R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Oliver Ipeoma Emeka Nkiti
| Publisher | United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales) |
| Author | High Court (Queen's Bench Division) |
| Publication Date | 11 November 1988 |
| Citation / Document Symbol | [1989] Imm AR 182 |
| Type of Decision | CO/1549/87 |
| Cite as | R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Oliver Ipeoma Emeka Nkiti, [1989] Imm AR 182, United Kingdom: High Court (England and Wales), 11 November 1988, available at: https://www.refworld.org/cases,GBR_HC_QB,3ae6b66228.html [accessed 4 November 2019] |
| Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
R v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT ex parte OLIVER IPEOMA EMEKA NKITI CO/1549/87
Queen's Bench Division
[1989] Imm AR 182
Hearing Date: 11 November 1988
11 November 1988
Index Terms:
Refusal of leave to enter -- whether reasonable -- applicant charged with possession and importation of heroin found in friend's luggage -- acquitted at trial -- immigration officer subsequently refused leave to enter as conducive to the public good -- believed applicant had knowingly attempted to bring heroin into the United Kingdom -- whether immigration officer acted reasonably -- whether, after applicant's acquittal he was precluded from coming to the conclusion he did.
Held:
On arrival in the United Kingdom the applicant collected, with his own, the luggage of a friend who had missed the flight. In that luggage was half a kilo of heroin. The applicant was arrested and charged with possession and importation of heroin. He was ultimately acquitted, the defence being that he did not know what was in his friend's luggage. After his acquittal the immigration officer refused him leave to enter the United Kingdom, he concluding that the applicant had knowingly attempted to bring heroin into the United Kingdom. Before the court it was argued that the immigration officer should have made further enquiries. Held: 1. The applicant's acquittal on criminal charges did not preclude the immigration officer from concluding that on a balance of probabilities the applicant had known what was in the luggage. 2. The immigration officer was under no duty himself to make further enquiries. He knew of the acquittal and the surrounding circumstances. The applicant had had an opportunity of putting forward his explanation to the officer. 3. The decision could not be faulted.Cases referred to in the Judgment:
No cases are referred to in the judgment.Counsel:
S Kadri for the appellant; D Pannick for the respondent PANEL: Macpherson JJudgment One:
MACPHERSON J: In this case Mr Kadri argues on behalf of Oliver Nkiti. Mr Nkiti has been in this country a number of times. He has done some studying here and his history is set out in the papers. The entry with which we are concerned is one made at Gatwick on 29 September 1986. He arrived there but his friend missed the flight. He was issued with a form pending enquiries regarding the explanation as to why he had changed schools in the United Kingdom and he then collected his luggage and the luggage of his friend when he realised that the friend had missed the flight. In the friend's luggage was half a kilo of heroin. Mr Nkiti told the customs officer that he did not know there were any drugs in his friend's luggage and he said that his friend had missed the flight and that he had simply collected his friend's luggage as a favour. But despite his protestations of innocence he was charged with possession and importation of that heroin. Obviously, the only thing that could happen then was that the matter was stood over because Mr Nkiti was no doubt put in handcuffs, or at all events arrested and taken off to stand his trial. He was tried twice; once the jury disagreed and on the second occasion in August 1987 he was acquitted. Of course, the burden of proof in the criminal court required the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty and that he had not come in with that luggage innocently. The jury were out, apparently, for 3 hours on 17 July 1987, when they disagreed and, as I have already indicated, when he was tried later on the jury found in his favour. So Mr Nkiti returned to the customs officer on 18 August 1987. He was taken there and seen by an immigration officer, who, as he himself says, in the words of his solicitor in the affidavit filed in support of this application, knew that Mr Nkiti had pleaded not guilty to the charge of importation and had throughout maintained that he did not know that there was heroin or any other drug in the luggage collected by him on 29 September 1986. The very simple defence which had been raised at the trial and the assertion which Mr Nkiti has alaways made was that he did not know of the presence of the heroin in that luggage. The officer also knew that the jury had accepted Mr Nkiti's plea of innocence -- that is the way it is put -- and had found him not guilty. But at the end of his examination, as the officer in charge indicates, the officer's conclusion was that he was satisfied "that the applicant had knowingly been involved in an attempt to import drugs into the United Kingdom, and so the applicant's presence would not be conducive to the public good." That is paragraph 12 of Mr Fothergill's affidavit, and in paragraph 11, the officer indicates he knew "the applicant had subsequently been acquitted of the criminal charge" but he also says, "that did not alter the fact that on 29 September 1986 he had been found to be in possession of heroin". And the officer indicates that both his behaviour at the time and his explanation of how he had come to be in possession of the heroin led him, the officer, to believe that he had knowingly attempted to bring heroin into the Untied Kingdom. So that it is quite apparent, unfortunately, for the applicant, that the immigration officer knew exactly what the defence was, namely that the heroin had been in the friend's suitcase and that he had been ignorant of its presence. If Mr Nkiti had wanted to say any more than that he had all the opportunity that he needed to do so when he saw the immigration officer and I simply do not see why the immigration officer had, in Mr Kadri's words, to ask a lot of questions of the applicant in order to further his enquiries. He knew what the defence was because he had been told that. The applicant was there, the man had been found in possession of the heroin and the officer was entitled to reach his conclusion upon the facts which were before him. I do not believe that he had the duty, which sometimes applies, for example, in the refugee cases, to pursue the matter beyond investigating the denial and looking at all the circumstances of the case as an immigration officer. He was not a juror, this was not a criminal trial, and Mr Nkiti's acquittal did not mean that the immigration officer was precluded from reaching his conclusion that the man probably knew what was in the luggage and that his presence here was not conducive to the public good. In any event, this was a matter, in my judgment, for the immigration officer himself. As Mr Pannick says, unless there is an error of law or perversity in the decision, it is not for this court to go over the facts again and say whether this court might have reached a different conclusion. Immigration officers are intimately involved all the time with cases of this kind and must reach their conclusions on the ground in possession of all the relevant facts and making their own judgment in accordance with commonsense and the law. For what it is worth, it seems to me an impeccable decision in the sense that it was made with all relevant factors in mind and after proper investigation. In those circumstances, there is no material here upon which this immigration officer's decision that this man should leave should be reviewed. Of course, it will not be very good for him to know that he has been excluded from the country, but that it is not an absolute bar to travel and it will be up to him to satisfy the authorities here, if he can, on another occasion, probably in advance, that he is a better citizen and that he is the sort of person who may be admitted. In those circumstances, and in the end without any hesitation, since I must look keenly to see whether there has been any injustice in this case, this application must be refused.DISPOSITION:
Application dismissedSOLICITORS:
Karim Laxman & Co, London; Treasury SolicitorCopyright notice: Crown Copyright
