

COI Focus

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Table of Contents

1. General	3
1.1 Short historical overview	3
1.2 Actors	5
1.2.1 Security Forces	5
1.2.2 Militant Groups.....	6
1.2.3 Nationalist Insurgent Groups.....	10
1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations.....	10
1.4 Anti terrorism acts	11
1.5 Impact of violence on civilians	12
2. FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa	17
3. Balochistan	19
4. Punjab	20
5. Sindh	21
6. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan	22
Bibliography	24

1. General

1.1 Short historical overview

This chapter describes the security situation in Pakistan in recent times, and tries to give an indication to the current state of affairs.

The instability in northwestern Pakistan is the result of the 2001 toppling of the Taliban-regime in Afghanistan. Many Afghan Taliban settled in Pakistan Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, currently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), having fled the collusion invasion. Under their influence several Pakistani groups with a similar ideology went on working together in what became a federation of armed groups. This resulted in the so called Talibanisation of the region. Their policies included a strict application of conservative Islamic principles and resulted in violence against the civilian population and eventually the Pakistani authorities ¹. Since 2007 the Pakistani army conducts in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa military operations aiming at breaking the power of the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated organizations ². Especially in 2009 this army offensive caused a massive displacement ³. In spite of repeated peace agreements and triumphal statements by the Pakistani army command the violence has continued in recent years. Occasional confrontations between the security apparatus and insurgents, terror attacks and anti-terrorism campaigns persist. Moreover since 2004 the US army conducts drone attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the region ⁴. In recent years most of those have occurred in North-Waziristan ⁵.

In spite of the provincial elections victory of a number of nationalist parties in May 2013 the insurgency in Balochistan continues to cause bloodshed. Balochi activists claimed that in the period 2013-2015 the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies continued targeting Balochi activists. There were a number of disappearances and extrajudicial killings ⁶. Apart of that sectarian tensions are on the rise in recent years. In particular the Shia Hazara community in Quetta are victims of murders and terror attacks ⁷.

Over the last number of years the tensions between Mohajir and the Pashtun-population in Karachi have increased. The power struggle between both populations groups translated into numerous political murders of members of the Muttahadi Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party

¹ Amnesty International, *As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan*, 10 June 2010; Rashid, A., *Descent into Chaos*, 2008, pp.265-270.

² Critical Threats/ AEI, *Pakistani Military Operation in North Waziristan: Knowing the Battlefield*, 16 June 2014; ICG, *Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA*, *Asia Report N°178*, 21 October 2009; Thomson Reuters Foundation, *Pakistan Violence*, 11 April 2013; World Politics Review, *FATA: The Never-Ending War on Pakistan's Periphery*, 6 January 2015

³ Amnesty International, *As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan*, 10 June 2010; ICG, *Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis*, *Asia Briefing N°111*, 16/09/2010

⁴ HRW, *World Report 2015 – Pakistan*, January 2015; ICG, *Drones: Myths And Reality In Pakistan*, *Asia Report N°247*, 21 May 2013

⁵ Roggio, B., *Charting the data on US strikes in Pakistan 2004- 2014*, 2014

⁶ AHCR, *Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were found during 2013*, 8 January 2014; Al Jazeera, *From rallies to armed resistance in Balochistan*, 6 May 2014; Deutsche Welle, *'Pakistani army involved in Baloch kidnappings'*, 6 December 2013; IBT, *Balochistan: 'Hundreds of people abducted and murdered by Pakistan army' activists say*, 11 March 2015

⁷ Dawn, *Eights Hazaras gunned down in Quetta bus attack*, 23 October 2014; HRW, *We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan*, 30 June 2014

(ANP), Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Furthermore sectarian tensions rose and militants of the Taliban sought refuge in the city ⁸.

Actions of the Pakistani military prompted the Punjabi faction of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to surrender and renounce terrorism in Pakistan in September 2014. The group said it will focus future violent attacks on military and government targets in Afghanistan ⁹.

Prime Minister Sharif initially opted for negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban, which proved to be a difficult and complex task ¹⁰. The talks started in earnest on 6 February 2014 in Islamabad,¹¹ but were soon stalled after the Mohmand wing of the Taliban executed 23 soldiers of the Frontier Corps, who had been held since 2010 ¹². In an effort to restart negotiations the Taliban announced a month-long ceasefire on 1 March 2014, ¹³ which eventually ended on 17 April 2014 ¹⁴. What was left of the peace talks finally collapsed after the terrorist attack on Mohammad Ali Jinnah airport in Karachi on 8 June 2014, which left 26 people dead. Although the attack was executed by militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility ¹⁵. On 15 June 2014 the Pakistani army launched an offensive in order to eradicate "*foreign and local terrorists*". The main targets were militant strongholds in the North-Waziristan tribal region where insurgents enjoyed sanctuary. The operation was codenamed Zarb-e-Azb ¹⁶. The fighting continued during 2014, but without giving the army a decisive victory over the Taliban and its allies in FATA ¹⁷. The militants struck back with terrorism: on 2 November 2014 a suicide bombing claimed 60 lives at the Wagah border crossing near Lahore, a symbolic and sensitive area ¹⁸. On 16 December 2014 seven gunmen, apparently affiliated with the TTP, entered an army public school in Peshawar. They opened fire on school staff and children, killing 145 people, including 132 minors, mostly children of army staff. It was the deadliest terrorist attack ever conducted in Pakistan and it left the population stunned and the army command livid ¹⁹. The Army Chief of Staff, general Raheel Sharif, urged the government to take strong action against the Taliban ²⁰. On 25 December 2014, after consultation with different political parties, prime minister Sharif announced a 20 point comprehensive plan of action in order to confront the terrorist threat. Special courts would be established for the speedy trial of terror suspects and a moratorium on capital punishment was lifted. Six convicted terrorists have been hanged since the lifting of the ban. Furthermore a 5000-strong counter terrorism force would be deployed across the country. No armed militias would be allowed to function in the country

⁸ DINA, *Pakistan: nearly 3,000 killed in Karachi violence in 2014*, 7 January 2015; HRW, *World Report 2015 – Pakistan*, January 2015; USIP, *Conflict dynamics in Karachi*, 19 October 2012

⁹ HRW, *World Report 2015 – Pakistan*, January 2015

¹⁰ Washington Post (The), *Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's effort to seek peace with Pakistani Taliban of to rocky start*, 19 September 2013

¹¹ BBC, *Pakistan enters peace talks with Taliban*, 6 February 2014

¹² Reuters, *Peace Talks between Pakistan and Taliban collapse after killings*, 17 February 2014; Telegraph (The), *Peace talks collapse as Taliban execute 23 Pakistani soldiers*, 17 February 2014

¹³ Dawn, *Pakistani Taliban announce a month-long ceasefire*, 2 March 2014

¹⁴ Dawn, *TTP ends ceasefire, says talks option open*, 17 April 2014

¹⁵ Associated Press, *Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport*, 10 June 2014

¹⁶ BBC, *Pakistan army North Waziristan offensive: thousands flee*, 19 June 2014; Dawn, *Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan*, 16 June 2014; Reuters, *Pakistan army in for long haul in offensive against Taliban*, 17 June 2014

¹⁷ Jane's, *Uncertain Victory – Pakistan's North Waziristan Offensive*, 28 December 2014

¹⁸ Dawn, *TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead*, 3 November 2014; Guardian (The), *Dozens killed at suicide attack at Pakistan-India border post*, 2 November 2014

¹⁹ CNN, *In Pakistan school attack, Taliban terrorists kill 145, mostly children*, 17 December 2014; New York Times (The), *Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead*, 16 December 2014

²⁰ Economist (The), *The man with the plan: Pakistan after the school massacre*, 24 January 2015

and their funding would be "choked". Hate speech would be forbidden. Army commander Sharif confirmed that military operations in the tribal areas would continue ²¹.

1.2 Actors

1.2.1 Security Forces

The **Pakistan Armed Forces** currently have 643,800 combat troops at their disposal, of which 550.000 belong to the army. Operational control rests with the National Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan's nuclear and conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and structured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008, however, a priority for the army has been counter-insurgency operations, mainly against Islamist groups for which forces have been redeployed from the Indian border ²². In the east of the country the 11th corps is stationed in Peshawar and the 12th corps in Quetta ²³. The military gradually gained control of a large part of the country's economic resources. It is entrenched in the country's corporate sector and controls some of Pakistan's largest companies and significant tracts of real estate. It enabled them to become an independent class ²⁴. The Pakistan army has developed a very strong 'esprit de corps'. As Anatol Lieven observes:

The Pakistan military, more even than most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civil society ²⁵.

The unity of the army is scrupulously guarded. Islamist conspiracies by junior officers against their superiors have in the past been penetrated and smashed by Military Intelligence. The efficient reputation of the army means that the institution is admired by large parts of the general populace and in the past every military coup in Pakistan when it happened was popular with most Pakistanis ²⁶.

A section of the army often imbedded in controversy is the Military Intelligence, the feared Inter Intelligence Service (ISI). The agency has opaque relations with a number of extremist Islamist groups. In the nineties the ISI used the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset to raise Pakistani influence in Afghanistan ²⁷. At the same time close ties were established with outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed to put pressure on India, with whom Pakistan was already for decades embroiled on the issue of Kashmir. ISI agenda was to create a pro-Pakistan movement inside Azad Kashmir and therefore supported the targeting of pro-independence activist groups like the JKLF ²⁸. The strategy of ISI has partly backfired after 9/11 when a homegrown Pakistani Taliban formed. Some factions of Jaish-e-Mohammed joined this Taliban while Lashkar-e-Taiba developed an independent radical agenda culminating in the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008 ²⁹.

The **Frontier Corps** is an auxiliary military force, theoretically residing under the Interior Ministry, but commanded by army officers. There are two major subdivisions, one stationed in Khyber-

²¹ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *Fight against terrorism: Defining moment*, 25 December 2014

²² IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 2015

²³ Singh, R.S.N., *The Military factor in Pakistan*, p.378

²⁴ Globalsecurity, *Pakistan Army*, s.d.; Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, pp.169-170

²⁵ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, p.163

²⁶ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, pp.163-164

²⁷ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, p.188

²⁸ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, pp.189-190

²⁹ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, pp.194-196

Pakhtunkwa/FATA and one stationed in Balochistan³⁰. It's total strength is approximately 70,000³¹. The Frontier Corps help local law enforcement maintaining law and order, border control and fighting organized crime³². In FATA army and Frontier Corps have been involved in human rights violations³³. In Balochistan the corps, together with the army and intelligence services, are said to be involved in extrajudicial killings and disappearances³⁴.

The **Rangers** are a paramilitary force residing under the Interior Ministry³⁵. There are two major subdivisions, the Punjabi Rangers headquartered in Lahore and the Sindh Rangers headquartered in Karachi³⁶. The Rangers help local law enforcement, border security and fight smuggling³⁷. Their total strength is about 20,000 in Punjab and 25,000 in Sindh³⁸. The Rangers have sometimes been named as human rights abusers, notably in Sindh³⁹.

The Pakistani **Police** has a strength of 354,000. There are 1479 police stations throughout the country. The police is generally understood to be underfunded and is facing a difficult task fighting rising amounts of crime and in certain regions activity of militants and insurgents. The reputation of the police itself is not good. As a USIP-report observes:

*The police in Pakistan have a terrible reputation, and ordinary people often avoid approaching police to report crime or communicate grievances. There is a general perception that the institution of the police is corrupt, institutionally incompetent and, brutal ... Even internal police assessments acknowledge the police's lack of credibility in the public eye.*⁴⁰

In Khyber-Pakhtunkwa and FATA Pakistani army and police sometimes use irregular militia, so called **Lashkars**, to control territory. They are often called "government Taliban". Some of them are in fact former Taliban. Occasionally they use indiscriminate and punitive force engaging in punitive destruction of houses belonging to suspected Taliban and their families, arbitrary arrest and unlawful killings⁴¹.

1.2.2 Militant Groups

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is the largest militant group active in Pakistan. It was founded around 2007 as a loose formation of Deobandi groupings chiefly operating in the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan. Initial objectives of the organization were implementation of the sharia law and the ousting of coalition forces from Afghanistan. After president Pervez Musharraf took action against militants hiding in the red mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad, common action was taken

³⁰ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor (The), *Transforming Pakistan's Frontier Corps*, 29 March 2007

³¹ IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 2015; Pakistan Army, *A Journey from Scratch to Nuclear Power*, s.d.

³² Globalsecurity, *Frontier Corps*, s.d.

³³ AHCR, *Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were found during 2013*, 8 January 2014

³⁴ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years; Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan*, 28 July 2011

³⁵ Roggio, B., *Rangers deployed to secure Islamabad outskirts*, 24 April 2009

³⁶ Pakistan Rangers, *Introduction*, s.d.

³⁷ Pakistan Army, *Pakistan Rangers (Punjab)*, s.d.

³⁸ IISS, *The Military Balance 2015*, 2015; USIP, *Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Infrastructure*, February 2011

³⁹ HRCP, *State of Human Rights in 2013*, 2014

⁴⁰ USIP, *Reforming Pakistan's Police and Law Infrastructure*, February 2011, p.9

⁴¹ Amnesty International, *As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan*, 10 June 2010

against the Pakistani authorities⁴². In 2010 membership of TTP already reached 30,000 to 35,000 armed men⁴³. Militants are mostly Pashtun originating from the border zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Recruitment is on a voluntary base and most of these recruits are thought to be jobless youngsters. The Pakistani Taliban finances its activities by extortion, smuggling, drugs trade and kidnappings⁴⁴. TTP entertains strong ties with sectarian Deobandi organizations like Lashkar-e-Janghvi and Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat⁴⁵. In 2013 the TTP was responsible for 645 terror acts. These claimed the lives of 732 civilians and 425 members of the security forces. In FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkwha the organization was involved in 34 direct confrontations with the Pakistani army and security services. Though FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkwha are TTP's main operational area, terror attacks elsewhere in Pakistan and specifically Karachi have risen⁴⁶. On 1 November 2013 TTP official leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed by a drone-attack in North-Waziristan⁴⁷. The nomination of hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as his successor was considered as a rejection of possible peace attacks with the Pakistani authorities⁴⁸. In December 2014 TTP claimed responsibility for the Peshawar school attack, which killed 145 people. A spokesman said it was a retaliation for the ongoing army campaign in North-Waziristan⁴⁹.

In the Pakistani tribal regions there are several groups who operate alongside TTP but were initially not homegrown. First there is the **Haqqani Network**, lead by Afghani warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani. Originating from Loya Paktya (Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces) they now mainly operate in North-Waziristan. Though their main objective is attacking international forces in Afghanistan, they closely cooperate with TTP. The Haqqani Network also has a longstanding relation with the Pakistani Inter Intelligence Services (ISI) which had lead to frictions between Pakistan and the US⁵⁰. The vast majority of the Haqqani fighters belong to the Zadran tribe but there are also non-Pashtun militants including Arabas, Chechens and Uzbeks. The Haqqani network is believed to have ties with al-Qaeda⁵¹. American sources stated in November 2014 that ongoing Pakistani military operations in North-Waziristan have 'disrupted' the military capabilities of the Haqqani's⁵².

The **Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan** (IMU) has been active in the Pakistani tribal region since late 2001, where it regrouped after sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the Taliban during the US invasion of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of Toher Yuldashev the group targeted the Pakistani security forces from its bases in North and South Waziristan. From 2007 on the IMU formed an alliance with the TTP and fought alongside them. In 2009 Yuldashev was killed in a drone

⁴² CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012; Guardian (The), *Pakistan Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud is alive, says spy agency*, 28 April 2010

⁴³ SATP (South Asia Terrorism Portal), *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, 2015

⁴⁴ LandInfo, *Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterede forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) og Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)*, 8 November 2013

⁴⁵ NOREF, *Sectarian violence: Pakistan's greatest security threat?*, 9 August 2012

⁴⁶ PIPS, *2013, Pakistan Security Report 2013*, 4 January 2014

⁴⁷ Monde (Le), *Hakimullah Mehsud enterré, les Talibans choisissent un successeur*, 2 November 2013

⁴⁸ Guardian (The), *Pakistani Taliban select hardliner Mullah Fazlullah as new leader*, 8 November 2013

⁴⁹ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *TTP claim responsibility for Peshawar school attack*, 16 December 2014

⁵⁰ Asia Times, *Haqqani network sours Pakistan-US ties*, 20 September 2011; Economist (The), *The Haqqani Network. Snake Country. The Pakistan army's complex relationship with jihadists*, 1 October 2011; Foreign Policy, *Dealing with the Haqqani Network*, 23 September 2011; Rashid, A., *Descent into Chaos, 2008*, p.221.

⁵¹ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012

⁵² Dawn, *Operation Zarb-e-Azb disrupted Haqqani network; US general*, 6 November 2014

attack while Pakistani military operations forced the IMU to north-Waziristan where it started to cooperate with the Haqqani network. Osman Odil became the new leader of the organization. A radical splinter group of IMU, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), is aiming at exporting terrorism from its Pakistan base⁵³. On 8 June 2014 IMU militants staged a bloody attack on Karachi airport⁵⁴.

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, many **al Qaeda** operatives withdrew to the Pakistani tribal regions. By 2008 they were so deeply entrenched in Waziristan that according to American intelligence officials the area had become al Qaeda's "*international operations hub*"⁵⁵. Among their ranks were Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese muslims⁵⁶. In FATA Al Qaeda has aligned itself with several militant groups, offering support with manpower, training and propaganda. It also attacks the Pakistani government, which is viewed as apostate for allying itself with the US-led war on terrorism. Al Qaeda in Waziristan has developed privileged relations with the IJU⁵⁷. In December 2014 al-Qaeda lost two top operatives: the Pakistani army killed Adnan El-Shukrijuma in South-Waziristan,⁵⁸ while a US drone eliminated Umar Farooq in North-Waziristan⁵⁹.

It is not totally clear if the **Punjabi Taliban** are part of the TTP or are independent organizations. The most influential group of the Punjabi Taliban is lead by Maulana Asmatullah Muawiya. But there are several groups who were found facilitating TTP, Al Qaeda and LeJ. In 2014 the Punjabi Taliban claimed responsibility for only two terrorist attacks. In September 2014 Muawiya first intended to shift his militant activities from Pakistan to Afghanistan,⁶⁰ and some days later announced he would give up armed struggle in Pakistan entirely⁶¹.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is a former Deobandi political party founded in the early eighties by Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi in Jhang, in Punjab. It's principal aim is to fight shia influence in Pakistan. Jhangvi was assassinated in 1990, at which time Maulana Azam Tariq became the new leader of SSP. Tariq, in turn, was killed in 2003 when gunmen fired bullets into the vehicle he was travelling in. Tariq was succeeded by Maulana Ali Sher Hyderi. The organization is understood to have close ties to the Jihadi organization Jaish-e-Muhammad. Numerous reports have labelled SSP as a violent group. At the beginning of the century it was responsible for the murder of Shiite militants, ordinary Shiite citizens and attacks on Shiite mosques. In spite of the group denying being involved in violence president Musharraf banned it in 2002 while in 2005 the US listed SSP as a terrorist organization⁶². Part of SSP resurfaced in more recent years under the name Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, who under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ahmed Ludhianvi contested elections in 2014⁶³. Other members left SSP to form an apparently even more radical outfit under the name

⁵³ ISW, *Uzbek militancy in Pakistan's tribal region*, 27 January 2011

⁵⁴ Associated Press, *Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport*, 10 June 2014; BBC, *Karachi airport: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claims attack*, 11 June 2014

⁵⁵ Guardian (The), *Waziristan: the hub of al-Qaida operations*, 7 January 2008; Rashid, A., *Descent into Chaos, 2008*, pp.268-269

⁵⁶ Reuters Alertnet, *Analysis - The ties that kill: Pakistan militant groups uniting*, 30 May 2010

⁵⁷ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012

⁵⁸ Dawn, *Top Al Qaeda leader killed in South Waziristan*, 6 december 2014

⁵⁹ Dawn, *Al Qaeda leader Umar Farooq killed in N Waziristan drone strike*, 7 December 2014

⁶⁰ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report, 2015*; UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

⁶¹ Dawn, *Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan*, 13 September 2014

⁶² Canada Immigration and Refugee Board, *Pakistan: the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), including its activities and status (January 2003-July 2005)*, 26 July 2005; Dawn, 2009: *Southern Punjab extremism battle between haves and have-nots*, 21 May 2011; NOREF, *Sectarian violence: Pakistan's greatest security threat?*, 9 August 2012; Rashid, A., *Descent into Chaos, 2008*, pp.227-228; Roul, A., *Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan*, 5 May 2005

⁶³ New York Times (The), *Banned Group's Leader Given Pakistani Parliament Seat After Vote Dispute*, 10 April 2010

Lashkar-e Jhangvi (Lej). Other extremist splinter groups of SSP are the Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers, Tanzeem-ul-Haq, Al-Farooq and the Al-Badra Foundation ⁶⁴. Still, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) remnants of SSP keep on perpetrating attacks on Shiites into 2015. In January 2015 Pakistani authorities executed three convicted cadres of SSP ⁶⁵. The core of the SSP's supporters is formed by Sunni peasantry in the rural Jhang and by the merchant and trader classes in the urban centers. The madrassas are also a major recruiting ground for the SSP. Militants have been known to get jihadi training in Afghanistan. To fund its organization and activities the SSP has relied on contributions from its supporters in the form of zakat. Sunni business people contribute as well. It is also widely understood that the SSP thrives on considerable financial and logistic backing from the Saudi donors, who have wanted to curb Iran's influence over the Shia population in Pakistan ⁶⁶.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is a Deobandi terrorist group founded in 1996, when a number of militants led by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq broke away from Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan. LeJ is not political party, it is a purely paramilitary organization. Some claim that its creation was correlated with the 1994 of Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP) a Shiite militant group who targeted leaders of the SSP. There is also a line of thinking that the LeJ was formed as the militant wing of the SSP to carry out attacks against the Shia community and that it became independent when it gained more proficiency. In the years following LeJ became a formidable terrorist organization, responsible for 350 violent attacks prior to 2001. In later years there were bloody bombings on Shiite mosques. As SSP Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has cordial relations with Jaish-e-Muhammad ⁶⁷. President Musharraf banned LeJ in 2001 and the group joined the US terrorist list in 2001 ⁶⁸. Its underground violent activities continued unabated, especially against members of the Hazara community in Quetta ⁶⁹. In February 2013 Pakistani authorities arrested Malik Ishaq after LeJ had bombed a market place in Quetta, leaving more than eighty Shiite civilians dead ⁷⁰. Although most of the violence of LeJ is targeting Shiites the organization also cultivates a radical stance against Christians, Ahmadi and Sufi Muslims ⁷¹. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) attacks by LeJ members continued into 2015. In January 2015 Pakistani authorities executed several convicted activists of LeJ ⁷². Not much is known about the LeJ's financial resources. But like the SSP, the LeJ has also benefited from contributions made by other Deobandi groups and sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan ⁷³.

Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) is a small outfit active in the Khyber Agency of FATA, where it conducted 63 attacks in 2014, mainly attacks on shrines, security forces and leaders of rival sectarian groups. LI

⁶⁴ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012

⁶⁵ South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), *Incidents and Statements Involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan: 2015*, 2015

⁶⁶ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012

⁶⁷ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012; Dawn, *Pakistan bans 25 militant organizations*, 6 August 2009; Intellibriefs, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Sectarian Violence in Pakistan and Ties to International Terrorism*, 3 June 2005; UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

⁶⁸ BBC, *Pakistani group joins US terror list*, 30 January 2013

⁶⁹ Dawn, *Lashkar-i-Jhangvi claims responsibility: 13 lives lost in brutal attack on Shia pilgrims*, 28 June 2012; HRW, *We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan*, 30 June 2014

⁷⁰ CNN, *Leader of militant group arrested in Pakistan, police say*, 23 February 2013

⁷¹ Roggio, B., *State designates leader of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi as global terrorist*, 6 February 2014

⁷² SATP, *Incidents and Statements Involving Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: 2015*, 2015

⁷³ CSIS, *Religion and militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan*, June 2012

was banned in june 2008. Pakistani military operations in 2014 seem to have crippled the groups operational capabilities ⁷⁴.

Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) is a shia militant group whose aim it is to protect the shiite community and target hostile sunni Deobandi organisations like SSP and Lej. SMP is a radical offshoot of a mainstream Shia political party, the Tehrik-e-Jaferia Pakistan ⁷⁵. Origins are unclear but it is probably founded around 1993 by Maulana Mureed Abbas Yazdani. Current leader is Ghulam Raza Naqvi. The organization claims to have some 30.000 activists ⁷⁶. SMP was outlawed in Pakistan in August 2001 ⁷⁷. Karachi and Quetta are the two major cities where the SMP carried out most of its attacks ⁷⁸.

1.2.3 Nationalist Insurgent Groups

The **Balochistan Liberation Army** (BLA) is a Baloch nationalist guerilla organization. The objective is an independent Balochistan, free of Pakistani and Iranian rule. Due to violence including bomb attacks it was outlawed in Pakistan in April 2006 ⁷⁹. Current leader is Nawabzada Marri ⁸⁰. In June 2013 BLA staged an attack and damaged the historic residence in Ziarat where Mohammed Ali Jinnah spent his last days, killing one ⁸¹. In 2014 BLA has carried out 113 terrorist attacks.

While the BLA is the main Balochi insurgent group there are several smaller Balochi outfits who occasionally carry out attacks on Pakistani targets including the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), its offshoot the United Baloch Army (UBA), furthermore Lashkar-e-Balochistan and finally the Baloch Republican Army. The latter mainly consists of Bugti tribesmen ⁸².

1.3 Recent security trends and armed confrontations

According to the 2014 year report of the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a total of 1,206 terrorist attacks were carried out by militant, nationalist/insurgent and violent sectarian groups in Pakistan in the year 2014. This is a decrease of 30 percent from 2013.

As many as 436 of the total reported terrorist attacks (about 36 percent) exclusively targeted personnel, convoys and check-posts of the security forces and the law enforcement agencies. Civilians were the apparent targets of 217 attacks (18 percent). A total of 157 attacks (13 percent) had sectarian targets, mainly members of the Shia and sunni communities and worship places

⁷⁴ Dawn, *Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations*, 6 August 2009; Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *List of banned organisations in Pakistan*, 24 October 2012, PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015,

⁷⁵ Dawn, *Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations*, 6 August 2009 ; Roul, A., *Sipah-e-Sahaba: Fomenting Sectarian Violence in Pakistan*, 05 May 2005; UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

⁷⁶ SATP, *Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan*, 2015

⁷⁷ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *List of banned organisations in Pakistan*, 24 October 2012

⁷⁸ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

⁷⁹ Dawn, *Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations*, 6 August 2009 ; Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *List of banned organisations in Pakistan*, 24 October 2012; ICG, *Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°255*, 23 January 2014; UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

⁸⁰ Pakistan Herald, *Details of Nawabzada Hyrbyair Marri*, s.d.

⁸¹ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *BLA destroys Jinnah's Residency in Ziarat*, 16 June 2013

⁸² PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

including mosques and shrines. Another 66 terrorist attacks targeted pro-government tribesmen, members of tribal peace committees and lashkars, 56 attacks were aimed at political leaders and workers while 40 targeted educational institutions, mainly schools. Other targets hit by terrorists during the previous year included state installations including gas pipelines, power pylons and railways (a total of 121 attacks), polio health workers (24 attacks), NATO supply vehicles (22 attacks), government officials (11 attacks), journalists and media (11 attacks) and minority communities (8 attacks). Officials of the political administration in FATA, tribal elders, non-Baloch settlers/workers in Balochistan, members of NGOs and civil society, private property, alleged spies and foreign interests/diplomats etc. were also targeted by terrorists in different parts of the country in 2014.

Apart from 26 suicide blasts, terrorists employed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of different types in 516 attacks, about 43 percent of all attacks. Also a considerable number of reported terrorist attacks in 2014 – 501, or 41 percent – were incidents of targeted killings or shootings. Other tactics used by terrorists in 2014 included grenade blasts (79), rocket attacks (52), sabotage (18), mortar fire (12) and beheadings (2)⁸³.

1.4 Anti terrorism acts

The National Action Plan (NAP) to eliminate terrorism from the country was evolved in consultation with and amid a consensus among all political parties. The December 2014 terrorist attack on the Peshawar Army Public School served as a catalyst that paved the way for the political consensus after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif convened an all parties' conference the day after the attack.⁸⁴

The government already announced an internal policy for a five year period, until 2018, on 24 February 2014. It mainly focused on securing urban centers and kept largely silent on the situation in FATA and Baluchistan. It talked about dialogue with all stakeholders for madrassa reforms, militants' rehabilitation and deradicalization. A prime target was isolating terrorists. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was supposed to streamline the fight against terrorism and take up all important tasks ranging from counterterrorism to political and operational interventions. In February 2014 the government was still engaged in peace talks with the Taliban and the Security Policy proved to be not sufficient once the military operation in North Waziristan started and the country fell victim to bloody retaliatory attacks by the militants⁸⁵. Therefore in December 2014 a National Action Plan (NAP) was established. Key features were:

- Continued execution of convicted terrorists
- Establishment of speedy military trial courts for two years
- A commitment to ensure that no armed militias were allowed to function in the country
- Countering hate speech and extremist material
- Choking financing for terrorists
- Ensuring that proscribed organizations did not re-emerge
- Establishing and deploying a dedicated counterterrorism force
- Taking effective steps against faith-based persecution
- Strengthening and restructuring of NACTA
- Registration and regulation of madrassas
- Prohibition of glorification of terrorism and terrorist organizations through the print and electronic media

⁸³ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.7

⁸⁴ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *Fight against terrorism: Defining moment*, 25 December 2014

⁸⁵ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.42

- Administrative and development reforms in FATA with immediate focus on return of IDP's
- Dismantling communication networks of terrorist organizations
- Tangible measures against abuse of the internet and social media for terrorism
- Zero tolerance for militancy in Punjab
- Taking the ongoing operation in Karachi to its logical conclusion
- Empowering Balochistan government for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders
- Dealing firmly with sectarian terrorist
- Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all unregistered Afghans unlawfully present in Pakistan
- Revamping and reforming the criminal justice system to strengthen counterterrorism departments including authorizing the provincial CID's to intercept terrorist communications

⁸⁶

Later in December Nawaz Sharif announced the formation of a federal counter-terrorism force with immediate effect. An operation would be launched against terrorism in the major cities. The Prime Minister also confirmed that operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas would continue ⁸⁷.

It needs to be observed that following the Peshawar school attack, the political and security establishment preferred to set up temporary military courts to try terrorism related offences instead of pursuing the cause of an independent judiciary. The government also introduced a series of amendments in counterterrorism laws and introduced the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) ⁸⁸.

In March 2015 the national Coordinator of NACTA, Hamid Ali Khan, presented some of the first results of the NAP. Approximately ten billion rupees had been confiscated from clerics and banned organizations in order to choke terror funding. In the ongoing crackdown against those who delivered hate speeches, the law enforcement agencies registered 5,017 cases against clerics, while 4,647 of them were arrested. Over 3,758 clerics were held in Punjab, 508 in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 197 in Sindh, 94 in Islamabad, 86 in Balochistan and 30 in Gilgit-Baltistan. Police also sealed 40 shops that were selling and distributing hate material ⁸⁹.

1.5 Impact of violence on civilians

Several institutes present statistics on the number of casualties. All have figures on civilian fatalities. However these figures sometimes vary, which makes it difficult to interpret them since none of the institutes outlines a methodology. The three research institutes who present figures about the situation in 2014 are the Pakistani Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS).

⁸⁶ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *Fight against terrorism: Defining moment*, 25 December 2014; Washington Post (The), *Pakistan announces a national plan to fight terrorism, says terrorists' days are numbered*, 24 December 2014

⁸⁷ Dawn, *Nawaz constitutes special committee to implement national Action Plan*, 26 December 2014

⁸⁸ Dawn, *Military Courts part of National Action Plan: PM Nawaz*, 30 December 2014; PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

⁸⁹ Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *National Action Plan: Over Rs 10 billion in foreign terror and AML funds frozen*, 25 March 2015

Let us first study the observations of PIPS, who's director, Muhammad Amir Rana, is often quoted as an expert on Pakistani security issues⁹⁰. He is also writes opinions for the Pakistani daily Dawn⁹¹.

In 2014 at least 1,723 people lost their lives while another 3,143 were left injured in terrorist attacks. The overall number of people killed and injured in terrorist attacks in 2014 decreased by 30 and 42 percent respectively. About 61 percent (731) of all 1,206 terrorist attacks were carried out by Pakistani Taliban mainly the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) and affiliated outfits or other groups with similar objectives. At least 1,212 people were killed and another 2,088 injured in these attacks alone. Baloch and Sindhi nationalist insurgents carried out 334 attacks that claimed the lives of 258 people and injured 758. Meanwhile, 141 terrorist attacks were of a sectarian nature, largely perpetrated by banned Sunni and Shia sectarian groups. The highest number of terrorist attacks for any one region of Pakistan in 2014 was reported from Balochistan, where 341 attacks killed 375 people and wounded 926 others. However, in terms of terrorism-related casualties, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) was the most affected province, where 542 people lost their lives and 829 others were injured in 325 reported terrorist attacks. As many as 234 reported attacks from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) claimed 293 lives and left another 389 people injured. Karachi alone witnessed 217 terrorist attacks, while there were 31 attacks in interior Sindh, and three in Gilgit-Baltistan.⁹²

PIPS makes a distinction between terrorism and all incidents of violence. It defines actions of violence as: the terrorist attacks cited above, as well as operations carried out by security forces and clashes/encounters with militants, incidents of ethno-political violence, drone attacks, inter-tribal, inter-militant conflicts and clashes between tribesmen and militants, sectarian clashes, communal violence, cross-border attacks and clashes, clashes between rival criminal gangs and with security forces and abductions by militants and nationalist insurgents.

In all these confrontations a total of 5,306 people were killed and 4,571 injured, mostly civilians and militants. This is an increase of 12 percent compared to 2013. Civilian casualties in 2014 in overall incidents numbered 2,991 with 3,315 wounded.⁹³

The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) is a website run by the Institute for Conflict Management, a non profit organization set up in 1997 in New Delhi. It's committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. It's headed by its founder K.P.S. Gill⁹⁴.

According to SATP in 2014 there were 5,496 fatalities in terrorism related violence in Pakistan. Of these 1,781 were civilians, 533 security force personnel and 3182 terrorists/insurgents. SATP is the only one who already provides figures for 2015: until April 12th 1263 fatalities. Of these 339 were civilians, 103 security force personnel and 821 terrorists/insurgents⁹⁵. We observe that PIPS talks about 1,723 deaths due to 'terrorism' and 5,306 deaths to 'violence', while SATP talks about 5,496 deaths due to 'terrorism'.

A third source is the Centre for Research and security Studies (CRSS), a Pakistani research institute that analyses politics in the country. It is based in Islamabad and headed by Imtiaz Gul, a journalist and author of several books on Pakistan⁹⁶. CRSS published a report on security in Pakistan in 2014,

⁹⁰ Gunaratna, R. and Iqbal, K., *Pakistan, terrorism ground zero*, 2011; Telegraph (The), *Pakistani children are victims of their leaders' mistakes*, 16 December 2014

⁹¹ Dawn, *Muhammad Amir Rana*, s.d.

⁹² PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.7

⁹³ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.10

⁹⁴ SATP, *Institute for Conflict Management, An Introduction*, s.d.


⁹⁵ SATP, *Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2015*, 12 April 2015

⁹⁶ Imtiaz Gul Official Website, *Biography*, s.d.

written by senior research associate, Mohammad Nafees, journalist and political columnist with the Pakistani newspaper Daily Times ⁹⁷.

Violence as defined by CRSS includes terrorism, militant attacks, sectarian violence, crime target killings, security operations and drone strikes. According to CRSS this left 7,560 persons dead and 3,946 wounded.⁹⁸

Violence-Related Deaths in Pakistan - 2014




Compared to 5,687 deaths in 2013 this is an average increase of about 35%. There is a sudden spike from the month of June 2014 (May 514 fatalities, June 958), which CRSS attributes to the start of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Deaths also accelerated towards the end of the year, pulling significantly ahead of the same-month figures from 2013. The last three months in 2014 were especially violent, with an alarming 258% increase for the same period in 2013.⁹⁹ The most significant increase in violence was observed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where fatalities more than doubled from 1,457 in 2013 to 3,400 in 2014. A big reason for this marked increase is the military-led Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the North Waziristan Agency of the FATA region. The second largest increase was in Punjab, where death from violence rose from 120 in 2013 to 307 in 2014, a drastic increase of 156%. This increased figure, in part, may be attributed to the

⁹⁷ CRSS (Center for Research and Security Studies), *Management*, s.d. ; Daily Times, *Mohammad Nafees*, s.d.; Hindu (The), *7,655 deaths recorded in Pakistan in 2014*, 10 January 2015

⁹⁸ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, p.3

⁹⁹ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, p.4

November 2, 2014 bombing of the Wagah border closing ceremony, which left 60 dead. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) saw a decrease in violence-related deaths, with 941 deaths in 2014, as compared to the 1,031 deaths in 2013. Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) saw the largest percentage decrease in violence-related casualties, at 3 in 2014, from 20 in 2013. Compared to last year the fatalities from security operations are three times higher, while the fatalities from militant attacks, terrorism and target killings are more than 15% lower this year. Fatalities in the different provinces in respectively 2013 and 2014 were in Sindh 2086 and 9193, FATA 1467 and 3400, KP 1031 and 941, Balochistan 950 and 752, Punjab 120 and 307, Islamabad 20 and 48, Gilgit-Baltistan 20 and 3, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir 3 and 6.¹⁰⁰




This year, the combined figure of militant and criminal fatalities was more than 50% of the total fatalities while the total casualties of civilians (dead and wounded) were the highest among all other victims. The other victims of violence belonged to security agencies, political parties, religious parties, religious persons and media persons¹⁰¹.

¹⁰⁰ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014, 2015*, pp.4-5

¹⁰¹ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014, 2015*, pp.6-7

Victims of Violence-Related Deaths in Pakistan - 2014



The Center for Research and Security Studies, Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report - 2014

Apart from the civilian casualties, fighting in the tribal areas has created a steady stream of internally displaced persons (IDP's). Since 2008, almost five million people from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA have been registered as IDP's, uprooted in various waves. Many were able to return after the fighting subsided. However, in the fall of 2014 approximately 1 million people were still displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance and support. Additionally operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan forced many local families to flee. The majority of the displaced families have sought refuge in Bannu, with some moving to Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Kohat Karak, Hangu and Charsadda in KP. Others moved to Sindh province ¹⁰². The statistics of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2015 are as follows: the 714,548 registered IDP's in need of humanitarian assistance in 2014 have been joined by an additional 500.000 IDP's as a result of the North Waziristan emergency. In addition Pakistan still hosts 1,5 million refugees from Afghanistan ¹⁰³. Return of refugees and IDP's happens at a slow pace. In March 2015 a number of IDP's returned to the army-held South Waziristan ¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰² Al Jazeera, *Pakistan's IDPs reach record one million*, 1 September 2014; Dawn, *Experts, politicians express concern over IDP crisis*, 16 July 2014; Dawn, *Number of IDPs may reach 600,000: Baloch*, 25 June 2014

¹⁰³ UNHCR, *2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Pakistan*, s.d.

¹⁰⁴ Al Jazeera, *Pakistan's IDPs come home to the Taliban heartland*, 21 March 2015

2. FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa

In recent years both FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have been the scene of large-scale operations by the Pakistani armed forces in order to eradicate militant activity. In 2009 the army engaged in a series of military operations against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in KP. This offensive went hand in hand with human rights violations and arbitrary arrests¹⁰⁵. Moreover, the hostilities caused a large wave of displacement¹⁰⁶. In the next couple of years the Pakistani military remained heavily present in the area but the scale and intensity of military operations abated. The local Taliban went underground and continued its activity by means of terror attacks and targeted killings in the whole of KP¹⁰⁷. In FATA the Pakistani army conducted military operations since 2004. As in KP there were a series of human rights violations and a significant wave of displacement¹⁰⁸. By 2014 only the North Waziristan agency was still controlled by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. The military operation Zarb-e-Azb sought to eradicate the Taliban's power in this last stronghold¹⁰⁹. The militants responded with terrorism in FATA and wider Pakistan¹¹⁰.

According to PIPS in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa a total of 325 terrorist attacks were reported in the province in 2014 compared to 499 in 2013, including nine suicide attacks that killed 41 people and wounded 143 others. Overall, 542 people were killed in the province and 829 were reported wounded. Fatalities included 375 civilians, 85 police, 36 army personnel, 10 FC and 32 militants. Out of the 325 terrorist attacks, 308 were carried out by the TTP or associated groups, while 17 attacks were of sectarian nature and mostly perpetrated by TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Just like in 2013, Peshawar remained the most affected part of the province. These attacks targeted civilians, security forces, educational institutions (such as the Peshawar army school), health workers, the Shia religious community, political leaders/workers, pro-government tribesmen, power pylons, government officials, government installations, Sikh community, worship places, CD shops etc. Charsadda was the second most hit area of KP followed by Bannu. Beside these attacks, KP also witnessed ethnic/political violence, clashes between security forces and militants, inter-tribal clashes, Pak-Afghan border attacks, inter-militant clashes, abductions by militants and militants-tribesmen clashes¹¹¹. Estimates in fatalities by CRSS are higher, 941 dead and 1,025 wounded. Still as PIPS CRSS observes a downward trend when compared with 2013. The trend of violence showed a downward decline from March, until the devastating attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014.¹¹² The capital city of the province stood out as the abnormally highest affected district while the other districts were moderately affected. Methods of violence used by the outlaws were executions via firearms, bomb explosions, abducting and dumping of dead bodies, suicide attacks, hand grenade attacks, armed attacks, indiscriminate firing, IED explosions and cross border attacks. The counter violence operation carried out by security agencies in the province were

¹⁰⁵ Amnesty International (AI), *Pakistan: Investigate deaths in lawless Tribal Areas*, 17 January 2013; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL): *Rights Group Says 2,000 Men Missing In Pakistan*, 15 October 2013

¹⁰⁶ ICG, *Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111*, 16 September 2010

¹⁰⁷ ICG, *Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA, Asia Report ° 242*, 15 January 2013; LandInfo, *Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) og Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)*, 8 November 2013

¹⁰⁸ Amnesty International, *As if hell fell on me, the human rights crisis in northwest Pakistan*, 10 June 2010; ICG, *Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, Asia Briefing N°111*, 16 September 2010

¹⁰⁹ Dawn, *Zarb-e-Azb operation: 120 suspected militants killed in N Waziristan*, 16 June 2014

¹¹⁰ Guardian (The), *Dozens killed at suicide attack at Pakistan-India border post*, 2 November 2014; New York Times (The), *Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead*, 16 December 2014; SATP, *FATA timeline – 2015*, s.d.

¹¹¹ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.13

¹¹² CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, p.38

air raids, encounters and clashes with militants. Custodial deaths were reported in the province as well ¹¹³. SATP reports that in the first 45 days of 2015, 55 persons had been killed, 36 civilians, 15 terrorists and 4 security forces personnel. Deadliest incident occurred on 13 February when a suicide squad attacked a Shia *ammabargah* in Peshawar, killing 22 worshippers. Still according to SATP fatalities in KP are down with 66% compared to the corresponding period is 2014 ¹¹⁴.

In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas PIPS observes that 234 terrorist attacks killed 293 people in 2014, including 146 civilians, 14 policemen, 45 army personnel, 52 FC and 18 militants. The number of wounded was 389. Most of the actions were launched by the TTP, associated groups and Khyber-agency based sectarian groups like Lashkar-e-Islam. The number of sectarian attacks was limited to 4. Concerning terrorism The Khyber Agency remained the worst-hit area in FATA, followed by Mohmand, Bajaur and only then North Waziristan. The heavy fighting between army and militants caused most casualties. Security forces carried out 101 operational attacks in FATA in 2013, which killed 1,784 people, including 1,772 militants. Apart of these military manoeuvres there were also clashes, 38 in total, that claimed the lives of 349 people, among them a number of civilians. Meanwhile there were some 30 inter-militant clashes, 21 incidents of cross-border attacks and a number of drone strikes ¹¹⁵. According to CRSS the number of fatalities in FATA was extremely high in 2014, due to the large military operation which started mid-June. There were 3400 dead and 720 wounded.¹¹⁶ The methods of violence used by militants were armed attacks, executions, IED's and landmines, abduction and dumping of dead bodies, bomb explosions, mortar and rocket attacks, beheadings and hangings. The security agencies resorted to air raids, encounters, clashes and shelling ¹¹⁷. Though exact information is difficult to obtain SATP declares in the first two and a half month of 2015 at least 411 have been killed, including 356 terrorists, 20 security forces personnel and 35 civilians. The military makes extensive use of aircraft to bomb rebel positions during both operation Zarb-e-Azb in North-Waziristan and operation Khyber I in Khyber agency. Rebel groups have apparently united confronted with this threat. The high toll of casualties is not expected to abate in the immediate future ¹¹⁸. It is to be observed that the South Asia Terrorism Portal offers a detailed timeline of all incidents in KP and FATA ¹¹⁹.

In spite of frequent terror attacks the situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has markedly improved since the 2008-2009 period ¹²⁰. This is shown by a decline of military activity in the province and the falling number of IDP's. In 2014 about 104,000 IDPs returned ¹²¹. In spite of the return of IDPs socio-economic recovery is slow, among other things as a result of the damage that had been inflicted on agricultural infrastructure ¹²². The situation in FATA remains more volatile. Military operations in North-Waziristan in 2014 caused a new wave of IDP's ¹²³. Figures vary. UNHCR states that approximately half a million IDPs fled the North Waziristan fighting ¹²⁴. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) writes that the actual number of IDPs is often underestimated and says that there may be up to more than 900,000 IDPs who have fled due to the

¹¹³ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, p.40

¹¹⁴ SATP, *Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹¹⁵ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.14

¹¹⁶ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, p.34

¹¹⁷ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, pp.36-37

¹¹⁸ SATP, *FATA assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹¹⁹ SATP, *FATA timeline – 2015*, s.d.; SATP, *Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Timeline – 2015*, s.d.

¹²⁰ LandInfo, *Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold i Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) og Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)*, 8/11/2013; SATP, *Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹²¹ IDMC, *Pakistan IDP Figures Analysis*, 31 March 2015

¹²² IPS, *Barren Fields Recover From Taliban*, 30 December 2013

¹²³ Al Jazeera, *Pakistan's IDPs reach record one million*, 01/09/2014; Dawn, *Experts, politicians express concern over IDP crisis*, 16 July 2014

¹²⁴ UNHCR, *2015 UNHCR country operations profile - Pakistan*, s.d.

violence caused by operations Zarb-e-Azb (North Waziristan) and Khyber I (Khyber). The majority of these people do not live in IDP camps but settle in host communities in KP. Some have moved to Afghanistan ¹²⁵. Returnees prepared to return to the areas declared safe face many obstacles. There are numerous checkpoints, curfews and shoot-on-sight orders from the military, who do not always differ between militants and non-combatants. Furthermore there are damaged houses, lack of health and educational facilities, shortages of water and electricity and limited business and employment opportunities ¹²⁶. Notwithstanding all this in mid-March 2015 the Pakistani authorities unfolded a plan for a swift return of IDP's to their FATA home area ¹²⁷. In March 2015 a number of IDPs returned to the army-held South Waziristan ¹²⁸.

3. Balochistan

In recent years the violent death of nationalist frontrunner and tribal head Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 sparked unrest. Since then, the two biggest outfits, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) have staged increasing attacks on government targets and on Punjabi settlers. The authorities have reacted heavy-handed. Military and the Frontier Corps have been abducting, torturing and killing hundreds sympathizers of the Balochi cause. Apart of a nationalist uprising Balochistan is also plagued by bloody sectarian violence. The local Shia community, mostly Hazara, falls increasingly victim to terrorist attacks. From 2003 to 2014 about 550 Hazara lost their lives in this violence, mostly in Quetta. It is generally assumed that the main culprit is Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The death toll is mounting in the last couple of years. On 10 January 2013 a car bomb killed over 100 Shia while on 16 February 2013 another bomb left more than 80 dead in Hazara town ¹²⁹.

According to PIPS in 2014 341 terrorist attacks occurred in Balochistan, compared to 487 the previous year, killing 375 people and wounding 926 others. Of a total of 341 attacks, 306 were perpetrated by Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) and also smaller groups like the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the United Baloch Army (UBA) and Lashkar-e-Balochistan, causing 243 deaths. The Balochi chapter of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and associated militant groups also conducts occasional terrorist operations, 20 in total. Meanwhile 15 attacks were sectarian related. Extremist groups including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba killed 86 people and wounded 137, mostly Hazara Shia. Among those killed in terrorist attacks were 273 civilians, 32 police officials, 30 FC troops, and 17 militants. Quetta was most hit by terrorists, with 111 fatalities followed by Dera Bugti. Apart from terrorist attacks, 13 operational attacks and 27 clashes between security forces and militants, some cross-border attacks with Iran and Afghanistan and 5 intra-tribal clashes claimed the lives of 751 people while 1,021 others sustained injuries. Finally, a total of 105 dead bodies were recovered in different parts of Balochistan in 2014. The identities of most of those killed and their killers remain unknown ¹³⁰. CRSS writes that the total loss of human lives in 2014 in Balochistan was 752 people, with 840 wounded. This is a reduction in fatalities of 20% compared to the previous year. The district of Quetta suffered the highest loss of human life ¹³¹. In its assessment over Balochistan SATP highlights the

¹²⁵ IDMC, *Pakistan IDP Figures Analysis*, 31 March 2015

¹²⁶ Dawn, *Bara IDPs hesitant to return home*, 13 December 2014

¹²⁷ Dawn, *IDPs to start returning to their areas tomorrow*, 15 March 2015

¹²⁸ Al Jazeera, *Pakistan's IDPs come home to the Taliban heartland*, 21 March, 2015

¹²⁹ HRW, *We Are The Walking Dead. Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan*, 30 June 2014; ICG, *Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°255*, 23 January 2014

¹³⁰ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.16

¹³¹ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, pp.30-32

continuation of the dumping of dead bodies in 2015. SATP confirms that in 2014 153 such bodies were found and observes that there is a relentless campaign of the state's covert agencies to target Baloch nationalists and their sympathizers in campaigns of 'disappearances', and a 'kill and dump' policy, both directly and through sectarian/extremist proxies in Balochistan, particularly in the south regions of the province. According to SATP thousands remain missing as of today¹³². The staggering number of extrajudicial killings is one of the major impediments to pacification¹³³. Concerning terrorism related incidents and fatalities there is a decline with 607 in 2014 compared to 960 in 2013. A new extremist group called Tanzim-ul-Islam-al-Furqan (TIF) has surfaced recently, threatening girl schools. TIF killed a school teacher in May 2014¹³⁴. The fighting in Balochistan is usually referred to as a low-level insurgency¹³⁵.

Around 2006 when president Pervez Musharraf launched a military operation in the Marri and Bugti tribal areas, this caused a refugee wave of about 100,000 IDP's who fled to neighbouring districts¹³⁶. In recent years there has not been a massive upheaval of IDP's. One source speaks of about 5,000 IDP's from Kech, Punjgur and Awaran seem to have settled in adjacent districts in the second half of 2014¹³⁷. SATP observes that the insecure situation in Balochistan and the rise of extremism in the province has in past years instigated tens of thousands of Shias, Zikris, and Hindus to migrate to other parts of Pakistan¹³⁸.

4. Punjab

The magnitude of violence in Punjab is much more limited than the violence occurring in Sindh, FATA and Khyber-Pakhtukhwa¹³⁹. PIPS writes that in terms of the sheer number of terrorist attacks, the security landscape in Punjab was very similar in 2014 to that of the previous year, even though the number of casualties increased significantly. There was a total of 41 attacks that killed 126 people including 103 civilians, 5 policemen, 12 army soldiers, 3 rangers and 3 militants. Moreover 274 were wounded. The provincial capital Lahore suffered the most casualties¹⁴⁰. The most deadly attack was the 2 November suicide bombing of the flag-ceremony at the Wagah border post, which claimed 60 lives¹⁴¹. On the whole, 98 incidents of violence were reported during the year, which represents a 21 percent rise from 81 incidents in 2013. These include terrorist attacks, clashes between security forces and militants, incidents of ethnic/political violence, sectarian clashes, communal violence, abductions and murder attempts on political leaders¹⁴². CRSS reports that the total count of fatalities from violence in Punjab was 307 dead and 342 wounded, an increase of 156% over 2013, though it was only 5% of the total number of fatalities in the whole country. Lahore was the highest

¹³² SATP, *Balochistan assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹³³ AHCR, *Balochistan; 160 persons extra judicially killed, 510 disappeared and 50 decomposed bodies were found during 2013*, 08/01/2014

¹³⁴ SATP, *Balochistan assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹³⁵ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2011 - Pakistan*, 26 July 2011; International Affairs Review, *Pakistan's Baloch insurgency: History, conflict drivers and regional implications*, 2012,

¹³⁶ Daily Times, *Comment: Balochistan unattended IDP crisis*, 31 October 2010; South Asians for Human Rights, *Internally Displaced Persons: a report on the fact finding mission to Balochistan in 2008*, 2008

¹³⁷ Sharnoff's Global Views, *The tragic status of IDPs in Balochistan*, 18 December 2014

¹³⁸ SATP, *Balochistan assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹³⁹ LandInfo, *Pakistan: Sikkerhetsrelaterte forhold - Balochistan, Sindh og Punjab*, 16 October 2013

¹⁴⁰ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.22

¹⁴¹ Dawn, *TTP splinter groups claim Wagah attack: 60 dead*, 03 November 2014; Guardian (The), *Dozens killed at suicide attack at Pakistan-India border post*, 2 November 2014

¹⁴² PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

affected by violence ¹⁴³. Actors of violence include Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who claimed responsibility for the killing of three Shia political activists on 16 January 2015 in Rawalpindi. A week earlier eight Shia worshippers died in a bomb blast in a religious site. Again an organization affiliated with the TTP claimed responsibility ¹⁴⁴. In 2014 the Punjabi Taliban were responsible for only two terrorist attacks. In September 2014 Muawiya first declared to want to shift his militant activities from Pakistan to Afghanistan,¹⁴⁵ and some days later announced to give up armed struggle in Pakistan entirely ¹⁴⁶. A feared sectarian outfit is Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which according to SATP, exerts significant influence in Punjab ¹⁴⁷. It's leader Malik Ishaq, accused of more than 100 sectarian murders, was released from jail in December 2014 after a decision by the Lahore High Court, due to lack of evidence ¹⁴⁸. There are no reports of IDP's in Punjab. In spite of the relative peace in the province there is a worrying trend of radicalization of the population, particularly in the south of the province where Deobandi-organizations gain influence ¹⁴⁹.

Concerning the situation in Islamabad, a significant increase in terrorist attacks was reported in the federal capital with 14 reported terrorist attacks as opposed to 4 in the previous year. These attacks killed 44 people and wounded 212 others ¹⁵⁰.

5. Sindh

In Karachi violence is on the rise in recent years. Between 2008 and 2012 more than 7,000 people were killed in ethno-political, terrorist, sectarian and criminal conflicts which plague the city ¹⁵¹. An important dynamic is the ongoing power struggle between the political parties of the main demographic groups, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM, Mohajir), the Awami National Party (ANP, Pashtun) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP, Sindhi). The armed wings of these respective formations are responsible for mutual assassinations of political leaders and workers as well as city riots and deadly clashes ¹⁵². Moreover the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated organizations are making increasing inroads in the city ¹⁵³. On 8 June 2014 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) staged an attack on the Mohammad Ali Jinnah airport in Karachi on 8 June 2014, killing 26. TTP later claimed responsibility ¹⁵⁴. Apart of this political violence Karachi is the home base for more than 200 heavily armed criminal gangs. Sometimes these deliver services for the armed wings of political parties ¹⁵⁵.

PIPS reports that a total of 248 terrorist attacks were recorded across Sindh, including 217 in Karachi alone. They claimed 340 lives (317 in Karachi) and injured 501 others. Among those killed were 203 civilians, including a considerable number Shias and Sunnis who lost their lives in sectarian-related targeted killings. The army, rangers and police lost 123 personnel. Sectarian

¹⁴³ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, pp.42-44

¹⁴⁴ SATP, *Punjab assessment - 2015*, s.d.

¹⁴⁵ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015; UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

¹⁴⁶ Dawn, *Punjabi Taliban call off armed struggle in Pakistan*, 13 September 2014

¹⁴⁷ SATP, *Punjab assessment - 2015*, s.d.

¹⁴⁸ Dawn, *Malik Ishaq's detention ends*, 23 December 2014; News (The), *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi leader Malik Ishaq set to be freed*, 24 December 2014

¹⁴⁹ SISA, *The new frontiers: militancy and radicalism in Punjab*, 04 February 2013

¹⁵⁰ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.24

¹⁵¹ USIP, *Conflict dynamics in Karachi*, 19 October 2012

¹⁵² Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, p.303, p.316; USIP, *Conflict dynamics in Karachi*, 19 October 2012

¹⁵³ BBC, *How the Taliban gripped Karachi*, 21 March 2013; New York, Times (The), *Killings Rise in Karachi as Taliban Target Police*, 11 August 2014

¹⁵⁴ Associated Press, *Pakistani forces repel attack near Karachi airport*, 10 June 2014

¹⁵⁵ USIP, *Conflict dynamics in Karachi*, 19 October 2012

violence in Karachi is dominated by the two enemy groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan. Violence between the two killed 100 people in 2014. The TTP, for its part, seems to have concentrated on killing members of the security forces in the previous year ¹⁵⁶. On 9 January 2014 a high ranking police officer, Chaudry Aslam, head of the anti-extremist cell of the Sindh Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and a leading voice in the fight against the militants, was killed by a roadside bomb in Karachi. The Mohmand TTP claimed responsibility ¹⁵⁷. A month later the Taliban attacked a police bus, killing 13. Apart from security officials militants hit a range of other targets in Karachi, including political leaders, journalists, government officials and members of the civil society. Ethno-political violence, between members of different political groups kept on declining when compared with the situation in 2012 and 2013, partly as a result of continued security operations by the law enforcement agencies. Concerning the situation in Interior Sindh a total of 31 terrorist attacks claimed 23 lives and wounded 63. Most of these attacks (21) were carried out by Baloch and Sindhi nationalists groups. Baloch were especially active in Kashmore district. The Sindhi Desh Liberation Army (SDLA), a small Sindhi nationalist outfit was involved in some sabotage actions, in which no lives were lost. The TTP was responsible for eight incidents ¹⁵⁸. CRSS observes that after FATA Sindh had the highest number of casualties of violence in the country during 2014 with 2,193 dead and 765 wounded. These figures are higher than 2013. However robbery, which claimed 199 fatalities was not included in 2013, so concerning other violence there is a slight downward trend. With 93% of all violence related deaths in Sindh the situation in Karachi is the most dramatic. According to CRSS this is in part due to the sheer size of the metropolitan, and in part due to the deplorable law and order situation in the city. The most common form of violence in Sindh is target killing and 60% of the fatalities in the province fall into this category ¹⁵⁹. On 30 January 2015 a bomb exploded in a Shia place of worship in the district Shikarpur, claiming 61 lives. Jundullah, a splinter group of TTP, claimed responsibility. SATP confirms that after FATA casualties in Sindh are the highest in Pakistan and Karachi is clearly the worst affected. Figures of SATP for 2014 are 1,180 dead including 734 civilians, 128 security forces personnel and 318 militants. The large number of civilian deaths is attributed to attacks by sectarian groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan and targeted killings between armed activists of the competing political parties, MQM, ANP and PPP. SATP also points to criminal syndicates, who are apparently affiliated with political parties. The cumulative impact of these multiple patterns of violence has made Karachi "the most dangerous megacity" in the world, according to a *Foreign Policy* report ¹⁶⁰.

6. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

The Pakistan controlled territory of Kashmir consists of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (commonly called Azad Kashmir) and Gilgit-Baltistan, previously named the Northern territories. Both regions have a partially autonomous administration. However, especially in Azad Kashmir the influence of the Pakistani government and army is far-reaching. Azad Kashmir has a population of about five million, while Gilgit-Baltistan has 2 million inhabitants ¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁶ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015, p.19

¹⁵⁷ Dawn, *Taliban bombing kills senior police officer Chaudhry Aslam*, 24 December 2014; News (The), *SP CID Chaudhry Aslam martyred in Karachi bombing*, 10 January 2014

¹⁵⁸ PIPS, 2014, *Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

¹⁵⁹ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015, pp.46-49

¹⁶⁰ SATP, *Sindh assessment – 2015*, s.d.

¹⁶¹ ACCORD, *Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan) - COI Compilation*, 7 May 2012

In May 2013 unknown perpetrators assassinated Sardar Arif Shahid, president of the All Parties National Alliance (APNA), a movement which advocates an independent Kashmir. This led to demonstrations in several cities. Protesters held army and ISI responsible for the murder¹⁶². In the past the ISI has supported pro-Pakistani Islamist groups to sideline independence movements like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)¹⁶³. These radical outfits included Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)¹⁶⁴. Such groups, whose main objective is to fight Indian troops in Indian administered Kashmir, have dozens of training camps scattered in Azad Kashmir¹⁶⁵. LeT and JeM are violent formations and are internationally considered terrorist organizations¹⁶⁶. The former was apparently responsible for the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008¹⁶⁷. The latter was suspected to be involved in an attempt to assassinate president Musharraf in 2003¹⁶⁸.

PIPS reports no terrorist attack in Azad Kashmir in 2014 though there are occasional cross-border attacks along the Line of Control (LoC). That killed four civilians. In Gilgit-Baltistan there were three terrorist attacks which killed three people and wounded twelve. The three dead were all Shia since the attack was of sectarian nature¹⁶⁹. CRSS does not mention Pakistani administered Kashmir¹⁷⁰. SATP does not signal any significant violence in that area¹⁷¹.

¹⁶² BBC, *Kashmiri's protest at killing of Sardar Arif Shahid*, 16 May 2013; Express Tribune (The)/ International New York Times (The), *Why they killed Arif Shahid*, 30 May 2013

¹⁶³ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, p.189

¹⁶⁴ UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

¹⁶⁵ Snedden, C., *The untold story of the people of Azad Kashmir*, 2012, pp.196-198

¹⁶⁶ UK Home Office, *Country of Origin Information (COI) Report; Pakistan*, 9 August 2013

¹⁶⁷ Telegraph (The), *Pakistan details how Lashkar-e-Taiba 2008 Mumbai attack gunmen were trained*, 12 November 2012

¹⁶⁸ Lieven, A., *Pakistan, a hard country*, 2011, p.192

¹⁶⁹ PIPS, *2014, Pakistan Security Report*, 2015

¹⁷⁰ CRSS, *Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report/Annual Security Report 2014*, 2015

¹⁷¹ SATP (South Asia Terrorism Portal), *Jammu & Kashmir assessment – 2015*, s.d.

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