Countries at the Crossroads 2006 - Georgia

(Scores are based on a scale of 0 to 7, with 0 representing weakest and 7 representing strongest performance.)

Introduction

Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has made mixed progress in promoting democracy and strengthening the rule of law. The country's first democratically elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was overthrown in a military coup after only a year-and-a-half-long rule. His downfall, largely provoked by his decision to abolish the post of commander of the Georgian National Guard and subordinate several senior officials to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, came amid accusations by the opposition that his presidency had become overly authoritarian. Gamsakhurdia's successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was invited by a military council to lead the country as the acting chairman of the state governing council and was elected president in a 1995 vote.

Although Georgia succeeded in holding successful elections in the early and mid-1990s, Georgia's government did not rest on a strong set of democratic institutions; it mainly relied on Shevardnadze's paternalistic relationship with different sectors of society.¹ As a result, the administration became increasingly authoritarian after the growing opposition challenged its rule in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Shevardnadze won the 2000 presidential election by approximately 80 percent of the vote, but the poll was marred by myriad incidents of serious electoral fraud, including group voting, ballot-box stuffing, police presence in polling stations, and a lack of transparency in vote-counting and tabulation. These events, coupled with discontent over ailing economic reforms and a dwindling standard of living, contributed to a significant drop in support for the regime. During that time, the country's civil society became better organized, more active, and increasingly critical of the government's policies.

Hence, it was not a surprise that civil society played an essential role in the events of November 2003 – better known as the Rose Revolution – in which the masses flooded the streets to protest the parliamentary elections deemed fraudulent by international and domestic observers. The events prompted Shevardnadze's resignation and brought to power a group of reformers, led by Mikhail Saakashvili and the coalition of the National Movement and the United Democrats. The new leaders consolidated their power after overwhelming electoral victories in January and March 2004, amid tremendous public enthusiasm and high expectations for the future of the country.

After his inauguration, Saakashvili found himself immersed in problems inherited from the old regime. The judicial system was plagued by incompetence, limited impartiality, and a lack of independence. Corruption was omnipresent in every segment of the society including government, the judiciary, law enforcement, utility companies, the educational system, and health institutions. Organized crime influence on politics and the economy was paramount and growing. In addition, Georgia's human rights record was mixed at best, with reports of torture and police brutality in prisons and pre-detention centers.

Amid the challenges, the government did make significant gains in several areas. New anticorruption measures successfully reduced corruption by instituting important laws on conflict of interest, increasing salaries for judges and police, and prosecuting corrupt officials at all levels of government. A crackdown on graft in tax-auditing bodies considerably improved tax collection. Independent units were created to oversee and punish police officers who practiced brutality and torture. These undertakings, however, were offset by some questionable developments, evoking doubts about the administration's commitment to democratic values. For example, changes to the constitution skewed the balance of power in favor of the presidency and weakened the parliament. Moreover, journalists seem to have become less willing to criticize the government due to pressures, and the judiciary became increasingly subject to executive interference.

Georgia's political developments unfolded against a backdrop of wars for independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Following Georgia's secession from the Soviet Union, the newly elected Georgian authorities, who were facing increasing levels of nationalism from Georgians wishing to establish an ethnic identity for their new state, stripped Abkhazian and South Ossetian minorities of their autonomy. Furthermore, Georgia's institutions at the time were not sufficiently developed to engage the minorities in the process of democratic compromise.² As a result, a civil war erupted, and both territories declared de facto independence from Georgia. Since the revolution, Saakashvili has attempted to reintegrate South Ossetia with the rest of the country; however, this effort has been largely unsuccessful and seems to have worsened the situation.

Accountability and Public Voice – 4.78

The Georgian constitution provides for universal, equal, and direct suffrage through secret ballot. However, in the period preceding the Rose Revolution, electoral standards were low, and various irregularities were commonplace. The elections were meaningful in that a multipleparty system existed and the franchise was inclusive, but there was little competition among the candidates, and the process was heavily skewed in favor of the incumbent. Massive fraud surrounding the November 2003 parliamentary elections prompted a peaceful popular uprising, eventually forcing Shevardnadze to resign.

The snap presidential and parliamentary elections of January and March 2004 were hailed as an improvement over the November 2003 vote, despite concerns about the continued lack of a clear separation between state administration and political party structures. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted many positive aspects, including progress in the administration of the election process, greater secrecy of the ballot, and efforts to increase the participation of national minorities. Conversely, they also recorded officials' interference in the functioning of local election commissions and reduced scrutiny by the domestic monitoring organizations. The elections clearly evidenced improvements in the freedom of expression through the wide range of media campaign coverage; however, the pro-Saakashvili parties had a distinct advantage on state television through extensive and overwhelmingly positive coverage and paid advertisements. By contrast, opposition parties took a more passive campaigning approach, making only a few low-key appearances, mainly due to lack of funds.³

A total of 16 political parties and electoral blocs participated in the elections, none of which succeeded in challenging Saakashvili's National Movement-United Democrats (NMD). After a sweeping victory, the NMD gained 135 out of 150 unfilled seats in the parliament. Such one-party dominance remains a concern, as it hinders the opportunity for the effective rotation of power among a range of competing interests and policy options. Parties that did not participate in the revolution lost a great number of supporters, while the former ruling party, the Citizens Union of Georgia, disappeared completely from the political scene. The Conservatives and the Republicans, which broke away from the National Movement, as well as the New Rights Party and the Industry will Save Georgia now contest the ruling party's policies in parliament, although with a little success due to their limited representation. In the by-elections, held in October 2005, the National Movement won all five contested seats despite the opposition's decision to present a unified candidate in four of the races.

The election administration in Georgia comprises the Central Elections Commission (CEC), 75 District Election Commissions, and 2,860 Precinct Electoral Commissions, which contain both the ruling and the opposition parties. Saakashvili's appointment of several persons close to his administration to the CEC in 2004 provoked criticism among the opposition parties and some analysts. Political party financing is determined by the Law on Political Association; parties that cross the required threshold in the preceding elections qualify for public funding. The CEC is tasked with monitoring the funds received by political parties.

The Georgian constitution calls for the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, although state power increasingly rests in the hands of the executive. In February 2004, the parliament passed constitutional amendments that created the post of prime minister, introduced the principle of governmental accountability to the parliament, and allowed the president to dismiss the parliament and call for new elections if the state budget is not passed in three attempts.⁴ Many Georgians argue that the creation of a stronger executive office was necessary to overcome the crisis created by the revolution, but others point out that such a concentration of power undermines the system of checks and balances. Yet, there is some evidence that the legislative branch is slowly gaining more influence and independence. For example, in March 2005 the parliament passed the resolution against the Russian military bases in Georgia despite pressure from the executive to modify its language. In October 2005, Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli dismissed Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili after members of parliament questioned her professionalism and asked for her discharge. The constitution grants the Constitutional Court the power to adjudicate upon the constitutionality of laws and normative acts of the president and the government.

As in many other post-Communist countries, entry into and promotion in Georgia's civil service remains plagued with nepotism and cronyism. Efforts to combat this trend have been systematized through legislation on public service, which posits that employees must be recruited through an interview process. However, in reality, these procedures are often ignored in favor of preferential treatment for relatives and friends of high-ranking officials.⁵

Georgia's vibrant civil society does not face any major legal or registration impediments. Considering the weakness of opposition parties, the civic sector has taken the role of opposing those of the government's actions perceived as less democratic. Georgian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have the ability to influence legislation and the political process. Parliamentary regulations provide for public hearing by committees on bills, and input from the civic sector is frequently sought. Furthermore, civic organizations are often included in various government commissions; Saakashvili has met with NGO representatives a number of times. Civil society's main critique of the current administration is that it sometimes does not provide enough time for public discussion when important decisions are made. For example, the motion to amend the constitution in February 2004 was initiated without much deliberation and consultation with the public.

Donors and funders of civic organizations are free of state pressures; however, most NGO financing still comes from abroad. The tax code, which was passed in December 2004, allows businesses to spend up to 8 percent of their earnings on such donations without paying taxes on that amount. A culture of charitable business activities is still underdeveloped, and only a small number of companies participate.

Freedom of speech and the press is enshrined in the Georgian constitution. However, media continue to be influenced by political interests. Further, journalists are still subjected to extralegal intimidation and physical violence; it remains unclear who is behind such attacks. For example, editor of the weekly Imedi in the eastern city Gurjaani, Gela Mtiulishvili, was brutally beaten while returning home in June 2005; in a separate incident in November, a hand grenade was thrown at his home. In September 2005, five assailants attacked Saba Tsitsikashvili, an investigative journalist of the local daily Saxalxo Gazeti, in the northern city of Gori. Police later arrested Mr. Tsitsikashvili's assailant, who turned out to be a relative of one of the mayor's bodyguards. The state does not restrict access to the internet, and it protects freedom of cultural expression.

In June 2004, the parliament passed the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression. The new act, widely praised as one of the most progressive laws in the region, formalized the right to free political speech and debate, editorial independence, and freedom to expose official wrongdoing; it also provided a set of new rules on defamation cases, ensured the right of journalists to protect the confidentiality of their sources, and relaxed provisions on disclosing state secrets. Moreover, defamation was officially decriminalized on the same day the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression was introduced.

Despite these positive developments, the government continues to exercise indirect control over broadcast and print outlets. Journalists often receive informal directions from media owners who perceive that "doing favors" for high-ranking government officials and fostering a good relationship with the government is good for their business.⁶ Moreover, due to the poor economic conditions in the country, the media suffer from a lack of advertising revenue and frequently struggle to remain commercially viable. As a consequence, many are forced to depend on local officials and businesspeople for financial support, becoming subject to their editorial influence.

Recommendations

• The administration needs to ensure that all political parties receive equal campaigning opportunities in state-owned media by enforcing penalties against the stations that do not respect this rule.
• The government needs to implement stricter measures to prevent undue interference in elections by local officials and ensure due legal measures against individuals who do interfere.
• The administration needs to do better at enforcing the system of hiring and promotion based on civil service exams. Stricter laws on nepotism and patronage should be imposed; a special commission should be created to oversee implementation of the civil service laws.
• The administration needs to make certain that the membership of the Central Election Commission is more equitably divided among various parties.
• The government needs to ensure the safety of journalists by investigating attacks against the media more rigorously.

Civil Liberties – 4.27

The torture of prisoners and pretrial detainees has been documented in Georgia for a number of years, representing one of the human rights violations in the country in most pressing need of remedy. Georgia's prisons lack basic humanitarian necessities; prisoners have been subjected to overcrowding and a shortage of basic hygiene and nutrition.⁷ However, of even greater concern are tactics used in pretrial detention centers that often include various forms of torture. In the past, the Shevardnadze regime tried to institute reforms that would reduce the occurrence of such abuses, but many of the anti-torture proposals and prison reforms were never fully developed or implemented.

In the months following the revolution, these problems were exacerbated as the new administration reportedly used torture to extract confessions from those they believed escaped justice under Shevardnadze, especially if they were involved in corruption. In this context, the government did not shy away from unlawful practices such as arbitrary arrests or planting evidence in order to detain individuals, frequently without ever making a record of the arrest. The law in Georgia stipulates that citizens can be held in pretrial detention for a maximum of four months. In practice, suspects tend to be held for much longer due to a lack of judicial independence and the prosecutors' ability to order judges to keep the suspect detained as long as the prosecution desires.

In recent months, the government had demonstrated increasing willingness to tackle the issue of torture. At the end of 2004, the ombudsman of Georgia and several NGOs published a report documenting over 1,100 cases of torture and ill-treatment in Tbilisi alone since the revolution, forcing the authorities to take a notice. Since then, several legal amendments have been introduced to the criminal and criminal procedure codes that in some way address the issue. For example, a measure was passed stipulating that testimonies obtained in pretrial detention could be used as evidence only if the defendant confirms their truthfulness in the court. In addition, witness testimonies obtained outside the courtroom can now be read during a trial only if the witness agrees to it while in the court. The reform was also initiated from within the institutions: the offices of human rights and monitoring within the General Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been largely staffed with former representatives of the NGO community, recordkeeping in detention facilities has improved, and the police academy has been working to develop a new curriculum emphasizing human rights issues. In January 2005, a new department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs was set up to investigate cases of prisoners brought to detention centers with signs of abuse or torture, but due to the lack of resources, its work so far is limited to Tbilisi.⁸

Despite the progress, officers responsible for the ill-treatment of pretrial detainees still often go unpunished. In 2004, there were over 1,000 reported cases of torture by law enforcement, yet investigations were initiated in only 192 cases resulting in sentencing of 27 officers.⁹ In 2005, of 154 investigations into torture by law enforcement, only 23 officers were officially charged, of which 21 were found guilty.¹⁰ The sole channel through which defendants can petition for redress of their rights is the prosecutor-general's office; however, these complaints often do not receive appropriate attention due to the prosecutor's close relationship with the police.

The Georgian constitution guarantees equality between men and women; however, this is not always respected in practice. Although the status of women has improved somewhat in recent years, Georgian women are paid less than men with the same professional credentials and hold lower skilled positions. Furthermore, the representation of women in politics is limited: Only 4 out of 20 members of the Cabinet of Ministers are women. Domestic violence in Georgia is not criminalized, and the police rarely respond to reports from the victims of such violence. Moreover, reports of rape and sexual assault often go uninvestigated.

The trafficking of women remains a problem, and Georgia is a source and transit point for individuals forced into international sex labor. The criminal code stipulates a sentence of 5 to 20 years for this offense, depending on whether an organized group was involved or the trafficking resulted in the death of a victim. The government has made significant progress in its attempts to comply fully with the international standards against trafficking, yet its efforts still fall short of fulfilling all their promises. In January 2005, Saakashvili approved the latest anti-trafficking action plan and has established a special commission under the National Security Council responsible for developing a dialog with civil society organizations and creating proposals on how to strengthen the current anti-trafficking legislation.¹¹ Under the same action plan, the authorities created a new anti-trafficking unit, which thus far has functioned effectively, with more than 30 arrests reported in 2005 alone.

Approximately 16 percent of Georgia's population is composed of ethnic minorities, whose rights are constitutionally guaranteed and generally respected in the territories under the government's control. Yet, less than 3 percent of the candidates in the March 2004 elections belonged to a national minority group. Furthermore, no relevant political party represents national minorities, although some parties include minority candidates on their lists. Minorities frequently find it difficult to participate in the political process due to insufficient knowledge of the state language. Even though the government organizes free language courses, many members of minorities do not speak Georgian, which in turn creates employment difficulties, particularly for persons wishing to work for the state. Some experts argue that the lack of language skills could be partially attributed to the physical isolation of many groups. For example, roads connecting some of these regions with the rest of Georgia are in very poor condition, often worse than the roads connecting the same regions to Armenia; this contributes to the export of more agricultural products from these areas to that country than to the rest of Georgia. In order to alleviate the problem, the state allocated a special budget in 2005 for the rebuilding of several roads. The government also created a number of initiatives aimed at reintegrating minorities into mainstream Georgian culture. For instance, the administration has provided for rebroadcasts of Georgian television news programs in translation and free legal consultations for ethnic Armenian and Azeri populations in certain regions. Furthermore, in order to quell persisting societal prejudices, Saakashvili has urged media not to report the ethnic origins of criminal suspects. Ethnic groups in Georgia, including Armenians, Abkhaz, Ossetians, Russians, and Greeks, are permitted to learn at schools in their respective native languages.

Despite improvements, religious minorities continue to report acts of intimidation and discrimination by local authorities. After the Rose Revolution, the new government permitted Jehovah's Witnesses to register the Watchtower Society, their staple organization. Yet several other minority churches, including the Armenian Apostolic Church and the Catholic Church, reported intimidation and difficulties in building new places of worship. According to a report by Amnesty International, the number of instances in which religious minorities were attacked decreased in 2004, but they still happened.¹² The government has successfully prosecuted and convicted some of the perpetrators, including a defrocked Orthodox priest who admitted to mobilizing members of his church to vandalize the premises of Jehovah's Witnesses and burn Bibles of the Baptist Evangelical Church.

The state refrains from involvement in the appointment of religious leaders and from placing restrictions on religious ceremony, although the Georgian Orthodox Church has been awarded a special role in the constitution for its position in the country's history. Under a special agreement between the two entities, the government has a right to use the church's official symbols and also produce and distribute religious articles. In addition, the Orthodox Church is the only religious entity in Georgia that enjoys tax-exempt status.

Discrimination against people with disabilities, particularly in domains such as employment and education, remains a problem. While the law mandates that the government should ensure appropriate conditions for disabled people and should provide special preferences and policies for these groups, due to the lack of funds and a certain social stigma, persons with disabilities do not have access to much of the assistance and are frequently subject to discrimination and bias.

The state recognizes every person's right to freedom of association and has generally respected this right in practice. There are no barriers to the formation of political parties, NGOs, or trade unions, and citizens are not pressured to belong to any particular association. Moreover, employers who discriminate against union members may be prosecuted and forced to reinstate employees and pay their lost wages. However, as only a small percentage of workers are unionized, this law is not frequently tested. The government officially permits public demonstrations; however, on several occasions the police used excessive force to break up peaceful protests. In one example, law enforcement used batons to beat participants in a protest in Terjola on January 11, 2004, against imprisonment of a local man charged with firearms possession. Saakashvili later defended this violent response. On January 28, 2004, police violently dispersed the protests of street traders who were objecting to a recent decision to prohibit street trading in Tbilisi.¹³

Recommendations

• Police officers accused of torturing pretrial detainees or prisoners need to be adequately investigated and prosecuted.
• The activities of the special bureau in the Ministry of Internal Affairs charged with investigating torture should be expanded beyond Tbilisi.
• Basic conditions in Georgia's prisons need to improve; officials must ensure that prisoners are not malnourished and that they receive medical treatment when required.
• Domestic violence in Georgia should be criminalized, and law enforcement personnel should receive better training on how to protect the rights of women.
• The state should institute more thorough legal protections for people with disabilities and ensure that all public buildings are wheelchair accessible.
• The government needs to ensure that citizens are guaranteed their right of assembly and should institute measures of punishment for any police officer who uses force to break up peaceful protests.

Rule of Law – 3.96

Georgia implemented several successful reforms to its legal system in the wake the Soviet Union's collapse. Additional measures to reduce corruption within the judiciary have been ushered in by Mikhail Saakashvili since his January 2004 inauguration. Despite this progress, Georgia's legal system continues to be mired in incompetence, corruption, and limited impartiality.

The Georgian constitution provides for an independent judiciary, protected by law from the influence of actors within the legislative or executive branch; it also gives judges personal immunity from prosecution without the consent of the head of the Supreme Court. However, the reforms pushed through parliament in February 2004 gave the president sole authority to appoint and dismiss common court judges. According to a Human Rights Watch briefing paper, this amendment has substantially reduced judicial independence by stoking fears among judges that decisions that displease the government may lead to their dismissal.¹⁴ As an example, analysts point to the August 2004 presidential decree that called for a reduction in the number of judges without specifying the criteria to be used in deciding who would be dismissed.¹⁵ The vagueness of the decree is likely to have caused many jurists to weigh the preferences of the government before handing down court decisions. Furthermore, judicial authorities report that prosecutors and officials in the executive branch do not hesitate to use more direct methods of pressuring judges into making decisions or delivering convictions sought by the government. For example, in cases deemed sensitive, judges often receive intimidating phone calls, and many are threatened with physical violence.¹⁶ In November 2005, the Speaker of the parliament, Nino Burjanadze, requested an investigation following allegations by a judge that authorities were attempting to influence his decisions. The same day, three Supreme Court justices accused Kote Kublashvili, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and Valery Tsertsvadze, the chairman of the Justice Council, of pressuring court judges at various levels.¹⁷

The Supreme Council of Justice, whose members are selected by all three branches of government, develops proposals for judicial reforms, initiates disciplinary proceedings, and organizes qualification exams for legal professionals wishing to become judges. In order to qualify to take the judgeship exam, candidates must have adequate legal education and at least five years of experience in practicing law. Despite the requirements, many judges in Georgia are poorly educated, lack professional pride, and are prone to graft. In an effort to curb these problems, the Georgian government has increased pay to jurists and has recently begun cracking down on judges suspected of taking bribes. In 2002, the average monthly salary for a judge on the Supreme Court was $280, whereas in 2005 most judges were earning between $1,000 and $2,000. With the increase in judicial salaries, bribery has decreased but was not completely eradicated. In October 2004, Alexandre Taliashvili, a Batumi judge, was arrested while taking a $500 bribe;¹⁸ only ten days later, police arrested a judge in the town of Rustavi for illegally obtaining $10,000.¹⁹

In efforts to improve judicial training, the Supreme Court has outlined plans to create the Advanced School of Justice, which will encompass 14-month training for all newly appointed judges starting in 2007. The school will be supervised by an independent board whose members will be appointed by the Supreme Court, High Council of Justice, and the Office of Prosecutor General.²⁰

The law in Georgia stipulates that everyone accused of a criminal offense is presumed innocent and has a right to public trial. However, the conviction rates are extremely high: only 1.1 percent of all verdicts by first instance courts in 2005 were "not guilty," presenting a very slight improvement over the 0.5 percent figure in 2004.²¹ According to the criminal code, the accused are guaranteed legal counsel before interrogation, and an attorney is provided to detainees who cannot afford adequate representation. However, the rights of the accused are not always observed in practice. Throughout 2004, authorities frequently limited attorneys' access to detainees, and the prosecutor's office exercised substantial control over court-appointed lawyers.²² In July 2005, the prosecutor's office started drafting a new criminal code that would introduce jury trails for certain severe crimes.²³ The new criminal code is scheduled to become effective in 2007.

The military in Georgia is managed by the Ministry of Defense, which in recent years has increasingly employed civilians for some of its top posts. The Georgian president acts as commander in chief of the armed forces and appoints the defense minister. The law prevents military officers from involvement in politics, although the army and paramilitary organizations were a visible political force in the early 1990s. In contrast to his predecessor, who largely stayed away from military affairs, Saakashvili has made army reforms a high priority, hoping to bring military standards closer to those of NATO. Yet many modifications still need to be implemented, as the Georgian Defense Ministry lacks transparency as well as critical legislative and judicial oversight. Military spending is subject to parliamentary approval; however, the parliament does not have much access to the details of how the money is being spent. Most problematic is the secrecy surrounding the Army Development Fund, which is financed by private individuals – frequently "patriots living abroad" – and used for activities that are not reported to the public.²⁴ Many NGOs are concerned that the Ministry of Defense has become a closed institution and that it has been extremely difficult to monitor the levels of corruption and abuse among the military ranks. In one instance the defense minister publicly lambasted prosecutors for attempting to investigate allegations of abuse against an army officer.²⁵ In a different case, the minister refused to launch an investigation following a public demonstration of approximately 60 troops who were protesting their inadequate living conditions, which prompted the military ombudsman to resign.²⁶

The right to own land and inherit property is enshrined in the constitution; expropriation of personal property is allowed only under limited circumstances and with the requirement that full compensation be made. However, in recent years several NGOs have published reports about irregularities in the process of land acquisition connected to the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, including illegal leasing of individuals' land by local government officials. In 2005, as the new offenses were being brought to light, the administration made very little effort to resolve these disputes. For example, neither have private properties damaged during construction been repaired nor have their owners received appropriate compensation. Moreover, the affected villagers have faced intimidation and threats of physical violence from BTC employees after expressing their intent to organize public demonstrations.²⁷

Recommendations

• The administration needs to work toward establishing a truly independent judiciary by encouraging legislation to restore the parliament's role in approving nominated judges and to eliminate the executive's ability to fire judges.
• Saakashvili needs to take more seriously allegations of judges' being pressured by prosecutors and other government officials by enforcing the current law and introducing stricter penalties.
• The administration needs to ensure that those accused of crimes have access to their attorney at all times. Those not able to afford a private attorney need to be able to access a qualified public defender.
• The military should allow for more transparency and be required to submit to the parliament detailed reports on their expenditures.

Anticorruption and Transparency – 3.87

Corruption in Georgia, as in most post-Soviet states, is widely perceived as a major impediment to the country's economic development. The previous government was frequently criticized for not punishing corrupt civil servants and failing to enforce existing anticorruption laws. After coming to power, Saakashvili pledged to make the fight against corruption a centerpiece of his administration. While it is too early to assess the long-term effects of his policies, citizens of Georgia exude optimism: According to a survey measuring public attitudes within the country, three-fifths of Georgians predict that corruption will decrease a little or a lot in the next three years.²⁸ The progress was also recorded in Transparency International's 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, in which Georgia scored 2.3 out of 10 points, a 0.3 point upgrade from the previous year.

Within the last two years, the government has undertaken a substantial number of anticorruption measures. It has created specialized anticorruption bodies and passed legislation in line with international standards. A new department was established within the National Security Council to take charge of anticorruption policy. In February 2004, the parliament passed a law for the creation of financial police, designated to fight economic crime; this agency is also in charge of uncovering corruption and has the full authority to carry out audits. In addition, the government established a specialized auditing body responsible for overseeing the use of public funds and started a hotline through which citizens can report wrongdoings in various agencies. In October 2005, legislation calling for the creation of a new special anticorruption division within the prosecutor-general's office and for bolstering the independence and power of this body was introduced in the parliament.

In a far-reaching attempt to institute systematic changes, the Ministry of Internal Affairs completely dismantled the old police force, notorious for its extortion practices, and created a new, much smaller, Western-style force in June 2004. In the process, about 16,000 police officers lost their jobs; the majority of these remain unemployed. Such a large number of dismissed police officers alarmed analysts concerned that, without a solid social security net, these former policemen could turn to organized crime. Yet, the police restructuring remains one of the most successful reforms undertaken by the new government. The new force is well trained and has received substantial pay raises, making it less disposed to corruption.

As a result of the ongoing anticorruption efforts, a number of high-ranking officials who served in the current and previous administrations, among them former ministers and deputies, department heads, and even Shevardnadze's son-in-law, were arrested on charges of corruption and embezzlement. These investigations and arrests have received significant attention from the media, although some experts charge that journalists have become less investigative and analytic in their reporting since the revolution.

One of the most controversial anticorruption reforms is the system of so-called plea-bargaining introduced in February 2004, which gives suspects the option of being released without trial if they agree to repay the state a predetermined amount of money, presumably equal to the amount they obtained through illegal deeds. While this practice is aimed at increasing budget revenues and bolstering the effectiveness of anticorruption reforms, it also creates doubts about a process that allows for criminal charges to be dropped if a suspect pays a specified amount in cash. Moreover, Transparency International maintains that while a portion of this money is destined to the state budget and the remaining funds are returned to law-enforcement agencies, the degree of tracking of this money is highly unsatisfactory.²⁹

Georgia has a relatively well-developed framework of laws aimed at preventing conflicts of interest among public officials; however, the main challenge so far has been the implementation of those regulations. The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service requires financial disclosures for all public servants and their families; the law also prohibits public servants from engaging in economic activities while in office. Starting in February 2004, all public officials have been obligated to submit proof of legality for their property purchases. However, the special bureau that is in charge of monitoring compliance with this and other similar laws does not have the capacity to verify these statements. Georgia has instituted basic protections for whistle-blowers through the 2004 Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, which stipulates that no person is legally liable "for the disclosure of a secret if that disclosure aimed to protect a lawful societal interest and the public interest in disclosure outweighs the damage done by the disclosure."³⁰

As a legacy of the old system, the state remains considerably involved in the economy; however, the government has made substantial efforts to speed up privatization of state-owned enterprises. The perception of pervasive corruption and the lack of law enforcement had kept many Western entrepreneurs from investing in Georgia. In July 2004, the Ministry of Economy published a list of 300 state-owned enterprises, including the State Telecommunications, Tbilisi International Airport, and Vartsikse hydropower plant, all of which were put up for sale. In order to make the climate in Georgia more business-friendly, the administration eased many regulations and registration requirements. For instance, a June 2005 law reduced the number of businesses requiring a special license from 900 to 159.³¹ At the same time, a new system was introduced under which individuals wishing to set up a business can obtain all information, forms, and licenses from a single state body.

The tax collection system in Georgia has suffered through the years due to corruption in tax-auditing bodies. In one of the largest scandals of 2005, the police arrested several senior tax officials on suspicion of soliciting an $80,000 bribe from a foreign businessman to write off $3 million in taxes he owed to the state. Despite the problems, tax revenue collection has improved due to the new tax code introduced in January 2005 and a timely payment of public sector wages, which resulted in an increase in consumer demand.³²

The Law on Public Procurement requires all government agencies to publish and conduct government contracts according to internationally accepted standards. However, the enforcement of this regulation has been weak due to poor training among public officials, as well as the lack of awareness of the law.³³ Noncompliance with this law is evidenced by a report on spending in the Defense Ministry that uncovered numerous cases in which large quantities of military supplies were purchased through direct contracts rather than competitive bidding. [Editor's note: In efforts to make the procurement system more transparent, the Ministry of Defense now posts all open tenders on their website].

The executive budget-making process in Georgia is fairly transparent and subject to legislative review; however, the parliament has no amendment powers and holds no public hearings. The budget and expenditures are published online and include mid-year and year-end reports, although the description of policy goals is often limited, making it unclear how some budget allocations connect to specific policy outcomes.³⁴ Moreover, the president's reserve fund, the annual budget designated for funding "special circumstances of state importance, such as natural and other types of calamities and unforeseen state obligations," often contains ambiguous charges such as for business travels abroad for parliamentarians and one-time payments to various public persons and law enforcement agencies, without specifying the purpose.³⁵ In July 2005, the Georgian Association of Young Lawyers alleged misuse of presidential funds after it was uncovered that 33,000 laris (US$16,500) were used to cover the costs of a Georgian delegation's recent trip to Italy, while only 4,000 laris (US$2,250) were used as emergency aid to citizens of Dushenti, whose homes were destroyed in a flood. Nonetheless, budgetary performance in Georgia has improved in 2005 due to increased tax collection.

The right to obtain information about government operations was institutionalized in Chapter 3 of the general administrative code of Georgia. This law gives citizens the right to petition government agencies for most types of public information. Yet, the Law on State Secrets requires that information that might impact the country's sovereignty and political and economic interests be classified for up to 20 years. Several reports state that public offices often delay or ignore citizen requests, although they are required under law to provide information within 10 days.³⁶

Corruption in higher education is widespread; it is common for students to pay significant amounts of money to gain admission to top schools or to get good grades. In efforts to ameliorate the situation, Saakashvili fired rectors of all state universities and arrested directors of several other schools on charges of bribery. The government recently introduced standardized university entrance exams, which are evaluated by independent agencies instead of universities as was previously the case. This measure provoked protests and hunger strikes at Tbilisi State University. Students protested mainly because in the past they were automatically granted an option to enroll at Tbilisi State Medical University after three years of college courses. However, some administrators protested because such a standardized system reduced their opportunities for extralegal income, as many students were bribing university admission officials with amounts up to $10,000.³⁷

Following the Rose Revolution, Georgia has had an influx of foreign aid estimated at approximately $1 billion.³⁸ Most recently, the United States signed a package giving Georgia $295 million through the Millennium Challenge Account. Some NGOs claim that these funds are not scrutinized closely enough, as the supervisory board in charge of the money is made up almost exclusively of officials from the ruling party.³⁹ While no reports have surfaced of gross misappropriation of foreign aid in the new administration, some irregularities do exist at the lower levels of government. In one instance, Saakashvili warned local governors about misdeeds in the distribution of humanitarian diesel fuel: The lists of eligible farmers have been inflated over the past year and it seems likely that local officials pocketed what was left over.

Recommendations

• The administration should ensure a more effective enforcement of the Law on Conflict of Interest by giving more power to the special bureau in charge of the law's implementation.
• The government needs to increase the knowledge of public officials on the procurement laws and their successful implementation.
• Additional safeguards are necessary to prevent misappropriation of foreign aid, especially at the local levels of government.

Author

Sanja Tatic is Managing Editor of Countries at the Crossroads, a survey of government accountability civil liberties, corruption, and the rule of law in 60 countries. She is also a Southeast Europe and Caucasus analyst for Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World and Press Freedom surveys.

Notes

1 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000).

2 Ibid.

3 "Repeat Parliamentary Election: Georgia" (Vienna: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], 28 March 2004).

4 Zaal Anjaparidze "Opposition Doubts Fairness of Georgia's New Electoral Comission" in Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation: 14 June, 2005). http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3365&article_id=2369878

5 David Losaberidze, et al. "Local Government in Georgia," in Local Governments in Eastern Europe, Caucasu, and Central Asia (Open Society Institute, 2002), http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2001/84/Ch5-Georgia.pdf.

6 Freedom House interview (Tbilisi: 15 March, 2006)

7 "Agenda for Reform: Human Rights Priorities after the Georgian Revolution" (New York: Human Rights Watch [HRW], 24 February 2004).

8 "Europe and Central Asia: Summary of Amnesty International's Concerns in the Region: January-June 2005" (London: Amnesty International [AI], AI Index: EUR 01/012/2005).

9 Statistics on the number of investigations and sentenced individuals is from the General Prosecutor's Human Rights Department provided to Freedom House through e-mail correspondence with Ako Minashvili, Executive Director, Liberty Institute, received on June 19, 2006.

10 Statistics from the General Prosecutor's Human Rights Department provided to Freedom House through e-mail correspondence with Ako Minashvili, Executive Director, Liberty Institute, received on June 19, 2006.

11 Otar Kakhidze, "Overview of Georgia's Efforts to Prosecute Perpetrators of Trafficking in Persons" (Tbilisi: Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, July 2005).

12 "Europe and Central Asia: Summary" (AI, AI Index: EUR 01/012/2005), 5.

13 Sidiki Kaba and Ucha Nanuashvili, "Open letter to Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy," (Paris: Human Rights in Georgia, 9 July 2004) http://www.humanrights.ge/eng/stat24.shtml.

14 "Georgia and the European Neighborhood Policy" (HRW, 2005).

15 Ibid.

16 "Georgia: Torture and Ill-treatment Still a Concern after the "Rose Revolution" (AI, November 2005).

17 "Judges Say they are Under Pressure," Civil Georgia, 23 November 2005, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11201, accessed 27 November 2005.

18 "Judge Arrested for Suspected Bribe-Taking," Civil Georgia, 11 October 2004, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8038, accessed 27 November 2005.

19 "Judge Arrested for Alleged Bribe-Taking," Civil Georgia, 21 October 2004, http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=8135, accessed 27 November 2005.

20 "Main Directions of the Court Reform" (Tbilisi: Supreme Court of Georgia) http://www.supremecourt.ge/georgian/strategia_eng.htm. Accessed on July 1, 2006.

21 Statistics from the Supreme Court of Georgia provided to Freedom House through e-mail correspondence with Ako Minashvili, Executive Director, Liberty Institute, received on June 22, 2006.

22 "Georgia," in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2005).

23 "CEELI in Georgia" (Washington D.C.: Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, July 2006) http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/countries/georgia/program.html.

24 Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Georgia: Civic Groups Criticize Defense Secretiveness, Militarization" (Prague and Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL], 12 April 2005).

25 John Mackedon, "Georgian Government's Image Takes Hit Over Rights Abuse Incidents," Eurasianet Online Magazine, 26 April 2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav042605a.shtml.

26 Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Georgia: Civic Groups Criticize Defense Secretiveness, Militarization" (Prague and Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL], 12 April 2005).

27 "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline: Human Rights, Social and Environmental Impacts" (Oxford: Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, September 2005), http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/publications/FFM_sep_05.pdf.

28 Global Corruption Barometer (Berlin: Transparency International [TI], 2004), http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#barometer.

29 "The Results of Background Research Within the Framework of State Expenditure Monitoring Program" (Tbilisi: TI Georgia, September 2005).

30 "Guide to the Law of Georgia on Freedom of Speech and Expression" (London: Article 19, April 2005).

31 "Georgia: Country Report" (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2005).

32 Ibid.

33 "Georgia: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Fiscal Transparency Module" (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund [IMF], Country Report No. 03/333, October 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr03333.pdf.

34 Pamela Gomez, "Opening Budgets to Public Understanding and Debate"(Washington, D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, International Budget Project, 2004), http://www.internationalbudget.org/openbudgets/Summary.pdf.

35 "&State Expenditure Monitoring Program" (TI Georgia, September 2005).

36 David Banisar, "The Freedominfo.org Global Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws Around the World" (Washington, D.C.: freedominfo.org, May 2004), http://www.freedominfo.org/survey/global_survey2004.pdf.

37 Natia Janashia, "Fighting Corruption in Georgian Universities," Academe, September/October 2004, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3860/is_200409/ai_n9440963.

38 "EU Extends Cooperation with Georgia, but Expresses Caution on Accession Issue," EurasiaNet, 17 June 2004.

39 Tamar Khorbaladze and Manana Khidasheli, "Georgia: Foreign Aid Challenge" (London: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 20 October 2005), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-6HD4XX?OpenDocument.