RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER 1

Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought

DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON

RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER 1

Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought

DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON

Published in 2014 by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI)
26 St Luke's Mews, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom.
PO Box 52771 GPO, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya.

THE RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE (RVI)

The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.

CENTRE FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

The Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba was established in 1997 to act as a research entity integrating humanitarian, conflict and peace studies with academic programmes.

THE AUTHOR

Douglas Johnson first visited the Sudan in 1969 after meeting Sudanese students at Makerere University College, Uganda, where he was studying. He is the author and editor of many works of South Sudanese history including *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars: Peace or Truce?* (revised edition, Woodbridge: James Currey, 2011), and *When Boundaries become Borders: the Impact of Boundary-making in Southern Sudan's Frontier Zones* (London/Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2010).

RVI EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: John Ryle

RVI INFORMATION & PROGRAMME OFFICER: Tymon Kiepe

EDITOR: Catherine Bond

REPORT DESIGN: Lindsay Nash

ISBN 978-1-907431-33-3

Contents

Introduction and summary

In a paper a few years ago I discussed self-determination in South Sudanese political thought.[1] In this paper[2] I look at its twin, the idea of federalism. Federalism has once again become a central issue in political debate in South Sudan; the idea has a long pedigree in the country's political history, and this paper gives an outline of that pedigree. I am neutral on the applicability of federalism to South Sudan and will not discuss the pros and cons of the idea, other than to record that federalism has meant different things to different persons at different times. The paper describes attitudes towards federalism and the ways it was presented from before Sudan's independence in 1956, up to South Sudan's independence today.

1 Delivered at Juba University on 21 May 2009, as Douglas H. Johnson, 'New Sudan or South Sudan? The multiple meanings of self-determination in Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement'. *Civil Wars* 15/2 (2013), pp. 141-56.

2 This a revised and expanded version of the lecture delivered at the Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, on 5 July 2014.

The Juba Conference of 1947

The first time that the collective opinion of southern Sudanese was canvassed concerning a national political issue was at the Juba Conference of 1947. Since 1930, British administrative policy in the Sudan had kept open the possibility that the southern provinces might one day be transferred to colonial authority in British East Africa. This remained a theoretical option only: it could not be done as long as Sudan remained an Egyptian colony in international law. Egypt was a partner in the condominium that ruled Sudan and East African governments were unenthusiastic about the idea of the southern Sudanese provinces joining them. In 1946, with Egypt attempting to reassert its sovereignty over the whole of Sudan, and with northern nationalist groups articulating demands for self-government and self-determination within Sudan's geographical boundaries, a separate administrative future for the southern Sudan was no longer even a theoretical possibility, and the Sudan government prepared a new policy linking the future of the 'South' inextricably with that of the 'North'. But some consultation with the educated leadership of the south—junior administrative officials, teachers, and chiefs—was deemed necessary, if only for form's sake. Following a preliminary survey of southern opinion,[3] a conference was convened in Juba in June 1947.

The conference was exploratory and could take no decisions by itself. Its main purpose was to find out if the nascent leadership of the southern, educated class was willing and able to take part as appointed members in the Legislative Assembly that was being established in Khartoum.[4] The first day of the conference ended in no agreement, but that night the southern delegates held a meeting with some 200 southern clerks and junior officials living in Juba. The meeting lasted until two o'clock in the morning. Finally, Paulino Cyer Rehan, one of the Dinka chiefs at the conference, spoke.

'Gentlemen,' he said, 'we now have stayed too long. Why should we be afraid of the Northerners? … if anything happens, if the

3 Letters published in Yosa Wawa, *Southern Sudanese Pursuits of Self-Determination: documents in political history* (Kisubi: Marianum Press, 2005). I am indebted to Yosa Wawa for making available to me other documents not included in this publication.

4 J.W. Robertson, *Transition in Africa: From direct rule to independence* (London: C. Hurst, 1974), p. 107.

Northerners want to make injustice to us, well, we have young children, young men: they will take up the response and fight them; they are men like ourselves.'[5]

So, in the end the southern representatives agreed to participate in the Legislative Assembly, but at no point in the conference was any system of government discussed. Despite what many South Sudanese now believe,[6] there was no mention of federalism.

5 Fr. Dellagiacoma (ed.), *How a Slave became a Minister: Autobiography of Sayyed Stanislaus Abdallahi Paysama* (Khartoum, 1990), p. 53.

6 See for instance The South Sudanese Professionals in Diaspora, *Negotiating Peace through Federalism: a proposal for good governance in post-conflict South Sudan* (2014).

1948–1957: Self-determination, independence, and federalism

Thirteen southerners were appointed to the Legislative Assembly, including Stanislaus Paysama and Paulino Cyer Rehan from Bahr el-Ghazal; Buth Diu and Edward Odhok Dodigo from Upper Nile; and Benjamin Lwoki and Andarea Gore from Equatoria. The southern members formed a bloc of opinion but were not yet a party. At first they had no agreed plan for a system of government. When the Umma Party brought forward a self-government motion in 1950, southerners led the opposition to it on the grounds that not enough had been done to enable the south to participate in self-government on an equal basis. Their proposal for a special minister of 'Southern Affairs' in a future self-governing Sudan was voted down by the northern members. They agreed to continue participation in the constitutional process only when the northern legislators accepted a provision for the governor-general to retain reserved powers over the southern provinces and the civil service. Southerners saw these as important safeguards against the potential abuse of power by a future northern majority government, but they were highly unpopular provisions among northern parties.

The political landscape of Sudan abruptly changed with the All Parties Agreement of January 1953, in which Egypt—supported by the northern parties—stated the conditions on which it would agree to a new Anglo-Egyptian treaty establishing the terms for self-government in the Sudan and the exercise of self-determination. The governor-general's reserve powers over the south and the civil service were to be dropped, and self-determination for the country as a whole was to be a choice between the alternatives of union with Egypt or complete independence.

The exclusion of southern representatives from these talks, the northern parties' extra-parliamentary repudiation of the constitutional formula agreed with southern representatives in the Legislative Assembly, and the Egyptian government's attempt to further circumvent the south's parliamentary representatives,

led to two important developments: the first was the formation of southern Sudan's first political party, the Liberal Party, to contest the 1953 elections; and the second was the articulation of a possible separate self-determination for the south with the threat of withdrawing from the constitutional process and finding 'other alternatives to determine its own future'.[7]

Following the 1953 elections, the formation of the first all-Sudanese cabinet under the pro-Egyptian National Union Party (NUP) of prime minister Ismail al-Azhari in 1954, further hastened southern political thinking where federation and self-determination became intertwined. Federation now emerged as the *condition* for southern participation in self-determination for Sudan as one country. One of the earliest statements of this came in a petition addressed to the British governor-general and forwarded by Abdel Rahman Sule, a Muslim merchant from Juba and co-founder of the Liberal Party who, shortly before the new cabinet was sworn in, claimed:

> No one in the South would like at the moment to see this Egyptian proposals carried out. We in the South are still undeveloped economically, socially and politically. If the Egyptian proposals to deprive us of our safeguards vested in the Governor-General is accepted, we ask Your Excellency that there will be no any other way for us except to ask for federation with the North. Failing to federate, we shall ask as alternative for the appointment of a High Commissioner from the British Foreign Office to Administer the South under the Trusteeship of the United Nations till such time as we shall be able to decide our own future.[8]

Thus federation was presented as the only viable path to the unity of Sudan, and self-determination for the south by itself was raised as the only acceptable alternative to federation.

The southern leaders, who now emerged into prominence as organizers of the Liberal Party and promoters of the new idea of federalism, were Benjamin Lwoki (president of the Liberal Party), Abdel Rahman Sule (chairman of the Juba branch), Buth Diu (in the House of Representatives), and the Senators Paulo Logali Wani

7 Rumbek Emergency Committee to the Governor General of Sudan, 25 November 1952, NA FO 371/102737, no. 28.

8 Abdel Rahman Sule, letter to the Governor General, 20 May 1954, NA FO 371/108324, no. 127.

(from Equatoria) and Stanislaus Paysama (from Bahr al-Ghazal). They were the ones who organized the first ever pan-southern conference, held in the Juba Cinema (now an Episcopal Church) in October 1954, which debated the south's future in Sudan.

Some 250 delegates from all three southern provinces attended, including chiefs from the rural areas, representatives from the southern diaspora in Khartoum, and seven southern members of the ruling NUP. Deliberations were conducted in English but translated into five other languages: Bari, Zande, Lotuko, Dinka, and Arabic. The conference debated two main questions: the political future of the Sudan as a whole, and the political future of the south, with the intention of southerners arriving at a common position on these two issues prior to the elections that were to decide them. It was at this conference that the idea of federalism was publicly debated by a southern-wide body for the first time.[9]

The conference very quickly came out in favour of the independence of Sudan and against union with Egypt. It then went on to debate the form of government southerners would support in an independent Sudan. Attillion Attor, a Shilluk from Upper Nile Province, was the first to speak in favour of federation. He was supported by Yona Lumanga, a teacher from Yei. But not everyone was convinced: Awad Somit, from Juba, opposed federation and spoke in favour of the NUP government; Necodemo Gore, also from Juba, objected to any discussion of the future of the country in general, as there were no northern Sudanese representatives present.

Senator Stanislaus Paysama, the vice-president of the Liberal Party, was chosen to explain the meaning of federation. He mentioned different types of federations adopted by different countries. His explanation had to be translated into all the languages of the conference and took two-and-a-quarter hours. 'By then,' the conference minutes concluded, 'the house was well informed with the meaning of Federation.'

A 'hot debate' then followed. Necodemo Gore raised the pertinent question, 'In case we receive Federation where shall we get our people to run it? How shall we Finance it?' Buth Diu responded with passion:

9 All quotations are from 'Minutes of Juba conference 18-21 October 1954', NA FO 371/108326, no. 193; the spelling and punctuation of the original document have been retained.

> May I draw your attention gentlemen, chiefs, of all tribes, elders, Citizens present in this house, I should like to know whether you in this house want to be SLAVES or it will be better for you to be poor and Free and happy? I should like to know whether you understand the meaning of 'FEDERATION' as explained to you. Federation does not mean SEPARATION but internal Law and order in the united Sudan, for you to be able to look after your own affairs. … My honourable gentleman NECODEMO GORE brought the question of management and finance of the Federation now under debate by Southerners. … With regard to the first part of your question the present Government must be bound to manage the federation of South for fear of Separation, if they cannot we can manage to separate the country. This I am quite sure the Present Regime has in mind. To conclude my dearest friend Mr. NECODEMO GORE we are here for Freedom and not money.

Chief Abdalla of Torit-Katire in Equatoria Province then broadened the debate about federation to include peoples from northern provinces—the Fur of Darfur, Fung of Blue Nile, and Nuba of Kordofan. He declared (original spelling), 'I and my people Strongly request Federation to safe my fellow Blacks in the North.' This call was repeated by Musa Beshir, a non-tribal delegate from Khartoum, who announced:

> I am deligate of 25,000 Southerners in the North this includes Nuba, Fur and Fung who carry the same idea of Federation. In this respect I am not representing tribe but I would prefer to say colour since the three communities referred to again and again. There are backward arears in the North far too Backward than the Southern Sudan. Therefore I am speaking here for the Blacks who favoured your demands for Federation. Federation must go ahead to meet our demands in all our backward arears namely Fur, Fung and Nuba Mountains.

A vote was then taken and federation was passed by 227 to 0, with seven abstentions from the NUP delegates.

The decision of the conference was conveyed to the foreign ministers of Britain and Egypt, the British governor-general of Sudan, and Sudan's prime minister, Ismail al-Azhari, in a letter signed by Benjamin Lwoki, in which he declared that the only alternatives facing Sudan were:

> (1) Either Authonomy in the South and Authonomy in the North under Federation, or if that is not acceptable to the Northerners.
> (2) A devided Sudan each ruling itself independent of each other. ... As the South went into Parliament on [its] own will so it can choose to walk out of [it] …We must determine to the future of the South in the way we think suits us or our aims.[10]

There seems to have been no reply from any of the recipients of Benjamin Lwoki's letter.

There are important points to highlight about the 1954 conference. First, federalism was presented as a way to maintain a united Sudan. Second, support for federalism was voiced by delegates from all three provinces, as well as from the diaspora living in the north. Third, southern Sudanese looked beyond their own borders and embraced the other marginalized areas of Sudan—Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur—in their call for federalism. Fourth, while forms of federalism might have been discussed there was no explicit proposal of what form a federal Sudan might take, and what balance of powers between the federal government and the federated states should be achieved. Federalism might have been an ideal, but at this point it remained only an idea without a blueprint. And finally, self-determination leading to independence was presented as a failsafe alternative for southern Sudanese should they fail in their primary goal of achieving federation for all of Sudan.

Both Britain and Egypt were committed to a lengthy process of self-determination for Sudan, but once the NUP formed the first Sudanese government and removed the threat of Sudan becoming independent under the rival Umma Party, they suddenly changed

10 Benjamin Lwoki to Foreign Secretary, et. al, 15 November 1954, NA FO 371/108326, no. 193, (ed.), published in Johnson, Douglas H. 1998, document 369, pp. 384-5, and in Wawa 2005 document 25, pp. 137.

their policy from union with Egypt to full independence. The August 1955 mutiny of southern soldiers and police in Torit and other towns of the south convinced the British government that the sooner it was released from its residual responsibility for Sudan the better, and Sudan's prime minister, Ismail el-Azhari, was advised that if parliament declared independence, Britain would recognize it, even though parliament had no mandate to make such a decision.[11]

Southern members of parliament at first opposed this move as premature if it were to be made before a constitution for the new country could be agreed. As Britain was reluctant to recognize Sudanese independence without the full support of the south, for a while it looked as if southern opposition could halt the momentum towards independence. In the end, the southern legislators agreed to vote for independence on the basis of a vague undertaking that parliament would 'consider' federalism in the future.[12]

True to its word, parliament did consider the federal option in 1957—and rejected it. Northern Sudanese of all political hues equated federation with secession, rather than as a way to maintain national unity.[13] Advocacy of even moderate federal demands by southerners was considered tantamount to subversion and was treated as such. In this context, the formation of a Federal Party with Ezboni Mundiri as president and Darius Bashir as secretary general, was a significant advance in clothing the idea of a federal Sudan with specific proposals.

The Federal Party studied models of federation from around the world and proposed a constitutional structure similar to that of the United States, with the legislative bodies of the federal government replicated in the northern and southern federal states. Whereas earlier demands for federalism had been vague about structures, the Federal Party emphasized the important point that accepting the federal principle meant creating 'states on the one hand and a Central Government on the other', and justified the creation of two federal states on the grounds of racial and territorial differences between the 'North' and the 'South'.[14] The party's four-page outline of a draft constitution defined the powers of the president, the judiciary, the federal parliament, the state parliaments, and where

11 W. H. Luce, letter to T. E. Bromley giving reasons why self-determination should be speeded up in order to help the Sudanese resolve the North-South divide, 1 December 1955, NA FO 371/113585, no. 104, published in Johnson, Douglas H. 1998, document 435, pp. 497-9.

12 Benjamin Lwoki, President of the Liberal Party, telegram to Mr. Macmillan, 31 October 1955, NA FO 371/113619, no. 239; W.H. Luce, inward telegram no. 429 to FO, 18 December 1955, NA FO 371/113625 no. 386.

13 Mohamed Omer Bashir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London: C. Hurst, 1968).

14 E.M. Gwonza, 'Conclusion, Reasons for Adopting U.S. Constitution', NASS EP SCR 10.B.33.

federal and state parliaments would hold separate or concurrent powers.[15]

Between them, the Liberal and the Federal parties returned a large pro-federal bloc of southerners to the Constituent Assembly in 1958. Prominent federalists came from all three provinces and included Senators Stanislaus Paysama and Paulo Logali (the father of Hilary Paul Logali), and Representatives Joseph Oduho, Buth Diu, and Fr. Saturnino Lohure (a Roman Catholic priest). Outside of parliament, southern politicians made approaches to other regions, including Darfur and the East, which began to take an interest in a federal constitution. This was one of the factors that precipitated an army coup to prevent the country from 'falling apart', the end to the first parliamentary period, and the first military government under General Ibrahim Abboud.

In this first period of political discussion, the federal idea evolved from a theoretical ideal to a more practical blueprint of the structure of government. Southern Sudanese legislators adopted federalism as a result of legislative disappointments, such as when the northern majority voted down proposals that southerners regarded as essential to safeguard their interests. Federation was originally presented as the only constitutional arrangement that would guarantee a united Sudan. At an early stage, southerners sought political allies in the quest for a federal constitution from other Sudanese peoples in marginal areas who shared their concerns. Throughout this period, federation within a united Sudan remained southern leaders' primary goal, and self-determination was only secondary.

15 E.M. Gwonza, 'Federation for the Republic of the Sudan', NASS EP SCR 10.B.33.

Exile, self-determination, and the revival of federalism

The Abboud regime put an end to parliamentary politics and any public discussion of federalism as a constitutional solution for Sudan. This drove several southern leaders into exile to organize armed opposition to Khartoum. With the outbreak of civil war in the southern Sudan in the early 1960s, the idea of federation was driven underground, and some southerners now opted for the idea of total independence. Fr. Saturnino Lohure and Joseph Oduho, both staunch federalists in parliament, formed the exile Sudan African National Union (SANU), whose stated goal was self-determination, a code word for independence.

The downfall of the military government in 1964 led to a renewal of open party politics and a commitment to a public forum on the southern Sudan at a round table conference convened early in 1965. A new party, the Southern Front, identified itself with African nationalism and proclaimed as its goal freedom from Arab domination, though it left the ultimate form of that freedom undefined. Despite SANU originally standing for self-determination, the first public statements by its leader, William Deng, favoured nothing stronger than federation. There appeared little difference between the policies of SANU and the Southern Front.[16]

Differences emerged at the Round Table Conference (its official title) convened in Khartoum in March 1965, with Aggrey Jaden, William Deng's deputy, returning to the principle of self-determination as the only means of solving the 'Southern Problem', and equating self-determination with independence. The William Deng faction of SANU declared that complete unity of Sudan was out of the question, and the country could either '1) voluntarily break up into two or 2) federate.' The other southern parties (including the old Liberals) did not go so far as to advocate separation, but proposed federation or regional autonomy in a variety of forms. In the end, William Deng's SANU and the Southern Front proposed a joint programme that went beyond the original provisions of

16 Southern Front, 'Constitution of the Southern Front', 1964, NASS EP 10.A.1; SANU, letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Sir el Khatim Khalifa, November 1964, published in Bashir 1968, Appendix 10, pp. 154-8; William Deng, letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, January 1965 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa); Southern Front, 'A Memorandum of the Southern Front to the Council of Ministers', 9 December 1964; Southern Front, letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, concerning the killing of the Southern Sudanese in the South by the security forces, published in Wawa 2005, documents 37 & 38, pp. 193-203.

federation, towards something more resembling confederation, with the northern and southern Sudans each having control of their own finances, foreign affairs, and armed forces.[17]

The outcome of the Round Table Conference was to be a disappointment to most southerners. SANU split between the William Deng ('Inside') and Aggrey Jaden ('Outside') factions as William Deng remained in the country and Jaden returned to exile and the guerrilla movement. Southern parties participated in the Twelve Man Commission, which had been set up to follow through on the Round Table proposals. The old Liberal Party re-emerged as an advocate of regional autonomy, something less than full federalism. The Southern Front now adopted the principle of self-determination (in its real meaning) as a process, and was keen to set out the details of each of the options now being proposed—independence, federation, regional autonomy, and local government—for southern Sudanese to choose from.[18]

SANU and the Southern Front again formed an alliance in the constitutional committee following the 1968 elections and sought to build a parliamentary alliance with other smaller regional parties. Together, the two parties opposed those articles in the draft constitution that denied regional diversity and imposed Islam and Arabic as the state religion and language. They withdrew their delegations when the northern majority voted down their amendments, precipitating a constitutional crisis that eventually resulted in the military once again overthrowing the parliamentary government.

17 Aggrey Jaden, 'The Problem of the Southern Sudan', 16 March 1965; SANU, 'Memorandum on the future of the Southern Sudan', 16 March, 1965, published in *Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan*, Khartoum March 16-25, 1965 ('Sudan Informazioni' News Agency Documents, 1965), pp. 148-53; The Liberal Party, 'Proposal for the Government of the Southern Region', 18 March 1965, NRO South 1/144/308; Southern Front, 'Programme for the Southern Front', 18 March 1965, published in Wawa 2005; SANU and Southern Front, 'Joint proposals by SANU and Southern Front for the implementation in the Southern Sudan', 24 March 1965, published in *Round-Table Conference 1965*, pp. 209-11, and in Beshir 1968, Appendix 18, pp. 180-2.

18 Hilary Nyigilo Paul Logali, 'Press release following the unilateral amendment of the constitution by northern political parties', 10 July 1965, published in Wawa 2005, document 42, pp. 212-16; Liberal Party, 'Proposal for the Government of the Southern Region of Sudan', 10 August 1965, NRO South 1/44; Southern Front, 'Press release concerning the Southern Sudanese exclusion at the celebrations marking the first anniversary of the October Revolution', 12 October 1965 (unpublished documents collected by Yosa Wawa).

1969–1983: The Nimeiri period

A second round of military government, beginning on 25 May 1969, brought with it an acceptance of the principle of regional autonomy for the south. The Nile Provisional Government (NPG)—one of the main exile groups with a presence in areas of the south not held by the government—rejected regional autonomy as soon as it was proposed in June 1969. The subsequent strength of the guerrilla movement and sudden internal weakening of the military government, however, finally made negotiations possible. By this time, there was a strong southern desire for a mediated solution.

Not all southern Sudanese were happy with this turn of events. The NPG had been displaced by Joseph Lagu's South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), their leaders living in political exile in Kinshasa. In a meeting between envoys of the SSLM and the 'Kinshasa group', the exiles objected to the precondition stipulated by Khartoum that negotiations would proceed on the basis of a united Sudan. The SSLM had a completely different understanding of 'regional autonomy' from what the government was proposing, and were confident that they were sure to get federation out of the negotiations.[19] The SSLM assumed that 'autonomy' meant federation, and their delegation, led by the veteran pro-federalist, Ezboni Mundiri, came to Addis Ababa armed with a proposal for a full federal structure.[20]

The first major disagreement between the two sides was over the very use of the term 'federal' to describe the role of the future central government. Khartoum's delegation argued that the People's Local Government Act of 1971 provided all the decentralization needed for the proposed Southern Regional Government to run effectively. Ezboni Mundiri countered, saying 'that the main question facing the conference was whether the Sudan Government delegation accepted 'Federal System' as the only way of solving the problem of the Sudan'. The SSLM delegation objected to the government's detailed restrictions on the powers of the regional government,

19 A.C. Agolong, 'Summary of the Meeting between the Representative J. Lagu, Messers: Wol Wol and Mading de Garang and the Kinshasha [sic] Group', 20 August 1971 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

20 South Sudan Liberation Movement, 'Revised (and Amended) Recommendations for a New Constitution for the Republic of the Sudan, NASS Ministry of Southern Affairs, 1.A.1.

and proposed instead that the powers of the central government should first be clearly defined and all other powers then reserved for the regions, a formula adapted from the US constitution. Their goal was to have a southern region and a northern region, with the central government autonomous from either region and not synonymous with the north. Mansour Khalid, a member of the government delegation, brought all discussion of federalism to an end, however, when he declared 'they could not impose Regionalism on the North when they had not asked for it.'[21]

The SSLM was offered, and finally accepted, something that might be termed 'Federation Lite' in what became the Southern Regional Government. The Addis Ababa Agreement was accepted by both the Sudan government of Nimeiri and the SSLM of Lagu in 1972. Self-determination as a process was abandoned, and the agreement was never subject to popular ratification; rather, it was retroactively incorporated into the 1973 Permanent Constitution. This was to be the agreement's undoing, for the constitution allotted powers to the president that he eventually used to override and then abolish the Southern Region.

The internal politics of the Southern Region during the period of the Addis Ababa peace (1972–1983) was seriously divided between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (those who had remained inside the political system in Sudan during the war and those who had gone to the bush or into exile); between the former Southern Front and SANU parties; and between 'Nilotics' of Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces and 'Equatorians' of the southernmost province. Nimeiri took advantage of these divisions to periodically dissolve the regional government, require new elections, and form new governments, something that would not have been possible in a true federal system that had limited the power of the federal government to intervene in the internal affairs of the states.

Nationally Nimeiri followed a policy of 'decentralization'. In 1976, he divided all of Sudan's provinces into two. Regionalism was then introduced in the north in 1980, when the old northern provinces were reassembled as regions. The powers of these northern regional governments were considerably less than the powers conferred

21 Minutes of Conference on the Southern Sudan held in Addis Ababa between Sudan Government and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, 1972, pp. 8-15.

on the Southern Region by the Addis Ababa Agreement. Retired general, Joseph Lagu, and his mainly Equatorian supporters used the regionalization of the north to propose a further regionalization of the south in a process colloquially known by its proponents as 'Kokora', the Bari word for 'divide' or 'division', and by its opponents as 'Re-division'.

The re-division debate was generated by political power struggles in the Southern Region and the perception by many in the two Equatoria provinces that they were being excluded from power by the numerically larger Nilotic Dinka and Nuer peoples. This proposal to abolish the Southern Region—and replace it with three smaller regions of the restored Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr al-Ghazal provinces—gained considerable support among northern Sudanese who had always considered regional autonomy a threat to national unity. It was hotly contested by the majority of southern Sudanese,[22] but Nimeiri favoured the minority position and abolished the Southern Region by presidential decree in June 1983.

In practice, 'Kokora' meant the expulsion of non-Equatorians from government and civil service positions in the regional capital of Juba and elsewhere, and their reposting to their home regions. There had been no discussion among the proponents of 'Kokora' about retaining a pan-regional superstructure through which southerners could coordinate and protect their common interests. If Equatorians had hoped that their new region would assume all the powers of the old Southern Regional government, they were soon disappointed, as all three southern regions were put on par with the much weaker northern regions. If the Southern Region had been a form of 'Federalism Lite', the three new southern regions were 'Federalism even Liter'.

22 African Nationalist Front, 'Memorandum on redivision of the Southern Sudan into three regions by the African Nationalists' Front', and Solidarity Committee of the Southern Members of the 4th People's National Assembly, 'Document rejecting the division of the Southern Region into three regions', 1982, published in Wawa 2005 as documents 62 & 63, pp. 268-316.

The second civil war, and the positions of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA)

As in the first war, the renewal of civil war in 1983 changed the direction of the political debate among southerners and between southerners and northerners away from a focus on government structures for southern Sudan only and towards the reform of government for the whole of Sudan. The SPLM/SPLA became the main opposition force actively fighting the government. Its manifesto was broadly Marxist in tone, but its analysis of the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was rooted in debates that pre-dated 1972. Its offer of a structural analysis of the Southern Region's weaknesses; its repudiation of a 'Southern Problem' to be considered in isolation of the rest of the country; its replacement with what it termed the 'nationalities' problem; and its proposal for a restructured, united Sudan, reached back to the early days of a federalist alliance between southern and regionalist parties in the 1958 and 1968 parliaments. The SPLM/SPLA manifesto was silent, however, on what form of government a restructured, united Sudan might adopt. In direct negotiations with various northern political groups between 1986 and 1988, the SPLM/SPLA showed how far the debate had moved on since the Round Table Conference in 1965, redirecting it from proposed constitutional arrangements for the south alone to a broader debate about power in the country. Gone were calls for either federation or self-determination; they were replaced by a consistent demand for a National Constitutional Convention.[23]

23 Sudan People's Liberation Movement, *Manifesto* (31 July 1983).

With the overthrow of Nimeiri in April 1985, new, internal, southern Sudanese parties emerged, many with broad, national-sounding titles that in reality represented only provincial or even smaller constituencies. Southern political leaders disagreed about their objectives. The most common proposal was a return to the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resurrection of a single Southern Region as a means by which southerners themselves could resolve their differences. The SPLM/SPLA, though, maintained its position that a return to the pre-1983 constitutional structures was

out of the question. In their analysis, the Addis Ababa Agreement had failed to address the fundamental inequalities in the country, leaving the Southern Region vulnerable to manipulation from the centre. As an agreement, its demise was proof of its weakness.[24]

Throughout the period of Sadiq al-Mahdi's government (1986-1989), more and more southern Sudanese leaders began to publicly agree with the SPLM/SPLA's analysis, whatever doubts they had about the SPLA and its leader, John Garang. They began to speak in terms of a 'nationalities question', 'the ruling clique', and 'uneven development' throughout the Sudan. They also made a direct reference to the south's first demand for federation in 1954 and its frustration as one of the causes of continued civil war.[25]

By the beginning of 1989, there was a broad agreement between parties within Sudan that negotiations with the SPLM/SPLA should lead to a broad-based National Constitutional Conference, and it was to halt this that the National Islamic Front (NIF) coup of 30 June 1989 overthrew Sadiq al-Mahdi's coalition government and ended negotiations.

In the twenty year period between 1969 and 1989, the idea of federalism had been effectively replaced nationally by policies of 'decentralization' and 'regionalization', where the central government retained its power in part by devolving its responsibility for providing services to the regions who, nevertheless, were denied the resources to bear the burden of that responsibility.

24 Samuel Aru Bol, 'The Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) Stands for Respect for and Application of the Provisions of the Sudan Transitional Constitution, Article 16(2) and the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972 regarding the Establishment of Reasonable Regional Government in the Southern Sudan', 15 December 1986 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

25 African Parties, 'Position Paper by the African Parties, concerning war and peace in the Sudan', 26 September 1987 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

1989–2005: Federation under the NIF

The NIF/military regime of Omar al-Bashir adopted the language of federalism to describe its own policy of decentralization. In the south, this was part of a strategy to isolate the SPLM/SPLA and manufacture an internal peace. The SPLM/SPLA had also wavered in its commitment to national restructuring and began to place more emphasis on self-determination as a solution.

Within the government-held areas of Sudan, southerners explored what sort of peace was possible in the context of the new political developments at the centre. Peter Cirillo, an ex-Anyanya soldier, a former governor of Equatoria, and a one-time energetic foe of the SPLA, addressed the September 1989 National Conference on Peace, convened by the new government in place of the proposed National Constitutional Conference. He showed surprising sympathy for the SPLM's analysis of the causes of war, though his preferred solution—a federalism that fell short of reconstituting the former Southern Region—showed that he was still committed to the old regional politics. Other Equatorian leaders also adopted the language of 'nationalities' popularized by the SPLA; they argued for federalism as the logical extension of decentralization, also urging that the current consultation exercises should be no substitute for the aborted constitutional conference. But they, too, began to urge separation in the absence of any agreement over federalism with the north.[26]

Internal dissent within the SPLM/SPLA eventually led to a split. Ostensibly aimed at resolving the SPLM/SPLA internal contradictions, the breakaway movement of the Nasir commanders was founded on its own contradictions. Its declared objective was for the independence of the southern Sudan, but at its very inception it received military and political support from Khartoum—the very government from which it wanted to secede.[27] The SPLM/SPLA had already been preparing a new position on self-determination,

26 Peter Cirillo, 'A Critical Analysis of the Problems of the Sudan and the Prospects for Permanent Peace', 21 September 1989, published in Wawa 2005, document 73, pp. 399-406; Elders, Religious Leaders and Intellectuals of Equatoria Region, 'Position Paper on Peace in Sudan', September 1989; Chiefs of Equatoria Region, 'Speech by the Chiefs of Equatoria Region to the Visiting Political Committee from Khartoum to Juba', 11 September 1990 (unpublished documnt published by Yosa Wawa).

27 Peter Adwok Nyaba, *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An insider's view* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997), pp. 84, 89-90.

signaling a major shift of position, and in September 1991 declared its priority of options:

> the position of the SPLM/SPLA on the system of Government shall be based on resolving the war through a united secular democratic Sudan, confederation, association of sovereign states or self-determination.[28]

The two factions of the SPLA remained bitterly hostile to each other on the battlefield, but outside Sudan attempted to reconcile their positions. At meetings in the Nigerian capital Abuja in 1992, and Washington DC in 1993, the two sides found a formula of words that tried to merge a national commitment with a more narrowly defined political solution for southern Sudan, and proclaimed support for self-determination not just for the South, but for Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile as well, all outside the administrative boundaries of the southern provinces but territories where the SPLA was also active.[29]

With self-determination now the primary goal, federalism dropped out of the equation. Neither faction mentioned what form an interim government would take should peace be agreed with Khartoum or should south Sudan achieve independence. At the 1992 Abuja talks between the two factions, the SPLM/SPLA delegation was explicitly sceptical of the different terms then being discussed between the Nasir faction and Khartoum. Reading from the text prepared for him by other members of the delegation, William Nyuon Bany (then still a member of the mainstream SPLM/SPLA and the delegation's leader), declared:

> In the Sudan serious words like "federalism", "participatory democracy", "grassroots democracy", "people's congresses" are thrown about here and there without any concrete content. They have become alibi for dictatorship. No system is federal merely because it claims to be federal. No system is federal merely because the word "democratic" has been tagged on to its name as one of its descriptive adjectives.[30]

28 The SPLM/SPLA Torit Resolutions, 1991, John Garang, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Mansour Khalid (ed.) (London & NY: Kegan Paul International, 1992), Appendix 2, p. 284.

29 SPLM/SPLA 'Joint Abuja Delegation declaration', 1 June 1992; Text of Washington Declaration, SPLM/SPLA Update 2/41, 24 October 1993, p. 2.

30 William Nyuon Bany, 'Opening address to the Abuja peace talks', 26 May 1992 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

In the meantime, the government in Khartoum went ahead introducing its own form of federalism throughout Sudan. In 1994, a federal constitution created 23 new federal states, including ten in the South. These last were largely theoretical because government forces did not control most of the territory in the proclaimed states. The process of creating states in the south was also somewhat arbitrary in that originally nine states had been agreed until the southern governor of Bahr al-Ghazal Region insisted that his home area be made a state too; thus Warrap state was carved out of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state for no other reason than that one of the government's most important southern allies wanted it that way.

From this point on there were two separate strands of negotiation that eventually converged to produce the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), with all its own contradictions. The SPLM/SPLA negotiated with Khartoum through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and separately with the northern opposition parties, a series of agreements that combined the principle of a secular state for Sudan with the right of self-determination through a referendum for the south. The government in Khartoum negotiated a series of agreements with its southern allies, appearing to grant them the right to determine their constitutional future at some undetermined date and eventually creating a Coordinating Council for southern Sudan's federal states in place of a single regional government. By 1999, however, it was clear from the implementation of these agreements that the Khartoum government's version of federalism was highly centralized and the Coordinating Council had little real authority.

There were two main points of disagreement between many exiled southern Sudanese and the SPLM/SPLA's leader, John Garang. The first was over the options to be voted on in self-determination; Garang wanted to define them in advance of a ceasefire and interim arrangements. He put forward three options of regional, federal, and confederal governments. Other political figures, such as Bona Malwal, suggested that the interim arrangements should be the alternative to independence, and that southerners would be asked to decide whether they would remain in the Sudan according to the

way the government of the day in Khartoum was administering at the time of the referendum. The second point of disagreement was over who would be given the right of self-determination. Garang appeared to insist on including the peoples of the Nuba Mountains, southern Blue Nile, and elsewhere in the exercise of this right, at the same time as the south. Bona Malwal again articulated the opposition to this and insisted that a resolution for southern Sudanese should not be delayed by attempts to accommodate the other marginalized areas. Lam Akol, one of the former Nasir coup leaders who continued to lead his own movement based in the southern Shilluk territory, was quoted as dismissing the inclusion of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile in southern self-determination as 'preposterous paternalism'.[31]

This was the context in which the IGAD peace negotiations re-started in earnest in 2002. The outcome of those negotiations was that Khartoum's 'decentralized' federal system was retained as the formula for a united Sudan, rather than a more robust federal structure for the whole nation. Self-determination was narrowed to include southern Sudanese peoples only, and the peoples of the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile were effectively abandoned, leaving an unstable situation along most of southern Sudan's northern border.

31 Lam Akol, *SPLM/SPLA (U) Mid-West Upper Nile Press Statement*, 7 September 1994, quoted in Sudan Update 5/19, 10 November 1994, p. 2.

2011 and after

In principle, southern Sudanese rejected Khartoum's version of federation when they voted for independence. In practice, they inherited Khartoum's division of the south into ten states, with Juba replacing Khartoum as the central power: in other words, they inherited 'decentralization' rather than federation. Debates over the balance of powers between the central and state governments began with the drafting of the transitional constitution. Substantive calls for a federal system were made as early as 2011.[32]

The debate over federalism in an independent South Sudan is now complicated by the fact that the armed opposition in the current political crisis precipitated by fighting in December 2013 has adopted 'federalism' as a political platform, while the government equates talk of federalism with subversion and disloyalty. But if we are to learn anything from the past history of southern Sudanese political thought, it is that federalism means many things. As the SPLM/SPLA warned at Abuja in 1992, 'no system is federal merely because it claims to be federal'; the same term has been used to describe what are, in practice, highly centralized systems of government, as well as more radical projects of devolution that remain untried. Until there is a full and open discussion of the issue there will be no common understanding of what federalism might mean for South Sudan, and once understood, whether the majority of South Sudanese will want to adopt it.

The most open public debate about federalism today has been conducted on the World Wide Web. It has been dominated by the diaspora, mostly without specifics, falling back instead on dictionary definitions or text book outlines.[33] Some advocates use the same argument for a federal system in South Sudan that earlier advocates used for federalism in Sudan: that it will promote unity, good governance, and development. Others advocate federalism for more parochial reasons, seeing federalism mainly as a means for removing persons of other states from their own.

32 'Equatoria Conference 2011 Resolutions', 29 May 2011.

33 The most detailed general outline can be found in Sindani Sebit's multi-part posting, 'Proposed Federal System for Future South Sudan: let's serialize it', accessible on the South Sudan News Agency (www.southsudannewsagency.com) and Gurtong (www.gurtong.net) websites. The South Sudanese Professionals in Diaspora group have discussed the principles of federalism with specific reference to South Sudan in their *Negotiating Peace through Federalism: a proposal for good governance in post-conflict South Sudan* (2014), p. 10.

In Juba, there are some who now advocate a return to Kokora as the federal solution. A recent writer claims that the word is misunderstood and misrepresented.[34] If that is so, it is not only because of the way some in the three Equatoria states are reviving anti-Dinka (or anti-*Jieng*) propaganda in support of federalism,[35] but because of the tribalist way the advocates of Kokora applied it at the beginning of the last civil war. Those of us who lived through Kokora—and were abruptly and brusquely told to leave our jobs and go back to our home regions—have every reason to be suspicious of the advocates of the new Kokora, especially after reading the comment sections on articles posted on such websites as the *South Sudan News Agency* and *Sudan Tribune*. Let us be clear: Kokora is not the same as federalism. It did not create a federal state in Equatoria or any place else in southern Sudan. It weakened the powers of the regions while leaving the power of the central government in Khartoum untouched, enhanced even. Those who want genuine federalism are best advised not to adopt Kokora as their model.

Currently the term 'Ethnic Federalism' has become a popular slogan, appearing to offer each community control of its own resources and affairs. Ethiopia is frequently presented as a model for ethnic federalism, yet Ethiopian federalism in practice also has been described as a means by which the ruling party has divided the opposition along ethnic lines, making it difficult for a united opposition to arise and challenge its power. The problem with Ethiopian federalism is not that it is insufficiently ethnic, but that it is insufficiently federal, and it is possible that its emphasis on ethnicity is the source of that weakness.[36] Current proponents of ethnic federalism in South Sudan have proposed a number of federal states irrespective of current demography or economic viability. The SPLM-in-Opposition's recent proposal of making 21 states along the 1956 boundaries of the South's districts[37] threatens to take the Ethiopian example to the extreme, creating weak states unable to challenge or restrain whoever holds power in the federal government.

The focus of many South Sudanese has been on the creation of the federal states, rather than on the balance between federal and state governments. It would be well to remember the point the Federal Party made back in 1957: that accepting the principle of federalism

34 Jacob K. Lupai, 'Kokora: often misunderstood, grossly misinterpreted and most feared', South Sudan News Agency, 28 January 2013.

35 See Dr Peter Kopling, MD's mistitled 'Peaceful Coexistence: how the Equatorians got it right!', 29 June 2014.

means creating *both* a central government *and* state governments at the same time. It does not mean creating state governments alone. There will be a central government, however its powers are defined. It will have a presence wherever its capital is finally located, and it will also have a presence through various federal agencies in every state. The creation of a federal government goes hand in hand with the creation of federal states. The failure of past regional experiments in Sudan was that this principle was not adopted: the construction of decentralized states and regions was done primarily to protect the powers of those in charge of the central government.

But is federalism alone a sufficient solution to South Sudan's political crisis? One sceptic has drawn attention to the difference between a political system and a system of governance, warning 'federalism cannot solve the country's problem because it is a system of governance and not a political system. In other words, federalism will only thrive under a hospitable political system which appreciates its benefits and promotes its development.'[38] Or, as another South Sudanese later commented to me by email after this lecture, in July 2014, 'with this mixed perception of federalism South Sudanese have, do they consider which would be easier; to remove one big tyrant or several petty tyrants?'

The idea of self-determination for the South was originally twinned with federalism as an option open to southern Sudanese if a federal system for the whole of Sudan were to be rejected. The suppression of an open debate on federalism by a succession of Khartoum governments and their rejection of a true federal system helped to elevate self-determination to be the primary goal of South Sudanese. Federalism has once again emerged as central to the discussion of how South Sudanese wish to govern themselves and live together now that they have achieved their independence. Self-determination means more than choosing independence. It also means choosing a form of self-government, and that choice has still to be made.

36 David Turton (ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: the Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective* (Oxford/Athens OH/Addis Ababa: James Currey/Ohio University Press/Addis Ababa University Press, 2006).

37 'SPLM in Opposition Proposes 21 States with Ramciel as National Capital', 17 July 2014.

38 Jack Lino Wuor Abeyi, 'South Sudan: federalism and the prisoner's dilemma', part one, 23 June 2014.

Glossary of words and acronyms

IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, regional association of Eastern African countries
Kokora	(Bari) division of the Southern Region into three smaller regions
NIF	National Islamic Front
NUP	National Union Party, historically pro-Egyptian sectarian political party
NPG	Nile Provisional Government, mostly exiled southern political group that rejected regional autonomy
Southern Front	South Sudanese political party identifying with African nationalism
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement, under the leadership of Joseph Lagu
SANU	Sudan African National Union, advocating self-determination
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, advocating a 'New Sudan' for the whole country
Umma Party	Sectarian political party in Sudan, rival of the NUP

Bibliography

Abeyi, Jack Lino Wuor. 'South Sudan: federalism and the prisoner's dilemma', part one, 23 June 2014. (http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/15400/Default.aspx) accessed 4 July 2014.

Adwok, Peter Nyaba. *The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997.

African Nationalist Front. 'Memorandum on redivision of the Southern Sudan into three regions by the African Nationalists' Front', 1982, published in Wawa 2005 as document 62, pp. 268-9.

African Parties. 'Position Paper by the African Parties, concerning war and peace in the Sudan', 26 September 1987 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

Akol, Lam. *SPLM/SPLA (U) Mid-West Upper Nile Press Statement*, 7 September 1994, quoted in *Sudan Update* 5/19, 10 November 1994, p. 2.

Agolong, A.C. 'Summary of the Meeting between the Representative J. Lagu, Messers: Wol Wol and Mading de Garang and the Kinshasha [sic] Group', 20 August 1971 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

Bashir, Mohamed Omer. *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict*. London: C. Hurst, 1968.

Bol, Samuel Aru. 'The Southern Sudan Political Association (SSPA) Stands for Respect for and Application of the Provisions of the Sudan Transitional Constitution, Article 16(2).

Chiefs of Equatoria Region. 'Speech by the Chiefs of Equatoria Region to the Visiting Political Committee from Khartoum to Juba', 11 September 1990 (unpublished documents collected by Yosa Wawa).

Cirillo, Peter. 'A Critical Analysis of the Problems of the Sudan and the Prospects for Permanent Peace', 21 September 1989, published in Wawa 2005, document 73, pp. 399-406.

Dellagiacoma, Fr. (ed.), *How a Slave became a Minister: autobiography of Sayyed Stanislaus Abdallahi Paysama*. Khartoum, 1990.

Deng, William. Letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, January 1965 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

Solidarity Committee of the Southern Members of the 4th People's National Assembly. 'Document rejecting the division of the Southern Region into three regions', 1982, published in Wawa 2005 as documents 63, pp. 290-316.

Elders, Religious Leaders and Intellectuals of Equatoria Region. 'Position Paper on Peace in Sudan', September 1989.

'Equatoria Conference 2011 Resolutions', 29 May 2011.

Gwonza, E.M. 'Conclusion, Reasons for Adopting U.S. Constitution', National Archive of South Sudan [NASS] EP SCR 10.B.33.

—. 'Federation for the Republic of the Sudan', NASS EP SCR 10.B.33.

Iro, Siricio, Hassan Fartak, P.A. Rehan, B. Madut Akol, Southern Staff Aweil, L. Bey & C. Mboro, government school teachers Tonj, Philibert Ucini & Patrisio Lojok Juba Police force to governor, Equatoria Province and deputy governor Bahr el-Ghazal (April-June 1947), Sudan Archive, University of Durham 519/2/1-2, 5-12, 14-19, published in Yosa Wawa, *Southern Sudanese Pursuits of Self-Determination: documents in political history*. Kisubi: Marianum Press, 2005. Documents 1-9, pp. 23-44.

Jaden, Aggrey. 'The Problem of the Southern Sudan', 16 March 1965.

Johnson, Douglas H. 'New Sudan or South Sudan? The multiple meanings of self-determination in Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement'. *Civil Wars* 15/2 (2013): 141-56.

Kopling, Dr Peter. 'Peaceful Coexistence: how the Equatorians got it right!', 29 June 2014. (http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/peaceful-coexistence-how-the-equatorians-got-it-right) accessed 30 June 2014.

Liberal Party. 'Proposal for the Government of the Southern Region', 18 March 1965, National Records Office, Khartoum [NRO] South 1/144/308.

Liberal Party. 'Proposal for the Government of the Southern Region of Sudan', 10 August 1965, NRO South 1/44.

Logali, Hilary Nyigilo Paul. 'Press release following the unilateral amendment of the constitution by northern political parties', 10 July 1965, published in Wawa 2005, document 42, pp. 212-16.

Luce, W.H. Inward telegram no. 429 to Foreign Office [FO], 18 December 1955, National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom [NA] FO 371/113625 no. 386, published in Johnson 1998, document 437, pp. 500-1.

Luce, W.H. Letter to T.E. Bromley giving reasons why self-determination should be speeded up in order to help the Sudanese resolve the North-South divide, 1 December 1955, NA FO 371/113585, no. 104, 1998, published in Johnson 1998, document 435, pp. 497-9.

Lupai, Jacob K. 'Kokora: often misunderstood, grossly misinterpreted and most feared', South Sudan News Agency, 28 January 2013. (http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/kokora-often-misunderstood-grossly-misinterpreted-and-most-feared), accessed 3 July 2014.

Lwoki, Benjamin. Letter to Foreign Secretary, et al., 15 November 1954, NA FO 371/108326, no. 193, (ed.), published in Johnson 1998, document 369, pp. 384-5, and in Wawa 2005 document 25, pp. 137.

Lwoki, Benjamin. Telegram to Mr Macmillan refusing to support a declaration of independence, 31 October 1955, NA FO 371/113619, no. 239.

Minutes of Conference on the Southern Sudan held in Addis Ababa between Sudan Government and Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, 1972.

'Minutes of Juba conference 18-21 October 1954', NA FO 371/108326, no. 193, published in Wawa 2005, document 24, pp. 115-37; the spelling and punctuation of the original document have been retained.

Nyuon, William Bany. 'Opening address to the Abuja peace talks', 26 May 1992 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa).

Robertson, J.W. *Transition in Africa: from direct rule to independence*. London: C. Hurst, 1974.

Rumbek Emergency Committee to the Governor General of Sudan, 25 November 1952, NA FO 371/102737, no. 28.

SANU. Letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Sir el Khatim Khalifa, November 1964, published in Bashir 1968, Appendix 10, pp. 154-8.

SANU. 'Memorandum on the future of the Southern Sudan', 16 March, 1965, published in *Round-Table Conference on the Southern Sudan, Khartoum March 16-25, 1965* ('Sudan Informazioni' News Agency Documents, 1965), pp. 148-53.

SANU and Southern Front. 'Joint proposals by SANU and Southern Front for the implementation in the Southern Sudan', 24 March 1965, published in *Round-Table Conference* 1965, pp. 209-11, and in Beshir 1968, Appendix 18, pp. 180-2.

Sebit, Sindani. Multi-part posting, 'Proposed Federal System for Future South Sudan: let's serialize it'. Gurtong Trust, 24 June 2014. (http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/15377/Proposed-Federal-System-For-Future-South-Sudan-Lets-Serialize-It.aspx) accessed 25 July 2014.

Southern Front. 'A Memorandum of the Southern Front to the Council of Ministers', 9 December 1964.

Southern Front. 'Constitution of the Southern Front', 1964, NASS EP 10.A.1.

Southern Front. Letter to the Prime Minister of the Sudan, concerning the killing of the Southern Sudanese in the South by the security forces, published in Wawa 2005, documents 37 & 38, pp. 193-203.

Southern Front. 'Press release concerning the Southern Sudanese exclusion at the celebrations marking the first anniversary of the October Revolution', 12 October 1965 (unpublished documents collected by Yosa Wawa).

Southern Front. 'Programme for the Southern Front', 18 March 1965, published in Wawa 2005, documents 39 & 40, pp. 203-10.

Southern Provinces Self-Government Act, 1972 regarding the Establishment of Reasonable Regional Government in the Southern Sudan', 15 December 1986 (unpublished document collected by Yosa Wawa)

South Sudan Liberation Movement. 'Revised (and Amended) Recommendations for a New Constitution for the Republic of the Sudan (Based on a Federation of two Regions)', NASS Ministry of Southern Affairs, 1.A.1.

South Sudanese Professionals in Diaspora. *Negotiating Peace through Federalism: a proposal for good governance in post-conflict South Sudan*. 2014.

'SPLM in Opposition Proposes 21 States with Ramciel as National Capital', 17 July 2014. (http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/15464/SPLM-In-Opposition-Proposes-21-States-With-Ramciel-As-National-Capital.aspx) accessed 17 July 2014.

SPLM/SPLA. 'Joint Abuja Delegation declaration', 1 June 1992.

SPLM/SPLA. 'Press Statement on the Causes and Continuation of War in the Sudan after the overthrow of Dictator Nimeiri', 13 January 1987, published in Wawa 2005, document 70, pp. 351-5.

SPLM/SPLA. 'Text of Washington Declaration', *SPLM/SPLA Update* 2/41, 24 October 1993.

SPLM/SPLA. Torit Resolutions, 1991, published in John Garang, *The Call for Democracy in Sudan*, Mansour Khalid (ed.) London & NY: Kegan Paul International, 1992.

Sudan People's Liberation Movement. *Manifesto*. 31 July 1983.

Sule, Abdel Rahman. Letter to the Governor General, 20 May 1954, NA FO 371/108324, no. 127.

Turton, David (ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: the Ethiopian experience in comparative perspective*. Oxford/Athens OH/Addis Ababa: James Currey/Ohio University Press/Addis Ababa University Press, 2006.

Recent RVI publications



Talking Peace in the Ogaden: The search for an end to conflict in the Somali Regional State in Ethiopia

Prospects for a peace agreement between the Ethiopian government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front.

A safe haven for Somalis in Uganda?

A Nairobi Forum briefing examining the emergence of the Somali migration route to Uganda and its significance in the long history of Somali migration in East Africa.



The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity

An analysis of armed mobilization, the FARDC, and efforts in demobilization and army reform. Aussi en français.



The Sudan Handbook

A guide to Sudan and South Sudan and the historical processes that shaped them, written by leading specialists and edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok.



My Mother Will Not Come to Juba: South Sudanese debate the making of the constitution

Debates at Juba University on the new constitution, examining challenges, reasons for delay, and questions of public participation in constitution-making.



Les Banyamulenge: Insurrection et exclusion dans les montagnes du Sud-Kivu

Ce rapport examine les Banyamulenge, communauté Tutsi congolaise se trouvant au coeur des multiples conflits dans l'est de la RDC. Also in English.

Le maintien de la paix sans stratégie politique: La MONUC et la MONUSCO en RDC

Ce briefing expose l'histoire de l'ONU dans l'est de la RDC et analyse les défis qui continuent de faire face à la mission. Also available in English.

Projet Usalama du RVI: conférence de Kinshasa

Ce rapport résume les meilleurs moments de la conférence sur les conclusions de la recherche du Projet Usalama documentant les groupes armés dans l'est de la RDC. Also available in English.

حينما تصير الحدود الادارية الداخلية حدوداً دوليّة

ركز النقاش الدائر حول السودَانيّن، الشمالي والجنوبي، على مسالة أين يمر خط الحدود بينهما. ويفحص التقرير موضوعاً آخر هو: الأثر المحتمل للحدود الجديدة على سكان الاراضي الحدوديّة.

When Boundaries Become Borders *is also available in English.*

RVI books and reports are free to download from **www.riftvalley.net/publications**
Print versions are available from Amazon

In South Sudan there is no system of governance so popular—yet so little understood—as the federal system. Historically the demand for federation with North Sudan was seen as the way to keep Sudan united, and the absence of such a system was held up as one of the causes of the long wars between North and South. Now federalism is proposed as a panacea for problems of governance in independent South Sudan. But is it? And is the system any better understood now than in the 1950s? Douglas Johnson's paper—first delivered in a packed lecture hall at Juba University—is required reading for those who wish to see orderly discussion on the various federal systems before we rush into something which could lead to an even bigger problem.

—Jacob J. Akol, Gurtong Trust

Federalism has once again become a central issue in political debate in South Sudan. The idea has a long pedigree in the country's political history, signifying different things at different times. In *Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought*, Douglas Johnson explains how the idea evolved in the colonial era as part of the southern search for political identity. His paper discusses attitudes towards federalism and the ways it was presented from before Sudan's independence in 1956, up to South Sudan's independence today.

www.riftvalley.net

Rift Valley Institute
Taasisi ya Bonde Kuu
معهد الاخدود العظيم
Machadka Dooxada Rift
የስምጥ ሸለቆ የጥናት ተቋም
Instituto do Vale do Rift
东非大裂谷研究院
Institut de la Vallée du Rift

Centre for Peace and Development Studies at the University of Juba

ISBN 978-1-907431-33-3