Iraq: Political Differences and Outside Influences
| Publisher | Jamestown Foundation |
| Author | Alexander Sehmer |
| Publication Date | 15 September 2017 |
| Reference | Terrorism Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 16 |
| Cite as | Jamestown Foundation, Iraq: Political Differences and Outside Influences, 15 September 2017, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/59bb8d8c4.html [accessed 8 June 2023] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
Link to original story on Jamestown website
As Iraq moves into the next stage of its campaign against Islamic State (IS), political rivalries, sectarian divisions and the outside influence of regional players are conspiring to hamper efforts to tackle the terrorist group.
Backed by air strikes, Iraqi forces have begun moving in on IS fighters in Tal Afar, the final IS stronghold in northern Iraq's Nineveh governorate (Twitter, August 7; Iraqi News, August 7). This is the next phase of the battle following the July 10 liberation of Mosul. Despite that victory, there is still a long way to go.
Three years under IS rule and a massive military operation to recapture the city have left Mosul in ruins. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, and with years of rebuilding ahead, few are ready to return home (Rudaw, August 9). At the same time, both Iraqi forces and the Shia militias that aided in the liberation of Mosul have been accused of carrying out abuses in the city (Baghdad Post, August 7; Rudaw, July 20).
The Hashd al-Shaabi (PMU, Popular Mobilization Units) — a collection of predominantly Shia militias formed in 2014, though not all of them are in fact Shia — have proved to be an important and effective player in the battle against IS, but have become increasingly difficult for the government to control. Nonetheless, the organization appears likely to remain a fixture of the Iraqi security landscape. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has ruled out dissolving the PMUs, a demand made by Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr who wants the more "disciplined" PMU fighters to be absorbed into the Iraqi army (al-Jazeera, August 5). In truth, al-Sadr's concern over the PMUs may come from the fact that they include a number of his own political rivals.
Having previously fought IS on the outskirts of Tal Afar, the Shia militias were warned not to enter the town, but now it appears that PMU fighters will take part in the new offensive (Anadolu, July 29). That will set the stage for disagreements between Iran — Iran sponsors a number of the PMU militias and would be pleased to see them take Tal Afar — and Turkey, which sees itself as the protector of Sunni Turkmen living in the city and fears that there will be sectarian reprisals similar to the abuses reported in Mosul.
Meanwhile, Iraq's Sunni politicians are also struggling to find common ground. Rival reconciliation meetings, including a conference organized by parliamentary speaker Salim al-Jabouri, have failed to get off the ground (New Arab, July 13). Those disagreements are likely exacerbated by the diplomatic spat between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, since both Gulf States back various Iraqi Sunni parties, with al-Jabouri thought be favored by Qatar (al-Monitor, June 11).
All told, the region's troublesome politics risk hampering the next stage of the battle against IS, to say nothing of the Iraqi government's efforts to rebuild communities in areas that have suffered terribly under the terrorist group.
