



COUNTRY OPERATIONS PLAN

Country: Kenya

Planning Year: 2004

Part I: Executive Committee Summary

(a) SUMMARY

The 2004 Country Operations Plan for Kenya is based on a total of three main camp based caseloads, Sudanese, Somalis, Ethiopians (3), the urban based refugees and thematic (8) programmes. The 2004 operational requirements stand at US\$17,792,924.

The COP as a whole has been prepared, first and foremost, according to the global instructions governing the process,¹ the strategic objectives of the Africa Bureau as set out in the Directors memorandum of 7 February 2002, and other instructions specially elaborated for the COP process in the Africa region. Secondly, the Branch Office staged, yet again, a Joint Strategic Planning Workshop during which all stakeholders together elaborated the overall strategic goals upon which the programme would be constructed. Thirdly, a detailed needs assessment took place in two cycles, the first before and the second after the JSPW, in which UNHCR and the implementing partners jointly and closely established and aggregated the refugees' problems and needs and the actions to be taken. Fourth, the principal strategic and policy outcomes of the Regional Strategic Planning Workshop held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 13 to 17 March 2003 under the auspices of the Africa Bureau have also influenced the elaboration of the COP most crucially in its strong reiteration of established minimum standards as the basis for the threshold planning. Finally, and most importantly of all, the 2004 COP for Kenya is driven, by the principal strategic goal to ensure that, across all the services sectors, there would be a major and realistic effort in addressing the abysmal plight of the refugees while, in those sectors where minimum standards have basically been met, they would be secured and sustained.

IOM/73-FOM/61/2002 of 18 December 2002, "Instructions and Guidelines to UNHCR Field and Headquarters on Reporting, Implementation and Planning 2002-2004"; the "UNHCR Global objectives and Indicators of Progress"; IOM/26-FOM/25/2002 of 15 March 2002, "Project Planning in UNHCR-Practical Guide on the use of Objectives, Outputs and Indicators", and IOM/13-FOM/13/2002 of 6 February 2003, "Parameters and Further Procedures for Submission and Review of 2004 Country Operations Plans and Headquarters".

(b) PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

Save for the new policy and operational orientations brought into play by the new Government since it entered Office at the beginning of 2003, and the expectation that the respective on-going peace processes for the Sudan and Somalia could, if successful, bring about a materially different platform for the thrust and orientation of 2004 programme, the assumptions on which the 2004 COP has been built have remained essentially the same as for the 2003 programme. While it is not unlikely that there could be an influx of refugees from Somalia because of the continuing fragility of the country and its susceptibility to cycles of strife and conflict, it is considered that the overall refugee population in Kenya will remain stable. Certainly, there will be reductions in the overall numbers through resettlement and repatriation. However, the projected resettlement caseload is a limit of some 6,000 cases whereas, unless conditions for massive repatriation to Sudan and Somalia occur, the number of refugees expected to return will remain relatively limited. On the other hand, the steady low-level flow of new arrivals from the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Great Lakes region will continue. Thus, accounting for all these adjustments, the overall planning figure, a total of 218,436 refugees, provides a for net reduction in the caseload expected to be of concern to UNHCR in Kenya in 2004.

Table 1: Planning figures

Country of Origin	2002	2003				2004			
	End 2002	Repartr.	Resett.	Influx	End 2003	Repartr.	Resett.	Influx	End 2004
Somalia	155,767	4,000	1,500	5,000	155,267	8,000	3,600		143,667
Sudan	57,779	200	1,000		56,579	100	200		56,279
Ethiopia	11,202	200	700		10,302	250	1,700		8,352
Others	8,923	500			8,473	250	500		7,723
Asylum seekers from various countries	2,415			2,415				2,415	2,415
Total	236,086	4,900	3,700	5,000	232,086	68,500	6,000	2,415	218,436

The assumption of power by the new Government has brought up the most important set of new assumptions for the Kenya refugee programme as compared with years before. Overall, the new authorities have signaled a far more positive outlook towards refugees, refugee issues, problems and policies. If the undertakings made so far come to be implemented, by the beginning of 2004, a national refugee legislation would have been adopted, bringing with it more predictability in refuge protection; a dedicated Governmental refugee management structure would be in place for the first time in a decade; and it should also be possible to start exploring more realistically prospects for self-sufficiency for refugees, ranging from initially only very limited opportunities, it must be admitted, to fairly radical re-orientations in the programme if the notion of relocating the camps becomes a reality.

Provision has been made in the COP for the immediate programming implications of the assumptions arising from the new Government's policy outlook on refugees, including the facilitation of the proposed capacity-building, and the elaboration of mechanisms for systematically registering refugees and issuing them with refugee documents. However, the more fundamental implications, such as the relocation of the camps, have not been provided for. The strategy is that, should there be agreement to relocate the camps, there would at that point be a comprehensive restructuring and reconstruction of the programme as a whole in deliberative and planned manner.

In view of this, while some crucial adjustments have been effected in the structure and characteristics of the 2004 programme as compared with that of 2003, the overall thrust will remain essentially the same in other words, essentially an asylum-oriented programme. It is assumed, in this connection, that while protection management will become more predictable, the historical problems in this field will remain a challenge throughout the year, including standards of treatment, registration, and the safety and security of women and girls, including sexual and gender-based violence. And, while it is also expected that at least several refugees will have the opportunity to compete for employment and that there will be a more flexible and better regulated system of refugee movements in and out of the camps, the policy of encampment will continue in practice, and the camps themselves will remain in their current semi-arid, marginal and congested locations. Therefore, the decisive part of the refugee caseload in Kenya will still be faced with the same precarious security conditions and severely constrained prospects for local integration and self-reliance as has been the case thus far. Dependence on international relief assistance and the struggle to meet more acceptable standards in their protection, lives and livelihood will continue to be the essential strategic and operational predicaments of the 2004 programme.

These features and characteristics would be fundamentally altered, and the strategic thrust of the programme as a whole changed, if conditions for massive voluntary repatriation to the Sudan and Somalia were to be realised. However, for purposes of the COP, the assumptions in this connection have been elaborated rather conservatively. It is true that there is hope and optimism that the ongoing peace processes for, respectively, the Sudan and Somalia, will be successfully concluded, thus making it possible for the nearly 60,000 Sudanese and 145,000 Somali refugees currently in exile in Kenya to be repatriated. However, the slow and protracted pace of the negotiations thus far, and the continuing strife in those countries themselves, have spoken in favor of caution. Moreover, even if peace was to be agreed, the realistic achievement on the ground of conditions that would allow all the refugees to return safely and in a sustainable manner within 2003 or 2004 is bound to take a long time. Thus, massive repatriation has not been programmed into the 2004 COP.

(c) **STRATEGIC GOALS AND POLICY PRIORITIES**

The main strategic and policy goals underlying the 2004 COP have, in view of what has been summarized above, not changed significantly from those applicable for the current programme, and are as follows:

- **Mandated international protection priorities will be secured, above all the protection and material needs of refugee women and children, while ensuring effective assumption by the Government of its obligations under international refugee law.**
- **Across the programme, priority will be given to ensuring that basic, life-saving and life-sustaining needs are met, in the first instance according to at least accepted minimum standards, while sustaining them in those sectors where they have been met.**
- **Subject to resource availability and an enabling legal and policy environment, self-sufficiency and enhancing the coping ability of refugees shall continue to be vigorously and purposefully pursued on both an individual and communal basis, while, at the same time, through complementarity with other programmes and agencies, giving attention to the needs of local host communities as feasible and appropriate.**
- **Facilitate the targeted repatriation of refugees, particularly Sudanese and Somalis, as opportunities occur, while facilitating resettlement in accordance with UNHCR criteria.**
- **Pursue embracing and pro-active external relations strategies across the spectrum of constituencies crucial for UNHCR programmes, including donors, the media and the public at large.**
- **Optimize management, performance and oversight of the Kenya refugee programme, with particular reference to the established operational goals and targets, and more effective partnerships, synergy, co-ordination, monitoring and reporting.**

(d) **PROJECTED 2004 OPERATIONAL BUDGET**

Table 2: Summary of 2004 project budget

PROJECT	2004 US\$	2003 US\$	Difference US\$	US\$
AB/KEN/CM/200	3,640,741	3,281,611	359,130	3,640,741
AB/KEN/CM/201	12,451,598	7,022,527	5,429,071	9,700,706
AB/KEN/CM/202	6,280,088	4,473,733	1,806,355	5,663,053
AB/KEN/CM/251	0	727,300	-727,300	0
AB/KEN/RP/300	145,500	145,500	0	145,000
AB/KEN/RP/370	2,500,000	1,303,858	1,196,142	0
AB/KEN/RE/500	450,000	343,600	106,400	450,000
Total	25,467,927	17,298,129	8,160,798	19,599,500

It has long been recognized that the Kenya programme is in fact a long-standing protracted emergency. Because of the policy and material conditions of asylum in Kenya, refugees are in effect barracked into camps in marginal and difficult locations where they have no opportunity at all to meaningfully fend for themselves, or realize any self-sufficiency and independence from international relief assistance. Even so, the nature and level of this assistance itself has over the years been woefully inadequate. The life and condition of the refugees across many of the key sectors, from food, health care, shelter and even education have thus been among the most parlous in any UNHCR programme the world over.

The 2003 COP submissions already reflected a concerted effort to bridge these poor and unacceptable standards. It made both a "Tier One" and "Two" submission, the key elements of which were to close the gap in minimum standards in some of the most crucial sectors. However, even had all the requirements been authorized, not all the needs would have been met, so critical was the situation. As it was, the full value of the "Tier One" submission was authorized together with only about 50% of those projected in the "Tier Two" request.

Clearly, by the close of 2003, some of the more acute shortfalls in minimum standards will have been addressed. Even so, a review undertaken as part of the preparation of the COP showed that there will still be severe shortfalls in both basic survival and other essential sectors. In other words, the ceiling of the 2003 programme is, notwithstanding that some of the "Tier Two" submission was approved, seriously deficient, and key elements of the chronically unmet needs will continue to be outstanding even with the full and effective implementation of the entire appropriation. This is why it proved both unavoidable and imperative that this ceiling had to be exceeded, if the job of meeting basic, acute needs was to be done more meaningfully. What has been included in the core submission for this purpose is explained below.

First, *protection and capacity building*. The submission in this sector has increased by 11% across the board as compared with the 2003 approved budget. The main reason for the increase is the need to support the Government structures in establishing the structure for the systematic management of protection and other aspects of refugee affairs which will start already in 2003 and be solidified in 2004. For the first time in a decade, the authorities would assume their critical responsibilities for refugee affairs, particularly in the field of protection. This has been an objective UNHCR has strongly pursued over the years and would resolve the situation whereby the Office currently bears responsibility for virtually every aspect of refugee management and co-ordination, including those which belong fundamentally to the State. The result is that the core protection, monitoring, advocacy and capacity-building responsibilities of the Office are correspondingly compromised. The Government itself is

going to allocate the decisive part of the resources for the establishment and functioning of the new structures. However, it is also clear that substantive financial support will be required from UNHCR, at least for the establishment of processes, procedures and functions to cater for registration of refugees and asylum-seekers, refugee status determination and issuance of identity cards and other documents. The increase also accounts for the need to reinforce UNHCR protection delivery through the recruitment of UNV protection officers and posting them in the critical operational locations throughout the country.

The COP also contains, yet again, a submission which would re-introduce *complementary food* at Dadaab for the first time in four years. The need for this item in the Dadaab programme, provided for already in Kakuma, speaks for itself. For more than three years in a row, the WFP pipeline has become seriously unstable, with the food basket routinely dropping to as low as only 1400 Kcal per refugee per day instead of the internationally set standard of 2100 Kcal. Until some four years ago, complementary food had been provided as part of the programme in Dadaab. It had however had to be sacrificed due to consecutive budget cuts. In view of the aggravation of the nutrition situation in the camp, the Office had, for the 2003 COP, sought both to reintroduce the item and to increase the allocation for Kakuma. Both requests had however not been approved. It is imperative for this item to be authorized.

Turning to *shelter*, it is widely known that this sector has consistently been among the most acute in the Kenya refugee programme, since the early nineties. Several studies of the problem have been undertaken and recommendations made by Headquarters since over five years ago, yet none of these has resulted in a surge of resources to be injected into a sector recognized to be critical. For the 2003 COP, the relevant needs and imperatives were highlighted. However, because of the restrictions imposed for the COP for that year, only a small part of the requirements could be included. Thus, whereas there were 34,000 shelters required to be repaired in Dadaab and 15,500 new ones to be constructed in Kakuma, it was possible to make provision for only 3,500 structures in Kakuma and the repair of only 1,000 in Dadaab. The achievement of these targets is well on course, in fact they are bound even to be exceeded. However, the overall unmet needs would remain and even new ones added. This is why the core submission on this item reflects an increase of 86% for Dadaab as compared with the 2003 budget. The approval of the request would allow for the construction of 7,500 new shelters there, while a request for another 7,500 is included in the secondary submission. For Kakuma, whereas a total of 15,500 shelters is the requirement, the COP includes a core submission for only 3000 units (US\$ 300,000) while US\$ 90,000 is requested only the secondary submission for another 3,000 units.

The related sector of *domestic needs* has likewise been critically unmet over several years, in fact there has been no general distribution of non-food items in the Kenya programme since 1997. With the approval of some of the money requested under Tier Two in the 2003 COP, it will be possible to address a bit more of the needs during the course of the year. In particular, plastic sheeting will be distributed in Dadaab. Moreover, close to 60% of the domestic energy requirements will be provided in Dadaab. Even so, the situation will still be that the refugees will still be receiving only 0.027 kg per person per day of firewood, especially at Kakuma, instead of the 1.5 kgs set in the international minimum standards. Soap will also continue to be distributed in Dadaab to only vulnerable refugees and in Kakuma for a total of only 8 months per year.

With regard to sanitary pads, the 2003 COP submission had been devised with the idea that to all the 55,000 women who require them, yet, because of budgetary constraints, there is provision in 2003 for distribution of the item to only a total of 20,250. For 2004, the overall figure of women requiring the materials have grown to a total of 65,000 hence an increase accordingly. With regard to water, the standards of between 15 to 20 litres per person per day have in principle been attained. However, particularly in Kakuma, actual water received is frequently below even 10 litres per person per day and the user to tap ratio is typically over 1:300 instead of the established maximum of 1:200. The budgetary increase in the submission for all these sectors would allow for the minimum standards to be addressed better.

Coming to *education*, there is an increase of 54% in the submission under this sector to allocation for 2003. The additional requirements would enable the Office to continue addressing the current gap on the ground in the established standards, for instance the teacher/student in primary school in Dadaab of 1:144 against the standard of 1:35. The same applies for the desk/student ratio, currently 1:5; the textbook to student ratio which is at 1:5; and the teacher to student ratio which is 1:58. The target is to enroll new students and decongest the schools at least to a ratio 1/50. The core amount of US\$ 1,692,651 would ensure that all these unacceptably high ratios are brought down and the refugees receive a some semblance of quality education.

With regard to *health*, there is an overall increase of 42% in what has been requested under this sector as compared with the 2003 budget. The reason for this is so that the many critical areas of health care in both camps can be addressed more effectively. This was in fact the same concern that accounted for special submissions for this sector in the 2003 COP, for instance the latrine to user ratio which in one part of Kakuma refugee camp averaged 1:100, far in excess of the established international standard. The projection is that, on the basis of the resources which were authorised accordingly, the minimum standards, already standing at an average of 1:24 in Kakuma and in Dadaab at the optimal 1:14, will be fully secured. The ratio in the schools, however remains pre-occupying, particularly in Dadaab where it stands at 1:275, although this is projected to have been brought down to at least 1:150 by the end of 2003. Other aspects of health care are no less critical. In both camps, malaria remains a major cause of mortality. The maternal mortality rate stands at 366/100,000 live births against the established standard of < 100/100,000 live births. The neonatal mortality stands at 14/1000 live births against the standard of 10/1000 live births. Combating all these conditions definitely calls for more funds. Moreover, in Dadaab, the withdrawal of MSF-B which necessitated that, already in 2003 US\$ 650,000 had to be found to bridge its contribution to the programme means that the same amount has to be budgeted into the 2004 UNHCR programme.

There is a new submission in the COP under *forestry*. Thus far, the forestry/environmental sector has been implemented through trust funds provided by the German Government through GTZ, the implementing agency. This funding is however set to continue only until the end of 2003, thus there is a need to make provision for US\$ 569,000 in the programme for 2004. The imperative to continue with environmental activities in 2004 cannot be emphasized enough. There would be an escalation and aggravation of the political problems witnessed already in 2002 if these activities are not implemented, namely the criticism of UNHCR by local politicians and communities for what is perceived as an uncaring and destructive attitude towards the local environment. Relations between the refugees and the local communities and indeed between the latter and UNHCR, already fragile enough, could break down completely.

Table 3: BO Kenya operational budgets 1997 - 2003

Year	UNHCR Budget US\$	Number of beneficiaries	Amount spent per refugee/year US\$	Amount spent per refugee/month US\$
1997	14,896,034	235,069	63.36	5.38
1998	11,996,006	244,577	51.15	4.26
1999	11,940,460	229,495	52.02	4.33
2000	11,525,000	206,709	55.75	4.65
2001	14,499,203	209,024	69.36	5.78
2002	13,028,600	218,671	59.60	4.97
2003	17,298,129	219,829	78.68	6.55

It is imperative that the Branch Office's submission, particularly the core budget should be authorized in full. The Office is concerned that in terms of the very poor manner in which minimum standards have been addressed in Kenya over the years, the mandate of the office could even be considered as close to a collapse. Over the past six years, while the per capita expenditure per refugee has apparently increased as seen in Table 3 above, the overall quality of life of the refugees has remained at best stagnant, and more usually deteriorated. The rigorous needs assessment for the 2003 programme, which yielded an initial total requirement of US\$ 30 million, and for the 2004 COP, for which the initial figure was US\$ 34 million, both have showed that a per capita expenditure of at least twice the current figure is what is realistically required. As further evidence of this, in each of the last four years, the annual approved allocation has been fully implemented and often been overspent. Whenever budget cuts have been ordered, such as towards the end of last year, the programme virtually ground to a halt. The preceding summary should help highlight that if the requested core budget is not approved, UNHCR will once again effectively have failed refugees in the Kenya programme

Domestic needs account for the second longest component of the submission, some US\$ 850,000. The strategy of the Branch Office is to be able to undertake the first distribution in seven years of non-food items. 50% of the requirements for this has been included in the core submission. The above figure of US\$ 850,000 represents the rest of the requirements. Similarly for shelter and education, only half of the total requirements to acceptably address minimum have been included in the core submission. If these particular submissions are not approved, 7,500 shelter units in Dadaab and 900 in Kakuma would not be constructed. The construction of classrooms and purchase of educational materials to address the poor rations explained earlier would not be fully related.

The other requirements in the secondary submission include US\$ 100,000 for the construction of two additional distribution centres in Dadaab; US\$ 300,000 in the water sector to construct two additional bore holes, and the purchase of 2 generators to help address some of the host community needs; US\$ 250,000 which would add to the resource envelop for activities to combat HIV/AIDS; and US\$ 400,000 under agency operational support which would enable the replacement of more of the old, uneconomical vehicles and other assets.

(c) **AGENCY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

Table 4: Agency operational costs

COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE OF AGENCY OPERATIONAL SUPPORT COSTS BETWEEN 2003 AND 2004						
PROJECT	BUDGET US\$	2003		2004		%
		AOS US\$	%	BUDGET US\$	AOS US\$	
AB/KEN/CM/200	3,283,900	1,342,544	41%	3,640,741	1,199,254	33%
AB/KEN/CM/201	7,022,527	1,295,923	18%	12,451,598	1,851,010	15%
AB/KEN/CM/202	4,471,443	614,923	13%	6,280,880	862,679	14%
AB/KEN/CM/251	658,176	170,866	26%	0	0	0
AB/KEN/RP/300	131,671	87,647	67%	145,500	20,624	14%
AB/KEN/RP/370	1,179,975	48,359	4%	2,500,000	204,707	8%
AB/KEN/RE/500	310,944	87,647	28%	450,000	2,222	0.09%
GRAND TOTAL	17,058,636	3,647,909	21%	25,468,719	4,140,496	16%

Once again, the Branch Office wishes to underscore, as seen in the above table, the consistency in the Kenya programme in its efforts to keep agency operational support costs down ,year after year. In 2002, AOS represented some 23% of the overall budget. In 2003, efforts were made to cut this to 21%. For 2004, the figure would be 16%. There is, therefore a constant reduction of between 3 to 4 % in agency operational cost every year from 2002 to 2004. In case it may be said that this is not true for the relatively considerable percentage of 33% indicated under project CM/200, let it be explained that the bulk of this figure, some US\$ 600,000, is allocated to the air charter which sustains the operations of the 2 Sub-Offices. In reality, this is an operational cost that should ideally be budgeted under the logistics sector. However, the existing instructions do not provide for the budgeting under that sector of any costs relating UNHCR's air operations.

(f) MANAGEMENT, STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

From a management, staff and administrative point of view, the operations of BO Kenya were crucially affected in 2001 and 2002 by the aftermath of the corruption scandal of 2000/2001. Because of the implementation of a comprehensive reform plan of action, and the fact that the staffing complement of the Branch Office had been decimated through suspensions, terminations and staff charged in the Kenyan courts with criminal offences, 2001 and 2002 witnessed a significant number of post creations and a similarly high reliance on consultants and staff either on mission or on temporary assistance for the operations of the office. With most of the reform measures set to have been substantially implemented by the close of 2002 and the newly-created posts filled accordingly, 2003 was seen as a year of returning to and consolidating normalcy. The respective post creations, continuations and reclassifications for this purpose had been requested accordingly in the 2003 COP. Moreover, the implementation of the instructions contained in IOM/81-FOM/79/2001 of 22 September 2001 to phase out project staff, which in Kenya meant the retention in 2003 of only 42 such staff from an overall total of 240 in 2002, also meant that a number of posts had to be requested for creation in 2003.

Unfortunately, the post creations requested were all mainly denied. Thus, already in 2003, a situation projected as well for 2004, the Branch Office has faced such an acute shortage of staff that, in some sectors such as eligibility determination in Nairobi, administration and financial control in Kakuma, and social and community services in Dadaab, the Office in effect is unable to deliver its mandated responsibilities. The need for additional staff at the Branch office is thus critical, as was appreciated even by the Controller and the Inspector General during their respective missions to the Branch Office early in 2003.

In addressing this crisis, the Branch Office has sought, first and foremost, to respect and not disrupt the Office Standard Parameters (OSP) as they apply to Kenya, and with which the Office is thus far in full compliance. Secondly, there has also been an effort to adhere to the "zero growth" policy as far as possible. Therefore, the COP proposes mainly a series of reclassifications, redeployments and some upgrades. And, while kept to a minimum, it has been unavoidable that some post creations have had to be requested. The Branch Office appeals very strongly for these requests to be approved.

The proposed ABOD for Kenya as a whole for 2004 is US\$2,706,850. This is an increase of \$294,840, or 12.5%, over the 2003 ABOD of US\$2,412,010, although the increase in the 2003 ABOD over that of 2002 had been much higher (US\$380,000). However, as table 4 below shows, in Nairobi, there is in fact a net reduction, while Kakuma and Dadaab account for the total increase. In both locations, the urgency of providing housing utilities and equipment, and effecting repairs to residential facilities, hitherto provided for under the Housing Fund, account for some of the increases. Being unable any longer to employ project staff to provide security services, the contracting of professional firms has meant higher costs already in 2003 and as well in 2004. The replacement of old and obsolete equipment and vehicles, especially in the outposted locations, is also urgent for both 2003 and 2004.

Table 4: 2004 ABOD budget for Kenya:

Location	2003	2004	Increase/decrease %
Nairobi	1,160,475	1,154,700	(-0.5%)
Kakuma	617,745	787,000	27%
Dadaab	633,790	765,150	20%
Total	2,412,010	2,706,850	12.5%

(g) SELECTED PROGRAMME GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The key strategic goals and programmes of the 2004 Kenya COP are summarized below:

Name of beneficiary population: Refugees in Kenya	
<p>Main Goal(s):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist the Government of Kenya in ensuring high standards of protection and assistance for all refugees while vigorously pursuing the search for durable solutions. ▪ Provide material assistance and other services aimed at meeting the minimum standards. 	
* Protection	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promote full involvement of the Government in providing protection and durable solutions for refugees. ▪ Assist the Government in promulgating and implementing refugee legislation and articulating viable policies on urban refugees. ▪ Address protection and material requirements of refugee women, placing emphasis on empowerment and preventive measures against sexual and gender-based violence and harmful traditional practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Government attains institutional, management and operational capacity in respect of refugee status determination (RSD), screening, registration documentation, security and safety, and standards of treatment. ▪ Domestic legislation and urban refugee policy elaborated and implemented. ▪ A comprehensive plan of action to protect and address the special needs of refugee women as an integral part of the operations is implemented.
* Assistance	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strive to bridge the gaps between the existing inadequate levels of assistance as per the established minimum standards. ▪ Foster synergy of efforts with the Government, NGOs, UN agencies, refugees and stakeholders in combating HIV/AIDS in the refugee communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assistance activities in sectors of chronic inadequacy and direct effect on refugee women, children and the vulnerable, namely food, shelter, water and health and nutritional conditions of pregnant women and children are prioritised. ▪ Preventive and care measures, focussing also on risk groups to control the spread of the disease.
* Urban refugees	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assist the Government of Kenya to provide effective protection to urban-based refugees while actively searching for solutions to 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Definition of a clear policy on standards of treatment of urban refugees. ▪ Urban refugees are oriented towards skill

enhance their self-efficiency.	development programmes that could render them more competitive on the employment market.
* Local capacity-building	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advocate for and provide support to the Government in its efforts to set up a refugee management platform. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A national structure dealing with all refugee- related matters is established. ▪ Government management role is also institutionalized in the camps
* Durable solutions	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Make maximum use of all opportunities for durable solutions, particularly repatriation and resettlement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Where feasible and possible, repatriation is pursued as the best durable solution. ▪ Substantial numbers of refugees are resettled from Kenya.
* Combating HIV/AIDS	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mitigate the threat of HIV/AIDS through awareness raising and prevention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Awareness campaigns on the dangers of HIV/AIDS pandemic are conducted in refugee settlements. ▪ Condoms are distributed and their use encouraged.
* Eradicating sexual and gender based violence (SGBV)	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Protect women and girls against sexual-based violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Root causes of SGBV are identified ▪ Awareness campaigns against SGBV are conducted
* Environment management	
Principal Objectives	Related Outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintain and expand environmental management and rehabilitation schemes in the refugee camps and the host communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All actors on development are brought on board with the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) as the Government focal point in developing integrated approaches to address the environmental impact in the refugee affected areas
* External relations	
Principal Objectives	Related outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Raise awareness on the Kenya refugee programme among the public opinion, the civil society and the donor community through advocacy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increased interest of the public in the refugee situation. ▪ Increased donor interest in the refugee programme in Kenya.
* Tertiary education	
Principal Objectives	Related outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increase opportunities for tertiary education for qualified refugees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DAFI programme is sustained. ▪ Tertiary education is pursued through non-academic institutions.
* Peace education	
Principal Objectives	Related outputs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Promote peaceful means of conflict resolution among the refugees and the host communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peace education is an integral part of the curriculum in schools. ▪ Peace education committees are established