides services within the 12 official Palestinian camps, of which Beddaoui is one, is not mandated to extend services to ‘gatherings’. (UNDP, 2015 Aug).

Municipality	Cadastre	Location Type	Name
Tripoli	El-Qobbe	Gathering	Bab El Tabanneh
	Jardins		Zahhariya
Mina	Al-Mina No.3	Gathering	Al Mina
Beddaoui	-	Gathering	Mankoubin
	-		Muhajjarin-Beddaoui
	-	Camp	Beddaoui

Table 2 Palestinian gatherings and official UNWRA camps in Tripoli urban area. Source: UNWRA, UNDP and UN-Habitat (2016).

The term ‘gathering’ has; however, weaknesses in descriptive and analytical terms. First, Palestinians are also to be found living outside of both camps and ‘gatherings’, integrated less visibly in the host community’s residential fabric. Second, the term ‘gathering’ focusses attention on one vulnerable group in the out-of-camp urban fabric which is accommodated in poor, often mixed-nationality residential neighbourhoods, which also include host populations. The implied cohort-based focus is increasingly partial following the recent influx of Syrian refugees. The current profile instead assumes an area-based approach which aims to understand cross-population vulnerabilities within defined geographical boundaries.

THEME 2

Governance







Municipalities & union:

63 municipal councillors

69 mokhtars

Limited powers & finances Growing NGO engagement

Governance encompasses the formal and informal institutions and norms for making and implementing decisions in society. It highlights questions of administrative efficiency, power distribution and asymmetries and democratic accountability. At a national scale, institutions and the government play a core role in a country's development²⁴. In the city, "Urban governance is the software that enables the urban hardware to function"²⁵. At the urban level, governance is challenged with addressing needs across the territory's diverse spaces, institutions and demographics and, moreover, coordinating responses. Governance efficacy is directly implicated in outcomes for cities and their residents²⁶.

State governance

Union of municipalities

Lebanese law contains provisions²⁷ for adjoining municipalities to confederate into 'unions'. The purpose of unions is to provide meso-level coordination of municipal functions and resources. This is with regard to responsibilities better addressed at a cross-boundary strategic scale rather than at a municipality level. The union council is led by one of the elected mayors or council members of the participating municipalities. At national level, there are 53 unions covering 79% of the country's 1,138 municipalities (early 2015 figures)²⁸.

Inter-municipal collaboration at a union level on public interest issues may help areas define distinctive regional visions for development.

The municipalities of some unions jointly feed into regional development projects. Significantly, some have viewed unions as institutions of decentralised power. This is in the context of a heavily centralised state not only in terms of population, but also in terms of investment and governmental power distribution. Weaknesses undermine the competence of unions as strategic entities and forces for decentralisation²⁹ include:

- Weak administrative capabilities
- Inability to collect membership fees
- High dependence on central government's Independent Municipal Fund for revenues
- Overlapping competencies with municipalities resulting in conflict
- Performance impedances caused by sectarian politics
- Non-contiguity of many unions, curbing potential for collaborative development planning

²⁴ World Bank (2016) "Lebanon Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity: Systematic Country Diagnostic" (link: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/951911467995104328/pdf/103201-REPLACEMENT-PUBLIC-Lebanon-SCD-Le-Borgne-and-Jacobs-2016.pdf>).

²⁵ <http://unhabitat.org/urban-themes/governance/>

²⁶ <http://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-policy/Governing-the-City-Policy-Highlights%20.pdf> (OECD, 2015).

²⁷ "The Legislative Decree No. 118 of 30 June 1977, on municipalities, authorizes the creation of federations to allow them to undertake projects that exceed the financial possibilities of a municipality." Localiban, 25 February 2009 Federation of municipalities. Updated 26 January 2016.

²⁸ Ministry of Interior and Municipalities/Lebanon (2015).

²⁹ Atallah, S (2012 Mar) "Decentralisation in Lebanon" (<http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6>).




Figure 9 Key national, union & municipal governance institutions. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

Turning to Tripoli, four municipalities in the vicinity of the urban core have joined forces to form a union. Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui were united under the so-called Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities in May 1982³⁰. The fourth municipality, Qalamoun, did not succeed legally in affiliating at this point³¹ due to its geographical dislocation from the others³². Qalamoun is geographically separated from the other three municipalities by Ras Maska municipality. However, following extraordinary administrative and judiciary manoeuvrings, Qalamoun was later admitted to the union in Jul 2014^{33, 34}. The Mayor of Tripoli is currently also the Mayor of the Union of Al Fayhaa.

Whilst Ras Maska has to date refused the opportunity to join the Union, reluctant to be detached from the Koura district for now (see **Figure 5** for districts); its eventual joining is expected as around

³⁰ Tripoli and Mina joined the Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities by Decree No.5,234. Beddaoui joined by Decree No.23, despite its affiliation to the Minieh-Dennieh district.

³¹ This was despite Qalamoun's affiliation to the Tripoli district.

³² Normally, a legal condition for establishing a union of municipalities is that confederating municipalities are geographically interconnected. Confederating municipalities are also required to comprise at least three in number.

³³ Qalamoun joined the the Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities by Decree No. 150.

³⁴ Al-Fayhaa Union of Municipalities Technical Office.




Figure 10 Union of Municipalities of Al Fayhaa, municipalities and the Tripoli metropolitan area boundary. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

40% of its inhabitants are originally from Tripoli³⁵. New strategic urban and peri-urban developmental opportunities as well as challenges are likely to arise in response to any such future union expansion.

Figure 10 indicates the spatial coverage of the Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities relative to the Tripoli urban area. The urban area covers most of the 1982 iteration of the Al Fayhaa Union, with Qalamoun omitted for the same reason that prevented its unionisation in 1982 - its lack of urban connection to the core.

In terms of urban studies and works, the Union relies mainly on the national Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) and on privately appointed consultants for analysing and progressing development agendas. Technical professionals from various disciplines work in consultancy capacities with the union to coordinate, plan and execute urban projects in its territory under an organisation known as the 'Urban Community of Al Fayhaa'. This organisation also has its own permanent core staff of technical and administrative expertise.

³⁵ Abed al Kafi al Samad "القلمون تنضم إلى اتحاد الفيحاء", Al-Akhar Newspaper, Issue 2367, 13th of August 2014.

Municipalities & Mokhtars

Lebanon's 1,138 (early 2015 figures) municipalities are spatially nested into governorate and district boundaries³⁶. An area's municipality constitutes its local government³⁷, charged with responsibilities for its development. A 1977 decree-law sets a range of duties that is broad: "...any work having a public character or utility within the area of the municipality falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council"³⁸. This includes, amongst other things, providing or coordinating communal services and utilities, and otherwise managing environmental quality.

Municipalities are led by mayors on a six year electoral cycle, with no limit to the number of terms an electee can serve. The long electoral period, in principle, offers political scope for pursuing medium and long-term strategic objectives as well as short-term wins.

The process by which mayors are elected is a step removed from direct popular democracy. Groups of candidates or 'lists', each list representing a different political party, stand for popular election in municipalities, with people voting for lists rather than individuals. Those on the winning list become municipal councillors and nominate, from amongst themselves, a municipal mayor. In contexts where a union of municipalities exists, the mayors of the relevant municipalities again nominate from amongst themselves a mayor or councillor to head the union³⁹.

On a separate hierarchy, the public also votes on the same electoral cycle for neighbourhood or village representatives known as 'mokhtars'. Mokhtars are directly answerable to Ministry of the Interior and Municipalities. They are authorised to receive payments for administering various notary-type functions⁴⁰ including public health insurance for members of the public.

Voting rights in Lebanon are determined by an individual's place of civil registration⁴¹ rather than place of current residence, which do not always correspond. In practice this can mean it is not uncommon for the majority of a municipality's residents

to be ineligible to vote there, an obvious democratic dislocation⁴². This cannot but contribute to low turn-outs amongst eligible voters, indicating weak civic engagement.

Turning to municipal practices, municipal service delivery in Lebanon is heavily circumscribed by budget constraints combined with often opaque political dynamics. Regarding public taxes raised on municipal territory, a part is retained locally, making up about 30% of municipal income (14 such sources related to taxes and fees including building permit fees, rental value fees etc) and the other part goes to central government (13 such sources including tax on built property, income tax etc)⁴³. Municipalities then receive an annual central government grant from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities' Independent Municipal Fund (making up about 70% of their income). In law⁴⁴, the formula on which this is calculated factors in (1) geographical location in terms of potential contribution to national balanced development (2) the number of registered voters in the municipality (not the number of actual residents)⁴⁵ (3) area [km²] of the municipality and (4) the percentage of tax dues actually collected during the previous period.

The amount granted to a given municipality may however vary unpredictably from year to year, presenting challenges for public investment & business planning. Understaffing is a common municipality issue; indeed, some municipalities are not staffed at all⁴⁶. Resource constraints limit local autonomy to the extent that municipalities' democratic mandate to lead strategic city planning and infrastructure policy-making and implementation is curtailed, with projects that are initiated usually reliant on central government funding.

⁴² This carries the collorary of individuals voting in their ancestral places of residence, thereby undermining the responsiveness of the electoral system to the needs of the actual residents living in these places.

⁴³ قانون البلديات في لبنان المرسوم الاشتراعي رقم 118 سنة 1977 وتعديلاته Municipalities Act in -law decree No. 118 of 1977, as amended.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ World Bank (2016) p.116 "Lebanon Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity: Systematic Country Diagnostic" (link: <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/951911467995104328/pdf/103201-REPLACEMENT-PUBLIC-Lebanon-SCD-Le-Borgne-and-Jacobs-2016.pdf>).

⁴⁶ Atallah (2012) suggests that 400 municipalities in Lebanon do not have even one staff member. <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6> It is also the case that not all areas of Lebanon are under the jurisdiction of a municipality.

³⁶ <http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/about-lebanon-en> viewed 7 Jun 2016.

³⁷ Article 1 of Legislative Decree No. 118 of 30 June 1977.

³⁸ Atallah (2012) <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6>

³⁹ The councillors and mayors assume voluntary roles, though in some circumstances union mayors receive a central government salary.

⁴⁰ Mokhtars receive a salary and other benefits from central government.

⁴¹ Lebanese citizens are registered in the area of their ancestors rather than in the place they live. These may or may not correspond.

Summarily, municipalities and unions of municipalities, the only forms of state institutional decentralisation in Lebanon, are weak relative to the central administration, which itself is confessional⁴⁷ in make-up. External factors maintaining this status quo include low municipal budgets, dependence on central government for infrastructure project funding, bureaucracy, and central government retention of authority to incentivise investment⁴⁸.

Table 3 shows the distribution of Tripoli urban area's 63 municipal councillors and 69 mokhtars across the municipalities. Amongst the municipal councillors, only 3 (<5%) are female, though these are distributed to give a female councillor in all three municipalities. This maintains a chronic and pronounced under-representation of women in this, and other Lebanese municipal councils.

National municipal staffing and financial constraints are evident amongst these municipalities. Mina, for instance, did not have a mayor or municipal board of councillors from 2013-2016. Also, municipal territorial responsibility in Beddaoui is limited to areas outside the Palestinian camp, which itself falls under UNWRA administration.

Municipality	Mayor	No. of municipal councillors		No. of mokhtars
			Of which female councillors	
Tripoli	Yes	24	1	51
Mina	Yes ⁴⁸	21	1	12
Beddaoui	Yes	18	1	6

Table 3 Number of municipal councillors and mokhtars by municipality. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

⁴⁷ "In political science terminology, confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population.... (T)he original confessional formula was good for civic peace and gradual democratic development (but) Having ... religious communities (in Lebanon's government) meant an eventual extension of regional politics into domestic affairs" (Harb, 2006). "(T)his system...is increasingly seen as an impediment to more effective governance, paralyzing the decision-making process and hollowing out the state" World Bank Systematic Country Diagnostic 2015 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/publication/lebanon-systematic-country-diagnostic-2015> [viewed 29.6.16].

⁴⁸ Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 (2011).

⁴⁹ Mina municipality had no mayor in the period 2014-2016.

A recent review of the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 identified four critical points influencing the territory's developmental trend related to governance⁵⁰:

- High centralization of decisions, which leads to obtaining "parachuted" projects without the existence of a regulating body at a local level or local structures for the management of big infrastructures and equipment.
- Absence of "project culture," and discussions at a strategic scale, and the lack of much needed planning in order to promote the projects.
- Absence of trust in public administration, and a lack of confidence in its technical, financial and managerial capacities.
- Sustainable development of the cities of Al-Fayhaa requires parallel actions: possessing the means of good governance, showing transparent municipal decisions, involving the inhabitants in urban policies, developing a sense of public interest and citizenship, and establishing a culture of continuing education.

Government policy towards refugees

The Government of Lebanon has been required to offer a policy response to the refugee question for around 70 years since the start of the major incursion of displaced Palestinians since 1948. Refugees are officially termed 'guests' and are in general barred from gaining Lebanese nationality or work permits in all but a few sectors. PRS incoming from Syria are subject to the same restrictions. Lebanese women who have children with a non-Lebanese cannot pass her Lebanese nationality on to her offspring.

At the start of the crisis, the Lebanese border was open to Syrians without any restrictions and they were automatically granted a free visa. Yet, the policy of not establishing camps was set at the very beginning of the response. As of Dec 2014, the Lebanese government effectively closed its borders to incoming Syrians, and even earlier for PRS. In early 2015, new visa requirements were stipulated; a yearly charge of US\$200 per adult was set, a pledge not to work was required, as well as various documentation such as a confirmation from the mokhtar and attestation from a landlord regarding a place to live. Whilst these requirements do not formally affect their refugee status with UNHCR, some feel the contrary.

⁵⁰ Rajab, M (2015) "Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 Plan Review" (link: <http://www.medcities.org/documents/10180/234514/16.02.26+AFSDS+Review-Final+Report.pdf/1d019d9c-7d5c-4f30-8f61-a5c679214e9a>).

The Vulnerability Needs Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VaSyr 2015) summarises policy towards Syrian refugees as follows:

- Registration restriction
- No-camp policy
- Entrance restrictions
- Residential permit requirements
- Pledge not to work

These factors impact on the income-generating opportunities available to refugees, their access to goods and services, their overall vulnerability and ability to mitigate their circumstances and pursue socio-economic mobility.

Non-state governance

NGOs

Non-state entities play increasingly important roles in contemporary national and urban governance. In the Lebanese context - a constrained state sector on one hand and a globally significant humanitarian crisis layered onto a baseline of pre-existing vulnerability on the other - the activity and investment channelling of international and local NGOs has been in ascendance⁵¹. Realising the potential benefits for all of this third sector engagement surge in national and urban governance, presents challenges of coordination and communication between state and non-state actors; a difficulty being reported by informants in the Tripoli urban area⁵².

NGOs active in the Tripoli urban area are shown in **Appendix 2**. Listing organisations reporting on their work through the online humanitarian activity reporting portal, ActivityInfo, the table is not comprehensive, since it omits NGOs not using the portal as well as other non-NGO entities conducting humanitarian work such as mosques and other religious authorities.

The Palestinian Refugee Camp in the municipality of Beddaoui operates its own particular governance system, the main players being UNWRA, who formally manages the camp, and popular neighbourhood committees representing political factions which are, in Beddaoui Camp's case, dominated by the PLO. Similar to neighborhood popular committees elsewhere in Tripoli, each 'gathering' outside

the camp in Beddaoui has an elected local committee responsible for management of the neighborhood including infrastructure and services⁵³.

Informal governance

Informal governance denotes unregulated practices and arrangements partially or wholly outside the realm of the formal state and regulatory environment. Informal entities are a critical part of city governance and of the urban economy in particular. Unofficial commercial exchanges, credit-granting, supplementary service provision, and tacit community leadership structures are elements of how city life may be ordered through the informal sector.

Religious bodies, especially Islamic entities, occupy a major position in Tripoli's daily life. The Islamic associations are not only active at a religious level but also at a political and security level in many neighborhoods.

The unspecified nature of the informal sector renders it elusive to capture meaningfully at the city scale, through desk-based review. Detailed field-based analysis at the neighbourhood level instead holds more promise for specifying the nature of the sector. This may be addressed in the context of the neighbourhood profiling work to be conducted for Tripoli in the near future.

Spatial development policies

Policies and plans potentially shaping how space is used and by whom are relevant to any city profiling exercise, providing a spatial context for making reasoned and sensitive responses to challenges which may be identified.

A recent review of the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy identified three critical points influencing the territory's developmental trend related to territorial governance:

- Fragmentation of urban planning with the presence of three master plans (one for every [municipality] of the urban community), which were approved independently, and accompanied by weak suggestions
- Lack of communication among the urban territories, combined with absence of a regulating frame for urban projects, which does not encompass all the Fayhaa districts

⁵¹ This is particularly since the Syrian Crisis spillover effect into Lebanon from 2011.

⁵² Insight from various UN-Habitat communications with Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities representatives and with various NGOs active in the area (2016).

⁵³ UN-Habitat, UNDP, and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDCD (2014 May) "Profiling deprivation: An analysis of the Rapid Needs Assessment in Palestinian Gatherings Host Communities in Lebanon".

Year	Law / Decision	Project / Study	Municipal Coverage	Status	Author / Initiator	Topic
1964		First Master Plan of Tripoli City	Tripoli	Technically live but outdated***	Henri Edde (head of Lebanon's Association of Engineers and Architects in 1961) & Georges Doumani	City zoning and Land use
1982	Decree No. 5234 (Tripoli & Mina); Decree No. 23 (Beddaoui) *	Establishment of Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Live***;	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	Unionisation of 3 municipalities of Tripoli, Beddaoui, Mina
Qalamoun added to the Union in 2014	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities	Unionisation of 3 municipalities of Tripoli, Beddaoui, Mina	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Not implemented **	JICA for Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)	Transport Study for traffic reorganization
2001		Japanese International Consulting Agency (JICA)	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Not implemented **	JICA for Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)	Transport Study for traffic reorganization
2001		Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project (CHUD)	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Not yet completed**	Lebanese Government	Cultural Heritage and Urban Development
2002		First review of the 1964 Master Plan of Tripoli City	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Rejected by local authorities/ not implemented**	Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)	Master Plan Review:
New zoning and land use		A Sustainable Development Strategy for the Al-Fayha'a Union of Municipalities, Tripoli, El-Mina and Beddaoui	Union of Municipalities: Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui		Not implemented**	Sustainable development strategy
Master Plan updated and re-released		Ancient/ traditional buildings in Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui.	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Completed Feb 2008	Completed in 2004; implemented in 2009**	Building and character area conservation/heritage
		Sustainable development program of the coastal zone	Coastline of the Union of Al Fayha'a municipalities	Not implemented	Urban community of Al-Fayhaa in collaboration with "Lavaill Conseil" (Private Company) and European Union	Network of Mediterranean cities collaborating on environmental management & urban environmental conservation
2002		Study for developing a new master plan for the Union of Municipalities				
2005 Dec	Decreed	National Physical Master Plan for Lebanon [SDATL / NPMLT]	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Completed in 2004; implemented in 2009**	Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)	National strategic spatial planning
2006		A Sustainable Development Strategy for the Al-Fayha'a Union of Municipalities, Tripoli, El-Mina and Beddaoui	Union of Municipalities: Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui		Diran Harmadiyan	Sustainable development strategy
2008		Ancient/ traditional buildings in Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui.				
	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui	Completed Feb 2008	Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities Environmental Monitoring and Development Centre	Identification of building and character-area conservation/ heritage designations		
2009	Decreed	New master plan of Tripoli municipality		Implemented by decree 2009		
2010	The Strategic Plan« Tripoli 2020 » / «Plan of the MPs Office»	Based on a diagnosis of the economic situation in Tripoli and the need to create 30 000 jobs, the study which was funded by the MPs themselves and by Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri, proposed 24 sub-initiatives for a vision of Tripoli. Initiatives were grouped into 6 categories: 1-Management and implementation of the programs, 2- Lobbying and infrastructure unit, 3-Projects 4-Funding & Finance 5-Employment and training 6-Young, Small & medium enterprises. Study proposed creation of a Tripoli Development Council.		Strategic plan project frozen following dissolution of partnership of initiating MPs.		
2010		Sustainable Development Program of the Coastal Zone	Coastline of the Union of Al Fayha'a municipalities	Not implemented	Urban community of Al-Fayhaa in collaboration with "Lavaill Conseil" (Private Company) and European Union	Network of Mediterranean cities collaborating on environmental management & urban environmental conservation
2011		Al Fayhaa 2020 Sustainable Development Strategy 2020	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui, [Report later revised to include Qalamoun post-2014]	Completed in 2011; Revised in 2014 year to include Qalamoun	Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities	Sustainable development of the Union
2011	Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project (CHUD) Implementation Report	Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui		Not yet completed**	Lebanese Government	Cultural Heritage and Urban Development Project
2014	Decree No. 150 (Qalamoun)	Addition of Qalamoun Municipality to Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities		Live		Amendment to membership of Union of Municipalities of Al Fayhaa

* Source: Beddaoui Municipality (Interviewed by UN-Habitat Lebanon Area Coordinator for Tripoli, 2016)

** Source: «Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy Plan Review» (Mosbah Rajab, 2015)

*** Source: "Tripoli report" (Charbel Nahhas 2012)

Table 4 City planning documents.

- Lack of access points to the urban territory, and insufficient presence of an urban public transportation system”⁵⁴ (Rajab 2015:7)

A search for significant urban planning policies, land use zonings, masterplans and infrastructure investment plans yielded **Table 4**, which lists relevant documents by institution/administrative entity.

Highlights from selected plans and reports included in **Table 4** follow.

First Master Plan of the City of Tripoli (1964)

- The first Master Plan of the City of Tripoli was proposed by Henri Edde and Georges Doumani in 1964. It covered Tripoli municipality only and was adopted in 1971.
- The plan subdivided the city into distinct planning districts:
 - Zone A: The historic city core on the west banks of the river.
 - Zone B: This surrounds the old city. It is a dense mixed-useresidentialandcommercialarea.
 - Zones C & D: Zone C is a lower density residential area with potential for future growth into zone D, an expansion area.
 - Zones E & F. These were dedicated to tourism and industrial activities respectively.
- The master plan segregated the city by implementing a road network, however this also destroyed some historic areas of the city.

Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities (1982, 2014)

- The Union of Municipalities of Al-Fayhaa, bringing together the four municipalities of Tripoli, Beddaoui, Mina and Qalamoun, offers a promising institutional arrangement for urban-level strategic spatial planning.
- The union has produced the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020.

Cultural Heritage and Urban Development project (2001)

This project was launched in 2001 by the Lebanese government and managed by CDR, in which a dedicated project management unit was set up. It is aimed at preserving Lebanese cultural heritage to support local socio-economic development particularly through tourism and quality of life. It has been implemented to date through funding partnerships⁵⁵ to regenerate historic cities across Lebanon. It attended to the historic cores and archaeological locations of five Lebanese cities of which Tripoli was one⁵⁶. Heritage buildings in the various cities have been actively identified.

The project has three main components: an urban component focussed on the rehabilitation of historic centers and their infrastructure; an archaeological component; and an institutional strengthening and capacity-building strand. The latter enlists support from the DGA and the DGU and involves providing technical assistance to the five cities’ municipalities. Training workshops were also run to support effective implementation of the project. In this context, workshops were held for Tripoli and the other cities in 2009 focusing on the implementation of Environmental Management Plans.

An implementation report was published in 2011. For Tripoli, it was the largest of the CHUD initiatives due to the size of the city and preponderance of heritage structures; key actions undertaken were:

- Definition of the historical city limits in order to specify the concerned area.
- Rehabilitation of several souks and a residential plot.
- Rehabilitation of several historic buildings.
- Restructuration of the banks of the Abu Ali River.
- Development of a new code of construction and protection.

However, locally expressed conflict between Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen in the five years after 2008 meant that operations have stalled and in some cases been overrun by informal vending activity.

⁵⁴ Rajab, M (2015:7) “AFSDS 2020 Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy Plan Review” (<http://www.medcities.org/documents/10180/234514/16.02.26+AFS+DS+Review-Final+Report.pdf/1d019d9c-7d5c-4f30-8f61-a5c679214e9a>).

⁵⁵ It is jointly financed by the World Bank, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Governments of France, Italy and Lebanon.

⁵⁶ The others were Tyre, Baalbek, Byblos and Saida.

National Physical Master Plan for Lebanon (2005)

This document was produced by CDR, which had replaced the Ministry of Planning early in the civil war in 1977. The CDR is legally bound to prepare for cabinet submission a masterplan for national territorial development⁵⁷. Notably, the fundamental territorial direction of the national physical plan – polycentric development – is fixed at the level of primary legislation: Planning Law No. 69/83 of 22 Sep 1983 Article 4 states that the plan must adhere to the principle of “balanced development of regions, being the essential pillar of the state’s unity and stability of the regime”. Its nine national objectives are:

- The unity of the Lebanese territory
- The balanced development of regions
- Rationalizing the use of resources to ensure sustainable development.
- Decreasing the public debt
- Improving productivity and increasing the average economic growth
- Improving the balance of international trade
- Improving the living conditions
- Environmental preservation
- Heritage preservation

Objectives are also set out for Tripoli, like for several other key agglomerations.

Coastal zone preservation and rehabilitation is also designated for three locations (CDR,IV: 65):

- Palm Island
- Seashore corniche and fishing harbour of Al Mina
- Beach of southern Tripoli towards Qalamoun (though Qalamoun municipality is outside the urban boundary)

Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy 2020 (Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities, 2011)

- A Sustainable Development Strategy report commissioned by the Union of Municipalities of Al Fayhaa studied the urban planning sector in Al-Fayhaa municipalities, seeing it as one of the most important components of the city’s planning.
- Focusing on three main elements of the Al Fayhaa space (urban area, equipment, infrastructure), the report criticises the lack of a unified vision identified across the existing three masterplans in terms of city building requirements and planning, and poor capacity and resourcing for organizing and delivering projects.

⁵⁷ Law No. 5/77 of the 31st of January 1977 issued by the Lebanese Government.



- Low municipal budgets, lack of popular or political initiative to lobby central government to mitigate this, and dependence on central government for authority and funds all converge to render municipalities unable to develop and enforce a coherent urban policy. The report is clear that this situation pre-dates the Syrian crisis.
- The lack of a master plan to protect existing cultural heritage in the Al-Fayhaa area is also criticised.
- The effect of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) on several sectors in the city is seen to have contributed to the lack of an effective masterplan.
- The priorities attained, in the action plan, focused on a project to establish a comprehensive strategy for the revitalization of the downtown and historical districts of Tripoli. This project post-dated – and was intended as an extension of – both the CHUD project and the 2002 Master Plan study. It was also geared towards offsetting the effects of the new masterplan for Tripoli municipality⁵⁸ decreed in 2009 (Rajab, 2015: 14).

⁵⁸ “The ratios proposed in the new master plan of Tripoli allowed the construction of buildings in the neighborhoods surrounding the extensions to the historic town. Their heights, architecture and materials were not in harmony with the traditional medieval architecture nor with the architecture of the early twentieth century. The primary project of the AFSDS would therefore expand the boundaries of the historic areas to include the extension of the neighborhoods.” (Rajab,2015:15).

- The other main document besides CHUD referred to in the formulation of the AFSDS was the National Physical Master Plan for the Lebanese Territory in terms of its prescriptions for Tripoli.

Medcities project

- A study was undertaken by an international network of partner cities located around the Mediterranean Basin interested in tourism and urban environmental management. Tripoli was involved through the Urban Community of Al-Fayhaa in collaboration with the private company Lavaill Conseil.
- The study includes a general definition of tourism and global characteristics of a successful tourism sector.
- It analyses the specificity of tourism in Lebanon in three specific locations including Tripoli. These areas well illustrate the opportunities and constraints of tourism development.
- For Tripoli, issues covered include:
 - Development in relation to tourism and the question of the volume of cultural tourism and the importance of nocturnal activities were analyzed (28% of overall Lebanese tourism spin-offs in 1972).
 - Second, the issue of international customers and the heavy volume of the Lebanese Diaspora in the previous context were analyzed.
 - The third highlighted issue was the segmenting of coastal zones' uses through the partial privatization of the coastline and its accessibility to bathing facilities (closed residential centers/ private beaches next to public beaches giving negative social connotations).

These three issues appear to be playing a vital role in tourism development of the Urban Community of Al Fayhaa in general and its shoreline and islands in particular.


- A SWOT analysis was conducted in order to analyze the environment's characteristics and attributions and the expected impacts on the studied area (the development of the coastal zone of the Urban Community).
- Finally, a sheet for actions, action plan's objectives, targets, due date and where actions will take place in a specific timeframe was elaborated.

Ancient/traditional buildings in Tripoli, Mina & Beddaoui. (Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities Environmental Monitoring and Development Centre, GIS division, 2008 Feb)

- This document was produced in 2008 by Al Fayhaa Union of municipalities. Inside the territories of the three municipalities, many traditional and historical buildings exist such as mosques, khanat and souks which date back to the Mamluk era (14th century).
- It is understood that this document is consistent with and draws on findings from the CDR's Cultural Heritage and Urban Development project, which commenced in 2002 and is currently ongoing.
- Tables list lots (by number and by municipality) containing historical buildings. These are based on maps produced by the Environmental Monitoring and Development Centre under the mandate of Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities.
- Buildings are classified as "traditional" and areas as "protected areas" and sorted by municipality.
- Some of these classified buildings and protected areas are part of CHUD project (initiated in 2009). In addition, some of the historical buildings are classified under decree number 1915 (date 14/09/1971).
- The historical core/ city and its boundaries are also marked in an independent map.
- Conservation features are focussed in the Mina peninsula area and in Tripoli old town area.

THEME 3

Population







Syrian crisis: 64,432 refugees

Union's Lebanese population estimate:
365,381

UN-Habitat all-population estimate:
0.5million

Tripoli urban area

58% of Lebanese in poverty

Palestinian refugee community: post-2011
increase 9%

96% Syrian

4% Palestinian refugees from Syria

Public service planning and humanitarian aid programming are driven by population data. Accurate demographic statistics are fundamental to matching needs with responses and to identifying gaps. They are also the crucial basis for meaningful demographic and economic monitoring and analysis.

Population data in Lebanon is generally weak. The most recent population census undertaken in Lebanon dates as far back as 1932⁶¹. Sensitivities surrounding national demographic composition, directly implicated in power distribution in a proportional representation political system, combined with an unclear regulatory approach to citizenship issues including naturalisation rights⁶², have long mitigated against a comprehensive re-enumeration. Significant trans-national population fluxes, not least the post-2011 inflow of refugees driven by the Syrian crisis, and the unregistered status of an unquantified proportion of the refugee population, further complicate population estimates.

Against this backdrop, sample studies have since been relied upon. A country population calculation was reported in 2004 as part of a national poverty assessment conducted jointly by UNDP and the Government of Lebanon⁶³. The figures were drawn from an earlier national population estimation from 1997, conducted by consultants⁶⁴ in collaboration with the government to underpin the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territories (NPMPLT) published in 2005. This put the 1997 national population at 4,005,020, is a figure which includes residents of all territories except Palestinian camps⁶⁵. This dataset, available to cadastre level, is significant as it is the one adopted by all partners to the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan [LCRP], a joint Government of Lebanon - UN plan for coordinating the international and local humanitarian response to the Syrian crisis and for ensuring alignment with national policies⁶⁶.

At the sub-national level, the significance of weaknesses in the statistical base is magnified, with other dynamics, such as rural-urban migration adding complexity.

⁶¹ It identified 17 confessional sects and a national population of 1.05m of residents [0.79m resident Lebanese & 0.26m emigrant Lebanese]. The census had far-reaching impacts, becoming the basis for the official personal registration of the population as well as for the country's political proportional representation from 1943 when independence was declared to 1975 when civil war broke out [Maktabi, R (1999) "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the Lebanese?". British Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (2) 219-241.

⁶² Maktabi, R (1999) "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited: Who are the Lebanese?". British Journal Of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (2) 219-241.

⁶³ UNDP and Government of Lebanon (2004) "National Poverty Assessment Joint Assessment".

⁶⁴ CDR, Dar Al Handasah and American University of Beirut.

⁶⁵ This national population figure based on a sample building survey includes by default Palestinians living outside camps. It also differentiates between primary and secondary residents, implying first and second homes, to avoid double-counting.

⁶⁶ "Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) Overview" http://www.un.org.lb/library/assets/LCRP_QA-124515.pdf. There have been two versions of the LCRP - 2014-15 and 2015-16. A version focussing on stabilisation, 2017-2020, is anticipated.



© Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.

For Tripoli – like other Lebanese geographies – reliable figures with comprehensive coverage across population groups are not available. Nonetheless, figures adopted in the current LCRP, put Tripoli urban area’s population at 287,531 (**Table 5**). Refugee counts (**Table 6**) can be added to this agreed baseline.

The Union of Municipalities of Al Fayhaa undertook its own independent population survey to inform inter alia municipal service planning, also shown in **Table 5**. A comprehensive building survey of the union⁶⁷ was completed in 2001. The number of housing units were multiplied by the average household size⁶⁸ to arrive at an estimate of 300,488 for 2001. This population baseline has been incrementally projected forward using annual growth rates fixed for consecutive five year intervals to give estimates of 348,726 for 2011 and 376,047 for 2015⁶⁹. Extracting out from the union territory the cadastres making up the urban area only, a 2015 population figure of 365,381 emerges. This would in principle include refugees outside camps, but the 2011-2016 growth rate has not been increased to take account of post-2011 refugees

⁶⁷ Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui municipalities.

⁶⁸ 5.4 persons (source: comprehensive building survey of the union by Al Fayhaa UoM/ 2011).

⁶⁹ including Qalamoun after 2014.

from Syria. Despite being some 27% greater than the 1997/2004 statistic, there is good reason to consider the union estimate a conservative one. The underlying building survey has not been updated, so additions to the built stock – whether horizontal or vertical – over the last 15 years of urban expansion are not captured. The Palestinian camp of Beddaoui is also excluded from calculations. Densification of households in buildings – an urban dynamic of the post-2011 Syrian crisis – is also unreflected.

UN-Habitat offers an alternative population figure for Tripoli, expanding the LCRP agreed figure as it breaks down for Tripoli by the World Bank annual growth rate to bring it forward to 2011. The growth rate is a uniform national factor, so proportionally greater growth in cities symptomatic of urbanisation is not reflected. Nonetheless, an estimate of 423,521 for 2011 emerges, some 47% higher than the LCRP figure adopted by all aid agencies. With the addition of all refugees, numbering 96,229 at 2015/2016 (source UNHCR, UNDP, UNWRA), the comprehensive population count for Tripoli urban area grows to 508,990 (**Table 5**).

Applying this population estimation at the cadastral level might in some cases affect the vulnerability scoring of locations. This could be the case if the ratio of host to refugee populations is factored in (with implications for the composition of the

inter-agency defined list of 251 most vulnerable localities). However, for Tripoli, the concentration of poverty amongst the Lebanese and the number of refugees deem the level of vulnerabilities only

higher, plus obvious challenges of Municipalities to provide services.

Table 6 shows the underlying data calculations for the population statistics discussed above.

Pop estimate (yr)	Source	Geography	Methodology	Caveats
287,531 (1997)	LCRP [2014, GoL & UN] 2004 figures, based on 1997 figures (NPMPLT, 2005)	Tripoli urban area 17 cadastres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sample study of primary & secondary households. Primary household data extrapolated from sample based on district-specific family size averages. Available at cadastre level Refugees (Camp PRL, PRS, SyR) can be added to this to reach total population counts. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outdated baseline Baseline pre-dates Syrian crisis Excludes Palestinian Camps (relevant for Beddaoui) but includes PRL outside camps
365,381 (2015)	Economic & Social Section of the Al Fayhaa / Table 601 "Estimation of Population Distribution by Cadastre"	Tripoli urban area 17 cadastres. Available for all cadastres / 4 municipalities of Union of Municipalities of Al Fayhaa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2001 building unit count multiplied by national family average of 5.4 to give population baseline No update of original building survey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Underlying building survey outdated Urbanisation not taken into account Excludes Palestinian Camps (relevant for Beddaoui) but includes PRL outside camps Refugees post-2011 from Syria (PRS, SyR) not factored into 2001 survey or 2011 growth rate
423,821 (2011)	UN-Habitat 2011, adapting NPMPLT 1997 figures	Tripoli urban area 17 cadastres	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apply national annual growth rate set by World Bank to NPMPLT 1997 figures to project forward to 2011 Available to cadastre level 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outdated baseline Baseline pre-dates Syrian crisis from 2011 National growth rate likely to be below urban growth rate Excludes PRL, PRS, SyR in camps
508,990 (2011 [refugee figures are 2016])			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As above, adding refugee figures of 962,229 for 2011 ie PRL (31,797 [UNWRA 2016]); PRS (2,876 [UNWRA, 2016]); SyR (61,556 [UNHCR, 2015]) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRS and SyR registration localities may not correspond to actual locality of residence⁷⁰ An unknown % of all refugees are unregistered and thus uncounted

Table 5 Population estimations for Tripoli including methodology and caveats.

Lebanese in Tripoli urban area

Density is a critical factor in urban service and infrastructure debates. High population density may indicate over-concentration of residences, low space standards and other negative congestion effects like air pollution and high real estate costs. However, dense neighbourhoods can also be pedestrian-friendly due to the proximity of functions, and public transit-friendly given a high localised customer pool. Densely populated areas can offer efficiencies on a per capita basis when it comes to collective infrastructure interventions, supporting the business case for capital investment. Indeed, "compact development"⁷¹: it can offer opportunities for optimising land use efficiency, mitigating against urban sprawl.

The almost 418,000 Lebanese in Tripoli are heavily concentrated in an inner ring tightly wrapped around the old city core which itself contains few residents (**Figure 11**). The three cadastres of Tripoli Et-Tell, Tripoli El-Qobbe and Tripoli El-Haddadine alone contain 50% of the entire urban area's Lebanese population. These being amongst the smallest cadastres, yet having high densities that exceed for example 230,000/km² in Tripoli El-Qobbe to the east of the inner circle (**Table 7**). The cadastres Tripoli El-Haddadine and Tripoli Et-Tell, which complete this inner ring, are also densely populated.

⁷⁰ Based on detailed verification through UNHCR RAIS questionnaires, the figure for SyR residence by locality is unlikely to diverge significantly from that officially recorded. Anecdotal suggestions of a dislocation between place of registration and place of residence has however been encountered in the data gathering for the current profile.

⁷¹ Eg Jenks & Burgess (2000) "Compact Cities: Sustainable Urban Forms for Developing Countries" (London: Spon).

	Leb pop 1997	Leb pop 2011		Leb < \$4/day 2004	Leb < \$4/day 2011		Syrian Refugees 15/12/31		PRL (All)		PRL in Camps 2016	PRL outside camps 2016	PRS (All)		PRS in Camps 2016	PRS outside camps 2016	PRL & PRS		Total	
		Count	%		Count	%	Count	%	Count	%			Count	%			Count	%	Count	%
Beddaoui	27,460	40,476	9.55	17,294	25,894	10.49	15,564	25.28	21,767	68.46	20,737	1,030	2,484	86.37	2,257	227	24,251	69.94	79,261	15.57
Mina Jardin	15,574	22,956	5.42	8,834	13,227	5.36	2,946	4.79	2,507	7.88	-	2,507	98	3.41	-	98	2,605	7.51	26,000	5.11
Mina N.1	10,127	14,927	3.52	5,744	8,601	3.49	-	0.00	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	14,927	2.93
Mina N.2	13,641	20,107	4.74	7,737	11,585	4.69	-	0.00	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	20,107	3.95
Mina N.3	9,595	14,143	3.34	5,442	8,148	3.30	2,936	4.77	2,507	7.88	-	2,507	98	3.41	-	98	2,605	7.51	17,177	3.37
Total Mina	48,937	72,133	17.02	27,757	41,561	16.84	5,882	9.56	5,014	15.77	0	5,014	196	6.82	0	196	5,210	15.03	78,211	15.37
Tripoli El-Hadid	335	494	0.12	190	284	0.12	469	0.76	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	963	0.19
Tripoli El-Mhatra	0	0	0.00	1	1	0.00	6	0.01	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	6	0.00
Tripoli El-Haddadine	52,252	77,019	18.17	29,637	44,376	17.98	1,501	2.44	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	78,520	15.43
Tripoli El-Qobbe	55,817	82,274	19.41	31,659	47,403	19.21	9,043	14.69	2,508	7.89	-	2,508	98	3.41	-	98	2,606	7.52	91,415	17.96
Tripoli En-Nouri	2,568	3,785	0.89	1,457	2,182	0.88	40	0.06	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	3,825	0.75
Tripoli Er-Remmaneh	1,751	2,581	0.61	993	1,487	0.60	-	0.00	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	2,581	0.51
Tripoli Es-Souayqa	9,737	14,352	3.39	5,523	8,270	3.35	76	0.12	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	14,428	2.83
Tripoli Tabbaneh	19,931	29,378	6.93	11,305	16,927	6.86	5,207	8.46	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	34,585	6.79
Tripoli Et-Tell	57,625	84,939	20.04	32,685	48,939	19.83	2,848	4.63	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	87,787	17.25
Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	3,995	5,889	1.39	2,266	3,393	1.37	2,323	3.77	2,508	7.89	-	2,508	98	3.41	-	98	2,606	7.52	8,310	1.63
Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun	4,902	7,226	1.70	2,780	4,163	1.69	16,675	27.09	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	23,901	4.70
Tripoli Jardins	2,221	3,274	0.77	1,260	1,887	0.76	1,922	3.12	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	0	0.00	5,196	1.02
Total Tripoli	211,134	311,212	73.43	119,756	179,311	72.66	40,110	65.16	5,016	15.78	0	5,016	196	6.82	0	196	5,212	15.03	351,518	69.06
Total	287,531	423,821	100.00	164,807	246,766	100.00	61,556	100.00	31,797	100.00	20,737	11,060	2,876	100.00	2,257	619	34,673	100.00	508,990	100.00

Table 6 Comprehensive population data for Tripoli urban area cadastres showing sources.

(Grey cells contribute to the total count.)

	Cadastral Area [km.sq]	Est. Lebanese Pop [Person/sq.km]	Density [Person/sq.km]
Beddaoui	5.52	7,327	14,349
Mina Jardin	2.71	8,461	9,583
Mina N:1	0.25	59,065	59,065
Mina N:2	0.40	49,819	49,819
Mina N:3	0.45	31,208	37,903
Total Mina	3.82	18,869	20,459
Tripoli El-Hadid	0.05	9,681	18,875
Tripoli El-Mhatra	0.05	0	110
Tripoli El-Haddadine	0.37	208,694	212,761
Tripoli El-Qobbe	0.38	214,835	238,704
Tripoli En-Nouri	0.08	48,234	48,744
Tripoli Er-	0.04	64,696	95,886
Tripoli Es-Souayqa	0.15	97,380	97,896
Tripoli Tabbaneh	0.22	132,466	155,944
Tripoli Et-Tell	0.51	165,751	171,309
Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	0.14	42,160	59,493
Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun	11.30*	640	736
Tripoli Jardins	6.94	472	749
Total Tripoli	20.23	15,382	17,374

Table 7 Cadastral areas (km²), Lebanese population count and densities.

As a proxy for poverty, the percentage of Lebanese on incomes under US\$4/day has been calculated⁷² to district level. In the district of Tripoli, containing Tripoli and Mina municipalities, 57% of Lebanese residents are estimated to fall into this category. In Minieh-Dennieh district of which Beddaoui municipality is part, the figure is higher at 63%. Across the three Tripoli urban area municipalities, calculations suggest that 58.2% of Lebanese – 246,766 – are living in poverty. This compares to the national percentage of 29%⁷³.

More granular cadastre-level percentages for this critical parameter are not currently available, a weakness in the data which could usefully be addressed in future work. That said, a simple spatial assumption can be made that poverty is

⁷² 2004 data for Lebanese under \$4/day at district level is from (CAS, UNDP, MoSa 2004). For comparability with UN-Habitat’s 2014 Lebanese population figures, UN-Habitat projected the aforementioned 2004 data forward to 2014 using the national World Bank growth rate.

⁷³ This figure is based on a total population figures of 4,050,128 in National Physical Master Plan for the Lebanese Territories (2005).

concentrated in the inner circle around the old city (**Figure 11**) by virtue of the sheer population densities there. This assumption is further supported by the concentration of poor building quality and low socio-economic classes found in these same locations (see **Theme 4 Housing, Shelter & Tenure**).

Refugees in Tripoli Urban Area

Pre- and post-crisis refugee count

Of the 96,229 registered refugees in Tripoli urban area (**Table 8**), 33% (31,797) at 2016 are Palestinian refugees [PRL].

Conversely, 67% of refugees (64,432 combining SyRand PRS) can be considered mainly post-2011 incomers driven by the Syrian crisis.

On this basis, from an approximate pre-crisis baseline of 31,797⁷⁴ refugees [PRL] in Tripoli, the Syrian crisis has driven a 202% increase in the urban area’s refugee count. This is likely to be a conservative estimate as unregistered refugees⁷⁵ are not factored in.

Palestinian refugees in Tripoli Urban Area

Palestinian refugees, combining PRL and PRS, currently make up almost 7% of the Tripoli urban population (2011 Lebanese, 2015/2016 refugee figures).

Amongst PRL, a majority reside in Beddaoui Camp (65%, or 20,737). Adding those living outside the camp⁷⁶, Beddaoui municipality holds 63% or 21,767 of Tripoli’s PRL.

Subsidiary hubs for PRL exist near the port in Mina No. 3, with two further smaller concentrations on the north-east of the inner urban ring, in Tripoli Jardins and Tripoli Al-Qobbe (**Figure 12**).

It is pertinent to briefly consider PRL and PRS as one group because of their geographical split between the official UNWRA camp on one hand and the rest

⁷⁴ This is though a 2014 figure, albeit one that can be assumed to have grown by the rate of natural increase only rather than through new immigration in the post-crisis period.

⁷⁵ Estimates of the number of unregistered Syrian refugees, for instance, range up to 25% of the registered total at national level.

⁷⁶ Concentrations of Palestinian refugees outside camps have sometimes been termed ‘gatherings’.

of the city under municipality administration on the other. The pre- and post-crisis spatial dispersal of all Palestinian refugees is notably limited to only four of the urban area's 17 cadastres, the overwhelming majority being in Beddaoui municipality (66.32%) related to the camp. Indeed, looking at PRS particularly, of the 2,876 in Tripoli at 2016, the entirety are registered to Beddaoui municipality, with the overwhelming majority - 78% - residing in the camp⁷⁷. So PRS are reinforcing the pre-existing distribution pattern of PRL (**Figure 12**), a pattern further entrenched by the greater propensity of new incoming PRS to locate in the camp relative to the longer-established PRL.

	In-Camps		Outside-Camps		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
PRL	20,737	65.22	11,060	34.78	31,797	100.00
PRS	2,257	78.48	619	21.52	2,876	100.00
SyR	-	0.00	61,556	100.00	61,556	100.00
Total	22,994	23.90	73,235	76.10	96,229	100.00

Palestinian Camp	PRL	PRS	PRL & PRS	PRS as % of PRL
Beddaoui ⁷⁸	20,737	2,257	22,994	10.88

Table 8 PRL & PRS by in-camp/outside-camp and by cadastre.

Syrian Refugees in Tripoli Urban Area

Around 5.2% of Lebanon's Syrian refugees in 2015 were located in Tripoli urban area. In the absence of informal tented settlements in the area, it is their distribution across the existing urban fabric that is in question.

Figure 12 shows the spatiality of refugee groups across the city by locality, against a backdrop of Lebanese population density by cadastre. There are two broad patterns evident in the distribution of Syrian refugees across the city.

- First, a quarter (15,564) of all Syrian refugees are registered to Beddaoui municipality, north of its Palestinian Camp. Adding to this the location of PRS exclusively inside the boundaries of this one municipality, Beddaoui can be considered a hotspot in terms of the urban response challenge posed.
- Second, the remaining 75% (45,992) Syrian refugees have mainly located in and around the densely populated 'inner ring' of the urban core, adding to and radially extending the pattern of high Lebanese density in this circle. On the southern margins of this ring, the cadastre Tripoli Zeitoun alone contains 27% of Syrian refugees dispersed across several localities, this layering the inner-city.
- Lebanese and Syrian refugees represent a compounding of urban stresses.

Syrian refugees, then, appear to be reinforcing both the spatial concentrations of PRL and PRS together on one hand, and that of the Lebanese on the other. This co-location of demographics may present scope for interventions which impact on more than one cohort. Such interventions could offer efficiency gains as well as opportunities for mitigating inter-group tensions.

⁷⁷ This proportional split amongst PRS between in-camp and out-of-camp closely reflects the split found for PRL.

⁷⁸ Residents of Beddaoui Palestinian Camp, the only camp in Tripoli urban area, have been excluded from the 1997 population estimate whilst those living outside the camp have, in principle, been included.





Figure 11 Population density of Lebanese by cadastre 2014 densities. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.



Lebanese density 2014 was estimated using World Bank annual growth rate for Lebanon / PRS data by UNRWA 2015 / PRL data by UNRWA, AUB 2011 - UNDP - UN-Habit 2014 / Syrian refugees are presented by their registration locations UNHCR as of 31.05.2015

Figure 12 Lebanese population density by cadastre plus PRS/PRL plus Syrian refugees registration locality spots. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.

Crisis-driven population change by cadastre

As a broad indicator of the spatiality of simple demographic pressure, counts for populations arriving post-crisis – SyR and PRS – can be expressed as a percent of the established pre-crisis populations – Lebanese and PRL. **Table 9** shows this breakdown at cadastre level to suggest the geography of relative population-driven pressure increments on pre-crisis level baseline services.

Relative to the urban average increment of 14.49%, the underlying spatial differentiation shows 10 cadastres with below-average impact and 7 cadastres with above-average impact.

Five cadastre ‘groups’ can be identified in terms of these demographic change characteristics, as posited in **Figure 13**.

1. The cadastre which underwent by far the most dramatic crisis-driven population increase (231%) is Tripoli Zeitoun abutting the south margins of the inner circle of high Lebanese density.

2. The cadastre which experienced the greatest population rise in absolute terms is clearly Beddaoui, with all PRS occupying the Palestinian camp there, and SyR occupying areas outside the camp mainly to its south.

3. The urban area’s three most populous cadastres, Qobbe, Tell and Haddadine [in that order] in Tripoli municipality show low rates of proportional increase, yet their high baselines means that the absolute increments are substantial. Moreover, these are the urban area’s three densest cadastres in terms of Lebanese per km² (**Table 7**).

4. Seven cadastres with variable pre-crisis baseline populations show little or no intake of PRS or SyR. These are split between central city low residential cadastres like Mhatra and Remmaneh on one hand, and a post-Syrian crisis refugee vacuum in part of relatively affluent Mina on the peninsula.

5. The remaining group is a mix of cadastres with under 30,000 baseline Lebanese/PRL population and moderate SyR/PRL intakes of under 6,000 each.

Notwithstanding caveats in the population data, these groupings provide a pragmatic, quantified characterisation basis against which services and infrastructure provision and access can be analysed in **Theme 4** below.

	Pre-crisis pop: Lebanese & PRL	Post-crisis pop: PRS & SYR	Post-crisis as % of pre-crisis
Beddaoui	61,213	18,048	29.48
Mina Jardin	22,956	3,044	13.26
Mina N:1	14,927	0	0.00
Mina N:2	20,107	0	0.00
Mina N:3	14,143	3,034	21.45
Total Mina	72,133	6,078	8.43
Tripoli El-Hadid	494	469	94.98
Tripoli El-Mhatra	0	6	-
Tripoli El-Haddadine	77,019	1,501	1.95
Tripoli El-Qobbe	82,274	9,141	11.11
Tripoli En-Nouri	3,785	40	1.06
Tripoli Er-Remmaneh	2,581	0	0.00
Tripoli Es-Souayqa	14,352	76	0.53
Tripoli Tabbaneh	29,378	5,207	17.72
Tripoli Et-Tell	84,939	2,848	3.35
Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	5,889	2,421	41.11
Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun	7,226	16,675	230.78
Tripoli Jardins	3,274	1,922	58.71
Total Tripoli	311,212	40,306	12.95
Total	444,558	64,432	14.49

Table 9 Counts for populations arriving post-crisis (SyR and PRS) expressed as a percent of the established pre-crisis populations (Lebanese and PRL) for 2014 and 2015.



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



Figure 13 Number of Lebanese (2011) and PRL (2016) versus number of SyR and PRS (2015-6) by area/locality⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ Lebanese (2011 data) and PRL (2016 data) are mainly populations originating pre-crisis. PRS and SyR are mainly new populations post-crisis (2015-6 data). Two-dimensional characterisation of cadastres in terms of these parameters offers a simple spatial approximation of the relative demographic pressures resulting from the crisis, relative to pre-2011 baseline.

THEME 4

Services







Economy

National

Classed as a developing world country, Lebanon is a free market economy that has experienced moderate economic growth in recent decades. However, ‘growth has been uneven due to large, frequent and mostly “political” shocks, to which the economy has been relatively resilient’.⁸¹ Real GDP grew by around 4.4% from 1992-2014, an average concealing variations related to unfolding political crises, of which the ongoing conflict in Syria is the most recent⁸². The quality of economic growth has been poor and has not been matched by domestic job creation.

According to the World Bank’s (2016) retrospective on 2015, “improved security conditions have been more than offset by a deteriorating political environment, leading to a further slowdown in an already sluggish economy”. Further, “negative impacts of low oil prices” are highlighted as a new drag on the economy for 2016.

Poverty has been widespread nationally since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war, which severely damaged the economy. Spatially, poverty has been higher outside the capital in the north and south of the country, and in dense pockets in the suburbs of large towns, reflecting the unevenness of economic growth⁸³.

According to a World Bank-led Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian conflict (2013), the Syrian crisis was, between 2012 and 2014:

- pushing 170,000 Lebanese into poverty.
- reducing real gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 2.9 percentage points per annum
- doubling unemployment to over 20% (mostly among unskilled youth).
- depressing government revenue collection by US\$ 1.5 billion.

As a counter-balance, UNHCR Shelter Survey (2015) reported that Syrian refugees injected US\$36,000/mth, based on March data, into the national economy.

⁸¹ World Bank (2015) “Systematic Country Diagnostic” (<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/publication/lebanon-systematic-country-diagnostic-2015>) [viewed 30.6.16].

⁸² World Bank (2015):9 (http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDS/IB/2015/06/23/090224b082f55445/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Lebanon-000Prom0c0country0diagnostic.pdf).

⁸³ Ibid.

GDP per capita was US\$18,200 pa in PPP terms⁸⁴ in 2015. GDP composition by sector of origin is shown in **Table 10**. Orientated towards services, the main growth sectors are banking and tourism. Other sectors are food processing, wine, jewelry, cement, textiles, mineral and chemical products, wood and furniture products, oil refining and metal fabricating⁸⁵. The country is also highly dependent on diaspora remittances (c.US\$7bill/yr) which is a partial driver of domestic consumption.

Sector	%
Services	69.7
Industry	24.7
Agriculture	5.6

Table 10 Sectoral contribution to GDP.

Public debt shows continued escalation as an established feature of the macro-economy (Figure 14). Empirically, international research has shown this indicator to be negatively correlated with economic growth, a relationship particularly clear as public debt approaches 100% of GDP⁸⁶. In 2014, Lebanon’s public debt was 146% of GDP⁸⁷. Whilst the theoretical existence of causality going from public debt to economic growth is unresolved, this macro-fiscal vulnerability remains an important policy issue and an indicator of the Lebanese context. This is not law as public debt as a percent of GDP is projected to rise: indeed, the IMF⁸⁸ forecasts an increase to 155% by 2019 from a 2013 baseline.

⁸⁴ GDP pc on a purchasing power parity basis, predicated on a national population figure of 6,184,701 (July 2015 est.) CIA World Fact Book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html> [viewed 29.6.16].

⁸⁵ CIA World Fact Book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html> [viewed 29.6.16].

⁸⁶ Reinhart and Rogoff 2010a, 2010b; Kumar and Woo 2010; Cecchetti et al. 2011, cited in VOX CEPR’ Policy Portal <http://voxeu.org/article/high-public-debt-harmful-economic-growth-new-evidence>, 22 Apr 2012, Viewed 30.6.16

⁸⁷ “At the end of 2012, average gross debt in OECD countries was close to 110% of the group’s GDP”. VOX CEPR’ Policy Portal <http://voxeu.org/article/high-public-debt-harmful-economic-growth-new-evidence>, 22 Apr 2012, Viewed 30.6.16

⁸⁸ IMF, 2014, in World Bank 2016 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDS/IB/2016/03/09/090224b08416f27b/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Lebanon000Prom0c0country0diagnostic.pdf




Figure 14 Key Economic Indicators 2015: Derived from MoF Public Finance Monitor.

A range of impediments to foreign investment – not formally restricted in Lebanon – have been identified which also bear on the domestic business climate including⁸⁹:

- Red tape
- Corruption
- Arbitrary licensing decisions
- Complex customs procedures
- High taxes, tariffs and fee
- Archaic legislation
- Weak intellectual property rights

In this context, one of a range of recommendations by the World Bank for augmenting the country’s development prospects was “(Improving) the business climate by easing the burden on firm creation and operation”⁹⁰.

Tripoli Urban Area

In a few decades, Tripoli has shifted from its position as a regional trade centre in the 1950s to one of the poorest cities not only in Lebanon but in the region. The city (on all geographic definitions) now manifests some of the highest poverty rates nationally. It has been particularly hard hit by the various wars and conflicts in the last 40 years, which have prompted and entrenched private and public sector disinvestment. A nationally peripheral pole in a context of a highly centralised country focused on its capital Beirut, Tripoli fared worse relative to the national average in the country’s post-1975 downward economic spiral, a trajectory which has led to economic stagnation.

⁸⁹ CIA World Fact Book <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html> [viewed 29.6.16].

⁹⁰ World Bank (2015: vii) http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/06/23/090224b082f55445/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Lebanon-000Prom0c0country0diagnostic.pdf

According to the World Bank’s (2016) Systematic Country Diagnostic Report on Lebanon, the country’s “failure to generate inclusive growth and jobs” is due to the confluence of two overarching, deep-rooted and mutually reinforcing constraints. These are “Elite capture hidden behind the veil of confessionalism/ Confessional governance” and “Conflict and Violence”. The first relates to endemic corruption and lack of transparency. The state does not sanction illegal behaviour, where the actors are confessionally linked or wealthy, fostering impunity towards the rule of law. The second – associated with wider Middle East dynamics – produces instability and an unattractive business environment. Further the impact of these overarching constraints becomes relevant when considering potential barriers to reform of individual service and infrastructure sectors like education or electricity. Constraints on individual sector reform are compounded by the overarching ones, making them less tractable than they would otherwise be. This point is relevant to the discussion of services and infrastructure challenges in the remainder of this profile theme.

Several historic factors converged to predispose the urban area to economic degeneration including:

- With the inclusion of Tripoli in the State of Great Lebanon from 1920 and the start of the French mandate period, Tripoli was cut off from its Syrian hinterland, affecting associated trading routes. A Lebanon-Syria tariff union was dissolved in 1951, and in the 1970s Syria’s Port Tartous developed in direct competition with Tripoli’s port, surpassing the latter’s earlier role as the main maritime port of central Syria (Nahhas, 2012). Within Lebanon, Tripoli port also lost market share to Beirut Port. At 2014, 93.5% of the share of shipments through the two Lebanese ports were via Beirut, leaving only 6.5% for Tripoli (Hamidi, 2014)⁹¹.
- Post-war reconstruction efforts have been concentrated in the capital at the expense of the peripheries from 1990. This has not been reversed on the ground since the decree of the Nation

⁹¹ <http://biatcenter.org/assets/uploads/Fawaz%20Hamidi%20Carnegie%20Center.pptx>

Physical Master Plan for the Lebanese Territory (CDR, 2005) which is legally obliged to plan for nationally balanced development.

- There has been a complete demise of rail links to Beirut or elsewhere since early in the 1975-1990 Civil War.

Another contributing factor has been the inability of the main economic sectors in the Tripoli agglomeration to retain adequately qualified people in the city⁹².

The weak economy and weak infrastructure provide the salient context for each other; mutually reinforcing factors in a vicious circle that appears unlikely to be broken without concerted public sector efforts at the structural level. According to the Development Board for the Tripoli 2020 Stimulation Plan⁹³, “Tripoli suffers from limited financial facilities, including restricted support from the banking sector, restricted foreign direct investments, and lack of an industrial base resulting in a GDP per capita that is the lowest in the country by far. Add to that a weak infrastructure characterized by underutilized, and often inefficient systems including utilities, roads and railroad, port and airport, and industrial clusters, and Tripoli’s business growth is largely impeded.”⁹⁴ (Tripoli 2020, Stimulation Plan Development Board).

A recent review of the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy identified five critical and pessimistic points related to the theme “Potential of the local economy” likely to affect the territory’s future developmental trend (Rajab, 2015:7). These are:

- “The presence of a weak economy based on micro-enterprise structures, (which) is not organized on a professional, entrepreneurial or sectorial scale.
- Low demand of consumers and enterprises, which obstructs local economic development. The case is the same when it comes to personal services.
- The presence of weak local resources.
- The weak positioning of the local economy relative to the open market.

Lack of an efficient infrastructure network that supports the local economy (seaport, airport, fair, rail network).” (Rajab, 2015:7⁹⁵)

⁹² Fawaz Hamdi (October 2009), pré-diagnostic économique, in Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâa: diagnostic et éléments de stratégie, Catherine Le Thomas and Bruno Dewailly, December 2009.

⁹³ The Board is now frozen.

⁹⁴ <http://tripolivision.com/tripoli-today>.

⁹⁵ Rajab, M (2015:7), “AFSDS 2020 Al-Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy Plan Review”.

For Tripoli, the city’s marginalisation at a national level has been compounded by the refugee influx. Demographic pressures are affecting all three municipalities as well as the UNWRA Palestinian camp in Beddaoui, pushing up existing poverty levels across the city. Urgent challenges are thus presenting themselves both to the municipalities and to UNWRA. More recently, in 2015-16, an economic crisis coupled with a renewed wave of armed sectarian conflict in the adjacent neighbourhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab el Tabbaneh negatively affected the job market as well as the city’s business environment and image. (Neighbourhood Conflict in Tripoli). The refugee influx has, however, grimly yielded a boost to the economy through cheap labour and through new demand for privately traded services. In the T5 territories, research has suggested that 8% of Lebanese have reported receiving services or rent from displaced Syrians (FAO Reach, 2015). The only governorate to surpass this is the Bekaa, where the figure is 11%.

Neighbourhood Conflict in Tripoli

Neighbourhood level sectarian clashes between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian government factions have taken place between the Alawite Muslims of Tripoli El-Zeitoun’s Jabal Mohsen & the Sunni Muslims of adjacent Tabbaneh cadastre’s Bab Tabbaneh both in the vicinity of the old town. The groups are divided by support for or opposition to the Alawite Syrian government. A long-standing rivalry exists since the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war with conflicts periodically flaring.

Jabal Mohsen residents reported losing business to other parts of Tripoli after fights in 2008 due to intimidation, discrimination and attacks on their shops. Tabbaneh, the pre-civil war ‘gate of gold’ in reference to its then intense economic activity and nightlife, is now associated with conflict and poverty. Of the Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen residents, 67% were living under the upper poverty line and 33% under the lower poverty line⁹⁶.

On the cusp of the Syrian crisis in 2011, an overwhelming 77% of the families in these neighbourhoods were considered to be in economic deprivation⁹⁷. Tensions have risen again with the Syrian civil war and its knock-on effects in Lebanon. The effects of the crisis are overlain onto a context of existing deprivation, magnifying their amplitude in terms of access to urban services and average living conditions.

⁹⁶ UNDP (2009), “Mapping of human poverty and living conditions in Lebanon”.

⁹⁷ ESCWA. (2014), « Urban Deprivation Index. Methodology and results of the field research in Tripoli, Lebanon”.

Economic Sectors

Understanding the relationship between the national sectoral performance and potential, the urban sectoral structure and city-regional competitive advantages are critical to understanding the economic opportunities and challenges for the urban area. **Table 11** shows the urban area's sectoral makeup. The main national growth sectors, banking and tourism, fall under "services", a category which employs about 20% of the city's working population (comprising >14% in services and >6% in tourism) in Tripoli. The overwhelming majority of workers are engaged in the category "Trade" (54% of working population), a sector that is also relatively buoyant at a national level. The concentration in trade and services is positive in principle, but the figures do not factor in the high unemployment rates among the work age population, known to be high. Handicrafts - in which Tripoli has a local specialisation - combined with manufacturing comprise a mere 2% of the active workforce.

	% of economically active people	% of companies
Trade	54	58
Services	> 14	23
Industry	14	19
Manufacturing & Handicraft	2	< 1%
Construction	10	1
Tourism	> 6	< 1

Figures shown with '<' are inferred from the other sectoral data and are thus approximations only

Table 11 Economic sectors in Tripoli, Mina & Beddaoui by % of economically active people & % of companies. Source: Hamidi, 2009.

Drawing on the limited economic data available for Tripoli, a brief sectoral outline is provided below based on Hamidi (2009).

TRADE: Trade is overwhelmingly the largest economic sector. In 2009, trade engaged 58% of companies active in the Caza of Tripoli and 54% of its economically active population⁹⁸. The sector has played historical role in the economic life of Tripoli, but is highly dependent on land trade with Syria and via Syria. This reliance has worked to its detriment particularly following the outbreak of war in Syria in 2011.

SERVICES: Services reach second place in the sectoral composition of Tripoli's economy, engaging

23% of companies⁹⁹. Education services and health services are the major activities in this sector, accounting for 10% and 4% respectively of the economically active population in Tripoli.

INDUSTRY: Tripoli is known as the major industrial area of the North¹⁰⁰, ranking second for industrial activity nationally behind Mount Lebanon. The major industry is furniture, with main products being bedrooms, kitchens, sofas, office furniture and dining rooms. The chief threat facing the industrial sector is price competition from China, Indonesia and Malaysia. In 2009, 14% of the economically active labor force was working in the industrial sector, which represents 19% of the companies in Tripoli¹⁰¹.

MANUFACTURING & HANDICRAFTS: The manufacturing sector is essentially composed of a sugar plant, arabic sweets production, blossom and rose water distillation, salt refining plant and fishing¹⁰². Agriculture and fishing account for 2% of the work force¹⁰³. There is a wealth of crafts available in Tripoli (gold and silver, copper, furniture and wooden crafts, yachts, traditional clothing, blown glass, pottery, leather works, soap, sweets). However, this sector's activities are shrinking because of political stability and the lack of security as well as paucity of tourists in the city¹⁰⁴ amongst other things.

CONSTRUCTION: The building sector represents 1% of companies yet 10% of the economically active workforce nationally¹⁰⁵. Even if Tripoli's share in total investments on Lebanese soil is small, a likely large part of its share goes to the construction sector.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Cities Alliances (October 2011), "Al Fayhaa 2020, Sustainable development strategy, final consolidation report.

¹⁰¹ Fawaz Hamdi (October 2009), pré-diagnostic économique, in Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâa: diagnostic et éléments de stratégie, Catherine Le Thomas and Bruno Dewailly, December 2009.

¹⁰² Cities Alliances (October 2011), "Al Fayhaa 2020, Sustainable development strategy, final consolidation report.

¹⁰³ Fawaz Hamdi (October 2009), pré-diagnostic économique, in Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâa : diagnostic et éléments de stratégie, Catherine Le Thomas and Bruno Dewailly, December 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Fawaz Hamdi (October 2009), pré-diagnostic économique, in Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâa: diagnostic et éléments de stratégie, Catherine Le Thomas and Bruno Dewailly, December 2009.

TOURISM: The Tripoli tourism sector witnessed continuous growth since the end of the 1990s¹⁰⁶ and is considered a priority in any strategic development and is a higher revenue generator compared to agriculture and industry. However, the sector in Tripoli is confronted by major challenges including the lack of security, the need for major infrastructure investments and a lack of tourist accommodation. Further, increasing concentrations of poverty in the downtown area is actively degrading the existing built heritage¹⁰⁷, in the absence of enforced institutionalised mechanisms for its protection and sustainable maintenance. This dynamic is progressively and irreversibly shrinking the scope for touristic development.

The Urban Deprivation Index (UNDP, 2014) offers an estimation of job distribution in Tripoli municipality by selected sectors, using 2011 data. **Figure 15** shows the top five categories. The importance of the hand craft sector to the job market is clear (20.5% of jobs), followed by services (13.5%) and education (13.5%).




Figure 15 Main jobs distribution in Tripoli municipality. Source: UNDP 2014 Urban Deprivation Index.

Tripoli Special Economic Zone

The Tripoli urban area or indeed the union of Al Fayhaa, lack a dedicated economic development agency or strategy. However, successive governments have drawn up plans to reinvigorate its economy.

One such initiative was the 1960 “Permanent International Fair”, renamed in 1991 the “Rashid Karami International Fair”. Designed to promote local trade, industry and agriculture whilst promoting trade-related communications domestically and abroad, the fair remains incomplete and virtually unused to this day.

¹⁰⁶ Cities Alliances (October 2011), “Al Fayhaa 2020, Sustainable development strategy, final consolidation report”.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.medicities.org/documents/10180/234514/16.02.26+AFSDS+Review-Final+Report.pdf/1d019d9c-7d5c-4f30-8f61-a5c679214e9a>

In 2005, Lebanon’s parliament passed legislation¹⁰⁸ creating the framework for a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and a regulating authority. A further law was passed in 2008 providing for its establishment/enactment. Options were put forward for the SEZ location. One was the fair and selected adjacent areas stretching port-wards. Another was the port – an option which would incorporate a significant land reclamation component and could in time extend to the fair and airport areas. The latter was subsequently selected. Geared towards stimulating investment into trade, industry, services – excluding tourism services, and stockpiling, the SEZ is to offer a range of relaxed bureaucracy measures and tax breaks as investment incentives. A cooperation agreement was signed between the SEZ General Management Authority and the Chamber of Commerce of Tripoli and North Lebanon in 2015. However, the SEZ remains inoperational¹⁰⁹, raising questions about market demand, government commitment to the initiative or some combination thereof.

Livelihoods

National

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) asserts that the struggle for employment is linked to the deteriorating security situation and to the employment of Syrians at lower wages relative to locals. FAO reported that a rising numbers of Syrian workers caused a 60% reduction in the daily agriculture wage rate (FAO 2014)¹¹⁰, while jobs created in recent years have gone to non-Lebanese. Furthermore, the current Syrian crisis has raised poverty levels including by severing economic and familial ties, and by preventing residents for shopping in Syria for cheaper goods.

According to the World Bank (2015), income and daily wages at a national level have been decreasing in the three years up to 2015. FAO predicted that the Syrian crisis would increase poverty among the Lebanese population by 170,000 people by 2014¹¹¹, while the already poor would be pushed deeper into poverty.

Over the years, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have work restrictions, preventing them from

¹⁰⁸ Tripoli SEZ Law No. 18.

¹⁰⁹ The Monthly Magazine (5 Nov 2014) Developing the economy of Tripoli, between the fair and the economic zone. <http://www.localiban.org/article5725.html>

¹¹⁰ World Bank (2015), “Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity” p.83.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.1.

accessing the job market, which worsens their economic situation. The same restrictions are also imposed on Palestine refugees from Syria. In early 2015, new visa regulations for Syrian refugees also oblige Syrians to sign a pledge not to work, and work permits exceptions are only allowed in sectors where Syrian workers have traditionally occupied jobs.

For Syrian refugees in Lebanon, "...poverty...is at unprecedented levels. 70% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon live below the national poverty line. Over 50% fall below the minimum means needed for survival. Hundreds of thousands find themselves in a situation of increasing insecurity, hardship and destitution"¹¹².

Tripoli Urban Area

POVERTY

In Tripoli, the stagnant economy presents an overriding structural context for livelihood insecurity. Degeneration has eroded people's livelihood opportunities and thus the ability to maintain their quality of life. ESCWA (2012) estimated that 51% of Tripoli's residents live in extreme poverty, on an income of less than US\$4/day for a household of five. This compares to the national minimum monthly wage of US\$450, or about US\$15/day (ESCWA, 2012¹¹³).

In terms of expenditure (per capita consumption) in the pre-Syrian crisis period, IPC (2008) found that amongst the regions "... the North had the lowest per capita expenditure (and also) exhibits the highest inequality compared to ... other governorates". The northern governorate at that time was found to exhibit "(a) very high prevalence of extreme and overall poverty (18% and 53%, respectively)" (IPC, 2008:9)¹¹⁴. Further, comparing per capita consumption between 1997 and 2004-5, the only governorates to show a decrease were the North and Mt Lebanon - the bigger drop from a lower baseline evident for the North.

According to the Basic Assistance Sector Plan (2015:2)¹¹⁵,

- "Extremely poor Lebanese households constitute an estimated 10% of the country's population as

¹¹² www.nrc.co, (viewed Aug 2016).

¹¹³ ESCWA (2012) report in cooperation with the Arab Institute for Developing Cities.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCCountryStudy13.pdf> (2008).

¹¹⁵ <http://www.un.org.lb/library/assets/BasicAssistance-SectorPlan-065614.pdf>

per the criteria of the National Poverty Targeting Programme (NPTP), and the incidence of poverty has risen by 6% since 2011". "Extremely poor Lebanese households are found mainly in the North (43%) [including Tripoli] and Bekaa (21%)." Further, Lebanese returnees from Syria are increasing poverty partly through driving up unemployment rates.

- "Two-thirds of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (PRL) live under the poverty line"¹¹⁶. As for PRS, "89% ... are in poverty, and 9% of them suffer from extreme poverty. Extreme poverty is three times higher for PRS than PRL".
- For Syrian refugees (SyR) as in 2015, "An estimated 70% ... lives below the poverty line (US\$3.84/day, or US\$584/month for a household of five), in comparison to 49% in 2014. Furthermore, 52% of the total registered population of displaced Syrians is deemed severely economically vulnerable, that is, currently living below a Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket of US\$435/month for a household of five".

FALLING INCOMES

Falling incomes amongst Lebanese have been reported for the wider T5 territory for the 2013-2015 period¹¹⁷. Reasons cited for T5 were (FAO, 2015:18):

1. Cost of materials and items needed for livelihood increased (52% of survey respondents)
2. Fewer job opportunities (23%)
3. Salary decreased (9%)
4. The customer base has decreased so there are fewer opportunities for respondent's livelihood (7%)
5. The salaries of casual laborers or staff have increased (6%)

UNEMPLOYMENT

For Tripoli, job shortages were cited as a key cause of division and tension between host communities and Syrian refugees. However, Syrian refugees constitute a mainly low-skilled workforce with low education levels, working predominantly in construction, agriculture and domestic work. In contrast, most poor Lebanese in the old city of Tripoli - where Syrian refugees are concentrated - work in services, handicrafts, small commerce and public administrative services. Thus, while there is increased unemployment amongst Lebanese,

¹¹⁶ UNRWA and AUB (2015), "Socioeconomic Report on the Living Conditions of Palestine Refugees in Lebanon (Preliminary Findings)". The poverty calculation in this report is based on the national poverty line calculated in 2004 while accounting for the inflation rate of 2015: US\$6/capita/day for the upper border (poverty line) and US\$2.50 for the lower border (extreme or absolute poverty line).

¹¹⁷ FAO (2015).

Sector		Livelihoods		
		Year	2014	2015
Activity		No Activity	1- Vocational skills training program	2- Internship, on-the-job training
Unit			Individuals	Individuals
1	Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun			
2	Tripoli Tabbaneh			
3	Beddaoui		108	21
4	Mina 1			
5	Mina 2			
6	Mina 3			
7	Mina Jardin		382	
8	Tripoli Jardins			
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe			
10	Tripoli Et-Tell			
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh			
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa			
13	Tripoli En-Nouri			
14,15,16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra			
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh			
Total			490	21

Table 12 Number of reported activities against “Livelihoods” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

traditionally Syrian workers and Lebanese may not have competed over jobs within the same sectors. Restrictions on Syrian Refugees’ access to the Lebanese labor market, approved by the government in late 2014, have reduced livelihood opportunities and self-sufficiency. As such, the rising unemployment rates may be the result of a declining economy rather than of wage undercutting by refugees.

The livelihoods of Syrian Refugees is deteriorating with rising unemployment and cost of living¹¹⁸. Whilst Syrian unemployment rates nationally increased by 7% from 2014-2015 (Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2015:35), the rate for Tripoli (T5) was double this at 14%. Syrian household dependency on loans as their first livelihood source also increased fastest in the T5 region over this period, from 1.5% in 2014 to 10% in 2015. This however compares to a higher but slower moving national average of 5% in 2014 rising to 15% by 2015. Regionally, in Tripoli and the North, reliance on food vouchers as Syrian Refugee households’ first source of livelihood was 68% in 2015: this is double for Beirut & Mount Lebanon (35%) but lower than that for West Bekaa (74%). (VaSyR, 2015:38).

¹¹⁸ E.Gracia (2014), “Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Lebanon Host Community Shelter Programmes” p.8.

WORKING CONDITIONS FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES
For Syrian Refugees, Tripoli (T5) shows both the longest working hours and lowest average wage in Lebanon, at 60 hours per week and 368,000LBP (US\$245.3)/month respectively. Compared to the average income of Syrians in the whole country, those in Tripoli earn 50 000LBP (US\$33.3) less per month.

Reported Activity

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against ‘Livelihoods’ (**Table 12**) show:

- No reported activities in 2014
- Only Beddaoui and Mina Jardins cadastres benefit from activities in 2015; no activity in the remaining 15 cadastres.
- There is one main activity “Vocational skills training program” in 2015, which targeted 490 individuals inside the two cadastres mentioned.

Gaps & Challenges

The most impoverished city in Lebanon and on the Mediterranean, Tripoli urban area has a weak economic base comprising low growth sectors and micro-enterprises. Stagnation combined with the influx of refugees has contributed to social tensions, at times acute. The clear challenge is to halt and reverse the degeneration of the urban economy in ways that create jobs for locals,

through a combination of a state-orchestrated strategic stimulus package and upskilling or right-skilling measures at the labour supply side. This would speak to the strategic agenda for nationally balanced development espoused in the decreed NPMP (2005).

Gaps mitigating against achievement of this include lack of national appetite for reversing the post-war focus on the capital and the lack of a pro-active governance culture or unified competent body in greater Tripoli to bring forward a multi-sectoral, multi-agency regeneration initiative. The influx of refugees has entrenched average poverty levels and risks diverting attention from the fundamental structural economic challenges of the city Pre-Syrian crisis.

The Tripoli economy is heavily reliant on small scale enterprises, handicrafts and tourism, with products often sold at the local markets. It is thus dependent on the local consumer economy. The main former scaleable income generators with critical mass - trade to Syria and the harbour function - are unlikely to be restored in the foreseeable future. The city therefore needs clear direction on which industries or businesses it could competitively cater for.

There are indications that host and refugee communities are not, in the main, competing for the same job sectors. However, there appears to be a case for strengthening partners' livelihood activities in those cadastres most affected by the refugee influx in proportional terms, including easing host/refugee community tensions. This can be progressed as informed by learning from partners' activities reported on to date targetting the Beddaoui and Mina Jardins cadastres.

Basic assistance

National

Direct aid supplied to severely socio-economically vulnerable households is aimed at enabling them to meet basic needs without increasing negative coping mechanisms. It includes cash transfers with spending prioritisation left up to recipient households¹¹⁹, as well as vouchers, in-kind support and strengthening existing social safety net structures. Targetting can be seasonal or year-round. Against a national backdrop of rising poverty linked to "shrinking of spaces for livelihoods and income-

¹¹⁹ UNHCR Basic Assistance Working Group. Multi-purpose cash is usually spent on food and accommodation. https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=122.&Id=23

generation"¹²⁰ amongst populations affected by the crisis, refugees as well as Lebanese are increasingly unable to access basic goods and services and are increasingly dependent on loans, credit and food assistance. According to Inter-Agency Coordination Lebanon (2016)¹²¹, almost 90% of the total refugee population in Lebanon is trapped in debt, with the debt level having increased from US\$750 in early 2015 to almost US\$1,000 in 2016 - five times greater than the average refugee monthly income of US\$177/month.

Tripoli Urban Area

The previous section has described the poverty and vulnerability situation in Tripoli relative to the national context, which provides the backdrop for considering reported activities under 'basic assistance'.

Reported Activity in Basic Assistance

On Jan-May 2016, in the eight governorates, the number of households receiving multi-purpose cash assistance in the North was 6,346 - the third highest behind Bekaa (15,848) and Akkar (6,669) (IACL, 2016 Jan-May Dashboard).

According to VaSyR 2015, for Syrian Refugees¹²²

- Food vouchers were the main type of assistance (67% versus 69% in 2014) in the three months prior to the survey, with the lowest rate being in Akkar (52%), followed by Tripoli (61%).

Only 7% of national households received cash assistance in the three months before the survey, with the lowest rate in Tripoli (3%).

- Assistance in Tripoli reached the registered Syrian Refugee population as follows: 61% received food vouchers, 11% health care, 3% cash assistance, 3% food in-kind, 2% hygiene kits, 1% fuel for heating subsidy and 1% rent subsidy.¹²³ These percentages are notably all under the national average (**Table 13**) suggesting in-principle scope for the extension of the programmes, especially in light of the poverty levels and vulnerability trajectory reviewed in the section '**Economy & Livelihoods**' above.

- In terms of occupancy type, whilst the great majority of occupancy arrangements are "unfurnished rental" in Tripoli (77%), in common with elsewhere, a small minority (5%) of shelter

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Interagency_Quarterly_Jan_May_2016BasicAssistance_.pdf

¹²² UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP (2015), "VASyR2015, executive summary" - p.11.

¹²³ VASyR (2015), p.66.

rental costs are paid for by direct assistance. Relative to the other regions, this is low, with only Beirut/Mount Lebanon showing a lower percentage (2%).

Assistance	Region					
	Akkar	Bekaa	BML	South	Tripoli	Total
Food Voucher	52%	71%	70%	72%	61%	67%
Health Care	19%	12%	10%	11%	11%	12%
Cash Assistance	5%	9%	8%	5%	3%	7%
Food inkind	11%	7%	5%	10%	3%	7%
Hygiene Kits	4%	8%	1%	8%	2%	4%
Other NFI	4%	5%	1%	2%	1%	3%
Fuel Subsidy	4%	3%	2%	6%	1%	3%
Rent Subsidy	2%	3%	1%	2%	1%	2%
Other assistance	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%
Psychosocial	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 13 Assistance by region and total. Percentages relate to whole registered Syrian refugee population per region.¹²⁵

- Health assistance tended to reach a higher proportion of households in the Bekaa (62% reporting that they were in receipt of health assistance) but least regular in Tripoli, where only 28% reported receiving health assistance at the time of the interview.¹²⁵
- Up to 2015, the two main types of basic assistance provided by agencies in Tripoli were food vouchers (62%) and health care (28%)¹²⁶.

Activities reported in ActivityInfo against ‘Basic Assistance’ (**Table 14**) show:

- It is difficult to compare the two years reported on due to changes in activity categories. However, there is an acute fall off in overall basic assistance activity from 2014 to 2015, particularly evident in cash assistance.
- In 2014, the two main activities were “Non-Food Items distribution: ATM cards loaded with this cash” and “Non-Food Items distribution: Baby Kit or voucher” with an expenditure of US\$654,754. These were both focussed overwhelmingly on the cadastre Tripoli Jardins, which is however at the lower end of the spectrum for poor Lebanese and total refugees.

¹²⁴ VASyR (2015), p.66.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid (Fig 17.3)

Gaps & Challenges

Combining Tripoli urban area’s total of Lebanese earning under US\$4/day, PRS and PRL gives a vulnerable population of 226,756¹²⁷. The scope for expansion of activities addressing basic need is clear. However the trajectory of basic assistance in Tripoli from 2014-2015 is one of alarming descent in a context of escalating acute poverty, indicating a gap demanding partners’ attention. The magnitude of any emerging gap will be revealed by forthcoming ActivityInfo figures for 2016 and beyond.



© Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.

¹²⁷ Reference pop dates- Leb 2014, refugees 2015

Sector		Basic Assistance								
Year		2014					2015			
Activity		1- NFI distribution ATM cards loaded with this cash	2- NFI distribution of individuals for Cloth (in kind or vouchers)	3- NFI distribution Standard Newcomer Kits	4- NFI distribution Hygiene kit or voucher	5- NFI distribution Baby Kit or voucher	6- NFI distribution \$ USD Cash multi-purpose	1- Children who received winter clothes (in kind)	2- House Hold Seasonal cash headed HH receiving seasonal cash grants	3- USD Seasonal cash Total USD amount distributed
Unit		ATM Cards	Children	Kits	Kits	Kits	USD	Children	Households	USD
1	TripoliEz-Zeitoun	303				53	67,800		10	1,000
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh				40					
3	Beddaoui	299			2	550	191,623	500	314	
4	Mina 1	47				8,204	11,000	500		
5	Mina 2					132				
6	Mina 3	2					400			
7	Mina Jardins					58		200		
8	Tripoli Jardins	2,837					333,922			
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe	1,344	14		79	705	33,800			
10	Tripoli Et-Tell	255		936		3,852	11,600			
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	15					4,200			
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa									
13	Tripoli En-Nouri									
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra	2					400			
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh									
Total		5,104	14	936	121	13,554	654,745	1,200	324	1,000

Cadastres

Table 14 Number of reported activities against “Basic Assistance” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Basic Urban Services

Housing, Shelter & Tenure

Residential building quality

Figure 16 shows the results of a high-level external assessment of residential stock quality at the urban scale (adapted from Schinder, 2014).

Very poor quality

Notwithstanding the broadbrush nature of the survey, concentrations of ‘very poor quality’ buildings were identified in three main concentrations.

- The major one is anchored on the entire inner residential ring surrounding the commercial heart of Tripoli. Critically, this ring is densely populated by poor Lebanese and latterly Syrian Refugees, representing the majority of the urban area’s total residents. It extends a spine north-west through Tripoli Jardins and northern Tripoli Zeitoun to encompass the areas around the Palestinian Camp in Beddaoui, the municipality where all the urban area’s PRS are registered. There is a clear spatial correlation between the worst quality housing and the registered location of refugee populations.
- A second small concentration is located near the northern coastlines of Mina 1 and Mina 2, adjacent to and part of the centre of Mina historic city. No refugees are officially registered to these cadastres, suggesting occupation of the very poor quality housing by vulnerable Lebanese.
- Another concentration is found seaward of the international fair near the western coastline of Mina Jardins, characterised by informal housing on land earmarked for development. Over 3,300 Syrian Refugees are registered to Mina Jardins; it is fair to anticipate their insertion into the poorest quality accommodation in the area.

Poor quality

Housing in this category forms a second albeit incomplete ring around the densely populated old city inner ring, lying to its east and south. Large tracts are also found in Beddaoui and Tripoli Zeitoun. The category accounts for the bulk of the residential stock of Mina 1, 2 and 3.

Fair to good quality

There is a substantial stretch of “fair to good quality” residential housing in between Tripoli old city and Mina old city, in Mina Jardins and Tripoli Jardins. These two cadastres hold but a minority (about 6%) of the total residents of the urban area.

New building

Major urban expansions exist to the south and east of the urban area in Mina Jardins, Tripoli Jardins and Tripoli Zeitoun, comprising new buildings dating to the post-2000 period. Regionally prime real estate along the west coast of Mina Jardins west of the fair is currently vacant and earmarked for residential development. The combination of fairly homogenous parcellation into large lots, high real estate prices, 5-6 storey zoning, and the high-end character of the several parcels constructed to date underpin an expectation of high-income residential in the remaining build-out.

Socio-economic groups by residential area

Figure 17 offers a high-level assessment of the spatiality of socio-economic groups of all nationalities at the urban level, that can be cross-referenced with residential building quality in **Figure 16**. Focusing on the “very poor”, shows that this group occupies the hearts of the worst building quality concentrations. Main instances are:

- A strip that traverses the core of the densely populated “very poor quality residential” old city, involving Tripoli municipality’s Tabbaneh, Al-Hadid, Al-Mouhaitra, Al Soueka.
- A major swathe of Beddaoui municipality around the Palestinian camp to its north and east, with a secondary offshoot to the north-east of the municipality’s residential extent. The camp itself was not surveyed but is categorised as socio-economically “very poor” based on UNWRA findings.
- A sub-section to the north of the “very poor quality” residential pocket near the western coastline of Mina Jardins, characterised by informal housing on land parcelled for high end residential development.

The locational cross-referencing of very poor residential building quality with the most vulnerable socio-economic groups indicates hotspots that may inform the spatiality of the humanitarian response. The absence of Syrian Refugees from some of the so-affected cadastres such as Tripoli Al-Soueka shows that both refugee and host communities are implicated. This finding supports multi-cohort interventions, a characteristic of an area-based approach. Neighbourhood-level analysis would of course be required to supplement the urban-level findings, ahead of programming field interventions.

The broad confluence of the poorest building quality and the most socio-economically vulnerable resident groups is unsurprising. It is equally foreseeable that the socio-economic “upper class” occupies the swathes of post-2000 “new building”




Figure 16 Building quality map showing Palestinian camp and social housing instances. Adapted from Schinder (2014).

in Tripoli Jardins and Tripoli Zeitoun. What is perhaps less intuitive, however, is that poor and even very poor condition residential areas are being occupied not only by the poorest socio-economic groups but also by middle income classes. Cases in point are the city-ward extent of Tripoli Zeitoun both south and north-east of the old city; much of Tripoli El-Tell; and the majority of Mina 1, 2 and 3. The area between the old city periphery and Beddaoui, mainly comprising Tripoli Al-Qobbe, shows middle income residents occupying residential stock classed as “very poor quality”.

Recalling the limited instances of “fair to good quality” residential buildings in the overall urban area (located in between Tripoli old city and Mina old city, in Mina Jardins and Tripoli Jardins), there appears to be a mismatch between supply and demand in the housing market, not least in terms of diversity of supply. It could be that occupation costs are disproportionately high relative to building quality, a view supported by the fact that average rents in this most impoverished city are exceeded only marginally by those in Beirut/Mt Lebanon. Certainly, average building quality is generally low. Another possible dynamic is the squeezing out of middle-classes from the housing market resulting from both the progressive degradation of standing stock and the direction of the residential stock pipeline towards high-income occupiers. A full housing market supply and demand study would be required to make causal links against longitudinal trends, in order to inform any strategic planning guidelines addressing the apparent mismatch.




Figure 17 Socio-economic groups in Tripoli metropolitan area. Adapted from Schinder (2014).

Social Housing

In principle, it is likely that part of the housing demand/supply mismatch may only be addressed through provision of non-market or part-market housing. There are three small pockets of social housing: two on the inner periphery of Tripoli old city and one in Mina Jardins (**Figure 16**). These were built by central government (CDR) in partnership with the municipality on municipal land. These are as follows:

- Located in Tripoli municipality at its eastern border with Beddaoui, Al Mankoubin is a social housing development that was started in 1955 after a major flood gave rise to rehousing needs. The development, which remains uncompleted, was occupied by squatters during the 1975-1990 civil war. It remains a squatted development to present. It is surrounded by informal construction and in terms of building condition, it is of “poor” quality.
- Also in Tripoli municipality in the Tabaneh cadastre is Khan Al Askar, a three block, 33 apartment social housing development of 8,400sqm built up area. Construction commenced in 2014 and finished in 2015/16. The development aimed to offer resettlement housing to long-term squatters occupying part of the khan since the 1955 flood, in anticipation of their displacement linked to rehabilitation plans for parts of the souqs. A relatively new development, it is of “fair to good” quality.
- Al Mina Social Housing project in Mina Jardins was completed in the 1950s by Al Mina municipality and the CDR. Comprising 20 buildings offering 40 apartments and a total 9,900sqm built-up area,

the project was part of an effort to suburbanise development pressure from the old city. It is now surrounded by informal construction and is itself of “poor” quality.

Tripoli’s scarcity of social housing is a feature shared with the rest of the country. The lack of social housing is particularly conspicuous in this urban area in light of the nationally disproportionate concentration of poverty and the overwhelmingly inadequate condition of the residential stock on one hand, and the planned dedication of new housing land to high-income units on the other. The 2015 review of the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy (Rajab, 2015) recommends a social housing project as one of five strategic actions under the theme ‘Social Development’. The question of formulating context-appropriate, scalable financial-institutional models for social housing production based on a limited number of poor quality cases, looms large for Lebanon as a whole. Prospects are poor in a state with an - at best - weak social policy sphere, and even poorer for Tripoli given its economic stagnation and history of central government is passive neglect.

Shelter conditions

The most pressing shelter needs relate to the requirement for improved shelter conditions, overcrowding, and security of tenure for Syrian refugees. With the influx of refugees since 2011, already poor urban neighborhoods suffering from severe deterioration are becoming overcrowded and land tenure is locked, allowing little room for manoeuvre.

For Syrian refugees in 2015, overcrowding was reported as the most pressing issue in terms of shelter conditions. Syrian refugees tend to live in the poorest areas and enclaves within the city, mainly occupying highly deteriorated buildings. The top four inadequate shelter conditions in Tripoli that Syrians reported were damaged roofs (90%), followed by unsealed windows (80%), lack of disabled access (65%) and overcrowding (64%)¹²⁸. On the latter point, Syrian refugees in Tripoli live at the highest density of all Lebanese cities, with 48% living at under 10.5sqm/person (VaSyR, 2015).

Rented shelter conditions

In terms of shelter quality and according to a study of six neighbourhoods with high refugee counts (CARE, 2015), rented accommodation in Tripoli is for the most part sub-standard, often in unfinished buildings, garages or makeshift shelters, exposing families to very poor living conditions and insuffi-

cient access to water and hygiene service. Although some residences have access to running water, a toilet and drainage, others are living in very poor conditions; many dwellings are not weather-proof, suffer from excessive leaks and damp, have partial or broken windows, little or no heating facilities, and have limited daylight and ventilation (CARE, 2015:44)¹²⁹.

Of the six studied neighbourhoods, the average persons per toilet ranged between 3.95 at the most adequate end (Jabal Mohsen) and 6.12 at the least adequate side of the range (Beddaoui)¹³⁰. Accessibility to a toilet ranged from 100% in Mina to 87.5% in Al Ghuraba. Average space per person ranged from the most generous at 13.38m²/person in Abu Samra to the tightest of 7.19m²/person in Mina [CARE, 2015]. There is apparently no reliable correlation in space between these quality of life dimensions (eg Mina has the highest access to a toilet but the lowest space per person conditions), suggesting that each needs to be understood in its own right.

Toilets			
Area	Average people/toilet	Average people/toilet (Calculated through ratio/100)	Access to Toilet(%)
Abu Samra	5.2	7.32	95.77
Beddaoui	6.12	13.91	95.35
Tabbaneh	5.01	9.45	96.15
Al Ghuraba	5.16	12.59	87.50
Qobbe	4.87	9.37	96.08
Mina	5.17	7.83	100
Jabal Mohsen	3.95	8.06	95.83

Table 15 Access to toilets. Source: CARE 2015 Report 2015.

¹²⁹ CARE (2015), p.44.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁸ VaSyR (2015), p.19.

Area	m ² / person	Unacceptable Roof (%)	Unacceptable Roof (%)	Unacceptable Wall (%)	% Partition (between sleeping areas & kitchen/toilet)
Abu Samra	13.38	81.69	32.39	81.69	53.52
Beddaoui	8.75	83.72	48.84	81.40	44.19
Tabbaneh	9.08	65.38	40.38	80.77	51.92
Al Ghuraba	10.6	60.00	47.50	87.50	17.50
Qobbe	9.62	72.55	21.57	68.63	41.18
Mina	7.19	76.92	27.69	67.69	43.08
Jabal Mohsen	19.1	93.75	60.42	87.50	47.92

Table 16 Shelter space. Source: CARE, 2015.

Land ownership & tenure

The conditions under which buildings are held or occupied can present significant challenges for residents' socio-economic stability as well as for the appropriateness and complexity of any rehabilitation interventions.

Land ownership

Like other Lebanese cities, Tripoli has its share of complex land ownerships, multiple co-owners, overcrowded tenements, legal caps on rental increases and tenancy laws that compromise rehabilitation and development potential.

There are three types of land ownership in Tripoli: private, public and 'awqaf'. Each of these property titles comes with its own set of challenges in relation to tenure and stakeholders.

- Privately held land in Tripoli is concentrated in the hands of a few families, many of whom lived in the old city but then moved out to the more affluent parts of the city. Private ownership stays with families over generations. Owner investment in such properties can be minimal or non-existent; buildings are commonly left to deteriorate, whether rented out or not. Privately owned land has little chance of redevelopment as the ownership terms offer shares of ownership instead of an actual physical allocation. Inheritance laws mean that over the years plots or buildings are owned on the basis of ever-fragmenting ownership and a multitude of shares.
- According to CHUD, it is estimated that 4-5% of the total land is under 'awqaf' in Tripoli. Awqaf means "assets that are donated, bequeathed, or purchased for the purpose of being held in perpetual trust for general or specific charitable causes that are socially beneficial property"¹³¹. These plots are diverse and scattered across the city, but found especially in its historic core. Implications for development.
- Public land ownership.

¹³¹ www.isdb.org (Islamic development bank).

Tenure

Based on the six neighbourhoods studied across Tripoli, CARE suggests that (**Figure 18**) the majority of shelter arrangements across all cohorts are technically considered "squatting" (49%), with a similar proportion for renting (47%). Whilst there is legal precedent for state leniency towards long term squatters in demonstrable need, squatter status is generally linked to precarious - if unclear - tenure implications, which constitute a major source of vulnerability.

Focussing on Syrian refugees and PRS only, UNHCR (2014 May) had earlier reported a lower but rising incidence of squatting. In the North/Tripoli T5, squatting was found to be more prevalent in the poorest neighborhoods such as Al Mina where 5.8% of families were squatting, or the old city where the figure was 4.5%. The growing trend for Syrian refugees and PRS to reside in informal settlements on private or public land as well as in overcrowded accommodation in Palestinian refugee camps was also noted by UNHCR (May 2014)¹³².

¹³² UNHCR (2014 May), "Inter sectoral Multi Sector Needs Assessment".




Figure 18 Shelter arrangements in Tripoli - Lebanese. Source: Urban deprivation index 2014/data sample 2011.

For Lebanon’s refugees, insecurity of tenure is reported as one of the most pressing challenges since 2011. This is mainly due to the frequency of non-formal, verbal nature of agreements between refugees and landlords combined with pervasive difficulties in paying rent. According to UNHCR (May 2014), “A rapid survey among newly-registered (Syrian and PRS) refugees confirms the assumption that most agreements between refugees and landlords are non-formal and largely verbal, often making the tenure insecure”. Curiously, CARE (2015) found a minority, rather than a majority of rental agreements not classed as legal or formally written (**Table 17**) based on its study of six neighbourhoods in Tripoli - about 14.5% of Syrian refugee families surveyed. There is a clear scope for resolving the divergent findings through further tenure research ideally involving unified/standardised data collection methodologies.

Type of rental agreement	Syrian	Lebanese
No agreement	2.45%	15.42%
Legal (notary/municipality)	9.82%	7.96%
Formal Written	75.46%	31.34%
Verbal	2.45%	1.99%
Other	1.23%	4.98%
Own - No agreement	6.13%	38.31%
INGO contract	61.00%	-
Total	100%	100%

Table 17 Percent of families interviewed / Rental agreement type based on six selected Tripoli neighbourhoods. Source: CARE, 2015.

Lebanese landlords leasing to refugees can exploit insecure tenure arrangements by drawing down the rehabilitation of shelter units to adequately standard, then evicting the tenants to secure higher rental returns on their improved properties. This known dynamic is not quantified either nationally or at the Tripoli urban level, but highlights the confounding issue of insecure tenure.

In Tripoli, 8% of Lebanese landlords receive rent or services from displaced Syrians on or off their property, giving some sense of the potential magnitude of this unintended effect of humanitarian action.




Figure 19 Housing types occupied by Syrian refugees.
Source: CARE, 2015.

VASyR 2015 reports on the type of occupancy Syrian Refugees hold. The situation in Tripoli operational area does not diverge significantly from the national. The overwhelming majority - 77% - occupy “unfurnished rental” accommodation, with 7% in “furnished rental”. For the remaining 16%, 7% live in accommodation provided by their employer or hold a rent-work combination agreement, and 4% are “hosted” by others. Only 5% have their occupancy covered by “assistance” (definition), a figure on the low end of the national range which is dwarfed by Akkar’s 19%.

Rents

For Syrians, according to OCHA (2014, in CARE, 2015:10¹³³), “nationally, over 82% of Syrians have found shelter within the existing housing market, renting any available covered space for between US\$200 and US\$300 a month”. The review of the Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy noted that “...displaced Syrians. (...) according to their financial means, lived with relatives families, rented apartments in the middle class residential areas, or have managed to accommodate themselves in the old districts in dilapidated housing.” (Rajab, 2015¹³⁴). Syrian refugees in Tripoli pay an average monthly rent of US\$173¹³⁵, which constitutes 61% of the Tripoli all-market average. They also receive the lowest humanitarian rental assistance of all regions (VASyR2015:18).

Paying rent is one of the most pressing issues for Syrian Refugees; it is one of the main reasons for borrowing money in Tripoli.¹³⁶ Rent paid by a displaced Syrian is the largest share of the household

¹³³ UN OCHA (20 Aug. 2014), “Lebanon - Community Access to Shelter”.

¹³⁴ <http://www.medicities.org/documents/10180/234514/16.02.26+AFSDS+Review-Final+Report.pdf/1d019d9c-7d5c-4f30-8f61-a5c679214e9a>

¹³⁵ VASyR (2015), p.18.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p.60.

budget, which also includes expenditure on food, health, education and services.

Reported activities in Shelter Sector

- Amongst partners reporting under ActivityInfo for the selected activities shown (**Table 18**), the main observation is the overwhelming dominance of Beddaoui municipality in attracting interventions across both years.
- Rehabilitation remains constant between the two years, whilst weatherproofing drops off steeply from 2014-2015.
- Site and infrastructure improvement for informal ‘gatherings’ appears as an activity in 2015, though again focussed exclusively in Beddaoui.
- Against the selected indicators, 4,503 individuals benefitted from shelter activities in 2014, a figure falling to 2,293 in 2015. These figures appear low when considered relative to the number of refugees in the urban area.
- The foregoing analysis has shown, what is at the simplest, a two pole distribution of poorest residential building quality: Beddaoui on one hand and the multiple cadastres of the old city on the other. Humanitarian interventions, dependent on background studies, local knowledge and embedded partnerships, may suffer to some extent from path dependency. It may take time for the shelter sector to respond to the comparably poor condition of the old city relative to well-studied Beddaoui with its high visibility camp, vulnerable peripheral settlements and history of institutionalised UNWRA attentions.

Gaps & Challenges


The housing market supply side appears to be divided between very poor or poor quality on one hand and new-build on the other. There is limited housing stock of fair to good quality, which tends to take the form of larger residential unit sizes. This represents a gap which means that low middle income and/or upwardly mobile Tripolitans, or indeed middle class growing families, may be pressed to find housing footholds locally. This could represent an economically selective push factor that may contribute to the entrenchment of economic stagnation by hollowing out the urban demographic class structure. Middle income classes are currently occupying poor quality housing, which acts as an unsustainable situation in the medium to long term.

There is a challenge in bringing to the municipal and humanitarian consciousness the comparability of housing and shelter vulnerability between Beddaoui municipality on one hand and Tripoli old town on the other.

There are data gaps or conflicting data on aspects of housing and tenure, such as the incidence of informal rental agreements amongst renters, which may make the definition of responses elusive.

The toxic combination of limited access to livelihood opportunities and insecurity of tenure disproportionately affecting refugees from Syria is a nexus which requires further research in order to propose solutions which will have an impact on the vulnerabilities at scale.

The need for social housing is nowhere greater nationally than in Tripoli urban area. The challenge is to draw out lessons, both negative and positive, from the area's limited 'pilot' schemes to date and to formulate creative solutions for scaling up provision. In adequate quantum, this would take the pressure off the private housing market and mitigate vulnerabilities for the worse off.



© Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.

Sector		Shelter						
		2014			2015			
Year								
Activity		1- Collective Shelter Rehab and management (UNIT)	2- House Rehab	3- Weather Proofing	1- Rehab of Unoccupied Shelter	2- Rehab of occupied shelter	3- Site/ infrastructure. improvement- informal gatherings	4- Weather-proofing of substandard buildings
Unit		Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual
1	TripoliEz-Zeitoun		99	70	36			
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh					8	225	
3	Beddaoui	1,115	823	460	235	884		849
4	Mina 1					20		
5	Mina 2							
6	Mina 3							
7	Mina Jardins			1,897				
8	Tripoli Jardins							
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe					5		
10	Tripoli Et-Tell							
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh					10		
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa							
13	Tripoli En-Nouri							
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra		39			20		
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh							
Total		1,115	961	2,427	271	947	225	849

Cadastrés

Table 18 Activities reported in Activity Info for the shelter sector for 2014 and 2015, based on a UN-Habitat - filtered selection of indicators.

Potable Water

National

In Lebanon, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) is mainly responsible, as per Article 2 of law 221/2000, for:

- Strategic planning of the Water and Wastewater (WW) sectors
- Management, development and monitoring of water resources.

There are four Regional Water Establishments (WEs) in Lebanon which are appointed by the Ministry of Energy and Water. They run the water systems in the four regions of North Lebanon WE which covers Tripoli; South Lebanon WE, Beirut & Mt Lebanon WE, and Bekaa WE. The WEs are responsible for implementation of WW projects based on MoEW master plans, and for ensuring the organization and management (O&M) of WW projects¹³⁷.

Before the 2011 onset of the Syrian crisis, water supply in Lebanon was estimated at just over 1,100m³/capita/year, perilously close to the international benchmark of 1,000m³/capita/year below which water resources are considered under stress (World Bank 2009)¹³⁸.

However, the country's water resources were already under stress pre-crisis. Available water including rivers and springs, storage dams and groundwater was estimated at 2,000-2,700m³/yr¹³⁹ in 2012. This does, in principle, well exceed the water demand projected to 2030 of about 2,818m³/yr (**Table 19**). However, a disastrous combination of substandard water infrastructure, with 48% water loss in networks¹⁴⁰, and widespread pollution is restricting the government's ability to meet water demands now and in the future.

¹³⁷ FAO (2015 Jun), "Food security and livelihood assessment of Lebanese host communities". p.40.

¹³⁸ WHO & USJ (2012), "National Health statistics report in Lebanon" p.135.

¹³⁹ ECODIT (2015) "Strategic environmental assessment for the new water sector strategy for Lebanon (<http://www.moe.gov.lb/getattachment/5ac-7c2d8-4a3a-4460-a6c8-daa8acd42f1b/STRATEGIC-ENVIRONMENTAL-ASSESSMENT-FOR-THE-NEW-WAT.aspx>).

¹⁴⁰ LCRP (2015), "WASH sector (2016) response plan, situation analysis and context".



© Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.

Sector	2010		2020		2030	
Domestic	467	31%	767	37%	1258	44%
Industrial	163	11%	268	13%	440	16%
Irrigation	900	58%	1020	50%	1120	40%
Total	1530	100%	2055	100%	2818	100%

Table 19 Annual water demand in million m³ and share of total for period 2010-2030 (2009). Source: MoE/ UNDP/ECODIT (2011) State and trends of the Lebanese environment (2010).

Regarding pollution, the fact that 92% of the country's untreated sewage is running directly into watercourses and the sea, is arguably the main national water resource problem. Conversely, a minimal 8% of effluent is treated¹⁴¹. This active discharge of raw sewage and other waste, both domestic and industrial, is occurring in the absence of any regulation or control from the WEs¹⁴². Uncontrolled dumpsites, proliferating in the current and protracted national garbage crisis, also contribute to contamination by producing leachate that seeps into rivers and aquifers¹⁴³.

According to UNDP (2010), data on groundwater is 'fragmented and not centralised'. Data that does exist is generated by Environmental Impact Studies, NGOs and environmental research bodies, as well as by ministries in response to known public health threats on an ad-hoc basis. The report argues that "There is an urgent need to consolidate such data into a centralized data system to appraise decision makers and municipal authorities as well as support future SOERs, EIAs and other environmental studies" (UNDP, 2010:63)¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴¹ World Bank (2015), "Lebanon promoting poverty reduction and shared prosperity" p.56.

¹⁴² UNDP (2010), "State and Trends of The Lebanese Environment" p.60.

¹⁴³ Ibid. p.62.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

Post-2011

A steep increase in national water demand of up to 12% has been reported as a result of the influx of refugees post 2011.¹⁴⁵ This increase has exacerbated an already precarious national water situation and resulted in falling groundwater table levels, with drops ranging from 1m to 20m in a selection of assessed wells across the country between April 2013 and April 2014¹⁴⁶.

The water usage source profile for Syrian Refugees nationally was assessed by UNDP (2014)¹⁴⁷ (**Table 20**). Only 30% of the water that Syrian refugees used was drawn from the public water network. 10% of their water was purchased, representing a significant cost to impoverished households.

Sources of water	%
Public water network	30
Wells	24
Public reservoirs/ standpipes	22
Springs	12
Purchased	10
Mineral	1
other	1

Table 20 Sources of water used by Syrians nationally. Source: UNDP (2014:60).

Tripoli Urban Area

The three municipalities within the urban boundary are under the mandate of the North Water Establishment (NWE). The area sits on an aquifer, which has been identified as a “stressed groundwater basin” by UNDP (2014:68)¹⁴⁸.

According to FAO-REACH (2015), the main sources of water in Tripoli T5 – combining both household and commercial uses – were:

- 58% from municipal connection
- 17% from wells
- 15% from certified authorized borehole or spring

The main water supply issue is its inefficiency, a situation which predated the Syrian crisis. The “Al Fayhaa 2020” report (2011) specified that potable water networks are uneven across neighborhoods. It identified that the older parts of the network, mainly located in the poorest areas of the union, were deteriorated and leaking, as well as contaminated by wastewater. The same report noted that 60%, the majority, of the citizens of Tripoli were purchasing their potable water (Al Fayhaa, 2011)¹⁴⁹.

An ESCWA study (2014, based on 2011 data)¹⁵⁰ on deprivation in Tripoli municipality indicated that

- The water infrastructure was considered as ‘good’ for 19% of the families, and as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘very satisfactory’ for 34%. The converse is that water infrastructure was less than satisfactory for almost half (47%) of the municipality’s residents.
- Public water is provided for approximately two hours a day. This is low relative to elsewhere in the country, with four hours per day common in Beirut.

For the Al-Fayhaa area (before the accession of Qalamoun), a 2009 report noted that a large majority of households were indeed connected to both running and potable water networks. However, disparities in supply between neighbourhoods was a feature. At the well-served end of the spectrum, 92% of households in the neighborhood of Basatin Al Mina had continuous running water in summer whilst, at the other end of the scale, the figure for Bab El Tebbaneh was only 43%¹⁵¹. The known socio-economic vulnerability of Tabbaneh, amongst the most impoverished cadastres in the country and region, is thus reflected and compounded at the level of this basic urban infrastructure service.

In Beddaoui municipality, no potable water network exists other than in the Palestinian camp (Dewailly, Le Thomas, 2009). In the camp, UNRWA is responsible for water infrastructure. Inhabitants outside the camp use private tanks and illegally dug private wells in neighborhoods, which often carry health risks due to potential wastewater contamination and deplete the water table¹⁵².

¹⁴⁵ LCRP (2015), “WASH sector (2016) response plan, situation analysis and context.

¹⁴⁶ World Bank (2015).

¹⁴⁷ UNDP (2014), “Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions”.

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Energy%20and%20Environment/Publications/EASC-WEB.pdf>

¹⁴⁹ Cities Alliances (October 2011) “Al Fayhaa 2020, Sustainable development strategy, final consolidation report”

¹⁵⁰ ESCWA (2014) «Tripoli Urban Deprivation Index Report»

¹⁵¹ Dewailly, Le Thomas (2009) «Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhaa: diagnostic et éléments de stratégie»

¹⁵² Ibid.



Ottoman sewer running under the tiles of what is now a dwelling house © Photo: Synne Bergby, UN-Habitat, 2016.

Post-2011

Related to the Syrian crisis, Tripoli is reported to have experienced a water demand increase of between $2\text{mm}^3/\text{yr}$ and $4\text{mm}^3/\text{yr}$ over the 2011-2014 period¹⁵³. The major source for public water supply is groundwater, against which the stressed underlying groundwater basin is problematic¹⁵⁴.

Based on its study of six Tripoli urban area neighbourhoods, CARE (2015) found that Syrian Refugee families rely on water collected from unprotected wells or standpipes, and often do not have access to clean drinking water¹⁵⁵. There are many areas that still rely on unprotected wells and do not have connections to the municipal water mains¹⁵⁶. Indeed, according to VASyR (2015), only 36% of Syrian Refugees in Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui have access to household running water with a connection for less than two hours/day.

¹⁵³ UNDP report (2014) "Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions"/based on the map.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ CARE (2015), p.44.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p.45.

Inside Beddaoui camp, already ageing infrastructure has been strained further by the addition of a large number of PRS to the existing camp population¹⁵⁷. Many PRS reside in areas adjacent to the camps, beyond UNRWA's mandate for provision of infrastructure services. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene services in these areas are often inadequate, with needs not fully met by local municipalities¹⁵⁸.

Gaps & Challenges

- Water conservation practices as well as supply network losses need to be addressed urgently in the context of both the pre-crisis national proximity to the international benchmark for stressed water resources, and the sudden post-crisis increase in population.
- Improvement in the quality of potable water supply, would lower the household pressure put on the 60% of union citizens acquiring their potable water from sources other than the network. Whenever it is privately purchased, the cost is of great significance to those least able to pay.

¹⁵⁷ MSNA (2014), "Interagency multi- sector need assessment" (P.31).

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

- Any campaign to promote wastewater treatment initiatives should emphasise, amongst other implications, the danger of pollution of scarce groundwater resources as the major source of drinking water.
- Action to ameliorate the oldest and most deteriorated parts of the main water supply network, will by default follow the geography of the poorest areas of the union. There is thus an opportunity to integrate such interventions spatially with other pro-poor / humanitarian initiatives in an “area-based” integrated manner.
- The lack of a public water supply network in Beddaoui municipality outside the Palestinian camp requires a proper supply and demand assessment and medium to long-term infrastructure planning. Of the almost 80,000 residents who live within the municipality’s boundary, only 28% (PRL, PRS) reside in the camp with its own potable water network, with the remainder left to their own informal, inefficient and often unsafe private devices for accessing water.
- There is a need for a systematised data collection and monitoring protocol related to potable water sources and supply networks.
- There is scope for consideration of installing integrating water metering and promoting management support for municipalities in the collection of fees, as an element within any area based interventions.

Waste Water - Sewage

National

As well as potable water, Lebanon’s regional Water Establishments are also responsible for Waste Water operations as per law 221/2000, Article 4 as amended.

However, sewage networks have traditionally been the responsibility of municipalities; Law 221/2000 is ambiguous on the issue of responsibility for sewerage maintenance, and the municipal bye-laws also indicate the condition and rehabilitation of the sewerage network remains within the mandate of municipalities¹⁵⁹.

At a national level, only 8% of wastewater is treated (Ministry of Energy and Water, 2012)¹⁶⁰ leaving 92% to run directly into groundwater reserves, surface watercourses and the sea causing pollution that affects both the environment and public health. The cost of environmental degradation resulting from

¹⁵⁹ UNDP (2010), “State and Trends of The Lebanese Environment” p.72.

¹⁶⁰ World Bank (2015) report, “Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity”, p.70.

the uncontrolled discharge of raw sewage has been estimated at 1% of GDP (UNDP, 2010a)¹⁶¹.

According to CAS, only 52% of buildings in Lebanon were connected to sewage networks in 2004. The remaining 48% relied on septic tanks, most of which are permeable or are deliberately drained to prevent overflow.

Coastal waters in Lebanon receive untreated sewage from at least 53 major sewage outfalls¹⁶² located along Lebanon’s 240km coastline. They receive an estimated 162m m³/year of raw sewage (equivalent to 276,000 m³/day), which amounts to 65% of the country’s total sewage load (UNDP, 2010)¹⁶³.

Prior to the Syrian Crisis and according to CDR’s master plan in 2005, the projected quantity of treated sludge will grow from 334 t/d in 2010 to 426 t/d in 2020 (WB, 2010)¹⁶⁴.

Tripoli Urban Area

In Tripoli, the percent of buildings with a sewage connection is high - recorded at 91%¹⁶⁵. Notably, only Beirut has a slightly higher connection rate, at 96%, and the rate compares favourably to the 52% national average which reflects scores as low as 1% (this being in Batroun) (UNDP, 2011).

Prior to the Syrian Crisis and on average 70% of the population was connected to the waste water system. It is also marked to be “obsolete” in the old city center. 20% of the sewage network currently works and it is expected that this figure will rise to 45% at the end of 2017.

The existing wastewater collection system (some 130km of pipelines) does not cover the entire city¹⁶⁶. Wastewater collection systems are described as “Inadequate: but...being improved¹⁶⁷” inside the city. A waste water treatment plant located on the coastline close to Union office became functional in 2009. Its outfall should eject to the sea treated

¹⁶¹ UNDP (2010), “State and Trends of The Lebanese Environment” p.54.

¹⁶² The number of outfalls was reported in the 2001 SOER and has not been updated.

¹⁶³ UNDP (2010), “State and Trends of The Lebanese Environment” p.63.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p.79.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p.68.

¹⁶⁶ CHUD (2011), “Update of the Environmental Impact Assessment” p.29.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. p.vi.

water meeting the highest cleaning requirements¹⁶⁸ with a daily average flow of 135,000m³/d (CDR, 2005)¹⁶⁹. It was connected in 2011 but the level of incoming connections is not yet high enough for it to be able to pump wastewater to the plant¹⁷⁰.

Post-2011

After the Syrian Crisis, most of the households visited inside the six neighborhoods in Tripoli, studied in the CARE report, are connected to sewerage (73%), whilst about 20% discharge their wastewater into a septic tank or a pit¹⁷¹.

Location (RWE)	Population Served	Capacity m ³ /d	Process	Status
Main Coastal STPs				
Ghadir (BML)	250,000	50,000	PT	Operating. An expansion planned to add 850,000 people.
Jbail (BML)	50,000	9,000	B	STP complete. Networks completion in 2011
Jieh (BML)	88,000	11,900	B	Complete
Tabarja (BML)	505,000	70,000	B	Planned
Bourj Hammoud (BML)	2,200,000	330,000	PT	Planned
Saida (Sth L)	390,000	55,000	PT	Operational
Sour (Sth L)	200,000	45,000	AS	Under Construction
Batroun (Nth L)	30,000	4,100	EAAS	Complete. Network under construction
Chekka (Nth L)	15,600	1,750	EAAS	Complete. Network under construction
Tripoli (Nth L)	1,000,000	135,000	AS	Complete. Operational mid 2011
Abdeh (Nth L)	185,000	30,000	AS	Planned

Table 21 Status of Lebanon's sewage treatment plants, showing main inland sewage treatment plants. Source: UNDP 2010.

¹⁶⁸ BOD 5 <25 mg/L, TSS <35 mg/L and H₂S <0.1 ppm.

¹⁶⁹ Lebanese science journal (2010), Article "Satet of art about water uses and wastewater management in Lebanon"- p. 148.

¹⁷⁰ UNDP (2014) "Lebanon environmental assessment of the Syrian crisis" p.63.

¹⁷¹ CARE (2015), p.39.

Sanitation					
Area	HHs with No access to functioning toilet (%)	HHs connected to Sewage (%)	HHs connected to septic Tank (%)	Toilet Sinks with no Running water (%)	Toilets with no doors
Abu Samra	4.23%	61.97%	22.45%	19.72%	36.62%
Beddaoui	4.65%	74.42%	13.95%	27.91%	34.88%
Tabbaneh	3.85%	82.69%	13.46%	46.15%	44.23%
Al Ghuraba	12.50%	67.50%	15.00%	60.00%	77.50%
Kobbe	3.92%	86.72%	7.84%	9.80%	43.14%
Mina	0.00%	56.92%	36.92%	18.46%	38.46%
Jabal Mohsen	4.17%	91.67%	2.08%	47.92%	45.83%

Table 22 Access to sanitation. Source: CARE 2015:62.

Gaps & Challenges

- At a national level, responsibility for the maintenance of the sewerage networks needs to be clarified between the MoEW/WEs and the municipalities.
- Nationally the percentage of wastewater treated needs to be increased dramatically. Tripoli’s constructed wastewater treatment plant needs to become operational. The impact of wastewater treatment initiatives would be relatively high impact/efficient due to the high proportion of households connected to the sewerage system.
- There is a clear challenge to ensure incremental increases in the rate of treated sludge at the urban level as at the national level.





Storm Water - Drainage

Tripoli Urban Area

The storm water drainage system in Tripoli consists of the three main components: the natural rivers of Nahr Abou Ali and Nahr el Bohsas, the storm water along the highways, and the existing urban storm water drainage/irrigation facilities. In 2011, as reported in CHUD, storm water drainage in Tripoli suffered from poor conditions and mixing with sewage¹⁷².

Gaps & Challenges

- The key challenges for urban storm water management are to incrementally move from on-street drainage towards piped drainage on one hand, and on the other, to separate stormwater out from sewage channels to reduce the risk of seasonal flooding of the latter. The latter has been progressed at the neighbourhood level in limited locations to date (eg Nabaa, UN-Habitat).
- A difficulty in scaling up such an initiative however relates to the prevalence of informal connections of stormwater to sewers. Large scale mapping of formal & informal as-built networks are a prerequisite to any strategic-level interventions.
- Engineering solutions may be explored to allow storm water to feed into water table recharge rather than simply redirecting to sinks (the sea). Consideration could be given to the concept of blue/green streets and other ways to manage rainwater catchment areas.

Solid waste

National

Waste generation: According to Sweep-Net (in Blominvestbank¹⁷³), “Lebanon generates around 2.55m tonnes of waste annually, based on each person generating between 0.8kg and 1.2kg per day. This average is higher for cities relative to the countryside: Sweep-net (in MoE 2014 Apr:9) states that municipal solid waste generation varies between 0.95-1.2kg/day for urban areas, compared to 0.8kg/day for rural. The breakdown by waste type is shown in **Table 23**. There is a high proportion of organic waste, which has been anecdotally attributed to the country’s specific food and hospitality culture (Blominvestbank, 2015).

¹⁷² CHUD (2011), “Update of the Environmental Impact Assessment” p.VII.

¹⁷³ Blominvest Bank (2015), “Solid Waste Management in Lebanon”.

Waste Produced	%
Organic	52.5
Paper / Card	16
Plastics	11.5
Metal	5.5
Glass	3.5
Other	11

Table 23 National waste production by type. Source: Sweep-net, in Blominvestbank, 2015:3.

Waste treatment: The breakdown of waste disposal by endpoint is shown in **Table 24**. Almost half goes to landfill. There are about 700 dumpsites in Lebanon (European Environment Agency, 2013:22). No methane extraction from landfill is in operation in Lebanon. Notably, in the absence of official incineration plants, there is no opportunity for green electricity generation – a treatment that would also take the pressure off landfill sites in a highly space-constrained nation. **Table 24** also shows that 29% of waste nationally is openly dumped in unofficial sites. Blominvestbank (2015) reports that “Uncontrolled dumping and improper waste handling causes (...) problems (...) such as contaminating water, attracting insects and rodents, and increasing flooding due to blocked drainage canals. It may result in safety hazards from fires or explosions.”

Waste Treatment	%
Landfill	48
Openly dumped	29
Composted	15
Recycled	8

Table 24 National waste disposal by endpoint. Source: Sweep-net, in Blominvestbank, 2015:4.

Almost all municipal Solid Waste (SW) generated in Lebanon is collected by public or private haulers (99% in rural areas, 100% in urban areas); however management varies from one area to another. The private sector has been highly involved in collection, disposal and treatment: for instance, in landfilling in Greater Beirut; in constructing an anaerobic digester in Saida; in pressing and exporting recyclables (paper, plastics, and glass); and in recovering materials by the informal and semi-formal private sectors¹⁷⁴.

Regulatory and policy environment: National Solid Waste Management (SWM) policies and plans are virtually absent in Lebanon. There is no specific legislative framework for SWM, in which the Government has been, to a significant degree, on emer-

¹⁷⁴ Blominvest Bank (2015), “Solid Waste Management in Lebanon” p.39.



gency response measures¹⁷⁵. There are however some legal instruments bearing on SWM. Decree 8735 of 1974 identifies SWM as a municipal responsibility; whilst decree 9093 of 2002 provides municipalities with an incentive to host a waste management (WM) facility¹⁷⁶. A solid waste decree 8006/2002 as amended by decree 13389/2004 categorised hospital waste and set guidelines for healthcare waste management. Notably, according to the European Environment Agency (2012), these healthcare waste decrees “have unequivocally improved Healthcare Waste Management (HCWM) services and increased awareness of the topic”. According to Sweepnet (2014:11)¹⁷⁷, “A framework law for the protection of the environment was adopted in 1988 and amended in 2002 (Law 444, 8/8/2002), which defines the basis and norms for environmental protection, but which does not provide details of any regulations for the solid waste management”. Moreover, enforcement of those laws which do exist is weak.

Post-2011

A marked decline in the level and quality of solid waste management and municipal services has resulted from the sudden increase in service demand linked to the Syrian refugee influx¹⁷⁸. Nationally, the incremental quantity of municipal solid waste attributed to refugees is estimated at 325,000 tons per year, representing an almost 16% increase in municipal solid waste generation. While part of the waste is being managed by existing solid waste facilities, more than half the additional waste is disposed of in open dumps which increases land, soil and water contamination and creates serious health risks¹⁷⁹.

¹⁷⁵ Blominvest Bank (2015), “Solid Waste Management in Lebanon” p.39.

¹⁷⁶ MOE, EU, & UNDP. (2014), “Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions”.

¹⁷⁷ <http://www.moe.gov.lb/Main/Announcements/Announcement/SolideWaste2015/2-LEBANON-COUNTRY-REPORT-ON-SWM-2014.aspx>

¹⁷⁸ World bank report (2015)-“ Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity” - p.12.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p.70.

Tripoli Urban Area

Waste generation: The mohafza of North Lebanon, of which Tripoli is part, generates 18% of the national daily tonnage, at 1,000t/day¹⁸⁰. Sweep-net (2014 Apr) reports that the city of Tripoli (though the boundaries are undefined) produces 350t/d of municipal solid waste – a third of the mohafza’s total. Solid waste treatment: **Table 25** summarises key characteristics of waste treatment in Tripoli city¹⁸¹.

The dumpsite in Tripoli, located near the connection of Abu Ali River to the sea near the Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities headquarters, receives solid waste from Tripoli, Mina, Beddaoui, Qalamoun and other areas. It takes in waste generated by inter alia Tripoli’s slaughterhouse, the port of Tripoli, Palma resort and Naji Resort. Its management covers:

- solid waste landfill
- biogas treatment generated from solid waste dissociation
- limited management of leachate (a centre for leachate refinement and filtration is under construction)¹⁸².

Region	MSW daily tonnage	MSW Collection operator	MSW Disposal operator	Type of treatment
Tripoli	350*	Private sector (Lavajet)	Private sector (Batco-local operator)	Disposal in a controlled dumpsite(2) (but with no liner)
* For comparison, the figure is 1000t/day for the North Lebanon mohafza				

Table 25 Municipal solid waste overview in main cities – extract for Tripoli city. Boundary unspecified. Source: Sweepnet, 2014 Apr:19.

The dumpsite is thus considered ‘monitored’ but haphazard as there is no waste sorting. For 20 years up until 1999, it was uncontrolled, receiving solid waste without any regulation. More recently, despite exceeding its limit in 2011, garbage is still being piled onto it. Tripoli’s dumpsite is now at a critical point characterised by risk of collapse and fire. It is 32m in height and whilst its legal area is 60,000m²¹⁸³ it now stretches over 100,000m²¹⁸⁴. All liquid residue from the trash is going into the sea.

¹⁸⁰ Sweepnet (2013) figure, in Sweepnet, 2014 Apr:17.

¹⁸¹ The assumed boundary relative to the urban boundary adopted in this profile is unclear.

¹⁸² Engineering consultant “Dar Al-Handasah-Nazih Taleb and his partners” monthly report for Al Fayhaa union of municipalities -December 2015 for Tripoli’s dumpsite.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Jalal Halawani, key informant interview (2016).

In terms of monitoring, the dumpsite is managed by engineering consultant “Dar Al-Handasah-Nazih Taleb and Partners”, covering:

- incinerator status including temperature
- biogas flow
- biogas composition
- gas temperature

As part of this monitoring, kiloage of solid waste entering the dumpsite is quantified by type (domestic waste, agricultural waste, sweeping waste, etc), by source (municipality), and by time (year, month and daily average). Tripoli as the most populous municipality generates the majority - 68.5% - of the total¹⁸⁵. In terms of type, domestic waste constitutes the highest percentage in all three municipalities. The AL Fayhaa Union has built a sorting facility and already prepared tendering for piloting sorting at source in 1 or more neighbourhoods.

Currently, collection of solid waste is missing mainly a post-sorting system; most of the areas within Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui are neither equipped nor have the know-how to sort garbage within households. Recent manual sorting activities at the dumpsite level started operating but for limited solid waste quantities¹⁸⁶ and Al Fayhaa Union of municipalities is planning to build a sorting unit subsidiary to the dumpsite (funded by the European Union)¹⁸⁷.

The private contractor Lavajet has operated all the solid waste activities inside the city of Tripoli since 1994. Lavajet’s contract with the Union ended in 2012 and has been renewed every 6 months since then. It includes household waste sorting, street sweeping and cleaning, wall posters removal and recycling. All machinery used by Lavajet is provided by the Union of Municipalities, which is paying US\$1,000,000/ month¹⁸⁸. The cost of solid waste management in Tripoli city is US\$18/t for collection (including sweeping) and US\$29/t for landfilling (Sweepnet, 2014 Apr:30). These are mid-range costs relative to the other Lebanese cities mentioned in the same report.

Post-2011

In Tripoli, the incremental daily quantity of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) generated by refugees arriving

post-2011 is estimated at 54 t/day¹⁸⁹. This is one of the highest additional loads nationally amongst cities accommodating Syrian refugees.

As known from initial outcomes of the forthcoming UN-Habitat Neighbourhood Profile for Al-Aswaq in Haddadine (2016), waste collection management has to take into consideration not only absolute capacity of waste container provision and frequency of collection relative to populations and sectoral uses in space, but also the locational distribution of those containers and attitudes and practices relating to littering. Dumpster placement is in principle known for the Tripoli urban area (**Figure 20**), providing a potential starting point on one hand for macro-analysis at the urban level in terms of overall provision to population and, on the other hand, for future neighbourhood-level analyses. The mapped data may need verification and/or updating.

Gaps & Challenges

- The urgency of optimising solid waste management systems in Tripoli urban area has been heightened due to the major increment on waste generation linked to the refugee influx from Syria post-2011 (54t/day additional for Tripoli municipality alone).
- Resolution of a capacity development solution to Tripoli’s grossly overfilled, precarious official dumpsite should be expedited.
- The urban area’s dependence on landfill combined with tight space constraints - both also national-level features - offers in-principle opportunities for gas collection for green electricity generation. This warrants sustained strategic exploration by the municipalities, union and indeed mohafza.
- Liquid residue from landfill should be fed into a waste-water treatment system rather than being discharged directly into the sea.
- Across the three municipalities of the urban area, the bulk of legally disposed solid waste is generated by Tripoli. This offers a starting point for the spatial prioritisation of solid waste management interventions.
- Benchmarking the national average solid waste production figures against the Tripoli urban area could be undertaken as part of a comprehensive urban solid waste management strategy. This could in turn offer an alternative route for estimating total population. Robustness of figures would however depend on reaching an understanding of the proportion of total solid waste generated being disposed of informally/illegally - a significant challenge in itself.

¹⁸⁵ Jalal Halawani, key informant interview (2016).

¹⁸⁶ Engineering consultant “Dar Al-Handasah-Nazih Taleb and Partners” monthly report for Al Fayhaa Union of Municipalities. 2015December 2015 for Tripoli’s dumpsite.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Jalal Halawani, key informant interview (2016).

¹⁸⁹ UNDP (2014), “Lebanon environmental assessment of the Syrian crisis” report - p.42 table B-1.




Figure 20 Dumpster placement across Tripoli Metropolitan area. Source: Union of Municipalities of Al Fayha'a.

- Enforcement action against illegal dumping should be an integral part of any solid waste management initiative to maximise impact. This should be complemented by inter alia public awareness-raising campaigns.

Reported activities in WASH sector

The WASH sector covers water, sanitation and hygiene promotion. From 2015, energy was added to this sector, known currently as the Water & Energy sector.

All sub-sectors

- The old city centre of Tripoli's neighborhoods "Tripoli Es-Souayqa, En-Nouri, El-Haddadine, El Hadid and El Mhatra" have not been targeted in any kind of activities in either year 2014 or 2015.
- The activities of 2014 reached 12 neighborhoods whereas in 2015 it decreased to 4 main neighborhoods (Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun, Beddaoui, Tebbaneh and Mina Jardins).

Solid waste

- In 2014, the most significant activities in terms of number of individuals impacted across the UN-Habitat-studied WASH indicators was by far "Individual Access to Solid waste Disposal

[household]". These were spatially concentrated in one Tripoli inner city cadastre, Tripoli El Zeitoun, which is a densely populated cadastre in its city-ward reaches with the highest official number of registered Syrian refugees - 18,404 - across the urban area. According to the Union of Al Fayhaa's own population estimate, this is also the most populous cadastre in terms of pre-2011 population and excluding camps, at 104,508. The 2014 focus in the reported activity here, may then be justified when considered at the strategic level, and in light of the solid waste challenges specified above.

- Whilst 2014 "Individual Access to Solid waste Disposal [Household]" was focussed in Tripoli El-Zeitoun, "Individual Access to Solid waste Disposal [Communal]" targetted mainly Tripoli Qobbe, another inner city cadastre.
- For 2015, only minimal activity is reported for solid waste, this being for 'Improved Solid waste management - Output', benefitting 151 individuals in the inner city's Tripoli Et-Tabbaneh cadastre. The drop-of in solid waste management activity from 2014-2015, warrants attention and preempts a focus on the forthcoming 2016 figures against this activity.

Potable water

- The great majority of reported activity in 2015 was directed at potable water supply and storage improvements. Over 95% of individuals benefitting from the range of reported 2015 WASH activities studied, were split roughly evenly between ‘Improvements in Water Supply - and ‘Provision of Water Storage - (294,164 and 270,558 individuals respectively, both overwhelmingly concentrated in the inner city’s Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun, a similar distribution as for 2014 solid waste activity which is noted above).
- With activity descriptions modified between the two years reported on, potable water interventions were of a lower order of magnitude in 2014 in terms of individuals benefitted. A total of 90,562 benefitted from ‘Individual Access to Water Communal’ (69,583); ‘Individual Access to Water - household’ (9,696); and ‘Individual Access to Storage Containers’ (11,283). The geographical spread of these activities was more disparate, covering eight cadastres, but weighted heavily towards the inner city cadastres of Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun and Tripoli El-Qobbe. Un-Habitat figures show El-Qobbe to be the most populous of all the urban area’s cadasters, at over 91,415 including host and registered refugee cohorts. That said, the Al-Fayhaa Union of Municipalities puts the figure much lower than 12,000, it is moot that this does not pretend to include the almost 9,043 Syrian refugees registered there. The justification of the potable water activity distribution in terms of proximity to population concentrations, then, depends on which population figures are relied on.

Waste water

- Waste water activities feature for 2014 but not for 2015. This drop-off should be probed, and attention paid to activities reported on for 2016 in due course.
- For 2014, the 2014 activity breaks down into ‘Individual Access to Wastewater - Communal’ (3,524 individuals or 40% of all benefitting from waste water activities) and ‘Individual Access to Toilets’ (5,079, or 60%).
- This low level of activity could be justified based on the high rate of connection to the waste water network that characterises Tripoli. On the other hand, coordinated action at the strategic level to expedite full functioning of Tripoli’s wastewater treatment plant, arguably the overall wastewater priority, is something that partners could jointly influence by upgrading the overall network in terms of its connections to the plant.

Hygiene

- Hygiene promotion and provision of hygiene items, benefitting over 65,000 individuals in 2014 (about 13% of all individuals counted as benefitting in that year), dropped off in 2015 to under 20,000 individuals.
- Broadly, a geographical focus on the old city Tripoli Et-Tabbaneh as well as Beddaoui, which holds the Palestinian camp, is consistent across both years. Inner city Tripoli El-Qobbe shares in the distributional focus in 2014 but this drops away entirely in the subsequent year along with the overall magnitude of activity in this sub-sector in 2015.

Sector	Wash																
	2014							2015									
Year	1- Ind Access to Solid Waste Disposal Communal	2- Ind Access to Solid waste Disposal HH	3- Ind Access to Storage Containers	4- Ind Access to Toilets	5- Ind Access to Wastewater Communal	6- Ind Access to Water Communal	7- Ind Access to Water HH	8- Ind Hygiene Items	9- Ind Hygiene Promotion	1- Provision of Hygiene Items - Activities	2- Improve-ments in Water Supply--Output	3- Improve-ments in Water Quality-Output	4- Pro- vision of Water Storage- Output	7- Improved Solid waste management- Output	8- Vector Control Measures - Output	9- Pro- vision of Hygiene Promotion - Output	10- Pro- vision of Hygiene Items - Output
Unit	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	kit/vouch	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual	Individual
1	Tripoli/Ez-Zeitoun	350,000	610		14,001					10	266,701		266,701			2,566	200
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh	7	3,265	869	1,573	3,625	10,184	8,911	638	1,780	2,686	3,366	266,701	151	153	4,355	2,593
3	Beddaoui	70	893	968	23	1,665	9,289	9,288	89	25,683	286	491			1,212	5,168	
4	Mina 1							722			230					1,472	
5	Mina 2		56		269	123		874									
6	Mina 3																
7	Mina Jardins		1,208	1,847	3,037	174	3,355	2,132	1,050								
8	Tripoli Jardins			1,105													
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe	2,529	5,221		195	3,245	10,211	8,209									
10	Tripoli Et-Tell		10				208									16	
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh		20	290		180	65	65									
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa																
13	Tripoli En-Nouri																
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra																
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh																
Total		2,973	350,007	11,283	5,079	3,524	69,583	9,696	33,312	31,980	1,787	294,164	3,202	270,558	153	9,621	7,961

Cadastres

Table 26 Number of reported activities against basic urban services in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Electricity

National

Electricity Du Liban (EDL), which is an autonomous state-owned entity under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy and Water (MOEW), is responsible for providing and managing electricity for public and private demand.

The electricity infrastructure in Lebanon has suffered from repeated wars and conflicts. Damages have been caused either by the Israeli Air Force (1996, 1999, and 2006) or by internal conflicts (Nahr el Bared refugee camp in May 2008).

In 2002, 96% of the population were estimated to have access to electricity (IEA, 2004), a figure growing to 99.9% in 2005 (IEA, 2006)¹⁹⁰. Before the Syrian Crisis, annual electricity consumption was estimated at 2,745KWh/capita in the 2004 figures (CAS 2006)¹⁹¹.

The electricity sector has suffered many technical and administrative problems long predating the Syrian Crisis. One main issue has been technical losses in the EDL network which have been optimistically estimated at 15%. Non-technical losses (theft) and uncollected bills may constitute further losses to a scale of around 30% (World Bank, 2008)¹⁹². A different type of challenge is the network's extensive load-shedding, with supply cuts in Beirut, of at least 3hr/day, a period extending up to 12 hr/day outside of Beirut¹⁹³.

Electricity resources (formal and informal): Lebanon relies on six principal sources of primary energy¹⁹⁴. The composition of primary energy as of 2008 is shown in **Table 27**.

Thermal power plants produce 85% of total electricity, while hydropower plants generate an additional 4%¹⁹⁵. The remaining 11% comes from imports. Because Lebanon's formal energy production does not meet domestic demand, private backup generators produce a supplementary estimated

500MW, equivalent to 20% of total production (MOEW, 2010)¹⁹⁶.

Private generators (un-surveyed but in the thousands) are found in industries and other establishments, located on balconies, in basements, in empty lots and along curbsides. They typically have short stacks, are not properly maintained, generate significant noise (especially if not cased or equipped with noise mufflers) and release soot and particulate matter inside cities and between buildings adding to the high air pollution¹⁹⁷.

After the Syrian Crisis, "the already ineffectual electricity sector has worsened with the influx of refugees to Lebanon in general, in terms of a larger mismatch between demand and supply due to higher demand for power, thus yielding longer hours of rationing" (UN-Habitat, 2014)¹⁹⁸.

In addition, the World Bank estimated the additional demand to be around 251 megawatts in 2013, and the rise in the average daily rationing hours from 18.3 (pre-crisis) to 16.2 (post-crisis) on a national level¹⁹⁹. The 2013 World Bank Report "Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict" projected that by the end of the following year (2014), the total demand for electricity would rise to between 251MW and 362MW, depending on the number of refugees²⁰⁰.

Primary energy source	% of national total
Imported hydrocarbon fuels	95
Biomass	2.1
Imported electricity	1.2
Hydroelectricity	0.6
Alternative energy	1

Table 27 Composition of primary energy in Lebanon as at 2008. Source: UNDP, 2010:312.

¹⁹⁰ MoE, UNDP (2011), "Vulnerability, adaptation and mitigation chapters of Lebanon's Second national communication to the UNFCCC" report.

¹⁹¹ UNDP (2010) - State and Trends of the Lebanese Environment p.11.

¹⁹² Ibid. p.318.

¹⁹³ World Bank (September 2013). "Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict", p.126.

¹⁹⁴ UNDP (2010), "State and Trends of the Lebanese Environment" p.312.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. p.103.


¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. p.104.

¹⁹⁸ UN-Habitat (2014), "Profiling deprivation: an analysis of rapid need assessment of Palestinian gatherings in Lebanon".

¹⁹⁹ World Bank (September 2013) "Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict".

²⁰⁰ World Bank (2013) "Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict" Report p.125.



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Tripoli Urban Area

Electric supply from EDL is provided for 12 hours/day in Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui, which are fed by both Qadisha station (semi-private hydroelectric power plants) and EDL through a 220KV cable network with an estimated daily demand of around 250MW²⁰¹.

A supply station is currently under construction by the Ministry of Energy in cooperation with CDR.

Common to elsewhere in Lebanon, the main issue in electricity is the inefficient supply. This has fostered the proliferation of a network of private providers in neighborhoods who benefit from the situation but are also responsible for increased pollution and risks. City residents purchase power from these providers by hooking up via informal, often chaotic wiring that renders the electric current unstable and can lead to deadly accidents. The World Bank more than 150 private providers in Tripoli as of 2009²⁰², a number that is highly likely to have expanded with population expansion since then. The 2014 ESCWA Urban Deprivation Index reports that, on 2011 data, 51% of the families in Tripoli municipality share or own a private generator, the corollary of which is that the remaining 49% have daily power outages in accordance with mains outages.

²⁰¹ Mr Abdularahman Mawas-Director of Qadisha Electricity Station – key informant interview.

²⁰² World Bank (2009) “Lebanon Social Impact Analysis - Electricity and Water Sectors” report.

Only 10% of the citizens of Tripoli described the electricity infrastructure as “good” while 42% described it as bad or very bad. 51% of families were estimated to own or share a private generator²⁰³.

Post-2011

For Syrian refugees, the majority of money earned by households goes towards rent, leaving little else for food, household assets, health, transportation or utilities such as electricity connections²⁰⁴.

Based on a sample of six neighbourhoods in Tripoli, CARE (2015) identified different areas characterised by weak electricity supply conditions. In some neighborhoods (such as El-Qobbe), Syrian refugees have little option but to live in low-rent garages. These garages are converted into accommodation through the addition of a toilet; however, no hot water, very poor access to running water and rely either on access to a landlord’s generator (at cost) or on illegal syphoning of electricity. According to VaSyR (2015:13), electricity provision is also reported to be very poor in Mankoubin²⁰⁵.

²⁰³ ESCWA (2014) Urban Deprivation Index.

²⁰⁴ VaSyR (2015), p.40.

²⁰⁵ Ibid. p.13.



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Gaps & Challenges

- EDL faces deep and intractable structural problems related to the quality of its network, constraints on its generation capacity as well as entrenched administrative limitations.
- Compounding the lack of fitness-for-purpose of the public grid, one major and highly politicised barrier to addressing its limitations is the private generator lobby which profits handsomely from EDL’s very inadequacies.
- With a power sector divided between public and private supply and bills for both, it is the least able to pay who suffer from the system’s deficiencies. Syrian refugees may be the most-studied cohort in this context, but the problems are inarguably shared with their poor Lebanese neighbours.
- There is unexploited use of renewable energy, both at household level and for larger institutions.
- Solar power systems (and solar water heating) could offer less reliance on expensive and polluting generators, and innovative neighbourhood initiatives such as solar-powered street lighting may offer learning for scaling up.
- However, fundamental changes at the level of the management and administration of EDL - a strategic governance issue - would be required before the long term phase-out of private generators becomes a realistic discussion point.

Transport National

Transport is a critical infrastructure sector at all spatial scales directly linked to economic performance and thus employment markets. Land transport as well as maritime and air sub-sectors will be addressed in detail in a future release of the current profile. Suffice to note here that Lebanon’s land transport system is characterised by a dearth of public transport facilities generally and specifically no rail links between the core cities, an under-maintained road network that is overcapacitated in and around the capital, and a lack of non-motorised transport or pedestrian provision off or on-street.

Tripoli Urban Area

In common with elsewhere in Lebanon, Tripoli urban area lacks a good quality public transport network. As noted in the 2015 Al Fayhaa Sustainable Development Strategy Review (Rajab, 2015)²⁰⁶, ‘The urban area lacks an efficient private and public transport system to facilitate the urban economy. The transport systems are at capacity...’. The review recommends amongst other strategic actions under the theme ‘Territorial Management’ the following (Rajab, 2015:10):

- ‘Establish integrated public transport lines and parking lots as part of a general solution to the parking problem’.
- ‘Complete the western highway and the east interchange for the cities of Al Fayhaa under the related theme ‘Infrastructures and Equipment for Competitiveness’, the following transport-related actions amongst others is recommended (Rajab, 2015:10):
- ‘Rehabilitate the railways station of Tripoli and reopen the railway section between Tripoli and Homs’ in Syria.

The realism of a cross-border rail link into Syria is fatally compromised in the current political climate. However, the principle of re-establishing Tripoli’s historic market integration with Lebanon’s eastern neighbour is in itself worthy of long-term exploration.

²⁰⁶ Medcities report (online: <http://www.medicities.org/documents/+16.02.26/234514/10180AFSDS+Review-Final+Report.pdf/1d019d9c7-d5c4-f8-30f-61a5c679214e9a>)

Gaps & Challenges

- In light of the entrenched and worsening structural economic conditions affecting Tripoli urban area outlined in **Theme 4 ECONOMY & SERVICES**, the arguable priority for capital transport infrastructure investment is the promotion of a more polycentric urban format for Lebanon, currently highly centralised on Beirut. The keystone of this could be reactivation of the former rail link between Tripoli and Beirut and with other urban poles to widen access to market share for goods, services and employment.
- At the intra-urban level, instigation of a good quality and reliable public transport network appealing to a range of customer types would take pressure off the central city's congested road network. It would also increase geographical watersheds for access to livelihood opportunities, and potentially improve access to services including education through lowering the transport cost barrier.
- A relatively low-cost, minimal infrastructure public transport mode would be a bus rapid transit system operating via on-road dedicated and enforced bus lanes in selected areas across the city and inter-city. An economic and logistical feasibility evaluation study would be an appropriate first step in that direction. Route-setting could draw on observations of informal public transport routes in order to capture existing circulation patterns and maximise ridership. Such a study could focus on the investment payback period as well as evaluating alternative public-private delivery models.



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Social Services

Health

National

“The Lebanese healthcare system is dominated by the private sector which is geared towards hospital-based curative care (48% of total public health expenditure) rather than primary and preventive health measures. The refugee crisis has exposed the fragile nature of the pre-existing public health system where 50% of the Lebanese population have no formal health insurance, are exposed to very high health care expenditures and lack basic means of social protection such as pensions and unemployment insurance.” (Tyler, 2014)²⁰⁷

Health care is a particularly complex issue in the current Lebanese context. The post-2011 refugee influx added pressure to an already stressed health-care system characterised by a mismatch between average cost of access and average ability to pay of the resident population. Against this backdrop, access to basic health services is a key source of tension between host and refugee communities. Perceptions of preferential treatment of refugees over poor Lebanese resulting from NGO and other humanitarian-orientated initiatives feeds a sense of competition. This dynamic is in counterpoint in cities where refugees and deprived Lebanese live in proximity and at high density.

In the context of a national healthcare system that is privatised and costly, refugees and vulnerable Lebanese rely heavily on primary health care centres (PHC) as a first port of call for their medical needs. Refugees registered with UNHCR still have to pay 25% of the cost of PHC services. Table 28 shows details of the Ministry of Public Health's health response strategy for the displaced, run through UNHCR-partnered institutions and launched in June 2015. Unregistered refugees are excluded from assistance. Part of the humanitarian health sector's response has been the renovation and equipment upgrading of selected PHCs. Various targeted assistance is also provided by international aid organisations.

²⁰⁷ Tyler, F (2014), “Characteristics and challenges of the health sector response in Lebanon” (<http://www.enonline.net/fex/48/characteristics>).

Secondary health care centres (SHC) - mainly hospitals - are also partly subsidised for some refugees, but only for emergency cases, excluding most chronic illnesses. This presents a financial barrier which adds to the burden placed on the PHC system arising from both refugee and host communities.

The flooding of PHCs and public SHCs (hospitals) with refugees has anecdotally led to: Lebanese patients avoiding these facilities due to overcrowding, increased waiting times and perceptions of decreased care quality.

Service	Price for Refugees at a UNHCR partner institution
Vaccines	Free at all PHC centers and dispensaries
Consultation	3,000- 5,000 LBP
Acute medications	Free
Chronic medications (diabetes, cardiac, conditions, hypertension, asthma, epilepsy, ect.)	1,000 LBP per visit (handling fee)
Family planning (Insertion of IUD, pills, condoms)	Free
2 ultrasounds for pregnant women	Free
Dental care	Subsidized
Laboratory and diagnostic tests	15% of the cost for <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Children under 5 years • Persons over 60 • Persons with disabilities • Pregnant women 10% of the cost for those refugees with specific needs who cannot afford it. Other refugees will pay 100% of the cost of Laboratory and diagnostic tests.

Table 28 UNHCR-subsidised PHC services for the displaced. Source: MoPH 2015.

For refugees, deficient living conditions including compromised access to water and sanitation renders them particularly prone to water-borne diseases, skin diseases an Hepatitis (ILO, 2014). According to ILO (2014:17), “An assessment of (WASH) conditions in the Bekaa and the North showed high levels of contamination of drinking water, inadequate sanitation facilities, as well as poor hygiene”.

According to VASyR 2015, lack of access to health care is one of the main challenges facing Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. The main reason for Syrian Refugee households not receiving the required health assistance was the high cost of drugs or treatment followed by the cost of doctors’ fees. Whilst Syrian Refugees are receiving cash assistance from WFP and other agencies, this does not stretch to covering healthcare costs on top of rent, education and food.

For the Palestinian refugees, ‘UNRWA is the sole

‘official’ provider of humanitarian, educational and health services as well as other forms of support...’ (EU, 2013)²⁰⁸. The influx of PRS has added additional stress to their service provision, and there has recently been tension related to the roll-out of UNWRA’s new health system.

LCRP (OCHA) (2015) has stated that ‘There has been coordination between all the agencies and ministries working in the health sector’. Continued optimisation of coordination will be required to maximise the benefits from scarce resources.

Tripoli Urban Area

Figure 21 and **Figure 22** show the locations respectively of 24 PHCs and 11 SHCs²⁰⁹ across the Tripoli urban area.

PHCs, listed by name and cadastre in **Table 29**, follow the main population concentrations across Tripoli, Mina and with some representation in Beddaoui. SHCs are focussed in Tripoli municipality mainly to the west and north west of Tripoli Old City.

SHCs are listed by number on map, name and bed capacity in **Table 30**, showing a combined bed capacity of 1,169. The figures here do not yet however identify which hospitals are contracted by the Ministry of Public Health for subsidised beds²¹⁰, or the percentage of beds per hospital allocated for aid organisation-subsidised patients, together typically a minority. Indeed, OCHA (2014) flagged up as a ‘challenge’ that in the North governorate there are only eight partner hospitals, against a backdrop of high SHC costs. The data here is thus an updated, mapped framework for further research²¹¹.

²⁰⁸ EU (2013), “Community conflicts in Northern Lebanon” report.

²⁰⁹ One SHC (No.11 on map) is located just south of the metroplitan boundary but is included in the overall urban count here.

²¹⁰ MoPH Health Bulletin 2011 notes that in the North Mohafza, 6 public hospitals and 26 private hospitals held contracts with the MoPH. Source: WHO- USJ (2012) Hospitals “National Health Statistics Report in Lebanon”.

²¹¹ OCHA (2014), “Lebanon: Tripoli Governorate Profile” report.



Figure 21 PHCs in Tripoli Urban Area. Source: Inter-Agency Coordination, updated by UN-Habitat, 2016.



Figure 22 SHCs in Tripoli Urban Area. Source: Inter-Agency Coordination, updated by UN-Habitat, 2016.

Cadastre	PHC
Tripoli El-Haddadine, El-Hadid, El-Mhartat	Alazm Wassadeh Dispensary
Tripoli El-Qobbe	Kobba Islamic Centre
	Qobbe Medical Centre
	Qobbeh SDC
Tripoli Tabbaneh	Bab EL Tebaneh
	Rahmah Health Centre
Tripoli Et-Tell	Makarem Al Akhlak PHC
Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	Azzahraa Medical Centre
	Nejme
Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun	Al Bachaer PHC
	Al Dawa Clinic - Tabbaneh
	Caritas Lebanon Migrants Centre - CLMC
	Dar El Zahraa Hospital - Abu Samra
	Directorate of Health - Tripoli - Hariri Foundation
	Ibn Sina Medico-social Centre
Tripoli Jardins	Tripoli PHC Centre
	Alkarameh Charity Centre
Beddaoui	Governmental Central Dispensary Tripoli
	Al Shifa Medical Association "Human Call" Beddaoui
	Nahda Clinic
Mina Jardin	Safad Hospital
	Directorate of Health - Mina - Hariri Foundation
Mina 2	Al Iman Health Centre - Mina
Mina 3	Mina

Table 29 PHCs by name & cadastre.

Number on Map	SHC	Bed Capacity	
		Information Management Drop Box AI_SHC [Mar 2016]	UN-Habitat phone survey [Apr 2016]
1	Dar Al Shifaa Hospital	-	150
2	Chahine Hospital	-	27
3	Salam	180	180
4	Mazloum	100	100
5	Mounla	150	150
6	Islamic Hospital	164	164
7	Nini Hospital	128	128
8	Orange Nassau Hospital	-	60
9	Al Hanane	30	30
10	Bissar Hospital	-	50
11	Tripoli Gov.	130	130

Table 30 Tripoli urban area SHC by name and bed capacity.

Reported Activities in Health Sector

- PHC consultations, a key health care indicator, amount to over 74,000 in 2014, half of which were women patients; and over 80,000 in 2015, not differentiated in gender terms. The geographical spread across the urban area is broadly well dispersed across the highly populated inner city cadastres for both years, but becomes heavily weighted towards Beddaoui in 2015, with 59% of PHC consultations concentrated in that municipality.
- As pre-empted in the foregoing literature, the number of SHC in-patient care is limited - less than 3,800 cases are noted in 2014.

Gaps & Challenges

- There is a clear gap between the financial structure and pricing of healthcare services on one hand and the ability to pay of the Lebanese population on the other. This disconnection, which pre-dated the Syrian Crisis and is now exacerbated by the influx of refugees with limited spending power, has fundamental negative effects on the wellbeing of the resident population.
- Health care initiatives targeting refugees need to be undertaken with awareness of the potential for feeding host/refugee community tensions.
- Active consideration of extending the number of hospitals with WHO/UNHCR partnerships and maximising the percentage of subsidised bed capacity in already partnered institutions may yield opportunities for increasing SHC treatment amongst the most vulnerable.
- The direct link between quality of living conditions and health is well recognised and should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis of any housing and infrastructure intervention.
- Optimising coordination between the government and aid agencies working in the health sector should continue to be scrutinised constructively to maximise the efficiency of collective efforts.
- SHC bed capacity figures presented here, a comprehensive version of the incomplete data previously available, may be analysed by health sector experts in order to benchmark the adequacy of capacity to population ratio in the urban area relative to sector standards.
- Partners' responses reported in ActivityInfo showed the majority focus on Beddaoui municipality. In light of the weight of Syrian Refugees in the Old City area, the reasons behind this should be probed with a view of attempting to optimise the match between needs and response in space.

Sector		Health					
Year		2014			2015		
Activity		1- Children PHC of primary health care consultations	2- Consultations PHC of primary health care consultations	3- Individuals SHC of patients receiving in-patient care; including emergency room	4- Women of primary health care consultations	1- Provision of PHC consultations	2- Severe chronic conditions treated cancer /dialysis
Unit		Children	Consultations	Individuals	Women	Consultations	Individuals
1	Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun		55			2,875	9
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh					29	
3	Beddaoui		10,324	388	35,896	47,106	19
4	Mina 1		502		297		
5	Mina 2		7,193			9,197	
6	Mina 3			3	256	320	
7	Mina Jardins	26	66		8		
8	Tripoli Jardins		9,460	3,340	28	5,405	
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe		6,792		687	2,147	
10	Tripoli Et-Tell		2,613			13,223	
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh		14				
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa						
13	Tripoli En-Nouri						
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra		6	1			
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh						
Total		26	37025	3732	37172	80302	28

Table 31 Number of reported activities in Tripoli metropolitan area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population [highest to lowest]. Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Education

National

The Lebanese education system is based on private schools, private free schools (semi-private, religious organisation-run), public schools and UNRWA schools which are run by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE).

Prior to the Syrian Crisis, 30% of Lebanese students attended public schools. Most schools use French as the primary language (50.83%) and others use English (25.74%), with 23.44 % following a bilingual program²¹².

UNDP (2008:29) identified that “education is highly correlated with poverty in Lebanon. Almost 15% of the poor population (is) illiterate, compared to only 7.5% among the non-poor group.”²¹³ The Syrian Refugee crisis unfolded against this already precarious backdrop.

Education in Syria

In Syria, education was free and school attendance obligatory of a minimum of 9 years²¹⁴. According to the 2014 Multi-sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) report, “since the crisis in Syria, there has been a decrease in access to, and availability of, education in Syria itself due to displacement, insecurity and cost. As a result, many Syrian children were without education for months before arriving in Lebanon. Pre-conflict Syria had a literacy rate of 78% for women and 90% for men. By comparison, in Lebanon’s case, the World Bank placed basic education enrolment at 90%, further noting that it had been stable for a decade, with gender parity achieved.” (MSNA, 2014:10)²¹⁵.

Post-crisis

After the Syrian Crisis, the Lebanese Government represented by the MoEHE in association with UN agencies (UNICEF, UNRWA, UNHCR and UNDP) gave Syrian refugees the right to attend public schools, allowing them to enroll despite missing two years or more of schooling.

²¹² BEMO Banque (2014), “Education in Lebanon” Report.

²¹³ UNDP (2008), <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Poverty/Publications/Poverty,%20Growth%20and%20Income%20Distribution%20in%20Lebanon.pdf> p.29.

²¹⁴ MSNA Team (2014) Inter-Agency Multi-Sector Needs Assessment: Phase One Report p.10.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

According to the 2014 MSNA Report, by Feb 2014, 120,000 children affected by the Syria crisis were enrolled formally in Lebanese public schools. This number included 90,000 Syrian children. Syrian Refugee children face a number of barriers in accessing education including financial constraints, curriculum and language challenges, as well as psychological, social and safety limitations. The relative significance of these barriers could not be established based on data available.

Further, the constraints of the Lebanese education system hampered its capacity to enroll additional students. Limitations included the availability of space, equipment, facilities, and teachers. (MSNA, 2014:10)²¹⁶ The Lebanese public school system is designed to accommodate around 300,000 Lebanese children only. It therefore struggles to accommodate the 400,000 Syrian refugees who are in need of an education²¹⁷. According to the “Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP)”, nearly half of the refugees are under 18. 655,000 Syrian children aged between 3 and 18 years old were of school age in 2015, against 502,000 in September 2014. This figure is equivalent to more than twice the number of Lebanese students enrolled in public schools. The last data provided by UNHCR estimates 577,703 Syrians aged between 3 and 24 years in Lebanon, about a quarter - 140,588 - of which are specifically in North governorate. In the North governorate, the high concentration of Syrian refugees in host communities has led to the overcrowding of schools that were previously under-populated.

According to Alsharabati et al (2016), 61.5% of children age 8 to 17 are going to school in Lebanon, 27.4% are not going to school, and 12.6% dropped out. The percentage of enrolment in the North is 61.73%²¹⁸.

Impact of economic situation on school enrolment

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Regional Office for the Arab States report, the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) facilitated access to education for Syrian refugees to all public schools; however, both students and schools continue to face significant challenges. Amongst families under acute financial pressure, estimated to include 90% of refugees in Lebanon,

and in the context of institutionalised barriers to livelihoods access, parents are sending their children to work or entering them into marriage at a young age to help the family survive²¹⁹. This impacts on the proportion of children returning to school. Indeed, only 48% of refugee children from Syria are able to access education opportunities²²⁰. Girls are often the first to be denied access to education if a choice has to be made between sending sons or daughters to school²²¹. In addition to school fees, the cost of transport to school represents a further financial strain. It can cost US\$30-40/month to send one child to school²²².

Formal and Non-Formal Education

For formal education, Lebanese regulations require the teaching of the official program to Syrians in the same conditions as those applied to the Lebanese. As mentioned, the language adopted in education poses great learning difficulties for refugee children who only know Arabic, therefore it's a handicap for them. In response, UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Education has offered to the Syrian Refugee a non-formal education program, the Accelerated Learning Program (ALP). This program leads to enrolment in mainstream public schools. Other educational programs are not formally recognized by the Ministry of Education.

Number of Shifts

In 2013, afternoon shifts were created in public schools; these are reserved exclusively for Syrian children while the first (mixed classes) are intended to accommodate Syrian Refugees within a limit not exceeding 50% of total children. In the North, there are two shifts. 30.5% of refugee children attend the morning shift; also there are 24% of these children who are attending the Syrian programs and it is the highest in Lebanon. Enrolment in the Syrian Program is the highest in the North at almost 25% of refugee children, whereas access to public school is the lowest Tripoli urban area.

²¹⁹ ILO (2013), “Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile”.

²²⁰ Frontier Economics, & World Vision International. (2016). “The cost of conflict for Children” p.4.

²²¹ CARE (2015) “Shelter Needs and the most vulnerable in Tripoli, Lebanon: Rapid Urban Assessment 2015

²²² Ibid.

Tripoli Urban Area

In Tripoli, there are 38 private schools and 26 private-free schools but no data is available upon their capacities or attendees. **(Appendix 3 Private Free Schools shows some details for this category)**. There are also 108 public schools from which data was collected from UNHCR, MoEHE, CRDP and a phone survey conducted by the UN-Habitat during April 2016. This is in addition to 8 UNWRA schools in Beddaoui camp where data was collected through the focal point of the education sector in UNRWA.

As shown in **Table 32**, it appears that in the UNRWA schools there is a maximum efficiency in the first shift since the physical capacity is equal in all the shifts to the total registered pupils. This table validates the information that we find in the UN-Habitat, UNDP, SDC Profiling Deprivation Report, which reports that two shifts were introduced in UNRWA schools in order to absorb the new number of students.²²³ UNRWA (2014) indicates that low enrolment rates are more prevalent among PRS living outside camp regions, where access to education could be more challenging. Another major issue that was revealed from UNRWA was the reported discrimination and bullying PRS students were subjected to in schools. In this regards, UNRWA has assigned and trained teachers to carry out psychosocial activities related to bullying in order to motivate and increase the self-esteem of PRS students.

In Tripoli according to **Table 33**, 16 schools are over capacity. According to the directors of the schools, they were obliged to transform a bathroom, kitchen and library into classrooms to fit the registered pupils. They are also using one benches for three students instead of for two. Six of these schools do not have any Syrian Refugees.

Table 33 also shows that 18 schools are at full capacity. Eight of these do not have any Syrian Refugees. Since 2014, 5 schools merged with other schools in Tripoli.

In 2015, 4 schools were closed. This dynamic, according to UNICEF, exists in different schools across Lebanon: out of 1,282 schools UNICEF²²⁴ surveyed, 60 are closed and 250 are in urgent need of renovation. Public schools in Lebanon already suffer from a deficiency of teachers training, lack of equipment and material, as well as old infrastructure.

The data gathered indicates that schools in Tripoli overall are at 88% capacity in terms of the morning shift only, suggesting scope for rebalancing over-registered schools over space, though home-to-school travel distances come into play as a complicating factor. There is much greater capacity if only in physical terms, for increasing the incidence of second shifts, though supply side constraints not least in terms of materials and teaching capacity come into play.

The enrolment in the Syrian Program ALP is the highest in the North 24.65% where access to public schools is the lowest. The Syrian Program in this area plays a role of substitute when opportunities for both Lebanese and Syrian to access regular education are closed because of difficulties of learning or distance for instance. In Tripoli, there are 15 public schools which have 2 shifts, one being the ALP.

UNRWA Schools						
ID	Name	Physical Capacity (per shift)	Total registered pupils [all shifts]	PRS	PRL	Number of shifts
1	Kawkab Elem Boys	621	621	12	609	2
2	Battouf Elem Girls	708	708	10	698	2
3	Ramleh Prep Coed	587	587	2	585	1
4	Majdal Prep Coed	170	170	9	161	1
5	Nazareth Sec Coed	514	514	22	492	1
7	Mazar Prep Girls	650	650	244	406	1
8	Majeddo Prep Boys	616	616	263	353	1
Total		3,866	3,866	562	3,304	-

Table 32 UNWRA schools.

²²³ UN-Habitat, UNDP, & SDC. (2014). "Profiling deprivation: an analysis of Rapid Needs Assessment of Palestinian Gathering Host Communities in Lebanon" report.

²²⁴ Constaniijn Wouters (May 2016), UNICEF Key Informant interview.

THEME 4 Services

Public Schools

ID	Name	Physical Capacity (per shift)	Total registered pupils [all shifts AM]	Syrian Refugee pupils AM	Syrian Refugee pupils PM	Lebanese pupils	Number of shifts
1	May Al Rasmiyah lil Banat	360	276	0		276	1
2	Al-Tall Al Rasmiyah Al jadidah Lil Banat	280	270	20		250	1
3	Al Nammouzaj Al Rasmiyah Lil Sobyen	300	360	10		350	1
4	Al Fadileh Al Rasmiyah lil sobyan	275	217	20		197	1
5	Al Jadidah Al Rasmiyah Lil Banat	500	424	0	534	424	2
6	Al Madrassah Al Jadidah Lil Sobyen+ Farah Antoun	1200	1172	470	490	642	2
7	Mardasat Tarablus al Oula Al Rasmiyah lil Banin	374	374	55		319	1
8	Rawdat Al Nashe' Al Jadid Lil Banet	210	210	0		210	1
9	May El Oula El Rasmiyah Lil Banet	480	452	0		452	1
10	Al Nammouzaj Lil sobyan	360	360	0		360	1
11	Dawhat al Adab Lil Banet	400	384	71		313	1
12	Thanawiyat Trablous Al Rasmiyah lil Banet	570	368	0		368	1
13	Jebran Khalil Jebran Lil Banet	530	490	4		486	1
14	Madrassat Farah Antoon al Rasmiyah Lil Banin	600	473	0	82	473	2
15	Al Zhariyah Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	250	154	27		127	1
16	Al Zhariyah Al Rasmiyah Lilsobyan	600	411	41		370	1
17	Al Houda Al Rasmiyah Lil sobyan	180	151	50		101	1
18	Thanawiyat Andre Nahhas Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	486	700	0		700	1
19	Saba Zreik Al Rasmiyah Lilsobyan	550	488	2		486	1
20	Al Tahzibiyya Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	355	355	0		355	1
21	Madrassat Al Banat Al Oula al Rasmiyah Al Mina	500	456	12		444	1
22	Al Naser Al Rasmieh Lil Banin al Mina	375	300	0	400	300	2
23	Refaat Al husseini Mina	250	195	0		195	1
24	Al Nahda Al rasmiyah Lil Banin	300	440	0		440	1
25	Al Nahda Al rasmiyah Lil Banat	600	510	40		470	1
26	Botros Dourah Al salam al rasmiya lil banin	320	339	0		339	1
27	Al Takaddom al rasmiyah lil banat	375	374	36		338	1
28	Thanawiyat Trablous Al Haddadin Al Rasmiyah Lil Banin	350	300	10		340	1
29	Thanawiyat Trablous Al Haddadin Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	840	713	40		673	1
30	Al Salah Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	360	328	0		328	1
31	Al Nour Al Rasmiyah lil Banet	400	390	40		350	1
32	Al Fayhaa Al Moutawsitah Al rasmiyah lilsobyan	340	340	50		290	1
33	Al Arez Al Rasmiyah lilsobyan	350	350	0		350	1
34	Madrassat Al Ghazali Al Rasmiyah lil Banin	550	534	0		534	1
35	Al Tadrib Al Tarbawi Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	800	762	0		762	1
36	Ibn Khaldoun Al Rasmiyah Al Moukhtalata	510	671	0	89	671	2
37	Al Tarbiyah Al Hadisah Al rasmiyah Lil Banet	852	852	0	618	852	2
38	Al Arez Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet	150	138	0		138	1
39	Al Amria Nasab Al Rasmiyah lil Banet	300	272	35		237	1
40	Al Moustakbal Al rasmiyah lil Banet	130	109	0		109	1
41	Loukman Al rasmiyah al moukhtalata	400	162	30		132	1
42	Thanawiyat Al Morabbi Fadel Al Mokaddem lil Banet	500	464	0		464	1
43	Sleiman Al Boustany al moutawassita lil Banet	150	86	0		86	1
44	Al Aahed Al Jadid Al rasmiyah lil Banet	250	136	0		136	1
45	Al kubbah al rasmiyah lil Banet	250	444	0		444	1
46	Ibn Rushed al rasmiyah lil Banet	160	51	0		51	1

Public Schools							
ID	Name	Physical Capacity (per shift)	Total registered pupils [all shifts AM]	Syrian Refugee pupils AM	Syrian Refugee pupils PM	Lebanese pupils	Number of shifts
47	Al Farabi Al rasmiyeh lil Banin	250	250	0		250	1
48	Takmiliyat Trablos Al Oula Al rasmiyeh lil Banet	315	304	10		294	1
49	Madraset Ibn Sina Al rasmiyeh al takmiliyeh lilso-byan	900	378	37		341	1
50	Al Menia Blat Al rasmiyeh lil Banet	500	183	34		149	1
51	Al Baddawi al rasmiyeh lil Banet	254	254	0		254	1
52	Al Baddawi al rasmiyeh lilsobyan	665	665	0	275	665	2
53	Al Fadila Al Rassmiyah lil banet	450	369	46	509	323	1
54	Al Namouzaj Al Rasmiya lil banet	270	270	25		245	1
55	Al Nashe' Al jadid lil banet						
56	Nasr Al Rasmiya lil banet						
57	Thanawiyat Al Morabi Hassan Al hajjah	400	200	0		0	1
58	Rawdat Al Tal - Al Zahriya madrassa moukhtalata	120	110	30		80	1
59	Rawdat Al Tabbaneh al Thaniya Al Moukhtalata	124	124	0		124	1
60	Al Hayat Al Rasmiya lil banet	520	520	40		480	1
61	Al banet Al oula al rasmiya	500	460	61		399	1
62	Al Nour Al Rasmiya al moukhtalata	305	305	80		225	1
63	Rawdat Al Mina al oula	461	461	47		414	1
64	Rawdat Al Mina al thalitha al rasmiya	270	235	21		214	1
65	Rawdat Al Mina al thaniya al rasmiya al moukhtalata	110	110	12		98	1
66	Rawdat Al Nejme al moukhtalata	180	184	0		184	1
67	Abi Samra al oula lil banet	600	557	30		527	1
68	Ibrahim Yazegi al rasmiya lil banin	400	380	16		364	1
69	Rawdat Abi Samra al oula al rasmiya	407	407	0		407	1
70	Rawdat Abi Samra Al namouzajiya	315	368	14		354	1
71	Loukman al rasmiya lil banet	163	163	29		134	1
72	Abi Feras El Hamadani al rasmiya al moukhtalata	400	328	39		289	1
73	El Ahed El Jaid al rasmiya lil banet	250	136	0		136	1
74	Rawdat Daher El Mogher	100	106	7		99	1
75	Al Diya' Al rasmiya lil banet	180	188	11		177	1
76	Sleiman Al Boustany al rasmiya lil sobyan	650	645	14	564	631	2
77	Rawdat Al Quba al rasmiya	200	196	11		185	1
78	El Kobeh El Jadidah el rasmiya lil banet	150	143	16		127	1
79	El Kobeh Al rasmiya al moukhtalata	800	310	0		310	1
80	Rawdat Al Badawi Al rasmiya al moukhtalata al oula	203	203	15		188	1
81	Thanawiyat George Sarraf al rasmiya	390	394	0		394	1
82	Tajamou Rawdat Baal Muhsen Al moukhtalata al rasmiya	250	344	53		291	1
83	Rawdat Al Tabbaneh al thaniya al rasmiya	350	252	38		214	1
84	Takmiliyat Al Murrabi Samih Mawlawy	500	409	56		353	1
85	Takmiliyat Kobba al rasmiya al moukhtalata	800	310	0		249	1
86	Thanawiyat Tripoli El Kobba Al moukhtalata Al Thaniya	250	241	0		241	1
87	Hay El Nouzha Al rasmiya al moukhtalata	400	182	8	160	174	2
88	Rawdat Hay Al Nozha Al moukhtalata	175	242	76		166	1
89	Rawdat Daher Al Mogher al Thaniya al rasmiya	230	206	23		183	1
90	Moutawassit Al Tabbaneh Al rasmiya Al moukhtalata	900	610	77	222	533	2
91	El Kobeh Al rasmiya lil banet	350	445	16		429	1

Public Schools							
ID	Name	Physical Capacity (per shift)	Total registered pupils [all shifts AM]	Syrian Refugee pupils AM	Syrian Refugee pupils PM	Lebanese pupils	Number of shifts
92	Wadi El Nahleh Al rasmiya al moukhtalata	540	340	0		340	1
93	Baddawi Al ibtdaiya al rasmiya al moukhtalata	397	397	0	416	397	2
94	Thanawiyat Al Baddawi al rasmiya						
95	Rawdat Al Baddawi al thaniya al rasmiya						
96	Moutawassit Al Baddawi Al thaniya al rasmiya lil banet	800	678	0	707	678	2
97	Al Kobba Al Jadida al rasmiya al moukhtalata	520	330	75	163	255	2
98	Rawdat Al Kobba Al Jadida Al Rasmiya	200	196	11		185	1
99	Baal Mohsen Al Rasmiya al moukhtalata	700	810	91		799	1
	Rawdat Al Nashe' Al Jadid	215	212	2		210	1
101	Nathalie Azar Al Rasmiya lil Banet	245	238	39		199	1
102	Thanawiyat Al kobbeh Al moukhtalata	300	168	0		168	1
103	Adnan Zaki Darwich al Rasmiya lil Banin	500	300	58	379	242	1
104	Moujamaa al tal al tarbawi al jadid lil sobyan	700	695	61	469	634	2
105	Al-Zahria lil banet		156	26		130	1
106	Rawdat loukman al rasmiya al moukhtalata	200	208	43		165	1
107	Al-Zahria lil sobyan	600	411	41		370	1
108	Ibn Khaldoun Al Rasmiyah lil sobyan	360	354	0	320	354	2
Total		41,506	36,445	2,502	6,397	33,752	-


Note:

1. Our sources of information are from UNHCR, MoEHE, CRDP and UN-Habitat phone survey.
2. The schools that are over capacity transformed the bathroom, the kitchen and the library into classrooms. They are also using the same benches for 3 students instead of 2 students.
3. 18 schools are at capacity, 8 of them don't have any Syrian Refugees.
4. 16 schools are over capacity, 6 of them don't have any Syrian Refugees.
5. The red rectangles: Schools with missing data.
6. Since 2014, 5 schools were merged with other schools in Tripoli (Al Nasser Al Rasmiyah Lil Banet, Madrasat Abi Samra Al Rasmiyah Al thaniyah Al Moukhtalata, Al Mkaleh Al Rasmiyah lil Banet, Rawdat al Menia al rasmiyah al moukhtalata, Madrassat al Daman Al Rasmiyah).
7. 4 schools are closed (Al nashe' Al Jadid lil Sibyan, Al Amir Fakher el Din Al Maani Lil Banin, Al Takaddom Al Rasmiyah Lil Sebyan, Al Moustakbal lil Banin).

Table 33 Public Schools.

Based on raw data shown in **Table 32** and **Table 33**, **Figure 23** shows the 108 public and 8 UNWRA schools in the Tripoli urban area. Schools over-registered relative to capacity - some by up to 40% - are encircled red. (orange circled markers in **Figure 23**).

Overregistered schools appear to follow the overall population density pattern radiating out from Tripoli old town area on one hand and Mina municipality on the other.



The pie charts' diameters are proportional to the total number of students in each school, and are represented to avoid overlapping objects, thus they do not correspond to the actual location of the schools.

Figure 23 Public & UNWRA schools in Tripoli. Source: UN-Habitat, 2016.



© Photo: Christoffer Naustdal Hjelm, 2016.

Sector		Education						
Year		2014			2015			
Activity		1- Formal and non-formal education for Adolescents	2- Formal and non-formal education for Children	3- Formal and non-formal education in Schools	1- Activity Covering public school 1st shift	2- Activity Covering public school 2nd shift	3- Activity Community Early Childhood Education	4- Training for Youth
Unit		Adolescents	Children	Children	Children and Adolescents	Children	Children	Adolescent
1	TripoliEz-Zeitoun	31	4,938	15	40			15
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh		1,824		38		38	
3	Beddaoui	2,746	33,784	2	1,392	216	250	469
4	Mina 1	1,360	3,099	366	46		46	230
5	Mina 2							
6	Mina 3		765					
7	Mina Jardins	38	435		7			
8	Tripoli Jardins	29	2,663	14				
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe		1,172					
10	Tripoli Et-Tell	539	3,886	37	7			
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh		1,665		8			
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa							
13	Tripoli En-Nouri		66					
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra	25	1,835	83				
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh							
Total		4768	56132	517	1538	216	334	714

Table 34 Number of reported activities against “Education” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Reported activities in Education

- The number of children benefitting from education activities decreased dramatically from 56,132 in 2014 to 2,088 in 2015, a trend that demands exploration.
- The focus of activities is heavily weighted towards Beddaoui municipality, which holds the camp.
- It is important to highlight the introduction of the new activity “Training for youth” in 2015.

Gaps & Challenges

- The phone survey is an imperfect methodology for establishing school capacity and registration figures, as public schools may be subject to action from the Ministry in cases of overregistration. That said, the current data may feed into the intelligence base of the education sector to inform their planning.
- Over-registration of schools - sometimes gross over-registration relative to space and desks - in public schools should be of serious concern to the sector and to the ministry. First-hand anecdotal reports of 40 children in a class intended for 25 were heard.

- At a urban area level, there is some slack in school capacity relative to registered pupils suggesting scope for rationalising places or indeed for increasing the percentage of refugee children attending school. However, this simple mathematical calculation does not take into account the various confounding spatial, financial and linguistic constraints at play.
- Teenagers in middle or high school struggle with the option of working instead of going to school, an issue especially in the Tebanneh/old city area.
- Parents have experienced having to rush to get their children out of school under gun-fire in neighborhoods facing conflicts inside Tripoli in the last 5 years, which has in unquantified numbers encouraged parents to keep them at home. Children of Jabal Mohsen go to Zgharta or Mejdlayia, not to Tripoli for fear of their safety, of discrimination and violence.
- Discrimination at school against students from certain stigmatised neighbourhoods of the city and against refugee children have been reported. There is a basis for initiating and/or expanding

awareness-raising campaigns and tailored training of teachers to address such psycho-social issues in the classroom.

- In terms of partners' reported activities, consideration of including the new post-crisis distributions of refugees as well as Beddaoui as the pre-crisis concentration of refugees seems to be necessary.

Social Stability

National

According to the Government of Lebanon in year two of its 2015-2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Programme, (2015 Dec:6)²²⁵, "Conflict prevention in Lebanon is becoming more important than ever. No country in the world can be expected to manage such a crisis on its own. Lebanon and the Lebanese need continuous international support". In the context of livelihoods, health and education, the foregoing has shown how the risk to social stability of competition, perceived or real, for urban services and resources, and how aid targeting refugees specifically can fuel feelings of inequity and injustice.

Tripoli Urban Area

Based on available data, UNHCR's MSNA report (2014 May:21) found high tension in the locations of Jabal Mohsen, Bab al-Tabbaneh and El-Qobbe in Tripoli urban area. In at least the former two of these, tensions predate the Syrian crisis, and continue with pro and anti Syrian government factions in situ. A series of serious conflict incidents in Tripoli has been linked to extremism and affiliations to Al Nusra Front and ISIS²²⁶. There are concerns of recruitment to extremist groups, especially from amongst young and unemployed men.

The Conflict Analysis Project by the Civil Society Knowledge Centre/Lebanon Support²²⁷, has produced a geo-located mapping of conflict incidents across Lebanon based on news reports from 27 Jun 2014. The data shows a total of 8,717 conflict incidents across Lebanon, with 562 incidents reported in Tripoli. The highest concentrations of incidents were reported in Qobbe 60 s and 71 in Tabbaneh.

During this period, 36 incidents related to explosions were reported, the majority being 'throwing' of hand grenades and sonic grenades, another of an IED explosion, one incident of Molotov cocktails thrown

close to Tabbeneh police station in 2014, and the detonation of an IED under a car in 2015. In August 2014, one individual died and seven others were injured in an explosion which rocked Khanak Bridge in Tripoli²²⁸, 26 of these explosions were reported in Tabbeneh and Zeitoun alone.

On 10 Jan 2015, two suicide bombers targeted a coffee shop in Jabal Mohsen, killing 9 and wounding 39 persons²²⁹. Al-Nusra Front allegedly claimed the responsibility of the attack. Later the same day, a sonic grenade was thrown at the Baael Al Darawish playground in Tabenneh, Tripoli resulting in the death of one child.

Other major categories of incidents reported for Tripoli includes 55 incidents of shooting, 76 incidents of brawl/dispute, also these often includes shooting. Concentration of these incidents also occurred in Qobbe and Tabbeneh. A total of 26 deaths was recorded in Tripoli since 2014, related to conflict. Some 83 protests, solidarity movements and so forth were reported in Tripoli, accounting for nearly 10% of national reporting. From 27 Jun 2014 to 31 Dec 2014, 98 incidents was recorded, throughout 2015, 244 incidents, and from 1 Jan 2016 to 17 Oct 2016, 220 incidents were reported, indicating a steady occurrence of incidents in Tripoli.

Reported activities in Social Stability

Table 35 shows selected social stability activities reported in ActivityInfo. Based on UN-Habitat's filter, activities are reported for 2015 only.

- Tripoli is known to be the most impoverished city in the country, with acute competition for services and resources, with close historic links to Syria and therefore particularly vulnerable to ripple effects from the neighbouring country, and with some of the densest neighbourhoods in the country populated by both host and refugee cohorts. Against this backdrop, the low number of activities reported for Tripoli is notable.
- Activities are focussed on the old city cadastres - Tripoli El Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra, Et-Tabbaneh, Ez-Zeitoun. There is a secondary focus on Beddaoui, with this cadastre being the only recipient for 'US\$ Support immediate needs of HC & Ref'.
- In 2015, activities reported included 42 initiatives, as well as benefitting 3 communities and 77 individuals.

²²⁵ LCRP (2015-16) <http://www.un.org.lb/library/assets/engbrochfullversion-065158.pdf>

²²⁶ CSKC (2016) <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/cma/map>

²²⁷ CSKC (2016) <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/cap>

²²⁸ CSKC (2014) <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/sir/one-killed-7-injured-tripoli-explosion>

²²⁹ CSKC (2015) <http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/sir/-2-simultaneous-suicide-bombings-tripoli>

Gaps & Challenges

- This City Profile may shed light on the nature and spatiality of urban and social services in terms of their interplay with social stability, potentially informing the approach of the sector in Tripoli urban area.
- In the context of poverty, limited education and lack of access to livelihood opportunities, and the overarching regional political tensions converging in Tripoli, there is clear potential for recruitment to extremist groups and associated activities.
- Conflict prevention measures in Tripoli need to remain a top priority at the local and indeed national levels.

Sector		Social Stability							
		Year	2015						
Activity		No	1- Communities Support immediate needs of HC & Ref	2- Individuals Conflict mitigation mechanisms	3- Individuals Support LG institute in part process	4- Initiatives Youth peace building initiatives	5- Participatory m Support LG institute in part process	6- Projects Support immediate needs of HC & Ref	7- USD Support immediate needs of HC & Ref
Unit			Communities	Individuals	Initiatives	Initiatives	Participatory m	Projects	USD
1	TripoliEz-Zeitoun			30		1			
2	Tripoli et Tabbaneh			17		1			
3	Beddaoui		3		21		1	1	23312
4	Mina 1				2	1			
5	Mina 2								
6	Mina 3								
7	Mina Jardins								
8	Tripoli Jardins								
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe								
10	Tripoli Et-Tell								
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh								
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa								
13	Tripoli En-Nouri								
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra			30	15		1		
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh								
Total			3	77	38	3	2	1	23312

Table 35 Number of reported activities against “Social Stability” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low).

Food Security

The most widely accepted definitions of food security comes from the World Food Summit (WFS) in November 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.

The food security sector directs its activities towards providing food assistance, supporting food availability, supporting sustainable agricultural production, and promoting utilization of diversified and quality foods.

Various negative coping strategies have been identified in Lebanon, including reducing the number of daily meals, limiting meal sizes, buying food on credit, withdrawing children from school or relying on children to generate additional incomes. On one particular measure, according to UNHCR²³⁰, “Tripoli had the highest proportion of Syrian refugees who ate just one or two meals per day, when compared to Akkar and Bekaa”. A range of negative coping mechanisms are shown in **Figure 24**, with Tripoli T5 and the other regions pulled out for comparison. Tripoli T5 shows a fairly undifferentiated profile on this division, though a different picture may emerge with a focus on the urban area in isolation, relative to the whole of T5. For this City Profile, data on food security on cadastre or municipality level has not been available.

Reported Activities in Food Security

Table 36 shows reported activity under food security. There is a focus of activities on Beddaoui in 2014 which expands to include Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun in 2015.

Future updates of this City Profile will seek to offer further analysis of how these figures for Tripoli urban area relate to the national context and implications thereof, through discussion with the sector leads. This will allow a suggestion of gaps and challenges as for other sectors in the foregoing.

²³⁰ UNHCR (2014 May) MSNA report.

Protection

National

The lack of valid residency amongst Syrian refugees has become a growing problem, fed partly by the introduction of a stricter residency regulation since Jan 2015. The annual fee for residency combined tensely with a pledge not to work are barriers to gaining residency. Based on a 2015 survey of Syrian households, the Government of Lebanon’s LCRP 2015-16 (2015 Dec) found that 61% of those visited had no formal residency. Refugees thus affected were reported to show ‘a growing sense of insecurity and unease’ due to heightened risk of detention and deportation (p.96). Exploitation at the hands of Lebanese sponsors was also a reported dynamic. Overall, ‘the combination of lack of legal residency, reductions in assistance, limited self-support opportunities, and depletion of resources including savings and assets, is increasing the vulnerability of persons displaced from Syria’ (Government of Lebanon, 2015)²³¹.

The Government of Lebanon’s LCRP 2015-16 (2015 Dec: 92) notes that “Reported incidents of exploitation have been increasing throughout 2015. Further analysis suggests that there might be a correlation between the deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, lack of access to legal stay and reduced assistance, and a gradually increasing risk of exploitation for women and girls”.

Refugees have been subject to physical threats as well as rising numbers of evictions, while relocation becomes increasingly challenging as shelter alternatives dwindle.’

In Lebanon, Syrian refugee children are often forced to sleep in the same space as their parents or other adults outside of the immediate family²³². Few of the most vulnerable families have sufficient levels of privacy in their homes, posing potential protection issues for those living in extended families, or in shelters with little security²³³.

Tripoli Urban Area

A key informant interview was conducted with a well-placed protection sector authority²³⁴ in North Lebanon, which yielded the following insights.

²³¹ Government of Lebanon (2015 Dec) “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-16”.

²³² CARE (2015), p.36.

²³³ Ibid. p.44.

²³⁴ The key informant was not in a position to have his/her name quoted against interview outputs.

Cadastres

Sector		Food Security				
Year		2014		2015		
Activity		1- Food security value in dollars	2- Food security who benefited from distribution	1- Provision of e-cards/ vouchers redeemed through e-cards in dollars	2- Provision of e-cards/vouchers of vulnerable individuals receiving e-cards	3- Provision of food parcels: new arri&pend reg
Unit		Dollars	Individuals	Dollars	Individuals	Individuals
1	Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun			8,790,592	485,711	674
2	Tripoli Et Tabbaneh					
3	Beddaoui	3,944,301	131,966	2,418,530	133,129	2,445
4	Mina 1		6,000			
5	Mina 2					
6	Mina 3					
7	Mina Jardins					3,029
8	Tripoli Jardins	2,415,754	10,164			
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe		1,946			
10	Tripoli Et-Tell	47,085	301			
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh					
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa					
13	Tripoli En-Nouri					
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra		27,807			
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh					
Total		6,407,140	178,184	11,209,122	618,840	6,148

Table 36 Number of reported activities against “Food security” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Triangulation of views would be required in order to form the basis for any action or programme formulation.

- There are around 260,000 refugees registered in the North: 60% in Akkar and around 40% in Tripoli and the T5 region. According to the latest data, there are around 100,000 registered refugees in Tripoli.
- Refugees are dispersed through the city, though with a major concentration being Mina municipality’s Hay el Tanak which hosts a high number of refugees in addition to deprived Lebanese and shows an existing geographic segregation between the two. Other concentrations exist in the form of small collective shelters in Beddaoui and Wadi el Nahle, containing between 5 and 10 families. Due to this dispersion of refugees, it is possible for them to change areas or houses easily in case of tension.
- Currently, an NGO called Utopia is carrying out a significant share of community work.
- Neighborhood committees, supported by partners, are present throughout Tripoli, Mina and Beddaoui.
- There are three main partners working on Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV): LeCorvaw, IRC

and DRC. Information collected is highly sensitive and confidential, and therefore cannot be published.

- Child labor is considered a major issue in Tripoli. Although no official data exists, it is estimated that Tripoli has the second highest percentage of child labor after Beirut. Save the Children is the main actor focusing on child labor.
- Average marriage age and early pregnancy data are not available: most of the reported cases of early age for these life events are in Akkar and not very common in Tripoli.

Sector		Protection			
Year		2014		2015	
Activity		1- Protection of boys and girls benefiting from psychosocial support	2- Protection of caregivers benefiting from psychosocial support	1- Individuals participating in community center and community-based activities	2- Protection interventions
Unit		Children	Individuals	Individuals	Individuals
1	Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun		99	36	
2	Tripoli Et Tabbaneh				8
3	Beddaoui	1115	823	235	884
4	Mina 1				20
5	Mina 2				
6	Mina 3				
7	Mina Jardins				
8	Tripoli Jardins				
9	Tripoli El-Qobbe				5
10	Tripoli Et-Tell				
11	Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh				10
12	Tripoli Es-Souayqa				
13	Tripoli En-Nouri				
14, 15, 16	Tripoli El-Haddadine, El Hadid, El Mhatra		39		20
17	Tripoli Er-Remmaneh				
Total		1115	961	271	947

Cadastres

Table 37 Number of reported activities against “Livelihoods” in Tripoli Urban Area by cadastre for selected indicators. Cadastres ordered by population (high to low). Source: ActivityInfo 2014, 2015.

Reported Activities in Protection Sector

- The number of individuals targeted by the protection sector decreased from 2076 in 2014 to 1218 in 2015.
- Beddaoui scored the highest number in terms of targeted individuals.
- Some neighborhoods have shown no reported activities in either year, these being Mina 2, Mina 3, Mina Jardins, Tripoli Jardins, Tripoli El-Tell, Tripoli Es-Souayqa, Tripoli En-Nouri and Tripoli Er-Remmaneh.

Gaps & Challenges

The protection sector’s area of study, described by highly sensitive data, renders it elusive to gain publishable information on. The key informant interview above is illustrative of themes but cannot be considered as representative guide to the situation in Tripoli. As such, this section will be developed further in discussion with sector leads in order to specify how the multisectoral and spatialised study context may add value to the protection sector’s operations.





Conclusions

Analysis of Tripoli in terms of its three-municipality functional geography has generated a profile of this historic urban pole that begins to reflect the pragmatic, as-lived nature of the agglomeration in its true scale. The potential role of Tripoli in a more polycentric Lebanon of the type promoted in the National Physical Master Plan of the Lebanese Territories (CDR, 2005) has been raised as a long-term policy and investment agenda. However, the urgent local and strategic barriers to reaching a point where such a discussion is realistic have been shown in sharp relief, inter-relating across the economy, urban services and social services.

The urban challenges shared across Lebanon are found in abundance in Tripoli. What is unique however is the unrivalled concentration of impoverishment, and the steepness of its descent from Pre-Civil War regional hub. Tripoli, Lebanon's second city, is indeed a city at risk, travelling along a self-reinforcing spiral of a weak economy served by weak infrastructure support. Historical events combined with the level of poverty represented across both host and refugee communities have yielded a socio-economic and sectarian conflict tinderbox. Home to affiliates of both sides of the Syrian conflict, Tripoli represents a concentration of potential to destabilise the country.

Humanitarian interventions and local authority programming are undermined by Lebanon's lack of a robust statistical base. The overwhelming finding for Tripoli has been the lack of reliable population data, leaving scope only for speculation between rival data sources. There is strong suggestion, however, that the official figures used by all partners to the crisis response and for national planning – totalling just under 288,000 for Lebanese – are grossly below conservative estimates of the real situation, as exemplified for instance by the union's estimate of about 365,000. UN-Habitat's own calculation puts the Lebanese population figure at a level approaching 423,821. The uncertainty undermines the validity of policy and programming decisions by the third sector where poor Lebanese are involved. It also affects the ability of municipalities and the union to align planning to service demand or to monitor critical urban indicators such as employment rates.

Regarding the approximately 100,000 refugees in Tripoli, there are data caveats around the number of unregistered individuals, as well as around how point of registration relates to actual place of residence. Paying for shelter is the second highest outgoing²³⁵ amongst Syrian households, and insecurity of tenure a major concern – the dynamics of which are not well understood.

Activities reported against the various sectors by partners to the response often show concentrations on Beddaoui, home to the urban area's Palestinian camp, with a spread throughout the remaining geography which takes limited account the new influx of Syrians who have predominantly occupied the lowest cost aspects of the mainstream housing market, shared with the Lebanese poor. It is hoped that the current profile will contribute to the urban knowledge base in ways that foster the extension of the focus on well-known Beddaoui to other less familiar neighbourhoods.

Cross-cutting all other issues, the governance theme has probed constraints in how civil society is ordered in Tripoli. The critical finding is that, between the North governorate on one hand and the individual urban core municipalities on the other, there is a meso-level vacuum in place of active strategic coordination and urban interest promotion at the urban level. Integrated and mutually supportive collaboration between municipalities for service planning and delivery would potentiate efficiency gains and the capture of economies of scale.

²³⁵ Highest expenditure is food.

Policy & research implications

Tripoli urban area has a distinct tradition of inter-municipal working. This experience should be drawn on in institutionalising the formulation of strategic land use and infrastructural assessments and planning at the urban level. The focus could include spatially referenced demand and supply evaluations leading to action across topics such as transport, employment markets, land and housing markets, and office and industry markets. Underpinning this, unified mapping of residents and their movements across cadastral and municipal boundaries would facilitate improved service planning by local and national service providers.

There is further a role for such a urban-level governance entity to develop arguments outlined in this profile to approach central government about activating the National Physical Master Plan's legal commitment to balanced development of the country. This could be with a view to improving Tripoli's situation in ways which are complementary to rather than in competition with the role of Beirut. Re-generation of Tripoli's industrial base complemented by fit-for-purpose supporting infrastructure and communications is a candidate theme. The development of Tripoli is an opportunity for the whole of Lebanon in terms of national economy as well as security.

There is a role for the established Al Fayhaa urban observatory and relevant affiliates to identify and prioritise the data gaps that are undermining planning for mitigating urban deprivation and enhancing access to livelihoods opportunities. This would include reviewing existing population data and identifying ways forward to reach a robust, consensus-winning assessment. It would also involve compiling and/or making available as-built maps of the various infrastructure networks. This would facilitate locally-specific analysis of service provision, allow for targetting of specific hotspots or networks, and help with locating investments or interventions that are adequately supported by the services necessary for sustainability.

Identifying conflicting evidence and a lack of city-specific data, this profile has pointed to the need for further research into security of tenure and wider HLP issues amongst refugee communities.

Empirical investigations at the neighbourhood level would begin to address some data gaps identified in the foregoing, such as on as-built infrastructure network characteristics, housing and shelter conditions, and economic activity in both the formal and informal sector. It is envisaged that such bottom-up analyses, undertaken by UN-Habitat and others in the future, will be reflected in and inform updated versions of the current profile.

The review of spatial strategic plans and reports showed an absence of disaster risk reduction and preparedness practices or policies. Reducing the vulnerability of people and property stretches across both natural and anthropogenic risks. Disaster risk reduction measures should be promoted as a cornerstone of sustainable development. Institutional structures and competences for scoping the mobilisation of this concept remain to be determined.

Strategic interventions and actions

This profile suggests value in assessing the potential of several catalytic strategic interventions which may offer wider city-level impacts. These include the following, which could be prioritised and phased during urban-level deliberations:

- Revisiting the regeneration of Tripoli Port with a view to regeneration that takes into account existing facilities in Beirut and Syria's Tortos, based on a formal market study. Obvious options may be increasing its dredged depth or development of its dry dock facilities.
- The planned land use mix for the prime greenfield residential plots west of the International Fair may be reconsidered for mixed use development and/or for on or offsite affordable housing provision. This could be in the context of exploration of regulatory-institutional models for piloting and scaling up affordable housing initiatives.
- Spatial consolidation of existing industrial uses and establishment or strengthening of collective information, best practice-sharing and lobbying industry collectives.
- The revisiting of earlier efforts to instigate a Special Economic Zone to stimulate regeneration of the type that offers livelihood opportunities for locals.
- Reactivating the fair. Several strategies have suggested the reactivation of the fair without translating this into clear action. Given the status of the buildings, which would require substantial budgets for finalisation and rehabilitation, options for temporary use of parts of the fair and its buildings could be studied. This could for instance include renovation of a selected building for youth training programmes and vocational training, play days for school children, or a monthly artisanal and handicraft market.
- Calculating and actioning the required level of connections feeding into the sewerage system supplying the constructed wastewater treatment plant, so it can begin to operate at maximum functionality.
- Instigation of a good quality, affordable intra-urban public transport network. A low cost bus rapid transport system is one scenario for exploration.
- Capitalising on the relationship with CDR's past CHUD analysis to identify, upgrade and capitalise on the city's significant cultural heritage endowment as one plank of an integrated economic regeneration strategy.
- The boundary of Beddaoui Camp and formal division of competences between UNWRA and the municipality are long established. However, the weakness of municipal services in the camp and adjacent areas works in favour neither of the residents nor of the municipality, instead presenting risks that are in fact shared across the border. The inadequate water, sewage and power services used by the residents are informal, illegal and/or private and inefficient. This is at the expense of municipal interests, namely through reduced municipal ability to manage the water table in terms of absolute levels and contamination; non-technical power losses, and illegal connections to the sewage system. A selectively permeable approach to the boundary solely for infrastructure integration purposes may offer a mutually advantageous solution, whereby camp and adjacent area's residents gain improved services and the municipality improves its ability to manage and charge for services. Pre-existing engagement between UNWRA, the municipalities and service providers including the Water Establishment for approvals and connections to infrastructure networks offer a starting point for any such deliberations.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Cadastres, Neighbourhoods and Sub-neighbourhoods

Cadastres	Neighbourhoods	Sub-Neighbourhoods	Cadastres	Neighbourhoods	Sub-Neighbourhoods	
Tripoli Ez-Zeitoun	Jabal Mohsen (shared with Qobbe)		Mina 3	Port Said (shared with Mina 1 and 2)		
	Zeitoun			Mar Elias		
	Abu Samra (shared with Haddadine)	Douwar al Mawlawi			Corniche	
		Seke al Bayda		Sehet Labban		
		Al Safa		Mina Jardins	Haret el Jdide	
		Sheree el Islah			Hay el Tanak	
		Al Shoulfe			El Masaken el Shaabiye	
		Al Jinane			Ras el Sakher	
		Al Inaya al Ahliya			Maarad (shared with Tripoli Jardins)	
		Al Shifa'			Port (shared with Tripoli Jardins and Mina 1)	
		Manar Street			Bewaba	
		Fathi Yagan			Azmi Street (shared with Tripoli Jardins and Tripoli Et-Tell)	
		Al Outour			Miten Street (Shared with Tripoli Jardins)	
	Rawdet al Zaytoun		Central			
Jamee Khadija		Tripoli Jardins	Maarad (shared with Mina Jardins)			
Al Kuwaitiye			Dam w Farez			
Tripoli et Tabbaneh	Tebbaneh (shared with Tripoli Jardins)		Tebbaneh al fawqa (Kouwaa)	Boulevard		
			Tebbaneh el Tahta (Bael al Daqour)	Mharam		
			Tebbaneh al Makaber (al Beraniye)	Miten Street (Shared with Mina Jardins)		
Beddaoui	Al Mankoubin			Monla		
	Madrasat Al Banat Al Oula al Rasmiyeh Al Mina			Jamil Aadrah Street		
	Al Naser Al Rasmieh Lil Banin al Mina			Nadim el Jisr Street		
	Refaat Al husseini Mina			Mar Maroun Street		
	Al Nahda Al rasmiyeh Lil Banin			El Sakafe Street		
	Al Nahda Al rasmiyeh Lil Banat			Azmi Street (shared with Tripoli Et-Tell and Mina Jardins)		
	Hay el Baher			El Nini		
	Jabal			Port (shared with Mina Jardins and Mina 1)		
	Wadi el Nahle			Zahrieh (shared with Ez-Zahrieh and Et-Tell)		
	Palestinian Camp		Tebbaneh (shared with Et-Tebbaneh)			
Mina 1	Mina Old City (shared with Mina 2)		Saki el Shmeli			
	Terab el Islam (shared with Mina 2)		Mina Street			
	Port (shared with Tripoli Jardins and Mina Jardins)					
Mina 2	Mina Old City (shared with Mina 1)					
	Port Said (shared with Mina 1 and 3)					
	Hosh el Abid					
	Al Ziraa'					
	Terab el Islam (shared with mina 1)					

Cadastres	Neighbourhoods	Sub-Neighbourhoods
Tripoli El-Qobbe	Mashrou el Hariri	
	Ebn Sinna	
	Al Jamiaa	
	Koliyet al Handasah	
	Arez Street	
	Sehet el Qobbe	
	El Amerkan	
	Al Riva	
	Moustashfa al Houkoume	
	Al Qouloud	
	Al Bakkar	
	Jabal Mohsen	
Tripoli Et-Tell	Et-Tell	Sehet el Nour
		Masaref Street
		Sehet el Kiyel
		Baladiye Street
		Meliye Street
		Itfeiiye Street
		Saraya al Aatia'
		Ez el Din Street
		Central el Tell
		Sehet el Koura
	Azmi Street (shared with Tripoli Jardins)	
	Metran Street	
	Zahrieh (shared with Ez-Zahrieh and Tripoli Jardins)	
	Boulevard	
Tripoli Ez-Zahrieh	Zahrieh (shared with Ez-Zahrieh Tripoli Jardins)	Al Mir Street
		Latife Street
		Kanayes Street
		Ghouraba
Tripoli Es-Souayqa	Souayqa	
	Dahr el Mougher	

Cadastres	Neighbourhoods	Sub-Neighbourhoods
Tripoli El-Haddadine	Old City (shared with En-Nouri, El Hadid, El Mhatra, Er-Remmaneh)	Al Aswaq al Dakhiliya
		Dar al Ajaze
	Abu Samra (shared with Ez-Zeitoun)	Chaarani
		Marj el Zouhour
		Sanawiyet el Haddadine
		Al Irshad
		Makatabat al Ouloum
		Sahet el Shiraa
		Sahet al Dinawi
		Hawouz
		Sehet Sadoun
		Madrasat al Ghazali
		Nazlet al Qalaa
		Haddadine (shared with Ez-Zeitoun)
	Beb el Ramel	
	Dbebse	
	Ahwet Moussa	
	El Jebene	
	Abr el Zayni	
	Jamee Amira	
Taqtaq Street		
Rifaeye		
Tripoli El Hadid	Old City (shared with En-Nouri, El-Haddadine, El Mhatra, Er-Remmaneh)	Khan al Nahasin
		Souk Haraj
		Berket al Malaha
		Khan al Askar
		Jamee el Tawbe
Tripoli En-Nouri	Old City (shared with El Hadid, El-Haddadine, El Mhatra, Er-Remmaneh)	Al Rahbet
		Sehet el Nejme
		Jamee al Kabir
		Souk al Dahab
		Khan al Saboun
Tripoli El Mhatra	Old City (shared with En-Nouri, El-Haddadine, El Hadid, Er-Remmaneh)	Souk al Aatarin
		Bet al Nashar
		Rifaeye
		Souk al Nahasin
		Souk al Aarid
Tripoli Er-Remmaneh	Old City (shared with En-Nouri, El-Haddadine, El Mhatra, El Hadid)	Souk al Samak
		Zoukak al Rammeneh

Appendix 2: Partners/3W

ID	Municipality	Name / Cadastre	General Economy		Basic Urban Services		Health	Education
			Livelihoods	Social Assistance	Shelter	WASH		
1	Mina	Mina N3				SCI	Beyond, HI, RI, UNRWA	CLMC
2		Mina N2					IMC, IOCC	CLMC
3		Mina N1		CLMC, IR LEBANON	IOM	CARE, HOOPS		CLMC, HOOPS, LEBANESE RED CROSS, UNRWA
4		Mina Jardins		IOCC	DRC	IOCC, LEBANESE RED CROSS	BEYOND, RI, UNHCR, UNRWA	CLMC, IQRAA, NRC
5	Tripoli	Trablous Jardins		UNHCR, UNRWA	UNRWA		ABAAD, IOCC, RESTART LEBANON, UNHCR, UNRWA	CLMC, NRC
6		Trablous El -Tell			IOM		ABAAD, IMC, IOCC, UNFPA	CLMC, MS LEBANON, NRC, UNRWA
7		Trablous Ez-Zahrieh			DRC			CRMC, COOPI, UNRWA
8		Trablous et Tabbaneh			DRC, UNDP	OXFAM, UNDP	ABAAD, BEYOND, IOCC, RI	CLMC, COOPI, NRC
9		Trablous El-Qobbe				CISP	ABAAD, HI, IMC, IOCC	CLMC, COOPI, NRC, SCI
10		Trablous Es-Souayqa					IOCC	CLMC
11		Trablous El Hadid						
12		Trablous Er-Remmaneh						
13		Tablous En-Nouri		HWA				
14		Trablous El Mhatra						CLMC
15		Trablous El-Haddadine, El-Hadid, El-Mhartat			DRC		BEYOND, CLMC, HI, RIO, WHO	CLMC
16		Trablous Ez-Zeitoun			DRC	RI	Beyond, CCP Japan, HI, IMC, IDCC, MAP-UK, UNRWA	CLMC, NRC, SCI
17	Beddaoui	Beddaoui	SCI	DRC	DRC, NRC, SOLIDARITES	ANERA, SOLIDARITES, UNRWA	Beyond, CCP Japan, HI, IMC, IDCC, MAP-UK, UNRWA	Pal_scouts, CCP Japan, CLMC, NRC, UNRWA

*The Darkest shade of blue entails the highest number of (I)NGOs working in the specified sector.

Social services

	Social Stability	Food Security	Protection	Child Protection	SGBV
	SFCG		NRC	WCH	
	SFCG		DRC	CLMC, DRC, HOOPS, SCI, WCH	
			DRC, IRC	WCH	HEARTLAND
		IOCC, MOSA, UNRWA		DRC	HEARTLAND
			IRC, NRC	MS LEBANON, WCH	DRC, HEARTLAND
			IRC	WCH	HEARTLAND
	SFCG		NRC, OXFAM, UNRWA	WCH	HEARTLAND
	SFCG		IRC, NRC, OXFAM	SCI, WCH	HEARTLAND
		LEBANESE RED CROSS	IRC		
	INTERAGENCE, SFCG		IRC	WCH	HEARTLAND
	SFCG	DCR, FAO	IRC, NRC, UNHCR, UNRWA	SCI	
	DRC, UNDP	CCP Japan, DRC, Solidarites	DRC, IRC, NRCT	DRC, HDC, MAP-UK, PAL-SCOUTS, RESTART	MAP-UK, UNRWA

Appendix 3: List of Private-free Schools in Tripoli

Schools - Tripoli				
	Name	Latitude	Number Of Students	Contact
1	Private Free school	Al Imam Ali Bin Abi Taleb		Tripoli- Jabel Mohsen Al Ali
2	Private Free school	Tarablos al marouniya al moukhtalata	285	Tripoli- Al tall, Al talla la ouliya street
3	Private Free school	Al moutran al khayriyah al marouniya	1361	Tripoli- Al kayyal district,al moutran street
4	Private Free school	Dar al hanan al moukhtalata	312	Al Mina- al ramla, jamal al din al Afghani street
5	Private Free school	Al Askala		Al Mina- al andalus district, Port saed street
6	Private Free school	Al mina al nammouzajiyah al majjaniyah	201	Al Mina- Al ittihad street
7	Private Free school	Al Fayhaa al wataniyah		Tripoli- Mahatra district, Mahatra street
8	Private Free school	Al Markaz al ijmitaa al awwal		Tripoli- Abou Samra, Al kalaa district
9	Private Free school	Al hayat lil taalim al ibtidaei		Tripoli- Abou Samra, Saadoun Street
10	Private Free school	Al ouloum al jadidah		Tripoli- Tabbana, Al imam street
11	Private Free school	Al taawouniyah		Tripoli- Tabbana, souk al ghodra street
12	Private Free school	Nahej Al Balagha	116	Tripoli- Al baoul district, Souriyya street
13	Private Free school	Al wataniyyah al lubnaniyah		Tripoli- Karam Al Zahed district,Al mouhajrin street
14	Private Free school	Al moutran al riyaaiyeh	149	Tripoli- Al sayydeh district, Bab Al tabbanah
15	Private Free school	Al Malloula		Tripoli- Al mankoubin
16	Private Free school	Al thakafiyyah al lubnaniyah		Tripoli- Bab al tabbanah, bael al darawsih street
17	Private Free school	Dawhat al adab	591	Tripoli- Al kubba, al rahbat street
18	Private Free school	Al Amal Al moukhtalata	518	Tripoli-Al kubba,Alnasser street
19	Private Free school	Lubana la moukhtalata		Tripoli- Al kubba, daher al mogher street
20	Private Free school	Nahdat al Fayhaa		Tripoli- Al kubba, Al rahbet street
21	Private Free school	Kubbat al naser al marouniyeh	601	Tripoli- Al kubba, talaat al shimal
22	Private Free school	Al hidayah al majjaniyah al ibtidaiah		Tripoli- Al nouri district, al rahbet street
23	Private Free school	Al ibtidaiyah al nammouzajiyah		Tripoli- al kubba, Al american street
24	Private Free school	Al ilm wa al nour		Al Minya -Al jadidah district,al jadidah street
25	Private Free school	Al Mouassasah al ijtmimayah al islamiyah al ibtidaiah		Al baddaoui, al mankoubin
26	Private Free school	Al ilem wa al kholoq al majjaniyah al moukhtalata		Tripoli- Al khannaq district,

	Phone Number
	06- 628948
	06- 445627
	06- 440820
	03- 3349601
	06- 601596
	N/A
	06- 626591
	06- 431119
	N/A
	N/A
	06- 629334
	03- 349565
	06- 430588
	06- 389128
	625955
	N/A
	06- 440347
	06- 629387
	06- 632424
	N/A
	06- 382513
	06- 620409
	N/A
	N/A
	06- 611360
	N/A



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Confederaziun svizra

Cities Alliance
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