User menu

Defining CCCM roles and responsibilities in Kenya

You are here

Defining CCCM roles and responsibilities in Kenya

The CCCM sector has learned from its experiences in both conflicts and natural disasters, and has been continuously reviewing its projects, programs and responses. This first edition of CCCM Case Studies presents 12 summaries of CCCM activities from 11 different countries. The purpose of this publication is to provide lessons as a knowledge base to support humanitarian operations (in both emergency and protracted contexts). Programs introduced in these case studies were implemented by CCCM Cluster agencies, as well as national authorities, in response to large-scale displacement caused by different types of humanitarian crises: these include earthquakes (Haiti), floods (Namibia, Thailand, Pakistan), typhoons (the Philippines), conflicts (Burundi, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Uganda, Yemen), and complex emergencies (Colombia). In light of these diverse contexts, each case study portrays experiences, successful practices, challenges and lessons.

Context

Prior to 2007, Kenya had a long history of internal displacement, most of which had been associated with its colonial legacy, land ownership, and inter-clan conflict over water resources. Large-scale conflict-induced displacement occurred in the aftermath of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1992-2007. In 2007 two-thirds of Kenyans (400,000 out of 600,000) who were forced to flee their homes had previously been displaced due to conflict, droughts, floods and other natural disasters.

The December 2007 post-election violence was prompted by claims that the elections were fraudulent. In January 2008 violence erupted spontaneously in the cities of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, but was more pronounced in the opposition strongholds of the Rift Valley, and the Nyanza, Western, and Coast Provinces. Some 300 camps were set up in the country, with the majority located on the Naivasha-Eldoret axis, where the violence was most severe. The populations that were most affected by this violence were city dwellers, farmers with rights to their own land, farmers who rented their land, agricultural workers, squatters, and persons who owned small businesses.

The scale and the scope of displacement quickly led to the setting up, consolidation and expansion of temporary settlements into large camps. The majority of the camps were closed within seven months, as most of the IDPs either returned home, settled close to their homes in “satellite camps”, or “integrated” (living in their own accommodation or with host families). Only three defined IDP camps (Naivasha town, Nakuru and Eldoret show grounds) were still up and running in July 2008, with 20,000 camp residents in total.

Cluster Activation

The CCCM Cluster was activated as a standalone cluster in January 2008 along with 11 other clusters. The cluster approach was activated because the country was overwhelmed by the crisis, despite the presence of a strong governance structure. The majority of the 11 clusters were phased out in August 2008 with the exception of Protection and Early Recovery. The Kenyan Red Cross Society (KRCS) was designated by the Government of Kenya (GoK) to head the emergency response for the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM), Shelter and NFI Clusters. The KRCS was referred to as the de facto “must go through partner,” in terms of camp management. The roles of the CCCM Cluster were to provide support to KRCS in terms of camp infrastructure, registration and service provision. However, at the onset of the crisis the roles and responsibilities of all CCCM actors were not well established. Thus, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was drafted, agreed, and signed by the KRCS and the CCCM Cluster. The CCCM Cluster played an integral role, providing advice and technical support to the KRCS.

Actions Taken

MoU signed:
This document established clear roles and responsibilities of the cluster lead agency and the camp management agency. It facilitated coordination and collaboration in the emergency response. 

Capacity building trainings for local staff and the government on CCCM issues.

Operational support: The cluster lead agency funded 19 camp managers.

Challenges

Cluster lead staff had prior experience in refugee, not IDP contexts.

Limited understanding of the cluster system by the national authorities and partners.

The CCCM Cluster’s role was not clearly defined or understood among key national stakeholders.

Coordination among the cluster and the KRCS.

Without an established MoU indicating who was doing what, where, and when, there was no clear assignment of tasks for the cluster and the KRCS.

Disconnect between field and national level clusters.

Coordination difficulties between the two cluster levels resulted in gaps in specific emergency operations; particularly in terms of gender-based violence, identification, tracing and family reunification, and special care for vulnerable populations.