Pakistan: Update to ZZZ32353.E of 5 August 1999 and PAK33645 of 27 January 2000 on the Kashmiri group called Hizbul-Mujahideen (Hezbul-Mujahideen or Hezb-e-Mujahideen) (HM) and its connections with the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)

The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was founded in 1989 (SATP n.d.; SAPRA 16 Jan. 2003) as "the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami [or Jammat-e-Islami , JI], a socio-cultural and religious organisation of Jammu and Kashmir" (SATP n.d.).

With most of its estimated 800 cadres drawn from the local population, the Hizbul remains the largest group in Kashmir (Jane's Intelligence Review 1 Sept. 2001a; SATP n.d.). The other major fighting groups in Kashmir - the Laskhar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), al Badr, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) - are "non- indigenous, composed mostly of Punjabi mercenaries from Pakistan" (Janes Intelligence Review 1 Sept. 2001b). Although most of its militants have been recruited from Azad and Jammu Kashmir, the Hizbul accommodates a "large number of Pakistanis, some Afghans and a few Arabs" (The Herald Aug. 2000, 29).

However, in a report on Kashmir, Eric Margolis, the author of War on Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet, states that during his visits to the region, he found that, contrary to Indian claims, most fighters were Kahsmiri Muslims (Foreign Correspondent.com 13 Aug. 2000). In recent years, larger local Kashmiri groups, including the Hizbul, have been pushed aside by the better financed and equipped Jaish and Lashkar groups whose fighters originate mostly from the Sind and Punjab regions of Pakistan (The New York Times 9 Jan. 2002).

A profile of the Hizbul Mujahideen published on the Website of the Security and Political Risk Analysis Foundation of India (SAPRA), "a New Delhi based, not for profit, think tank which focuses on peace and conflict studies, political risk, terrorism and security related issues pertinent to the Southern Asian context" (SAPRA n.d.), states that the Hizbul, which draws most of its cadres from the Jammat-e-Islami, advocates for the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan (ibid. 16 Jan. 2003). In addition, the report states that

the major source for its finances has been the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI and its mercenary outfits like the Harkat and the LeT [Laskar-e-Tayyiba] need local knowledge and support, and this is provided by the HM which has the strongest presence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. According to reports, the HM receives nearly 1 crore rupees from the ISI and is the biggest beneficiary of the funds given by the ISI. However, the ISI, according to Indian intelligence sources, is now promoting Masood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad at the cost of HM (ibid.).

A 29 May 2002 ABC News report on key figures in the Kashmir conflict states that Syed Salahuddin, born Syed Mohammed Yusuf Shah, was the "supreme commander" of the Hizbul Mujahideen at the time the war in Kashmir broke out (see also The Herald Aug. 2000). The report also states that

... after 12 years of operating in the region, there are reports of schisms in the Hizabul Mujahideen ranks. The differences came to a front in November 2001 when Salahuddin called an extraordinary meeting of Hizbul Mujahideen functionaries to denounce moves by a faction leader who had earlier publicly expressed a desire to consider a ceasefire with the Indian authorities. Salahuddin denounced the declaration and the factional leader, Abdul Majid Dar, was kicked out of the Hizbul ranks (abcNews.com 29 May 2002).

Abdul Majid Dar was killed on 24 March 2003 by members of his own organization (The Statesman 10 Apr. 2003; SAPRA 27 Mar. 2003). The Calcutta-based newspaper The Statesman commented on Dar's assassination in these terms:

... in the summer of 2000, serious differences arose between Pakistan-based Salahuddin and Dar, then ''chief commander operations'' in the valley, when he declared the unilateral ceasefire. Salahuddin withdrew the ceasefire on August 8, saying New Delhi had refused to involve Islamabad in the talks. What really had irked Salahuddin were reports that Dar was sharing information with intelligence agencies after declaring the ceasefire. The result: Salahuddin expelled Dar from Hizbul on December 2001. Saiful Islam replaced him.

Dar had antagonized Pakistan-based militant groups with his pro-talks stand. ... But Dar's expulsion brought the split between pro-Pakistan Hizbul militants to the fore. Dar had said 'no' to ISI diktats and Salahuddin's gun culture. Thus began the clashes between the moderates and the hardliners...

Dar's support cut across the political and factional divide, for he seemed to be one of the few militant leaders who wanted a peaceful solution in Kashmir. ... Political observers say that though his killing will not lead to a major fall-out in Kashmir, peace might be silenced for some time.

"Yes, his death is certainly a warning to those who support peace and dialogue. Besides, it would also strenghthen Salahuddin's hold over his outfit, and those who have supported Dar all along would be further marginalised," said Prof. Hari Om, political analyst and member [of the] Indian Council of Historical Research. And everybody fears that violence may once again increase in the valley (10 Apr. 2003)

In a 27 March 2003 report, the SAPRA Foundation states that, following the March 2003 assassination of Abdul Majid Dar by militants within Hizbul, some 200 dissidents rejected the leadership of Syed Salahuddin and launched their own faction.

A 14 May 2003 Asia Times report states that, from what was being said within Pakistani intelligence circles, Pakistan and the United States may have agreed on a road map to bring militancy in Kashmir "under control." According to the report, the ISI is trying to curtail the activities of Pakistan-based organizations by forcing them to merge into one umbrella organization, and to arrange, under the auspices of an agreement to be reached with India, their eventual surrender and safe passage to Pakistan (Asia Times 14 May 2003.). Furthermore, failure of indigenous organizations like the Hizbul Mujahideen to abide by ISI's instructions to surrender would lead the ISI to "hand over maps of their arms caches and training camps, one by one, forcing them to ultimately compromise on the new road map for the Kashmir dispute" (ibid.).     

For information on ISI and its involvement in Kashmir, and further information on the Hizbul-e-Mujahideen, please consult the attached reports.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

References

abcNews.com. 29 May 2002. "Key Figures: Who's Who in the Kashmir Uprising." [Accessed 15 May 2003]

Asia Times [Hong Kong]. 14 May 2003. Syed Saleem Shahzad. "Kashmir Militancy in the Firing Line." [Accessed 15 May 2003]

Foreign Correspondent.com. 13 August 2000. Eric S. Margolis. "The Jerusalem of the Himalayas." [Accessed 15 May 2003]

The Herald [Karachi]. August 2000. Zaffar Abbas. "A Who's Who of Kashmir Militancy."

Jane's Intelligence Review [Surrey, UK]. 1 September 2001a. Vol. 13, No. 9. "Main Groups in Kashmir." (NEXIS)

_____. 1 September 2001b. Vol 13, No. 9. Peter Chalk. "Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency." (NEXIS)

The New York Times. 9 January 2002. "Pakistan May Be Unable to Calm Kashmir." [Accessed 9 Sept. 2002]

The SAPRA Foundation of India [New Delhi]. 27 March 2003. "Hizbul Mujahideen Splits into Two Factions."    [Accessed 5 May 2003]

_____. n.d. "The Web Site of the SAPRA (Security and Political Risk Analysis Foundation India." [Accessed 8 May 2003]

_____. 16 January 2003. "Terrorism Profiles: Hizbul Mujahideen." . [Accessed 2 May 2003]

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). n.d.. "Hizb-ul-Mujahideen." [Accessed 9 May 2003]

The Statesman [Calcutta]. 10 April 2003. "Not So Accidental Death of a Militant." (NEXIS)

Attachments

Jane's Intelligence Review. 1 September 2001. Vol 13, No. 9. Peter Chalk. "Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency." (NEXIS)

The Pioneer [Delhi]. 27 January 2002. Rajeev Deshpande. "ISI Where It All Begins." [Accessed 2 May 2003]

The SAPRA Foundation of India. 16 January 2003. "Terrorism Profiles: Hizbul Mujahideen." . [Accessed 2 May 2003]

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). n.d. "Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin." [Accessed 9 May 2003]

The Tribune [Chandigarh]. 28 November 1999. Syed Nooruzzaman. "How Pakistan's ISI Funds Its Proxy War." [Accessed 2 May 2003]