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Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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Summary

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan's government and economy and of its cooperation with U.S. policies in the Middle East.

Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include Jordan's continued involvement in attempting to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and the stability of the Jordanian regime, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. U.S. officials may also consider potential threats to Jordan from the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym *Da'esh*).

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by State and USAID) to Jordan through FY2016 amounted to approximately \$17.108 billion. With more U.S. aid to Jordan being channeled through the Defense Department's security assistance accounts, Jordan has received \$774.6 million in additional military aid since FY2014.

For FY2017, H.R. 5912, the House version of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill, would have provided not less than \$1.275 billion in total aid to Jordan, of which not less than \$375 million would have been for budget support for the Government of Jordan. The Senate version (S. 3117) would have provided not less than \$1 billion in total aid to Jordan.

P.L. 114-254, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, specifies that appropriations for Economic Support Fund/Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF/OCO) and Foreign Military Financing/Overseas Contingency Operations (FMF/OCO) be provided to Jordan. The act did not specify exact dollar amounts for the kingdom.

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Overview

In early 2017, Jordan is facing a confluence of regional threats that have the potential to undermine its domestic stability. Over the past year, Islamic State-directed or inspired terrorist attacks inside the kingdom have grown more frequent. The Syrian refugee population has continued to place strains on the economy and social fabric. Finally, a Trump Administration proposal to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem may spark Palestinian and pan-Arab protest at a time when the Jordanian government is already facing domestic criticism for alleged security lapses, corruption, and mismanaging of the economy.¹ Jordan has responsibility for administering Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. In mid-January, the king partially reshuffled the cabinet and replaced key domestic intelligence chiefs in order to reassure the public that the government was taking steps to ensure stability.

Figure 1. Jordan at a Glance



Area: 89,213 sq. km. (34,445 sq. mi., slightly smaller than Indiana)
Population: 8,185,384 (2016); Amman (capital): 1.155 million (2015)
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 98%; Circassians 1%; Armenians 1%
Religion: Sunni Muslim 97.2%; Christian 2%
Percent of Population Under Age 25: 55% (2016)
Literacy: 95.4% (2015)
Youth Unemployment: 29.3% (2012)

Source: Graphic created by CRS; facts from CIA World Factbook.

¹ "Jordan Cracks down on Activists over Social Media Posts," *Al Jazeera*, January 18, 2017.

The professionalism of Jordan's military and security services, along with the policies of its leaders, have made Jordan an important partner for the United States on regional issues and have helped maintain broad congressional support for assistance. Jordan is contributing to Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym *Da'esh*) in Syria and Iraq by periodically conducting air strikes, allowing the use of its bases by foreign forces, and sharing intelligence with coalition partners.²

In order to bolster Jordan's economy and military capability, the Obama Administration and Congress provided significant amounts of foreign assistance to the kingdom. P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, provides "not less than" \$1.275 billion in bilateral economic and military aid for Jordan. The act also authorizes the use of Defense Department-wide funding (Operations & Maintenance) for Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders. Section 9012 of the act further specifies that "up to \$600 million from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to provide assistance to Jordan to enhance security along its borders."

Latest Developments in U.S. Assistance for Jordan

- P.L. 114-254, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, specifies that appropriations for ESF/OCO and FMF/OCO be provided to Jordan. The act did not specify exact dollar amounts for the kingdom.

The Islamic State and Domestic Security

Jordan is a key contributor to the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State. Jordanian F-16s and other aircraft fly missions as part of Operation Inherent Resolve in Syria and Iraq, and Obama Administration officials testified in February 2016 that Jordan had shown no sign of decreasing the tempo of its air strikes.³ In limited instances, Jordanian ground forces and special operators have targeted Islamic State (IS) fighters along the kingdom's border with Syria and Iraq.⁴

Jordan is an attractive IS target not only because of these operations, but also because of the kingdom's strong ties to the West and close relations with Israel under a 1994 peace treaty. In 2016, there were several possible IS-directed or inspired attacks inside Jordan, including the following:

- On March 2, 2016, IS-linked militants killed a Jordanian officer participating in a raid on the group's hideaway in the town of Irbid.
- On June 6, 2016, unidentified gunmen killed five people, including three security officers, at a Jordanian intelligence services office in the Baqaa refugee camp on the outskirts of Amman. No group has claimed responsibility for this attack.
- On June 21, 2016, a suicide bomb attack on the Jordanian-Syrian border killed seven people at the remote Al Rukban refugee camp near the Syria-Iraq-Jordan

² Press Conference, Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Amman, Jordan, November 6, 2016.

³ Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Jordan: A Key U.S. Partner, Statement of Ambassador Gerald M. Feierstein, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, February 11, 2016.

⁴"Jordan begins covert operations against IS in Syria," *Middle East Eye*, March 25, 2016.

- tri-border area. The bombing wounded border guards, civil defense personnel and members of Jordan's Public Security Department.
- On November 4, 2016, three U.S. soldiers⁵ were killed when a Jordanian guard opened fire on their vehicle as it returned to Prince Faisal Air Base. Reportedly, the soldiers had been detailed to assist a CIA-led training mission for Syrian rebels.⁶
 - On December 18, 2016, seven Jordanian security personnel and three civilians (including a Canadian tourist) were killed in a shootout with members of an IS-affiliated cell in the city of Al Karak. The fighting erupted when patrolmen investigating reports of an apartment fire were attacked upon arrival by IS militants holed up in the suspected apartment. The gunmen eventually fled to the nearby Karak Crusader castle, a prominent tourist attraction on a hilltop overlooking the city, where they were eventually overtaken by Jordanian Special Forces. The attackers were all Jordanian nationals and college-educated young men from tribal families. According to Jordanian authorities, they had been planning attacks on New Year's Eve.
 - On December 20, 2016, another four Jordanian policemen were killed in antiterror raids on suspected IS hideouts in Al Karak.
 - On January 6, 2017, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the killing of a Jordanian soldier in the southern province of Ma'an. Jordanian authorities dispute the claim, saying the shooting was a criminal act rather than terrorism.

Jordanian and U.S. authorities⁷ are concerned not only with IS infiltration into the kingdom, but also IS radicalization of Jordanians who have fought in Syria. The kingdom is home to several areas where manifestations of antigovernment sentiment are high, economic prospects are poor, and sympathy for violent extremist groups appears to be prevalent. One study on radicalization in Jordan found the following:

New data reveal that since 2011, nearly 4,000 Jordanians have fought in Syria and Iraq. This is not only double the previous expert estimate long cited by Western outlets but also now makes Jordan the second largest contributor of foreign volunteers to the Islamic State behind Tunisia.... Ground zero for Salafist-jihadi recruitment is no longer the impoverished southern town of Ma'an, but instead northern cities like Irbid and Salt. These more modernized cities barely resemble the tribal backwaters assumed to embrace extremist ideologies. Their youths targeted by Salafist-jihadi recruiters often have private-sector jobs and have seldom faced real destitution. However, these youths share something else thing in common—a sense of desperation permeating their lives, having lost faith in government to fix the economy, provide services, and induce pride in citizenship. Their turn to religion is a deliberate one, motivated by a desire to find

⁵ In November 2015, five people, including two American police trainers, were killed at the Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) by a Jordanian police officer who fired on them before he was shot to death.

⁶ "Killing of U.S. Soldiers in Jordan Called Deliberate," *Washington Post*, November 22, 2016.

⁷ On December 23, 2016, the U.S. Department of State issued a travel alert, warning all U.S. citizens of threats from terrorist groups throughout Jordan and to consider the risks of travel to and throughout the country. The warning also noted that "all U.S. government personnel on official travel must receive prior permission to visit any area within 10 km from the Jordan-Syria border, which includes the town of Ramtha.... U.S. government employees on personal travel are not permitted to visit the border areas or refugee camps, and the embassy advises U.S. citizens to avoid both." See <https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/jordan-travel-warning.html>.

meaning and purpose. This is the resounding theme in interviews with jailed IS affiliates and other radical Islamists in Jordanian prisons.⁸

In 2017, many observers remain concerned that even as the Islamic State loses territory in Iraq and Syria, the group will use its networks elsewhere, such as in Jordan, to continue attacking its adversaries. However, these small-scale attacks have not threatened the kingdom’s overall stability to date. According to one analysis, “The stigma of terrorism and extremism repels [Jordanian] families and tribes across the country, who see it as a stain on their honor as a collective whole. This has led many [Jordanian] tribes and families to disown sons and daughters who have joined ISIL.”⁹

Figure 2. Syria-Jordan Border



Source: CRS Graphics.

The War in Syria and Its Impact on Jordan

The war in Syria poses a number of problems for Jordan. Syrian refugees have fled to the kingdom; Jordan’s borders have become less secure; and Russian jets have conducted air strikes against Syrian rebel groups operating close to the kingdom. Jordan has worked on multiple fronts to mitigate these challenges. On the military side, it has quietly supported moderate Syrian rebel groups (such as the Southern Front) operating in southwestern Syria in order to prevent more

⁸ Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour, “The Social Terrain of Islamist Radicalization: Insights from Jordan,” *Lawfare*, published by the Lawfare Institute in cooperation with Brookings, August 21, 2016.

⁹ “Against ISIS, Jordan has a Big Gun: Social Cohesion,” *Christian Science Monitor*, December 21, 2016.

radical groups from taking hold.¹⁰ On the diplomatic side, Jordan is a member of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), a group of countries that has unsuccessfully attempted to broker a negotiated settlement to the Syria conflict. On the humanitarian side, Jordan has hosted at least 655,399 UNHCR-registered Syrian refugees, who have increased the country's population by 10%. Hundreds of thousands of unregistered refugees may be in Jordan.

Will the War Intensify in Southern Syria?

Many Jordanians are concerned that with the retaking of Aleppo by the Asad regime and its Russian and Iranian backers, fighting will shift to the south, where rebel groups, regime forces, Al Qaeda affiliates (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) and even IS-affiliated militias (Khalid ibn al-Walid Army)¹¹ have largely remained in a stalemate. Jordan has warned that “any action that will push refugees towards our border with Syria or push fighting to our border will be considered an act of war by Jordan.”¹² However, southern Syria could become one of the most complex battlefields in the six-year Syrian war, given the competing interests of nations such as Jordan, Israel, Russia, the Syrian government, and the United States, and nonstate actors such as Hezbollah, the Southern Front, and affiliated militias of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. In July 2016, Russian airstrikes near the Jordanian-Syrian border killed at least eight people, many of whom were Syrian refugees. Russian aircraft may have been targeting rebel groups backed by the United States and Jordan. The strike was the closest Russian attack along the Jordanian border since Russia began military strikes in Syria in September 2015. The kingdom has tried to coordinate with Moscow to keep their respective military forces apart.¹³

U.S. Troops in Jordan

According to President Obama's last War Powers Resolution Report to Congress, “At the request of the Government of Jordan, approximately 2,300 U.S. military personnel are deployed to Jordan to support counter-ISIL operations and the security of Jordan and to promote regional stability. These forces will remain in Jordan, in full coordination with the Government of Jordan, until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.”¹⁴ Although precise details of the U.S. military presence in Jordan may be classified, American soldiers support the deployment of a contingent of U.S. F-16s and operate a Patriot missile battery near Jordan's northern border with Syria.

As of early 2017, Jordanian officials support Russian and Turkish diplomatic efforts to achieve a cease-fire in the conflict, leading to the start of peace negotiations.

¹⁰ Officially, Jordan denies that it offers technical and logistical support to Syrian rebels. Instead, the government emphasizes its participation in the international coalition to counter Daesh and extremism broadly. See Open Source Enterprise, *OSE Media Note: Jordan—Officials Downplay Syria Intervention*, Regional Media Highlight Role, Document ID# LIR2016071375179053, July 13, 2016.

¹¹ This group is an affiliate of the Islamic State. It controls territory east of the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. It was formed in a merger of groups in 2016. One of the merged organizations, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, had already been designated by the U.S. State Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity in June 2016. See <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258264.htm>. In late November 2016, the Khalid ibn al Walid Army fired mortars at the Israel Defense Force's (IDF's) Golani Reconnaissance Battalion. Israel responded with air strikes.

¹² “America's Modest Success in Syria, and Why It's Under Threat,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 2, 2016.

¹³ “Syrian rebels say Russian jets hit refugee camp along Jordan border,” Reuters, July 13, 2016.

¹⁴ The White House, Letter From The President- Supplemental 6-month War Powers Letter, December 5, 2016.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan

Since 2011, the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan has placed tremendous strain on the government and local economies, especially in the northern governorates of Mafraq, Irbid, Ar Ramtha, and Zarqa. The government, which had already been limiting its intake of Syrian refugees, officially closed all entry points to the kingdom in June 2016 after a suicide bomb attack on the Jordanian-Syrian border killed seven people at the remote Al Rukban refugee camp. In August 2016, King Abdullah II remarked that

the decision, to declare the northern and north-eastern borders closed military zones, came following several warnings by Jordan that extremist elements exist among makeshift camps near the border. We will not allow, under any circumstances, Daesh, outlaws or smugglers to create bases there.... We will not allow anyone to put pressure on us. Our national security tops our priorities and is above all other considerations. We are committed to working with the international community for a solution, but it will under no circumstance come at our expense.¹⁵


In order to improve the livelihoods of Syrian refugees already living in Jordan and to receive more external assistance from the international community, the Jordanian government has entered into an arrangement with foreign governments and international financial institutions known as the Jordan Compact. Reached in February 2016 at a donor conference in London, the Compact aims to provide work permits to 200,000 Syrian refugees enabling them to be legally employed in the kingdom. Jordan also will expand access to education for over 165,000 Syrian children. In return, the Jordanian government will receive low-interest loans from foreign creditors (such as the World Bank's Global Concessional Financing Facility) and preferential access to European markets for goods produced in special economic zones with a high degree of Syrian labor participation (15%).

¹⁵ Open Source Center, "His Majesty's Interview with Addustour Newspaper," Document ID# LIR2016081574765426, *Al-Ghadd Online* in English, August 15, 2016.

The “Berm”

As of January 2017, approximately 85,000 Syrians remain stranded in a no-man’s land, commonly referred to as the “Berm,” an isolated desert area just inside Jordanian territory where earthen mounds (or berms) mark the border with Syria. According to USAID, the population at the Berm includes large numbers of extremely vulnerable people—more than half are children. As previously mentioned, a June 2016 attack near the border has led authorities to close the area, shutting down deliveries of humanitarian aid. Periodically, the Jordanian government has used cranes to drop shipments of aid over the earthen wall demarcating the border. Living conditions at the makeshift camps at the Berm, known as Rukban and Hadalat, are poor, with no sanitation, running water, or electricity.

On January 21, 2017, a car bomb attack inside the Rukban refugee camp at the Berm killed at least four people. One Syrian rebel group, known as Jaish al Ashair, maintains a checkpoint inside the camp, and that checkpoint was the apparent target of the bombing. A similar attack killed three people in Rukban in October 2016.¹⁶



Source: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF).

Relations with Israel

The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. In 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,¹⁷ and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semicordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid. Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for Jordan. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel.

¹⁶ “Blast kills Four in Syrian Camp near Jordan: Monitor,” *Reuters*, January 21, 2017

¹⁷ Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).

Natural Gas Deal with Israel

In September 2016, Jordan's state-run National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) signed a 15-year, \$10 billion natural gas import deal with a consortium of U.S. (Noble Energy Inc.) and Israeli (Delek Drilling-LP and others) companies. The contract calls for the companies to supply 1.6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to Jordan, which would reportedly meet an estimated 40% of the country's electricity needs. Shipments to Jordan from Israel's offshore Leviathan field will begin in 2019 through a pipeline currently under construction. NEPCO has stated that as a result of this deal, sharp hikes in electricity prices for Jordanian consumers will be avoided, and the government will save \$600 million annually on energy costs. Since 2011, Jordan has had to purchase more natural gas on the open market as pipeline shipments from Egypt have been cut owing to repeated terrorist attacks against gas pipelines in the Sinai Peninsula. While there have been regular public protests in Jordan as a result of this deal with Israel, the protests appear to have been relatively subdued.

Trump Pledge to Relocate the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem

The Jordanian government has reacted negatively to the pledge by President Trump to relocate the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In early January 2017, Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad Momani warned that an embassy move would be a "red line" for Jordan and "inflame the Islamic and Arab streets."²⁰ He also said that such a move would "definitely affect the bilateral relationship" between Jordan and the United States and would serve as a "gift to extremists." At this time, it is unclear how strong a Jordanian domestic reaction will be to any U.S. embassy relocation. Some observers are questioning the proposal due to its potentially destabilizing effects.²¹ However, proponents of a move downplay such concerns.²²

Holy Sites in Jerusalem¹⁸

Per arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 and then subsequently confirmed in their 1994 bilateral peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem's historic Muslim shrines.¹⁹ A Jordanian *waqf* (or Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family's rule. Successive Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that appear to circumscribe King Abdullah II's role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political problem for the King. Jewish worship on the Mount/Haram is prohibited under a long-standing "status quo" arrangement.

¹⁸ For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, *Israel: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jim Zanotti.

¹⁹ Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that "Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines." In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to serve as the "Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem," a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924.

²⁰ "Jordan Not Pleased With Proposed Embassy Move," Associated Press, January 5, 2017.

²¹ According to one analyst, "At a time when Middle East states are crumbling, does it make sense to risk the stability of a key partner in fighting regional extremism? Would a Jordanian government be able to maintain the same level of diplomatic relations with Washington or continue to host U.S. counter-terrorist forces and training programs after such (continued...)"

Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation

Despite disputes over Jerusalem, bilateral cooperation is ongoing in other areas, most notably on military and water issues. In the summer of 2015, multiple reports suggested that an unnamed Arab country participated in “Red Flag” training exercises alongside U.S. and Israeli pilots. One U.S. official suggested that Jordanian warplanes participated in these multinational drills and Jordanian jets even “refueled from an Israeli tanker over the Atlantic Ocean.”²³

On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, a multibillion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. Under this December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority agreed to a water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea.

In February 2015, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement establishing a joint agency to administer the construction of the Red-Dead Canal and an associated desalination plant. In late 2015, Jordan moved ahead by issuing a “prequalification tender” to private companies and consortiums interested in contracting for phase one of the project to build a water conveyance system (pipeline) from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea.

P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that \$100 million in Economic Support Funds be set aside for water sector support for Jordan. This aid is intended to support the Red Sea-Dead Sea water project, pending completion of relevant studies and assessments.

Country Background

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River

(...continued)

a provocative move?” See “Hidden Dangers of Moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem,” *The RAND Blog*, December 28, 2016.

²² Amiad Cohen, “Please, America, Move Your Embassy to Jerusalem,” *New York Times*, December 27, 2016; “Moving the US embassy to Jerusalem,” *Economist*, December 24, 2016.

²³ “Jordanian Combat Pilots flew with Israel Counterparts in Recent US Exercise,” *Times of Israel*, November 3, 2015.

known as the West Bank.²⁴ The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their general exclusion from certain public-sector and military positions.²⁵

The Hashemite Royal Family

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 55) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the rank of Major General. The king’s son, Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (born in 1994), is the designated crown prince.²⁶

The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (cabinet).²⁷ On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

Political System and Key Institutions

The Jordanian constitution, most recently amended in 2016, empowers the king with broad executive powers. The king appoints the prime minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He also has the sole power to appoint the crown prince, senior military leaders, justices of the constitutional court, and all 75 members of the senate. The king appoints cabinet ministers. The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.²⁸ The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.²⁹ The king also must approve laws before they can

²⁴ Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.

²⁵ Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948) in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.

²⁶ In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.

²⁷ In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister. Although the king retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime minister would be chosen by the largest bloc in parliament.

²⁸ The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”

²⁹ New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue (continued...)

take effect, although a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament can modify legislation. The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (*lèse-majesté*), with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.

Jordan's constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, "Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law." Jordan has three main types of courts: civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and "security offenses." Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.

Parliament and Elections

Although King Abdullah II has envisioned Jordan's gradual transition from a constitutional monarchy into a full-fledged parliamentary democracy,³⁰ in reality, successive Jordanian parliaments have mostly complied with the policies laid out by the Royal Court. The legislative branch's independence has been curtailed not only by a legal system that rests authority largely in the hands of the monarch, but also by carefully crafted electoral laws designed to produce pro-palace majorities with each new election.³¹ Due to frequent gerrymandering in which electoral districts are drawn to favor more rural pro-government constituencies over densely populated urban areas, parliamentary elections have produced large pro-government majorities dominated by representatives of prominent tribal families. In addition, voter turnout tends to be much higher in pro-government areas since many East Bank Jordanians depend on family/tribal connections as a means to access patronage jobs.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB) is the strongest opposition group, but it is divided between reformists and conservatives, and pro- and anti-monarchical factions. Youth protestors remain active in opposition political circles, but they tend to act in small groups and appear divided along secular/Islamist and regional/tribal lines. Political parties in Jordan, which were abolished from 1957 to 1992, are extremely weak; the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.


(...continued)

temporary laws.

³⁰ See "Making Our Democratic System Work for All Jordanians," Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein, January 16, 2013, available online at http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/pages/view/id/248.html.

³¹ "How Jordan's Election Revealed Enduring Weaknesses in Its Political System," *Washington Post*, October 3, 2016.

Figure 4. Districting and Seat Allocation for 2016 Elections



Source: Independent Election Commission published by the Jordanian Embassy in Washington, DC.

Parliamentary elections for Jordan's Lower House (Chamber of Deputies) were last held in September 2016 under a new electoral law that permitted voters to cast ballots both for individual representatives allotted to their districts (the kingdom is divided into 23 electoral districts) and for party lists (a system known as open-list proportional representation, or PR). There were quotas for women (15 seats), Christians (9), and Circassians and Chechens (3). Members serve a four-year term, and the voting process was overseen by the Independent Elections Commission (IEC).

Traditionally, Islamist groups, such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, have participated in the political system, including in parliamentary elections (but not every time).³² In 1989 parliamentary elections, it won 22 out of 80 seats in the lower house, and combined with other allied groups it controlled 34 seats total, a historic high. The political wing of the original Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, known as the Islamic Action Front, or IAF, had boycotted the previous two parliamentary elections in 2013 and 2010.

Leading up to the 2016 elections, divisions within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood over the trajectory of its political approach toward the government (accommodating versus confrontational) led to its splintering into smaller factions.³³ Jordanian authorities also contributed to the internal division of Islamists by outlawing the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood for its association with the Brotherhood in Egypt. As a result, IAF-affiliated candidates formed a broad coalition to compete in the elections under the National Coalition for Reform (NCR), which also

³² In order to legitimize Jordanian parliamentary elections in the eyes of the West, Jordan is eager to have opposition participation.

³³ Out of the original Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, there are now at least four offshoot political groups: The Muslim Brotherhood Society (officially licensed by the government), the Zamzam Initiative (liberal), the Muslim Center Party (al Wasat), and the Muslim Brotherhood Group/IAF (holdovers from the original parent organization and unlicensed who ran under the NCR coalition).

fielded Christians and women on its slate of candidates and dropped the Brotherhood’s infamous slogan, “Islam is the solution,” and replaced it with “Reform.”

The elections, which witnessed low voter turnout of 37%, saw the NCR list winning 17 out of 130 seats. This was more than any other party list, but observers note that it “only won 11.6% of the vote in the 11 districts in which it competed.”³⁴ Of the three other competing Islamist lists, only one of them, the Muslim Brotherhood Society, secured a seat in parliament. The election witnessed 20 women candidates elected to parliament, the most ever in Jordanian history.

Figure 5. Selected Members of the Jordanian Royal Family

	<p>King Abdullah II ibn Al Hussein (born 1962) King Abdullah II has been King of Jordan since February 7, 1999, when he succeeded his father King Hussein. Since his ascent to the throne, King Abdullah II has maintained a relatively stable country and a favorable international reputation. The king is a major general in the Jordanian military and has studied at Oxford, Georgetown, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. King Abdullah II is married to Queen Rania, and they have four children.</p>
	<p>Prince Feisal ibn Al Hussein (born 1963) <i>Brother to the king</i> Prince Feisal is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Jordan Armed Forces and has served as regent during Abdullah II’s absences abroad. He is president of the Jordan Olympics Committee and a member of the International Olympic Committee, and he founded the non-profit organization Generations for Peace. He is married to Alia Tabba, and they have four children.</p>
	<p>Princess Aisha bint Al Hussein (born 1968) <i>Sister to the king</i> Princess Aisha is the defense attaché with Jordan’s embassy in Washington. She is a major general in the Jordanian military and a member of NATO’s Women Mediterranean Dialogue. Princess Aisha studied at Oxford, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and the National Defense University in Washington. She is married to Zeid Saadedine Juma, and they have two children.</p>
	<p>Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein (born 1964) <i>Son of Prince Ra’ad bin Zeid of Jordan; distant relation to the king</i> Prince Zeid has been the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights since September 2014. Before that, he was Jordan’s ambassador to the US and non-resident ambassador to Mexico (2007-2010). He played an important role in establishing the International Criminal Court and was elected first president of the Assembly of State Parties of the International Criminal Court in 2002. From 1994-1996, he was a political affairs officer in UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia. He is married to Sarah Butler, and they have three children.</p>
	<p>Crown Prince Hussein ibn Abdullah (born 1994) <i>Son of the king and heir apparent</i> Hussein was named Crown Prince in 2009 and has occasionally served as regent since coming of age in 2012. He is currently a student at Georgetown University, majoring in Political Science. He holds the title first lieutenant in the Jordanian military. His “Haqeq” (achieve) initiative is a civic-minded youth organization.</p>

Source: Created by CRS. Images derived from various media sources.


³⁴ Kirk H. Sowell, “Takeaways From Jordan’s Elections,” *Sada*, Middle East Analysis from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 30, 2016.

The Economy

There is widespread dissatisfaction in Jordan with the state of the economy. With few natural resources and a small industrial base, Jordan’s economy is heavily dependent on aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector. In 2016, the economy grew sluggishly at around 2%. Among the long-standing problems Jordan faces are poverty, corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment (especially female unemployment). Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a “brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers from leaving. The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll.

Due to perennially slow economic growth, high energy/food subsidies, and its large public-sector workforce, Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is \$35.4 billion, and net public debt was 90% of 2016 GDP), which it partially offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the IMF agreed to a three-year, \$2 billion loan in August 2012. In 2016, the IMF and Jordan reached a new, three-year \$723 million extended fund facility (EFF) agreement that commits Jordan to improving the business environment for the private sector, reducing budget expenditures, and reforming the tax code.

Figure 6. Public Opinion Polling in Jordan
IRI Data on Economy and Politics (June 20, 2016)



Source: International Republican Institute.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by State and USAID) to Jordan through FY2016 amounted to approximately \$17.108 billion. With more U.S. aid to Jordan being channeled through the Defense Department's security assistance accounts, Jordan has received \$774.6 million in additional military aid since FY2014.

Three-Year MOU on U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan

On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with \$1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017. The new MOU followed a previous five-year agreement in which the United States had pledged to provide a total of \$660 million annually from FY2009 through FY2014. During those five years, Congress actually provided Jordan with \$4.753 billion in total aid, or \$1.453 billion (\$290.6 million annually) above what was agreed to in the five-year MOU, including more than \$1 billion in FY2014. According to the Department of State,

The United States and Jordan share a commitment to promoting regional security and stability, furthering Jordan's economic development, and advancing social, political, and economic reform in Jordan. The United States recognizes Jordan's increased immediate needs resulting from regional unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight against ISIL and other extremist ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy supplies, and other unprecedented strains.³⁵

Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2014-FY2017 Request
(in millions of dollars)

Account	FY2014	FY2015 est.	FY2016 est.	FY2017 Request
State Dept.—ESF (+OCO)	700.0	615.0	812.350	632.4
State Dept.—FMF (+OCO)	300.0	385.0	450.0	350.0
State Dept.—NADR	6.70	7.20	8.850	13.6
IMET	3.5	3.8	3.8	4.0
DOD O&M (Coalition Support Funds)	—	147.0 (allocated over 2014-2015)	105.000	TBD
DOD—1206/2282 (CTPF)	—	276.930	162.930	TBD
DOD—2282	—	27.762	55.0	TBD
Total	1,010.200	1,462.692	1,597.93	1,000.0

Source: U.S. State and Defense Departments.

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, "The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Assistance," Office of the Spokesperson, February 3, 2015.

Economic Assistance

The United States provides economic aid to Jordan both as a cash transfer and for USAID programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt. Approximately 40% to 60% of Jordan's ESF allotment may go toward the cash transfer.³⁶ USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament's support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.

Humanitarian Assistance for Syrian Refugees in Jordan

The U.S. State Department estimates that, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, it has allocated more than \$814 million in humanitarian assistance from global accounts to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis. U.S. aid supports refugees living in camps (20% of all refugees) and those living in towns and cities (80%). According to the State Department, U.S. humanitarian assistance is provided both as cash assistance and through programs to meet basic needs, such as child health care, water, and sanitation.

Millennium Challenge Account

In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold country in the lower-middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC's board of directors approved up to \$25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, \$275.1 million compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also is intended to help improve the efficiency of water delivery, wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian citizens with freshwater.

Loan Guarantees

Since 2013, the Obama Administration provided three loan guarantees to Jordan, totaling \$3.75 billion.³⁷ These include the following:

³⁶ In 2016, the United States provided \$470 million in ESF to Jordan as a cash transfer (59% of the total ESF allocation for Jordan).

³⁷ Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same act also appropriated \$30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan guarantees for Jordan in Section 7034(r)(1) of P.L. 113-235 (Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015). P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, once again reauthorized loan guarantees to Jordan.

- In September 2013, the United States announced that it was providing its first-ever loan guarantee to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to \$120 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO to support a \$1.25 billion, seven-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.
- In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King Abdullah II, the Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an additional five-year, \$1 billion loan guarantee. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate \$72 million out of the \$340 million of FY2014 ESF-OCO for Jordan to support the subsidy costs for the second loan guarantee.
- In June 2015, the Administration provided its third loan guarantee to Jordan of \$1.5 billion. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate \$221 million in FY2015 ESF to support the subsidy costs of the third loan guarantee to Jordan.³⁸

Military Assistance

Foreign Military Financing

U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain conventional weapons systems.³⁹ On February 18, 2016, President Obama signed the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-123), which authorizes expedited review and an increased value threshold for proposed arms sales to Jordan for a period of three years. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan's purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan's border monitoring and counter-terror capability. In recent years, Jordan also has acquired Javelin missiles, Hellfire missiles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices.⁴⁰ Recent proposed arms sales notified to Congress include 35 Meter Coastal Patrol Boats; M31 Unitary Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) Rocket Pods; UH-60M VIP Blackhawk helicopter; and repair and return of F-16 engines.⁴¹

Excess Defense Articles

In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development.⁴² In the last five years, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.

³⁸ Op. cit., Congressional Notification #74.

³⁹ According to Jane's Defense, Jordan's 2016 defense budget was \$1.827 billion. See *Jane's Defence Budgets*, Jordan, November 21, 2016.

⁴⁰ Information provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, January 2014.

⁴¹ Information provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, May 2016.

⁴² See Designation of Jordan As Major Non-NATO Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97-4, November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.

Defense Department Assistance

As a result of the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through Defense Department-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid from the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan's border security. Currently, Congress has authorized Jordan to receive funding from three primary accounts: (1) Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 Authority to Build Partner Capacity,⁴³ (2) the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF),⁴⁴ and (3) Department of Defense Operations & Maintenance Funds (O&M).⁴⁵ Military aid provided by these accounts is generally coordinated through a joint Defense Department (DOD)-State Department (DOS) review and approved by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Among congressional notifications of 10 U.S.C. 2282 activities between FY2015 and FY2016, Defense Department assistance to Jordan includes the following:

- Operational equipment (body armor/ammunition) for counter-terrorism (\$45.76 million);
- Special Operations equipment (night-vision devices) for counter-terrorism (\$22.73 million);
- Weapons, communication and electronics equipment, and military training for the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) to conduct counterterrorism operations (\$11.2 million),⁴⁶
- Vehicles, equipment, weapons, munitions, and training for the Jordanian Border Guard to respond to border incursions by terrorist elements (\$60.1 million);

⁴³ Section 1205 of P.L. 113-291, the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, permits the transfer of other appropriated funds (such as CTPF monies) to conduct programs under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.

⁴⁴ Section 9012 of P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that "up to \$600,000,000 of funds appropriated by this Act for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund may be used to provide assistance to the Government of Jordan to support the armed forces of Jordan and to enhance security along its borders." Section 1226 of P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act FY2016, authorized FY2016 CTPF funds "pursuant to section 1534 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 (P.L. 113-291; 128 Stat. 3616)."

⁴⁵ Section 1207 of P.L. 113-66, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), originally authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide up to \$150 million in "assistance on a reimbursement basis to the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and Syria." The FY2015 Omnibus, P.L. 113-235, permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO funds to "reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine to maintain the ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border between Jordan and Syria." Section 1226 of P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act FY2016, authorized funds available for reimbursement of certain coalition nations for support provided to United States military operations pursuant to Section 1233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 393). P.L. 114-113, the FY2016 Omnibus Appropriations Act, specifies that funds from Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide "may be used to support the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon, in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to enhance the ability of the armed forces of Jordan to increase or sustain security along its borders and the ability of the armed forces of Lebanon to increase or sustain security along its borders, upon 15 days prior written notification to the congressional defense committees outlining the amounts intended to be provided and the nature of the expenses incurred."

⁴⁶ \$1 million originally notified for this program was subsequently reprogrammed to a Kenya security cooperation activity.

- Weapons, ammunition, night-vision devices, other equipment, and training for the Jordanian Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to disrupt terrorist groups attempting to operate within Jordan's borders (\$16.8 million);
- Fixed-wing ISR aircraft and related support for the Jordanian Air Force to support operations against regional terrorist organizations (\$16.6 million);
- Eight UH-60 helicopters to provide the Jordanian QRF with lift capabilities (\$200 million);
- Four additional UH-60 helicopters to provide Jordanian QRF with lift capabilities (\$117.2 million); and
- Defense Institute International Legal Studies (DILS) seminar to promote human rights and civilian control of the military (\$40,000).

Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
(in millions of dollars)

Fiscal Year (FY)	Economic Assistance				Military Assistance		Totals
	EconSpt	Food	Devel	PeaceCp	FMF	IMET	
1991	35.0 ^a	0	0	0	20.0 ^a	1.3	56.30
1992	30.0 ^b	20.0	0	0	20.0 ^b	.6	70.60
1993 ^c	5.0	30.0	0	0	9.0	.5	44.50
1994 ^d	9.0	15.0	4.0	0	9.0	.8	37.80
1995	7.2	15.0	6.7	0	7.3	1.0	37.20
1996	7.2	21.0	7.9	0	200.0 ^e	1.2	237.30
1997 ^f	112.2	2.6	4.5	1.1	30.0	1.7	152.10
1998 ^f	150.0	0	0	1.2	75.0 ^g	1.6	227.80
1999	150.0	0	0	1.4	70.0 ^g	1.6	223.00
1999 (Wye)	50.0	0	0	0	50.0	0	100.00
2000	150.0	0	0	1.7	75.0	1.6	228.30
2000 (Wye)	50.0	0	0	0	150.0	0	200.00 ^h
2001	150.0	0	0	1.7	75.0	1.7	228.40
2002	150.0	0	0	1.6	75.0	2.0	228.60
2002 (Suppl.)	100.0	0	0	0	25.0	0	125.00
2003	250.0	0	0	1.0	198.0	2.4	451.40
2003 (Suppl.)	700.0	0	0	0	406.0	0	1,106.00
2004	250.0	0	0	2.3	206.0	2.9	461.20
2004 (Suppl.)	100.0	0	0	0	0	0	100.00
2005	250.0	0	0	1.6	206.0	3.0	460.60
2005 (Suppl.)	100.0	0	0	0	100.0	0	200.00
2006	247.5	0	0	1.6	207.9	3.0	460.00
2006 (Suppl.)	50.0	0	0	0	0	0	50.00
2007	245.0	0	0	0	206.0	3.1	454.10
2007 (Suppl.)	10.3	0	0	0	45.0	0	55.30 ⁱ
2008	361.4	0	0	0	298.3	2.9	662.60

Fiscal Year (FY)	Economic Assistance				Military Assistance		Totals
	EconSpt	Food	Devel	PeaceCp	FMF	IMET	
2008 (Suppl.)	200.0	0	0	0	50.0	0	250.00
2009	263.5	0	0	0	235.0	3.1	501.60
2009 (Suppl.)	150.0	0	0	0	(150.0 in FY2010 Advanced funding)	0	150.00
2010	363.0	0	0	0	300.0	3.8	666.8
2010 (Suppl.)	100.0	0	0	0	50.0	0	150.0
2011	362.0	0	0	0	299.4	3.7	665.1
2012	460.0	0	0	0	300.0	3.7	763.7
2013	564.404	0	0	0	284.829	3.608	852.841
2014	700.0i	0	0	0	300.0	3.588	1,003.588
2015	615.0	0	0	0	385.0	3.888	1,003.888
2016 est.	812.350	0	0	0	450.0	3.8	1,266.15

Notes: These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance. They also do not include appropriations from Defense Department-managed accounts.

- a. Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
- b. Released in late July 1993.
- c. Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, September 17, 1993.
- d. FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, January 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
- e. Three components: \$30 million (Administration's original request); \$70 million in additional FMF under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and \$100 million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
- f. These figures include \$100 million in economic assistance under the President's Middle East Peace and Stability Fund (\$100 million in FY1997, \$116 million in FY1998).
- g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes \$25 million in drawdown authority.
- h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
- i. Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was \$85.3 million. The above chart does not include \$25 million in NADR funds.
- j. The total \$700 million FY2014 ESF appropriation to Jordan was split between enduring (\$360 million) and OCO (\$340 million) funds.

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