Nations in Transit - Estonia (2004)

Capital: Tallinn
Population: 1,400,000
Status: Free
PPP: $10,066
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 71
Religious Groups: na
Ethnic Groups: na

Executive Summary

In 2003, Estonia continued its development as a consolidated, liberal democracy. Parliamentary elections in the country maintained the pattern of peaceful transfers of power from one set of ruling elites to another, while a national referendum on European Union (EU) membership confirmed Estonia's desire to look west for its economic and military security. The still sizable portion of the population without citizenship (mainly ethnic Russians), the generally low levels of political participation among citizens, and the corresponding low levels of trust in governmental institutions remained the most glaring weaknesses in Estonian democratic development.

The four most important events in Estonia in 2003 were the parliamentary elections in early March, the signing of the NATO membership accords later that month, the signing of the EU Accession Treaty in April, and a national referendum in September confirming public support for the accession process. The last three events paved the way for Estonian membership in the EU and NATO in 2004. Parliamentary elections in some ways mirrored the local elections of late 2002, continuing the slide from power of the former center-right parties while also rejecting parties from the far left. This trend can be explained partly by scandals and public perceptions of poor performance by the right-of-center parties previously in power and partly by the waning appeal of nationalism as ethnic Estonians become more optimistic about the survival of their culture and their state. The resulting coalition government, a mix of three parties bridging the middle of the political spectrum, faced a crisis late in 2003 over proposed cuts in the personal income tax rate. The government survived this crisis, in part by pushing the more difficult stages of the tax cuts to beyond 2004.

Electoral Process. The electoral process in Estonia in 2003 centered on parliamentary elections in early March and the EU referendum in mid-September. Both votes were generally without controversy. However, continued displeasure was expressed by noncitizens who are still excluded from national votes owing to Estonia's decision early after independence to refuse automatic citizenship to all permanent residents. This ruling denied citizenship to a sizable, mainly ethnic Russian, population. Even here, though, progress continued to be made in 2003, thanks to ongoing naturalization and the government's commitment to social integration of noncitizens and ethnic minorities. The growing strength of Estonia's electoral process, the transparency of the 2003 votes, and the continued commitment of the government to decrease the number of noncitizens justify an improvement in Estonia's rating from 1.75 to 1.50.

Civil Society. Although Estonian civil society is more advanced than in many other post-Communist states, there is still room for improvement. Smaller civil society organizations remain isolated from the political process, and most face organizational hurdles such as high levels of dependence on international sources of funding. Civil society organizations as a whole were much less involved than political parties and government officials in important political issues in 2003 such as the EU referendum. Smaller groups in particular remained isolated from the political process owing to their limited financial resources and weaker connections to government decision makers. Overall, nongovernmental organizations have been much less successful at advocating for policy change in the country than international governmental organizations like the EU. Estonia's civil society rating remains 2.00.

Independent Media. Estonia continued to excel in the area of media independence in 2003. There were few negatives during the year, except for the rising levels of financial pressure placed on individual media outlets in Estonia's highly saturated market. Changes to the penal code, in effect since September 2001, have helped allay past fears about the use of libel and defamation laws against investigative reporters. The continued commitment by the Estonian government to provide Internet access to the general population and ongoing improvement in the portion of the population using the Internet were both notable in 2003. Estonia's rating for independent media improves from 1.75 to 1.50 owing to its Internet-related policies.

Governance. Provisions for the government to allow citizens to use the Internet's technological savvy to play a greater role in the policy process continued to be exploited in 2003. However, the instability of the ruling coalition and low levels of public support for the major political parties and governing institutions raised overall concerns about governance in Estonia. By year's end, though, Estonia remained one of the most economically and politically stable of the post-Communist countries. The country's governance rating remains unchanged at 2.25.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework. It is still too early to tell how fully effective the changes in, or adoption of, laws such as the Courts Act (adopted on June 19,2002) and the criminal procedure code (passed on February 12,2003) will ultimately be. Initial indications, however, are promising. Owing partly to the imperatives of the EU accession process, Estonia continued to build on a strong constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework in 2003. Maintenance of the country's previous rating of 1.75 is warranted.

Corruption. Corruption remains a concern, although in comparison with other post-Communist states, Estonian government and society remain highly transparent and relatively free from corruption. Indeed, the Estonian public perceives the national government as much more corrupt than evidence would support. This perception is likely due, in part, to the print media's aggressive coverage of the relatively few scandals involving national political figures. Corruption at the local level appears to be a more widespread problem. Estonia's rating for corruption remains 2.50.

Outlook for 2004. Assuming there is no renewed crisis in the ruling coalition, the political events of 2004 will center on the accession of Estonia into the EU and NATO. Membership in these institutions will mark the end of a long journey for Estonia from Soviet territory to European counterpart. The accession process has provided a significant advantage to Estonia in the six areas covered by this report. The EU has closely monitored Estonian legislation and its application, government practices, and social relations. Recommendations from the EU have been both specific and, with the carrot of membership held out, powerful. Whether the Estonian government remains as strongly committed to further improvement in the areas of democratization and rule of law once it is an EU member is an open question and one that bears watching in 2004.

Electoral Process (Score: 1.50)

The year 2003 witnessed two important national elections in Estonia, following on the heels of local elections in November 2002. The local elections had pointed to important changes in electoral politics, specifically the consolidation of the Center Party as the most popular party in the country, the emergence of Res Publica as a new force on the Estonian political scene, and the further evaporation of support for the Fatherland and Moderate parties. These last two parties, participants in the ruling coalition from spring 1999 through the beginning of 2002, together received only 11 percent of the vote in the local elections; the Center Party gained nearly 26 percent of the vote, while Res Publica secured more than 15 percent, according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Elections to the Parliament took place on March 2,2003, and represented the first national vote of the year. Eleven political parties registered to participate in the election, with four of the parties submitting the maximum allowable number of 125 candidates each. The left-leaning Center Party received the most votes (25.4 percent), while the center-right Res Publica ran a close second with 24.6 percent. Each party won 28 seats in the 101-seat Parliament. Res Publica became the centerpiece in a 3-party coalition government that included the Reform Party and the People's Union.

The second important election of the year was the national referendum on membership in the European Union (EU). The September 14 vote followed a barrage of information from government officials about the referendum, as well as a great deal of attention in the media. According to the Estonian National Electoral Committee, turnout was higher than for most Estonian elections (64.06 percent). Slightly more than two-thirds (66.83 percent) of the votes cast were in favor of EU accession and the required amendment to the Estonian Constitution.

The two-thirds threshold was psychologically if not legally important, as EU membership had been one of the most debated and controversial topics in Estonia in recent years. Polling data for several years had shown support for membership to be lower in Estonia than in other candidate countries. However, by the end of 2003 the portion of the public favoring membership had increased to levels higher than those in many other countries. Some in Estonia attribute the previously low levels of support to a lack of knowledge about the workings of the EU prior to the government-led campaign for a yes vote. This limited knowledge led to a "combination of myths, stereotypes, hopes, and anxieties" about the EU, which made for volatile levels of support among the Estonian public, according to academic Evald Mikkel.

In Estonia, the authority of government is based upon universal and equal suffrage and the will of the people as expressed by regular, free, and fair elections conducted by secret ballot. The caveat to this statement, at least in the case of national elections, involves the exclusion of a large (though declining) portion of the population without Estonian citizenship. The decision by the Estonian government in the early and middle 1990s to adopt citizenship policies that excluded large numbers of Russian-speaking residents affected the ability of these individuals to be represented adequately in national government. At the same time, the Estonian government should be commended for its policy allowing noncitizen permanent residents to vote in local elections – a provision rare even among the advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe.

Except in the minds of some of Estonia's noncitizens, the electoral laws, campaigning opportunities, polling, and tabulation of ballots are fair and consistent with the norms of Western democracies. The electoral system is free of significant barriers to political organization and registration for citizens, and the resulting party system includes several viable political parties and a functioning opposition at national and local levels. When people go to the polls in Estonia, they are free from domination by the specific interests of power groups that plague voting in other post-Communist countries.

The situation in Estonia was judged so favorable that the OSCE decided not to send an official monitoring mission to observe the 2003 parliamentary elections. Still, the OSCE judged the elections free and fair and praised the "full transparency," professionalism, and impartiality of the electoral administration. It also commended Estonia for changes – recommended back in 1999 – regarding language proficiency of candidates. Previously, candidates were required to be highly proficient in Estonian, even those seeking local office in Russian-speaking cities.

Estonia's electoral system is somewhat confusing to the casual observer. The system combines principles of multimember district elections with proportional representation. There are 12 national electoral districts, with 6 to 12 mandates per district. Voters cast their ballots for a particular candidate, most of whom are affiliated with a political party.

Seats in Parliament are distributed to candidates through a three-step process. Candidates who receive more votes than the "simple quota" for that district (the number of votes cast in the district divided by the number of mandates) receive a seat in the Parliament. Following this, parties that receive more than 5 percent of the vote nationally are awarded seats from a given district equal to the number of times more than the simple quota that candidates from that party received as a whole from the district. In the third stage, remaining seats in the Parliament are distributed based on a modified d'Hondt method, incorporating the 5 percent national threshold for the parties and the performance in district voting by the individual candidates.

Although in theory independent candidates could be elected, the system favors candidates affiliated with the most prominent political parties. No independent candidates won seats in the 2003 parliamentary elections. Ideas have become as important as individuals in electoral politics, perhaps even more so. This may be surprising given the small size of the country, but it is a welcome development in the consolidation of Estonian democracy.

Perhaps because of the complex electoral rules, participation in the political process by the Estonian public could be better, particularly for the ethnic and other minority groups that make up the bulk of noncitizens in the country. Even among citizens, engagement in political life is lower than one might expect. Turnout for the 2003 parliamentary elections was 58.2 percent, compared with a little under 57.5 percent in the 1999 parliamentary elections and 52.7 percent in the October 2002 local elections. Interestingly, there was relatively little variation in turnout across the country. This could be interpreted as a negative sign – that the lack of attachment to the political process is pervasive – but it is probably better seen as a positive sign for stability in the country. There appear to be no pockets of extreme disillusionment.

Considering the amount of media and government attention given to the issue of EU accession, it is not surprising that voter turnout was higher for the September 2003 referendum on EU membership. Over 63 percent of eligible voters participated, reported Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Consistent with Estonia's commitment to incorporating technology into the lives of ordinary citizens – and perhaps serving as a boost to participation at the same time – the government continues to work on a plan to have an electronic voting system in place by 2005.

The continued sizable portion of the population without Estonian citizenship (around 20 percent) and the low levels of political participation by noncitizens remain the greatest blemishes on Estonia's political system. The lack of voting rights in national elections for noncitizens is not unusual compared with the situation that exists in other democracies. Few other democracies, however, have such a sizable portion of the population holding citizenship from another country or from no country at all. Criticism from Russia was particularly severe in 2003 about the exclusion of Russian-speaking noncitizens from the EU referendum vote. Although one could question whether noncitizen permanent residents should have a say in something as important as EU accession, it is unlikely – given the margin of victory for the yes vote, the relative uniformity of support across the country, and polling data from 2002 and 2003 indicating that ethnic minorities in the country were more supportive of EU membership than ethnic Estonians – that their participation would have changed the outcome in any meaningful way.

This is not to say that Estonia has made no progress on this front. There has been a steady reduction in the percentage of noncitizens over the last decade, and governmental attempts to "integrate" minorities into Estonian society should be applauded. These efforts have been praised by the United States and Western European governments, as well as by intergovernmental organizations such as the OSCE and the EU. Although the interest in integrating minorities has clearly been affected by concerns about the "other integration" (EU membership), one should not quickly dismiss the actions of the Estonian government as a ploy to gain favor with EU officials. These efforts also represent a desire to move toward a more unified and productive society and the recognition that the effective integration of ethnic minorities is crucial to the achievement of this goal.

Although the main political parties in Estonia are in general agreement about broad policy approaches (including EU accession and NATO membership), the 2003 parliamentary elections demonstrated the opportunity for the effective rotation of power among a range of political parties representing competing interests and policy options. The coalition government was anchored by Res Publica, one of the oldest political organizations in Estonia but one that had not run candidates in national political elections prior to 2003; it formed as a political party only 14 months before the election. Because its campaign slogans centered on vague populist themes ("Choose Order"), Res Publica's support appeared to be driven more by dissatisfaction with the previous ruling coalition than by strong agreement about particular policy positions; evidence of this may be implicit in the fact that the party's support came from both younger voters desiring further marketization and pensioners opposed to much of the marketization process. After initially considering a four-party coalition that would have garnered more seats, Res Publica decided not to include the center-right Pro Patria party; instead, it joined with the Reform Party (the party that had supplied the previous prime minister) and the People's Union.

The number of female deputies in Parliament increased from 18 to 19 (out of 101) as a result of the 2003 elections. While still relatively low by the standards of some Western European countries, this number compares favorably with those of other Western countries such as the United States. On the other hand, none of the predominantly Russian political parties won seats.

The year 2003 also witnessed renewed discussion in Estonia of electing the president through a popular vote. Draft legislation, supported by the ruling coalition, was proposed to create a six-year, one-term presidency elected by the general population. Such changes would require amending the Constitution, and there are plans to submit the proposal to a referendum in the middle of 2004.

Currently, the president is selected by the Parliament or, if no candidate can achieve the necessary two-thirds support (68 votes) in Parliament, by a majority of members from an electoral body made up of the Parliament and representatives of local government councils. Because of the multiparty makeup of the Parliament, it is not surprising that this special electoral body has been called upon to decide previous presidential elections, including the 2001 election of the current Estonian president, Arnold Ruutel.

Ironically, given the indirect nature of selection, the Estonian president has generally been one of the most popular political figures in the country. This is probably due to a combination of factors, including the character of the previous and current president, the ability of the president to remain outside scandals affecting the prime minister and cabinet, and – owing to the weak institutional powers of the president – a sense that the president is not to blame for unpopular policies. Ruutel was, in 2002, much more popular than the prime minister, the government (cabinet and prime minister), or the Parliament. Analysts with the surveying firm EMOR credit his strong push for a yes vote on the 2003 EU accession referendum with bumping up support, particularly among older Estonians.

Civil Society (Score: 2.00)

Examining how a government tolerates or encourages civil society can tell observers a great deal about its desire not to control all aspects of society and its openness to a diversity of opinion. In Estonia, there is clearly a commitment in principle by the government and the media to autonomous organizations. In practice, though, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) continue to face numerous hurdles, including a lack of commitment to them by the general population. The situation has improved somewhat over the last two years, thanks in part to the development of the Estonian Civil Society Development Concept (EKAK).

EKAK was adopted by the Parliament on December 12,2002. This was followed in February 2003 by the signing of a "memorandum of national accord" by nearly 39 representatives of NGOs and the major political parties. This memorandum contained few specifics but committed the groups to develop a civil society based on ideals such as the rule of law. A later national social accord, committing the government to spend more on education and do more to address the divide between the wealthy and poor in Estonia was signed by 38 NGOs but not by representatives of the three parties of the ruling coalition or the main opposition Center Party. It also failed to generate the degree of public support anticipated by its main proponent, President Ruutel.

Formal NGOs take one of three forms in Estonia – nonprofit associations, foundations, and nonprofit partnerships, the latter of which are not required to be registered with the government. Nonprofit associations are numerous (17,632 in 2002; 13,666 in 2001), while there are many fewer foundations. Most NGOs function in Estonia's largest cities, and over three-quarters of them focus exclusively on local-level activity.

NGOs advocating the rights of ethnic minorities and women are not uncommon, although they have been much less effective in bringing about policy change than have international governmental organizations. Many of the policy changes over the last decade related to ethnic minorities have come at the insistence of European intergovernmental institutions. In November 2003, the EU listed the lack of a Law on Gender Equality as one of three pressing priorities for Estonia. As a result, it is likely that such a law will be passed. It is telling, however, that the EU, and not domestic NGOs, is the force behind the development of such a law.

Estonian society is generally free of excessive influence from extremist and intolerant nongovernmental institutions and organizations. In fact, NGOs related specifically to the integration of ethnic minorities into Estonian society have been some of the most vibrant in the country. This is true partly because of the financial support provided by the Estonian government, foreign governments, and international governmental organizations for integration programs administered by such groups.

Many individual NGOs lack the administrative or financial capacity to sustain their work. Active participation by the Network of Estonian Nonprofit Organizations to improve coordination among Estonian NGOs has helped to an extent, as have the efforts of the Open Estonia Foundation, part of the network of Open Society Institute organizations established by George Soros. Open Estonia has funded millions of dollars of civil society projects over the last 10 years, often in cooperation with Western government aid. Such funding has allowed many more NGOs to be established than would otherwise have been possible. The danger of external funding is the dependency it can create by lessening incentives for groups to develop their own fund-raising capacity. The government is officially receptive to policy advocacy by NGOs and other interest groups. Representatives are invited to testify about, comment on, and influence pending policies or legislation.

One of the valuable uses of the Internet is as a bridge between the Estonian government and the general population. A Web site run by the Estonian Law Center Foundation allows comments on legislation from the general public and particularly welcomes input from representatives of NGOs. At the same time, the actual impact of such activities on public policy in Estonia is less than many would like. Only among the largest NGOs have there been significant attempts to work with political parties to represent the issue positions of the group. Overall, the "reluctance of civil servants and politicians to take the third sector seriously creates barriers for participation," particularly for smaller groups, according to the Open Estonia Foundation.

The Estonian media are relatively supportive of civil society efforts. Media outlets provide space for the discussion of civil society activities. The newspaper Postimees publishes the "Foorum," a monthly supplement to the paper that is designed to inform the general public about NGO activities as well as facilitate improved communication among various groups. A weekly television program on Estonian Television, The Third Sector, also provides information about civil society. The program airs in Russian with Estonian subtitles.

The Estonian education system is generally free of political influence and propaganda. The only significantly contentious issue related to education involves the use of the Russian language in instruction. Developing proficiency in the Estonian language is an important component of the government's efforts at integrating the mainly Russian-speaking minority population. Estonian is a required subject from the first grade in all Russian-language public schools.

In November 2003, an amendment was introduced to the Secondary School Act to change the language of instruction in Russian-language schools to Estonian beginning with the 2007-2008 academic year. This amendment failed, partly because of its impracticality – Russian is the current language of instruction for a sizable number of students – and partly because of a commitment to provide education in the native language of students. Since 2002, schools with at least 10 students of the same ethnic group have been required to provide instruction in their native language. In the 2001-2002 academic year, more than one-quarter (26.2 percent) of students in primary and secondary schools attended Russian-language schools. This percentage continues to decline but is significantly higher than that in higher education, where only 11.2 percent of university students were instructed in Russian in 2001-2002.

The percentage of Russian-speaking students in higher education receiving instruction in Estonian could be even higher, if the teaching of Estonian to Russians in elementary and secondary schools was improved. In April 2003, Russian university students speaking at a meeting of the Federation of Estonian Student Unions (EUL) criticized such teaching. EUL officials pointed to the significant gap between the percentage of the general population that is Russian speaking (35 percent) and the percentage of Russian speakers in higher education (15 percent) as evidence of the language training problem.

Independent Media (Score: 1.50)

Estonian media are considered very free by most observers. Media outlets are numerous, legal protections for press freedom exist and are practiced, there is little regulation over the establishment and functioning of media outlets, and investigative reporters are protected from victimization by powerful state or nonstate actors. The only concern in recent years – and it is not a concern shared by all analysts – is that the country's libel and defamation laws may have deterred some journalists from being as aggressive as they might otherwise be in pursuing stories that would cast government officials in a negative light. Although this may help explain the comparatively smaller number of stories about corrupt local officials, it is not consistent with the aggressive coverage of political corruption (arguably more than is justified) at the national level. In addition, the changes to the penal code in Estonia, which came into effect in September 2002, removed the libel and defamation provisions and should ease the fears of journalists in the years ahead.

Particularly considering the small size of the country, the Estonian public enjoys an impressively diverse selection of print and electronic sources of information representing a range of political viewpoints. Most of these media outlets are privately owned, although some receive government assistance. One could argue that there are actually too many media outlets for a country of Estonia's size, leading to what the International Press Institute has described as a "vibrant but saturated" market in which the survival of smaller outlets is threatened. Others see the situation from 1996 to the present as one in which the media landscape has stabilized.

In addition to 46 daily or weekly newspapers, there are 4 public service radio stations, 30 private radio stations, and 3 television stations – not counting cable channels – available to the people of Estonia. Information from Russian-language media outlets is accessible in print (19 Russian-language newspapers and 5 Russian-language magazines), on radio (4 private radio broadcasters and 1 public service radio station offer Russian programming), and on television (2 of the 3 television stations in Estonia offer regular Russian-language programming).

Pressure on individual media outlets to maintain economic viability is driven almost entirely by market forces, and the general freedom from political influence extends to the economic realm of the media as well. The only concern about ownership concentration in Estonian media developed in 2003 with the closing of the news operations of the Estonian News Agency (ETA) in February. ETA, the oldest news agency in Estonia, was privatized in 1999 and faced economic hardship almost from the start. The move left Estonia with only one news agency, Baltic News Service (BNS). Although this is a source of concern, BNS has established a solid reputation for providing impartial coverage of political and social events.

The Estonia Newspaper Association (ENA) was established as a professional association of print media outlets. The ENA has set down guidelines for the conduct of print media in the country. For example, it has developed rules for the coverage of political campaigns, including provisions for providing "space to candidates on an equal basis," indicating clearly when political information is in the form of an advertisement, and using caution when publishing results from public opinion polls. Likewise, the National Broadcasting Council is charged with establishing such guidelines for radio and television coverage of political campaigns.

In February 2000, the Parliament passed legislation guaranteeing Internet access to the general population. As a result, Estonia has one of the most technologically connected populations in Europe. Already by the early part of 2003,35 percent of the population had a home computer, and more than two-thirds of these computers were connected to the Internet. In all, around 45 percent of the population uses the Internet, according to surveys in 2003. This is up from 39 percent in 2002 and 32 percent in 2001. Estonia's usage rates are nearly double those of its Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Lithuania, according to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The country's high rates of Internet usage come not only from the notable percentage of residences with home computers, but also from a strong government commitment to providing free public Internet access points across the country. By the end of 2003, the country had established over 700 such access points, as well as 230 free wireless Internet zones. Road signs with an "@" symbol point Estonian residents to the nearest site. All schools in Estonia are connected to the Internet, more than half of all households pay their bills electronically, and a government Web site allows citizens to access their various official records. The World Economic Forum ranked Estonia eighth in the world in 2003 in putting the Internet to practical use.

Governance (Score: 2.25)

Like most parliamentary systems that rely on coalition governments, Estonia has had a history of conflicts among parties of the ruling coalition. The year 2003 witnessed numerous struggles involving the ruling coalition of the Estonian government. The coalition government that emerged following the spring parliamentary election – consisting of Res Pulbica, the Reform Party, and the People's Union – came to be at odds over taxation late in 2003. The Reform Party wanted a sizable reduction in the personal income tax rate (currently at 26 percent), while the People's Union supported a cut only if offset by increases in other taxes and an overall escalation in government spending. For a brief time, it appeared that the conflict would threaten to break apart the coalition, but an agreement was ultimately reached to lower the rate by 6 percent over a period of several years but maintain the 26 percent rate in 2004.

The ruling coalition survived the ordeal, but at a cost. Results from a national survey conducted by the Estonian polling firm EMOR indicated that support for the two main parties of the ruling coalition, Res Publica and the Reform Party, dropped following the crisis. At year's end, both parties were supported by less than 15 percent of eligible voters. The People's Union got an initial bump from the crisis but had dropped back to only 7 percent by the end of December.

Estonia saw two top government officials resign in 2003, one for concerns about his actions during the Soviet era and one owing to questions about his post-Soviet business dealings. The interior minister, Ain Seppik, faced allegations that as a judge during the Soviet period, he ruled against anti-Soviet dissidents. The finance minister, Tonis Palts, resigned amid allegations of corrupt business dealings. Following an investigation into Palts's business dealings, the Estonian Tax Board brought misdemeanor charges against a firm owned by Palts.

Thanks in part to its embrace of technology, the Estonian government operates openly and with a high degree of transparency. Both the media and the general public have access to information about legislation in its draft stage and can even shape the final look of a bill, largely through the use of the policy-focused Internet sites established by the government and by NGOs. In 2001, the government launched a Web page, Tana Otsustan Mina ("I Decide Today"), onto which draft bills and amendments are uploaded for public comment. People can even propose amendments to the legislation, and ideas that have gained significant public support are taken into account. The government estimates that around 5 percent of all ideas proposed are used as amendments to bills.

The daily work of the Estonian government reflects the country's embrace of technology in other ways as well. All cabinet meetings are now paperless, with ministers marking up legislation and voting via a computer in front of each of them. Cabinet members can also participate in meetings on-line without actually being on location. By 2004, all state and local agencies are supposed to provide services via the Internet.

Local governments in Estonia have a fair degree of autonomy from the national government, but this is not a federal system. Local governments do what the national government allows them to do. In 2003, the Parliament passed legislation to extend the term of elected local officials from three to four years. A lingering concern is the lack of effective municipal reform (including consolidation of the number of local governments). The EU expressed concern in late 2003 that continued delay in this arena jeopardizes fully effective financing and implementation of policies (including the distribution of EU structural funds) at the local level.

Local elections in Estonia are considered free and fair by observers. The Law on Elections of Local Government Councils (passed in 1996) allows noncitizens to vote in local elections if they are 18 years or older and have lived in their locality for at least five years. Because the elections are open to noncitizens, the governments created at the local level are arguably more representative of the permanent population than those created at the national level through parliamentary elections. Ethnic minorities have had a much easier time achieving elected office at the local level than in the national Parliament.

The Public Service Act, the Anticorruption Act, and the Government of the Republic Act govern the activities of the nearly 25,000 civil servants in Estonia. EU reports on Estonia have generally complimented this legislation. A late 2003 EU report indicated that "there have not been any changes to the status of the civil servants and other public employees established in the Public Service Act, in force since 1996. ... Satisfactory rules are in place to provide for the openness and transparency of the public service." According to a 2002 Open Society report on corruption in Estonia, there is "very little evidence of corruption among executive officials and civil servants." Little happened in 2003 to change such a perception.

However, the local level is another story. Although efforts have been made since 2001 to reform local government, it remains a significant area of concern. Local corruption has been facilitated by a weak system of control. The security police, which had overseen local corruption investigations, lost this power in 2000. Instead, local police prefectures were put in charge of investigating cases of local corruption such as bribery of local government officials.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (Score: 1.75)

The Estonian political system is a parliamentary arrangement that places significant power in the hands of the Parliament, the prime minister, and the other government ministers. The president has few real powers. As with other parliamentary systems, there is little concern with checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. Although the Parliament's ruling coalitions have experienced some instability over the last decade, Estonia's legislature is the effective rule-making institution.

The judicial branch can be quite important as a check on government action, as the Supreme Court has the ability to rule on the constitutionality of laws. In 2003, the Supreme Court required a change in permanent residency procedures for Soviet and Russian military veterans living in Estonia. The Court ruled that such residents were eligible for permanent residency permits; prior to the ruling, they could receive only five-year residency permits. Such Court rulings are enforced by the government.

Human rights are respected in Estonia. As early as 1997, the European Commission concluded that "no major problems over respect for fundamental rights" exist regarding Estonia. Likewise, a 2002 European Commission report highlighted the country's respect for freedom of expression. Though the denial of Estonian citizenship to a large portion of the Russian-speaking minority has been a source of apprehension for many observers of Estonia, scholars and international officials generally do not consider it a fundamental human rights violation. While still mentioning citizenship as an area of concern, a Council of Europe report, based on a fact-finding trip to Estonia by the organization's commissioner for human rights in October 2003, concluded that "the authorities have gone a long way to ensuring the rights of the Russian-speaking minority."

Those charged with a crime in Estonia are eligible for legal assistance. However, the report of the Council of Europe human rights commissioner called for improvements in access to free legal aid and information about legal rights provided to detainees. For the most part, suspects and prisoners are protected in practice against arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, searches without warrants, torture and abuse, and excessive delays in the criminal justice system. The UN Committee Against Torture criticized Estonia in late 2002 for isolated incidents "of ill-treatment of detainees by officials" in some police departments. Previous criticism from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, based on trips to Estonia in 1997 and 1999, had also criticized conditions of detention.

In general, Estonia observes equality under the law for its citizens. In 2003, the European Commission expressed concerned about the lack of legislation addressing discrimination "in the workplace, job training, social policy, education, access to goods and services, and housing." Estonia also drew criticism for the lack of information for citizens about their rights against discrimination, as well as concern about a draft Law Against Discrimination not doing enough to reduce "inequality arising from language proficiency and ethnic origin," according to a report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Yet general standards of justice common in the West (presumption of innocence, independence of prosecutors, and so forth) are practiced in Estonia.

Estonia's new criminal procedure code will take effect in the summer of 2004, with EU evaluations of the code already generally positive. The new rules will enhance the role of prosecutors in investigations. In addition to receiving training specific to the new code, judges have also learned about the European Court of Justice, the role of national courts in the EU, and the implementation of EU law. The EU's Phare program has coordinated, and funded, much of the judicial training over the last several years.

The Courts Act, adopted in 2002, has helped ensure judicial independence, and a Court Administration Advisory Council should further the cause of judicial "self-governance." The lack of such a council was highlighted in the past as a concern for solidifying an independent judiciary. According to EU monitoring reports, the appointment of judges for life and the particular rules for their removal are favorable for judicial independence. The November 2003 EU report highlighted the decrease in the number of judicial vacancies: 237 sitting judges and only 3 empty positions.

Some concerns do exist about the potential for corruption in the judiciary. Despite being covered under the Anticorruption Act, it is unclear if judicial corruption has received the attention from the Parliament that it deserves. At the same time, recent increases in judges' salaries may limit incentives for corruption.

Corruption (Score: 2.50)

Corruption in Central Europe and the Baltic States is arguably a greater problem than in most Western European countries, but it does "not pose a vital threat to the functioning of democracy," according to a 2002 report by Transparency International. Despite a persistent public perception of corruption within the national government, Estonia is considered one of the least corrupt of the Eastern European and former Soviet states. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2003, released in October, placed Estonia 33rd globally out of 133 countries in the ranking. Slovenia was the lone post-Communist state to rank higher (29th).

In 2003, Estonia continued its work in both the Council of Baltic Sea States Task Force on Organized Crime and the Baltic Anti-Corruption Initiative. The country also implemented new anticorruption initiatives. In one such move, Estonia and Finland agreed to expand the authority of FinEsto – the joint police force of the two countries – from the drug-related crime it has focused on to broader issues of the black market economy beginning in 2004.

This is not to say that more cannot be done. Though arguing that little evidence exists of rampant corruption among national political leaders, an Open Society Institute report entitled Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Estonia raised questions about corruption at the local level and the persistence of organized crime – again a predominantly local problem in terms of impact on political corruption. The only real oversight of local officials (other than from voters) comes from the audit commissions of local councils, which have neither the expertise nor the incentive to pursue local corruption. The Open Society Institute's report also called into question the compliance of political parties with rules regarding funding and fund-raising.

Still, even this report gave Estonia high marks for its treatment of corruption "as a distinct crime under criminal law" (something unusual in transition countries) and for comprehensive conflict-of-interest rules in the country's Anticorruption Act. Likewise, in its 2002 report, the Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies (sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) stated that the Anticorruption Act "provides the legal basis for the prevention of corruption" and declared that "Estonia has come a long way in creating a good legal basis for fighting corruption."

Once more, the EU accession process has been an important factor in shaping Estonia's approaches to corruption. The EU considers the fight against corruption in new member states to be "a vital element in building administrative capacity, strengthening the judiciary, and ensuring financial control," although it has been generally supportive of Estonia's efforts and complimentary of the low levels of corruption.

A second reason for Estonia's low levels of government corruption is, arguably, its laissez-faire approach to economics. To say that Estonia is free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption is an understatement. The Estonian economy has been rated one of the most economically free in the world. In fact, an irony of the EU accession process is that the Estonians – in their zest to remove the vestiges of the old Soviet system – created an economy that was too market oriented for its Western European EU partners. Many of the issues addressed in accession talks with the EU involved the reestablishment of government control over aspects of the economy, though the EU's concurrent concerns about corruption make it unlikely that such changes will open the doors to a noticeable increase in corruption.

The final cause of Estonia's low levels of corruption is the degree of intolerance among the general population for official corruption. Though corruption is far from rampant in the government, the Estonian public was not terribly trusting of any government figure other than the president in 2003. The electoral success of Res Publica can, again, be attributed as much to displeasure with the previous ruling coalition (coupled with Res Publica's vague promises to aggressively pursue corruption) as with the policy positions of the party. One of the first actions of the new ruling coalition following its rise to power was the reconstitution of the Anticorruption Committee in Parliament. The committee will focus its work on collecting, verifying, and publishing information about the assets of sitting government officials.

Allegations of corruption are given wide and extensive airing in the print media. This is likely one reason for the public perception of high levels of corruption among national political figures. Less attention has been paid to corruption in the electronic media, though it is unclear whether this is due to political interference or simply to a lack of investigative resources, according to the Open Society Institute's EU Accession Monitoring Program. The Open Society Institute has also expressed concern about local media outlets being less zealous than national media in exposing corruption. Yet whistleblowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal protections in Estonia, and there is little reason to feel insecure about investigating and reporting on cases of bribery and corruption.

Author

Lowell W. Barrington is an associate professor of political science at Marquette University. He has published numerous articles on Baltic citizenship policies and post-Communist mass attitudes and is the editor of the forthcoming book Nationalism After Independence.