



**UNHCR ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR
ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION NEEDS OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS
FROM IRAQ**

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

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NOTE

UNHCR *Eligibility Guidelines* are issued by the Office to assist decision-makers, including UNHCR staff, Governments and private practitioners, in assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers. They are legal interpretations of the refugee criteria in respect of specific profiles on the basis of assessed social, political, economic, security, human rights and humanitarian conditions in the country/territory of origin concerned. The pertinent international protection needs are analyzed in detail, and recommendations made as to how the applications in question relate to the relevant principles and criteria of international refugee law as per, notably, the UNHCR Statute, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and relevant regional instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration, the 1969 OAU Convention and the EU Qualification Directive. The recommendations may also touch upon, as relevant, complementary or subsidiary protection regimes.

UNHCR issues *Eligibility Guidelines* to promote the accurate application of the above-mentioned refugee criteria in line with its supervisory responsibility, as contained in paragraph 8 of its Statute in conjunction with Article 35 of the 1951 Convention and Article II of the 1967 Protocol, and based on the expertise it has developed over the years in matters related to eligibility and refugee status determination. It is hoped that the guidance and information contained in the *Guidelines* will be considered carefully by the authorities and the judiciary in reaching decisions on asylum applications. The *Guidelines* are based on in-depth research, information provided by UNHCR's global network of field offices and material from independent country specialists, researchers and other sources, rigorously reviewed for reliability. The *Guidelines* are posted on UNHCR's Refworld website at <http://www.refworld.org>.

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List of Abbreviations

AAH	Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq
AQI	Al-Qa'eda in Iraq
AQKB	Al-Qa'eda Kurdish Battalions
CCCI	Central Criminal Court of Iraq
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CoR	Council of Representatives
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists
FGM	female genital mutilation
FPS	Facilities Protection Service
GoI	Government of Iraq
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDP(s)	internally displaced person(s)
IEDs	improvised explosive devices
IFA/IRA	internal flight alternative / internal relocation alternative
IHEC	Independent High Electoral Commission
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISF	Iraqi security forces
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ITF	Iraqi Turkmen Front
JAM/PDB	Jaysh Al-Mahdi / Promised Day Brigades
JRTN	Naqshbandi Army
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party
KH	Kata'ib Hezbollah
KIG	Kurdistan Islamic Group
KIU	Kurdistan Islamic Union
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
LGBTI	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces in Iraq

NGO	non-governmental organization
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNHCR	(the Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USF-I	United States Forces in Iraq
UXO	unexploded ordnance

I. Introduction

These Eligibility Guidelines replace the April 2009 *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Iraq* and the 2010 *Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers*.¹

The purpose of these Eligibility Guidelines is to set out the profiles of asylum-seekers for whom international protection needs are likely to arise in the current context in Iraq.²

The current situation in Iraq can be characterized as one of ongoing uncertainty due to several factors, including: (i) high levels of political and sectarian violence; (ii) the unpredictable security situation, including significant numbers of civilian casualties as a result of attacks by armed groups; (iii) the full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq at the end of 2011; and (iv) continuing challenges with regard to establishment of the rule of law, provision of services, distribution of land, and respect for human rights.

UNHCR's recommendations with regard to assessing the international protection needs of asylum-seekers from Iraq, as set out in these Eligibility Guidelines, may be summarized as follows.

All claims lodged by asylum-seekers - whether on the basis of the refugee criteria contained in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees³ and/or its 1967 Protocol⁴ (1951 Convention), or broader international protection criteria, including complementary forms of protection - need to be considered on their own merits in fair and efficient status determination procedures and based on up-to-date and relevant country of origin information.

UNHCR considers that asylum-seekers from Iraq with the following profiles, and depending on the particular circumstances of the individual case, are likely to be in need of international refugee protection. These risk profiles are not necessarily exhaustive, nor is there any hierarchy implied in the order in which they are presented:

- (i) individuals associated with (or perceived to be supporting) the Iraqi authorities, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or the former foreign forces in Iraq (Multinational Forces in Iraq, MNF-I or US Forces in Iraq, USF-I);
- (ii) individuals (perceived as) opposing the Iraqi authorities;
- (iii) individuals (perceived as) opposing the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG);
- (iv) certain professionals;
- (v) individuals with religion-based claims,
- (vi) individuals with ethnicity-based claims;
- (vii) women with specific profiles or in specific circumstances;
- (viii) children with specific profiles or in specific circumstances;
- (ix) victims or persons at risk of trafficking; and
- (x) lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) individuals.

In light of the ongoing non-international armed conflict,⁵ related civilian casualties, security incidents and conflict-induced displacement, in particular in central Iraq,⁶ UNHCR recommends that international protection applications lodged by Iraqis claiming to flee high levels of and/or intense violence should each be assessed carefully, in light of the evidence presented by the applicant and other current and reliable information on their place of former residence. This will include an assessment of whether the violence in the place of former residence is of such a level and intensity

that international protection is required under complementary protection regimes, even if the protection need cannot be related to a 1951 Convention ground.

UNHCR considers that internal flight options are often not available in Iraq due to serious risks faced by Iraqis throughout the country, including threats to safety and security, accessibility problems and lack of livelihood opportunities.

In light of the serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law during the former regime of Saddam Hussein from 1979 – 2003 (the “former regime”), as well as in the past decade, exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention may arise in certain individual cases. Careful consideration is particularly required for Iraqi asylum-seekers with the following profiles: (i) members of the former regime (1979 – 2003); (ii) members of armed groups opposing the former regime (1979 – 2003); (iii) members of the ISF, the Iraqi Government, the Kurdish Security Forces and the Sahwa (since 2003); (iv) members of armed groups (since 2003); and (v) members of criminal groups (since 2003).

In preparing these Eligibility Guidelines, UNHCR has analysed the most up-to-date and relevant information available from a wide variety of sources at 18 March 2012. However, access to fully comprehensive information on the situation in Iraq is not always accessible for a variety of reasons. In addition to publicly available sources, the analysis contained in these Eligibility Guidelines is also informed by reliable reports provided by: (i) Iraqi asylum-seekers and refugees around the world; (ii) internally displaced person (IDP) and returnee monitoring operations in Iraq; and (iii) UNHCR operations, UN agencies and other partners in Iraq.

II. Background Information

Developments in Iraq since the issuance of UNHCR’s last update in June 2010 have been uneven. Elections for Iraq’s Council of Representatives (CoR) were held on 7 March 2010. Following intense political wrangling, a coalition government under the leadership of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki was established in December 2010.⁷ Throughout 2011, power struggles among different factions hampered the political process:⁸ in particular, between Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s Shi’ite-dominated bloc and its cross-sectarian and largely secular partner, the Iraqiyya bloc, led by former Prime Minister Iyad Al-Allawi.⁹ The Iraqiyya bloc, which has strong Sunni support but also appears to be deeply fractured,¹⁰ accused the Prime Minister of amassing power¹¹ and politically sidelining Iraqiyya¹² and Sunnis in general.¹³ In December 2011, in the wake of the full US troop withdrawal,¹⁴ these political tensions turned into a political crisis with sectarian undertones.¹⁵ Prime Minister Al-Maliki sought to remove Sunni Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq.¹⁶ This action was followed by the issuance of an arrest warrant against Sunni Vice President Tareq Al-Hashemi on terrorism charges.¹⁷ The Iraqiyya bloc, to which both Al-Mutlaq and Al-Hashemi belong, responded by boycotting CoR and cabinet meetings, bringing government work to a halt.¹⁸ In turn, Prime Minister Al-Maliki threatened to abandon the power-sharing agreement. Further arrests of other prominent Iraqiyya members in Diyala and Baghdad aggravated concerns regarding Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s intentions in terms of continued cooperation with Iraqiyya in the Government.¹⁹ The crisis abated to some extent after Iraqiyya ended its boycott of the CoR and the cabinet.²⁰ The underlying disputes have not yet been resolved, however.²¹ A national conference is being considered to try to reconcile all sides.²²

Apparently making use of the political stalemate,²³ armed Sunni groups (such as Al-Qa’eda in Iraq) have stepped up attacks since December 2011. These attacks have been carried out primarily against Shi’ite civilians in what appears to be an effort to stir sectarian tensions²⁴ and undermine confidence in the ISF and, ultimately, the Iraqi Government.²⁵ The political stalemate also comes at an uncertain period in the wider region: the repercussions of ongoing unrest and tensions in Syria²⁶ and Iran,²⁷ with which Iraq shares porous borders and political and economic ties,²⁸ are not yet known. Iraq’s political difficulties have also reportedly increased tensions with neighbouring Turkey.²⁹

The political paralysis has meant that a number of long-standing issues have remained unresolved.³⁰ These include:³¹ disputes over territory³² and hydrocarbon rights³³ in areas claimed by both the Iraqi central authorities and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG); the division of powers between the central government and the regions/governorates;³⁴ and the inclusion of Sahwa (the largely Sunni Awakening Councils/Sons of Iraq) members into the ISF.³⁵ There are fears that if fundamental issues concerning the distribution of power, territory and resources remain unaddressed, Iraq's fragile stability may falter.³⁶

As mentioned above, armed groups opposed to the Iraqi Government remain active and capable of disrupting the security environment with regular mass casualty attacks, often directed at Shi'ite civilians, reportedly aiming to reinvigorate sectarian violence. Armed groups are also thought to be responsible for targeted attacks on government and security officials, politicians, tribal and religious leaders, and members of religious and ethnic minorities, among others. Occasionally, local cells manage to coordinate attacks across the country.³⁷ The number of civilian casualties, though less than at the peak of violence in 2006 and 2007, remains nonetheless significant³⁸ with around 4,000 civilians killed in both 2010 and 2011, respectively.³⁹ At least 464 civilians were killed in January 2012, in what appeared to be a surge in mass casualty attacks.⁴⁰ Shi'ite civilians have been the most affected.⁴¹ After a short lull in violence, several major attacks across central Iraq were again reported in late February, March and April 2012.⁴²

These casualty figures are indicative of the significant risks still faced by Iraqi civilians.⁴³ The number of civilian deaths from suicide attacks and car bombs decreased in 2011 compared to previous years, to an average of 6.6 per day.⁴⁴ While these attacks still account for the highest number of civilian deaths each month, the number of civilians killed from gunfire/executions rose to an average of 4.6 per day in 2011.⁴⁵ This suggests that an increasing number of Iraqis, especially government and security officials, are being individually targeted.⁴⁶ Violence is mostly concentrated in the predominantly Sunni or mixed central governorates of Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Salah Al-Din, but occasionally moves into the mainly Shi'ite governorates further south. Armed Sunni groups such as Al-Qa'eda in Iraq and Ansar Al-Islam are thought to be responsible for most of the violence.⁴⁷ Shi'ite armed groups have to a large extent been integrated into the ISF and the political process, though they reportedly maintain their independent military capabilities and at times threaten to use it to further their political agendas.⁴⁸ Armed groups target civilians on the basis of their (imputed) political views, religion, ethnicity, social status or a combination of reasons. As a result of the weak law enforcement and justice system, persons at risk of persecution are reportedly unable to find protection or judicial redress.⁴⁹ Observers mention undue political influence, the lack of trained legal professionals and corruption as further obstacles to the administration of justice, including in the Kurdistan Region.⁵⁰ Legal professionals continue to work in a very difficult security environment, and remain a target of armed groups.⁵¹ Crime is widespread and some armed groups reportedly engage in extortion, kidnappings and armed robberies to fund their other, politically – or religiously, or ideologically - motivated activities, conflating acts of persecution and criminality. Consequently, the line between persecution and criminality appears to be increasingly blurred.⁵²

Significant human rights violations at the hands of the ISF continue to be reported. There are frequent allegations that individuals have been arbitrarily arrested by the ISF, often on vague terrorism-related charges, and held without charge or trial for prolonged periods of time (up to several years).⁵³ Detention conditions are said to be harsh⁵⁴ and torture and ill-treatment are reportedly widespread and systematic,⁵⁵ both during arrest and while in detention - including allegedly in secret detention facilities.⁵⁶ Torture is reportedly used to extract information from detainees and to obtain "confessions" to be used in court against them.⁵⁷ Dozens of detainees have reportedly died as a result of torture or other ill-treatment in recent years.⁵⁸ It is suggested that these incidents often go unpunished.⁵⁹ Detainees held on terrorism or other security-related charges may be subject to grossly unfair trials at the Central Criminal Court of Iraq⁶⁰ or other criminal courts and, if convicted, may face the death penalty, including on the basis of confessions extracted under torture.⁶¹ Iraq has been criticized for excessive use of the death penalty: this has recently been increasing, with at least 69 executions carried out in 2012 [up to 18 March], despite continued allegations of unfair trials and widespread use of evidence obtained under torture.⁶²

In the Kurdistan Region, overall human rights conditions are reported to have improved;⁶³ however, abuses continue to be alleged.⁶⁴ Reports of arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention⁶⁵ and the use of torture and ill-treatment have been made, in particular, with regard to facilities run by the Kurdish Security Forces (*Asayish*).⁶⁶ Detainees held on terrorism charges under the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law⁶⁷ may be held without charge or trial for prolonged periods of time,⁶⁸ although reports suggest that this practice is not as common as it was in the past.⁶⁹ The KRG authorities have reportedly also lessened the previously widespread use of torture and ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners.⁷⁰ However, it is still occasionally reported that detainees are subjected to torture and ill-treatment,⁷¹ in particular when interrogated and investigated by the *Asayish*.⁷² The death penalty is still applied in the Kurdistan Region⁷³ and several persons have been sentenced to death in recent years,⁷⁴ however, the penalty has not in fact been carried out.⁷⁵

The Iraqi Government and the KRG have repeatedly been accused of disregard for freedom of expression and assembly.⁷⁶ Human rights and media organizations have condemned the violent suppression of popular protests⁷⁷ and restrictions on the freedom of the press.⁷⁸

The persistent problem of corruption⁷⁹ is said to prevent progress with respect to governance, public services⁸⁰ and security in Iraq.⁸¹ Efforts to combat corruption are reportedly hampered, *inter alia*, by an inadequate legal and institutional framework,⁸² weak parliamentary oversight,⁸³ ongoing attacks against anticorruption officials,⁸⁴ as well as government interference and political pressures.⁸⁵

Iraq also continues to face a challenging humanitarian situation and, as evidenced by recent Gallup polls⁸⁶ and street protests in the spring of 2011,⁸⁷ deepening pessimism and popular discontent. Many Iraqis still do not have sufficient access to essential services⁸⁸ - such as food,⁸⁹ drinking water,⁹⁰ sanitation,⁹¹ electricity,⁹² education⁹³ and health care⁹⁴ - and face difficulties in finding employment⁹⁵ and adequate housing.⁹⁶ These difficult living conditions are often more pronounced for the still high number of Iraqis that remain displaced inside and outside Iraq.⁹⁷ Security concerns and the lack of adequate livelihood opportunities remain obstacles to return and successful reintegration of formerly displaced persons. Nearly half a million Iraqis, including IDPs and returnees, reside in squatter settlements without access to basic necessities such as clean water, electricity, and sanitation; and often on public land or in public buildings at risk of eviction.⁹⁸

III. Main Actors of Persecution and Violence

A number of state and non-state actors are identified throughout this document. Observers consider them to be responsible for committing abuses against the civilian population, including acts of terrorism, killings, abductions, torture, rape, threats and harassment, as well as domestic violence and harmful traditional practices.

a) Non-State Actors

According to Iraqi Government officials, there are dozens of armed groups active in Iraq, comprising thousands of members.⁹⁹ Armed groups are largely split along sectarian lines, i.e. Sunni or Shi'ite. Some groups operate independently, while others are openly or secretly affiliated with political parties or have transformed into political parties, though this does not necessarily mean that they have disarmed. This section provides an overview of the major armed groups in Iraq, with a particular focus on their alleged responsibility for violence perpetrated against persons falling within the risk profiles outlined in this document.¹⁰⁰ It also assesses the interaction between criminal groups and politically/ideologically driven armed groups, noting the difficulties in clearly differentiating between them. This section also identifies family and tribes as perpetrators of domestic violence and harmful traditional practices, affecting mainly (but not solely) women and girls.

i. Armed Sunni Groups

After 2003, a range of armed Sunni groups emerged, generally referred to as the “Sunni insurgency”. These groups appeared to be united only by the goals of liberating Iraq from “foreign occupation” and

undermining the new political order in the country. In terms of ideology, membership and tactics, they reportedly had little in common and at times even turned against each other. Today, the Sunni armed groups considered responsible for most of the violence perpetrated against the Iraqi Government and the civilian population are Islamic State of Iraq / Al-Qa'eda in Iraq, Ansar Al-Islam and the Naqshbandi Army. These three groups, although independent, are reported to cooperate to some extent.¹⁰¹ Other Sunni armed groups are said to have been mainly, though not exclusively, focused on fighting the Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) / United States Forces in Iraq (USF-I) and their "collaborators" such as the ISF, armed Shi'ite groups and the Sahwa; they are said to reject targeting Iraqi civilians at large.¹⁰² After the withdrawal of the USF-I from Iraq in December 2011, these groups reportedly shifted their focus to the Iraqi Government, in addition to the remaining US presence in the country.¹⁰³

Al-Qa'eda in Iraq,¹⁰⁴ a radical Salafi organization, has reportedly been the main proponent of the Sunni insurgency since 2003 and is widely blamed for widespread attacks against the MNF-I/USF-I, the ISF and the (mainly Shi'ite) civilian population. Since 2006, Al-Qa'eda in Iraq has claimed to operate under the umbrella of the Islamic State of Iraq.¹⁰⁵ According to US officials, the group has between 800 and 1,000 members in Iraq.¹⁰⁶ It is claimed to be most active in the governorates of Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa (with Mosul being its major urban stronghold) and Salah Al-Din.¹⁰⁷ But it is also present in Babel and Kerbala, and even further south, as evidenced by occasional attacks for example in Kut, Basrah or Nasseriyah.¹⁰⁸ Unlike other armed groups, Al-Qa'eda in Iraq has reportedly deliberately targeted Iraqi civilians at large, in particular Shi'ites,¹⁰⁹ apparently with the aim of (re)igniting violence among Iraq's ethnic and religious groups. Al-Qa'eda in Iraq claims responsibility for continuous attacks against the Shi'ite population and their places of worship - including the attack on the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February of 2006, which led to widespread sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups in 2006 and 2007. Al-Qa'eda in Iraq has also claimed responsibility for attacks against the USF-I, the Iraqi Government, including its political, administrative and security representatives, and anybody considered to be collaborating with either the Government or the USF-I.¹¹⁰ Persons involved in fighting or openly criticizing Al-Qa'eda in Iraq risk being killed.¹¹¹ As a result of diminished popular support, opposition from the Sahwa forces,¹¹² increased USF-I/ISF offensives as well as high-profile arrests of leaders,¹¹³ the group was weakened and no longer holds territorial control of vast areas in central Iraq. Over time, Al-Qa'eda in Iraq is said to have transformed into a mainly "home-grown" terrorist group made up of Iraqi fighters,¹¹⁴ including those whose views are said to have radicalized after years in detention.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, Islamic State of Iraq / Al-Qa'eda in Iraq remains capable of launching major attacks, including multiple coordinated attacks across the country,¹¹⁶ and has reportedly resurfaced in former strongholds.¹¹⁷ While Al-Qa'eda in Iraq originally fought to expel the MNF-I/USF-I from Iraq, it is said to have shifted its focus to combat the Iraqi Government, which it considers to be controlled by Shi'ite Iran.¹¹⁸ Al-Qa'eda in Iraq is reported to finance its activities through extortion, kidnappings for ransom and other criminal activities, especially since funding from abroad has reportedly slowed.¹¹⁹ Al-Qa'eda in Iraq professes to pursue a long-term goal of establishing a Sunni Islamic state based on Shari'a law,¹²⁰ including by targeting Shi'ites and Sunnis participating in the political process,¹²¹ members of religious minorities,¹²² as well as women and men for their behaviour or dress, or professions considered to be "un-Islamic".¹²³ Al-Qa'eda in Iraq is also thought to engage in forcible recruitment, including of women and children, as suicide bombers or for other tasks.¹²⁴

Ansar Al-Islam (or Ansar Al-Sunna),¹²⁵ established in 2001, is considered to be a "home-grown" Kurdish Sunni extremist group that aims to establish an Islamic state governed by its interpretation of Shari'a law.¹²⁶ In spring 2003, the group was largely driven out of Iraqi Kurdistan by joint US-Kurdish military operations, but subsequently regrouped and reportedly "*became one of the most potent elements of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.*"¹²⁷ Ansar Al-Islam's former leader, Abu Abdullah Al-Shafi,¹²⁸ who was arrested on 3 May 2010,¹²⁹ maintained close ties with Al-Qa'eda in Iraq as well as with Osama Bin Laden and admitted to having conducted joint operations.¹³⁰ Ansar Al-Islam is also reported to have close allies in Iran, a country reportedly used as a safe haven by its members.¹³¹ The organization has claimed responsibility for large-scale suicide¹³² and car bomb attacks in Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Baghdad,¹³³ and is also active in Diyala.¹³⁴ Its main targets have been the MNF-

I/USF-I,¹³⁵ the ISF,¹³⁶ the Iraqi Government,¹³⁷ as well as Kurdish security forces and political parties (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan).¹³⁸ It is also said to have targeted Sahwa members for their cooperation with the USF-I.¹³⁹ Reportedly, it has also targeted Shi'ites,¹⁴⁰ Kurds,¹⁴¹ Christians,¹⁴² Yazidis,¹⁴³ Turkmen and Shabak.¹⁴⁴ Reports indicate that Ansar Al-Islam has assassinated “government officials, politicians, judges, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, doctors, professors, and individuals thought to be collaborating with foreign forces in Iraq, including translators, cleaners, and others who perform civilian jobs for the U.S.-led Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I).”¹⁴⁵ It has reportedly been involved in the killing of individuals considered to behave in an “un-Islamic” manner.¹⁴⁶

The Naqshbandi Army (or JRTN)¹⁴⁷ is a Sunni insurgent group with a mainly nationalistic outlook despite its claim to be part of a 14th century order of mystical Islam.¹⁴⁸ It was formed in December 2006 in response to the execution of former President Saddam Hussein¹⁴⁹ and seeks to re-establish the Ba'ath Party's dominance in Iraq.¹⁵⁰ The Naqshbandi Army has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against the MNF-I/USF-I¹⁵¹ in Baghdad, Al-Anbar, Ninewa, Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates.¹⁵² It is reportedly also active in Kirkuk Governorate¹⁵³ and, owing to Ba'athist ties to southern tribes, it is probably able to conduct limited attacks in southern Iraq.¹⁵⁴ The Naqshbandi Army is opposed to the Iraqi Government, which it considers to be controlled by Iran and as having persecuted Sunnis.¹⁵⁵ It is the doctrine of the Naqshbandi Army not to target Iraqi civilians unless they are considered as collaborators with “the unbeliever-occupier”, i.e. the Iraqi Government and previously foreign forces,¹⁵⁶ apparently making it a more acceptable alternative for supporters than Al-Qa'eda in Iraq.¹⁵⁷ It has been reported that the Naqshbandi Army enjoys sympathy if not support among Sunni security forces.¹⁵⁸ Despite deep ideological differences between them, the Naqshbandi Army is reportedly financing operations for Al-Qa'eda in Iraq, particularly attacks on civilian targets, in order not to be seen to be undermining its policy of not attacking civilians.¹⁵⁹ It reportedly also outsources attacks to other armed groups.¹⁶⁰

ii. Armed Shi'ite Groups

After 2003, a range of armed Shi'ite groups reportedly started to compete for power and religious influence in Iraq, at times resulting in violent intra-Shi'ite clashes.¹⁶¹ This was the case, in particular, between the Badr Corps,¹⁶² the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq / Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Jaysh Al-Mahdi, the armed wing of the Sadrist Movement led by cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr.¹⁶³ Jaysh Al-Mahdi became the main Shi'ite opposition to the foreign coalition forces in Iraq after the fall of the former regime in 2003. It staged two uprisings against US forces in April and August 2004 and launched numerous attacks against mainly US military targets. Attacks on US forces peaked in mid-2007, when Jaysh Al-Mahdi was responsible for the majority of all US casualties.¹⁶⁴ Both the Badr Corps and the Sadrists have integrated into the political process¹⁶⁵ and the Sadrists have become a major political force and main backer of Prime Minister Al-Maliki.¹⁶⁶ However, none of these groups have given up military capacity¹⁶⁷ and, in the case of Jaysh Al-Mahdi /Promised Day Brigades, sporadic attacks on US targets continued into 2011.¹⁶⁸ Some members of the Badr Corps, and to a lesser extent the Jaysh Al-Mahdi, have been integrated into the ISF.¹⁶⁹ Armed Shi'ite groups are accused of having a major role in the sectarian cleansing that followed the February 2006 Al-Askari shrine bombing.¹⁷⁰ Armed Shi'ite groups were significantly affected by the ISF-led offensives in southern Iraq and Sadr City/Baghdad in 2007–2008.¹⁷¹

Muqtada Al-Sadr faced apparent difficulties in retaining control over Jaysh Al-Mahdi, and the group splintered into various factions with differing agendas (so-called “Special Groups”¹⁷²), some of them engaging in mainly criminal activities.¹⁷³ In recent years, three main armed Shi'ite groups have been active: Jaysh Al-Mahdi /Promised Day Brigades; Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq,¹⁷⁴ which was created by former Sadrist Qays Al-Khazali;¹⁷⁵ and Kata'ib Hezbollah.¹⁷⁶ In 2011, these groups claimed responsibility for lethal attacks against the USF-I aimed at expediting the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq.¹⁷⁷ Their presence is mainly reported in Baghdad, Basrah, Missan, Thi-Qar, Kerbala, Babel, Najef, Wassit and Diwaniyah.¹⁷⁸ Armed Shi'ite groups have also been reported to engage in criminal activities such as kidnappings, extortion and oil smuggling.¹⁷⁹

Armed Shi'ite groups boasted that the US troop withdrawal from Iraq in mid-December 2011 was a "historic victory".¹⁸⁰ It remains to be seen how their agendas will evolve in the aftermath of this withdrawal. Reportedly, there continue to be regular rocket attacks against the US consulate in Basrah, which houses almost 1,000 US diplomatic and security personnel.¹⁸¹ At the same time, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq announced its decision to lay down its arms¹⁸² and engage in the political system as an opposition party.¹⁸³ This decision heightened existing tensions with the Sadrists.¹⁸⁴ Muqtada Al-Sadr has repeatedly warned that the Promised Day Brigades stand ready to attack any "oversize" US diplomatic presence in Iraq.¹⁸⁵ There are no indications that Kata'ib Hezbollah seeks to integrate into the political system.¹⁸⁶

While armed Shi'ite groups have in the past publicly focussed on attacking the MNF-I/USF-I, there are reports that they also single out Iraqis of various profiles for kidnapping and assassination, including former Ba'athists,¹⁸⁷ security¹⁸⁸ and government officials,¹⁸⁹ political/religious rivals,¹⁹⁰ and persons considered as "collaborators" with the foreign forces, especially the US.¹⁹¹ Further, Shi'ite groups have also enforced strict Islamic rules of behaviour and dress, and are considered to be responsible, *inter alia*, for attacks on women not wearing the veil, persons engaged in selling liquor,¹⁹² and LGBTI persons.¹⁹³

iii. Criminal Groups

Criminal gangs are reported to have taken full advantage of the tenuous security situation and weak law enforcement capacities of the state, engaging in various illegal activities such as extortion, kidnappings, killings, forced prostitution and human trafficking. Ideologically driven or politically oriented armed groups also reportedly engage in criminal activities to finance their activities and to further their political/ideological/sectarian goals,¹⁹⁴ at times cooperating with criminal organizations.¹⁹⁵ As a result, it may be difficult to establish the exact motivation behind a particular armed attack, i.e. whether it is profit-driven or whether there is (also) a link to a 1951 Convention ground such as the victim's political, ethnic or religious background or his/her membership in a particular social group.¹⁹⁶ Criminal motives may also overlap with motives linked to a 1951 Convention ground. For example, a victim may be singled out for kidnapping against ransom for economic profit and in order to pursue a political/ideological aim.¹⁹⁷ Law enforcement agencies are reported to be prone to corruption and bribery, intimidation and infiltration, which can facilitate and protect criminal activities.¹⁹⁸ As a result, criminal gangs (and armed groups) may be able to operate in collusion with members of the ISF and to enjoy impunity for their activities.¹⁹⁹

For the above reasons, UNHCR considers that, even in cases of harm or persecution that appear to be criminally motivated, it is necessary to thoroughly examine whether other motives for persecution related to one of the 1951 Convention grounds for refugee status may also have been present.

iv. Family, Community, Tribe

Acts of violence and harmful traditional practices, most notably domestic violence, "honour crimes", early and forced marriages, female genital mutilation as well as (sex) trafficking and forced prostitution are commonly committed by members of a victim's (extended) family, community or tribe. Iraqi laws do not criminalize certain acts of violence against women and, even when laws may be available to protect victims of violence, state organs often reportedly fail to charge or prosecute alleged perpetrators.²⁰⁰ There have also been reports of family members killing (perceived) LGBTI individuals for reasons of "honour".²⁰¹

b) State Actors

i. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

In the past decade of sectarian violence, the ISF - reportedly infiltrated by members of primarily Shi'ite armed groups - have been accused of engaging in frequent kidnappings, torture and summary

executions of (mainly) Sunni Arabs.²⁰² In recent years, there have been consistent reports of the ISF using repressive measures such as arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention (including in “secret” facilities) and torture to silence political opponents,²⁰³ journalists,²⁰⁴ and protestors.²⁰⁵ There have also been reports of the ISF engaging in abuses of LGBTI individuals.²⁰⁶ The ISF have allegedly used excessive force against protestors, including live ammunition.²⁰⁷ Civilian deaths have occurred as a result of ISF or joint ISF/USF-I military operations aimed at combating armed groups.²⁰⁸ Some sources claim that acts of violence committed by the ISF are achieved with impunity; and that where disciplinary proceedings against perpetrators are initiated, they lack transparency.²⁰⁹

ii. Kurdish Security Forces

Kurdish political parties, together with their armed forces and security/intelligence services, are accused by observers of using repressive measures - including harassment, physical assaults, arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, torture and ill-treatment in detention – against their political opponents, journalists, and members of ethnic/religious minorities in areas under their *de facto* or *de iure* control.²¹⁰ Unlawful killings by the Kurdish Security Forces have been reported.²¹¹ Kurdish Security Forces have also reportedly used excessive force, including live ammunition, to disband popular protests.²¹²

IV. Eligibility for International Protection

UNHCR recommends that all claims by asylum-seekers from Iraq be considered on their individual merits in fair and efficient refugee status determination procedures, taking into account up-to-date and relevant country of origin information. UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular details of their claims, individuals with profiles and in circumstances similar to those outlined below are likely to be in need of international refugee protection in the sense of the 1951 Convention²¹³ and the 1967 Protocol.²¹⁴

This listing is not exhaustive and is based on information available to UNHCR as at 18 March 2012. An individual’s claim is not without merit simply because he or she does not fall within any of the profiles identified below. Similarly, not all persons falling within these risk profiles will necessarily be in need of international refugee protection: in the assessment of whether or not a claimant would be likely to be exposed to persecution or serious harm upon return, the specific elements of the individual claim are decisive. Certain claims by asylum-seekers from Iraq, including of those possibly falling within risk profiles described in these guidelines, will require examination for possible exclusion from refugee status.

For persons who have already been recognized as refugees, their status may be reviewed only if there are indications, in an individual case, that there are grounds for cancellation of refugee status which was wrongly granted in the first instance; revocation of refugee status on the grounds of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention; or cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(1-4) of the 1951 Convention.²¹⁵ UNHCR considers that the current situation in Iraq does not warrant cessation of refugee status on the basis of Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention.

Availability of National Protection

In Iraq, the main perpetrators of persecution are non-state actors. However, protection by national authorities is unlikely to be available in most cases, given that the national authorities have limited capacity to enforce law and order.²¹⁶ The ISF, which now have around 930,000 members²¹⁷ and are widely acknowledged as increasingly capable and united, reportedly remain vulnerable to corruption²¹⁸ and infiltration by militants,²¹⁹ and continue to be themselves a major target of attacks.²²⁰ In addition, political disunity²²¹ has reportedly limited the effectiveness of the ISF.²²²

The judiciary, which remains understaffed,²²³ is reported to be prone to intimidation,²²⁴ infiltration,²²⁵ political interference²²⁶ and corruption.²²⁷ Judges often face death threats and attacks.²²⁸ Perpetrators of crimes and human rights violations are reportedly still not held accountable.²²⁹ In the Kurdistan Region, judicial independence is said to be hampered by political interference.²³⁰

A. Risk Profiles

1. *Individuals Associated with (or Perceived to be Supporting) the Iraqi Authorities and the (former) MNF-I/USF-I*

Armed groups continue to target civilians associated with, or perceived as supporting, the Iraqi Government. Numerous attacks against members of the ISF, the Sahwa, government officials and employees as well as members of political parties engaged in the political process have been reported. Tribal and religious leaders, as well as professionals such as judges or academics, have reportedly also been targeted for their (perceived) support of the Iraqi authorities, the political process or the USF-I. It is widely believed that many of these attacks are aimed at undermining the functioning and the overall legitimacy of the Iraqi authorities, although the exact intention is often difficult to establish.²³¹

According to the UN Secretary General's 28 November 2011 report, covering the period from 7 July 2011 onwards, "[T]here was a marked increase in assassinations of government officials, professionals and security personnel."²³² Attacks include instances of intimidation, abductions and assassinations, including by the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), (suicide) car bombs and targeted killings with firearms equipped with silencers or "sticky bombs" attached to vehicles.²³³ Many reports of intimidations and threats are made.²³⁴ Incidents of targeted attacks have been reported in almost all of central and southern Iraq, but particularly in Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Babel, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates.

UNHCR considers that individuals associated with, or perceived to be supporting the Iraqi authorities, the ISF or the (former) MNF-I/USF-I are, depending on the circumstances of their claim, likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their (imputed) political opinion.

Specific groups that may be associated with or perceived to be supporting the Iraqi authorities include the following:

a) *Government Officials and Employees*

Various armed groups²³⁵ are thought to be responsible for targeting persons involved in the Iraqi Government at both the federal and local levels, as well as members of their families and their bodyguards. Perpetrators' motives appear to be multidimensional. While certain acts are thought to be intended to delegitimize the Iraqi Government and spread fear among the wider population, other attacks seem to specifically target government officials, whether for their membership of a particular political party or their involvement in certain political affairs, such as national reconciliation, de-Ba'athification or anti-corruption efforts. In 2010, 2011 and 2012, there have been numerous attacks against high-ranking government officials, including members of the Council of Representatives,²³⁶ (deputy) ministers,²³⁷ other senior ministry officials²³⁸ and advisors to the Prime Minister or CoR members.²³⁹ Members of the Iraqi Justice and Accountability Commission,²⁴⁰ the Commission of Integrity²⁴¹ and the Independent High Electoral Commission²⁴² have also been targeted for assassination. At the provincial/municipality level, governors and deputy governors,²⁴³ local mayors²⁴⁴ and members of provincial²⁴⁵ and municipal/city councils²⁴⁶ have been targeted, among others. There are also many reported attacks on government employees²⁴⁷ and state-owned company employees,²⁴⁸ including by targeting their vehicles or homes. Family members, drivers and bodyguards are also at risk of being killed or wounded in attacks²⁴⁹ and, in some cases, may have been targeted deliberately.²⁵⁰ Former members of the Iraqi Government may remain at risk of attack.²⁵¹ Iraqi judges have frequently been the victims of attacks by armed anti-government groups. They continue to be singled out and killed in targeted attacks, frequently alongside family members and bodyguards.²⁵²

Numerous attacks targeting government offices have been reported, including the heavily guarded Ministry of Interior in Baghdad,²⁵³ a passport office in Kerbala²⁵⁴ and the provincial council compounds in Baghdad,²⁵⁵ Ba'quba (Diyala), Ramadi (Al-Anbar) and Tikrit (Salah Al-Din),²⁵⁶ resulting in a high number of casualties. Baghdad's heavily fortified International Zone, where many government institutions are located, has been a regular target for rocket and mortar attacks, and was the target of a suicide attack in November 2011, for the first time since 1997.²⁵⁷

b) Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)

In view of the need to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, applications for international refugee protection by *combatants* should not be considered unless it is established that they have genuinely and permanently renounced military and armed activities.²⁵⁸

As highlighted above, in 2010 and 2011 armed groups increased attacks against the ISF in an apparent effort to destabilize the country and undermine confidence in the ability of the Iraqi Government to provide security. Iraqi soldiers and policemen are killed on a daily basis. This trend is expected to continue following the USF-I's withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011.²⁵⁹ Members of the Iraqi Police are often particularly targeted: they do not have heavy weapons and equipment and receive less training than the Iraqi Army, and are accordingly reportedly considered the weakest element of the ISF.²⁶⁰ In 2011, according to Iraqi Government statistics, about 40 per cent of Iraqis killed were ISF members, including 609 Iraqi police and 458 soldiers.²⁶¹

ISF patrols, convoys, checkpoints, army bases and police stations are subject to daily attacks, mainly by roadside bombs and gunfire. Checkpoints are also regularly attacked by sniper fire.²⁶² The ISF are frequently targeted in larger attacks involving car bombs or suicide bombers,²⁶³ including in multiple coordinated attacks across the country.²⁶⁴ Major attacks against the ISF in 2011 and 2012, some of them claimed by Al-Qa'eda in Iraq (ISI/AQI), were carried out in Al-Anbar,²⁶⁵ Babel,²⁶⁶ Baghdad,²⁶⁷ Basrah,²⁶⁸ Diyala,²⁶⁹ Kirkuk,²⁷⁰ Ninewa²⁷¹ and Salah Al-Din²⁷² Governorates.

In addition, targeted killings of ISF personnel have been increasing since late 2010.²⁷³ While most attacks occur in the cities of Baghdad²⁷⁴ and Kirkuk,²⁷⁵ senior ISF officials have also regularly been targeted in the central governorates of Al-Anbar,²⁷⁶ Diyala,²⁷⁷ Ninewa²⁷⁸ and Salah Al-Din.²⁷⁹ In southern Iraq, targeted attacks on senior ISF officials are less frequent.²⁸⁰ Most assassinations are reportedly carried out through the use of weapons with silencers or "sticky bombs" attached to vehicles.²⁸¹ The victims have likely been monitored in advance of an attack.²⁸² According to Iraqi officials, senior ISF members of Sunni background have been particularly singled out for assassinations.²⁸³ Both Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups are thought to be responsible for the targeting of senior ISF officials.²⁸⁴ Iraqi officials suggested that Shi'ite groups strengthened their campaign against those of Sunni background due to fears that they could lead a military coup against the Government after the USF-I's withdrawal from Iraq.²⁸⁵ According to Ministry of Defense officials, "hit lists" have been issued by armed Shi'ite groups and published on websites, and some officers have received threatening phone calls.²⁸⁶ Acknowledging the increased risks, the Ministry of Interior introduced measures to help officials avoid assassination²⁸⁷ - even though, according to experts, "*there are few preventive measures against the use of such economical and low-profile tactics*" as sniper fire or sticky bombs.²⁸⁸

Members of the ISF are also reportedly singled out for assassination when off-duty, including in their homes,²⁸⁹ sometimes in apparently coordinated multiple attacks.²⁹⁰ Attacks on off-duty ISF members, as reported by the media, occur mainly in Ninewa and Kirkuk Governorates, but also in Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates.²⁹¹ Because members of the ISF, regardless of rank, are often attacked in their private environment, e.g. their homes or private vehicles, their family members, guards and drivers as well as civilian passers-by are also at risk of being killed or wounded.²⁹²

In areas of central Iraq under the *de facto* control of the Kurdish Security Forces (parts of Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates),²⁹³ attacks targeting the Kurdish *Peshmerga* and *Asayish* are reported.²⁹⁴

There are also reports that members of the army, security and intelligence apparatus of the former regime continue to be targeted by armed groups.²⁹⁵

c) Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community Leaders

Traditional tribal and community leaders, particularly those involved in the Sahwa movement,²⁹⁶ reportedly continue to be prime targets for armed groups such as Al-Qa'eda in Iraq (ISI/AQI), as was the case throughout 2010, 2011 and early 2012.²⁹⁷

Sahwa leaders and members of all ranks are considered “traitors” for their alliance with the MNF-I/USF-I or, after the transfer of responsibility,²⁹⁸ the Iraqi Government.²⁹⁹ They continue to be targets for roadside bombs and suicide attacks against checkpoints or patrols,³⁰⁰ as well as assassinations.³⁰¹ In 2011 and 2012, several Sahwa leaders have been singled out for assassination, often by “sticky bombs” or firearms.³⁰² Family members or civilian bystanders are routinely harmed as attacks frequently target the homes or cars of Sahwa members.³⁰³ Occasionally, Sahwa members are targeted in coordinated attacks.³⁰⁴ There have also been reports of attacks on former Sahwa members.³⁰⁵ Extremist groups have reportedly also threatened members of the “Daughters of Iraq” (*Banat Al-Iraq*).³⁰⁶

Other traditional tribal, religious and community leaders, beyond Sahwa members, have also been targeted.³⁰⁷ The motives behind these attacks are often unknown and may be multifaceted. However, in some cases, the victims were known for their involvement with / support to the Sahwa or their outspoken views against Al-Qa'eda in Iraq (ISI/AQI).³⁰⁸

d) Members of Political Parties

Members of political parties across the political spectrum continue to be targeted by armed groups opposed to the Iraqi Government or the political process, or as a result of political rivalries. Targeted attacks on party officials and party offices intensified in the run-up to the March 2010 CoR elections, when a number of candidates were killed,³⁰⁹ and continued throughout 2010 and 2011,³¹⁰ and into 2012. The perpetrators' motives appear to be multidimensional. Armed Shi'ite and Sunni groups are both thought to be responsible for targeted attacks on Shi'ite party representatives and offices.³¹¹ Competing Shi'ite armed groups, which in the past were involved in violent clashes against each other,³¹² are thought to be responsible for the targeting of rivals.³¹³ Conversely, armed Sunni groups target Shi'ite party representatives on sectarian and political grounds, considering them as “infidels” or “Iranian agents”.³¹⁴ Armed Sunni groups have repeatedly pledged to kill those Sunnis that take part in the political process, labelling them as “traitors” and “collaborators”.³¹⁵ They are therefore blamed for the assassination of a number of Sunni and secular politicians, including those belonging to the Iraqi Islamic Party³¹⁶ and the cross-sectarian Iraqiyya coalition, which garnered wide Sunni support.³¹⁷ Sahwa members who have become politicians have also been targeted.³¹⁸ In the multi-ethnic “disputed areas” of Ninewa, Kirkuk, Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates,³¹⁹ armed Sunni groups are accused of being behind targeted attacks on party offices and party representatives of Kurdish and Turkmen parties such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan or the Iraqi Turkmen Front, in what may be attempts to encourage ethnic/political divisions among the communities.³²⁰

e) Individuals Affiliated with the USF-I, Foreign Governments, NGOs or International Companies

Civilians (formerly) employed or otherwise affiliated with the former MNF-I/USF-I or foreign governments, NGOs or international companies, as well as their families, are at risk of being targeted by non-state actors for their (imputed) political opinion.³²¹ Since 2003,³²² both Sunni and Shi'ite

armed groups³²³ are known to have threatened, kidnapped and killed interpreters, embassy workers, drivers, subcontractors and others affiliated with the MNF-I/USF-I, foreign governments, international companies or organizations, reportedly to deter others from working for them.³²⁴

Ahead of the full USF-I withdrawal from Iraq, achieved by mid December 2011, advocates and Iraqis (formerly) employed³²⁵ with the US military raised concerns about being left without protection.³²⁶ There are fears that employee records maintained by the USF-I may have leaked to armed groups.³²⁷ Perpetrators of violence against Iraqis affiliated with the MNF-I/USF-I are both Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups.³²⁸ It is reported that there were no contingency plans to provide emergency protection to former Iraqi employees after the USF-I withdrawal.³²⁹

Individuals who have worked for the MNF-I/USF-I may be unable to find new employment if their former employer becomes known. Many former USF-I employees allegedly hesitate to reveal their prior work experience to a potential new employer for fear of retribution.³³⁰

2. *Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the Iraqi Authorities*

A range of armed groups, both Sunni and Shi'ite, continue to threaten security in Iraq and engage in armed attacks and criminal activities. Many individuals are arrested and prosecuted by the Iraqi authorities for their involvement in terrorism and other criminal acts. However, there are consistent allegations that members of the ISF target (perceived) political opponents in order to marginalize the opposition and consolidate power.³³¹ There are allegations that political opponents of the Iraqi Government have been arbitrarily arrested on the basis of vague terrorism-related charges or alleged Ba'athist ties for political motives rather than any specific criminal act. Those accused of terrorism are reportedly regularly exposed to incommunicado detention, torture and even extra-judicial executions, following allegedly unfair trials. In what is said to be an effort to silence critical voices, journalists,³³² protestors and anti-corruption officials have reportedly been subjected to intimidation, harassment and arbitrary arrests or had their employment in the public sector terminated. According to Human Rights Watch, “[A]fter more than six years of democratic rule, Iraqis who publicly express their views still do so at great peril.”³³³

UNHCR considers that individuals perceived as opposing the Iraqi authorities are, depending on the circumstances of their claim, likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their (imputed) political opinion.

Specific groups that may be (perceived as) opposing the Iraqi authorities include the following:

a) *(Perceived) Political Opponents*

Persons (considered to be) in opposition to the Iraqi Government reportedly face politically motivated arrests or are arbitrarily deprived of their employment in the public sector.³³⁴ Political opponents are allegedly arrested arbitrarily on vague terrorism-related charges, often coupled with accusations of Ba'ath Party ties or corruption.³³⁵ Judicial or administrative actions against persons reasonably suspected of terrorism, former Ba'athists or persons accused of corruption are legitimate, if in line with relevant legislation and the due process of law. However, observers note that the alleged lack of transparency, reported legal discrepancies, and politicized public statements have raised serious doubts about the real reasons for certain arrests of or administrative sanctions against political opponents of the Iraqi Government.³³⁶ Arrests of political opponents are reportedly increasing.³³⁷ Given that the ISF are Shi'ite-dominated, and those arrested are often of Sunni background, some

commentators have expressed the view that sectarian motives may also be a relevant factor in such incidents.³³⁸

After the fall of the former regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority and, subsequently, the Iraqi Government introduced a number of measures to “de-Ba’athify” the Iraqi administration and security forces.³³⁹ From the outset, it was reported that the implementation of relevant regulations was arbitrary, sectarian³⁴⁰ and politicized.³⁴¹ There have been continuous claims that the Iraqi Government has used accusations of “Ba’athism” to sideline political opponents and to settle political scores.³⁴² “De-Ba’athification” has reportedly been used to fire government and security officials and replace them with loyalists,³⁴³ and to ban political rivals from running in elections.³⁴⁴ Reported arrests of alleged Ba’ath Party members have raised concerns, given that neither the De-Ba’athification Law,³⁴⁵ nor any other law, provides for legal prosecution for Ba’ath Party membership.³⁴⁶ During an “arrest campaign” in October/November 2011, when more than 600 individuals were arrested on charges of terrorism and alleged Ba’ath Party ties, Deputy Minister of Interior Adnan Al-Asadi stated that all arrests were undertaken on the basis of the Counterterrorism Law of 2005.³⁴⁷ However, Iraqi Government officials repeatedly referred to a person’s Ba’ath Party affiliation and rank to justify the arrest.³⁴⁸ The timing and circumstances, the questionable legal basis and the lack of transparency of these arrests raised serious doubts among some observers over their real motivation.³⁴⁹ Most of those arrested reportedly remain in detention without charge.³⁵⁰

Reports suggest that persons accused of terrorism³⁵¹ are at risk of arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, including at secret detention facilities, as well as torture and ill-treatment.³⁵² Detainees suspected of links with armed groups as well as open critics of the Iraqi Government are reported to be at particular risk of being subjected to torture and ill-treatment.³⁵³ Several detainees are said to have died as a result of torture.³⁵⁴ Detainees charged under the Counterterrorism Law are considered by some observers to be at risk of facing unfair trials and, if convicted, may face the death penalty, including on the basis of confessions extracted under torture.³⁵⁵

There are allegations that certain senior government officials and politicians seek to silence persons investigating corruption within the Iraqi Government. Anti-corruption officials have reportedly faced threats, intimidation and forced removal from their employment.³⁵⁶ The former head of the Commission of Integrity sought asylum in the US based on fear of assassination allegedly linked to investigations into corruption by senior government officials.³⁵⁷

After the fall of the previous regime in 2003, persons affiliated or associated with the former regime, through membership in the Ba’ath Party or as a result of their functions or profession, were subjected to systematic attacks mainly by armed Shi’ite groups.³⁵⁸ Today, members of the former Ba’ath Party or the former regime’s armed forces or security and intelligence services are reportedly no longer systematically singled out for attack by armed groups. They may still be targeted in individual cases, although the exact motivation behind an attack may not always be known. Many former Ba’athists have found new identities as politicians,³⁵⁹ academics,³⁶⁰ tribal leaders,³⁶¹ or members of the current ISF.³⁶² It is difficult to determine if attacks against them are motivated by their role under the former regime or by the person’s present profile. Palestinian refugees,¹ who are widely considered to have received preferential treatment under the former regime and were suspected of supporting the Sunni insurgency, have also been singled out for attacks and arrests since 2003.

b) Protestors

Article 38 of the Iraqi Constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration,

¹ It should be noted that Palestinians originating from or having their habitual residence in Iraq are not included in the scope of these Eligibility Guidelines. For UNHCR’s position as regards the protection needs of Palestinians from Iraq, see *Update of UNHCR Aide-Mémoire of 2006. Protection Considerations for Palestinian Refugees in Iraq* [to be published shortly].

provided the exercise of this freedom “does not violate public order or morality”.³⁶³ However, regulations issued by the Ministry of Interior on 25 June 2010 in the wake of popular protests over poor public services, especially electricity, in several governorates³⁶⁴ make it difficult to obtain official permission to hold demonstrations³⁶⁵ and permit “all known methods to disperse protesters” in the event of any violence occurring during a demonstration.³⁶⁶ Public protests intensified in February 2011³⁶⁷ and on a proclaimed “Day of Rage” on 25 February 2011, tens of thousands of individuals demonstrated in at least 12 locations across the country.³⁶⁸ Grievances expressed included high unemployment, corruption and poor public services, as well as restrictions on civil and political rights.³⁶⁹ The ISF reportedly used excessive force, including live ammunition,³⁷⁰ to disband the protesters³⁷¹ and reports indicated that at least 25 persons were killed and dozens wounded across central and southern Iraq.³⁷² The death toll subsequently rose over the following few days.³⁷³ As a result of this response by Iraqi authorities, as well as heightened security measures and restrictive regulations, fewer people participated in later protests.³⁷⁴ The ISF and armed Iraqi Government supporters³⁷⁵ have also been accused of intimidating, beating, arresting and mistreating with impunity hundreds of protestors,³⁷⁶ among them protest organizers,³⁷⁷ students,³⁷⁸ women,³⁷⁹ journalists,³⁸⁰ artists and intellectuals.³⁸¹ It has been reported that detained protestors were often held incommunicado, denied access to lawyers and family visits.³⁸² Some were reportedly only released after signing a pledge not to participate in future protests.³⁸³ Protestors were also accused by Iraqi Government officials of being Ba’athists or serving the interests of foreign instigators.³⁸⁴ Despite some government concessions in response to the protestors’ demands,³⁸⁵ small protests³⁸⁶ continue to take place, usually on Fridays and mainly in Baghdad. They are reportedly regularly subject to interventions by the ISF and armed government supporters.

The Iraqi Constitution stipulates that every citizen has the right to go on strike peacefully in accordance with the law;³⁸⁷ however, the 1987 Labour Code prohibits striking in the public and private sectors. The US Department of State reported that in 2010 strikers were subjected to harassment and intimidation, and the ISF intervened to disband strikes in Basrah.³⁸⁸ Union leaders involved in strikes were reportedly forcibly transferred.³⁸⁹

3. Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities

The KRG authorities - through the two main political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - have *de jure* control over the Kurdistan Region encompassing the three northern governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dahuk. They also hold *de facto* control of “disputed areas”.³⁹⁰ While the two parties have formally agreed to unify their administration and security forces,³⁹¹ in reality they remain split, with the Kurdistan Democratic Party mainly exercising power in Dahuk and Erbil, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah.³⁹² Both parties have their own armed forces (*Peshmerga*), intelligence (*Parastin* and *Dazgay Zaniyari*)³⁹³ and security services (*Asayish*).³⁹⁴ They are also said to control their own party militias.³⁹⁵

According to various reports, criticism of the KRG or the ruling parties can result in intimidation, beatings, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, mainly at the hands of the party-affiliated security services.³⁹⁶ Those particularly at risk are said to be members of political opposition groups, journalists and other media personnel,³⁹⁷ as well as protestors and activists.

Members of political opposition parties - in particular from the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Kurdistan Islamic Group and the Goran List,³⁹⁸ which are all represented in the Kurdistan Parliament³⁹⁹ - are reported to have been repeatedly harassed, arrested arbitrarily, and physically assaulted; while their party offices have been attacked more than once.⁴⁰⁰ In the “disputed areas”, political activists from minority groups challenging the KRG’s dominance are also reported to be at risk of harassment and ill-treatment.⁴⁰¹ Supporters of opposition parties have also reportedly faced discrimination in terms of public sector employment.⁴⁰² As all political parties maintain their own media networks, journalists and other media personnel affiliated with opposition parties are often harassed, physically attacked and detained,⁴⁰³ or brought to court on defamation charges.⁴⁰⁴ Early December 2011 saw an escalation of apparently politically-motivated violence during the so-called

“Dahuk riots”. Mobs allegedly linked to the Kurdistan Islamic Union attacked mainly Christian and Yazidi businesses.⁴⁰⁵ In what appeared to be retaliatory action, Kurdistan Democratic Party supporters reportedly attacked Kurdistan Islamic Union party offices and party-affiliated media premises.⁴⁰⁶ Dozens of people were injured in the violence.⁴⁰⁷ The *Asayish* allegedly arrested many Kurdistan Islamic Union members⁴⁰⁸ and more than a dozen journalists, including many affiliated with opposition parties, were reportedly harassed, physically attacked or arrested in various locations across the Kurdistan Region as they attempted to cover the events.⁴⁰⁹ Both parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Islamic Union, accused each other of inciting the violence.⁴¹⁰ An official investigation found that pro-Kurdistan Islamic Union media had provoked the incident and that the security services had been overwhelmed. It also acknowledged that certain groups close to the Kurdistan Democratic Party had played a role.⁴¹¹ However, to date it appears that no one has been held accountable for these events.⁴¹²

Popular dissatisfaction with the monopoly on power held by the KRG came to the fore in February 2011, when protests broke out demanding, *inter alia*, political reforms and an end to government corruption.⁴¹³ Beginning on 17 February 2011, protests occurred on a daily basis in Sara Square in Sulaymaniyah, and occasionally in other towns, until the Kurdish Security Forces violently seized control of Sara Square on 19 April 2011.⁴¹⁴ Kurdish Security Forces, supported by armed party militia,⁴¹⁵ allegedly used excessive force, including live ammunition, to disband protests.⁴¹⁶ Protestors, journalists, members of political opposition parties,⁴¹⁷ religious figures, students and academics were reportedly threatened, harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained as a result of their participation in or support for the protests;⁴¹⁸ some were said to have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment.⁴¹⁹ Several media outlets⁴²⁰ and opposition party offices were also attacked.⁴²¹ An official investigation found that the Kurdish Security Forces “*were poorly trained*” and unable to respond to the protests “*appropriately*”; however, to date no one has been charged in relation to the reported violence.⁴²²

In light of the above, UNHCR considers that individuals (perceived to be) opposing or openly criticizing the KRG authorities or ruling parties are, depending on the circumstances of their claim, likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their (imputed) political opinion.

4. Certain Professionals

Since 2003, professionals such as journalists, academics, judges and lawyers, doctors and NGO workers/rights activists have been a prime target for various armed groups in Iraq. Motives for these attacks are complex and often difficult to pinpoint, given the widespread impunity with which they are committed. Professionals have been targeted for their (perceived) political opinion, their religion or ethnic background, their social status as well as for criminal purposes.⁴²³ While overall levels of violence, and particularly sectarian killings, have decreased since mid-2007, targeted attacks against professionals are still a very common occurrence. In some areas, attacks on academics and other professionals even appear to be increasing. It is reported that about 30 teachers, academics and medical practitioners have been killed in Mosul since 2003, in what Iraqi Government officials describe as an effort by armed groups to “empty” Iraq of its elite.⁴²⁴ In Kirkuk, an increase in targeted abductions and assassinations of professionals was reported in the second half of 2011.⁴²⁵

UNHCR considers that, depending on the circumstances of the case, professionals in the categories described below are, as a result of their profession, likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their (imputed) political opinion, their religion, ethnicity or membership of a particular social group.

Specific groups of professionals that, depending on the details of their case, are likely to be in need of refugee protection include the following:

a) *Journalists and Other Media Professionals*

i. *Central and Southern Iraq*

Journalism has flourished since the easing of restrictions on the press in Iraq from 2003 onwards. By the end of 2010, Iraq boasted several hundred daily and weekly publications, as well as dozens of radio and television stations.⁴²⁶ Freedom of the press is protected under Article 38 (A) and (B) of the Iraqi Constitution, subject to limitations on public order and/or morality grounds.⁴²⁷ Article 46 of the Iraqi Constitution allows restrictions on the press “*by law or on the basis of it, and insofar as that limitation or restriction does not violate the essence of the right or freedom.*” A variety of Iraqi laws contain such restrictions on the press, in particular, the 1951 Civil Code,⁴²⁸ the 1969 Penal Code⁴²⁹ and the 1968 Law of Publications.⁴³⁰ A 2003 Coalition Provisional Authority Order banning the media from inciting violence also remains in effect.⁴³¹ The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission issued regulations that further limit the freedom of media.⁴³² Journalists have also reportedly been arrested and detained on the basis of the Counterterrorism Law.⁴³³ In addition to legal restrictions, the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press is subject to widespread self-censorship, due to fear of reprisals from a range of state and non-state actors.⁴³⁴

Journalists and media workers in Iraq are reported to face many risks as a result of their work. While some have been killed in crossfire or other acts of general violence, the majority of those who have lost their lives have been victims of specific attacks based on their ethnicity or religion and/or their (imputed) political opinion. Given that most Iraqi news and television stations are owned by either political parties, religious groups or by the Iraqi Government,⁴³⁵ journalists and other media workers are often considered to represent a particular political or sectarian party or opinion.⁴³⁶ As a result, armed groups have repeatedly targeted media outlets and employees for their perceived “Western” or pro-American views,⁴³⁷ their affiliation with the Iraqi Government,⁴³⁸ or their sectarian or ethnic association.⁴³⁹ Others have been targeted for investigating controversial political or other sensitive issues, including corruption or activities of armed groups.⁴⁴⁰ In many cases, the exact motives for an attack remain unknown as no responsibility is claimed and/or serious investigations do not appear to be undertaken.⁴⁴¹ As there have been no arrests or convictions for attacks on the media, in 2011 Iraq was for a fourth year ranked first in the Impunity Index of the Committee to Protect Journalists.⁴⁴²

While deaths due to crossfire and other conflict-related events have dropped in recent years, Iraq remains one of the most dangerous places worldwide for journalists.⁴⁴³ Experts indicate that freedom of the press is being increasingly restricted, nearing 2008 levels.⁴⁴⁴ Of the 174 (mostly Iraqi) journalists killed in Iraq since 2003, the majority has reportedly been killed in targeted attacks, in most cases by “political groups”.⁴⁴⁵ Many of those killed were television broadcasters⁴⁴⁶ who are easily recognized by armed groups given their public profile and recording equipment.⁴⁴⁷

After a brief decline in 2009, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported a new spike in targeted killings in the second half of 2010, when six journalists and three media support workers were killed.⁴⁴⁸ In 2011, at least five journalists were killed⁴⁴⁹ and reports suggest that others were harassed or attacked, including by armed groups,⁴⁵⁰ Iraqi Government and party officials, or the ISF.⁴⁵¹ Several media offices have been bombed.⁴⁵² Female journalists are reportedly specifically targeted by armed groups, reportedly as result of their perceived “intrusion” into the male-dominated public sphere.⁴⁵³ In October 2011 a series of attacks and acts of intimidation against media personnel in different parts of the country were reported, including the attempted murder of a journalist,⁴⁵⁴ an ISF-led raid on a journalist’s home⁴⁵⁵ and the closure of an independent radio station.⁴⁵⁶

Further, a number of reports claim that journalists and media professionals face harassment, intimidation, arrest and abuse at the hands of the ISF or political parties.⁴⁵⁷ Journalists investigating

corruption or criticizing government officials appear to be particularly at risk.⁴⁵⁸ The ISF has allegedly arrested journalists without charge.⁴⁵⁹ Several media outlets were raided by the ISF and equipment was destroyed or confiscated.⁴⁶⁰ During the Iraq-wide protests in 2011, numerous incidents against journalists by the ISF were recorded, including harassment, arbitrary arrest, destruction and confiscation of equipment, and abuse.⁴⁶¹

Government officials are alleged to be increasingly⁴⁶² using civil and criminal lawsuits to intimidate journalists and critical news organizations,⁴⁶³ although not all lawsuits have been successful.⁴⁶⁴ Journalists have also reported that politicians have pressured them not to publish articles critical of the Iraqi Government.⁴⁶⁵ In some instances, media considered to be pro-government have also reportedly been subject to pressure by government opponents including armed groups.⁴⁶⁶ Journalists in Iraq have stated, however, that they are now more concerned with restrictions placed on them by the Iraqi authorities than threats from armed groups.⁴⁶⁷

On 9 August 2011, the CoR approved the long-awaited Journalist Protection Law,⁴⁶⁸ intended to protect journalists and to compensate them for any injuries sustained while exercising their profession. Rights groups have criticized the law for what they view as its narrow scope, and other perceived serious omissions.⁴⁶⁹ A local press freedom group has challenged the law in the Federal Supreme Court.⁴⁷⁰ The fact that, according to observers, the law's provisions are not always implemented in practice further weakens any actual protection provided to journalists by the legislation.⁴⁷¹

ii. *Kurdistan Region*

Since 2003, numerous newspapers, television and radio stations have been established in the Kurdistan Region;⁴⁷² many of them are affiliated with political parties, while a few are independent and non-partisan.⁴⁷³ Officially, there is no censorship in the Kurdistan Region. However, independent journalists and media organizations have repeatedly claimed that press freedom is restricted and that criticism of the ruling parties can lead to physical harassment, seizure of equipment, arbitrary arrest and legal prosecution on charges of defamation.

In 2007, the KRG promulgated a Press Law, which, *inter alia*, bans censorship, prohibits the closure of news outlets by the authorities, abolishes prison terms and places a ceiling on damages for media-related offenses.⁴⁷⁴ However, reports suggest that the KRG authorities do not implement the law systematically and continue to use the more restrictive 1969 Iraqi Penal Code and the 1951 Iraqi Civil Code provisions to prosecute journalists.⁴⁷⁵ The ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, as well as influential party members and government officials, have filed numerous lawsuits, mostly against independent journalists and news organizations that published articles they reportedly considered to be critical.⁴⁷⁶ Such libel suits appear to be attempts to prevent criticism of the KRG or the ruling parties.⁴⁷⁷ As a result, many media outlets self-censor with respect to key issues, in particular corruption and nepotism involving the ruling parties.⁴⁷⁸

In addition to libel and defamation lawsuits, critical journalists and media employees in the Kurdistan Region are reportedly subject to frequent intimidation and threats,⁴⁷⁹ arbitrary arrest and detention, beatings⁴⁸⁰ and confiscation or destruction of equipment, allegedly at the hands of KRG officials and Kurdish Security Forces.⁴⁸¹ Media offices have frequently been targeted for raids or arson attacks. Attacks against journalists, media professionals and media outlets are most frequently reported during political events or security crises such as elections,⁴⁸² popular protests,⁴⁸³ Iranian/Turkish bombing of border areas,⁴⁸⁴ or the "Dahuk riots,"⁴⁸⁵ in early December 2011.⁴⁸⁶ Journalists and news outlets affiliated with opposition parties are at risk of being forcibly prevented from covering such events.⁴⁸⁷ Reports suggest that journalists have also been targeted for physical assaults, abduction and assassination.⁴⁸⁸ The perpetrators of attacks against journalists are usually not known and most attacks are allegedly not promptly and transparently investigated.⁴⁸⁹ Journalists often express little trust in the independence of the judicial authorities and claim that persons affiliated with political parties are involved in attacks.⁴⁹⁰

b) Academics

According to various sources, hundreds of professors, teachers and academics have been killed since 2003 and many others have been kidnapped, arrested or threatened.⁴⁹¹ In 2010 and 2011, such attacks have been reported again with higher frequency,⁴⁹² and continued also in 2012, including in Al-Anbar,⁴⁹³ Babel,⁴⁹⁴ Baghdad,⁴⁹⁵ Diyala,⁴⁹⁶ Ninewa,⁴⁹⁷ Kirkuk⁴⁹⁸ and Salah Al-Din Governorates.⁴⁹⁹ In most cases, loss of life has resulted from shootings, often in the victims' home, or by "sticky bombs" attached to private vehicles. Some academics have been killed after returning to Iraq from abroad.⁵⁰⁰

Students and schoolchildren have also been targeted and in some cases killed and injured in bombings, shootings and abductions.⁵⁰¹ In central and southern Iraq, there are reports that faculty and administrators of schools and universities have been threatened by armed anti-government groups to adapt programmes and activities and promote certain students. Academic institutions have reportedly practiced self-censorship in order to avoid violence.⁵⁰²

University personnel are also reported to have been demoted or fired from their employment, often in an arbitrary manner, as part of ongoing "De-Ba'athification" campaigns.⁵⁰³

c) Judges and Legal Professionals

In 2010, 2011 and early 2012, reports of attacks against judges and legal professionals continued to be received⁵⁰⁴ and included the (attempted) killing of various high-profile figures.⁵⁰⁵ Incidents were reported mainly in Al-Anbar,⁵⁰⁶ Baghdad,⁵⁰⁷ Babel,⁵⁰⁸ Diyala,⁵⁰⁹ Kirkuk,⁵¹⁰ Ninewa⁵¹¹ and Salah Al-Din Governorates.⁵¹² In many cases, the victims were killed execution-style in their homes or cars. At least 47 judges have reportedly been killed in Iraq since 2003.⁵¹³ To address the threats faced by judges, the Ministry of Interior has allocated nearly 2,000 police officers to protect judges;⁵¹⁴ however, most judges still lack armored cars, weapons permits, and bodyguards and remain particularly vulnerable to attacks on their way to and from work.⁵¹⁵ Family members of judges are also reported to face death threats and attacks.⁵¹⁶ Attacks against judges and lawyers may be motivated by their involvement in sensitive cases, including cases relating to terrorism⁵¹⁷ or corruption charges.⁵¹⁸ Further, judges may be targeted as representatives of the Iraqi state and its institutions.⁵¹⁹ Finally, in an environment of impunity suspects or convicted prisoners, and their families, may also target judges for intimidation or personal revenge.⁵²⁰

d) Doctors and Medical Professionals

Health professionals have been killed, maimed and kidnapped in the thousands by armed Sunni and Shi'ite groups and criminal gangs since the fall of the former regime.⁵²¹ According to the Iraqi Ministry of Health, more than 600 medical personnel were killed between 2003 and early 2008⁵²² and 8,000 of Iraq's 15,500 doctors resigned in the same period, with many having left Iraq subsequently.⁵²³ The Iraqi Medical Association has estimated the number of doctors killed since 2003 at closer to 2,000.⁵²⁴ The Iraqi Physicians Union has said that more than 500 leading medical figures have been assassinated and more than 7,000 forced to flee abroad.⁵²⁵ While violence against doctors and medical professionals declined with the general drop in violence after 2008, and several hundred doctors have returned to Iraq in recent years,⁵²⁶ reports of threats, abductions and killings continue to be received.⁵²⁷ Attacks on medical personnel in 2011 and 2012 have been reported mainly in Al-Anbar,⁵²⁸ Baghdad,⁵²⁹ Kirkuk⁵³⁰ and Ninewa Governorates.⁵³¹ Several female doctors have been particularly targeted for assassination in Iraq.⁵³²

The exact motives for attacks on medical professionals are difficult to establish and it is rare for identified perpetrators to be charged or convicted.⁵³³ There is speculation that victims are targeted on the basis of their ethnic/religious background,⁵³⁴ their social status or (perceived) political opinion.⁵³⁵ Criminal motivations (especially in cases of abductions against ransom) or personal or tribal acts of revenge (in particular at the hands of patients' relatives) may be relevant factors.⁵³⁶ However, even in such cases, elements such as the victim's religion or ethnic identity may be relevant.

Acknowledging the great risks facing medical practitioners in Iraq,⁵³⁷ the Iraqi cabinet proposed a new law in January 2010 aimed at protecting doctors and other medical professionals from violent attacks. The law, *inter alia*, stipulates that certain medical professionals have the right to carry a gun for self-defence, outlaws tribal demands for compensation in the event of loss of life (so called “blood money”) and makes attempted extortion of doctors punishable by a prison sentence or fines.⁵³⁸ At the time of writing, it cannot be confirmed whether or not the law has been approved by the CoR.

e) *NGO Workers and Rights Activists*

During the height of violence in 2006 and 2007, various armed groups targeted NGO employees for assassination,⁵³⁹ often on the basis of their (perceived) political or sectarian profile. With the improved security situation, such attacks have become less frequent. In 2010, attacks were reported to be “rare”,⁵⁴⁰ but in 2011 media reports again noted the killing of several NGO workers and rights activists in what appeared to be targeted attacks.⁵⁴¹ In addition, some NGO workers and activists reportedly keep their work hidden from neighbours, friends and even family due to fears of retaliation from armed groups, who suspect them to be affiliated with the Iraqi authorities or the international community, in particular the US.⁵⁴² NGO workers and activists investigating, documenting or otherwise engaging in politically, religiously or socially sensitive issues - such as corruption,⁵⁴³ human rights abuses, or religious taboos - appear to be particularly at risk. According to reports, the Iraqi authorities have not taken sufficient action to protect NGOs from being targeted.⁵⁴⁴

The ISF and Iraqi authorities are also reported to harass and intimidate NGO workers and rights activists. The US Department of State stated in its latest human rights report that “*police conducted unannounced and intimidating visits to some NGOs, demanding photographs, passport details, names, and addresses of all staff and their family members.*” Despite the NGO Law of 25 January 2010, which provides some protection against arbitrary government actions negatively affecting NGOs and their staff,⁵⁴⁵ attacks on NGOs and activists reportedly continued, in particular in the context of popular protests in 2011.⁵⁴⁶

5. *Individuals with Religion-Based Claims*

The Iraqi Constitution provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice for all citizens⁵⁴⁷ and declares all Iraqis equal before the law without discrimination based on religion, sect, or belief.⁵⁴⁸ The Iraqi Constitution also states that no law may be enacted that contradicts principles of democracy or the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in the Constitution.⁵⁴⁹ The Constitution further stipulates that the state shall guarantee the protection of places of worship.⁵⁵⁰ However, several constitutional and legal provisions compete with these guarantees. For example, the Iraqi Constitution guarantees the “Islamic identity” of the majority of the Iraqi people,⁵⁵¹ declares Islam to be the official state religion,⁵⁵² mandates that Islam be considered a “foundation source of legislation”,⁵⁵³ and states that no law may be enacted that contravenes the “established provisions of Islam”.⁵⁵⁴ Other legal provisions appear to restrict the guarantee of freedom of religion, including a regulation preventing the conversion of Muslims to other faiths,⁵⁵⁵ a law that forcibly converts children to Islam if either parent converts to Islam,⁵⁵⁶ laws and resolutions that outlaw the practice of the Baha’i and Wahabi faiths,⁵⁵⁷ and a law that overrides religious tenets of individuals adhering to non-Muslim faiths with Islamic law principles.⁵⁵⁸ These contradictions have to date not been tested in court and accordingly the full scope of the protection of the freedom of religion remains unclear.⁵⁵⁹

Iraq is made up of diverse religious communities, with the majority of the population adhering to either Shi’ite or Sunni Islam. In addition, there are communities of Christians of various denominations, Yazidis, Sabaeen-Mandaeans, Kaka’i, Baha’is and Jews.⁵⁶⁰ After the fall of the former regime, Iraqi politics and society largely fragmented along religious and ethnic lines,⁵⁶¹ culminating in the large-scale sectarian violence between Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs in 2006 and 2007. While the Iraqi authorities respect freedom of religion and have assumed the responsibility of protecting religious groups in Iraq (e.g., by providing security at places of worship and to pilgrims), armed groups⁵⁶² continue to target religious groups, severely restricting the free exercise of religion.⁵⁶³

Political and religious extremism since 2003 has particularly impacted on ethnic and religious minority groups, which commonly do not have strong political or tribal networks. Minority groups represent “soft targets” for radical elements that consider them to be “infidels” and pressure them to conform to strict interpretations of Islamic rules in terms of their dress, social behaviour and occupations. In the ethnically and religiously mixed “disputed areas”,⁵⁶⁴ tensions among Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen have been simmering since 2003. Extremist groups are allegedly aiming to exploit those tensions with a view to inciting further violence.⁵⁶⁵ Criminal groups⁵⁶⁶ have also singled out members of certain religious minorities who are perceived to be comparatively wealthy, in a particularly deadly combination of persecution and crime.

Persons considered to be contravening traditional or religious practices or social mores have also been targeted by various extremist groups, elements of society or by their own families. In particular, secular-minded men and women, artists, LGBTI persons, as well as members of religious minority groups may face discrimination, if not violence, for not conforming to social or religious norms.

Depending on the individual circumstances of the case, persons with the profiles described below are likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion or perceived religious (or non-religious) identity.

a) Sunnis and Shi'ites

While open sectarian violence between Arab Sunnis and Arab Shi'ites ended in 2008, armed Sunni groups continue to target Shi'ite civilians with the apparent aim of reigniting sectarian tension. Sectarian-motivated violence includes: mass-casualty attacks targeting Shi'ite civilians and pilgrims; threats against Sunnis in Shi'ite majority areas and Shi'ites in Sunni majority areas; as well as targeted killings of both Sunni and Shi'ite clerics and scholars. Baathist ties and/or purported engagement in terrorism are often equated to sectarianism by the Iraqi Government and the ISF.⁵⁶⁷ Many individuals accused of Ba'athist ties and/or terrorism and thus perceived to be engaged in sectarianism are of Sunni background.

i. Shi'ite civilians, including pilgrims

Shi'ite civilians - in particular, Shi'ites performing their religious duties at the mosque, during funerals or mournings, or when on pilgrimage - are a key target for Sunni armed groups.⁵⁶⁸ The main aim of these attacks appears to be to divide Iraqis along sectarian lines in order to reignite tensions and violence.⁵⁶⁹ Attacks are most frequent on religious holidays, when thousands of pilgrims, including from Iran, march to and gather at Shi'ite holy sites in Baghdad,⁵⁷⁰ Kerbala and Najef,⁵⁷¹ but also in other areas of southern Iraq.⁵⁷² Attacks on Shi'ite pilgrims and civilians have also taken place in the mixed governorates of Diyala,⁵⁷³ Ninewa,⁵⁷⁴ Salah Al-Din⁵⁷⁵ and Kirkuk,⁵⁷⁶ where Shi'ite Turkmen,⁵⁷⁷ Shabak⁵⁷⁸ or Kurds (Faili Kurds)⁵⁷⁹ may also be targeted, and in the mainly Sunni Al-Anbar Governorate.⁵⁸⁰ Shi'ite civilians have also frequently been attacked in their homes, in restaurants or other public places in predominantly Shi'ite governorates,⁵⁸¹ towns⁵⁸² or neighbourhoods.⁵⁸³

ii. Sunni Arabs in Majority Shi'ite Arab areas and Shi'ite Arabs in Majority Sunni Arab Areas

During the period of heightened sectarian violence in 2006 and 2007,⁵⁸⁴ the social and demographic make-up of many areas were altered as Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups sought to seize control and to cleanse “mixed” areas of the rival sect.⁵⁸⁵ This occurred principally in Baghdad,⁵⁸⁶ Iraq's most diverse city, but also in the mixed towns and villages surrounding it. During that period, many members of both sects were internally displaced⁵⁸⁷ or fled abroad.⁵⁸⁸ To date, most of Baghdad's formerly mixed neighbourhoods remain largely homogenized,⁵⁸⁹ preventing many from returning to their former areas of residence.⁵⁹⁰ In only a few neighbourhoods of Baghdad do members of both sects live side by

side.⁵⁹¹ Most returnees have returned to areas under the control of their own community.⁵⁹² The recent political crisis, combined with a series of attacks by Sunni armed groups targeting Shi'ite neighbourhoods and pilgrims, has deepened sectarian tensions. Anecdotal evidence from UNHCR protection monitoring activities suggests that some Sunnis are leaving mixed and predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhoods in Baghdad fearing retaliation. While previously many Iraqi Sunnis fled to Syria and Jordan to escape sectarian violence, reportedly most now seek to relocate within Iraq given tightened visa requirements in these countries and the ongoing violence in Syria.⁵⁹³

Both Sunnis and Shi'ites living in or returning to areas in which they would constitute a minority may be exposed to targeted violence on account of their religious identity.⁵⁹⁴ Both Shi'ites in Sunni-dominated neighbourhoods and Sunnis in Shi'ite-dominated neighbourhoods have reportedly been subjected to threatening letters demanding that they vacate their homes. In cases where individuals do not comply, there are reports of violence or harassment, including killings.⁵⁹⁵

iii. Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams

There are numerous reports of attacks and (attempted) killings targeting Sunni and Shi'ite mosque imams and scholars in Al-Anbar,⁵⁹⁶ Babel,⁵⁹⁷ Basrah,⁵⁹⁸ Baghdad,⁵⁹⁹ Diwaniyah,⁶⁰⁰ Diyala,⁶⁰¹ Kerbala,⁶⁰² Ninewa,⁶⁰³ Salah Al-Din⁶⁰⁴ and Wassit.⁶⁰⁵ Because many attacks take place at mosques or in private homes, family members, other civilians and security guards are also caught in the violence. Possible perpetrators and their motives are numerous. Armed Sunni groups such as Al-Qa'eda in Iraq (ISI/AQI) are known to have targeted Sunni clerics, commonly for their criticism of the group concerned or their affiliation with the Iraqi Government.⁶⁰⁶ They are also thought to be responsible for the killing of Shi'ite clerics, whom they consider "infidels" and affiliated with the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi Government.⁶⁰⁷ Further, armed Shi'ite groups have engaged in assassinations of political/religious rivals, e.g., representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.⁶⁰⁸ In February and early March 2012, there were apparent "tit-for-tat" attacks against offices, mosques and homes by followers of two Shi'ite clerics, Mahmoud Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi⁶⁰⁹ and Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani: these were carried out across southern Iraq, including in Babel, Basrah, Diwaniyah, Thi-Qar and Muthanna.⁶¹⁰

b) Members of Religious Minorities

Since 2003, religious minorities have increasingly gained better representation within Iraq's political system. The CoR, elected in March 2010, reserved eight out of a total of 325 seats for minority groups, including five seats for Christians and one seat each for Sabaeen-Mandaeans, Yazidis and Shabak respectively.⁶¹¹ In addition to the quota seats, six Yazidi representatives were elected to the CoR as candidates on the Kurdistan Alliance List.⁶¹² The cabinet established under the power-sharing agreement of November 2010 includes one Christian minister (the only minority representative).⁶¹³ The KRG Council of Ministers includes two Christian ministers in charge of the Ministries of Finance and Civil Society, and two ministers without portfolio who are prominent Yazidis.⁶¹⁴ Nevertheless, reports indicate that as a result of religion-based discrimination and favouritism, minority groups are often underrepresented in the public sector, especially at the governorate and the municipality level, as well as in the ISF.⁶¹⁵ Yazidis and Christians have complained about political marginalization, resulting from the lack of adequate representation of minority groups in the provincial councils.⁶¹⁶

Since 2003, Sunni armed groups have targeted religious minority groups on the basis of their religious identity, their (imputed) political opinion⁶¹⁷ or their social status/profession.⁶¹⁸ Yazidis and Kaka'i, who are often identified as ethnic "Kurds", have also been targeted based on their (perceived) Kurdish ethnicity. Most minority groups live in the areas that have experienced and continue to experience the greatest violence since 2003, in particular Baghdad, Ninewa (Mosul and the Ninewa Plains) and Kirkuk.⁶¹⁹ Attacks on members of religious minority groups have reportedly been on the rise for the last three years due to increased targeting by armed groups, especially Al-Qa'eda in Iraq (ISI/AQI).⁶²⁰ Reported motivations for armed groups include undermining the Iraqi Government's ability to provide protection, maintaining a situation of conflict and, ultimately, destroying Iraq's religious

diversity.⁶²¹ According to various reports, Sunni armed groups in particular seek to eliminate religious minorities from the country.⁶²² Iraqi minorities are said by some to be “*facing extinction*.”⁶²³ Smaller religious minority communities, especially non-Muslims, have been particularly vulnerable.⁶²⁴ Armed groups have reportedly accused minority group members of being crusaders, devil-worshippers, apostates or infidels.⁶²⁵ As a result of sustained attacks on religious minority groups, their numbers have fallen significantly since 2003.⁶²⁶

As many of Iraq’s religious (and ethnic) minority groups such as Christians, Yazidis and Kaka’i, live in the Ninewa Plains, Sinjar District and the city of Kirkuk, all areas which are disputed by the Kurds and the Arabs, they are subject to political pressure and economic marginalization,⁶²⁷ neglect,⁶²⁸ and at times harassment and low-level violence.⁶²⁹ Minority groups have reportedly been pressured to identify as Kurds or Arabs.⁶³⁰

Minority women are likely the most vulnerable section of Iraqi society, facing violence and discrimination from a variety of actors on account both of their gender and their religious affiliation.⁶³¹ Minority women’s freedom of movement⁶³² and freedom to express their religious identity through the way they dress has been severely restricted by ongoing threats of violence and growing religious intolerance.⁶³³ This, in turn, restricts their access to health services, employment and education.⁶³⁴

The Iraqi Government has repeatedly committed to safeguarding Iraq’s religious diversity, publicly condemned attacks against minorities, promised to compensate victims and prosecute perpetrators of attacks,⁶³⁵ and also increased security measures at places of worship.⁶³⁶ In 2011, the Iraqi Government donated land and funds for a new church in Kirkuk⁶³⁷ and the CoR created a minority caucus, which aims to reform the education curriculum, eliminate discrimination and improve the provision of basic services for minority groups.⁶³⁸

Despite the Iraqi Government’s efforts, reports indicate that attacks against religious groups occur with impunity.⁶³⁹ The ISF are subject to significant risks when they intervene to protect minority populations.⁶⁴⁰ Members of minority groups are also said to be reluctant to report threats or attacks to the ISF, fearing that there will be no appropriate follow-up.⁶⁴¹

In the Kurdistan Region, the rights of religious minorities are generally respected and groups can worship freely without interference.⁶⁴² The KRG Ministry of Education funds public schools at the elementary and high school level in the Aramaic language. The curriculum in the Kurdistan Region does not contain religion or Qur’an studies.⁶⁴³ A significant number of religious minorities, in particular Christians, have sought refuge in the region.

UNHCR considers that, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, members of minority religious groups in central and southern Iraq are likely to be in need of international refugee protection on the grounds of religion, (imputed) political opinion or membership in a particular social group.

Christian converts are likely to be in need of international refugee protection in the whole country, including the Kurdistan Region.

iv. Christians, including converts

The number of Iraqi Christians (who belong to a number of different branches⁶⁴⁴) has been drastically reduced since 2003,⁶⁴⁵ with significant displacement inside and outside the country.⁶⁴⁶ Most Christians are located in Baghdad, in and around Mosul (Ninewa Plain), Kirkuk and Basrah. An estimated thirty per cent reside in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.⁶⁴⁷

Since the fall of the former regime in 2003, armed Sunni groups have targeted Christians and their places of worship.⁶⁴⁸ Attacks are commonly motivated by religion,⁶⁴⁹ (imputed) political opinion⁶⁵⁰ and/or (perceived) wealth.⁶⁵¹ An attack by Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qa'eda in Iraq on 31 October 2010 on the Our Lady of Salvation Catholic Cathedral in Baghdad left more than 50 Christians, including two priests, and seven policemen dead,⁶⁵² and triggered an exodus of more than 1,300 Christian families from Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah to the Kurdistan Region, other areas of Ninewa Governorate and abroad.⁶⁵³ In fact, more Christians were displaced in 2010 than any other year since 2003.⁶⁵⁴ After the October 2010 attack, threats and violence against Christians further increased⁶⁵⁵ and in the following months, persons of Christian faith were specifically targeted in their homes⁶⁵⁶ or workplaces.⁶⁵⁷

In 2011 and early 2012, Christians reportedly continued to be subjected to threats, kidnappings, attacks on their homes and assassination.⁶⁵⁸ Christians have also been kidnapped against ransom;⁶⁵⁹ however, even in criminal cases, consideration should be given to the victim's presumed vulnerability as a member of a religious minority or his/her (perceived) social status.⁶⁶⁰ In 2011, churches were repeatedly subject to (attempted) bombings, often coordinated, including in Baghdad,⁶⁶¹ Mosul⁶⁶² and Kirkuk.⁶⁶³ Extremist groups have also targeted Christians for being associated with the sale of alcohol.⁶⁶⁴

In the three northern governorates of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dahuk, the rights of Christians are generally respected and a significant number have sought refuge in the region:⁶⁶⁵ in particular, in the Governorate of Dahuk, from where many originate, and the Christian town of Ainkawa, near the city of Erbil.⁶⁶⁶ In early December 2011, however, a mob allegedly shouting anti-Christian slogans⁶⁶⁷ reportedly attacked mainly Christian and Yazidi-owned liquor shops and businesses in and near the town of Zakho (Dahuk).⁶⁶⁸ The attacks were allegedly triggered by an inflammatory Friday prayer sermon condemning "un-Islamic" businesses.⁶⁶⁹ Reportedly, up to 30 liquor shops, hotels and a massage parlour were vandalized or burned down. An attempt to attack the Christian quarter in Zakho was reportedly prevented by the security forces.⁶⁷⁰ Affected shop owners reportedly found leaflets on the shop walls, threatening them if they were to reopen the shops.⁶⁷¹ Motives for the violence remain unclear.⁶⁷² In 2011 several kidnappings of Christians were reported in Ainkawa, spreading fear among the community and resulting in internally displaced Christian families fleeing abroad.⁶⁷³

Christian converts

The Constitution of Iraq requires the Iraqi State to uphold both freedom of religion and the principles of Islam, which, according to many Islamic scholars, includes capital punishment for leaving Islam.⁶⁷⁴ Iraqi Penal Law does not prohibit conversion from Islam to Christianity (or any other religion); however, Iraq's Personal Status Law does not provide for the legal recognition of a change in one's religious status. These apparent contradictions have not yet been tested in court and, as a result, the legal situation of converts remains unclear.

A convert⁶⁷⁵ would not be able to have his/her conversion recognized by law, meaning that he/she has no legal means to register the change in religious status and his/her identity card will still identify its holder as "Muslim".⁶⁷⁶ As a result, children of converts may be without an identification card, unless their parents register them as Muslims.⁶⁷⁷ Children of converts cannot be enrolled in Christian schools and are obliged to participate in mandatory Islamic religion classes in public schools.⁶⁷⁸ A female convert cannot marry a Christian man, as she would still be considered Muslim by law.⁶⁷⁹ A convert may also have his/her marriage voided as under Shari'a Law, as an "apostate" cannot marry or remain married to a Muslim and will be excluded from inheritance rights.⁶⁸⁰

Given the widespread animosity towards converts from Islam and the general climate of religious intolerance, the conversion of a Muslim to Christianity would likely result in ostracism⁶⁸¹ and/or violence at the hands of the convert's community, tribe or family.⁶⁸² Many, including (Sunni and Shi'ite) religious and political leaders, reportedly believe that apostasy from Islam is punishable by death, or even see the killing of apostates as a religious duty.⁶⁸³ Additionally, Christian converts risk being suspected as working with the MNF-I/USF-I or more generally the "West", which in the

opinion of some has fought a “holy war” against Iraq.⁶⁸⁴

Converts and children of converts may face harassment at their place of employment, or at school.⁶⁸⁵ The reporting of harassment to the authorities, may, according to some observers, result in further harassment or violence at the hands of government officials and police.⁶⁸⁶

v. *Sabaeen-Mandaeans*

The Sabaeen-Mandaean religion is a gnostic religion with John the Baptist as a central figure and considered a prophet. Its adherents cannot marry outside the faith and they do not accept converts. Before 2003, there were an estimated 50,000 to 70,000 Mandaeans living in Iraq⁶⁸⁷ many of whom were well educated and worked as doctors, engineers, dentists and jewelers. After the fall of the former regime, Sunni and Shi’ite armed groups, as well as criminals,⁶⁸⁸ have singled out Sabaeen-Mandaeans on the basis of their religion, profession and (perceived) wealth.⁶⁸⁹ Some Sabaeen-Mandaeans elders, who traditionally wear long beards, have reportedly been attacked by Shi’ite militants who have mistaken them for strictly observant Sunni Arabs or Wahhabists.⁶⁹⁰ Sabaeen-Mandaeans are particularly vulnerable to attacks for several reasons. Unlike other groups in Iraq, the pacifist Mandaeans did not form militias to defend themselves.⁶⁹¹ Further, the already small community lives mainly in scattered groups. Their disputed status as “people of the book”, which under the Qur’an would provide them with a level of protection, failed to dissuade extremist groups from targeting them.⁶⁹² As a result of general violence and targeted attacks, large numbers of Mandaeans fled Iraq, mainly to Syria and Jordan. Currently, an estimated 3,500 to 7,000 Mandaeans remain in Iraq.⁶⁹³ Most of them live in Baghdad and southern Iraq, including in Amara, Basrah and Nassiriyah.⁶⁹⁴ According to a spokesman for the Mandaean community, there are currently about 500 Mandaean families in southern Iraq, mostly in the Governorate of Basrah.⁶⁹⁵

Since 2003, Sabaeen-Mandaeans have been subjected to threats, abductions and killings. There are also reports of forced conversions to Islam and some Sabaeen-Mandaeans have reportedly been killed for refusing to do so.⁶⁹⁶ Most religious leaders have either been killed or fled the country.⁶⁹⁷ Eight Sabaeen-Mandaeans were reportedly killed and five injured in 2010 in what were reported to be targeted attacks.⁶⁹⁸ In 2011, additional kidnappings and killings were reported by the Mandaean Associations Union.⁶⁹⁹ Sabaeen-Mandaean goldsmiths reportedly continued to receive threats and suffer from attacks.⁷⁰⁰ Even in cases of kidnapping for ransom, the perpetrators may deliberately single out Sabaeen-Mandaeans due to their vulnerable status as a religious minority, considered “infidel”.⁷⁰¹ There have been reports of kidnapped Sabaeen-Mandaeans killed or remaining missing despite the payment of ransom.⁷⁰²

In addition to targeted violence perpetrated against Sabaeen-Mandaeans, the community has also suffered from social marginalization⁷⁰³ and religious discrimination. There are no schools in southern and central Iraq that teach children in their language, Aramaic, and children are obliged to undertake Qur’anic studies at public schools.⁷⁰⁴ Sabaeen-Mandaean women are pressured to observe the *hijab* in public in order to avoid physical and verbal abuse, although their religion does not require veiling.⁷⁰⁵ Reportedly, Sabaeen-Mandaean women have been pressured to marry outside their faith in contradiction with their own religious customs⁷⁰⁶ and have been pressured to convert to Islam.⁷⁰⁷

vi. *Yazidis*

The Yazidi people can be classified as a distinct religious group.⁷⁰⁸ It is disputed, even among the community itself as well as among Kurds, whether they are ethnically Kurds or form a distinct ethnic group. Most Yazidis speak *Kurmanji*, a Kurdish dialect, though the Yazidis in Bahzani, Bashiqa and Sinjar often speak Arabic.⁷⁰⁹ According to Yazidi leaders, the number of Yazidis in Iraq is estimated at 550,000 to 800,000.⁷¹⁰ Yazidis reside mostly in the Governorate of Ninewa (primarily in the Sinjar mountain range, the Sheikhan area and the villages of Bahzani and Bashiqa near Mosul), while a minority of around 15 per cent live in the Kurdistan Region (Dahuk Governorate).⁷¹¹

Since 2003, Yazidis have been targeted, including by threats, public defamation campaigns and

assassinations.⁷¹² Armed Sunni groups targeted Yazidis as “infidels”, as (perceived) supporters of the US intervention and on the basis of their (perceived) Kurdish ethnicity. On 14 August 2007, they were targeted in the deadliest attack since the fall of the former regime, in which over 400 people died.⁷¹³ In 2009 and 2010, three major attacks against Yazidis were recorded.⁷¹⁴ And in 2011 and 2012, media reported several incidents in which members of the Yazidi community were kidnapped and/or killed.⁷¹⁵ In addition, Yazidis are associated with the sale of alcohol, making them a likely target for Islamist groups.⁷¹⁶

Yazidi activists reported that some 30 Yazidi women and girls had been abducted and forcibly married to members of the *Asayish* since 2003 and their families threatened with reprisals.⁷¹⁷

Additionally, Yazidi traditions such as forced marriages, “honour killings” or the prohibition on marriage outside one’s caste⁷¹⁸ and religion may result in serious human rights violations by a victim’s family or community. There has been a reported increase in (attempted) suicides among mainly young Yazidi women, though there are indications that at least some of these suicides may actually be disguised “honour killings”.⁷¹⁹ Yazidi women who have been kidnapped or sexually assaulted by Muslims may, reportedly, face severe sanctions by the Yazidi community, including exclusion from the Yazidi religion and community.⁷²⁰ At times, mere rumours can be a sufficient basis to impose such sanctions.

There are reports that Yazidis face difficulties when entering the Kurdistan Region and are required to obtain KRG approval to find jobs in areas within Ninewa Province administered by the KRG.⁷²¹

vii. *Baha’is*

Iraq’s Baha’is, estimated to number only 2,000 individuals spread across the country,⁷²² continue to suffer from legal discrimination as their faith remains banned under Iraqi law despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing religious freedom.⁷²³ The relevant legislation, Law No. 105 of 1970, has neither been repealed nor invalidated, as no court challenges have been brought against it.⁷²⁴ Regulation 358 of 1975, which prohibited the issuance of the Iraq national identity card to members of Baha’i faith, was cancelled in April 2007 by the Ministry of Interior.⁷²⁵ As a result, a small number of Baha’is were issued identity cards. However, the Ministry of the Interior/Nationality and Passport Section stopped issuance of identity cards after only a short period, claiming that Baha’is had been registered as “Muslims” since 1975 and citing a government regulation preventing the conversion of Muslims to another faith.⁷²⁶ Without identity cards, Baha’is experience difficulties registering their children for school, accessing services and rights, and applying for passports.⁷²⁷

viii. *Kaka’i*

Kaka’i, also known as Yarsan and Ahl-e Haqq (“People of the Truth”), are followers of a monotheistic religion founded in the 14th century in western Iran.⁷²⁸ Most followers live in Iran while an estimated 200,000 Kaka’i live in Iraq, mostly in a group of villages around the town of Daquq, southeast of Kirkuk city.⁷²⁹ In Iraq, Kaka’i are mostly ethnic Kurds who speak *Macho*, a Gorani dialect, but also Sorani Kurdish, Turkmen and Arabic.⁷³⁰ In the towns of Mandali, Ba’quba and Khanaqeen in Diyala Governorate, they speak only Arabic.⁷³¹ They do not observe Muslim rites and rituals.⁷³²

Kaka’i are secretive about their faith, which reportedly contains elements of Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism. Reportedly, Kaka’i religious and community leaders increasingly maintain that it is a form of Shi’ism. Since 2003, armed groups have subjected Kaka’i to threats, kidnapping and assassinations.⁷³³ Further, Muslim religious leaders in Kirkuk have allegedly told their followers not to purchase anything from “infidel” Kaka’i shop owners.⁷³⁴ For fear of persecution, Kaka’i reportedly hide their identity in public.⁷³⁵

ix. *Jews*

After the names and biographies of the nine remaining Jews in Baghdad appeared in cables published by WikiLeaks in September 2011, the small community has faced a heightened risk of being targeted by extremist groups. Since then, one person reportedly emigrated and one died, bringing the total Jewish population to seven individuals. The US Embassy in Baghdad is reportedly working to protect or relocate those that wish to leave Iraq.⁷³⁶ The only synagogue remaining in Baghdad has been closed and the cables published by WikiLeaks report that most Jews conceal their identity with some reportedly converting to Islam in order to reduce the risk of being targeted.⁷³⁷ The Nationality Law of 2006 also excludes Jews who emigrate from Iraq from regaining Iraqi citizenship.⁷³⁸ The promotion of Zionist principles or the association with or support of Zionist organizations is subject to punishment by death according to the Criminal Code.⁷³⁹

c) Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores

Years of violence and the apparent breakdown of law and order have created a climate which allowed for a rise in both religious extremism and the use of tribal customs. Iraqis, both men and women, have been targeted by Sunni and Shi'ite armed groups and their own families for their "secular leanings" or for not conforming to conservative Islamic or social norms.⁷⁴⁰ Women, artists, liquor sellers, LGBTI individuals and members of religious minority groups have been branded for their perceived "un-Islamic" or "Western" behaviour, dress or professions.

The situation of Iraqi women especially has deteriorated significantly since 2003.⁷⁴¹ In particular, those that have taken up a role in the public sphere, e.g. as professionals, journalists, politicians or rights activists, have been intimidated, harassed or even murdered by armed groups.⁷⁴² Armed groups also target women for their perceived "un-Islamic" or immoral behaviour.⁷⁴³ Others have been singled out for the way they dress.⁷⁴⁴ In order to avoid harassment, many women, including from non-Muslim minority groups, reportedly wear the *hijab* in public.⁷⁴⁵ Women have reportedly also been targeted for driving a car and wearing trousers.⁷⁴⁶ As a result of continuous violence against women, their participation in public life has been seriously undermined.⁷⁴⁷ Women are also targeted by their own family members for a variety of perceived transgressions of traditional or religious norms that allegedly infringe on the family or tribe's "honour".⁷⁴⁸ Armed groups have also targeted (perceived) gay men, as well as men considered effeminate due to their dress or haircut.⁷⁴⁹ In early 2012, human rights organizations and media reported a targeted campaign of brutal killings of so-called "emos", a term that is allegedly used in Iraq to describe "non-conformist" youth,⁷⁵⁰ but also gay and effeminate men.⁷⁵¹ "Hit lists" have allegedly been distributed in Shi'ite neighbourhoods and cities.⁷⁵² Media reports citing of dozens of victims from this campaign cannot be independently confirmed and Iraqi officials have denied that there was any campaign targeting gay men or "emo" teenagers.⁷⁵³ However, the reported killings have apparently created strong fears among concerned groups.⁷⁵⁴ International NGOs and UNICEF have called on the Iraqi Government to launch an investigation into the reported violence.⁷⁵⁵

Persons engaged in professions or providing goods or services considered "immoral" have also been singled out for attacks. This is particularly the case for shops or bars selling liquor.⁷⁵⁶ With the increasing influence of Sunni and Shi'ite extremists after 2003, shops and bars where alcohol is sold became a target for attacks and many consequently were shut down.⁷⁵⁷ The situation of persons engaging in alcohol sales remains very precarious. In primarily conservative Shi'ite communities such as the Governorates of Kerbala and Najef, alcohol shops are banned by local laws,⁷⁵⁸ while in the major cities of Baghdad,⁷⁵⁹ Basrah, Kirkuk and Mosul,⁷⁶⁰ shops and bars are severely restricted by the conservative political⁷⁶¹ and social atmosphere. In early 2011, media reported two incidents in which armed men (members of the ISF or acting under the cover of the ISF or the Baghdad Provincial Council), raided liquor stores and a club serving alcohol.⁷⁶² Sunni and Shi'ite extremists reportedly attack liquor shops and clubs with impunity.⁷⁶³ Extremists consider that the owners of such shops or clubs engage in un-Islamic practices. These shops or clubs are run by religious minorities, such as Christians and Yazidis.⁷⁶⁴ In early December 2011, up to 30 liquor shops in and around Zakho (Dahuk) were attacked by a mob, reportedly encouraged by a sermon lashing out at "un-Islamic" businesses.⁷⁶⁵

After years of reported persistent attacks against artists, actors and singers for their (perceived) engagement in “un-Islamic” or “Western” activities,⁷⁶⁶ Iraq’s cultural scene is said to be flourishing again.⁷⁶⁷ Artists report restrictions resulting from intolerance and strict interpretations of Islamic values,⁷⁶⁸ rather than by direct attacks.⁷⁶⁹ In a reflection of the ongoing struggle at the political and social level about the role of Islam in public life,⁷⁷⁰ in January 2011 the new Minister of Education reversed a decision of his predecessor to ban music and theater classes in art institutes.⁷⁷¹ Perceived or intended criticism of the Iraqi Government, e.g., in the form of illustrations depicting violence,⁷⁷² may also result in government repression. Artists who joined popular protests in spring 2011 were among those arrested by the ISF.⁷⁷³

6. *Individuals with Ethnicity-based Claims*

Iraq is home to a diversity of distinct ethnic groups, including Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Black Iraqis, Roma (*Kawliyah*) and Shabak.⁷⁷⁴ Other groups such as Christian Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians, Yazidis and Jews often consider themselves to be both distinct religious and ethnic groups.⁷⁷⁵ Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, the three largest ethnic groups in Iraq, have achieved political representation at the central and provincial level since 2003⁷⁷⁶ and minorities such as the Christians, Shabak and Yazidis were provided with seats under a quota system.⁷⁷⁷ Other ethnic groups, however, such as the Black Iraqis⁷⁷⁸ or the *Kawliyah*⁷⁷⁹ are reported to remain on the margins of society and suffer from political, economic and societal discrimination.⁷⁸⁰ While a number of Faili Kurds have been represented in the Iraqi Government since 2003, many others, who have not yet been able to recover their Iraqi citizenship of which they were arbitrarily deprived by the former regime, continue to be stateless. Many have not been able to recover their properties confiscated by the former regime and lack documentation required to access services and basic rights.⁷⁸¹

Historically, many of Iraq’s various ethnic groups live in Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates, in the areas that are disputed chiefly between Kurds and Arabs,⁷⁸² but also by Turkmen.⁷⁸³ Minority groups such as the Shabak or the Yazidis are put under pressure by Arab and Kurdish political groupings, which seek to further their political influence and territorial claims in the disputed areas. Resistance to such attempts may result in losing access to employment or services.⁷⁸⁴ Some Shabak leaders survived assassination attempts that were reportedly linked to their political opposition.⁷⁸⁵ In addition to these political power struggles, Sunni armed groups have targeted all ethnic communities in the disputed areas in an apparent effort to ignite ethnic and sectarian violence.⁷⁸⁶ According to observers, such violence is largely perpetrated with impunity.⁷⁸⁷ While there are targeted attacks against all groups, minority groups are particularly vulnerable given their lack of or limited political representation and general marginalization. In many cases, ethnic, religious and political identities overlap and possible motives for attacks are accordingly manifold. Shabak, Yazidis, Kaka’i and (Faili) Kurds have been targeted on the basis of their religion as well as their (perceived) Kurdish ethnicity.⁷⁸⁸ Shabak, Turkmen and Faili Kurds, who primarily adhere to the Shi’ite branch of Islam, have been targeted by Sunni armed groups on the basis of their religious identity as well as their ethnicity.⁷⁸⁹ Political and government representatives of all ethnic communities, including members of political parties, government and security officials as well as community leaders, have also been targeted, possibly on the basis of their (imputed) political opinion and ethnicity.⁷⁹⁰

In the Kurdistan Region, no discrimination against ethnic groups has been reported and minority communities reportedly operate their own schools⁷⁹¹ and are represented both in the parliament and executive branch of the KRG. While a previous KRG practice of transferring suspected members of terrorist groups from Ninewa and Kirkuk, including Turkmen and Arabs, to detention facilities in the Kurdistan Region appears to have ceased, to date several prisoners from these areas reportedly continue to be detained in the Kurdistan Region.⁷⁹²

UNHCR considers that, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, members of ethnic minorities in central and southern Iraq are likely to be in need of international refugee protection, not

only on account of their ethnicity/race, but also on account of their religious belief and/or (imputed) political opinion. Their need for international refugee protection may also be related to their profession; careful consideration should be given as to whether the person simultaneously exhibits other risk factors outlined in these Guidelines.

Specific ethnic minorities that are, depending on the details of their claim, likely to be in need of international protection, include the following:

c) *Turkmen*

Turkmen claim to be the third largest ethnic group in Iraq,⁷⁹³ and mainly reside in towns and villages in the region stretching from the northern town of Tel Afar in Ninewa Governorate to Badra and Al-Aziziyah in Wassit Governorate, southeast of Baghdad. The largest numbers can be found in the Governorate of Kirkuk, with others in Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Diyala, Wassit and Baghdad. The northern city of Erbil also has a significant Turkmen population. Turkmen representatives claim that there are an estimated 2.5 to 3 million Turkmen in Iraq while most international sources indicate a population of around 500,000-600,000.⁷⁹⁴ The Turkmen belong mostly to either the Sunni or the Shi'a faith of Islam.⁷⁹⁵ Reportedly, there is also a minority of 30,000 Christian Turkmen.⁷⁹⁶

Armed groups have targeted Turkmen civilians on the basis of their ethnic and religious identity as well as (imputed) political opinion. Several major attacks targeting Turkmen civilians, including in Shi'ite mosques, have been carried out in recent years.⁷⁹⁷ Turkmen party officials and community leaders have been a regular target for armed groups since 2003.⁷⁹⁸ In addition, a spike in targeted kidnappings and assassinations of Turkmen professionals was reported in Kirkuk in 2011.⁷⁹⁹ As a result of ongoing insecurity and attacks against members of the community, Turkmen in Kirkuk reportedly abstained from holding celebrations on the occasion of Eid Al-Adha in early November 2011.⁸⁰⁰

d) *Shabak*

Since 2003, there have been reports of attacks directed at the Shabak⁸⁰¹ community in Ninewa, one of the disputed areas. The fact that the Shabak are often identified as ethnic Kurds and primarily adhere to the Shi'ite branch of Islam makes them a target for Sunni armed groups.⁸⁰² Others may regard them as "infidels" given that they adhere to a distinct form of Islam.

According to Shabak representatives, 1,200 Shabak were killed in Iraq between 2003 and December 2011.⁸⁰³ Frequently, attacks against Shabak go unnoticed by the media due to the Shabak community's obscurity and lack of an influential political lobby.⁸⁰⁴ The Shabak community was reportedly exposed to attacks mainly in areas not under the control of the Kurdish political parties and their security forces.⁸⁰⁵ In the largest attack against the community, on 11 August 2009, 34 persons were killed and 179 persons injured.⁸⁰⁶ Since then, no large-scale attacks have been recorded; however, attacks against individual Shabak have been reported in 2010⁸⁰⁷ and 2011,⁸⁰⁸ although the motives for these attacks are often not known. The year 2012 saw an increase in reported attacks against Shabak in Ninewa, including an attack against Shabak IDPs in Bartella district (Ninewa) in January 2012.⁸⁰⁹ In recent research, a high percentage of Shabak women interviewed stated that they were hiding their religious identity in public.⁸¹⁰

Both Kurds and Arabs holding claim to the "disputed areas" of Ninewa Governorate contest the Shabak's identity and lands.⁸¹¹ Since 2008, Shabak leaders who oppose KRG policies in their territory are said to have increasingly been targeted for attacks, with Kurdish *Peshmerga* implicated in some of the incidents.⁸¹² It has been reported that on 10 July 2011, members of the Harkia tribe from the Kurdistan Region attacked the water service of the Shabak Bazwaya village, allegedly in an attempt to gain control over the water and electricity resources. Some 12,000 Shabak villagers were left without water for a prolonged period of time.⁸¹³

7. *Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances*

Article 14 of the Iraqi Constitution contains a strong guarantee of equality of the sexes before the law.⁸¹⁴ Article 16 stipulates that “*equal opportunities shall be guaranteed to all Iraqis.*” The Constitution also specifically addresses the potential vulnerability of women and the state’s obligation to provide for them⁸¹⁵ and prohibits “*all forms of violence and abuse in the family, school and society.*”⁸¹⁶ Article 37 prohibits forced labour, slavery, trafficking in women or children and enforced prostitution. The Constitution also provides for a quota for women in the CoR.⁸¹⁷ At the same time, the Constitution contains conflicting provisions that, depending on their interpretation, could undermine women’s rights.⁸¹⁸

Iraq is a State party to major international human rights treaties protecting the rights of women and girls, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).⁸¹⁹ Although women’s political representation⁸²⁰ has been strengthened⁸²¹ and the Government of Iraq has committed to achieving gender equality and empowering women in all spheres of life (Millennium Development Goal Three), this is yet to be translated into a broader recognition of gender equality across society and government bodies.⁸²² Further, as outlined below, a number of Iraqi laws, in particular contained in the Iraqi Penal Code and the Personal Status Law,⁸²³ favour men to the detriment of women.⁸²⁴ For example, women (except in the Kurdistan Region) reportedly still require the approval of a close male relative before being able to obtain a passport.⁸²⁵

While those killed and maimed in violence since 2003 have mostly been men, women are also caught up in indiscriminate attacks, including in attacks aimed at their husbands or other male family members, who, for example, work as policemen, politicians or government officials.⁸²⁶ Women have also been singled out for attacks, in particular if they have assumed a public role as politicians, government officials, rights activists or professionals.⁸²⁷ Others, including women of religious minority groups, have been targeted for not conforming to conservative Islamic or traditional norms, e.g., concerning their dress,⁸²⁸ or because they are considered to have brought shame to their family’s “honour”.⁸²⁹

Violence against women and girls has reportedly increased since 2003 and, according to most observers, continues unabated.⁸³⁰ Women and girls in Iraq are victims of societal, legal and economic discrimination, abductions and killings for political, sectarian or criminal reasons, sexual violence, forced displacement, domestic violence, “honour killings” and other harmful traditional practices, as well as (sex) trafficking and forced prostitution. Iraqi women and girls are reported to face violence at the hands of a range of actors, including armed groups, members of law enforcement agencies, and their (extended) families and community.⁸³¹ Most violence against women and girls appears to be perpetrated with impunity. According to a number of reports, the main reason why victims of gender-based violence refrain from reporting sexual abuse and rape, forced marriage, domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) is the fear of retaliation by the perpetrator or the family/community for tainting their “honour”.⁸³² Reports further indicate that women often fear that they would not receive protection from law enforcement agencies and courts, given that gender-based violence is often treated leniently while certain forms of violence, including domestic violence, trafficking and FGM are not criminalized by Iraqi law.⁸³³ It is reported that legal personnel dealing with cases of domestic violence may be subjected to harassment at the hands of the victim’s family members⁸³⁴ or may be considered as condoning the “*crime of immorality*” committed by the victim.⁸³⁵ Generally, the authorities are reported to have only limited capacity “*to prevent, protect and prosecute*” in cases of violence against women.⁸³⁶

Female detainees are deprived of their freedom either because they are suspected of having committed crimes themselves, or in order to put pressure on their male relatives.⁸³⁷ Many female detainees are held on charges of prostitution, adultery or homicide. Many have a history of forced marriage, abuse and violence; however, law enforcement and judicial personnel reportedly often disregard this fact and merely focus on the criminal charges brought against the woman.⁸³⁸ According to some sources,

women are regularly arrested without an arrest warrant and detained for prolonged periods without being charged or tried.⁸³⁹ There have been reports of women being held in detention in order to protect them from their families seeking to harm or kill them.⁸⁴⁰ Since 2003, a number of women have been sentenced to death and executed,⁸⁴¹ including three women in 2011⁸⁴² and two women convicted of terrorism-related crimes in January 2012.⁸⁴³

Women are reported to have been particularly affected by the dire humanitarian conditions following years of conflict. Women without male support,⁸⁴⁴ including widows,⁸⁴⁵ women whose husbands are missing or detained and divorcees, are most affected.⁸⁴⁶ Traditionally, they would move in with their families or their in-laws after the loss of their husbands; however, these relatives are often unable to provide substantial support given their own economic destitution.⁸⁴⁷ In addition, many female heads of household have been displaced and, as a result, have been separated from their extended families and traditional support networks.⁸⁴⁸ Most women heads of households in central and southern Iraq do not receive government welfare.⁸⁴⁹

Reports indicate that many women lack education,⁸⁵⁰ have little or no professional experience⁸⁵¹ and face difficulties in accessing the labour market, especially in rural areas.⁸⁵² Unlike in the recent past,⁸⁵³ Iraqi society appears increasingly to accept women working as independent breadwinners.⁸⁵⁴ Female-headed households often rely on (irregular) assistance from relatives and neighbours, or charity distributed through the mosques.⁸⁵⁵ Overall, many female-headed households are lacking the means to provide for themselves and their children⁸⁵⁶ and remain among the most vulnerable in the country.⁸⁵⁷ Women without support and protection provided by their family or tribal network are particularly vulnerable to being harassed, kidnapped or sexually assaulted.⁸⁵⁸ In order to ensure livelihoods for themselves and their children, women without a breadwinner may be compelled to engage in prostitution, begging⁸⁵⁹ or marriage to elderly men, including in so-called temporary or “pleasure marriages” (*muta’a*).⁸⁶⁰ The prevalence of school dropouts and child labour is particularly high in families headed by females.⁸⁶¹ Reported incidents also confirm that female heads of household are at greater risk of forced prostitution and/or (sex) trafficking,⁸⁶² or recruitment by armed groups, including as suicide bombers.⁸⁶³

In the Kurdistan Region, the KRG, religious leaders, the media and civil society organizations initiated a public debate on violence against women and lobbied for legislative and administrative measures. The KRG supports women’s shelters throughout the three northern governorates and has established four Directorates for Following up Violence Against Women to document gender-based violence and respond to cases of abuse. An important achievement was the enactment by the KRG, on 21 June 2011, of the Family Violence Bill.⁸⁶⁴ The law criminalizes FGM, forced and early marriages, verbal, physical, and psychological abuse of girls and women, forced prostitution, child abuse, and child labour.⁸⁶⁵ Under the law, special courts dealing with family violence cases are to be established⁸⁶⁶ and the police and courts have the authority to issue and enforce restraining orders to protect victims.⁸⁶⁷ The law led to fierce protest by some Islamic clerics and groups, who called it “un-Islamic”.⁸⁶⁸ Despite this significant legal change, violence against women, including domestic violence, “honour crimes” and FGM, reportedly remains widespread in the Kurdistan Region.⁸⁶⁹ Women in the Kurdistan Region who are widowed as a result of the former regime’s *Anfal* campaign⁸⁷⁰ or internal conflict, receive a welfare stipend from the KRG authorities.⁸⁷¹ In the disputed areas, widows reportedly do not receive any welfare assistance due to a lack of clarity as to which authority is in charge.⁸⁷²

UNHCR considers that women in specific circumstances as outlined below, including survivors or women at risk of sexual and gender-based violence, harmful traditional practices, and “honour crimes” are likely to be in need of international refugee protection on the basis of their membership of a particular social group, religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.⁸⁷³

a) *Sexual Violence and Harassment*

Under Iraqi law, rape is a private offense and only the victim, or her family if she is a child, may file a complaint. Marital rape is not included in the law as a criminal offence. The law indicates that, even if rape is committed with a political motive, it will not be considered as a political offence.⁸⁷⁴ Women and girls have been subjected to rape and other forms of sexual violence in detention centres and police stations,⁸⁷⁵ have been abducted and raped by or forcibly married to members of armed groups,⁸⁷⁶ face repeated and ongoing rape and sexual abuse in forced or early marriages,⁸⁷⁷ or are forced into prostitution or trafficked for sexual purposes.⁸⁷⁸ As a result of prevailing social taboos and the victims' fear of reprisal by their families, sexual violence against women and girls is thought to be grossly underreported.⁸⁷⁹

In addition to the actual ordeal of suffering sexual violence, women often fear or actually face social ostracism and further reprisals, including "honour killings" at the hands of their families.⁸⁸⁰ If women file a complaint or are arrested, they may, according to reports, face accusations,⁸⁸¹ harassment and abuse from Iraq's male-dominated police, who are said to be generally reluctant to deal with cases of sexual violence.⁸⁸² In rural areas, impartial investigations are said to be compromised by police members' own tribal affiliations.⁸⁸³ Furthermore, women and girls may be subjected to detention and criminal procedures on prostitution⁸⁸⁴ or adultery charges,⁸⁸⁵ even in the case of forced prostitution and rape.⁸⁸⁶ In article 398, the Iraqi Penal Code excuses the perpetrator of rape or sexual assault if he marries the victim, even after a sentence has been imposed.⁸⁸⁷ This practice has been reported even in cases in which the victim is a child.⁸⁸⁸ Advocates of this provision argue that marriage with the perpetrator will restore the woman's honour, which, they say, has been tainted by rape or sexual assault, thereby avoiding a potential "honour killing" by her family or tribe.⁸⁸⁹ This reasoning ignores that marriage to a rapist is likely to force "*the victim to undergo daily emotional, and likely physical, trauma.*"⁸⁹⁰ While the Personal Status Law requires the consent of both parties to a marriage, fear of further reprisals and social stigma is said to be likely to coerce a woman or girl into a marriage with the abuser.⁸⁹¹ Also in the case of abduction, including abduction with (attempted) rape, the punishment will be void in case the perpetrator marries the victim.⁸⁹² As a result, observers note that very few perpetrators of rape are known to have been convicted.⁸⁹³

Female detainees have reportedly been subjected to torture and ill-treatment in Iraqi detention facilities, including also rape or the threat of rape.⁸⁹⁴ (Threat of) rape of a female family member is also used as a way to humiliate a male detainee and/or to obtain confessions or information.⁸⁹⁵ Women subjected to sexual violence in detention or prison may also subsequently face "honour killings" at the hands of their families.⁸⁹⁶

b) *Domestic Violence*

Domestic violence against women and girls occurs "*mainly at the hands of their husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, and male extended family members*", at times at the order of tribal elders.⁸⁹⁷ Article 41 of the Iraqi Penal Code provides men with the legal authority to "discipline" their wives⁸⁹⁸ and children.⁸⁹⁹ While the Penal Code specifies that discipline is permissible only within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom, there are no specified legal criteria to determine when a threshold is breached. It is reported that if a woman does not exhibit any physical manifestation of domestic violence, such as bruising or scars, the case is automatically rejected.⁹⁰⁰ Article 393 of the Penal Code treats rape as a private offence. The law does not contain provisions criminalising marital rape. It does not stipulate a minimum penalty for rape and allows the victim's sexual history to be considered. Further, the authorities cannot initiate enforcement action without the consent of the complainant or her legal guardian. A law addressing domestic violence is reportedly in the drafting process.⁹⁰¹

Domestic violence is reportedly increasing⁹⁰² and surveys show that it is widely tolerated.⁹⁰³ The capacity of the Iraqi authorities to prevent, protect and prosecute domestic violence is limited. Medical and police authorities lack adequate training on caring for and protecting survivors of domestic violence, leaving women vulnerable to stigmatization and reprisals from family members for reporting their abuse.⁹⁰⁴ As a result, domestic violence often occurs with impunity as women rarely make complaints against their abusive husbands⁹⁰⁵ and law enforcement officials reportedly regularly

fail to arrest men accused of committing acts of violence against their female relatives.⁹⁰⁶ In the few cases that have been brought to trial, there have been complaints that sentencing has been lenient,⁹⁰⁷ even where a homicide has been involved.⁹⁰⁸ The stigma attached to female divorcees is said to result in women staying in abusive relationships as they consider it would be worse to be divorced.⁹⁰⁹ In addition, the economic situation is said to force women to stay in abusive relationships out of necessity.⁹¹⁰ Observers note that some women might be forced into prostitution or fall victim to traffickers after escaping abusive family situations.⁹¹¹

c) *“Honour-based” Violence*

So-called “honour crimes” - that is, violence committed by family members to protect the family’s honour - reportedly remain of particular concern. Most frequently, women and girls and, to a lesser extent, men and boys,⁹¹² are killed or subjected to other types of violence such as mutilations,⁹¹³ because they are judged to have transgressed cultural, social or religious norms bringing shame to their family. “Honour crimes” are said to occur for a variety of reasons, including adultery, loss of virginity (even by rape), refusal of an arranged marriage, attempt to marry someone against the wishes of the family⁹¹⁴ or making a demand for a divorce.⁹¹⁵ Even the suspicion or rumour that any of these acts have been committed can reportedly result in “honour crimes”.⁹¹⁶ With the emergence of mobile phones and internet, allowing young couples to communicate in secret, cases have been reported in which girls, or boys, were killed on the basis of suspicious or incriminating messages or phone calls.⁹¹⁷

The Iraqi Penal Code contains provisions that allow lenient punishments for “honour killings” on the grounds of provocation or if the accused had “honourable motives”. The punishment is between six to 12 months imprisonment.⁹¹⁸ Article 409 further provides that if a person catches his wife or a female relative in the act of committing adultery and kills/injures one or both persons involved immediately, the punishment will not exceed three years.⁹¹⁹ The law does not provide any guidance as to what “honourable motives” are and therefore, observers note, leaves scope for wide interpretation and abuse.⁹²⁰ “Honour crimes” are reported to be frequently committed with impunity, given the high level of social acceptance of this type of crime, including among law enforcement officials. “Honour crimes” are reported to be committed in all areas of Iraq,⁹²¹ though there is generally more information available in the Kurdistan Region, where the KRG has taken steps to combat the practice. Importantly, the KRG has introduced legal amendments to the Iraq Penal Code, effectively treating “honour killings” on the same level as other homicides.⁹²²

Despite these measures violence against women, including “honour crimes”, is reported to remain at alarmingly high levels in the Kurdistan Region.⁹²³ Given that “honour killings” are prohibited by law, they are allegedly often concealed as accidents⁹²⁴ or suicides⁹²⁵ in order to avoid prosecution. In other cases, women are reported to commit suicide, including by self-immolation,⁹²⁶ because they fear being killed by their families. Yet others are reportedly coerced by their families to commit suicide.⁹²⁷ Incidents of self-immolation are reported to be on the increase, with at least one case reported daily since 2010 and many more either going unreported or concealed as accidents.⁹²⁸ While the KRG pledged to investigate and prosecute “honour killings” and other violence against women, most cases reportedly continue to go unpunished. In the rare cases in which a person is convicted of having committed an “honour crime”, sentences are reported often to be lenient.⁹²⁹ Women at risk of “honour killing” are said to be unlikely to report to the police with a view to initiating prosecution of the family members involved as they fear retribution and want to avoid bringing further shame to the family.

Women at risk of “honour crimes” at the hands of their family are extremely vulnerable, as they have lost “*the primary source of protection and support*”.⁹³⁰ Their options are very limited and include shelters, prisons or the home of another relative or influential community leader.⁹³¹ In the Kurdistan Region, local authorities and NGOs have established several shelters with limited capacity.⁹³² While these shelters can, for a limited time, provide physical protection as well as social, legal and psychological counselling, they generally do not offer a durable solution.⁹³³ Observers indicate that, unless shelter staff, law enforcement officials or community leaders reach a mediated agreement with

the women's family (e.g., a couple obtains the family's agreement to marry, and the family commits not to harm her) the woman has no prospects for a future outside the shelter.⁹³⁴ However, reports indicate that there is a significant risk that even if a family pledges not to harm the woman upon return from the shelter, her rights might still be infringed⁹³⁵ or she may be killed.⁹³⁶ In cases of (alleged) adultery, the family's decision to kill the woman in order to "cleanse" the family's honour can generally not be reversed through mediation, and the woman has no other option but to remain in the shelter. Most shelters are reportedly under-resourced and unable to provide all necessary services.⁹³⁷ Women's shelters can also not guarantee full physical protection to women at risk, especially if a woman has to temporarily leave the shelter to appear in court.⁹³⁸ Shelter employees have reportedly been subjected to various forms of threats and intimidation because of their work and involvement in matters that are widely regarded as "family affairs".⁹³⁹ Occasionally, women's prisons effectively serve as shelters for some women who fear harm or honour killings if returned home.⁹⁴⁰ For these reasons, women at risk of "honour killings" can generally not find durable protection in the shelters available in the Kurdistan Region. For men at risk of "honour crimes", there are no protection facilities other than detention or prison.⁹⁴¹

In the central and southern governorates, there are no official shelters, although some women's organizations provide victims with temporary shelter in hidden locations.⁹⁴² Such arrangements are, however, not to be considered an effective form of protection given the lack of prospects for the women in the shelter and the shelter's unclear legal and financial status, in addition to the general intolerance vis-à-vis such institutions and associated security risks.⁹⁴³ An Iraqi Government policy on women's shelters is currently being developed.⁹⁴⁴ The Kirkuk Provincial Council recently voted in favour of establishing a shelter in Kirkuk.⁹⁴⁵

d) Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)

Particularly in the Kurdistan Region, the harmful practice of FGM⁹⁴⁶ continues to be reported. According to a 2010 empirical study,⁹⁴⁷ over 70 per cent of the female population surveyed in the predominantly Kurdish areas of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Garman/New Kirkuk have been mutilated, though there are regional variations.⁹⁴⁸ Reports indicate that, contrary to previous predictions, women in urban areas are as much affected as in the countryside.⁹⁴⁹ FGM is practiced mostly among Sunni Muslims, though it can also be found, to a lesser degree, among Shi'ite Muslims and Kaka'i.⁹⁵⁰ FGM was found to be almost exclusively practiced by ethnic Kurds, though there is no guarantee that girls/women of other ethnicities, e.g. Arabs and Turkmen, may not also undergo mutilation.⁹⁵¹ The study showed a trend of gradual decline in the practice of FGM, which in the past appears to have been almost universal.⁹⁵² The improvement of educational opportunities was found to be a major reason for the downward trend.⁹⁵³ Preliminary data from another study conducted in Kirkuk indicates that 40 per cent of the women there have undergone FGM.⁹⁵⁴

As a result of intense campaigning and lobbying in recent years, discussion of FGM is no longer taboo in the Kurdistan Region and has been recognized as a problem among the Kurdish public and the local authorities.⁹⁵⁵ On 21 June 2011, the Kurdish Regional Parliament took a crucial step towards eradicating the practice when it passed by a great majority the Family Violence Bill, criminalizing FGM.⁹⁵⁶ The Central Government of Iraq has yet to acknowledge the issue of FGM, which according to various indications, may also be prevalent in areas outside the Kurdistan Region or areas under *de facto* control of the KRG, e.g. in Kirkuk and Diyala Governorates.⁹⁵⁷

e) Forced and Early Marriages

Women and girls in Iraq may be exposed to other harmful traditional practices such as forced and/or early marriage, including exchanging of women between families and forced or coerced marriages of young women with much older men. The right of men and women to enter into marriage only if they freely and fully consent is not enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution. The Constitution does provide, however, that the state must protect childhood and prohibits all forms of violence and abuse in the family.⁹⁵⁸ In addition, Iraq is party to the ICCPR and the CEDAW, both of which guarantee the right to marry at one's free will.⁹⁵⁹ Under Iraq's Personal Status Law, which governs the manner in which courts settle disputes in marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, endowments and other similar

matters,⁹⁶⁰ forced marriage is prohibited and punishable by up to three years imprisonment.⁹⁶¹ The legal age for marriage is 18.⁹⁶² However, a 1979 amendment to the Personal Status Law lowered the minimum age for marriage to 15 years when there is consent of the parents, an adult brother or an adult married sister, or if the judge “*sees it an urgent necessity*”.⁹⁶³ Despite these legal provisions, cases of women and young girls who are forced to marry are reported,⁹⁶⁴ and the number is said to be growing.⁹⁶⁵ Those who reject their family’s choice risk enduring violence, including “honour killings”. Marriages of girls below the age of 15 are concluded according to religious customs and are not legally recognized.⁹⁶⁶ While no reliable statistics are available, it is widely believed that early marriages continue to occur throughout Iraq.⁹⁶⁷ As a result of the lack of legal recognition, girls married under this system are extremely vulnerable to further exploitation. Children born to the couple will have no civil identification cards until the marriage is legally recognized⁹⁶⁸ and, as a result, will have difficulties to access basic services, including education, without legal assistance.⁹⁶⁹ Temporary marriages, known as “*muta’a*”, have reportedly increased among Shi’ites since 2003. Such marriages have allegedly also been used by family members who have forced young women and girls into marriages for the purpose of financial benefit or to pay off a debt, at times selling them into prostitution or for the purpose of trafficking.⁹⁷⁰

In 2008, the KRG made amendments to the Personal Status Law relating to forced and early marriage. Article 6 of Law 15 of 2008, which replaces Law 188, prohibits the forced marriage of men and women. Article 5 of the amended law prohibits early marriage⁹⁷¹ and raises the age of marriage for males and females to 16 years, when authorized by a guardian.⁹⁷² Nevertheless, the practice of early marriage reportedly persists.⁹⁷³ In rural areas of northern Iraq, a practice called *Zhin bi Zhin*, meaning “a woman for a woman”, can be a form of forced marriage as it involves the exchange of girls or women between two families where no dowry is paid.⁹⁷⁴ This exchange of females is particularly sought after if one party is unable to pay a dowry or if relations between two tribes would be strengthened through the exchange of girls or women.⁹⁷⁵ Similar practices can also be found in other areas of Iraq.

Forced and early marriages have also been linked by some observers to domestic violence and (attempted) suicides among young Kurdish women.⁹⁷⁶ Girls reportedly may face ill-treatment or be at risk of honour-related crimes if they refuse the proposed marriage or are seen to associate with men not selected by their families.⁹⁷⁷

8. Children with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances

Articles 29 and 30 of the Iraqi Constitution guarantee the protection of children, particularly from exploitation, violence, forced labour and trafficking.⁹⁷⁸ While the authorities are committed to the protection of children, years of violence have destroyed many of the institutions and systems for physical, social and legal protection in much of the country.⁹⁷⁹ Children and adolescents continue to be killed and maimed in attacks against markets, schools and hospitals or the private homes of security or government officials.⁹⁸⁰ Others are abducted for criminal, sectarian or political motives.⁹⁸¹ Years of conflict have left millions of Iraqi children orphaned⁹⁸² and abandoned.⁹⁸³ Orphans and abandoned children are at particular risk of abuse,⁹⁸⁴ trafficking and recruitment by armed groups. Many more children have faced displacement.⁹⁸⁵ Children living near one of the more than 3,600 identified areas contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are at constant risk of being killed or maimed.⁹⁸⁶ A high number of Iraqi children suffer from psychological trauma⁹⁸⁷ and domestic and school-based violence.⁹⁸⁸ Children with mental or physical disabilities are among the most vulnerable of society.⁹⁸⁹ Children and youth⁹⁹⁰ are threatened by poverty and malnutrition,⁹⁹¹ lack of safe water and sanitation,⁹⁹² insufficient access to education,⁹⁹³ illiteracy⁹⁹⁴ and a lack of prospects for employment.⁹⁹⁵

UNHCR considers that children with specific profiles or in specific circumstances, as outlined below,

are likely to be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of membership of a particular social group.⁹⁹⁶ Asylum claims made by children, including any examination of exclusion considerations for former child soldiers, need to be assessed carefully and in accordance with UNHCR Guidelines on child asylum claims.⁹⁹⁷

a) Child Labour

Iraq is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. The Iraqi Constitution prohibits economic exploitation of children in all its forms⁹⁹⁸ as well as forced labour and slavery.⁹⁹⁹ The Iraqi Labour Law (Law No. 71 of 1987 as amended by Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 89)¹⁰⁰⁰ provides for a minimum age of 15 years for any kind of employment¹⁰⁰¹ and lists types of work that children below the age of 18 are not allowed to perform as it is “*likely to harm their health, safety and morals.*”¹⁰⁰² In addition to hazardous work, other worst forms of child labour are defined and prohibited by Order Number 89, including slavery, forced labour, child trafficking, forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict, child prostitution and pornography, and illicit activities such as drug trafficking.¹⁰⁰³

The Iraqi Constitution prohibits trafficking of women and children and the sex trade.¹⁰⁰⁴ While the Government of Iraq has strengthened its legal protections against the worst forms of child labour, “*significant gaps remain in government coordination mechanisms and in programs to address the worst forms of child labor,*” according to one observer.¹⁰⁰⁵ Child labour, including its worst forms, reportedly remains prevalent in Iraq and the Iraqi Government has yet to initiate programmes, as foreseen by law, to prevent child labour, to remove children from exploitive labour situations or to ensure their access to education.¹⁰⁰⁶ Children are observed to be undertaking hazardous work in the agriculture sector, automobile shops and on construction sites, while others beg in the streets exposed to multiple dangers.¹⁰⁰⁷ Children are also reportedly forced into prostitution and trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation within and outside of Iraq.¹⁰⁰⁸ By law, education is mandatory until the age of 11 (in the Kurdistan Region, until 14 years) and many children drop out at this age. Children aged 12 to 15 are thought to be most at risk of being exposed to the worst forms of child labour as they are no longer required to go to school but are not yet permitted legally to work.¹⁰⁰⁹ Vulnerable populations such as IDPs, refugees and returnees are often more susceptible to child labour than those not displaced.¹⁰¹⁰

b) Forced Recruitment

The use of child soldiers in the Iraqi armed forces is prohibited.¹⁰¹¹ The minimum age for recruitment is 18 years and military service is voluntary.¹⁰¹² Punishment for individuals recruiting children into military service is imprisonment of up to three months.¹⁰¹³ There are no reports of children being recruited into the Iraqi Army.¹⁰¹⁴ In 2009, the United Nations received reports that the Sahwa forces employed approximately 350 children in their ranks; however, the reports could not be verified due to the security situation.¹⁰¹⁵ Sunni armed groups,¹⁰¹⁶ including Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qa’eda in Iraq, reportedly continue to recruit and use children for various tasks, including scouting, spying, planting roadside bombs, transporting military supplies and equipment and videotaping attacks for propaganda purposes.¹⁰¹⁷ Of particular concern is the reported continued use of children as suicide bombers, including vulnerable children such as orphans, street children and mentally disabled children.¹⁰¹⁸ Armed groups also allegedly use children to lure security forces into ambushes.¹⁰¹⁹ Armed Shi’ite groups such as the Jaysh Al-Mahdi have also been reported to recruit children as young as 15 years of age.¹⁰²⁰ There are only a few programmes available to demobilize and reintegrate children engaged in armed conflict, and these are considered to have limited effectiveness.¹⁰²¹

c) Domestic and Sexual Violence, Harmful Traditional Practices

Children are also known to be subjected to domestic violence,¹⁰²² sexual violence,¹⁰²³ “honour”-based violence,¹⁰²⁴ trafficking and forced prostitution¹⁰²⁵ as well as harmful traditional practices such as FGM¹⁰²⁶ and early and forced marriages.¹⁰²⁷

d) *Children in Detention*

There are reports of children being held with adults in some detention facilities¹⁰²⁸ and of children being detained for their alleged membership in armed groups, particularly around Mosul.¹⁰²⁹ Numerous children, some apparently quite young, are also reportedly held in detention along with their detained or imprisoned mothers.¹⁰³⁰ Facilities for convicted juvenile offenders, under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, continue to be overcrowded and children are at risk of disease, abuse and exploitation.¹⁰³¹ In the Kurdistan Region, juvenile offenders are generally held in reformatories or detention centres for children that, according to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), provide satisfactory living conditions, though the availability of educational, social and recreational activities is limited.¹⁰³²

9. *Victims or Persons at Risk of Trafficking¹⁰³³ or Forced Prostitution*

The Iraqi Constitution prohibits forced labour, slavery, slave trade, trafficking in women or children, and the sex trade.¹⁰³⁴ A comprehensive anti-trafficking law criminalizing all forms of trafficking has been drafted but not yet enacted.¹⁰³⁵ While Iraqi law does not prohibit trafficking as such, the Iraqi Penal Code criminalizes a range of acts that commonly occur in the course of trafficking, including unlawful seizure, kidnapping, detention by force or deception, sexual assault, rape and enticement of children into prostitution.¹⁰³⁶ Coalition Provision Authority Order 89, which remains in effect, outlaws child prostitution and child pornography.¹⁰³⁷

Observers describe Iraq as a country of origin, transit and destination for trafficking in persons, including trafficking for sexual purposes, bride trafficking, fraudulent marriages and labour trafficking.¹⁰³⁸ Iraqi women and girls are said to be trafficked both within Iraq and across borders to neighbouring countries,¹⁰³⁹ most of them for enforced prostitution.¹⁰⁴⁰ Further, women and girls who fled as refugees to Syria, Jordan and other countries in the region are reportedly forced into prostitution in their host countries.¹⁰⁴¹ Trafficking has reportedly become widespread in the region since 2003,¹⁰⁴² but the exact extent is unknown.¹⁰⁴³ Traffickers use various methods of recruitment, including “*personal and family threat, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or even giving payments to a person in order to control the victim*”.¹⁰⁴⁴ Traffickers, or their (often female) intermediaries,¹⁰⁴⁵ reportedly deceive women and girls, who are often impoverished and illiterate,¹⁰⁴⁶ with false promises of legitimate employment,¹⁰⁴⁷ marriage, protection or other benefits.¹⁰⁴⁸ It is also reported that orphan children may be trafficked by employees of orphanages for the purpose of forced prostitution.¹⁰⁴⁹ Traffickers and pimps also bail out women from prisons and then force them (back) into prostitution.¹⁰⁵⁰

In addition to organized networks and criminal gangs engaging in trafficking, increasingly young girls and women are allegedly sold by their families or relatives into [forced] marriages or prostitution due to economic destitution, to pay debts or to resolve disputes with other families.¹⁰⁵¹ The traditional (Shi’ite) arrangement of temporary marriages (*muta’a*), under which the family receives a dowry from the husband and the marriage is terminated after a specified period,¹⁰⁵² is also reportedly misused for the purpose of sexual exploitation.¹⁰⁵³ Abusive husbands or in-laws are reported to have forced their wives/daughters-in-law into prostitution.¹⁰⁵⁴ The highest demand is said to be for girls under 16,¹⁰⁵⁵ in particular virgins.¹⁰⁵⁶ IDPs and refugees moving between Iraq and neighbouring countries are at particular risk of falling victim to trafficking.¹⁰⁵⁷ There are reports that Iraqi boys, mostly from poor families, have been trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labour, such as street begging.¹⁰⁵⁸

The Iraqi authorities have undertaken efforts to address trafficking, including by establishing a cross-ministerial committee to monitor the situation and make recommendations,¹⁰⁵⁹ and the drafting of anti-trafficking legislation.¹⁰⁶⁰ Despite these efforts, the Iraqi Government has yet to prosecute, convict or impose sentences on perpetrators of human trafficking or officials complicit in trafficking offenses.¹⁰⁶¹ Some government and law enforcement officials have reportedly been involved in trafficking women and girls, either directly or through corrupt practices.¹⁰⁶² In some cases, traffickers have reportedly been set free by the authorities despite the gravity of their crimes and families of victims have not pursued cases with law enforcement and judicial authorities.¹⁰⁶³ It is further reported

that police often blame the victim, doubt the victim's credibility, appear to be indifferent and/or conduct inadequate investigations.¹⁰⁶⁴ The Iraqi authorities reportedly do not encourage or assist victims of trafficking to press charges against offenders,¹⁰⁶⁵ nor do they make efforts to identify and protect victims of trafficking, or support NGOs providing legal, medical or psychological services to victims of trafficking.¹⁰⁶⁶ In the Kurdistan Region, the KRG is reportedly working to establish a shelter for victims of trafficking and forced prostitution.¹⁰⁶⁷

According to reports, victims of trafficking may further be criminalized and be subjected to imprisonment for illegal acts committed as a result of being trafficked, including penalization for engaging in prostitution¹⁰⁶⁸ or traveling with false documents.¹⁰⁶⁹ Due to social stigma, women or girls who were raped or forced into prostitution face difficulties reintegrating into their communities. After release from prison, they may be at risk of "honour killing",¹⁰⁷⁰ or renewed trafficking.¹⁰⁷¹ Iraqi women and girls trafficked to or in neighbouring countries may also face imprisonment and/or deportation in the host countries.¹⁰⁷² Survivors of trafficking also are reported to lack access to the necessary legal, medical and psychological services, despite the known emotional and physical health risks associated with the ordeal.¹⁰⁷³

In light of the above, UNHCR considers that victims of trafficking and persons at risk of being trafficked or re-trafficked, particularly women and children, are, depending on the circumstances of their individual claim, likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their membership of a particular social group.¹⁰⁷⁴

10. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals

Discrimination and targeted attacks against persons on the basis of their perceived or actual sexual orientation or gender identity continued to be reported in 2010, 2011 and 2012.¹⁰⁷⁵ Even though the Iraqi Penal Code does not expressly prohibit same-sex relations between consenting adults, a range of vague provisions in the Iraqi Penal Code leave room for discrimination and prosecution of LGBTI persons.¹⁰⁷⁶ Many Iraqis, including (Sunni and Shi'ite) religious and political leaders, believe that homosexuality is punishable by death under Shari'a law.¹⁰⁷⁷ Though there are no Shari'a courts in Iraq, this perception reportedly creates an environment of tolerance and impunity for violence perpetrated against gay men or those perceived to be gay;¹⁰⁷⁸ and some may see it as a religious duty to kill gay men.¹⁰⁷⁹

Attacks against men who look "effeminate," or who are perceived to be engaging in same-sex relations are reported to take place mostly at the hands of armed Shi'ite groups,¹⁰⁸⁰ who position themselves as "*agents of moral enforcement*";¹⁰⁸¹ or relatives, who seek to cleanse the family's tainted "honour".¹⁰⁸² According to Human Rights Watch, reports suggest that Sunni armed groups "(...) *were also joining, possibly competitively, in the campaign of threats and violence.*"¹⁰⁸³ Attacks against gay men have been reported in many parts of the country, including Baghdad,¹⁰⁸⁴ Najef,¹⁰⁸⁵ Basrah, Kirkuk, Kerbala and Thi-Qar.¹⁰⁸⁶ In September 2011, reports also surfaced of the mistreatment of gay men in the Kurdistan Region.¹⁰⁸⁷ Iraqi LGBTI, a London-based human rights group aiding LGBTI Iraqis,¹⁰⁸⁸ estimates that there have been 750 killings of LGBTI men and women since 2003.¹⁰⁸⁹ Other observers allege that thousands have been harassed and tortured and hundreds killed between 2003 and 2009.¹⁰⁹⁰ Various sources described brutal methods of torturing and killing LGBTI Iraqis.¹⁰⁹¹ In February and March 2012, human rights organizations and media reported a wave of brutal killings of so-called "emos" and of gay and/or effeminate men.¹⁰⁹²

It is reported that, commonly, attacks against LGBTI persons occur with impunity as perpetrators trust that no arrests or legal prosecution will be carried out.¹⁰⁹³ In the rare cases in which legal proceedings are initiated in relation to a crime committed against a person on account of his/her perceived or real sexual orientation, police and courts regularly take into account the alleged homosexuality of the victim as a mitigating factor ("*honourable motives*").¹⁰⁹⁴ The ISF allegedly engage in assaults on

(perceived) LGBTI Iraqis, including by raids on safe houses,¹⁰⁹⁵ harassment at checkpoints, extortion, arbitrary arrests, torture and extra-judicial killings.¹⁰⁹⁶

LGBTI individuals usually keep their sexual orientation secret and live in constant fear of discrimination, ostracism by family members and society, and targeted violence.¹⁰⁹⁷ Reportedly, armed Shi'ite groups and even government officials monitor gay men and inform their families about “inappropriate” behavior,¹⁰⁹⁸ leaving it in the hands of the family to take what action they consider appropriate. In many cases, this puts the individuals at risk of “honour” killings at the hands of their families.¹⁰⁹⁹ It has been reported that the appearance, for example, of men with slightly long hair and tight clothes, or mere rumours about a person’s alleged “misbehavior” is sufficient grounds to inflict harm on him or her.¹¹⁰⁰ Even in neighbouring countries, gay men may not be safe as family members may pursue them or they may face harassment at the hands of local officials.¹¹⁰¹

In light of widespread prejudice, traditional or tribal values of “honour”, potentially problematic legal provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code, and strong media bias against LGBTI individuals, UNHCR considers that LGBTI individuals are likely to be in need of international refugee protection on account of their membership of a particular social group, i.e., their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, since they do not, or are perceived not to conform to prevailing legal, religious and social norms.¹¹⁰²

Most information in this section relates to gay men and only limited information is available on the treatment of lesbians and of bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Iraq. The absence of reports should not mean that these persons are not at risk. LGBTI individuals cannot be expected to be discreet about their sexual orientation or gender identity in order to avoid persecution.¹¹⁰³ Further, the fact that provisions in the Iraqi Penal Code allow for criminal sanctions for “homosexual conduct” is a bar to state protection, including where persecutory acts are perpetrated by non-state actors such as armed groups, family or community members.¹¹⁰⁴

B. Eligibility under Broader International Protection Criteria, Including Complementary Forms of Protection

This section of the Guidelines provides guidance on the determination of eligibility for international protection of Iraqis fleeing areas of conflict and violence in Iraq, but who do not meet the refugee criteria contained in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.¹¹⁰⁵

Given the widespread human rights violations against individuals with specific profiles in many parts of Iraq, it can be expected that many asylum-seekers from Iraq, including those originating from areas where a situation of generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order exists at the moment of adjudication of their claim, will be eligible for refugee protection under the 1951 Convention.

The criteria for refugee status in the 1951 Convention should be interpreted in such a manner that individuals or groups of persons who fulfil these criteria are duly recognized and protected. Only when an asylum-seeker is found not to meet the refugee criteria in the 1951 Convention, should complementary or subsidiary forms of protection be examined.

Persons who are outside their country of origin because of a serious threat to their life, liberty or security as a result of generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order may also be recognized as refugees under broader international protection criteria, where applicable. This is contained in UNHCR’s mandate and several regional instruments.¹¹⁰⁶ In other regions, the 1951 Convention refugee definition has not been extended, but rather complemented through the establishment of specifically tailored international protection mechanisms.¹¹⁰⁷

The severity of conflict-related violence and the correlative risk to Iraqi civilians has been reviewed by UNHCR on the basis of several cumulative indicators: (i) civilian casualties as a result of indiscriminate acts of violence, including car bombs, suicide attacks, IED explosions and landmines, covering also casualties among bystanders affected by targeted violence; (ii) prevalence of security incidents; and (iii) population displacement resulting from violence and insecurity, and voluntary IDP and refugee returns.

Civilian Casualties

Iraq continues to experience significant civilian casualties. In 2010 and 2011, media reports recorded more than 4,000 Iraqi civilians killed, on average, each year,¹¹⁰⁸ bringing the total number of Iraqi civilians killed since 2003 to over 114,000.¹¹⁰⁹ From these figures, it appears that there is no noticeable downward trend in civilian casualty figures since mid 2009.¹¹¹⁰ “A *persistent low-level conflict*” is said to have taken root in the country, which will continue to kill civilians at a similar rate for years to come (“*an impassable minimum*”).¹¹¹¹ Iraqi Government sources provide consistently lower casualty figures than media reports by international observers.¹¹¹² In what appeared to be a surge in mass casualty attacks in January 2012, 464 civilians were killed,¹¹¹³ while February 2012 saw again a decrease in the numbers of casualties.¹¹¹⁴

As in previous years, in 2010 and 2011 non-state actors were responsible for the largest number of civilian casualties.¹¹¹⁵ Most large attacks in 2011 were directed against the ISF¹¹¹⁶ and Sahwa,¹¹¹⁷ government buildings¹¹¹⁸ as well as Shi’ite civilians, including pilgrims.¹¹¹⁹

The number of civilian deaths from suicide attacks and car bombs decreased in 2011 compared to previous years, to an average of 6.6 per day.¹¹²⁰ While these attacks still account for the highest number of civilian deaths each month, the number of civilians killed from gunfire/executions has risen to an average of 4.6 per day in 2011.¹¹²¹ This suggests that in 2011 an increasing number of civilians, especially government and security officials, were specifically targeted and executed.¹¹²²

Armed groups appear to have a diminished capability to launch large-scale bombings resulting in high numbers of deaths. In 2010, nine large-scale bombings killing more than 50 civilians per attack were recorded; there were eight such attacks in 2009. In 2011, three such large-scale attacks resulting in over 50 civilian victims were recorded.¹¹²³ At the same time, armed groups continue to be able to launch multiple coordinated attacks against selected targets,¹¹²⁴ e.g., coordinated attacks on the ISF,¹¹²⁵ government targets¹¹²⁶ or particular religious groups such as Shi’ites¹¹²⁷ or Christians.¹¹²⁸

While most attacks by armed groups are targeted against specific groups and individuals, due to the nature of the tactics employed, including large-scale bombings and attacks in public places, they inevitably have an indiscriminate effect, causing significant casualties among bystanders.

After years of conflict, Iraq is one of the countries worst-affected by landmines and UXO.¹¹²⁹ Contamination by mines and UXO is reported to affect the safety and livelihood of an estimated 1.6 million Iraqis.¹¹³⁰ As a result of landmines and UXO, between 48,000 and 68,000 Iraqis have had to undergo amputation.¹¹³¹ In 2010, at least 82 casualties from landmines and UXO were recorded.¹¹³² Lack of capacity, corruption and ongoing insecurity are said to hamper clearance of affected areas,¹¹³³ and as a result, reconstruction and economic development can be stifled.¹¹³⁴ Clearance of mines and UXOs¹¹³⁵ is also a prerequisite for displaced persons to be able to return to their former areas of residence¹¹³⁶ and for the provision of humanitarian assistance.¹¹³⁷ However, Iraq currently has less than 2,000 active de-miners, less than a quarter of the 9,000 required to honour its commitment to clear all landmines by 2018.¹¹³⁸ Depleted uranium has been linked to increased rates of leukemia, congenital malformations and various forms of cancers in certain parts of Iraq.¹¹³⁹

Security Incidents

While violence has fallen significantly since the worst period of sectarian conflict in 2006 and 2007, bombings, shootings and assassinations by armed groups continue to occur on a daily basis,¹¹⁴⁰ taking

a serious toll mainly on the civilian population, and mostly in central Iraq. Baghdad and Ninewa, especially Mosul, remain the most violent areas in Iraq, followed by Kirkuk, Al-Anbar, Babel, Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates.¹¹⁴¹ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, using information collated by the Iraqi Government, attributes violence to three main areas of Iraq: 1) Mosul, which remains the major stronghold of Sunni armed groups; 2) areas it describes as “sectarian melting pots” where Sunni armed groups target Shi’ite civilians as well as Sahwa members, i.e., Baghdad and the governorates surrounding it; and 3) the “disputed areas”.¹¹⁴² According to the Washington Institute, violence is “*rising sharply*” in these areas.¹¹⁴³ In late 2011 and early 2012, armed groups, which are speculated by some observers to be seeking to fill the political and security vacuum created by the ongoing political crisis and the USF-I’s withdrawal from Iraq, launched a number of large-scale assaults;¹¹⁴⁴ however, it remains to be seen if this will lead to an overall deterioration of security conditions.

Central Iraq

The large majority of attacks take place in Baghdad, which continues to see daily bombings, shootings and assassinations. A number of attacks with high casualty numbers were reported in 2011¹¹⁴⁵ and 2012,¹¹⁴⁶ resulting in scores of people killed and injured. These attacks took place in Sunni, Shi’ite and mixed areas across the capital. In addition, daily roadside bombs, shootings and “sticky bombs” attached to vehicles result in high numbers of casualties. Most frequently, members of the ISF¹¹⁴⁷ and Sahwa, government officials¹¹⁴⁸ and employees,¹¹⁴⁹ religious figures,¹¹⁵⁰ politicians,¹¹⁵¹ professionals¹¹⁵² as well as LGBTI persons¹¹⁵³ are targeted. Members of the Christian communities in Baghdad have seen attacks against churches¹¹⁵⁴ as well as individual members,¹¹⁵⁵ including those selling alcohol.¹¹⁵⁶ Baghdad in 2011 has also been the centre for popular protests, to which the ISF reportedly responded violently, arresting, beating and even killing protesters.¹¹⁵⁷

The Governorates of Ninewa (in particular Mosul) and Kirkuk (mainly Kirkuk city) continue to be volatile. In 2011 and 2012, both governorates saw several large-scale attacks as well as daily regular smaller attacks,¹¹⁵⁸ mostly directed against ISF, Sahwa and government institutions, but also civilians.¹¹⁵⁹ As in previous years, there were several bombings or attempted bombings of Christian churches in 2011.¹¹⁶⁰ Further, Kurdish party offices and members of the Kurdish army (“*Peshmerga*”) and security (“*Asayish*”) remain a target.¹¹⁶¹ Both governorates see regular kidnappings and assassinations, including of members of the ISF,¹¹⁶² government officials and employees,¹¹⁶³ Sahwa members,¹¹⁶⁴ tribal¹¹⁶⁵ and religious figures,¹¹⁶⁶ as well as members of religious and ethnic minorities, including Muslim Shi’ites, Turkmen,¹¹⁶⁷ Christians, Shabak and Yazidis.¹¹⁶⁸ In both governorates there are frequent reports of attacks against professionals;¹¹⁶⁹ Kirkuk has recently seen a sharp increase in targeted abductions and killings of professionals.¹¹⁷⁰

The Governorates of Diyala¹¹⁷¹ and Salah Al-Din¹¹⁷² reportedly remain among the most unstable governorates¹¹⁷³ and are subject to frequent security incidents, including attacks mainly directed against security and civilian government institutions, but also civilians, e.g., in cafes or mosques.¹¹⁷⁴ Both governorates, which are religiously “mixed”, have also seen attacks on Shi’ite civilians and pilgrims¹¹⁷⁵ as well as Sunni and Shi’ite religious figures.¹¹⁷⁶ There have also been high numbers of targeted killings, including of senior ISF officials and *Peshmerga/Asayish*,¹¹⁷⁷ tribal/Sahwa,¹¹⁷⁸ government¹¹⁷⁹ and party officials,¹¹⁸⁰ as well as professionals.¹¹⁸¹

The predominantly Sunni Al-Anbar Governorate, a former hotbed of insurgent groups, has seen a surge in violence since summer 2009.¹¹⁸² There were about 10 reported attacks per week in 2010 and 2011 in Al-Anbar Governorate, and observers speculate that Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qa’eda in Iraq is attempting to undermine the Al-Anbar provincial authorities and the ISF in order to increase tensions between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’ites.¹¹⁸³ In 2010, 2011 and 2012, Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qa’eda in Iraq and other armed groups launched several suicide and bomb attacks against highly secured government buildings and police headquarters.¹¹⁸⁴ Bomb attacks in areas frequented by civilians, such as markets and a cultural centre, resulted in civilian casualties.¹¹⁸⁵ Attacks on ISF convoys and checkpoints also often resulted in civilian casualties.¹¹⁸⁶ ISF officers¹¹⁸⁷ and Sahwa members¹¹⁸⁸ are

regularly singled out for assassination, often in their homes or private vehicles, causing casualties among family members.¹¹⁸⁹ At times, attacks on the houses of ISF members occur in an apparently coordinated manner across the governorate.¹¹⁹⁰ In addition to targeted attacks on government compounds, government officials and employees appear to be singled out for assassination.¹¹⁹¹ Further, armed groups have singled out party officials,¹¹⁹² tribal leaders,¹¹⁹³ Sunni scholars and mosque imams¹¹⁹⁴ and professionals¹¹⁹⁵ for attacks. In some cases it was reported that the victims had been vocal critics of Al-Qa'eda in Iraq.¹¹⁹⁶

Southern Iraq

The security situation in Southern Iraq shows a mixed picture. While Sunni armed groups continue to stage attacks mainly in areas closest to Baghdad, they are also capable of launching occasional attacks further south, including in Basrah, Nasseriyah, Kerbala and Najef.¹¹⁹⁷ Further, Shi'ite armed groups, which in the past fought open battles over dominance in the south, reportedly continue to engage in assassinations for “*score-settling and intimidation*” against security officials, religious and political rivals.¹¹⁹⁸ In February and early March 2012, clashes between followers of Shi'ite cleric Mahmoud Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi and supporters of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani occurred in various locations in southern Iraq.¹¹⁹⁹

Babel, the governorate closest to Baghdad, sees regular bombings against the ISF¹²⁰⁰ and civilians, including Shi'ite pilgrims.¹²⁰¹ Armed groups also single out individual members of the ISF for attacks, including on the houses and private cars of off-duty policemen.¹²⁰² Further, members of the Sunni Sahwa remain a major target of armed groups.¹²⁰³ Government officials and employees,¹²⁰⁴ party officials,¹²⁰⁵ professionals¹²⁰⁶ as well as religious figures¹²⁰⁷ are also targeted. It is also reported that Wassit Governorate has seen several high-profile attacks targeting civilians and the ISF.¹²⁰⁸ Several planned attacks have reportedly been successfully prevented by the ISF.¹²⁰⁹ Targeted killings of security, political, tribal or religious figures have also been reported.¹²¹⁰

Kerbala and Najef Governorates, which are home to important Shi'ite places of worship, see occasional large-scale attacks targeting mainly Shi'ite pilgrims¹²¹¹ despite heavy security measures employed ahead of and during religious festivities.¹²¹² Occasional targeting of prominent figures is also reported in Kerbala.¹²¹³

The other southern governorates are relatively calm and stable, however armed groups remain active as evidenced by ongoing arrests of suspected terrorists and criminals¹²¹⁴ and sporadic attacks, mainly in Basrah.¹²¹⁵ There are also targeted assassinations of prominent religious, tribal, political or professional figures,¹²¹⁶ especially in the Governorate of Diwaniyah.¹²¹⁷ In 2010 and 2011, southern Iraq was also the site of attacks on US convoys and bases by Shi'ite militias, at times resulting in civilian casualties.¹²¹⁸ Protests over poor services and corruption in 2010 and 2011 in various locations in southern Iraq, several of which turned violent, illustrate the potential for further social upheaval in the south, which has reportedly long felt neglected by the central Iraqi authorities.¹²¹⁹

Kurdistan Region

Though the security situation in the three northern governorates is relatively more stable, it remains a potential target for terrorist operations,¹²²⁰ e.g. by Ansar Al-Islam,¹²²¹ or the Al-Qa'eda Kurdish Battalions,¹²²² which reportedly remain active in the region. In early December 2011, the relative stability was disrupted for several days when attacks were launched against mainly Christian and Yazidi-run businesses in Dahuk Governorate, followed by retaliatory attacks on party offices and media outlets.¹²²³ Areas bordering the neighbouring central governorates of Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din¹²²⁴ as well as those neighbouring Turkey and Iran, are tense and unstable.¹²²⁵ The general human rights situation in the Kurdistan Region has improved in recent years, but continued abuses, including arbitrary arrests, *incommunicado* detention and the use of torture and ill-treatment continue to be reported by observers.¹²²⁶ Persons (perceived to be) opposing or openly criticizing the KRG or the ruling parties, including members of opposition parties, journalists, and protestors have

been targeted.¹²²⁷ Kurdish security forces are reported to have repeatedly used excessive force to clamp down on mostly peaceful pro-reform protests in spring 2011, resulting in casualties.¹²²⁸

Displacement for Reason of Violence and Insecurity and Voluntary Returns

Iraq has experienced various waves of internal displacement due to conflict, sectarian violence and forced population movements. The bombing of the Al-Askari Shrine in Samarra on 22 February 2006 triggered sectarian violence which quickly escalated and marked the beginning of a new series of displacements. More than 1.6 million Iraqis were displaced and registered as IDPs by September 2008.¹²²⁹ In addition, some two million Iraqis were displaced to neighbouring countries. Since then, new instances of large-scale displacement have decreased significantly. In 2010 and 2011, more than 1,300 Christian families were displaced as a result of targeted violence against their communities. Most of them moved to the Kurdistan Region or sought refuge abroad.¹²³⁰ In October 2010 nearly 1,000 families were displaced within the Diyala Governorate from Jalawla, Saadiya and Qaratap to Khanaqeen, Kalar and Kifri.¹²³¹ Several hundred families were displaced, mostly temporarily, as a result of Iranian and Turkish shelling of border areas in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Governorate.¹²³² Others, including persons already displaced by violence, have had to flee again as a result of natural disasters.¹²³³ And finally, individuals continue to flee their homes for fear of persecution or generalized violence to seek protection within or outside Iraq; however, their numbers are not known.

In 2008, IDPs and refugees started to return to their places of origin, and this trend has continued. To date, the Iraqi authorities have registered more than 1.55 million returnees, mostly internally displaced.¹²³⁴ The year 2011 saw a significant increase in registered returns, compared to previous years.¹²³⁵ The increase is attributed to various reasons, including stabilization in the security situation, an improvement in the economic situation,¹²³⁶ and, in the case of refugee returnees, an increase in the financial assistance granted by the Iraqi Government.¹²³⁷ Many others, however, returned to Iraq as a result of insecure conditions in their country of asylum, especially in Syria,¹²³⁸ or the inability to afford to continue to live in displacement.¹²³⁹ Not all returnees are able to go back to their place of origin, in particular in areas in which the demographic make-up has been altered as a result of sectarian violence.¹²⁴⁰ There is a risk that some returns may not be sustainable, in particular due to difficulties in accessing livelihood opportunities¹²⁴¹ or renewed violence in the place of return,¹²⁴² especially in light of a potential deterioration in security and political conditions.¹²⁴³

Despite increasing returns, the total number of IDPs remains high, with more than 1.25 million Iraqis internally displaced and in need of a durable solution.¹²⁴⁴ It is not known precisely how many Iraqis remain displaced outside Iraq, but by 29 February 2012, more than 163,000 Iraqis were still registered with UNHCR offices in the region.¹²⁴⁵ While the number has been decreasing as a result of returns and resettlement, those still displaced in neighbouring countries are becoming increasingly vulnerable.¹²⁴⁶

An estimated 467,565 persons – including IDPs, returnees and squatters – reportedly remain in more than 382 informal settlements throughout the country, with 148,483 persons living in 121 settlements in Baghdad, on public land or in public buildings.¹²⁴⁷ These people face very harsh living conditions and are at risk of eviction at any moment by the authorities, as they are illegally occupying land.¹²⁴⁸

Summary

The levels of violence in Iraq have declined from that experienced at the height of the conflict in 2006 and 2007. However, while the violence appears to have stabilized, is still at a high level and continues to affect a large number of Iraqis.¹²⁴⁹

As described above, based on information known and available to UNHCR as at 18 March 2012, the situation in certain areas, principally in central Iraq, continues to be affected by: (i) significant

numbers of civilian casualties; (ii) frequent security incidents; and (iii) significant numbers of persons who remain displaced. Consequently, Iraqi asylum-seekers who do not meet the 1951 Convention criteria and who were formerly residing in governorates, districts, cities, towns, villages or neighbourhoods where, at the time of adjudication of the asylum claim, high levels and a high intensity of violence continue to be reported, are, for reason of the foreseen impact on the individual concerned, likely to be in need of complementary forms of protection on the basis of a fear of serious and indiscriminate harm arising from that violence.

Information on the levels, intensity and impact of violence in an asylum-seeker's governorate, district, city, town, village or neighbourhood of origin is needed to assess the possible protection needs of persons found not to meet the 1951 Convention refugee criteria under broader international protection criteria. The current situation in Iraq does not allow for generalised conclusions in this regard on the basis of broad geographic distinctions. Therefore, adjudicators will need to assess on a case-by-case basis whether an individual asylum-seeker who has been found not to meet the refugee criteria of the 1951 Convention will run a risk of serious and indiscriminate harm upon return. In doing so, the principle of the shared burden of proof¹²⁵⁰ requires that both the asylum-seeker and the adjudicator make every reasonable effort to provide specific and up-to-date information on the situation in the asylum-seeker's former place of residence to support their position.

C. Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative

A detailed analytical framework for assessing the availability of an internal flight or relocation alternative (IFA/IRA) is contained in the UNHCR *Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*.¹²⁵¹

Individuals at Risk of Persecution

In order for an IFA/IRA to be a relevant consideration in any given case, the individual(s) concerned should not be in need of international refugee protection in the area concerned, and it must be found to be accessible. If these conditions are met, and an IFA is accordingly deemed to be relevant, a reasonableness test must be applied. This might be the case for individuals from southern and central Iraq, for example, for whom it must be determined whether they have an IFA in the KRG.

Whether an IFA/IRA is "reasonable" must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking fully into account not only the personal circumstances of the individual, but also the security, human rights and humanitarian situation in the prospective area of relocation at the time of decision. To this end, the following elements, amongst others, need to be taken into account: (i) the availability of traditional support mechanisms, such as communities, relatives and/or friends able to host the displaced individuals; (ii) the availability of basic infrastructure and access to essential services, such as sanitation, health care and education; (iii) livelihood opportunities, as well as (iv) the scale of displacement in the area of prospective relocation.

In the context of Iraq, UNHCR's analysis distinguishes between the situation in the central governorates, the southern governorates, and the three northern governorates (Kurdistan Region). The availability of an IFA/IRA in the latter area would also depend on whether the individual concerned is from the central or southern Governorates, or from within the three northern governorates themselves.

a) IFA in the Kurdistan Region

A large number of persons from the central governorates have found refuge in the three northern governorates since 2006.¹²⁵² Commensurate with the sharp decrease in new displacements generally, the flow of new arrivals has decreased significantly;¹²⁵³ however, only a few of those previously

displaced have to date returned to their places of origin. The influx of IDPs has had an important impact on the host communities, including increasing housing and rental prices, additional pressure on already strained public services and concerns about security and demographic shifts. At the same time, the three northern governorates have also benefited from the migration of professionals bringing skills and disposable incomes that boost the local economy. Unskilled IDPs have provided a source of affordable labour for the construction industry.

The KRG authorities continue to implement stringent controls on the presence of persons not originating from the Kurdistan Region. Depending on the applicant, particularly his/her ethnic and political profile, he/she may not be allowed to relocate to or take up legal residence in the three northern governorates for security, political or demographic reasons. Others may be able to enter and legalize their stay, but may fear continued persecution as they may still be within reach of the actors of persecution or face undue hardship. Therefore, despite the hospitable attitude of the KRG authorities towards a considerable number of IDPs, the availability of an IFA/IRA must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the following factors:

i. Relevance

Agent of Persecution

For individuals fleeing a state agent of persecution in the Kurdistan Region, UNHCR considers that no IFA is possible elsewhere in the Kurdistan Region, as the agent of persecution would be able to pursue the individual throughout the territory.

A person from central or southern Iraq may be out of reach of his/her persecutors if relocated to the Kurdistan Region as the state protection of the Kurdish authorities may be triggered. This may occur only if the person is both admitted to the Kurdistan Region and allowed to legally remain there and if the Kurdish authorities are able and willing to provide protection in the individual case. Generally, the Kurdish authorities will be able and willing to provide protection; however, certain persons, particularly those who fear harm as a result of traditional practices and religious norms of a persecutory nature – such as women and children with specific profiles and LGBTI individuals – may still be reached by their persecutors if relocated within Iraq. Further, large segments of society and conservative elements in the KRG public administration endorse such norms, which would militate against the availability of an IFA/IRA for some cases in the Kurdistan Region.

Practical, Safe and Legal Access to the Kurdistan Region

In terms of access, roads between the Kurdistan Region and central Iraq cannot be considered safe. Roads from Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah to Kirkuk or Mosul are generally only safe when under the protection of the KRG forces, although attacks on civilians and security forces in areas under their control have also occurred.¹²⁵⁴ Roads that are not under the control of Kurdish forces are unpredictable and have reportedly been the site of a high numbers of attacks.¹²⁵⁵ There are several official checkpoints between the central part of the country and the KRG-administered area. There are also random checkpoints set up depending on the security situation. Further, the borders of the Kurdistan Region, including between its own governorates, have been observed to close without advance warning due to security concerns. Other areas along the unofficial border have been heavily mined in the past decade and are regularly patrolled by Kurdish Security Forces. Such conditions make it nearly impossible for persons to cross into the three northern governorates through the countryside without danger. Therefore, entry through the major roads and their checkpoints is, practically, the only option available to most Iraqis seeking to enter the Kurdistan Region. In addition, there are regular flights from Baghdad and Basrah to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, but a one-way ticket from Baghdad to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah costs 101,000 Iraqi Dinars (approximately US\$85), an amount many Iraqis are not able to afford. Travelling from Baghdad or Basrah to Erbil or Sulaymaniyah by air is considered fairly safe and there have been no recent security incidents involving civilian aircraft. There have been infrequent indirect fire attacks on or near the Baghdad and Basrah airports, causing no casualties.¹²⁵⁶

Since the fall of the former regime, the KRG authorities are very vigilant about who enters the Kurdistan Region and have introduced strict security measures at their checkpoints.¹²⁵⁷ However, there are no official and publicly accessible regulations concerning procedures and practices at the entry checkpoints into the Kurdistan Region. An *ad hoc* and often inconsistent approach can be expected in terms of who is granted access, varying not only from governorate to governorate, but also from checkpoint to checkpoint. The approach at a particular checkpoint may be influenced by several factors including the overall security situation, the particular checkpoint and its staff, the instructions issued on that day and the particular governorate where the checkpoint is situated. UNHCR has repeatedly sought to obtain information and clarification from the KRG authorities on checkpoint practices and entry/residence in the Kurdistan Region, without success.¹²⁵⁸ Therefore, persons seeking to relocate to the Kurdistan Region depend on informal information with regard to entry procedures.

Individuals / families wishing to enter the Kurdistan Region can seek to obtain a tourist, work or residence card. The tourist card, which is commonly given to persons from central and southern Iraq who seek to enter the Kurdistan Region, allows the holder to stay for up to 30 days. Depending on the person's profile, but also the checkpoint and the officer in charge, persons seeking to enter as tourists may be required to produce a sponsor.¹²⁵⁹ Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds from the disputed areas are usually requested to have a sponsor, while Kurds (not from the disputed areas) and Christians are able to enter without a sponsor.

Alternatively, persons who have a proof of employment (letter of appointment) can obtain a work card, which is valid for 10-15 days and is, in principle, renewable.¹²⁶⁰ Persons seeking to stay more than 30 days should in principle obtain a residence card. Long-term stays always require a sponsor.¹²⁶¹ UNHCR is not aware of any IDPs who have received the residence card.

The sponsorship process lacks clarity and there is no uniform procedure in place. In some cases, the sponsor is required to be physically present at the checkpoint to secure the person's entry. In other cases, it seems to suffice that a person seeking to relocate to the Kurdistan Region produces a letter notarized by a court clerk attesting to the person's connection to the sponsor. In some cases, the officer at the checkpoint will simply make a phone call to the sponsor to verify the acquaintance. Iraqis without sufficiently strong ties to the Kurdistan Region and who, therefore, are unable to find a sponsor, may be denied entry into the Kurdistan Region.¹²⁶² There are reportedly also different requirements as to the nature of the sponsor.¹²⁶³

UNHCR is aware of individuals who have been refused entry into the Kurdistan Region. Arabs, Turkmen and certain profiles of Kurds¹²⁶⁴ will likely face extensive questioning and may be denied entry at the checkpoint, mostly due to security concerns. In particular, single Arab males, including minors, are likely either to be denied entry into the Kurdistan Region or to be allowed entry only after a lengthy administrative procedure and heavy interrogation.¹²⁶⁵ Checkpoints reportedly maintain "blacklists" of individuals banned from entering the Kurdistan Region, including those considered a security risk, but also those who have previously overstayed or did not renew their residence permits. Christians, especially those who fled due to targeted attacks, reportedly do not face difficulties in entering the Kurdistan Region.¹²⁶⁶

Persons not originating from one of the three northern governorates intending to remain in the Kurdistan Region for more than 30 days must approach the neighbourhood security station (*Asayish*) in the area of relocation to obtain a permit to stay ("information card" or *karti zaniyari*).¹²⁶⁷ As with the entry procedures, there are no official rules or regulations concerning the issuance of information cards. Generally, in all three governorates, a sponsor is required in order to obtain the information card.¹²⁶⁸ This means that those that were able to enter without a sponsor are, at this stage, obliged to find a sponsor. Families, provided they have a sponsor from the governorate concerned and the necessary personal documentation,¹²⁶⁹ are usually able to secure the information card. Single people apparently face more difficulties. Persons who do not have a sponsor will not be able to regularize their continued stay and may be forced to leave.¹²⁷⁰

Persons fleeing persecution at the hands of the KRG or the ruling parties will almost always not be able to find protection in another part of the Kurdistan Region. Persons fleeing persecution at the hands of non-state actors (e.g. family/tribe in the case of fear from “honour killing” or blood feud) may still be within reach of their persecutors. The same applies for persons fearing persecution by armed Islamist groups.

ii. Reasonableness

Shelter remains one of the main priorities for all Iraqis.¹²⁷¹ Access to adequate, affordable **housing** in the Kurdistan Region is restricted by the fact that in all three governorates, non-Kurdish IDPs do not have the right to purchase or own property. IDPs may rent property provided that they have successfully registered with the Kurdish Security Forces and that they have the financial means to pay rent (which is increasingly high).¹²⁷² According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), rents can be as high as US\$500 per month, requiring at least two members of a family to be fully employed.¹²⁷³ The majority of IDPs live in rented housing,¹²⁷⁴ and others live with host families,¹²⁷⁵ in public buildings¹²⁷⁶ or improvised dwellings made from mud or scrap materials.¹²⁷⁷ IDPs living in improvised dwellings cite health problems in particular.¹²⁷⁸ Some Christian IDPs have also found temporary shelter in churches and monasteries.¹²⁷⁹

UNHCR received information that single people, especially women, are for cultural reasons not allowed to rent houses on their own.

Although the overall **food** security situation in Iraq has improved in recent years, most Iraqis continue to rely on food provided through the Public Distribution System.¹²⁸⁰ In the Kurdistan Region, where costs of living are high, access to the Public Distribution System is crucial.¹²⁸¹ While in the past, a temporary transfer of food rations from the place of origin to the place of displacement (except for persons originating from the disputed areas) was possible at least for some IDPs,¹²⁸² UNHCR was informed that this temporary system had been stopped as of November 2011 based on instructions received by the Ministry of Trade in Baghdad.¹²⁸³ As a result, IDPs in the Kurdistan Region do not have access to their food rations through the Public Distribution System, meaning that they are forced to spend a high portion of their income on food, often leaving them without other essential items such as fuel or furniture.¹²⁸⁴

Access to **education** for IDP children is hampered for a variety of reasons.¹²⁸⁵ IDP children can generally enrol in schools provided their families are registered with the security department and have obtained an “information card” (see above). As outlined, this generally requires the IDP family to have a sponsor. A major challenge is the shortage of Arabic-language schools for the mostly Arabic-speaking IDP children from central and southern Iraq.¹²⁸⁶ While the language barrier is less pronounced for young children, who can more easily adopt a new language, older children face more difficulties in continuing their studies.¹²⁸⁷ In order to access the few Arabic schools, families must pay extra for transportation in order to send their children to school and some families cannot afford to do so.¹²⁸⁸ In addition, a general problem in primary and secondary schools in the Kurdistan Region is overcrowding. In many locations, schools have to run two or even three shifts in order to accommodate the students.¹²⁸⁹ This is also likely to affect the quality of education and in particular make it difficult to follow-up on children with specific needs.¹²⁹⁰ Differences in the curricula can also be an obstacle, especially for students.¹²⁹¹ Pupils and students may also face difficulties with the transfer of education documents.¹²⁹² Many IDP children are deprived of the right to education due to poverty, and are compelled to work in the informal labour market in order to help their families.¹²⁹³

Only persons registered with the Kurdish Security Forces have access to **employment**,¹²⁹⁴ which, as outlined above, means that they generally must have a sponsor.¹²⁹⁵ Access to employment may also prove difficult for persons with no family, tribal or political connections in the Kurdistan Region. Access to employment, in particular in the public sector, often requires tribal links or affiliation with the Kurdistan Democratic Party or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, respectively.¹²⁹⁶ Single women often depend on their family/tribe to support them economically. Those single women who do not

have such support face great difficulties in accessing employment. IDPs are generally more affected by unemployment than the rest of the population, having left behind their sources of income and moved to areas where their skills might not be marketable.¹²⁹⁷ In addition, employees in the Kurdistan Region are usually required to speak Kurdish, limiting access to employment for non-Kurdish speakers.¹²⁹⁸ For these reasons, employment is a top challenge for many IDPs.¹²⁹⁹ While skilled professionals such as professors or doctors have easily been integrated into the local economy, other IDPs often work on a day-to-day basis with irregular, low incomes.¹³⁰⁰ Many IDPs reportedly also face difficulties in accessing pensions they received at their former place of residence.¹³⁰¹ Difficulty in finding employment was a major reason why a significant number of Christian IDPs displaced to the Kurdistan Region in late 2010/early 2011 subsequently moved abroad or, to a lesser extent, returned to their places of origin.¹³⁰²

IDPs, irrespective of whether or not they registered with the Kurdish Security Forces, have access to the public **health** system in all three governorates of the Kurdistan Region; however, they may in practice often find it difficult to access adequate services. Primary health care centers often do not have adequate supplies and sufficient staffing,¹³⁰³ especially in remote areas, and there is a general shortage of female medical staff and medical services for women. Another common problem is lack of access to medicine and/or poor quality of medication. In particular, medication for chronic diseases is reportedly often in short supply.¹³⁰⁴ Often, medication of low quality is sold in unlicensed pharmacies.¹³⁰⁵ Furthermore, the public hospitals are often overcrowded and although all persons have the right to receive treatments available there, waiting times are long. Sometimes the only solution to receive necessary surgery or treatment in time is to turn to private health care institutions, which are often not affordable for IDPs.¹³⁰⁶

IDPs will often tend to relocate to areas where they will find religious or ethnic homogeneity or where they have pre-existing tribal or family links,¹³⁰⁷ which will support them in finding housing and employment. For example, Christian IDPs will likely choose to relocate to an area where there is already a Christian community and where they may be able to receive some community support, e.g., from the church.¹³⁰⁸ Single women and female heads of household may face particular difficulties to access employment and livelihood opportunities without a family/community support network. Vulnerable groups such as female-headed households and separated children, as well as children engaged in labour, are particularly prone to poverty and have, in some cases, been exposed to trafficking and other abuses.¹³⁰⁹

b) Summary for IFA/IRA in the Kurdistan Region

UNHCR generally considers that IFA/IRA in the Kurdistan Region is not relevant for many Iraqis due to the accessibility issues outlined above. In addition, IFA/IRA in the Kurdistan Region is not reasonable for many Iraqis due to difficulties in accessing livelihood opportunities, affordable housing, education, and food through the Public Distribution System. Persons fleeing persecution emanating from state or non-state actors from the Kurdistan Region will generally not be able to find protection in another part of the Kurdistan Region.

a) IFA in Southern and Central Iraq

i. Relevance

Agents of Persecution

With respect to individuals fleeing a state agent of persecution in southern and central Iraq, it is UNHCR's assessment that an IFA/IRA is not available, as the agent of persecution would be able to pursue the individual throughout the territory.

As indicated in these Guidelines, persecution primarily emanates from a range of non-state actors.¹³¹⁰ Armed groups reportedly have operatives in many parts of the country and, as a result, a viable IFA/IRA will likely not exist for individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups in southern and central Iraq. As reported throughout these Guidelines, armed groups are present in many parts of the country and have demonstrated mobility in accessing areas where they do not have strongholds.¹³¹¹ The mobility and reach of armed groups should not be underestimated in determining the relevance of an IFA/IRA. Persons seeking to relocate to other areas in central and southern Iraq may be at risk of facing renewed violence given the high levels of violence prevailing in many areas.¹³¹² UNHCR protection monitoring shows that lack of physical safety remains a concern for both IDPs and returnees, particularly in the central governorates.¹³¹³ Reports have been received of returnees being targeted because they do not belong to the majority sect in their area of return. In some cases, these attacks have been fatal.¹³¹⁴ The presence of IDPs can at times result in tensions with host communities that consider them a destabilizing factor.¹³¹⁵

Generally, protection by national authorities will not be available given that the national authorities have as yet limited capacity to enforce law and order. Members of the ISF and the judiciary are themselves a major target of attacks and are reportedly prone to corruption and infiltration.¹³¹⁶

The prevalence of ethno-religious violence in the “disputed areas”, compounded by land and property disputes, high unemployment and drought,¹³¹⁷ need to be considered when assessing the availability of an IFA/IRA in these governorates (i.e. Kirkuk, Ninewa, parts of Diyala and Salah Al-Din Governorates). Further, reports have been received that IDPs relocating to the disputed areas may be subjected to discrimination, harassment and threats.¹³¹⁸

For categories of individuals who fear harm as a result of traditional practices and religious norms of a persecutory nature – such as women¹³¹⁹ and children¹³²⁰ with specific profiles, victims of trafficking,¹³²¹ and LGBTI individuals¹³²² – and for whom internal relocation to another part of central and southern Iraq may be relevant, the endorsement of such norms by large segments of society and powerful conservative elements in the Iraqi public administration as well as the continued presence of armed groups with extremist or highly conservative leanings militate against the availability of an IFA/IRA in southern and central Iraq.

Travel by road within the central and southern governorates remains dangerous, especially at night.¹³²³ Roadside bombings¹³²⁴ and shootings,¹³²⁵ robberies,¹³²⁶ kidnappings¹³²⁷ and carjackings¹³²⁸ seem to remain daily occurrences, in addition to attacks on civilian, government and military vehicles on roads and highways in both urban and rural areas throughout the country.¹³²⁹ Travelling prior to or during religious festivities also involves a heightened risk as armed groups are said to aim at launching mass casualty attacks on Shi’ite pilgrims on the road.¹³³⁰ Military operations among armed groups and the ISF/Sahwa continue mainly in the central governorates. Travelling is reportedly often impaired and delayed by ISF/Sahwa checkpoints and convoys, where there is also an increased risk of being harmed given the frequent targeting of the ISF/Sahwa.¹³³¹ False checkpoints have also reportedly been erected to stage attacks.¹³³² Freedom of movement is also impacted by checks at governorate borders, sometimes reportedly resulting in arrests.¹³³³ Moving near official government or military/police convoys is said to be particularly dangerous as they are a frequent target of armed groups, including by roadside bombs and “sticky bombs” attached under vehicles.¹³³⁴ There have also been incidents reported of roadside bombs hitting public buses or “sticky bombs” being placed inside buses or taxis¹³³⁵ or bombings at bus terminals.¹³³⁶ Movement may further be limited by curfews and vehicle bans, which can be enforced at short notice.¹³³⁷ Travel by air from Baghdad International Airport is said to have improved. No recent attacks on civilian aircraft have been reported,¹³³⁸ but there are reports of infrequent indirect fire attacks on or near the Baghdad and Basrah airports.¹³³⁹ Attacks also occur regularly on the road between Baghdad and Baghdad International Airport.¹³⁴⁰

ii. Reasonableness

Lack of access to essential services such as food, drinking water, sanitation, electricity, education and health care, as well as the lack of work opportunities and adequate shelter are said to remain obstacles

for persons seeking to relocate to another part of central or southern Iraq. In the disputed areas, service provision may be hampered by administrative ambiguity as a result of disputed authority between the KRG and the central Iraqi authorities.¹³⁴¹ Access to public services such as food through the Public Distribution System, health and education may also be hampered by the fact that many displaced persons are frequently reported to lack the necessary **documentation**. The most common personal status documents reported to be missing are social welfare registration papers, civil identification cards, Public Distribution System cards, housing cards,¹³⁴² nationality certificates, as well as marriage and divorce, birth and death certificates.¹³⁴³ The lack of critical documentation also appears to compromise IDP protection. Lack of personal identification documents restricts freedom of movement and also may put displaced persons at risk of arbitrary arrest. Access to employment is also restricted for those without proper documentation, as employers require a civil identification card.

Housing is a main priority for all Iraqis,¹³⁴⁴ but even more so for IDPs.¹³⁴⁵ Most IDPs rent homes,¹³⁴⁶ often at high and increasing costs,¹³⁴⁷ but many others are reported to live in improvised buildings made from mud, sticks, and oil canisters, find a place with or near host families, or settle in public buildings.¹³⁴⁸ Displacement resulted in the development of informal housing settlements.¹³⁴⁹ Nearly half a million Iraqis – comprised of IDPs, returnees and squatters – are reported to remain in more than 382 settlements throughout the country, including 121 settlements in Baghdad, on public land or in public buildings.¹³⁵⁰ Public buildings and settlements are often reported to be overcrowded and to lack sanitation services, drinkable water, and electricity.¹³⁵¹ As illegal settlements are not connected to regular networks, IDPs apparently often resort to illegal tapping of water and electricity supplies, which in turn results in tensions with local communities. Further, illegal tapping often causes sewage to enter the water pipes, contaminating the water supply and causing health problems.¹³⁵² Those living in public buildings are reportedly at risk of eviction and secondary displacement at any moment.¹³⁵³ Despite a December 2010 decision by the CoR to suspend evictions and demolition of informal settlements, it is reported that evictions continue.¹³⁵⁴ UNHCR is aware of 45 camps and settlements in central and southern Iraq where residents are under threat of eviction,¹³⁵⁵ including 13 in Baghdad. After the passage of the annual budget in late February 2012, evictions are expected to increase as the central and local authorities will, according to reports, start to implement infrastructure projects and therefore may need to “clear” illegal camps and settlements.¹³⁵⁶ Those evicted may, if no alternative solution is found for them, end up in a situation of secondary displacement. Other informal settlements are said to have been established on private land.¹³⁵⁷ IDP stay there is precarious, as it is fully dependent on the landowners’ goodwill. Several IDP families have reportedly recently received eviction orders or had their settlements demolished.¹³⁵⁸ Temporary settlements, including mud houses, may also be prone to damage or collapse as a result of storms or flooding.¹³⁵⁹

Access to **food**¹³⁶⁰ is consistently mentioned as a priority concern by IDPs¹³⁶¹ and returnees.¹³⁶² While the overall food security situation in Iraq has improved in recent years, many Iraqis are still food insecure and rely on the Public Distribution System,¹³⁶³ which provides them, in principle, with essential items on a monthly basis.¹³⁶⁴ Displaced persons often face difficulties in accessing their monthly food rations through the Public Distribution System, especially if they move to another governorate.¹³⁶⁵ Persons originating from or relocating to a disputed area are not able to transfer their Public Distribution System registration to another place pending a settlement of the areas’ status in line with Article 140 of the Constitution. A third of IDPs interviewed by UNHCR in late 2009 did not have a Public Distribution System card valid in their governorate of residence, and only 15 per cent of those with a card reported receiving their full monthly entitlement. Those who do have access to the Public Distribution System have this apparently on an irregular basis, once every few months, and often report receiving only part of the food rations with several items missing that they then need to purchase from expensive local markets.¹³⁶⁶ A number of areas, mainly in Ninewa and Salah Al-Din,¹³⁶⁷ have experienced severe drought and related **water** scarcity and loss of livelihood, reportedly resulting in displacement, including secondary displacement of IDPs.¹³⁶⁸

Access to **education**¹³⁶⁹ in southern and central Iraq has reportedly been severely impacted by years of conflict.¹³⁷⁰ Given the often high number of youth and children among the IDP population,¹³⁷¹

access to education is of major importance for their future employment and livelihood opportunities. However, access to education is reportedly often fraught with additional difficulties for those in displacement, resulting in a higher percentage of children out of school than among the general population.¹³⁷² Obstacles are reported to include inability to afford school supplies or transportation costs, and, in the case of girls, a perception that education is of less importance.¹³⁷³ Other children are reportedly required to support their families through work.¹³⁷⁴ IDP children may also face difficulties related to social and cultural differences in the place of displacement, e.g., in case where they have relocated from an urban to a more rural or conservative area. Those who are able to access schooling are often confronted with shortages of teachers, crowded classrooms and poor infrastructure.¹³⁷⁵ Children in informal settlements often are reported not to have systematic access to education.¹³⁷⁶

Access to **health care**¹³⁷⁷ is reported to be another priority for IDPs, especially women and children, who as a result of “[T]he stress of long periods of displacement, substandard living conditions, insufficient diet, and poor sanitation“ may face a number of health issues.¹³⁷⁸ Access to health services is said to be particularly difficult in rural areas where many IDPs are located.¹³⁷⁹

Unemployment is a major concern for IDPs, who as a result of displacement have often lost their source of income.¹³⁸⁰ Their skills may not be marketable in the area of displacement¹³⁸¹ and IDPs may lack the affiliations or links required to secure employment in the area of relocation. Competition over jobs may also result in tension with the host community.¹³⁸² Often IDPs, and sometimes their children, have been reported to engage in temporary and often unreliable employment as day labourers or street sellers in order to make a living.¹³⁸³ Unemployment is consistently reported to be higher among IDPs compared to the general population, and this is particularly true for those residing in informal settlements.¹³⁸⁴ Of particular concern is the situation of female-headed households,¹³⁸⁵ for whom access to employment is reportedly even more problematic, especially in conservative areas and in areas where local customs differ from those in their area of origin.¹³⁸⁶ Those that find work allegedly often work under harsh conditions, e.g., in the agricultural sector.¹³⁸⁷ Many female heads of household have to rely on often irregular assistance from relatives, charities and others.¹³⁸⁸ Female heads of households are also often victims of physical and emotional violence and are particularly vulnerable to further displacement.¹³⁸⁹

Common ethnic or religious backgrounds and existing tribal and family ties in the area of relocation are crucial when assessing the availability of an IFA/IRA, as these generally ensure a certain level of community protection and access to services.¹³⁹⁰ This is true for both towns and rural areas, where newcomers, particularly when they do not belong to the sect, tribes or families present there, may be discriminated against. Even those originating from the area may be perceived as newcomers, if they have lost all links with their community. Further, an IFA/IRA to an area with a predominantly different ethnic or religious demography may also not be possible due to latent or overt tensions between groups. This can be particularly the case for Sunnis in predominantly Shi’ite areas, and vice versa, especially if the demographic make-up of the areas has changed as a result of previous sectarian violence.¹³⁹¹ Also, members of religious minority groups such as Christians or Yazidis should not be expected to relocate to an area with no presence of members of the same religious community that would allow for a certain level of support.

b) Summary for IFA/IRA in Southern and Central Iraq

In light of the above, UNHCR generally considers that even in cases where an IFA/IRA could be relevant because the agents of persecution are non-state agents whose reach does not extend to a proposed IFA/IRA area in southern and central Iraq, an IFA/IRA may not be a reasonable option in most cases.

In many cases, the application of an IFA/IRA would result in internal displacement within Iraq, adding to the already significant number of IDPs in the country.¹³⁹² Access to education, employment, healthcare, housing, electricity, water and food is of concern to many Iraqis, but even more so for persons displaced from their habitual place of residence, who would likely be cut off from their source of income and traditional social networks. In addition, an individual could not reasonably be expected to relocate to an unsafe area. Depending on the area, IDPs may also be exposed to targeted and/or generalized violence, criminality or landmines/UXOs. Areas already hosting large numbers of IDPs are prone to tensions between the IDPs and the host community over scarce resources, housing and land disputes and rising prices.

Reports of insecurity, problematic living conditions and lack of documentation in southern and central Iraq militate against the availability of an IFA/IRA. Further, relocation to an area with a predominantly different ethnic or religious demographic is not reasonable due to latent or overt tensions between ethnic or religious groups. This can be particularly the case when considering relocation of Sunnis to predominantly Shi'ite areas or vice versa.

Individuals Fleeing the Indiscriminate Effects of Violence

When assessing the relevance of an IFA/IRA for those individuals having fled the indiscriminate effects of violence in Iraq and who are not eligible for protection according to the 1951 Convention, the area of prospective IFA/IRA has to be practically, safely and legally accessible. It is of particular importance to consider: (i) the concrete prospects of safely accessing areas of Iraq not affected by the generalized violence, including by assessing the risks associated with the widespread use of IEDs and bombings throughout the territory and attacks taking place on busy roads; and (ii) the volatility and fluidity of the conflict in terms of the difficulty of identifying potential safe zones. The elements outlined above for individuals at risk of persecution should be taken into consideration when applying the reasonableness test.

D. Exclusion from International Refugee Protection

In light of the serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law reported during Iraq's long history of conflicts and repression, exclusion considerations under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention may arise in individual claims by Iraqi asylum-seekers. Exclusion considerations may be triggered if there are elements in the applicant's claim that suggest that he or she may have been associated with or involved in the commission of criminal acts that fall within the scope of Article 1F. Given the potentially serious consequences of exclusion from international refugee protection, exclusion clauses need to be applied on the basis of a full assessment of the circumstances of the individual case.¹³⁹³

Potential exclusion due to involvement in the commission of war crimes¹³⁹⁴ in situations of both international¹³⁹⁵ and non-international armed conflict,¹³⁹⁶ crimes against humanity,¹³⁹⁷ and serious non-political crimes¹³⁹⁸ are of particular relevance in the context of Iraq.¹³⁹⁹ Acts reportedly committed by the parties to the armed conflict in Iraq¹⁴⁰⁰ include, *inter alia*, abductions and enforced disappearances; indiscriminate attacks on civilians; forced displacement; torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; murder, including political assassinations; mass killings; extrajudicial and summary executions; and forced recruitment for commission of terrorist acts and/or labour, including recruitment of children.

For exclusion to be justified, individual responsibility must be established in relation to a crime within the scope of Article 1F. Such responsibility may flow from a person having committed or participated in the commission of a criminal act, or on the basis of command/superior responsibility for persons in positions of authority. Adjudicators considering exclusion also need to review defenses to criminal responsibility, if any, as well as considerations related to proportionality. As such, mere membership in government security forces, political parties or armed groups is not a sufficient basis in itself to exclude an individual from refugee status, particularly in light of the documented practices of forced recruitment, including of children, and the widespread membership in the former Ba'ath Party. It is necessary to consider whether the individual concerned was personally involved in acts of violence or other excludable acts, or knowingly contributed in a substantial manner to such acts. A credible explanation regarding the individual's non-involvement with, or disassociation from, any excludable acts should, absent reliable evidence to the contrary, remove the individual from the scope of the exclusion clauses.

In the context of Iraq, exclusion considerations may arise in the cases of asylum-seekers with certain backgrounds and profiles. Careful consideration needs to be given in particular to the following profiles: (i) members of the former regime of Saddam Hussein, including its armed forces (in particular elite troops and paramilitary forces), the police, the security and intelligence apparatus, and the judiciary; (ii) members of armed groups opposing the former regime of Saddam Hussein; (iii) members of the current ISF, the Iraqi government, the Kurdish Security Forces, as well as members of the Sahwa; (iv) members of armed groups; and (v) members of criminal gangs.

Members of the Former Regime (1979 – 2003)

Members of the military, paramilitary, police and security services, as well as high-ranking government officials during the former regime are known to have been involved in various acts which may give rise to the application of Article 1F. These acts include, but are not limited to: (i) war crimes committed during the First Gulf War against Iran, including the summary execution of Iranian prisoners of war and the use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers;¹⁴⁰¹ (ii) destruction of 5,000 Kurdish Iraqi villages, mass deportation and killings of 180,000 Kurdish civilians, culminating in the *Anfal* campaign against the Kurds and use of prohibited chemical weapons against civilians in 1987-88;¹⁴⁰² (iii) the forced expulsion of non-Arab citizens from Kirkuk and other oil-rich areas as part of the *Arabization* campaign;¹⁴⁰³ (iv) the killing, forced deportation, expropriation and denaturalization of Faili Kurds in 1980;¹⁴⁰⁴ (v) crimes committed in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait (August 1990 - February 1991), including torture and killing of hundreds of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals;¹⁴⁰⁵ (vi) the systematic drainage of the marsh areas (along with bombing raids, torture, disappearances and mass executions) and the consequent destruction of the economic, social and cultural base of the Marsh Arabs after the 1991 Gulf War;¹⁴⁰⁶ (vii) the former regime's repression of the Shi'ite population including "systematic assassinations, attacks and threats carried out against the Shi'a leadership";¹⁴⁰⁷ (viii) violent suppression of the 1991 uprisings by Shi'ites and Kurds;¹⁴⁰⁸ (ix) systematic abuse of political opponents, including through summary and arbitrary executions, torture and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment (for example amputations and mutilations for ordinary criminal offenses), and enforced or involuntary disappearances.¹⁴⁰⁹

Members of Armed Groups Opposing the Former Regime (1979 – 2003)

Crimes committed by various political groups and in particular their armed wings involved in violent resistance against the former regime of Saddam Hussein (e.g. Kurdish *Peshmerga*,¹⁴¹⁰ Badr Corps, Dawa Party) and mostly directed against government officials and institutions would also need to be assessed in light of the exclusion clauses. Article 1F(b) would be most relevant in this regard, as the acts in question may have been disproportionate to the alleged political objectives. Similar considerations would apply with regard to serious human rights violations committed against civilians and Kurdistan Democratic Party / Patriotic Union of Kurdistan officials by Kurdish Islamist groups¹⁴¹¹ opposed to the ruling Kurdish parties after 1991.¹⁴¹²

Members of the ISF, the Iraqi Government, the Kurdish Security Forces and members of the Sahwa (since 2003)

Reports suggest that members of the ISF, the Kurdish Security Forces, the Sahwa, as well as senior Iraqi Government officials serving since 2003, may have been involved in various acts which could give rise to the application of Article 1F. These acts include, but are not limited to: (i) extortion, arbitrary arrest, *incommunicado* detention, torture and ill-treatment, and summary or extrajudicial executions of civilians reportedly committed by parts of the ISF, including, *inter alia*, the Iraqi Police, the former Special Police Commandoes/Iraqi Federal Police, the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), and the Special Forces under the Prime Minister's Office; (ii) abductions, torture, extra-judicial killings and extortion of civilians by members of the Sahwa; (iii) forced displacement and ill-treatment of Arab, Turkmen, Yazidi, and other minorities in the disputed territories, as well as arbitrary arrests, *incommunicado* detention, torture and ill-treatment attributed to the Kurdish *Peshmerga*, security and intelligence agencies.

Members of Armed Groups (since 2003)

The applicability of the exclusion clauses is relevant in relation to individual members and the leadership of armed groups, including Islamic State of Iraq/Al-Qa'eda in Iraq, Ansar Al-Islam, Naqshbandi Army, Jaysh Al-Mahdi / Promised Day Brigades, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, and others.¹⁴¹³ Where there is sufficient evidence of their participation in serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, application of Article 1F may be appropriate. The pattern of indiscriminate and targeted attacks on civilians and security forces by these armed groups, which include roadside bombings, car and suicide bombings, summary executions, torture, and forcible displacement, is widely reported and outlined in these Guidelines. With respect to individuals perceived to be members of armed groups, combatants and armed elements should not be considered as asylum-seekers unless it is established that they have genuinely and permanently renounced military and armed activities, in view of the need to maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum.¹⁴¹⁴

Members of Criminal Groups (since 2003)

Exclusion considerations also arise with respect to members of criminal gangs, which at times may operate in cooperation with or on behalf of armed groups. The activities of such gangs reportedly include abductions, extortion, rape, murder, forced prostitution and (sex) trafficking.¹⁴¹⁵

¹ UNHCR, *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers*, April 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f569cf2.html>; UNHCR, *Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers*, 28 July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c4fed282.html>.

² These Guidelines are based on information available to UNHCR up to 18 March 2012, unless otherwise stated.

³ *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html>.

⁴ *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html>.

⁵ ICRC in its Annual Report for 2010 refers to Iraq as being in a situation of armed conflict (and has not withdrawn this qualification since then): "Despite improvements in the security situation, Iraq was still wracked by armed conflict. Armed violence, including bombings,

election-related incidents and attacks by armed groups, continued to kill, displace or otherwise affect people, disrupting the lives of many communities; minority groups were often singled out. “And further” All parties concerned were called upon publicly to respect IHL, notably its provisions prohibiting attacks targeting civilians and indiscriminate attacks”; ICRC, *Annual Report 2010 - Iraq*, p. 427, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/current/icrc-annual-report-2010-iraq.pdf>. See also ICRC, Overview of the ICRC's operations in 2012, 8 December 2011, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/appeals-2012-overview-2011-12-08.htm>.

⁶ “Central Iraq” refers to the Governorates of Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din. „Southern Iraq“ includes the Governorates of Babel, Basrah, Diwaniyah, Kerbala, Najef, Missan, Muthanna, Thi-Qar and Wassit. The *Kurdistan Region*, or the three Northern Governorates, encompasses the Governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.

⁷ The Iraqi parliamentary elections were held on 7 March 2010, with more than 12 million Iraqis taking part in the election process as candidates and voters. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's National Movement garnered 91 of the 325 seats compared to PM Al-Maliki's State of Law with 89. As none of the leading political blocs won an outright majority of seats in the 325-seat Council of Representatives (CoR), the constitutional process and power brokering over the formation of the new Government were prolonged. On 10 November 2010, a power-sharing agreement was reached (“Erbil Agreement”) by largely distributing power along sectarian/ethnic quotas. Under the agreement, the CoR elected Sunni Usama Al-Nujayfi as speaker and Kurd Jalal Talabani as president. President Talabani on 25 November 2010 officially reappointed Nouri Al-Maliki as prime minister. On 21 December 2010, the CoR voted in Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki's 42-member government, after more than nine months of stalemate since the elections took place. However, 13 positions were only filled temporarily due to ongoing disputes between the political factions. The CoR on 13 February 2011 approved several more ministers but key posts remained unfilled including the ministries of defence and interior. As part of the agreement, the CoR also lifted de-Baathification charges against three key Iraqiyya bloc leaders, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, who was appointed as one of three Deputy Prime Ministers. For an overview of the developments and the make-up of the major coalitions for the 2010 elections, see Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, pp. 8, 12-15, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>. See also Abeer Mohammed, *Sectarianism Stalls Key Iraqi Cabinet Appointments*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report No. 372, 31 March 2011, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/sectarianism-stalls-key-iraqi-cabinet-appointments>.

⁸ According to Ramzy Mardini, “Iraq's current political crisis stems from a buildup of unresolved political issues since the March 2010 election”; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 16 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>. See also Joost Hiltermann, *US troop withdrawal from Iraq*, Conservative Middle East Council, 5 December 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/ops/us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq.aspx>; International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. 18, 21, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>; Abeer Mohammed, *Sectarianism Stalls Key Iraqi Cabinet Appointments*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report No. 372, 31 March 2011, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/sectarianism-stalls-key-iraqi-cabinet-appointments>.

⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said about Prime Minister Al-Maliki and Iyad Allawi, leader of the cross-sectarian Iraqiyya coalition that won most votes in the 2010 elections, “[B]oth see the other as conspiring against them;” Jamie Tarabay, *As the U.S. Leaves Iraq, Shiites Determined to Hold Power*, The Atlantic, 21 December 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/as-the-us-leaves-iraq-shiites-determined-to-hold-power/250329/>. According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of the War, by mid December 2011 “(...) Iraqi politics had devolved to a level of mistrust not seen since the height of Iraq's sectarian conflict from 2005 to 2007”; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 16 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>.

¹⁰ This was evidenced during the current political crisis as Iraqiyya is divided over how to respond to the situation and Sunni political marginalization. Several Iraqiyya members of the CoR quit the bloc since the boycott of parliament began in mid December 2011, some of them established their own party (*Al-Wataniyun*). Also, three Iraqiyya ministers (Electricity, Industry and Provincial Affairs) continued to attend cabinet meetings in spite of the boycott; Tim Arango, *Iraq's Prime Minister Gains More Power After Political Crisis*, New York Times, 27 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/world/middleeast/maliki-wields-more-power-in-iraq-after-crisis.html>; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 15 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>; Sam Dagher, *Iraqi Crisis Ebbs as Sunnis Return to Cabinet*, Wall Street Journal, 8 February 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577209380861174426.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Al Arabiya, *Sunni-backed ministers end cabinet boycott but rifts remain*, 7 February 2012, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/07/193209.html>.

¹¹ PM Al-Maliki is particularly criticized for keeping the security ministries (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and State Ministry for National Security) unfilled. PM Al-Maliki has appointed loyal officials to run the ministries on an interim basis, but no permanent nominations have been made. Al-Maliki has also under his direct command the National Counter-Terrorism Force as well as the Baghdad Brigade (in charge of security in Baghdad), which report directly to his office rather than to the concerned security ministries. It has also been reported that Al-Maliki has used his position to appoint political allies in top security posts, fueling a sense of alienation among members of Iraqiyya in general, and Sunnis in particular; Michael Lipin, *Iraq's Sectarian Tensions Create Opportunities for Attacks*, VOA, 3 February 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/iraq/Iraqs-Sectarian-Tensions-Create-Opportunities-for-Attacks-138641804.html>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 16, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Testimony Of Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, Deputy Director, Institute For The Study Of War Before The Committee On Foreign Affairs Subcommittee On The Middle East And South Asia, United States House Of Representatives*, 23 June 2011, <http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/webcast/isw-deputy-director-marisa-sullivan-testifies-future-iraq>. According to Jason Gluck of the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), “[T]here's an incredible consolidation of power in the executive. The parliament has been rendered extremely feeble, with little ability to stand up to the executive;” Joel Brinkley, *Iraq outlook looks dim after pullout*, Politico, 26 February 2012, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73307.html>.

¹² As part of the power-sharing agreement of November 2010, the „Erbil Agreement“, the political factions reportedly agreed to establish a “National Council for Strategic Policies”, to be headed by Iyad Al-Allawi, and to distribute the security portfolios among the main blocs; however, from the onset, the political factions had different views of the council's functions and powers. Iyad Al-Allawi and his supporters wanted it to have an executive role in key areas such as national security that would serve as a counter-balance to the powers of the PM, whereas PM Al-Maliki intended it to have a mere advisory function. A law to create the Council was debated by the CoR, but has not been adopted to date. And while Iraqiyya obtained nine ministerial posts, including the key Finance Ministry, to date, no Minister of Defence has been appointed as PM Al-Maliki has rejected several Iraqiyya-supported candidates and reportedly insists that the post should be given to a Sunni, but not necessarily from Iraqiyya; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 16 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, pp. 13, 16, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Reidar Visser, *The Last Straw? Maliki*

Appoints Dulaymi as Acting Minister of Defence, Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 17 August 2011, <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/08/17/the-last-straw-maliki-appoints-dulaymi-as-acting-minister-of-defence/>; RFE/RL, *Iraqi Parliament Debates New 'Strategic Policy Council'*, 12 August 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_strategic_policy_council/24294945.html; Abeer Mohammed, *Sectarianism Stalls Key Iraqi Cabinet Appointments*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report No. 372, 31 March 2011; Reidar Visser, *The Apparent End of the Strategic Policy Council*, Iraq Business News, 4 March 2011, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/tag/national-council-on-strategic-policies/>; Bernard Gwertzmann, *A Tenuous Deal in Iraq*, Interview with Charles W. Dunne, Scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, Council on Foreign Relations, 18 November 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/tenuous-deal-iraq/p23443>.

¹³ Arrest campaigns and layoffs of alleged Ba'athists and members of the former security services are said to have furthered this perception and to have increased mistrust. In October and November 2011 alone, more than 600 individuals, most of them Sunnis, were reportedly arrested on often vague terrorism charges and allegations of ties with the former Ba'ath Party, reportedly all without arrest warrant. PM Al-Maliki is reported to have denied any sectarian or political motives behind the arrests, pointing out that both Shi'ites and Sunnis were arrested; however, the arrests were widely seen as attempts to consolidate power and marginalize political opponents as they were considered to have lacked legal consistency and transparency. According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, "[T]he lack of transparency and legal standards have damaged the credibility of the Maliki government and cast doubt on their intentions, intensifying sectarian tensions and local Sunni Arab movements toward federalism." Recent calls by Sunni Arabs in Al-Anbar, Salah Al-Din and Diyala Governorates to establish federal regions as foreseen in Article 119 of the Constitution, are meant as "a safeguard from Baghdad's authoritarian tendencies"; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 12 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf. See also "(Perceived) Political Opponents". Another longstanding issue between Sunnis and the Shi'ite-dominated government is the yet incomplete integration of the largely Sunni Sahwa forces into the ISF and civilian government employment, see below.

¹⁴ It was reported that, in adherence to the US-Iraq Security Agreement, which took effect on 1 January 2009, and the US troop drawdown plan outlined by US President Barack Obama on 27 February 2009, the USF-I withdrew its combat troops from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009, withdrew all combat troops from Iraq by 31 August 2010 and completed the withdrawal before the end of 2011. Throughout 2011, there were reports of intense negotiations to extend the US military presence beyond the December 2011 deadline; however, on 21 October 2011, the US announced the full withdrawal of its troops after the Iraqi Government reportedly refused to grant legal immunity to remaining US troops. For an overview of the protracted negotiations concerning an extension of US troops' presence in Iraq, see Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, pp. 21, 31-34, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

¹⁵ According to Kenneth Katzmann, "Iraq might be in the throes of its worst political crisis since the U.S. invasion of 2003, and it is possible that the Iraqi central government might unwind (...)"; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 22, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>. According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, "(...) a troubling political crisis emerged in Baghdad that has placed Iraq on a worrisome path that could potentially unravel and threaten its stability"; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 1*, Institute for the Study of War, 19 December 2011, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-post-withdrawal-crisis-update-1>. See also Charles Recknagel, *Violence Soars As Political Crisis Paralyzes Iraq*, RFE/RL, 27 January 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_violence_soars_explainer/24465203.html.

¹⁶ PM Al-Maliki called for a no confidence vote against Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al-Mutlaq after the latter called Al-Maliki a "dictator" in an interview with CNN. Al-Maliki referred to Article 78 of the 2005 Constitution as a basis for removing Mutlaq, which gives the prime minister the right to dismiss ministers in his cabinet with the "consent" of the CoR, which can be achieved by a majority of the lawmakers in attendance. However, the CoR did not reach a quorum because the Kurdish bloc decided not to participate in the session; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 16 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Arwa Damon, *Iraq's leader becoming a new 'dictator,' deputy warns*, CNN, 13 December 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-13/middleeast/world_meast_iraq-maliki_1_al-maliki-iraqi-prime-minister-nuri-shiite-and-minority-sunni?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST.

¹⁷ In mid-December 2011, government forces and tanks surrounded the residency of Sunni Vice President Tariq Al-Hashemi in Baghdad. Two of his bodyguards were reportedly beaten and detained. On 18 December 2011, Al-Hashemi boarded a plane at Baghdad airport to meet with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in Sulaymaniyah. He was removed from the plane by government forces but later allowed to travel to the Kurdistan Region. On 19 December 2011, Al-Hashemi's bodyguards in a televised appearance confessed to killings and bomb attacks, reportedly stating they had received orders from Al-Hashemi. On 19 December 2011, an arrest warrant was issued against Vice President Al-Hashemi and on 16 February 2012, a judicial panel, whose findings are not legally binding, stated reportedly that at least 150 attacks and assassinations against religious pilgrims, security officers and political opponents between 2005 and 2011 were linked to Al-Hashemi. Among other charges, the panel also holds Al-Hashemi's bodyguards responsible for a bombing in December 2011 on the Integrity Commission headquarters that killed 25 people and the assassination of a deputy education minister in 2010. Al-Hashemi and other senior Sunni leaders have not returned from the Kurdistan Region after the issuance of the arrest warrant and Masoud Barzani, the KRG President, reportedly refused to hand him over to the central authorities despite Al-Maliki's warning that there would be "problems" if they protected Al-Hashemi. Al-Hashemi rejected all the charges as „politically motivated“ and said that he did not feel safe to return to Baghdad where any trial would be compromised as a result of undue influence on the judiciary. Reportedly more than 50 members of Al-Hashemi's security and office staff are currently detained in Baghdad pending investigations relating to alleged terrorist acts; Jack Healy, *Iraqi Official Was Behind 150 Attacks, Judges Say*, New York Times, 16 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/middleeast/iraqi-vice-president-faces-new-accusations-of-violence.html>; Agencies, *Iraqi panel lays out charges against Hashemi*, 16 February 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/201221616142140730.html>; Sam Dagher, *Iraqi Crisis Ebbs as Sunnis Return to Cabinet*, Wall Street Journal, 8 February 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577209380861174426.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Barbara Surk, *Iraq's Sunni-backed ministers return to Cabinet*, AP, 7 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2012/02/07/international/i030543S05.DTL>; Martin Chulov, *Iraqi PM warns Kurds they must hand over Sunni vice-president*, Guardian, 21 December 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/21/iraqi-pm-kurds-sunni-vice-president>.

¹⁸ Barbara Surk, *Iraq's Sunni-backed ministers return to Cabinet*, AP, 7 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2012/02/07/international/i030543S05.DTL>; Michael S. Schmidt, *Rising Strife Threatens Tenuous Iraqi Stability*, New York Times, 22 January 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/middleeast/stability-in-iraq-threatened-amid-power-struggle.html>.

¹⁹ In January 2012, Iyad Al-Allawi of Iraqiyya publicly accused PM Al-Maliki of having arbitrarily arrested 1,000 members of other political parties over the past several months and holding them in incommunicado detention where they would be subjected to "brutal torture"; Roy Gutman, Sahar Issa And Laith Hammoudi, *Iraq's Maliki accused of detaining hundreds of political opponents*, McClatchy Newspapers, 19 January 2012, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/19/2597925/iraqs-maliki-accused-of-detaining.html>. On 20 January 2012, an ISF unit under direct command of the PM was reported to have arrested the Deputy Governor of Diyala, Ghadban Al-Khazraji,

also an Iraqiyya member, on terrorism charges. A second Deputy Governor, Jalal Al-Juburi, also from Iraqiyya, reportedly escaped arrest by relocating to the Kurdistan Region. Arrest warrants were reportedly also issued against two Iraqiyya provincial councillors, charging them with “terrorist activities”; AFP, *New arrests of Sunni leaders in Iraq political row*, 20 January 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/32217/World/Region/New-arrests-of-Sunni-leaders-in-Iraq-political-row.aspx>. On 19 January 2012, ISF arrested Riyadh al-Adad, the Sunni Vice Chairman of the Baghdad Provincial Council. And on 6 February 2012, Shi’ite Iraqiyya lawmaker Haidar Al-Mulla said he was informed that prosecutors were seeking to charge him for insulting the judiciary by publicly questioning its independence; Tim Arango, *Iraq’s Political Crisis Eases as Sunni Ministers Rejoin the Government*, New York Times, 7 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleeast/crisis-in-iraq-lulls-as-sunni-ministers-return-to-cabinet.html>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 23, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

²⁰ On 29 January 2012, Iraqiyya ended a month-long boycott of the CoR. According to Maysoun Al-Damluji, spokeswoman for Iraqiyya, the political bloc decided to end the boycott as a “goodwill gesture” in order to “create a healthy atmosphere to help the national conference” and to “defuse the political crisis.” However, according to an Iraqiyya member of parliament, the bloc decided to return to the CoR in order to have a say in the passing of the 2012 national budget. Another possible reason to end the boycott, which was already disregarded by several Iraqiyya members of parliament and ministers, was, reportedly, to prevent a further break-up of the bloc; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq’s Recurring Political Crisis*, Institute for the Study of War, 16 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis>. Also, on 7 February 2012, all Iraqiyya ministers reportedly attended cabinet meetings; Tim Arango, *Iraq’s Political Crisis Eases as Sunni Ministers Rejoin the Government*, New York Times, 7 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleeast/crisis-in-iraq-lulls-as-sunni-ministers-return-to-cabinet.html>.

²¹ According to Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War, “[P]olitics in Iraq remain paralyzed as deliberations among Iraqi political factions and parties continue to falter, despite a promising sign with Iraqiyya’s return to Parliament. This backdrop has set the stage for armed conflict and the likelihood of sectarian war”; Elizabeth O’Bagy, *ISW In Brief: Downward Spiral In Iraq*, Institute for the Study of War, 2 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/otherwork/isw-brief-downward-spiral-iraq>. See also Jack Healy, *Coordinated Attacks Bombard Iraq, Killing Dozens*, New York Times, 23 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/baghdad-car-bombings-kill-dozens.html>; Al Arabiya, *Sunni-backed ministers end cabinet boycott but rifts remain*, 7 February 2012, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/07/193209.html>; Jim Loney, *FACTBOX-Key political risks to watch in Iraq*, Reuters, 2 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/iraq-risk-idAFL5E8CS01A20120202>.

²² At the time of writing, no concrete steps to hold the conference have been taken. In January and February 2012, several preparatory meetings for the national conference were reportedly held, but no agreement was reached on its timing, scope or agenda; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 9*, Institute for the Study of War, 17 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-post-withdrawal-crisis-update-9>; Sam Dagher, *Iraqi Crisis Ebbs as Sunnis Return to Cabinet*, Wall Street Journal, 8 February 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203315804577209380861174426.html?mod=googlenews_wsj; Tim Arango, *Iraq’s Political Crisis Eases as Sunni Ministers Rejoin the Government*, New York Times, 7 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleeast/crisis-in-iraq-lulls-as-sunni-ministers-return-to-cabinet.html>.

²³ According to Ranj Alaaldin, a London-based Iraq expert at research institute Certus Intelligence, “Iraq’s security is dependent on Iraqis presenting a united front and being sympathetic to each other. The existing political climate of extreme divisions and uncertainty leads to the opposite”; Michael Lipin, *Iraq’s Sectarian Tensions Create Opportunities for Attacks*, VOA, 3 February 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/iraq/Iraqs-Sectarian-Tensions-Create-Opportunities-for-Attacks-138641804.html>. See also Charles Recknagel, *Violence Soars As Political Crisis Paralyzes Iraq*, RFE/RL, 27 January 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_violence_soars_explainer/24465203.html; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 23, <http://www.fas.org/sfp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

²⁴ Rowan Scarborough, *Al Qaeda in Iraq mounts comeback*, Washington Times, 4 March 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/4/al-qaeda-in-iraq-mounts-comeback/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS; AP, *Al-Qaeda in Iraq warns of looming war with Shiites*, 25 February 2012, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/25/196820.html>; UPI, *Iraq executions inflame political turmoil*, 9 February 2012, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/02/09/Iraq-executions-inflame-political-turmoil/UPI-26471328811256/; Stafford Nichols, “Suffering” in Iraq Highest Since 2008, Gallup, 9 January 2012, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/151940/Suffering-Iraq-High-%20est-2008.aspx>. See also “Shi’ite civilians, including pilgrims”.

²⁵ AP, *Iraq’s al-Qaida claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites*, 6 February 2012, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/national_world&id=8533308.

²⁶ Increasingly, reports emerged of weapons’ smuggling from Iraq into Syria to aid forces opposing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. US intelligence also reportedly indicated that AQI infiltrated Syrian opposition groups and was likely responsible for suicide bombings directed against intelligence and security compounds in Damascus and Aleppo; Ruth Pollard, *Fighters, weapons flow into Syrian war zone*, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 February 2012, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/fighters-weapons-flow-into-syrian-war-zone-20120217-1tefb.html>; Jonathan S. Landay, *U.S. officials: Al Qaida behind Syria bombings*, McClatchy Newspapers, 10 February 2012, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/02/10/138593/us-officials-al-qaeda-behind-syria.html>. Some Iraqi officials and observers also expressed concern that the conflict in Syria, which increasingly appears to evolve along sectarian lines, could deepen sectarian divisions in Iraq; Alice Fordham, *Sectarianism haunts Iraq as Sunnis call for more independence*, Washington Post, 16 March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/sectarianism-haunts-iraq-as-sunnis-call-for-more-independence/2012/03/16/gIQAy8cyFS_story.html; Suadad al-Salhy, *Iraq insurgents reject sending arms, fighters to Syria*, Reuters, 22 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-insurgents-reject-sending-arms-fighters-to-syria>; ABC, *Expert fears Syrian unrest may spill into Iraq*, 22 December 2011, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-22/expert-fears-syrian-unrest-may-spill-into-iraq/3744316>; AFP, *Iraq’s Syria stance is Sunni-Shiite related, analysts say*, 19 November 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/19/178041.html>; Nizar Latif and Phil Sands, *Iraq worried that Syrian violence will spill over border*, The National, 14 October 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/featured-content/home/middle-headlines/iraq-worried-that-syrian-violence-will-spill-over-border>.

²⁷ Iran is under tight US, EU and UN sanctions due to its disputed nuclear program. The EU increased pressure by announcing an embargo against Iranian crude oil due to take effect on 1 July 2012. In response, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, a step that would sharply affect Iraq’s ability to export oil from its Southern port in Basrah; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraq wants alternative routes to ship oil amid Iran tensions*, CNN, 18 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/18/world/meast/iraq-oil/>; Parisa Hafezi, *UN inspectors arrive in Iran for nuclear talks*, Reuters, 20 February 2012, <http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/02/20/iran-oil-europe-idINDEE81I07720120220>; CBS/AP, *U.S. slaps new sanctions on Iran amid tensions*, 6 February 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57371889/u.s-slaps-new-sanctions-on-iran-amid-tensions/; Jim Loney, *FACTBOX-Key political risks to watch in Iraq*, Reuters, 2 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/iraq-risk-idAFL5E8CS01A20120202>.

²⁸ See for example, Lara Jakes and Mazin Yahia, *Iraqis profit from Syrian arms smuggling*, AP, 18 February 2012, <http://www.chron.com/news/article/Iraqis-profit-from-Syrian-arms-smuggling-3335056.php>; Patrick Markey, *Iraq eyes waiver on U.S. Iran sanctions*, Reuters, 3 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/us-iraq-iran-idUSTRE8120PM20120203>.

²⁹ Tim Arango, *Iraq's Political Crisis Eases as Sunni Ministers Rejoin the Government*, New York Times, 7 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleeast/crisis-in-iraq-lulls-as-sunni-ministers-return-to-cabinet.html>; Jim Loney, *FACTBOX-Key political risks to watch in Iraq*, Reuters, 2 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/iraq-risk-idAFL5E8CS01A20120202>; Ramzy Mardini, *Iraq's Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 6*, Institute for the Study of War, 27 January 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/iraqs-post-withdrawal-crisis-update-6>; Jonathon Burch, *Turkey warns Iraqi PM over sectarian conflict*, Reuters, 24 January 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-turkey-iraq-idUSTRE80N1V920120124>.

³⁰ According to Kenneth Katzmann of the CRS, “[T]he constant infighting among the major factions over their perceived share of power and resources has interfered with the basic functions of governing and produced popular frustration over a failure of government to deliver services”; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, pp. 1, 24, <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>. As a result of broad sectarian/ethnic-based power-sharing governments since 2005, “Iraq’s governance record has been very poor”, according to Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group; Joost Hiltermann, *US troop withdrawal from Iraq*, Conservative Middle East Council, 5 December 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/op-eds/us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq.aspx>. See also Al Arabiya, *Sunni-backed ministers end cabinet boycott but rifts remain*, 7 February 2012, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/07/193209.html>.

³¹ See Michael E. O’Hanlon Ian Livingston, *Iraq Index - Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Brookings, 30 November 2011, p. 6, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf>.

³² According to Article 53A of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the KRG has *de jure* authority over “the territories that were administered by that government [the KRG] on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninewa”. While there is no dispute that the KRG has *de jure* authority over the Governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, the TAL, as well as the 2005 Constitution (Article 142 says that Article 53A TAL remains in force), fail to clearly define the southern borders of the Kurdistan Region. The KRG and the central government both claim authority over parts of Kirkuk, Diyala, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates (so-called “disputed areas”). As a result, many disputed areas are legally under the administration of the central authorities, but are *de facto* controlled by the KRG. The draft Kurdistan Constitution, which was finalized by the Kurdish Parliament in 2009, in Article 2(1) unilaterally lays claim to all disputed areas by stipulating that Iraqi Kurdistan is a

“(…) geographical and historical entity made up of the Duhok province in its present administrative boundaries, as well as the provinces of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, and Erbil Provinces, as well as the districts of Akra, Shiekhani, Sinjar, Telkeif, Karakush, and sub-districts of Zummar, Basheka, Aski Kalak of the Nineveh province and the districts of Khanakeen, Mandili of the Diyala province according to their administrative boundaries before 1968.”

Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which incorporates Article 53 of the former Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), laid down that the status of Kirkuk and other disputed areas should be solved by a three-step process to reverse the former “Arabization” policy, including “normalization” (i.e., return of the displaced and relocation of the Arabs who had been settled there under Saddam Hussein), a census and a referendum no later than by 31 December 2007. To date, the processes foreseen under Article 140 are reported to remain stalled given that the prospect of a census/referendum may likely instigate further political conflicts and violence; *Draft Constitution of the Kurdistan Region*, 23 June 2009, English translation, <http://gipi.org/2009/06/24/draft-kurdish-constitution/>; *Constitution of the Republic of Iraq*, 15 October 2005, unofficial English translation, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>. Since 2003, reportedly tensions between the KRG and the central authorities have largely been controlled by the USF-I presence. In 2009, in response to a military standoff between the two sides, the USF-I created a “combined security mechanism” with participation of both the Kurdish forces and the Iraqi Army, to conduct patrols and man checkpoints in the disputed territories. On a few occasions, the USF-I was reportedly able to disperse outbreaks of violence between the two sides. For example, on 25/26 February 2011, some 5,000 Kurdish troops (*Peshmerga*) from the Kurdistan Region were reported to have entered the city of Kirkuk claiming to need protection from security threats after Arab protestors burnt government offices in the predominantly Arab town of Hawija (Kirkuk). It was reported that the standoff only came to an end when Kurdish troops withdrew on 31 March 2012. And in November 2011, another tense standoff was reported when the Kurdish-dominated police in Kirkuk prevented the Iraqi Army from taking over control of Kirkuk’s military airfield from the withdrawing USF-I. The US Embassy reportedly ended the confrontation with a compromise under which the ISF was allowed to take control of the airfield, which however, as requested by the Kurds, has to be transformed into a civilian airport in the future. Armed groups such as AQI are said to be seeking a further destabilization of the situation by attacks on all members of ethnic/religious communities. There are concerns that in the absence of US mediation, tensions between the ISF and Kurdish forces could erupt into open violence. According to Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, “(…) while the situation has remained largely peaceful since 2003, the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil – or, put in ethnic terms, between Arabs and Kurds – is far from resolved, and tensions are strong enough that local incidents could escalate into open fighting. The conflict revolves around power, territory and resources”; Hussein Tahiri, *US withdrawal from Iraq may trigger revival of internal conflicts*, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/us-withdrawal-from-iraq-may-trigger-revival-of-internal-conflicts-20111221-1p5aj.html>; Kelly McEvers, *Tensions Feared as U.S. Leaves Disputed Iraqi City*, NPR, 14 December 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143675128/tensions-feared-as-u-s-leaves-disputed-iraqi-city>; Joost R. Hiltermann, *US troop withdrawal from Iraq*, Conservative Middle East Council, 5 December 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/op-eds/us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq.aspx>; Joost R. Hiltermann, *Kirkuk in the Wake of the Withdrawal*, *The National Interest*, 30 November 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/kirkuk-the-wake-the-withdrawal-6200>; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Iraq’s Kirkuk faces uncertainty without U.S. troops*, Reuters, 16 November 2011, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/uk-iraq-kirkuk-idUKTRE7AF1AS20111116>; Rania El Gamal, *Kurdish leader sees risk over Iraq’s Kirkuk city*, Reuters, 30 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/us-iraq-kurdistan-idUSTRE7AT24A20111130>; Roy Gutman, *Kirkuk is a ‘land mine’ where all sides want U.S. to stay*, McClatchy Newspapers, 19 July 2011, <http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/iraq/kirkuk-is-a-land-mine-where-all-sides-want-u-s-to-stay-1.149586>; Jim Loney, *Iraqi-Kurd force to take over in Kirkuk after U.S. withdrawal*, Reuters, 27 July 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-iraq-security-kirkuk-idUSTRE76Q2F820110727>; Marwan Ibrahim, *US troops should stay in Iraq*, *Iraq* *governor*, AFP, 15 June 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hGdYVmAALSDvMWHIMwEtKJ6pKmxYg?docId=CNG.d8b17504535e4f19218999090de182f4.f01>. For more background on the “disputed areas”, see also Sean Kane, *Iraq’s Disputed Territories*, USIP, April 2011, <http://www.usip.org/publications/iraqs-disputed-territories>; International Crisis Group, *Iraq And The Kurds: Confronting Withdrawal Fears*, Middle East Report N°103, 28 March 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/103%20Iraq%20and%20the%20Kurds%20-%20Confronting%20Withdrawal%20Fears.ashx>.

³³ Federal hydrocarbon legislation is reported to remain a major sticking point between the central government and the KRG, as it would define the powers of the central government vis-à-vis the KRG, especially in signing contracts. In 2007, the KRG was reported to have

adopted its own oil and gas law and to have signed nearly 50 production-sharing contracts with international oil companies; however, the Iraqi Government has consistently demanded that all oil contracts go exclusively through its Ministry of Oil and has reportedly blacklisted companies that signed deals with the KRG, excluding them from working elsewhere in Iraq. Most recently, in October 2011, tensions reportedly increased after the KRG signed an exploration deal with Exxon Mobil Corp. At least two of the six exploration blocks concerned, the Qush and the Bashiqa blocs, are reported to be located in the “disputed territories” of Ninewa Governorate that are *de facto* controlled by the KRG. According to Reidar Visser, an Iraq expert with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, the Bashiqa bloc is even located in a “particularly disputed area” given that Kurdish claims in that area are reportedly not very popular among the local electorate. The KRG conceded that if the concerned territory was subsequently judged to be part of central government-administered territory, then the revenues would be reallocated retroactively. Nevertheless, the central government considers the exploration deal “illegal” and has been reported to state in February 2012 that it would ban Exxon from further oil and gas exploration bids in Southern Iraq; Joel Wing, *Iraq Sanctions Exxon For Deal With Kurdistan*, AKnews, 18 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/290685/>; Dow Jones Newswires, *Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Blasts “Threats” Against Exxon*, 15 February 2012, <http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/02/15/iraq-deputy-prime-minister-blasts-threats-against-exxon/>; Ahmed Rasheed, *Iraq oil law deal festers as crisis drags on*, Reuters, 26 January 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/iraq-oil-law-idUSL5E8CN24L20120126>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 20, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Reidar Visser, *Exxon Moving into Seriously Disputed Territory*, Iraq Business News, 17 November 2011, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/11/17/exxon-moving-into-seriously-disputed-territory/>. See also Joost R. Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, who says that oil and gas in the “disputed areas” could “constitute a potential *casus belli* for both Baghdad and Erbil”; Joost R. Hiltermann, *Ethnic interests could trump economic sense*, Financial Times, 7 December 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/op-eds/hiltermann-guest-column-ethnic-interests-could-trump-economic-sense.aspx>.

³⁴ The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 establishes three main levels of government: the national government in Baghdad, regional governments and the governorates. Currently, there is only one region, the Kurdistan Region administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Law of the Executive Procedures regarding the Formation of Regions (Law No. 13 of 2008) is reported to provide that any governorate or group of governorates may choose to form a federal region via popular referendum. In order to initiate such a referendum, one-third of the Provincial Council members or one-tenth of the voters in the relevant governorates must submit a request to hold a referendum (Article 2). If a simple majority of voters approves the measure in the referendum, a region is formed (Article 6); see *Law of the Executive Procedures regarding the Formation of Regions*, unofficial English translation by UNAMI, http://gpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/cor_law_13_2008_formation_of_region_en-1.pdf. In response to perceived Sunni political and economic marginalization, in the last quarter of 2011, Sunni groups in three governorates (Salah Al-Din, Al-Anbar and Diyala) sought to initiate the mechanism to hold popular referenda to create federal regions. These moves were reportedly opposed by the central authorities, but also to varying degrees at the governorate level (especially in the mixed Diyala Governorate, where the move set off, at times, violent demonstrations and sit-ins by mostly Shi’ites in Ba’quba, causing Sunni and Kurdish members of the council who had supported the declaration to flee into Kurdish controlled areas in northern Diyala). PM Al-Maliki was reported to have dismissed the moves to form separate regions, saying that provincial and local governance institutions were currently too weak to assume the increased powers that would accompany such a change. Though no further actions have been taken to actually organize referenda, the underlying causes remain; KUNA, *Iraq: Prime Minister Still Opposed To Federalism*, 12 February 2012, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/12022012-iraq-prime-minister-still-opposed-to-federalism/>; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semianual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 5, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 17, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Joel Wings, *Push To Make Iraq’s Diyala Province An Autonomous Region Fades*, Musings on Iraq, 28 December 2011, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/12/push-to-make-iraqs-diyala-province.html>; Sam Dagher and Munaf Ammar, *Disruptions Mount in Iraq*, Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204553904577103072875917112.html>. In August 2011, also the Basrah provincial Council was reportedly seeking to create a federal region in reaction to what the local authorities say is an unfair distribution of oil revenues. The central government has not yet reacted to the demand and no further steps towards organizing a referendum have been initiated. In February 2012, the provincial council reportedly postponed the bid, saying that the time was not right; Waheed Ghanim, *Iraq’s Basra postpones bid for independence: Escape from centralism*, Niqash, 3 February 2012, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/2/govt1919.htm>; Gregg Carlstrom, *The breakup: More Iraqis bid for autonomy*, Al Jazeera, 22 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/201112161177518162.html>.

³⁵ In summer 2006, Sunni tribes and former insurgent groups in Al-Anbar Governorate began to turn against AQI. In early 2007, the US military reportedly started to support and train these groups and encouraged the “Awakening” or *Sahwa* movements (referred to by the MNF-I as “Concerned Local Citizens” or “Sons of Iraq”) to spread into other Governorates, including Baghdad, Babel, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din, where Sunni armed groups led a violent campaign against the MNF-I/ISF and Iraqi civilians. From early on, AQI was reported to have started a systematic campaign against the *Sahwa* in all the aforementioned areas in an attempt to break it up and regain control over areas it once controlled. Members of the *Sahwa* are considered to be a prime target for armed groups as evidenced by almost daily reports of attacks and assassinations. In 2008, the Iraqi Government vowed to absorb 20 percent of the *Sahwa* into the ISF and provide the rest with civilian government employment. The integration of the *Sahwa* fighters into security or civilian employment is considered a key to stabilizing Iraq. However, to date, their integration has been limited in numbers and geographic reach and promises to speed up the process after the formation of a new government have not been kept and by December 2011, only about half of them (about 50,000) had been integrated into the ISF or given civilian government jobs. Further fueling tensions, on 27 January 2012, Minister for National Reconciliation Amer al-Khuzai was reported to have told the Iraqi press that ISF would no longer want to recruit *Sahwa* members. At the same time, a number of ISF commanders were reported on 30 January 2012 to have pledged to revive efforts to absorb the *Sahwa* into the ISF; Ramzyardini, *Iraq’s Post-Withdrawal Crisis, Update 7*, Institute for the Study of War, 3 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/background/iraqs-post-withdrawal-crisis-update-7>. Many are thought to fear that increasingly disillusioned and threatened *Sahwa* members could revert to AQI or other armed groups. AQI has reportedly begun to entice *Sahwa* members by outbidding their salaries paid by the Iraqi Government. Some former *Sahwa* members also reportedly maintain that rejoining AQI is the only way to protect themselves from being targeted by the group. Myriam Benraad, research fellow at the Paris Institute of Political Studies and the Center for International Studies and Research, “*Although no firm figures exist that precisely count how many have switched sides and rejoined al-Qaeda and other insurgent groups at this stage, recent official sources suggest that possibly thousands have done so since 2009, often while still on the government payroll and receiving ammunition*”; In January 2011, Iraqi police reportedly arrested a local *Sahwa* leader over his alleged involvement in deadly bombings against Shi’ite pilgrims in Kerbala on 20 January 2011; Myriam Benraad, *Iraq’s Tribal “Sahwa”: Its Rise and Fall*, Middle East Policy Council, 15 March 2011, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/iraqs-tribal-sahwa-its-rise-and-fall?print>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 17, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Reuters, *Iraq’s Qaeda asks ex-fighters to return, threatens attacks*, 8 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqs-qaeda-asks-ex-fighters-to-return-threatens-attacks/>; Waleed Ibrahim, *Iraq Sunni*

fighters still waiting for promised jobs, Reuters, 11 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/iraq-sunni-fighters-still-waiting-for-promised-jobs/>; Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Iraq militia chief was behind pilgrim blasts*, AP, 22 January 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-militia-chief-was-behind-pilgrim-blasts-2191607.html>; Hamza Hendawi, *Al-Qaida in Iraq offers cash to lure former allies*, AP, 6 August 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9208787>. See also sub-chapter “*Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders*”.

³⁶ According to Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, “(...) while the situation has remained largely peaceful since 2003, the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil – or, put in ethnic terms, between Arabs and Kurds – is far from resolved, and tensions are strong enough that local incidents could escalate into open fighting. The conflict revolves around power, territory and resources”; Joost Hiltermann, *US troop withdrawal from Iraq*, Conservative Middle East Council, 5 December 2011, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/op-eds/us-troop-withdrawal-from-iraq.aspx>. See also Jack Healy, *Coordinated Attacks Bombard Iraq, Killing Dozens*, New York Times, 23 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/baghdad-car-bombings-kill-dozens.html>; Elizabeth O’Bagy, *ISW In Brief: Downward Spiral In Iraq*, Institute for the Study of War, 2 February 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/otherwork/isw-brief-downward-spiral-iraq>; Jim Loney, *FACTBOX-Key political risks to watch in Iraq*, Reuters, 2 February 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/iraq-risk-idAFL5E8CS01A20120202>.

³⁷ For example,

- On 20 March 2012, despite heavy security measures taken ahead of the forthcoming Arab League Summit, at least 46 people were reportedly killed and more than 200 wounded in a wave of coordinated attacks targeting mostly Shi’ite pilgrims and police and government officials in cities and towns across Iraq, including in Baghdad, Baiji and Mosul (Ninewa), Ba’quba (Diyala), Kirkuk, Daquq and Dibis (Kirkuk), Dhuluiya, Tuz Khurmatu and Samarra (Salah Al-Din), Fallujah and Ramadi (Al-Anbar), Kerbala as well as in Hilla, Latifiya, Mahmudiya and Mussayab (Babel). Police reportedly also defused bombs in Ba’quba, Fallujah and Mosul; AQI was reported to have claimed responsibility for the attacks, stating that it targeted the plan of the “*fool government preparing*” for the forthcoming summit; Lara Jakes, *Al-Qaida claims responsibility for Iraq attacks*, AP, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaida-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>, 21 March 2012, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaida-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>; AP, *Al Qaeda claims responsibility for Iraq bombings that killed almost 50*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/03/21/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-for-iraq-bombings-that-killed-almost-50/>; Agencies, *Iraq bombs kill scores before Arab League summit*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/iraq-bombs-kill-dozens>.
- On 23 February 2012, simultaneous early morning attacks involving bombings and shootings across Iraq reportedly killed at least 55 people and wounded more than 200. In Baghdad, at least 32 people were killed in 10 explosions in mainly Shi’ite neighbourhoods. More than a dozen blasts and attacks hit other cities and towns in Al-Anbar, Babel, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din Governorates, many of them targeting police. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attacks, Iraqi officials were reported to blame AQI, which in the past carried out similar coordinated attacks; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAIEI6zUR_story.html.
- On 15 August 2011, a series of suicide bombings, car bombs and roadside explosives reportedly killed at least 70 people and wounded more than 200 across Iraq. In the worst incident, a roadside bomb followed by a car bomb targeting police near a busy downtown market reportedly killed at least 37 people and wounded more than 60 in Kut (Wassit). And in Diyala, 12 people were reported to have died in two attacks that targeted an Iraqi checkpoint and a military camp. An estimated 20 others were wounded. Laith Hammoudi, *Coordinated attacks kill 68 on Iraq’s deadliest day this year*, McClatchy Newspapers, 15 August 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/15/120705/explosions-rip-iraq-from-north.html>.
- Reports indicate that on 3/4 July 2011, bombers and gunmen launched a string of at least 11 attacks against the ISF across Iraq, including in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, killing at least eight police and soldiers and wounding 20 others. Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>; Muhanad Mohammed, *Attackers kill 8 police and soldiers in Iraq*, Reuters, 4 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attackers-kill-8-police-and-soldiers-in-iraq/>.
- On 10 May 2010, a series of reported attacks in Baghdad, Basrah, Fallujah, Samarra, Hilla, Mahmudiya, Tarmiya and Suwayra struck police and army checkpoints, as well as markets, a mayor’s office and a textile factory, killing more than 100 and wounding hundreds; Steven Lee Meyers, *Coordinated Attacks in Iraqi Cities Kill More Than 100*, New York Times, 10 May 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html>.

³⁸ IBC speaks about “*an impassable minimum*”; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011*, 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010*, 30 December 2010, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2010/>. Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of the War said that the violence has reached a point “*where casualties may go up or down in a given period but stay within an expected range*”; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Joe Sterling “*Not a pretty scenario in Iraq*, analyst says, CNN, 27 January 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/meast/iraq-bombing-attack/?hpt=hp_t3.

³⁹ In 2006 and 2007, Iraq Body Count (IBC) based on media reports recorded 28,062 and 24,940 civilian casualties, respectively. In 2008 and even more in 2009, reported violence dropped significantly (down to 9,357 in 2008 and 4,704 in 2009). In 2010, IBC recorded reports of 4,045 civilian deaths and in 2011, 4,087; see IBC, *Database*, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>. See also “*Civilian Casualties*”.

⁴⁰ IBC, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>. According to Michael Knights from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which collates security metrics directly from the Iraqi government, Iraq witnessed 36 confirmed attempted mass-casualty attacks in January 2012, a significant increase of the average of 23 attacks a month in the last quarter of 2011. The Washington Institute also accounted for 561 reported attacks in January 2012, compared to 494 reported attacks in December 2011 and 302 reported attacks in November 2011. According to these statistics, a rise in violence is observed in particular in:

- 1) Mosul, which remains the main hub of Sunni armed groups (here the number of attacks reportedly jumped from 22 security incidents in November 2011 to 105 in January 2012);
- 2) „Sectarian melting pots“, where Sunni armed groups attack Shi’ite civilians as well as Sahwa members (Baghdad and the governorates surrounding the capital);
- 3) In the „disputed areas“, including Kirkuk but also in smaller towns and villages.

Michael Knights, *A Violent New Year in Iraq*, *The National Interest*, 16 February 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/violent-new-year-iraq-6517>. Casualty figures provided by the Iraqi Government, though lower, also showed a slight increase (99 civilians were killed in January, up from 90 in December. Thirty-one police and 21 soldiers were reported to have been killed, down from 36 and 29 respectively the previous month), but significantly lower than figures provided by IBC or other sources; Reuters, *Iraq civilian deaths rise in January-govt figures*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-civilian-deaths-rise-in-january-govt-figures/>.

⁴¹ Sam Dagher, *Iraq Political Leaders Seeking Maliki's Ouster*, Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577169010363577198.html>.

⁴² The most recent major attacks included:

- On 7 March 2012, two bombs that exploded in swift succession outside a crowded restaurant in the predominantly Turkmen city of Tal Afar (Ninewa) reportedly killed 20 and wounded 21; Rezan Ahmed, *UPDATE on Talafaar bombings: 20 killed, 21 injured*, AKnews, 8 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294556/>; AP, *Double bombing kills 14 in northern Iraq*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/03/08/double-bombing-kills-northern-iraq/BQTPVPYADROoMov9mc4lyL/story.html>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *15 dead in Iraq bomb attacks*, CNN, 7 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/07/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>.
- On 5 March 2012, dozens of alleged AQI fighters, some wearing army uniforms, reportedly shot dead 27 policemen when they attacked checkpoints and the homes of two officers in Haditha (Al-Anbar); Fadhel al-Badrani, *Gunmen kill 27 in raids on west Iraq checkpoints*, Reuters, 5 March 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-27-in-raids-on-west-iraq-checkpoints/>; Jack Healy, *Gunmen in Uniforms Kill 20 Police Officers in Iraq*, New York Times, 5 March 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/middleeast/police-killed-in-iraq.html>.
- On 23 February, coordinated attacks across Baghdad and other cities and towns reportedly killed at least 55 persons and wounded more than 200; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAEl6zUR_story.html.
- On 19 February 2012, a suicide bomber reportedly detonated his car as a group of police recruits left their academy in Baghdad, killing 20 and wounding at least 28; AP, *Iraq suicide car bomber kills 20 at police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/19/MN6O1N9SM8.DTL>. AQI was reported to have claimed responsibility for the attack; AFP, *Qaeda claims Iraq police academy attack: SITE*, 17 March 2012, <http://www.france24.com/en/20120317-qaeda-claims-iraq-police-academy-attack-site>.

⁴³ The 5th edition of the *Global Peace Index* (GPI) for 2011 ranked Iraq as the world's second least-peaceful country after Somalia. This is the first time Iraq is not ranked lowest in the GPI, which gauges ongoing domestic and international conflict, safety and security in society, and militarization in 153 countries. The improvement in the ranking is linked to the better security situation, the formation of a new government and better relations with neighbouring countries compared to previous years. However, the report notes "*tension and violence remain widespread with the exception of the relatively peaceful Kurdish-inhabited northern part of the country. The level of trust in other citizens, the homicide rate, the level of violent crime, the perceptions of criminality, the likelihood of violent demonstrations and the potential for terrorist acts all receive the highest possible scores*". It also mentions that displacement remains high (the third-highest in the world). Furthermore, the availability of small arms and light weapons remains widespread; Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index-2011 Methodology, Results and Findings*, 25 May 2011, pp. 19-29, <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2011/2011%20GPI%20Results%20Report.pdf>; see also US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁴⁴ At the height of the conflict in 2006/2007, the average number of reported deaths by suicide attacks and car bombs was 16 and 21, respectively. In 2008, the number dropped to 10 per day, in 2009 to 8.3 per day and in 2010 to 7.3; IBC, *Database*, accessed 8 February 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

⁴⁵ This figure was highest during the peak of the sectarian conflict in 2006/2007 when dozens of people were reportedly executed on a daily basis (57 per day in 2006 and 41 per day in 2007). Since then, the number of civilians reported to have been executed has dropped to a low of 3.9 per day in 2010, but has again increased over the course of 2011; IBC, *Database*, accessed 8 February 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

⁴⁶ See "Government Officials" and "Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

⁴⁷ See "Actors of Violence".

⁴⁸ See "Actors of Violence".

⁴⁹ See "Availability of National Protection".

⁵⁰ See "Availability of National Protection".

⁵¹ See "Judges and Lawyers".

⁵² See "Actors of Violence".

⁵³ Despite Iraqi Law requiring that criminal suspects must have their case reviewed by an examining magistrate within 24 hours of arrest (Article 123 of the 1971 Law on Criminal Proceedings), detainees are reportedly held without charge or trial for prolonged periods of time, at times for several years. While exact figures are not disclosed by the GoI, Amnesty International estimates that some 30,000 detainees are being held without charge or trial, despite the Amnesty Law of 2008, which would provide for the release of many detainees held without trial; Amnesty International, *Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds – Abuse and Neglect of Detainees in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 4, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2011/en/48c3c6e6-9607-4926-abd7-d1da1c51a976/mde140012011en.pdf>. See also Human Rights Watch (HRW), *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 15, 17, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IO/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; *Law on Criminal Proceedings* (Law No. 23 of 1971), 4 February 1971, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/468a674a2.html>.

⁵³ The Iraqi Constitution (Art. 37) and the Law on Criminal Proceedings (Article 127) explicitly prohibit the use of torture and the Iraqi Penal Code and the Law on Criminal Proceedings provide for criminal liability of the use of torture; *Constitution of the Republic of Iraq*, unofficial translation, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>; *Law No. 23 of 1971, Law on Criminal Proceedings*, 4 February 1971, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/468a674a2.html>.

⁵⁴ There are reports of severe overcrowding, lack of natural light or ventilation, and generally unhygienic conditions. According to the UN Secretary-General, detention conditions "*are characterized by overcrowding, poor hygiene, a lack of rehabilitation programmes for detainees and poor security*." He further reported that during a monitoring visit conducted by UNAMI in the Hilla Central Prison in Babel Governorate, severe overcrowding was found with 1,300 detainees being held in a facility with a capacity of 300; UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011)*, 28 November 2011, para 59, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_736_EN.pdf. In 2010, UNAMI conducted 21 monitoring visits to prisons and detention centres in Central and Southern Iraq. While the physical condition of the facilities and the standards of detainee treatment varied to a large extent, overcrowding was reportedly a problem in many facilities. It further reported that in some places, prisoners were removed before UNAMI's arrival in order to avoid giving the impression of overcrowding. As a result of unhygienic conditions, many detainees reportedly suffered from health problems, mostly skin infections; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in*

Iraq, January 2011, pp. 14-17, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. According to HRW and Amnesty International, the situation worsened in July 2010 after the USF-I transferred most of its remaining prison sites and detainees to Iraqi custody; HRW, *World Report 2011: Iraq*, January 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/iraq>; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, p. 6, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

⁵⁵ The Iraqi Constitution (Art. 37) and the Law on Criminal Proceedings (Article 127) explicitly prohibit the use of torture and the Iraqi Penal Code and the Law on Criminal Proceedings provide for criminal liability of the use of torture; *Constitution of the Republic of Iraq*, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>; *Law No. 23 of 1971, Law on Criminal Proceedings*, 4 February 1971, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/468a674a2.html>. According to Amnesty International, “[T]orture and other ill-treatment of detainees were rife in Iraqi prisons, especially those controlled by the Ministries of Defence and Interior”; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>. The human rights organization also reported that torture and ill-treatment most commonly take place following arrest when detainees are held *incommunicado* in police stations and detention facilities controlled by the Ministries of Interior and Defence; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, p. 32, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>. UNAMI staff visiting various detention facilities in 2010 reported seeing marks on some prisoners and detainees that appeared consistent with torture or mistreatment. UNAMI further reported that prisoners with visible marks of torture or abuse were removed from their cells before UNAMI’s visit. UNAMI further reported to have received evidence that detainees and prisoners were harmed after speaking to UNAMI. Common techniques alleged included beatings, death threats (including against family members), suspension from iron bars in painful positions for lengthy periods of time, electric shocks, sexual assaults, cigarette burns to the body, food, water and sleep deprivation, denial of medical treatment, near-suffocation by plastic bags placed over the head. UNAMI describes in its 2010 report a range of institutional, legal and environmental reasons resulting in the widespread and systematic use of torture and mistreatment, including, inter alia, a lack of accountability, insufficient resources, a “culture of abuse” and weak institutional capacity; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 15, 18-19, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 6-7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁵⁶ In February 2011, HRW reported that elite security forces controlled by the office of Prime Minister were operating a secret detention site at Camp Justice in northwest Baghdad. Reportedly, Iraqi authorities transferred more than 280 detainees, almost all of them terrorism suspects, to this site ahead of a planned international inspection of their previous location at Camp Honor in Baghdad’s International Zone. Camp Honor itself was the subject of scrutiny in January 2011, after the *Los Angeles Times* reported widespread abuse there and described the conditions as “miserable.” HRW interviewed several former detainees at Camp Honor and documented that detainees were held *incommunicado* and in inhumane conditions, often for several months. HRW reported of wide ranging abuses including beatings, suspension from the ceiling, electric shocks and asphyxiation with plastic bags put over detainees’ heads. PM Al-Maliki reportedly called the report “a lie” and said “We don’t have secret prisons, we don’t have political detainees or secret detainees.” According to the Iraqi Minister of Justice, who refuted all the allegations, the facility at Camp Honor was under his full authority. However, HRW reported to have obtained documents showing that the facility was under control of the Army’s 56th Brigade (“Baghdad Brigade”) and the Counter-Terrorism Service, both under the authority of the PM’s Office. It was reported that on 14 March 2011, the Iraqi authorities announced that Camp Honor would be closed after a parliamentary committee found evidence of torture there. Members of the committee reportedly told HRW that they had observed 175 prisoners in “horrible conditions” at the prison. They also reported “signs of recent abuse, including electric shocks” and marks on detainees’ bodies. Detainees reportedly told the committee that more than 40 other detainees had been hastily removed from the site just before the committee’s arrival. On 19 March 2011, PM Al-Maliki issued a statement reiterating that “there are no secret detention centers, and all prisons and detention centers are open to regulatory authorities and judicial authorities, which must report any violations found, if any, and notify judicial authorities to take legal action against the perpetrators.” However, HRW reportedly received credible information that detainees are still held at Camp Honour and that by the end of 2011, no officials had been prosecuted for torture in Camp Honor; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; HRW, *Iraq: Closing Torture Prison Won’t End Abuse*, 31 March 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/31/iraq-closing-torture-prison-wont-end-abuse>; AFP, *Iraq’s Maliki denies reports of secret prisons*, 6 February 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/06/136493.html>; HRW, *Iraq: Secret Jail Uncovered in Baghdad*, 1 February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/01/iraq-secret-jail-uncovered-baghdad>; Ned Parker, *Alleged abuse at Iraqi detention center prompts oversight concerns*, *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/23/world/la-fg-iraq-prison-20110124>. On 19 April 2010, media reported the discovery of a secret prison at the old Muthanna Airport operated by security forces under control of the PM’s Office (54th Brigade with the assistance of the 56th Brigade). More than 400 mostly Sunni Arab detainees, arrested in October 2009 in Ninewa Governorate, were reportedly being held there in *incommunicado* detention. Over 100 of them were reported to have been subjected to torture, including beatings, rape, suffocation with plastic bags and electricity applied to sensitive parts of the body. One prisoner reportedly died in January 2010 from the abuse. Reportedly, no officials associated with the event were held accountable. According to government officials, 75 of the prisoners were released and 200 were transferred to other jails; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *World Report 2011: Iraq*, January 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/iraq>.

⁵⁷ It is reported that sometimes, “confessions” are televised, jeopardizing the defendant’s right to a fair trial and violating the presumption of innocence; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 15, 18-19, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. UNAMI reported that detainees were threatened with death or rape of female family members if they refused to sign confessions. UNAMI also received consistent reports that suspects were coerced to sign statements, which they had not been allowed to read or have read to them; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 15, 18, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵⁸ It is reported that commonly, death certificates attribute deaths to “heart failure” or “heart attack” without further medical explanations. Human rights organizations however have reported that signs of torture have been found on detainees’ bodies; Amnesty International, *Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds – Abuse and Neglect of Detainees in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 11, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2011/en/48c3c6e6-9607-4926-abd7-d1da1c51a976/mde140012011en.pdf>. According to UNAMI, at least nine detainees reportedly died as a result of torture in 2010. And according to the Iraqi MoHR, four persons died as a result of torture in 2009; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 13, 19, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵⁹ Persons subjected to torture and ill-treatment are said to be reluctant to report any of the violations mainly due to fear of retribution. If abuses are reported, the authorities reportedly often do not conduct investigations into the allegations. In the rare instances where investigations were carried out, results were apparently not made public and penalties applied to perpetrators were often limited to disciplinary or administrative measures. According to HRW, “[S]ecurity forces in Iraq, particularly in detention facilities, violate rights with impunity, and the government too often looks the other way.” And the US Department of State assessed that “[I]mpunity for security forces continued.” HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 19, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, p. 41, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

⁶⁰ The former CPA established the CCCI by Order No. 13. It has jurisdiction to hear cases involving serious criminal offenses, including terrorism, organized crime, governmental corruption, acts intended to destabilize democratic institutions or processes and violence based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion (Section 18); see CPA, Order No. 13 (revised and amended), *The Central Criminal Court of Iraq*, 22 April 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/42d103474.html>. See also HRW, *The Quality of Justice - Failings of Iraq's Central Criminal Court*, December 2008, pp. 14-15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq1208web.pdf>.

⁶¹ Most death sentences are reportedly passed by the CCCI following proceedings, which failed to meet international fair trial standards. In particular, defendants alleged that the court used confessions extracted under torture as evidence in the face of complaints that they did not have adequate legal representation. Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>. See also UN News Centre, *Iraq's execution of 34 people in one day 'shocking' - UN human rights chief*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41019&Cr=Iraq>.

⁶² Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, the death penalty was applicable for a wide range of offences and was used extensively. The former CPA by Order No. 7 amended the Iraqi Penal Code and suspended the death penalty. However, Order No. 3 of 2004 of the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG), passed on 8 August 2004, reintroduced the death penalty and provides for capital punishment for some 48 crimes including those affecting internal state security, public safety, attacks on means of transportation, premeditated murder, drug trafficking, and abduction. The death penalty is extensively used in Iraq, mostly against defendants convicted of involvement in armed attacks. In December 2010, Iraq was one of a few states that voted against a UN General Assembly resolution calling for a worldwide moratorium on executions. According to OHCHR estimates, more than 1,200 persons have been sentenced to death since 2004. Despite objections by Ms. Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who called the number of executions "terrifying", saying there were "major concerns about due process and fairness of trials", between 1 January and 21 February 2012, Iraq executed at least 69 persons convicted mostly of terrorism-related charges. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concern that there are no reports of any person on death row being pardoned despite the well-documented cases of confessions being extracted under duress. Pillay called for an immediate moratorium. According to Haidar Al-Saadi, spokesman for the Iraqi Ministry of Justice, Iraq executed 68 persons in 2011, commonly by hanging. He further asserted that 99 percent of those executed were sentenced to death for terrorism-related crimes; AFP, *Iraq's 2012 executions top 2011's number*, 21 February 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ikHzCuF6KkjTmbRlNkmNpQW1B8wQ?docId=CNG.4a7405f435e18d06d38741269c27a37f.291>; Reuters, *Iraq executes 14 despite U.N. rights chief protest*, 8 February 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE81720820120208>; Reuters, *Iraq executes 17 after U.N. rebuke*, 1 February 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE8101BB20120201>; KUNA, *EU voices concern over increase in death penalty in Iraq*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2217709&Language=en>; PTI, *34 executions in Iraq this year: Ministry*, 26 January 2012, http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/34-executions-in-iraq-this-year-ministry_754979.html; UN News Centre, *Iraq's execution of 34 people in one day 'shocking' - UN human rights chief*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41019&Cr=Iraq>.

⁶³ Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011 - Iraq*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-12>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. v, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶⁴ Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011 - Iraq*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-12>.

⁶⁵ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 15, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; Amnesty International, *New order, same abuses - Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, September 2010, pp. 30-31, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

⁶⁶ The *Asayish* is the official security agency in the Kurdistan Region. Law No. 46 of 2004 describes the role of the *Asayish* as follows: "protect the population, provide stability and security in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and to combat terrorism, espionage and drug-related crime" (Article 6). The *Asayish* does not fall under the jurisdiction of any ministry, but reports directly to the presidency of the KRG. However, in reality, two separate *Asayish* entities are reportedly continuing to exist, each under the control of the KDP and the PUK in their respective areas of influence, both within the Kurdistan Region but also in areas *de facto* under their control; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 8, 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 27, 50, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. The *Asayish* reportedly run their own detention centres that are not under control of the KRG authorities, but rather the KDP and the PUK, respectively. Reportedly, there is an *Asayish* facility in every city and town, each one with a detention centre or prison; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 8, 10, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage - Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 10, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Hope and Fear - Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, April 2009, p. 9, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2009/en/c2e5ae23-b204-4b46-b7f5-06dc1501f62f/mde140062009en.pdf>.

⁶⁷ In July 2006, the Kurdistan Parliament adopted the Law on the Combat of Terrorism in the Iraq Kurdistan Region (Anti-Terrorism Law, Law No. 3/2006). It has since been extended every two years. In June 2010, the law was extended for another two years until 16 July 2012; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 27, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶⁸ In 2010, UNAMI reportedly became aware of several persons in the *Asayish* detention facility in Erbil, who had been held for prolonged periods of time on terrorism-related charges. The authorities reportedly informed that they were unwilling to bring these cases to court because they considered the applicable penalties under the Criminal Code as being „too lenient“; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR,

2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq, January 2011, p. 27, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also Amnesty International, *New order, same abuses - Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, September 2010, p. 25, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>. At least one case was reported in which the Anti-Terrorism Law was applied retroactively in the case of an individual detained before the law came into force in 2006. Amnesty International and UNAMI reported that the *Asayish* arrested Walid Yunis Ahmad, a translator and programme organizer for a local TV/radio station linked to KIU, in 2000 for his alleged involvement in terrorist acts. He was reportedly held for more than ten years without charge or trial, including in solitary confinement, and was allegedly tortured. Reports state that he was finally charged in 2010 under the Anti-Terrorism Law; he was tried by a criminal court on 17 March 2011 and sentenced to five years imprisonment for allegedly coordinating terrorist attacks from inside the prison. According to Amnesty International, the trial was unfair and the charges appeared to be fabricated in order to justify years of unlawful detention. Furthermore, the court ignored the 10 years spent in detention without charges, meaning that Ahmad still needed to serve most of his five-year prison sentence. Amnesty International, *Iraqi man jailed for five years on spurious terror charges*, 17 March 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-man-jailed-five-years-spurious-terror-charges-2011-03-17>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. v, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶⁹ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, compared to previous years, delays in bringing detainees to trial have been greatly reduced, except for a number of detainees held under anti-terrorism laws. The UNAMI inspection visits to various *Asayish* facilities revealed that most detainees were no longer held beyond the statutory period for investigation. However, most detainees UNAMI spoke to complained that their cases were being delayed due to a lack of coordination between the investigating authorities and the courts. UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. v, 26-27, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. In September 2010, Amnesty International reported that: "Scores of people have been detained without charge or trial in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, some for years." The report also provided that many suspected members of terrorist groups such as Ansar Al-Islam have reportedly been pardoned and released in 2008. Amnesty International, *New order, same abuses - Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, September 2010, pp. 24-27 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

⁷⁰ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 28, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁷¹ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, "there were still reports of incidents of abuse or torture of some detainees [in 2010]." UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. v, 28, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. Methods of torture reportedly include stress positions, broken fingers and electric shocks. A 2009 MOHR report on prison conditions in the Kurdistan Region reported evidence of "systemic torture" in *Asayish* detention facilities. US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. The MOHR report accounted for 574 allegations of torture during 2009, 56 of which reportedly were committed by Kurdish security forces. According to Amnesty International, this is likely to only represent the "tip of the iceberg." Amnesty International, *New order, same abuses - Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, September 2010, p. 32, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

⁷² UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 28, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁷³ In September 2006, the Kurdistan National Assembly repealed the CPA's decision to suspend the death penalty. According to this decision, the final authority for confirmation of death sentences approved by the Kurdish Supreme Court rests with the Kurdish Executive. Reportedly, between 2006 and 2008, 18 persons have been executed in the Kurdistan Region (all but one case in Erbil). Ako Muhammed, *Capital punishment opposed in Kurdistan*, Kurdish Globe, 3 July 2008, <http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.jsp?id=F9F77D7967E8D1C1DF05AA114377A5B8>.

⁷⁴ In 2010, 19 persons were reportedly sentenced to death, including 10 for murder under the Criminal Code and nine under the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law (Article 2 Item 3), which stipulates the death sentence for "[e]stablishing or organizing or managing an organization or association, committee, gang, centre, group or to lead these to commit one of the terror acts mentioned above;" UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 30, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. The law (in Arabic) can be found at: <http://www.niqash.org/uploaded/documents/antiterorlaw.kurdistan.htm>.

⁷⁵ The KRG has reportedly imposed an unofficial moratorium and has expressed the intention to abolish the death penalty in the Region. UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. v, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁷⁶ According to Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch, "Iraq is quickly slipping back into authoritarianism as its security forces abuse protesters, harass journalists and torture detainees. Despite U.S. government assurances that it helped create a stable democracy, the reality is that it left behind a budding police state;" HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>.

⁷⁷ See "Protestors" and "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities".

⁷⁸ See "Journalists and Other Media Professionals" and "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities".

⁷⁹ Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, which measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 183 countries and territories around the world ranked Iraq 175th out of 182 countries. Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2011*, <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/>. According to the Chief Justice of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC), Medhat al-Mahmoud, corruption in Iraq is "pervasive" and although it exists at all levels of the Government, it is "worse among high-ranking officials and has seemingly become the norm in many ministries." SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 79, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit. The Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN) survey of 2011 revealed that Iraqis perceive political parties and local civil servants to be heavily affected by corruption, while the media and the judiciary were perceived to be less affected. According to the survey, more than half of the population (54%) believes that the situation has deteriorated during the two years preceding the survey and only 28 percent consider the government's anti-corruption efforts to have been effective. IKN, *Governance Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 2, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1581/GovernanceFactsheet-English.pdf>.

⁸⁰ According to the International Crisis Group, "[P]ublic services continue to be plagued by severe deficiencies, notably widespread corruption, which spread like a virus throughout state institutions during the years of lawlessness that prevailed until 2008." It further assessed that partly as a result of widespread corruption, "(...) living standards languish, even palling in comparison with the country's own recent past. This applies to practically all aspects of life, including the health, education and electricity sectors, all of which underperform despite marked budget increases." International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113,

26 September 2011, pp. i, ii, 10,
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.

⁸¹ See also, Commission of Integrity, *Al-Maliki In His First Visit To CoI, "Fighting Corruption Is As Important As Curbing Terrorism"*, 30 October 2011, http://www.nazaha.iq/en_body.asp?field=news_en&id=336.

⁸² International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. 4, 11-17, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.

⁸³ Despite extensive powers granted by the 2005 Constitution to the CoR, it has failed to exercise oversight on the executive branch. According to the International Crisis Group, the "*parliament has in effect been side-lined since 2006.*" International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. 18-19, 22, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.

⁸⁴ It is reported that on 22 December 2011, a car bomb detonated outside a Commission of Integrity office in eastern Baghdad, killing 32 personnel in the deadliest attack ever on Iraq's main anticorruption agency. SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 12, <http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report - January 2012.pdf#view=fit>. See also "Government Officials and Employees".

⁸⁵ In September 2011, Rahim Al-Uqailee, the head of the Commission of Integrity (COI), Iraq's main anticorruption agency, reportedly resigned over political interference in his work. In an open letter to the CoR, he described corruption as "*part of the struggle for power in Iraq today.*" AFP, *Corruption as dangerous to Iraq as terrorism: Maliki*, 1 February 2012, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/01/191870.html>; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, pp. 12, 99-100, <http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report - January 2012.pdf#view=fit>; AFP, *Corruption hampering Iraq's development, says report*, 28 September 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/corruption-hampering-iraqs-development-says-report>. In its annual report for 2010, the Commission of Integrity reported that while it had made some progress to fight petty corruption, the prosecution of senior government officials with strong political connections remained very challenging as they have "*become more powerful than even the law or the constitution, and that constitutes a significant hindrance in the achievement of rule of law advances within Iraq.*" COI, Annual Report 2010, cited in: SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, pp. 95, 100, <http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report - January 2012.pdf#view=fit>. See also "Perceived Political Opponents".

⁸⁶ A recent poll conducted by Gallup found that an increasing number of Iraqis, 25 percent in September 2011 compared to 14 percent in October 2010, rate their lives poorly enough to be considered as "*suffering*". These findings are a reversal of the positive trend observed between 2008 and 2010. The percentage of Iraqis aged 15 or older that are "*suffering*" in 2011 is close to the high of 30 percent recorded in June 2008, at the end of intense sectarian violence. The rate is also among the highest in the Middle East and North Africa and the percentage of Iraqis who are "*thriving*", only 7 percent of the respondents—is among the lowest. On the other hand, the poll revealed that negative emotions such as sadness, stress, and anger were increasing with, for example, 70% stating that they were experiencing stress and 60% stating they were experiencing anger during much of the day prior to the interview. According to Gallup, "*a stressed, angry population whose wellbeing is decreasing is not conducive to stability.*" The results are based on face-to-face interviews with about 1,000 adults, aged 15 and older, conducted between June 2008 and September 2011 in Iraq. Stafford Nichols, "*Suffering in Iraq Highest Since 2008*", Gallup, 9 January 2012, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/151940/Suffering-Iraq-High-%20est-2008.aspx>. Another Gallup poll suggested that Iraqis' dissatisfaction with economic conditions is the highest in three years with 37% percent saying that the economy is getting worse in 2011 compared to 14 percent in 2009. Nearly two-thirds of Iraqis (65%) say it is a bad time to find a job in the city or area where they live, up from 41% in early 2010. The poll also found that more than half of all Iraqis state that they are dissatisfied with their standard of living, and more Iraqis see their standard of living getting worse than getting better—the first time this has been the case since Gallup started asking the question in 2008. Nicole Naurath, *Economic Negativity Abounds in Iraq*, Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, 26 September 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/149702/economic-negativity-abounds-iraq.aspx>.

⁸⁷ Partly inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in spring 2011, reportedly thousands of Iraqis took the streets across the country calling for better services and an end to corruption. According to Kenneth Katzmann, "[T]he spread of unrest into Iraq suggested to many that Iraqis have been frustrated by what they perceive as a nearly exclusive focus of the major factions on politics rather than governing or improving services." Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 24, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>. It is reported that while the Iraqi Government did make some concessions to protestors, it largely cracked down on protests. Both the ISF and the Kurdish security forces, at times helped by government or party-sponsored gangs, have been accused of using excessive force against protestors, killing, *inter alia*, at least 25 on the 25 February 2011 "*Day of Rage*". According to accounts, many protestors and journalists were arbitrarily arrested, detained, and subjected to beatings and other ill treatment. Reportedly, PM Al-Maliki pledged not to seek a third term in 2014 and called for a constitutional term limit. He also set a 100-day deadline for his cabinet members to respond to demands for better government services from electricity to employment and for an end to corruption or risk losing their jobs. However, the deadline passed on 7 June 2011 with little tangible results and the move was widely seen as a political maneuver to buy time. Ramzy Mardini and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Iraq Trip Report*, Institute for the Study of the War, 4 August 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf; Lara Jakes and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *AP Interview: Iraqi PM confident on reforms*, AP, 2 April 2011, <http://www.investorsiraq.com/showthread.php?155735-AP-Interview-Iraqi-PM-confident-on-reforms>. According to reports, a number of local officials resigned or were replaced in reaction to the protestors' demands, including the Governors of Babel, Basrah, Kirkuk and Wasit. Also the complete Fallujah City Council resigned over the protests. See Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *West Iraq Babel's Governor resigns, following mass protests*, 27 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141208&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Nezar al-Jaberi to replace Basra governor*, 28 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141238&l=1; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, April 2011, pp. 6, 73, <http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/April2011/Report - April 2011.pdf>. In addition, a number of ad hoc measures were reportedly implemented to appease protestors, including the provision of free fuel for neighbourhood generators, promises of free power from the national grid and the declaration of a national holiday on one particularly hot day. Jim Loney, *FACTBOX-Key political risks to watch in Iraq*, Reuters, 1 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-key-political-risks-to-watch-in-iraq/>. See also "*Protestors*" and "*Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities*".

⁸⁸ According to the ICRC, "[A]ccess to public services, such as clean water and proper healthcare, also remained a challenge for too many Iraqis, especially in rural and conflict-prone areas." ICRC, *Iraq: Facts and Figures, January to December 2011*, p. 1, March 2012.

⁸⁹ Reportedly twenty-three percent of Iraqis are living on less than US \$2 per day. Rising food prices, which doubled between 2004 and 2008, led to a 20 percent drop in protein acquisition in poorer households and further aggravated undernutrition among children and

women. UNICEF, *UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children*, 2011, p. 2, http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/files/HAC2011_4pager_Iraq_rev1.pdf. According to accounts, seven out of every 100 Iraqis, a total of 2.1 million persons, are undernourished, though disparities exist between the governorates with the governorates of Babel, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Muthanna and Salah Al-Din being particularly affected by food deprivation. In 2007, it was reported that more than one in five children in Iraq (22%) aged under five years continues to show stunted growth, 5% suffer from wasting, and 9% are underweight. IAU, *World Food Day Factsheet*, December 2010, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1123/world%20food%20day.pdf>; AO/WFP/UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO, *Food Deprivation in Iraq*, August 2010, pp. 2, 3, 16, <http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2010/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf>. According to the Ministry of Trade, more than 50 percent of the Iraqi population relies on the Public Food Distribution System (PDS), which was set up in 1995 as part of the UN's oil-for-food programme. Despite recent improvements in the food security situation in Iraq, the latest WFP/Government of Iraq analysis (2007/2008) shows that 930,000 people (3% of the population) remain food insecure, and an additional 6.4 million (22%) will become food insecure in the absence of the monthly food rations distributed through the PDS. IRIN, *Iraq: Government vows to improve food aid system*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91983/IRAQ-Government-vows-to-improve-food-aid-system>; Central Organization For Statistics And Information Technology/Ministry Of Planning And Development Cooperation/ Kurdistan Region Statistics Office/ Nutrition Research Institute, Ministry Of Health/WFP, *Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq 2007/2008*, Flyer, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Iraq_CFSVA_Flyer_EN.pdf.

⁹⁰ It is reported that as a result of decades of wars, violence, sanctions, underinvestment in infrastructure and poor management, the delivery of safe water continues to be hampered. Millions of Iraqis cannot get clean water or water in sufficient quantity, though there are significant differences between governorates, urban and rural areas and even between neighbouring districts. A comprehensive survey on the state of the environment in Iraq, undertaken by the GoI in cooperation with UNICEF and the EU revealed that 79% of the population has access to the drinking water distribution network, leaving one in every five Iraqis without access to safe drinking water. In rural areas, those without access to safe drinking water reportedly doubles in numbers to two in every five Iraqis. UNICEF/EU, *Survey on the state of the environment in Iraq launched*, 22 September 2011, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_59892.html. Reportedly the public water network is often not sufficient to provide households with drinking water, especially in rural areas. Only 38 percent of households surveyed in 2011 rated the availability of drinking water as "good" or "very good" (mostly in the Kurdistan Region, where the approval rate reached up to 89 percent in urban areas of Erbil Governorate). The lowest approval ratings were found across most rural areas of the south and centre, dropping to as low as one percent in rural Missan Governorate. Salinity affects public drinking water networks, especially in the southeastern part of the country and many households rely on bottled or tankered water (in Basrah, for example, only 1 percent of households uses the public water network as main drinking water source). In rural areas, there are still significant numbers of households without access to the general water network, water tankers or bottled water. In mountain areas, these households use closed wells. In other areas, households have to use water directly from rivers or lakes, especially in rural areas of Thi-Qar (36%), Babel (31%), Baghdad (31%), Wassit (26%), Kirkuk (22%) and Diyala (21%). Governorates; Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, pp. 1-2, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>. See also Dahr Jamail, *Iraq: A country in shambles*, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/20121411519385348.html>; ICRC, *Iraq: water formerly a blessing, increasingly a problem*, 14 May 2010, <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/iraq-update-110510>.

⁹¹ Only one third (30%) of households surveyed in 2011 had access to the public sanitation network, mostly located in the urban areas of Sulyamaniyah and Baghdad Governorates. In most other areas, access to the public sanitation network is very poor, dropping to just four percent among rural households. Access to the network is also below 10 percent in urban areas of Babel, Dahuk, Diyala, Muthanna and Ninewa Governorates. As a result, there is widespread dissatisfaction with sanitation facilities with 59 percent of the population rating their household's facility as "bad" or "very bad" (85 percent in rural areas). Households without access to the public network commonly use either a septic tank (40 percent of households) or a covered drain (25 percent) for waste disposal. Six percent of households use an unsafe sanitation method, such as an open drain (13 percent among households living in non-durable structures). Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 2, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>. Poor sanitation exposes especially young children to diseases such as diarrhea and causes outbreaks of cholera. In 2010, there were reportedly almost 884,000 diarrhoea cases as a result of polluted drinking water and poor hygiene practices, 57% of which were among children under the age of 5. WHO, *Weekly Situation Report on Influenza like Illness, Diarrhoea and Cholera in Iraq*, week 52, 2010, cited in: IAU, *Water in Iraq Factsheet*, revised March 2011, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1319/Water%20Fact%20Sheet%20March%202011.pdf>. See also Dahr Jamail, *Iraq: A country in shambles*, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/20121411519385348.html>; UNICEF/EU, *Survey on the state of the environment in Iraq launched*, 22 September 2011, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_59892.html.

⁹² According to reports, Iraq's electricity infrastructure was severely damaged by conflict and suffered from lack of investment and lack of available equipment under economic sanctions. Despite the increase of electricity production and imports since 2003, the electricity supply available on the public grids reportedly meets only about 60% of the estimated demand of all end users in Iraq. It is reported that electricity shortages are a main complaint among Iraqis, many of whom face power long power cuts on a daily basis. In 2011, households surveyed in Iraq received an average of 14.6 hours of electricity per day through a combination of the public grid and household or neighbourhood generators (rural areas received only 11.4 hours per day as there is more limited access to private generators, compared to 15.8 hours in urban areas). The public network provides households with an average of only 7.6 hours of electricity per day, meaning that households receive almost half of their electricity from sources other than the national grid. Only 17 percent of the households received more than 20 hours electricity per day through different sources (in rural areas only eight percent). Electricity is the worst-rated service in Iraq and 79 percent of Iraqi households surveyed in 2011 rated the service as "bad" or "very bad". Reports indicate that electricity shortages have consistently been raised during popular protests. Protests at the poor electricity situation in six cities in Al-Anbar, Basrah, Kerbala, Najef, Thi-Qar and Wassit in April and June 2010 reportedly resulted in the death of one civilian and injuries to both civilians and police. According to accounts, Karim Waheed, the Minister for Electricity, subsequently resigned on 21 June 2010, blaming the impatience of Iraqis and a lack of funds for his ministry for the lack of electricity generation. Aseel Kami, *Iraq plans to up power supply, still below demand*, Reuters, 13 February 2012, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2012/Feb-13/163126-iraq-plans-to-up-power-supply-still-below-demand.ashx#axzz1mMUw9Ppm>; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semianual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 74, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_January2012.pdf#view=fit; Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>; BBC, *Iraq electricity minister resigns after deadly protests*, 21 June 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10371581>.

⁹³ Reportedly, enrolment rates at primary school level remain low, especially for girls and in rural areas. According to COSIT, primary school net enrolment for the academic year 2007/08 was 87%; however, there are significant differences between boys and girls, rural and urban areas. COSIT, cited in: UN, *Common Country Assessment Iraq - 2010*, p. 45, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/CCA_Final.pdf. According to reports, net enrolment figures for primary education vary significantly among governorates. According to the IHSES 2007, it is highest in the Governorates of Diyala, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah (91%-92%) and lowest in the Governorates of Missan (66%), Babel,

Muthanna, Najef, Diwaniyah, Thi-Qar and Salah Al-Din (67%-78%). World Bank/COSIT/KRSO, *IHSES 2007*, cited in: IAU, *Net enrollment ratio in primary education*, August 2010, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/331/MDG_ACHIEVE_UNIVERSAL_PRIMARY_EDUCATION_07.jpg. According to UNICEF, using data provided by the Iraqi Ministry of Education, girls' enrolment numbers remain significantly lower than that of boys. Figures for 2007-2008 showed that 44.8 % of the children enrolled in primary education were girls. This means that for every 100 boys enrolled in primary schools in Iraq, there are just under 89 girls. At secondary school level, for every 100 boys there were only 40 girls. Girls' enrolment in compulsory primary education is highest in the Northern Governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah and lowest in the Southern Governorates of Basrah, Qadissiyah and Wassit; UNICEF, *Girls Education in Iraq – 2010*, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1098/Girls-Education-Ban.pdf>. Reportedly, less than 50 percent of all children originally enrolled in primary school go on to enrol in intermediate and secondary school. MOE figures 2007/2008, cited in: UNICEF/EU, *UNICEF, European Union and Government of Iraq Launch €17M Programme to Improve Primary Education in Iraq*, 15 May 2011, http://ceas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/documents/press_corner/news_2011/15052011_eu_education_project_launch_press_release_en.pdf. Furthermore, reports indicate many schools are in need of repair and reconstruction. According to UNICEF, 49% of school buildings in Iraq are in dire need of renovation and 21% are extremely unsuitable, leaving only 30% in an acceptable physical status. As a result, student to classroom ratio has reached 46:1 in some areas hosting a large number of IDPs. UNICEF, *Girls Education in Iraq – 2010*, Appendix 1, p. 51, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1098/Girls-Education-Ban.pdf>; UN, *Common Country Assessment Iraq – 2010*, p. 46, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/CCA_Final.pdf. UNICEF noted that attacks against schools and education professionals have significantly increased. While not all the attacks are specifically aimed at schools, they nevertheless impact a child's right to education. UNICEF, *On the Day of the Iraqi Child, UNICEF reconfirms its commitment to protect the rights of children in Iraq*, 13 July 2011, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/media_59212.html. See also chapter "Certain Professionals – Academics".

⁹⁴ All Iraqis are entitled to public personal health services at minimal charges. It is reported that the majority of Iraqis lack many of the most essential health services with health centres in dire need of rehabilitation, a lack of qualified and experienced medical staff and a lack of drugs, medical supplies and equipment. While services in private clinics may be better and waiting times shorter, 71 percent of households surveyed said that lack of affordability was a barrier to access such facilities. Less than a third of households (29%) have a positive opinion of health services (18 percent in rural areas, 33 percent in urban areas). Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>; WHO, *2011 Review*, p. 5, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/Review_report2011.pdf. Reports indicate that poor electricity, water, sanitation and waste disposal further aggravate the situation and result in poor hygienic standards and high rates of infections, especially among trauma victims, pregnant women and children. According to ICRC, "even minor accidents can sometimes be fatal because of inappropriate care." ICRC, *Putting the health-care system back on its feet*, 29 July 2010, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/iraq-update-290710.htm>. Medical doctors, surgeons and nurses have been subjected to threats and targeted violence and many consequently left the country; see "Professionals". Consequently, Iraq still ranks last in most of the major maternal and child health indicators for countries in the region. Iraq's Under-Five Mortality Rate currently stands at 41 per 1,000 live births. Iraq's high maternal mortality ratio, 84 per 100,000 live births, along with high infant mortality, 35 per 1,000 live births, places it in the group of 68 countries globally, which account for the vast majority (97%) of maternal and child deaths worldwide. WHO, *2011 Review*, p. 28, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/Review_report2011.pdf; UNICEF, *An Iraq Fit For Children: Building Iraq's Future*, Quarterly Newsletter, Issue 01, 2010, March 2010, p. 6, <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UNICEF%20Iraq%20Fit%20For%20Children%20Newsletter%20Issue%201.pdf>.

⁹⁵ Unemployment rates are reportedly estimated at 15 to 30 percent and often public sector jobs are the only ones available. SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 3, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_January_2012.pdf#view=fit. According to IKN, the national unemployment rate, using the relaxed definition, stands at 11 percent (9 percent for males and 21 percent for females). However, among the youth (15-24 years of age), the unemployment rate are reportedly high at 18 percent (27 percent of females and 17 percent of males), particularly affecting those with higher education. Fourty percent are employed in the public sector (45 percent in urban areas and 28 percent in rural areas). It is reported that the highest unemployment rates can be found in Thi-Qar (17%), Al-Anbar (16%) and Diyala (14%) Governorates. Kirkuk (2%), Erbil (4%) and Ninewa (5%) Governorates have the lowest. Female unemployment rates are highest in Diyala (30%) Kerbala and Thi-Qar (18%), and Sulaymaniyah (17%) Governorates. The lowest rates are found in Kirkuk (3%) and Salah Al-Din (4%). Male unemployment rates are the highest in Al-Anbar (17%), Thi-Qar (16%) and Diyala (11%) Governorates. The lowest are in the governorates of Kirkuk (2%) and Erbil (3%). In addition, underemployment stood at nine percent. Only 1 out of 6 persons in the labour force is a woman. IKN, *Labour Force Factsheet*, December 2011, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1582/LB%20Factsheet-English.pdf>. See also Dahr Jamaal, *Iraq: A country in shambles*, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/20121411519385348.html>.

⁹⁶ It is reported that Iraq has a shortage of up to two million dwellings and many of the existing dwellings are dilapidated, overcrowded and structurally unsafe. In recent years, there has been an increase in informal housing, including squatting in public buildings and proliferation of small informal settlements, where living conditions are often sub-standard. IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 7, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf); Ministry of Construction and Housing, *Iraq National Housing Policy*, October 2010, pp. 9, 27, http://www.unhabitat.org/jo/en/inp/Upload/634247_INHP_English%20Version.pdf. Among Iraqi households surveyed in 2011, nine percent of houses are made of non-durable materials (clay, wood, or metal plating). Most of them (73%) are found in rural areas. Housing from non-durable materials is most common in rural areas of Missan (57% of households), Wassit (48%), Mosul (38%) and Kirkuk (37%). Overcrowding was reportedly found to be a problem with 12 percent of households surveyed having more than three persons per room (17 percent in rural areas and 25 percent among households living in non-durable structures). Overcrowding is particularly common in rural areas of Missan (49 percent of households) and also affects approximately a quarter of households in rural Thi-Qar, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Kirkuk and Ninewa, and 10 percent of households in Baghdad. Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 3, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>.

⁹⁷ By August 2011, Iraq accounted for more than 1.25 million IDPs displaced in and after 2006. It is not known how many Iraqis remain displaced outside Iraq, but by December 2011, more than 168,000 Iraqis remain registered with UNHCR offices in the region, mostly in Syria and Jordan. UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, December 2011, pp. 1-2, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3434.pdf. See also "Conflict-Induced Displacements and Voluntary Returns".

⁹⁸ UNHCR, *IDPs in settlements in Iraq*, April 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_660.pdf.

⁹⁹ Rania El Gamal, *ANALYSIS-Iraq al-Qaeda regroups, Shi'ite militias threaten*, Reuters, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-iraq-al-qaeda-regroups-shiite-militias-threaten>.

¹⁰⁰ It needs to be reiterated that many in most cases, the perpetrator of violence is reportedly unknown. Reports indicate that, armed groups often only publicly claim high-profile cases for propaganda purpose. The description of actors of violence and their main tactics and targets therefore remain indicative and are by no means exhaustive.

¹⁰¹ The Governor of Kirkuk, Najmudine Karim, reportedly stated that: “there is coordination between Qaeda and Ansar Al Sunna and the Naqshbandi Army to carry out terrorist acts inside and outside Kirkuk.” NINA, *Kirkuk Governor: we have no desire or plan to bring in international forces*, 10 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJFGJG.

¹⁰² Reports indicate that targeting Shi’ite civilians and religious sites differentiates ISI/AQI and Ansar Al-Islam from most other armed Sunni groups in Iraq, such as the 1920s Revolution Brigades, Hamas in Iraq, the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Mujahideen Army or Ansar Al-Sunna Sharia, which do not condone AQI’s tactics. Several of these groups also reportedly formed anti-ISI/AQI coalitions, the Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance (IRPC) in November 2007, and the Jihad and Reform Front (RJF) in May 2007. Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Al Qaeda in Iraq*, last updated 11 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/1>; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Sunna Sharia*, last updated 5 August 2011, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/11#footn12>; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Islamic Army in Iraq*, last updated 9 January 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/5>; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Hamas in Iraq*, last updated 26 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/29>; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Mujahideen Army*, last updated 29 July 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/3>.

¹⁰³ For example, recently there have been reports of several attacks on “Freedom Base” in Kirkuk which houses the US Consulate in the city. See for example, Abdulah al-Amiri, *Rockets fall on military base in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 18 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/296591/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Freedom base in Kirkuk hit by 3 rockets*, 3 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(kjew5v55bs1355mhfmibezw\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146762&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(kjew5v55bs1355mhfmibezw))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146762&l=1); Aswat al-Iraq, *Four rockets fired on US consulate in Kirkuk*, 19 December 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(hxyiqn45ftzupurrbhv13xnl\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146094&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(hxyiqn45ftzupurrbhv13xnl))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146094&l=1). See also Suadad al-Salhy, *Iraq Sunni insurgents keep fighting after U.S. pullout*, Reuters, 29 February 2012, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/uk-iraq-insurgents-idUKTRES1S0YI20120229>.

¹⁰⁴ Originally, Jordanian Abu Mussab Al-Zarqawi reportedly founded the group in 2002 under the name “Tawhid wa’l Jihad”. As of October 2004, when the group formally joined Al-Qa’eda, the name changed to “Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn” (Al-Qa’eda in Iraq, AQI). Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Al Qaeda in Iraq*, last updated 11 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/1>.

¹⁰⁵ It is reported that the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al-Iraq Al-Islamiyya, ISI) was created in 2006 by Abu Ayub al-Masri, who placed Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi, as its leader. ISI superseded a previous umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC). ISI was formed as a governmental structure with a complete cabinet and also included several other, smaller insurgent groups. It is believed that ISI was established to give AQI, which at the height of the insurgency in 2005-2007 had a significant component of foreign fighters, an “Iraqi face”. Abu Umar al-Baghdadi was reportedly killed on 18 April 2010. Since then, no new leadership has been announced. Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Al Qaeda in Iraq*, last updated 11 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/1>; Greg Bruno and Julia Jeffrey, *Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia)*, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 April 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-al-qaeda-iraq-k-al-qaeda-mesopotamia/p14811>. The Islamic State of Iraq was to include the Governorates of Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Salah Al-Din and Wassit. David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, footnote 9, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, *Iraq Index - Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, Brookings, 30 November 2011, p. 4, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf>; Reuters, *Some 1,000 al Qaeda still in Iraq - CIA chief says*, 9 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/some-1000-al-qaeda-still-in-iraq-cia-chief-says/>. According to Qassem Atta, a Baghdad military spokesman, AQI has still around 3,000 members; AFP, *Suicide bomb kills 15 at Baghdad police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/world/suicide-bomb-kills-15-at-baghdad-police-academy-2012-02-19-1.443803>.

¹⁰⁷ See also “Security Incidents - Central Iraq”.

¹⁰⁸ Rania El Gamal, *ANALYSIS-Iraq al-Qaeda regroups, Shi’ite militias threaten*, Reuters, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-iraq-al-qaeda-regroups-shiite-militias-threaten/>. Reportedly, some Shi’ite militia members cooperated with AQI to execute terrorist attacks against the Iraqi Government in Southern Iraq as they have a common hatred against Iran. Other Shi’ites cooperated with AQI for mere profit; Nizar Latif, *Shiite gangs join al Qaeda in Iraq*, The National, 13 September 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/shiite-gangs-join-al-qaeda-in-iraq?pageCount=0>. In 2010 it was reported that AQI pays Shi’ites to gather intelligence and plant bombs in Shi’ite-dominated areas where AQI does not have a base; Timothy Williams, *Insurgent Group in Iraq, Declared Tamed, Roars*, New York Times, 27 September 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/middleeast/28qaeda.html>. See also “Security Incidents - Southern Iraq”.

¹⁰⁹ See chapters “Shi’ite civilians, including pilgrims” and “Individuals with Ethnicity-based Claims”.

¹¹⁰ For example, AKnews reported in January 2012 that ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for attacks on security and government officials in Mosul; Rizan Ahmed, *Al-Qaeda in Mosul lost third of their finances says official*, AKnews, 29 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286958/>. NINA, the Iraqi National News Agency, reported in August 2011, that ISI had distributed leaflets in Hawija (Kirkuk) threatening those that collaborate with the ISF; NINA, *Group of Islamic State of Iraq threatens of killing detectives in Kirkuk*, 6 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHIKMK. See also chapter “Individuals Associated with (or Perceived to be Supporting) the Iraqi Authorities and the (former) MNF-I/USF-I”.

¹¹¹ In particular, members of the ISF, members of the Sahwa, members of political parties, journalists, tribal, religious and community leaders; see relevant chapters. For example, on 24 January 2012, Mullah Nadim al-Juburi, a former senior AQI leader in Dhululiyah (Salah Al-Din), who joined the Sahwa and sided with the US Forces as of 2008 and a member of the national reconciliation commission, was reportedly killed by gunmen in Baghdad’s Al-Liqa’a Square. The killing came after Al-Juburi made remarks on Iraqi television of ISI’s leadership structure and provided names. Several messages on a jihadist Internet forum had warned that Al-Juburi’s “days are numbered”. Al-Juburi had reportedly only returned to Iraq a few days earlier from Jordan, where he had been in exile for the last two years; AFP, *Assassins kill Iraq Qaeda leader-turned-critic*, 25 January 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1179065/1.html; The Voice of Russia, *Former Iraqi Al Qaeda leader killed in Baghdad*, 25 January 2012, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012/01/25/64603824.html>.

¹¹² Reportedly, as of late 2006, Sunni tribes and former insurgents formed the Sahwa groups and turned against AQI, rejecting its extremist ideology and foreign leadership. John Ward Anderson and Salih Dehima, *Offensive Targets Al-Qaeda In Iraq*, Washington Post, 20 June 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/19/AR2007061900315.html>; Bill Roggio, *1920s Revolution*

Brigades turns on al Qaeda in Diyala, The Long War Journal, 12 June 2007, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/06/1920s_revolution_bri.php

¹¹³ Recent casualties include for example, the reported death of Majid Hassan Ali (Abu Ayman), ISI's head of operations in the city of Mosul, in a firefight south of the city with the ISF on 21 January 2012 AFP, *Police kill senior Qaeda leader in Iraq encounter*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/22-Jan-2012/police-kill-senior-qaeda-leader-in-iraq-encounter>. In addition, US officials relayed that Al-Qaeda's global second-in-command, Atiyah abd Al-Rahman, a Libyan who played a key role in managing ties between the leadership and AQI, was killed in Pakistan on 22 August 2011. On 24 February 2011, ISI's war minister was reportedly killed in an ISF raid in Hit (Al-Anbar); and in November 2010, reports indicate that the ISF captured ISI's security minister and the group's military commander for Baghdad in separate raids in Ramadi and Baghdad. Muhanad Mohammed, *Al Qaeda Iraq "war minister" killed in raid*, Reuters, 25 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/al-qaeda-iraq-war-minister-killed-in-raid/>; Bill Roggio, *Al Qaeda in Iraq's security minister captured in Anbar*, The Long War Journal, 1 December 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/12/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_se_1.php. See also a list of AQI leaders killed or arrested between January and May 2010: Bill Roggio, *Al Qaeda in Iraq is 'broken,' cut off from leaders in Pakistan, says top US general*, The Long War Journal, 5 June 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/al_qaeda_in_iraq_is.php.

¹¹⁴ In November 2009, US and Iraqi officials reported that ISI/AQI had transformed from a foreign-led organization to a network of mostly Iraqi fighters. Ernesto Londoño, *Al-Qaeda in Iraq gaining in strength*, Washington Post, 22 November 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102009.html>. See also, New York Times, *Al Qaeda in Iraq (Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia)*, updated 16 January 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_mesopotamia/index.html?inline=nyt-org. However, AQI still contains foreign fighters from other countries. Pam Dockins, *Analysts: Al-Qaida in Iraq Aims to Stir Sectarian Strife*, VOA, 29 December 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Al-Qaida-in-Iraq-Aims-to-Stir-Sectarian-Strife-136395608.html>.

¹¹⁵ According to Iraqi officials. Rania El Gamal, *ANALYSIS-Iraq al-Qaeda regroup, Shi'ite militias threaten*, Reuters, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-iraq-al-qaeda-regroups-shiite-militias-threaten>.

¹¹⁶ According to reports, major attacks in 2012, 2011 and 2010 for which the ISI/AQI claimed responsibility or was held responsible include, for example:

- On 20 March 2012, at least 46 people were killed and more than 200 wounded in a wave of coordinated attacks targeting mostly Shi'ite pilgrims and police and government officials in eight cities and towns across Iraq despite heavy security measures taken ahead of the Arab League Summit. AQI claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying that it targeted the plan of the "fool government preparing" for the forthcoming Summit. Lara Jakes, *Al-Qaida claims responsibility for Iraq attacks*, AP, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>, 21 March 2012, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>. According to John Drake, a senior risk consultant at the AKE Group, the attacks were "likely an attempt to show the authorities that their security measures are insignificant." Agencies, *Iraq bombs kill scores before Arab League summit*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/iraq-bombs-kill-dozens>.
- On 5 March 2012, dozens of alleged AQI fighters, some wearing army uniforms, shot and killed 27 policemen when they attacked checkpoints and the homes of two officers in Haditha. Fadhel al-Badrani, *Gunmen kill 27 in raids on west Iraq checkpoints*, Reuters, 5 March 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-27-in-raids-on-west-iraq-checkpoints/>; Jack Healy, *Gunmen in Uniforms Kill 20 Police Officers in Iraq*, New York Times, 5 March 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/middleeast/police-killed-in-iraq.html>.
- On 23 February 2012, simultaneous early morning attacks involving bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 55 people and wounded more than 200. In Baghdad, at least 32 people were killed in 10 explosions in mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods. More than a dozen blasts and attacks hit other cities and towns in Al-Anbar, Babel, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din Governorates, many of them targeting police. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying that it targeted security forces and government officials in "revenge for the elimination and torture campaigns that Sunni men and women face in the prisons of Baghdad and other cities." Bushra Juh, *Al-Qaeda claims deadly Iraq attacks*, AP, 25 February 2012, <http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/alqaeda-claims-deadly-iraq-attacks-20120225-1tuk1.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAEl6zUR_story.html.
- On 19 February 2012, a suicide bomber detonated his car as a group of police recruits left their academy in Baghdad, killing 20 and wounding at least 28. AP, *Iraq suicide car bomber kills 20 at police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/19/MN6O1N9SM8.DTL>. AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, saying "[T]hese graduates are qualified by the Safavid government to periodically control land in the Sunni areas and impose the reality of the situation in strengthening the rule of the (Shiites) in the land"; AFP, *Qaeda claims Iraq police academy attack: SITE*, 17 March 2012, <http://www.france24.com/en/20120317-qaeda-claims-iraq-police-academy-attack-site>.
- On 14 January 2012, the last day of Arbaeen, a suicide bomber disguised as a policeman killed 64 and wounded more than 130 in an attack on Shi'ite pilgrims visiting Al-Khatwa mosque in Zubayar, west of Basrah city. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, saying "Sunni heroes of heroes" infiltrated Shi'ite processions with explosive vests, killing scores of "nonbelievers and Iranian agents" during Arbaeen commemorations; AP, *Iraq's al-Qaida claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites*, 6 February 2012, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/national_world&id=8533308; Aswat al-Iraq, *64 killings, 137 wounded in Basrah explosion*, 14 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(i0zhgdzzwjnzfrzwbzyg45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(i0zhgdzzwjnzfrzwbzyg45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>.
- On 5 January 2012, 48 pilgrims were killed and dozens wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives among pilgrims heading from Nasseriyyah (Thi-Qar) to Kerbala ahead of Arbaeen. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; AP, *Iraq's al-Qaida claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites*, 6 February 2012, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/national_world&id=8533308; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.
- On 26 December 2011, at least seven people were killed and 34 wounded when a suicide car bomber, who passed six security checkpoints, drove his vehicle into a security cordon at the main entrance of the heavily fortified Ministry of Interior in central Baghdad. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group claims to have hit Green Zone*, 10 January 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-claims-to-have-hit-green-zone/>

- On 22 December 2011, a series of coordinated attacks claimed by ISI/AQI ripped through markets, cafes and government buildings in Baghdad and killed 69 people; AP, *Al-Qaida in Iraq claims responsibility for Baghdad blasts*, 27 December 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/27/al-qaeda-in-iraq-baghdad>.
 - On 28 November 2011, a suicide car bomb explosion in a parking lot at the CoR in Baghdad's International Zone killed at least one person and wounded six, including MP Muayad Al-Tayyeb, the spokesman for the Kurdish bloc in CoR. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group claims to have hit Green Zone*, 10 January 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-claims-to-have-hit-green-zone/>.
 - On 28 August 2011, a suicide attack against the Sunni Umm Al-Qura mosque in Baghdad's western Ghazaliyah district was reportedly targeted at him. He and another 39 people were wounded in the attack, which also killed 32 people.. The US government said Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri (aka Abu Du'a), the alleged AQI leader, was responsible for this attack. AP, *US puts al-Qaida in Iraq leader on terrorist blacklist, offers \$10 million bounty*, 4 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-puts-al-qaeda-in-iraq-leader-on-terrorist-blacklist-offers-10-million-bounty/2011/10/04/gIQA1W5qKL_story.html.
 - On 5 May 2011, a suicide bomber rammed his car into the entrance of a police headquarters in Hilla (Babel) during a shift change in the morning, when many police officers were outside the building, killing at least 20 and wounding 80. AQI was reportedly responsible for the attack; AP, *US puts al-Qaida in Iraq leader on terrorist blacklist, offers \$10 million bounty*, 4 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-puts-al-qaeda-in-iraq-leader-on-terrorist-blacklist-offers-10-million-bounty/2011/10/04/gIQA1W5qKL_story.html.
 - On 9 February 2011, eight people died and 75 were wounded when three car bombs targeting ISF detonated in quick succession in a residential area in southern Kirkuk. The third explosion, allegedly caused by a suicide truck bomber, targeted a *Peshmerga* building and also caused damages to a nearby KDP office. Investigations by the ISF revealed that the attacks were the responsibility of AQI; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Three car bombs kill 7, wound 78 in Iraq's Kirkuk*, Reuters, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/three-car-bombs-kill-4-wound-20-in-iraqs-kirkuk/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Recent bombings made by al-Qaeda - Kirkuk police*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141036&l=1.
 - On 18 January 2011, a suicide bomber attacked a police recruitment centre in Tikrit (Salah Al-Din), killing 60 and wounding over 100 persons. AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, calling the police recruits “treacherous daggers”; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>; Sabah al-Bazee, *UPDATE 5-Suicide bomber kills up to 60 police recruits in Iraq*, Reuters, 18 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-5-suicide-bomber-kills-up-to-60-police-recruits-in-iraq/>.
 - On 31 October 2010, an attack on Our Lady of Salvation Catholic cathedral in Baghdad left more than 50 Christians, including two priests, and seven policemen dead, and triggered a fresh exodus of at least 1,000 Christian families, or 6,000 persons; Maysoun Abo al-Hab and Ron Synovitz, *More Iraqi Christians Consider Leaving Iraq After Attack on Baghdad Cathedral*, RFE/RL, 4 November 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/More_Iraqi_Christians_Consider_Leaving_Iraq_After_Attack_on_Baghdad_Cathedral/2210972.html. See also Joel Wing, *2011's Deadliest Al Qaeda In Iraq Attacks*, AKnews, 4 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282281/>.
- ¹¹⁷ Rowan Scarborough, *Al Qaeda in Iraq mounts comeback*, Washington Times, 4 March 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/4/al-qaeda-in-iraq-mounts-comeback/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS; Reuters, *Al-Qaeda reappears in Iraq's 'Triangle of Death'*, 18 November 2011, <http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article535368.ece>; UPI, *Iraqi militants on rise amid U.S. pullout*, 13 October 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/13/Iraqi-militants-on-rise-amid-US-pullout/UPI-11921318531853/; Bill Roggio, *US adds al Qaeda in Iraq's emir to list of designated terrorists*, The Long War Journal, 4 October 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/10/us_adds_al_qaeda_in.php. Rania El Gamal, *ANALYSIS-Iraq al-Qaeda regroups, Shi'ite militias threaten*, Reuters, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-iraq-al-qaeda-regroups-shiite-militias-threaten/>; Timothy Williams, *Insurgent Group in Iraq, Declared Tamed, Roars*, New York Times, 27 September 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/middleeast/28qaeda.html>.
- ¹¹⁸ Joost R. Hiltermann, deputy director for the Middle East and North Africa program at the International Crisis Group, cited in: Dan Morse, *Al-Qaeda-linked group asserts responsibility for 37 Baghdad attacks*, Washington Post, 9 January 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/baghdad-car-bombs-kill-at-least-14-as-wave-of-attacks-continues/2012/01/09/gIQAzL6k1P_story.html.
- ¹¹⁹ Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Deadly attacks thwart heightened security in Iraq*, AP, 12 March 2012, <http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/deadly-attacks-thwart-heightened-security-in-iraq-1.3596177>. Reportedly, AQI also imposes ‘taxes’ on local shop owners, contractors, government departments, merchants and wealthy citizens; Rizan Ahmed, *Al-Qaeda in Mosul lost third of their finances says official*, AKnews, 29 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286958/>; New York Times, *Al Qaeda in Iraq (Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia)*, updated 16 January 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_mesopotamia/index.html?inline=nyt-org; Charles Keyes, *A top U.S. Army officer in Iraq compares al Qaeda to a Mafia criminal gang*, CNN, 29 September 2011, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/29/a-top-u-s-army-officer-in-iraq-compares-al-qaeda-to-a-mafia-criminal-gang/>; Rania El Gamal, *ANALYSIS-Iraq al-Qaeda regroups, Shi'ite militias threaten*, Reuters, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-iraq-al-qaeda-regroups-shiite-militias-threaten/>. AQI and other Sunni extremist groups reportedly“(…) exploited various criminal activities to augment their financial base. Kidnapping, (...) was very lucrative, surpassed only by the profits from the theft, diversion, smuggling, and black market sales of oil. Car theft was another important source of funding for AQI, having become particularly important in Mosul when AQI and its affiliates concentrated there after setbacks in Al-Anbar and Baghdad. Extortion and various kinds of fraud are also core funding activities”; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. xiv, 115, 157-158, 230-231, 232-233, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>.
- ¹²⁰ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Al Qaeda in Iraq*, last updated 11 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/1>.
- ¹²¹ See chapter “Members of Political Parties”.
- ¹²² See chapter “Members of Religious Minorities”.
- ¹²³ See chapter “Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores”.
- ¹²⁴ See chapters on Women and Children.
- ¹²⁵ Over the years, it has undergone several splits and name changes; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, *Ansar al Islam names new leader*, The Long War Journal, 5 January 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/ansar_al_islam_names.php; Evan Kohlmann, *Ansar al-Sunnah Acknowledges Relationship with Ansar al-Islam, Reverts to Using Ansar al-Islam Name*, 16 December 2007, http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/12/ansar_alsunnah_acknowledges_re.php.
- ¹²⁶ The National Counterterrorism Center, *Counterterrorism Calender 2011 – Ansar Al-Islam*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ai.html>; Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012,

[http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam).

¹²⁷ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.

¹²⁸ In contrast to AQI, Ansar Al-Islam's leadership is Iraqi; Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012, [http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam). On 15 December 2011, Ansar Al-Islam released a statement in which he reportedly announced Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman Al-Ibrahim as its new leader; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, *Ansar al-Islam names new leader*, The Long War Journal, 5 January 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/ansar_al_islam_names.php.

¹²⁹ Bill Roggio, *Iraqi forces arrest leader of Ansar al Islam*, The Long War Journal, 4 May 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/iraqi_forces_arrest.php.

¹³⁰ The National Counterterrorism Center, *Counterterrorism Calender 2011 – Ansar Al-Islam*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ai.html>.

¹³¹ Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, *Ansar al Islam names new leader*, The Long War Journal, 5 January 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/ansar_al_islam_names.php.

¹³² Reportedly, Ansar Al-Islam was the first insurgent group to use female suicide bombers; Bill Roggio, *Iraqi forces arrest leader of Ansar al Islam*, The Long War Journal, 4 May 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/iraqi_forces_arrest.php.

¹³³ For example, on 16 March 2011, a car bomb near the Kirkuk General Hospital killed three and wounded 39 people in central Kirkuk. Reportedly, Ansar Al-Sunna was responsible for the attack; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 16*, 16 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-16/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Final result of Kirkuk blast – 39 injuries*, 16 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141493&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two persons behind recent attacks in Kirkuk arrested*, 5 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141809&l=1.

¹³⁴ Bryar Mohammed, *Ansar al-Sunnah's military commander detained in Khanaqin*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282964/>.

¹³⁵ For an overview of attacks against the USF-I between 2009 and mid 2011, see Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012,

[http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam).

¹³⁶ For an overview of attacks against the ISF between 2009 and mid 2011, see Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012,

[http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam). On 22 February 2012, it was reported that ISF arrested Waleed Khalid, an alleged Ansar Al-Islam leader when he tried to return to Iraq from Syria. He was reportedly carrying hit lists with names of Iraqi police and army officers; Anwar Msarbat, *Notorious insurgent leader detained while sneaking back into Iraq*, AKnews, 22 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291621/>. See also Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>. See also “*Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)*”.

¹³⁷ For example, on 12 July 2011, Ansar Al-Islam claimed responsibility for a car bombing that killed two Iraqi government officials in Baghdad on 17 June 2011; Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012, [http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam). See also “*Government Officials and Employees*”.

¹³⁸ According to reports, the largest attacks against Kurdish interests claimed by or reliably attributed to Ansar Al-Islam included:

- On 9 February 2011, a suicide bomber posing as a dairy deliveryman struck a Kurdish *Asayish* headquarters in Kirkuk, killing seven and wounding up to 80 persons, including several *Asayish* members. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, but one week earlier, Ansar Al-Sunna had reportedly issued threats against the Kurdish security forces and political parties in Kirkuk; AP, *Car Bombs in Northern Iraq Kill 7*, 9 February 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/02/09/car-bombs-northern-iraq-kill/>.
- 17 February 2009, Ansar Al-Islam claimed responsibility for an attack on a security officer working for the Kurdish Intelligence Agency, *Asayesh*, with a sticky bomb placed under the officer's vehicle; Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012, [http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam).
- On 13 August 2008, Ansar Al-Islam claimed an attack on a *Peshmerga* barracks, reportedly killing 19 people; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.
- On 16 July 2007, seven *Peshmerga* border guards and a civilian were killed in an ambush on the Iranian frontier near Penjwin (Sulaymaniyah); Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.
- On 8 May 2007, a suicide attack outside the KRG Ministry of Interior in Erbil killed 15 and wounded 65; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.
- On 1 February 2004, simultaneous suicide attacks at the headquarters of the KDP and the PUK in Erbil killed 105 and wounded 100 persons; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.

See also “*Members of Political Parties*” and “*Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)*”.

¹³⁹ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>. See also “*Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders*”.

¹⁴⁰ Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012, [http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20Al-Islam); Kathryn Gregory, *Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists)*, *Ansar al-Sunnah*, CFR, 5 November 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/ansar-al-islam-iraq-islamistskurdish-separatists-ansar-al-sunnah/p9237>.

It was reported that Ansar Al-Islam for example claimed the following recent attacks against Shi'ites,

- On 13 October 2011, at least 16 people have been killed by two blasts in Baghdad's predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhood of Sadr City; BBC, *Bomb blasts in Iraq's Sadr City kill 16*, 13 October 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15300037>; Joscelyn, *The*

- Terrorists' War in Iraq Continues*, The Weekly Standard, 26 October 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/terrorists-war-iraq-continues_604035.html.
- On 10 October 2011, at least 10 people were killed in three successive blasts in Baghdad's mainly Shi'ite Washash district. The first blast was followed by two more when emergency services arrived at the site to tend to the wounded; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bombers, attacks hit Baghdad police, 28 dead*, 12 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-attacks-hit-baghdad-police-28-dead/>; Thomas Joscelyn, *The Terrorists' War in Iraq Continues*, The Weekly Standard, 26 October 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/terrorists-war-iraq-continues_604035.html.
- See also "Shi'ite civilians, including pilgrims".
- ¹⁴¹ Bryar Mohammed, *Ansar al-Sunnah's military commander detained in Khanaqin*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282964/>.
- ¹⁴² Kathryn Gregory, *Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists)*, *Ansar al-Sunnah*, CFR, 5 November 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/ansar-al-islam-iraq-islamistskurdish-separatists-ansar-al-sunnah/p9237>.
- ¹⁴³ On 23 April 2007, Ansar Al-Islam reportedly pulled 23 Yazidis from a bus, deliberately separating them from others, and executed them in Mosul; National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report on Terrorism, 30 April 2008, p. 59, cited in: Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.
- ¹⁴⁴ Mulla Salim Khadr, a Shabak leader, had reportedly said that Ansar Al-Sunna had issued a statement in early January 2011, in which it called for the killing of Shabak and Shi'ite Turkmen for their affiliation with the US; Shafaq Media, *Shabak minority fears of attacks increase against them in Mosul News Agencies*, 12 January 2011, <http://www.shafaq.com/en/component/content/article/691-shabak-minority-fears-of-attacks-increase-against-them-in-mosul-news-agencies-.html>. See also Bryar Mohammed, *Ansar al-Sunnah's military commander detained in Khanaqin*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282964/>.
- ¹⁴⁵ Kathryn Gregory, *Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists)*, *Ansar al-Sunnah*, CFR, 5 November 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/ansar-al-islam-iraq-islamistskurdish-separatists-ansar-al-sunnah/p9237>. See also Australian National Security, *Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 March 2012, [http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What Governments are doing Listing of Terrorism Organisations Ansar Al-Islam](http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/WWW/NationalSecurity.nsf/Page/What%20Governments%20are%20doing%20Listing%20of%20Terrorism%20Organisations%20Ansar%20al-Islam); Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Ansar al-Islam*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/13>.
- ¹⁴⁶ For example, it was reported that in January 2012, ISF arrested a military commander of Ansar Al-Islam in Khanaqin, who was accused, inter alia, of killing a Turkicman selling alcohol; Bryar Mohammed, *Ansar al-Sunnah's military commander detained in Khanaqin*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282964/>. In 2006, Ansar Al-Islam reportedly decapitated several "homosexual transvestites"; Miguel Denyer, *Terrorism Profiles - Ansar al-Sunna (AS)*, The Overwatch Report, 24 June 2010, <http://overwatchreport.com/issue/the-overwatch-report-august-2010/article/terrorism-profiles-ansar-al-sunna-as>.
- ¹⁴⁷ The "Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way" (*Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, JRTN).
- ¹⁴⁸ The Naqshbandia was founded in 1389 by Sheikh Muhammad Baha' Al-Naqshbandi and is one of the major Sufi orders of Islam; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 31 October 2010, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>; USF-I, *The Insurgency*, last updated 31 July 2009, http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=729&Itemid=45. According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, "the group is a chameleon that has at time stressed its Islamist credentials, tribal networks and old Arab socialist roots as circumstances required"; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents – The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>.
- ¹⁴⁹ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>.
- ¹⁵⁰ JRTN is reportedly made up mainly from former (elite) military and intelligence officers and Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, former Vice-President under Saddam Hussein, seems to play a key role in the organization. Al-Douri reportedly leads one of JRTN's wings, while a rival wing is led by Muhammad Younis Al-Ahmad, a former senior member of the Ba'ath Party. JRTN is reportedly also linked to the "New Baath Party", which is also led by Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, the highest-ranking member of former President Saddam Hussein's regime still at large; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents -- The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>; Miguel Denyer, *Terrorism Profiles - The Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Order*, The Overwatch Report, 22 November 2010, <http://overwatchreport.com/issue/the-overwatch-report-november-2010/article/terrorism-profiles-the-army-men-of-al-naqshbandia-order>.
- ¹⁵¹ JRTN reportedly considers the MNF-I, including individuals, equipment and supplies, as legitimate targets at any time or place in Iraq; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>; Rafid Fadhel Ali, *Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq*, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 2, 25 January 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bttnews%5D=4683&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1.
- ¹⁵² Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>.
- ¹⁵³ NINA, *Kirkuk Governor: we have no desire or plan to bring in international forces*, 10 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJFGJG; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>.
- ¹⁵⁴ Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents – The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>.
- ¹⁵⁵ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>.
- ¹⁵⁶ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>; Miguel Denyer, *Terrorism Profiles - The Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Order*, The Overwatch Report, 22 November 2010, <http://overwatchreport.com/issue/the-overwatch-report-november-2010/article/terrorism-profiles-the-army-men-of-al-naqshbandia-order>; Rafid Fadhel Ali, *Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq*, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 2, 25 January 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Bttnews%5D=4683&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1.
- ¹⁵⁷ According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, JRTN "is rapidly becoming the most influential insurgent group in the country"; UPI, *Iraqi militants on rise amid U.S. pullout*, 13 October 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/13/Iraqi.

[militants-on-rise-amid-US-pullout/UPI-11921318531853/](http://www.militants-on-rise-amid-US-pullout/UPI-11921318531853/).

¹⁵⁸ JRTN's tactic to publicly focus on anti-coalition activities and to dissociate itself from attacks against Iraqi civilians reportedly provides it with an operational space in which it remains largely untouched by the ISF; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents — The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>; Michael Gissick, *US Targets Sunni Group in Northern Iraq*, Stars and Stripes, 25 May 2010 <http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-targeting-insurgent-group-in-n-iraq-1.103959>.

¹⁵⁹ JRTN has reportedly been linked to ISI/AQI car bombings in Ramadi, Kirkuk and Tikrit and some attacks by ISI/AQI have even been jointly claimed by JRTN. JRTN only publishes videos showing attacks against the USF-I; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents — The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>. According to US intelligence, ISI/AQI “has greater operational capabilities and allows the Naqshbandis to claim that they are not responsible for the deaths when they occur—something AQI is still all-too-happy to take credit for”; Kenneth M. Pollack, *Iraq and the Death of Bin Laden*, Brookings Institute, 14 May 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0502_bin_laden_iraq_pollack.aspx; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations — Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia*, last updated 15 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/75#ref4>.

¹⁶⁰ Including Jaysh Al-Islami, Hamas, Ansar Al-Islam and Jaysh Muhammad; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents — The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>.

¹⁶¹ Mainly in 2006 and 2007, see Sam Dagher, *As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum*, Christian Science Monitor, 17 September 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0917/p01s08-wome.html>; Babak Rahimi, *The Militia Politics of Basra*, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor No. 5, Issue 13, 6 July 2007, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4286&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1. See also UNHCR, *Addendum to UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers*, December 2007, pp. 25-27, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4766a69d2.html>.

¹⁶² The Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Corps or Badr Brigade) used to be the paramilitary wing of ISCI (formerly SCIRI) and was trained and controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran; Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran and Iraq*, USIP, December 2010, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Iran%20and%20Iraq.pdf>.

¹⁶³ It was reported that Muqtada Al-Sadr had announced the formation of the Mahdi Army (*Jaysh Al-Mahdi*, JAM) in 2003 to oppose the MNF-I's presence in Iraq. Its membership was estimated by the Iraq Survey Group to be around 60,000 in 2006. In August 2007, following a violent clash between the JAM and the Badr Organization in Kerbala, Al-Sadr ordered a temporary “freeze” on all JAM activity, which was subsequently extended. In June 2008, Al-Sadr announced that the majority of JAM would be transitioned into a socio-cultural organization (the *Mumahidun*) while a small group of well-trained and tightly controlled fighters (the *Promised Day Brigades*, PDB) would continue to target the foreign coalition. The *Mumahidun* are reportedly engaged in teaching religious classes, organizing sports events, collecting garbage, etc., with some believing that Al-Sadr aims at establishing a state within the state modelled after the Lebanese Hezbollah. Reportedly, in early 2010, Al-Sadr announced a third wing, *Al-Munaserun*, to focus on social issues; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations — Mahdi Army*, last updated 18 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/57#footn82>; Tim Arango, *Radical Cleric's Path, Now at a Crossroads, Could Turn Iraq, Too*, New York Times, 21 September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/world/middleeast/sadrs-path-could-determine-how-iraq-turns.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Between 2004 and 2008, JAM was reportedly considered to be the most powerful force in Iraq after the US forces; New York Times, *Mahdi Army*, updated 18 January 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/mahdi_army/index.html. See also David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, p. 18, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf; BBC, *What is Iraq's Mehdi Army?*, 25 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7312599.stm.

¹⁶⁵ Since 2003, the Badr Corps has been transformed into a political party, the Badr Organization, led by Hadi Al-Ameri (the current Minister of Transportation); Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran and Iraq*, USIP, December 2010, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Iran%20and%20Iraq.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ The Sadrist bloc currently holds 40 out of 325 seats in the CoR and is part of the ruling coalition. Al-Sadr used this political power to secure Prime Minister Al-Maliki a second term and to gain several ministerial posts; New York Times, *Mahdi Army*, updated 18 January 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/mahdi_army/index.html. Reportedly, Al-Sadr conditioned his support to Al-Maliki to the release of hundreds of JAM; Kelly McEvers, *Iraqi PM's Alliance With Cleric Prompts Concerns*, NPR, 8 November 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131153638>.

¹⁶⁷ There are reportedly no indications that Badr militants have been fully disarmed; Reidar Visser, *Religious Allegiances among Pro-Iranian Special Groups in Iraq*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 26 September 2011, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/religious-allegiances-among-pro-iranian-special-groups-in-iraq>. It has been reported that the Badr Organization would “almost certainly” have access to sophisticated Iranian weaponry; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, pp. 24, 41-42, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf. Al-Sadr dissolved the JAM in early 2008, but in mid November 2008 announced the formation of the Promised Day Brigades (*Liwa Al-Youm Al-Mawud*, PDB). Though exact figures are not available, it is estimated that there are as many as 25,000 - 40,000 members; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, p. 6, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf; Michal Harari, *Status Update: Shi'a Militias in Iraq*, Institute for the Study of the War, 16 August 2010, pp. 4-5, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_ShiaMilitias.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ In a statement posted on his website, Al-Sadr called upon his followers to cease their attacks on US forces, saying that he did not want the US to have an excuse to remain in Iraq beyond the December 2011 deadline. At the same time, he reportedly threatened that the attacks would resume if the US troops did not leave by the end of the year; Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations — Mahdi Army*, last updated 18 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/57>; Michael S. Schmidt and Zaid Thaker, *Iraqi Cleric Tells Followers to Halt Attacks*, New York Times, 10 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/world/middleeast/11sadr.html>; Suadad al-Salhy, *Iraq's Mehdi Army faces splits, wary of return to war*, Reuters, 16 June 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/16/us-iraq-security-mehdi-idUSTRE75F4C220110616>; Memri Blog, *Muqtada al-Sadr Escalates Threats Against U.S.*, 11 April 2011, http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/36527.htm; Nizar Latif, *13 Iraqis die in gun and bomb attacks*, *The National*, 16 August 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/13-iraqis-die-in-gun-and-bomb-attacks>.

¹⁶⁹ Under Bayan Jabr Solagh, a former Badr commander and Minister of Interior between April 2005 and May 2006, many Badr militants were reportedly integrated into the ISF, especially in the Special Police Commando units. Also, militiamen loyal to Shi'ite cleric Muqtada

Al-Sadr infiltrated the Ministry of Interior, in particular the police forces; Robert M. Perito, *The Iraq Federal Police*, USIP, Special Report 291, October 2011, p. 5, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR291_The_Iraq_Federal_Police.pdf; Adam Mausner, Charles Loi, and Peter Alsis, *US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Competition in Iraq*, CSIS, Draft 22 September 2011, p. 20, http://csis.org/files/publication/110927_Iran_Chapter_6_Iraq.pdf; Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran and Iraq*, USIP, December 2010, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Iran%20and%20Iraq.pdf>. There have been unconfirmed media reports in 2011 claiming that there was a secret agreement between the Iraqi Government and the Sadrist Trend to give preferential treatment to former JAM militants to integrate into the ISF; The National, *Iraq gives Mahdi militants preferential treatment*, 27 November 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/iraq-gives-mahdi-militants-preferential-treatment?pageCount=0>. The fact that Shi'ite militias have been integrated into the ISF blurs the line between state and non-state actors.

¹⁷⁰ Members of the Iraqi Police and Special Police Commando units such as the "Wolf Brigade", reportedly acted as death squads, kidnapping, imprisoning, torturing, and killing Sunnis; Robert M. Perito, *The Iraq Federal Police*, USIP, Special Report 291, October 2011, pp. 1, 5-6, 7, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR291_The_Iraq_Federal_Police.pdf. See also Gareth Porter, *Torture Orders Were Part of US Sectarian War Strategy*, IPS, 1 November 2010, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/11/01-6>.

¹⁷¹ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Mahdi Army*, last updated 18 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/57>; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, pp. 19, 26, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁷² The Special Groups are reportedly funded by Iran to varying extent. While Iran has reportedly been funding an array of Shi'ite political and armed groups (and even some Sunni insurgent groups) since 2003, by 2010, it has reportedly narrowed its support to PDB, AHH and KH; Michael Eisenstadt, *Iran and Iraq*, USIP, December 2010, <http://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/iranprimer.usip.org/files/Iran%20and%20Iraq.pdf>. See also Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS Report for Congress, 27 December 2011, p. 22, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; AP, *June deadliest month for U.S. troops in 2 years*, 30 June 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2011-06-30-us-troops-iraq_n.htm; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, p. 18, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf; Michal Harari, *Status Update: Shi'a Militias in Iraq*, Institute for the Study of the War, 16 August 2010, p. 1, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_ShiaMilitias.pdf.

¹⁷³ Stanford University, *Mapping Militant Organizations – Mahdi Army*, last updated 18 February 2012, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/57>; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq Shi'ite militia splinters into hit squads, gangs*, Reuters, 21 July 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/21/us-iraq-violence-mehdi-idUSTRE76K22E20110721>; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, p. 18, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁷⁴ League of the Righteous People.

¹⁷⁵ AAH is led by Qays Al-Khazali, a Shi'ite cleric and former JAM leader, who fell out with Muqtada Al-Sadr on several occasions since 2004 and finally split and founded the AHH in 2006. Like the JAM, it has been reported as opposing the presence of foreign forces in Iraq and has claimed responsibility for over 6,000 attacks on US, Coalition and Iraqi Forces. It has also been implicated in kidnappings and sectarian violence. Qays Al-Khazali, arrested by US Force in 2007, was released from US custody on 5 January 2010, reportedly in exchange for the release of British hostage Peter Moore. According to the New York Times, "[H]is release came after negotiations with American and Iraqi officials that left the United States hopeful that Khazali would renounce violence and steer his men toward the political system." However, a ceasefire observed by the group since 2009 and negotiations with the Iraqi Government have failed. The group reportedly has less than 1,000 armed militiamen, but enjoys the backing of tens of thousands of supporters. JAM and AHH remain rivals and have at times clashed violently; Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Iraq Shiite Militia, Will Reportedly Lay Down Arms*, AP, 6 January 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/06/asaib-ahl-al-haq-lay-down-arms_n_1189600.html; Emad al-Shara, *US Troops Face New Threat From Iraqi Shia Militia*, IWPR, 31 August 2011, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/us-troops-face-new-threat-iraqi-shia-militia>; Michal Harari, *Status Update: Shi'a Militias in Iraq*, Institute for the Study of the War, 16 August 2010, pp. 2-4, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_ShiaMilitias.pdf; David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, pp. 18-19, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁷⁶ *Kata'ib Hezbollah*, or the Brigades of the Party of God, is reportedly Baghdad-based and has about 1,000 fighters. It has been accused of being a surrogate of Iran's Quds Force in Iraq and is also allegedly affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Though not much is known about its leadership, Jamal Ja'far Muhammad, known as Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis ("The Engineer"), is said to be a key figure. He has been described as the right hand of Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iran's Quds Force and is wanted by Kuwait for his role in the bombing of Western embassies and an attempted assassination of the Emir of Kuwait in the 1980ies; however, his status as a member of the CoR provides him with parliamentary immunity; AP, *June deadliest month for U.S. troops in 2 years*, 30 June 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2011-06-30-us-troops-iraq_n.htm; International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), *Kata'ib Hezbollah*, last updated 5 March 2010, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/Kata'ibHezbollah-05March10.pdf>; Thomas Strouse, *Kata'ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq*, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume 8, Issue 9, 4 March 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5D=36109.

¹⁷⁷ See for example, Hassan Abdul Zahra, *Iraq's Sadr orders halt to US troop attacks*, AFP, 11 September 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ilnHwep4rd0h3BDpbIlg1b72h7kqg?docId=CNG.da70d7dead7770eedf43101a078fc471.5b1>; AP, *June deadliest month for U.S. troops in 2 years*, 30 June 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2011-06-30-us-troops-iraq_n.htm.

¹⁷⁸ David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly and Jessica Watkins, *Security in Iraq - A Framework for Analyzing Emerging Threats as U.S. Forces Leave*, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010, p. 18, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/rand_gompert1.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq Shi'ite militia splinters into hit squads, gangs*, Reuters, 21 July 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/21/us-iraq-violence-mehdi-idUSTRE76K22E20110721>; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. xiv-xv, 115, 160, 235-236, 238, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>.

¹⁸⁰ Reuters quoted Qays Al-Khazali as saying, "[W]e believe that we have carried out our role regarding the liberation of our country and restoring its sovereignty. This political achievement could not have been done without the Iraqi armed resistance"; Reuters, *Iraq Shi'ite militia says U.S. has 'failed,' pledges to lay down arms in wake of Sunni bombings*, 5 January 2012, <http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/05/iraq-shiite-militia-pledges-to-lay-down-arms/>. See also Sam Dagher and Ali A. Nabhan, *As Iraq*

Ignites, Cleric Seeks Gains, Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204331304577140633371615966.html>.

¹⁸¹ Kenneth Katzmman, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 22, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

¹⁸² Reports have indicated that it is not clear whether AAH would also disarm. Certainly, the Iraqi Government has not asked for AAH's disarmament and Amer Al-Khuzai, the government's adviser for National Reconciliation, was quoted as saying, "[T]he government will not buy up the group's weapons, but we are ready to take them if they want us to"; Joel Wing, *What Role Will The League Of The Righteous Play In Iraqi Politics?*, AKnews, 24 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/286150/>.

¹⁸³ As a sign of good faith, it returned the body of Alan McMenemy, a British bodyguard it had kidnapped and murdered back in 2007 to the British Embassy in Baghdad in January 2012; Sky News, *Body Of Briton Kidnapped In Iraq Handed Over*, 21 January 2012, <http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16153471>; Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Iraq Shiite Militia, Will Reportedly Lay Down Arms*, AP, 6 January 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/06/asaib-ahl-al-haq-lay-down-arms_n_1189600.html.

¹⁸⁴ According to Kenneth Katzmman of the CRS, AAH's "decision to compete in politics could end up weakening the Sadr faction"; Kenneth Katzmman, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 22, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>. Muqtada Al-Sadr denounced AAH, saying that they should not be allowed to participate in the political process as they had "Iraqi blood on their hands"; Abeer Mohammed, *Alarm as Shia Paramilitaries Enter Politics*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 385, 17 January 2012, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/alarm-shia-paramilitaries-enter-politics>; Patrick Cockburn, *Iran increases hold in Iraq as Shia militia enters politics*, Independent, 7 January 2012, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-increases-hold-in-iraq-as-shia-militia-enters-politics-6286339.html>; Jack Healy and Michael S. Schmidt, *Political Role for Militants Worsens Fault Lines in Iraq*, New York Times, 5 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/world/middleeast/iraqi-moves-to-embrace-militia-opens-new-fault-lines.html?_r=2. AAH has reportedly also partly turned into a social movement and opened religious schools to increase its influence among the Shi'ite community, again putting it at odds with the Sadr Movement; Irena L. Sargsyan, *A New Hezbollah in Iraq?*, The National Interest, 23 December 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/new-hezbollah-iraq-6268?page=1>. See also Joel Wing, *What Role Will The League Of The Righteous Play In Iraqi Politics?*, AKnews, 24 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/286150/>.

¹⁸⁵ Sam Dagher and Ali A. Nabhan, *As Iraq Ignites, Cleric Seeks Gains*, Christian Science Monitor, 6 January 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204331304577140633371615966.html>.

¹⁸⁶ Aref Mohammed, *Iraq militia says to keep weapons, citing instability*, Reuters, 17 January 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/17/us-iraq-militia-idUSTRE80G1OA20120117>; Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Iraq Shiite Militia, Will Reportedly Lay Down Arms*, AP, 6 January 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/06/asaib-ahl-al-haq-lay-down-arms_n_1189600.html.

¹⁸⁷ See chapter "Former Ba'ath Party Members and Members of the Former Regime".

¹⁸⁸ See chapter "Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

¹⁸⁹ See chapter "Government Officials and Employees".

¹⁹⁰ According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as part of intra-Shi'ite power struggles "Shia political parties have carried out a wave of Shia-on-Shia assassination attempts against Iraqi Army division commanders, political party bosses, and local representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani"; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Relentless Insurgency*, Real Clear World, 25 August 2011, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/08/25/iraqs_relentless_insurgency_99641-2.html. See also chapters "Members of Political Parties" and "Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams".

¹⁹¹ For example, KH reportedly "mounts attacks on Coalition troops and patrols, as well as threatens Iraqi politicians and civilians that are in support of democratic reform in the country that does not result in an Islamic Shi'ite leadership"; International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), *Kata'ib Hezbollah*, last updated 5 March 2010, p. 9, <http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/GroupProfiles/Kata'ibHezbollah-05March10.pdf>. See also chapter "Individuals Affiliated with the USF-I, Foreign Governments, NGOs or Companies".

¹⁹² See chapter "Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores".

¹⁹³ See chapter "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals".

¹⁹⁴ According to Joel Wings, "(...) the insurgency and militias also became intertwined with organized crime. Many criminals joined militant groups, while militants turned to crime for funding"; Joel Wings, *The Growth Of Organized Crime And Gangs In Iraq*, Musings on Iraq, 1 August 2010, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2010/08/growth-of-organized-crime-and-gangs-in.html>. For example, during the sectarian conflict, JAM was reportedly engaged in confiscating cars and houses from Sunnis, an illicit activity that was "inextricably linked with, if not done completely under the guise of sectarian cleansing"; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. xiv-xv, 160, 235, 237, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ It was suspected that AQI cooperated with Shi'ite militias and criminal groups to execute terrorist attacks in Southern Iraq; Nizar Latif, *Shiite gangs join al Qaeda in Iraq*, The National, 13 September 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/shiite-gangs-join-al-qaeda-in-iraq?pageCount=0>. "Cooperation occurred between criminal organizations on the one side and terrorist and insurgent organizations on the other; some groups pursued both political and financial agendas; and some individuals and groups were transformed by events or opportunities, in effect moving from one identity to another. Moreover, different actors overlapped and intersected in complex ways"; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. 53-54, 116, 131, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ Iraq reportedly saw a massive upsurge in kidnappings for economic and political motives, or both, after 2003. Criminals as well as Iraqi and foreign insurgents have been named as perpetrators. Motives behind kidnappings are often difficult to assess: "In Iraq it is often unclear who is responsible for particular kidnappings, how and why specific individuals are targeted, or why some kidnap victims are killed while others are released unharmed"; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. 105-107, 109, 147, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>. For kidnappings for the purpose of forced prostitution and (sex) trafficking, see chapter "Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking or Forced Prostitution".

¹⁹⁷ "In some cases, kidnapping was done for profit, but the victim was also told to leave the country or face death. This seems to have been particularly prevalent in kidnappings of scientists, university professors, and doctors. Although the primary motive was profit, a political motive typically related either to sectarian cleansing or to the elimination of secular professions and the transformation of Iraq into a theocracy overlay the profit motive." Widespread kidnappings as a means for sectarian cleansing have also proven to be effective during the years of sectarian conflict. Often, the perpetrators murdered their victims. If not, the kidnapping served as a method to intimidate the victim and his/her family, who may then decide to leave the neighbourhood or the country; Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. 109-111, 121-122, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf>.

¹⁹⁸ Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq*, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009, pp. 199, 271, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub930.pdf>. See also Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq Shi'ite militia splinters into hit squads*, Reuters, 21 July 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/21/us-iraq-violence-mehdi-idUSTRE76K22E20110721>.

¹⁹⁹ "(...) many officials are corrupted themselves either being directly involved in crimes or getting payoffs to look the other way"; Joel Wings, *The Growth Of Organized Crime And Gangs In Iraq*, Musings on Iraq, 1 August 2010, <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2010/08/growth-of-organized-crime-and-gangs-in.html>. Reports indicate that Iraq sees a considerable number of prison breakouts, including by alleged terrorism suspects/convicts. It has been alleged that corrupt prison officials and even senior government officials facilitate the escapes. A parliamentary committee was set up to investigate the escape of 12 AQI figures, including Majid Abdul Aziz, alleged to be AQI's commander for Southern Iraq, some of them sentenced to death, from an interrogation centre in Basrah on 12 January 2011. According to Suzan Al Saad, a committee member, the probe had "led directly to senior officials in the prime minister's office who planned the escape." The escapees were provided police uniforms by prison guards and thus able to walk out of the prison unnoticed; see for example, Raman Brosk, *Prisons are terrorist breeding grounds where plots are hatched*, AKNews, 30 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/287231/>; Laith Hammoudi, *At least 30 Iraqi prisoners tunnel free in latest escape*, McClatchy Newspapers, 1 September 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/01/122896/at-least-30-iraqi-prisoners-tunnel.html>; AP, *4 al Qaeda Suspects Escape from Iraq Prison*, 9 September 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/09/world/main6848983.shtml>; Dina Al-Shibeeb, *Al Qaeda members escape from Iraq prisons, and reportedly form militias*, Al Arabiya, 4 June 2011, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/04/151769.html>. On 20 May 2011, five alleged JAM members reportedly escaped from the Taji prison (Salah Al-Din) as they were being transferred to a detention centre in Baghdad. Haider Al Saadi, a spokesman for the Ministry of Justice said that "weak and corrupted" officials allowed "a large number" of detainees to escape. He also spoke of the ministry's "serious concerns" over sectarianism among prison officials and said that prison staff was susceptible to "political pressure." Earlier in 2011, Adnan Taj Shalal Sharhan, a leading AAH figure, reportedly escaped from the same prison. According to the Iraqi Reconciliation Society (IRS), an independent organization that monitors Iraq's prisons, around 4,000 militants and terrorists have escaped detention with inside help since 2006. The IRS puts the blame on corrupt prison officials, bribery and political connections; Dina Al-Shibeeb, *Al Qaeda members escape from Iraq prisons, and reportedly form militias*, Al Arabiya, 4 June 2011, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/04/151769.html>; Nizar Latif, *Corruption blamed for escape of 4,000 militants from Iraq prisons*, The National, 3 June 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/corruption-blamed-for-escape-of-4-000-militants-from-iraq-prisons>.

²⁰⁰ See chapter "Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances".

²⁰¹ See chapter "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals".

²⁰² See UNHCR, *UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-seekers*, August 2007, pp. 41-44, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb05557.html>.

²⁰³ See "(Perceived) Political Opponents".

²⁰⁴ See chapter "Journalists".

²⁰⁵ See chapter "Protestors".

²⁰⁶ See chapter "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals".

²⁰⁷ See "Protestors".

²⁰⁸ It was reported that the rate of Iraqi civilian deaths caused by US-led coalition forces has declined steadily from 2009, along with the gradual reduction of troops and the hand-over of security responsibilities to the ISF. In 2011, a total of 19 civilian deaths were reported to be directly attributed to actions involving US-led coalition forces (down from 32 in 2010), the lowest rate since 2003. In total, IBC documented 14,712 civilian deaths directly caused by the US-led coalition between 2003 and 2011. At the same time, the rate of civilian deaths caused by the ISF has increased, rising from 96 in 2010 to 141 in 2011; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003-2011*, updated 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 10, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

²⁰⁹ According to the US Department of State, "Impunity for security forces continued, although there were indications that some disciplinary action was taken against security forces accused of having committed human rights abuses and judicial follow-up in some torture cases, but little information was publicly available." In a positive development, the CoR has reportedly repealed Article 136(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permitted Iraqi ministers to block investigations of their subordinates. As a result, there had hardly been any prosecutions of security force officials, especially high-ranking officials, for corruption or torture; SIGIR, *Message From The Special Inspector General For Iraqreconstruction*, July 2011, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Message_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 7, 12, 13-14, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 53, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. HRW said that "[S]ecurity forces in Iraq, particularly in detention facilities, violate rights with impunity, and the government too often looks the other way;" HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>. See also Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, 13 September 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8d8dbd12.html>.

²¹⁰ See "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities".

²¹¹ See "There were press reports and credible accounts of KRG security forces committing arbitrary or unlawful killings and arrests"; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

²¹² See "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities".

²¹³ UN General Assembly, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html>.

²¹⁴ UN General Assembly, *Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31 January 1967, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html>.

²¹⁵ UN General Assembly, *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html>.

²¹⁶ According to the US Department of State, "(...) continuing violence, corruption, and organizational dysfunction undermined the government's ability to protect human rights;" US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 1, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

²¹⁷ There are reportedly three principal components of the ISF: the Iraqi Army, under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, and the Iraqi Police and the Iraq Federal Police, both under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The ISF currently consists of around 930,000 members, including 650,000 police and 280,000 military members, according to Iraqi government figures; AFP, *Iraq forces ready internally but face external gaps*, 12 December 2011,

http://www.khaleejtimes.com/displayarticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/December/middleeast_December291.xml§ion=middleeast&col=

²¹⁸ According to the Chief Justice of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC), Medhat al-Mahmoud, police in Iraq are widely “prone to corruption”; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 79, [http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report - January 2012.pdf#view=fit](http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit). It has been reported that members of the ISF arrest, detain and torture people simply in order to extort money from them and their families. Bribes are also reportedly requested in order to free a detainee already acquitted by the judicial authorities, or to provide families with information on the whereabouts of a detainee. According to evidence collected by the Guardian, “[I]raqi state security officers are systematically arresting people on trumped-up charges, torturing them and extorting bribes from their families for their release”; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, *Corruption in Iraq: 'Your son is being tortured. He will die if you don't pay'*, The Guardian, 16 January 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/16/corruption-iraq-son-tortured-pay>; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, 13 September 2010, p. 16, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8ddbd12.html>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

²¹⁹ According to Anthony H. Cordesman of the CSIS, “[T]here are almost 600,000 Iraqi security personnel. Some of them almost certainly are tied to extremist groups;” Michael Lipin, *Iraq's Sectarian Tensions Create Opportunities for Attacks*, VOA, 3 February 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/iraq/Iraqs-Sectarian-Tensions-Create-Opportunities-for-Attacks-138641804.html>. See also Yazn al-Shummari, *Breaches in the ranks of the security services*, AKnews, 19 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285185/>.

²²⁰ See “Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)”.

²²¹ See “Background Information”.

²²² According to Maria Fantappie, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, the ISF’s performance has been “undermined by the political rivalries that have spread from the government to the highest ranks of the armed forces.” Furthermore, PM Al-Maliki, who heads the ministries of defence, interior and national security has reportedly appointed political allies to top security posts, thereby further undermining the ISF’s effectiveness; Michael Lipin, *Iraq's Sectarian Tensions Create Opportunities for Attacks*, VOA, 3 February 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/iraq/Iraqs-Sectarian-Tensions-Create-Opportunities-for-Attacks-138641804.html>.

²²³ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 14, 20, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

²²⁴ According to the US Department of State, “(...) judges were vulnerable to intimidation and violence. There were reports that criminal cases at the trial level or on appeal to the Court of Cassation were decided by corruption or intimidation”; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, 13 September 2010, pp. 17-18, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c8ddbd12.html>.

²²⁵ Yazn al-Shummari, *Breaches in the ranks of the security services*, AKnews, 19 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285185/>; Nizar Latif, *Al Qaeda 'making a comeback', security forces in Iraq warn*, The National, 10 May 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/al-qaeda-making-a-comeback-security-forces-in-iraq-warn?pageCount=0#full>.

²²⁶ ICG described the judicial system as “highly vulnerable to political pressure;” International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. ii, 24-25, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>. And according to the US Department of State, “The law provides for an independent judiciary. Although the judicial system was credited with efforts to maintain an independent stance, the security situation in the country rendered the judiciary weak and dependent on other parts of the government. Threats and killings by sectarian, tribal, extremist, and criminal elements impaired judicial independence in many places”; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

²²⁷ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 16, 38, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. 9-10, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

²²⁸ See chapter “Judges and Legal Professionals”.

²²⁹ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, “[E]nding impunity also remains a serious challenge in Iraq. Perpetrators of crimes committed over many years continue to be unaccountable”; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. iv, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

²³⁰ Despite important steps to guarantee the independence of the judiciary, “(...) the KRG executive continued to influence cases in politically sensitive areas, such as freedom of speech and the press”; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 16-17, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also chapter “Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities”.

²³¹ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, “[I]t appears that many of these attacks were aimed at undermining the functioning of State institutions and to ‘punish’ anyone seen to be associated with them;” UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 7, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

²³² UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011)*, 28 November 2011, para 58, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_736_EN.pdf. See also UN Security Council, *Third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1936 (2010)*, 7 July 2011, para 41, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_435_EN.pdf; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report - Observations*, 30 July 2011, p. 6, [http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section1 - July 2011.pdf#view=fit](http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section1_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit).

²³³ According to John Drake of AKE, a British private security firm working in Iraq since 2003, “sticky bombs are also known as Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices (UVIEDs). They are usually magnetic in nature and are affixed to a target vehicle before being detonated – usually by remote control. (...) UVIEDs are normally used to kill a specifically targeted individual, such as a ministry employee or senior member of the Iraqi security forces”; John Drake, *Weekly Security Update for 2nd February 2012*, AKE, 2 February 2012, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/tag/iraq/>.

²³⁴ According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “[M]ass-casualty attacks tell only part of the story of violence in Iraq, and mortality statistics overlook the targeted nature of violence in today’s Iraq, where a high proportion of victims are

local progovernment community leaders. For every one person of this kind who is killed, an exponential number of others are intimidated into passive support for insurgent groups"; Michael Knights, *A Violent New Year in Iraq*, *The National Interest*, 16 February 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/violent-new-year-iraq-6517>.

²³⁵ See "Actors of Violence".

²³⁶ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 21 March 2012, an IED stuck to a car detonated against the house of a former CoR member for the Sadrist bloc in Basrah, causing only material damages; NINA, *Material damages in explosion of two cars in Basra*, 21 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIGLJ.
- On 14 March 2012, Al-Iraqiyya bloc MP Talal al-Zawbaie said that he escaped an assassination attempt while he was driving his car near the entrance of the International Zone in central Baghdad. He said that a man wearing a police uniform opened fire on his vehicle; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT / MP Zawbaie says survived assassination attempt near GZ*, 14 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(gznhq55tnqr4s2oza4oce55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147456&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(gznhq55tnqr4s2oza4oce55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147456&l=1).
- On 11 March 2012, Iraqiyya bloc MP Khalid al-Alwani escaped an assassination attempt when an IED detonated against his convoy west of Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Islamic MP escapes bomb blast*, 11 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147370&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147370&l=1).
- On 1 March 2012, CoR member Mohammed Iqbal from Iraqiyya, survived an assassination attempt when a car bomb exploded against his convoy in western Mosul; NINA, *MP Mohammad Iqbal survive from an assassination attempt in Mosul*, 2 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFHGF.
- On 1 February 2012, Qais Al-Shathir, a CoR member who had recently left the Iraqiyya political bloc, escaped injury when a roadside bomb went off near his convoy, wounding two of his bodyguards and three passers-by in Baghdad's southeastern Ameen district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 1*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-1>.
- On 31 January 2012, the house of MP Zuhair Al-Araji from the White Iraqiyya bloc was attacked in Arajiya district in Mosul by a car bomb and an IED, causing no casualties; NINA, *Car bomb, IED explode near Al Araji house in Mosul*, 31 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMMKF.
- On 16 December 2011, gunmen fired shots at the house of MP Amineh Sa'adi Mehdi, in Zuhour neighborhood, eastern Mosul, causing no casualties; NINA, *Shots fired at law maker's house in eastern Mosul*, 16 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJGFKD.
- On 9 October 2011, MP from the Ahrar Bloc, Maha Al-Douri, was unharmed during an assassination attempt where gunmen using firearms with silencers shot at her car in Bab Al Sharji area in Baghdad; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS...Maha Al Douri survives assassination attempt*, 9 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHHHG.
- On 11 July 2011, the residence of Kamila Al-Moussawi, a CoR member for the Al-Fadhila Party from Thi-Qar, was destroyed in a rocket attack on Baghdad's International Zone. The MP's son and several of her guards were in the attack; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT / Son of Iraqi MP, her guards, injured in rocket attack on Baghdad's Green Zone*, 11 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143701&l=1.
- On 19 April 2011, in central Mussayib (Babel), Jawad Al-Jiboury, a CoR member belonging to the Ahrar bloc, escaped unharmed when a roadside bomb exploded near his convoy; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 19*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-19/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi legislature escapes assassination attempt*, 19 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142070&l=1.
- On 11 April 2011, Mohammed Al-Khalidi, a lawmaker from Iraqiyya, escaped an assassination attempt when a sticky bomb attached to his car detonated in western Baghdad; NINA, *Breaking News Iraqiya law maker Khalidi escapes assassination*, 11 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGEIHL.
- On 17 March 2011, MP Etab Al-Douri of Iraqiyya survived an assassination attempt near Yarmouk Hospital of western Baghdad when gunmen opened fire at her convoy; NINA, *IS member survives assassination western Baghdad*, 17 March 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFLGHL.

²³⁷ For example,

- On 7 March 2012, Mohammed Al-Darraj, the Minister of Housing, reportedly escaped an assassination attempt when a car parked on the roadside exploded against his convoy in Baghdad's Doura neighbourhood. Four of his bodyguards were injured in the attack. The Baghdad Operations Command said that Al-Darraj had not been the target of the attack; Yazn Al-Shammari, *Iraq's housing minister escapes assassination attempt*, *AKnews*, 7 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294411/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *BOC denies housing minister was target for Mansour blast*, 7 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147317&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147317&l=1).
- On 25 December 2011, Abdul-Kareem Samaray, the Minister of Science and Technology, was unharmed when a roadside bomb hit his motorcade in Balad (Salah Al-Din), injuring two of his guards; Yazn Shamri, *Minister survives bombing*, *AKnews*, 25 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/280431/>.
- On 1 December 2011, Sargon Lazar, the Minister of Environment, and Emad Youhanna, MP in the CoR, both members of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, escaped an assassination attempt by a roadside bomb that blew up when their convoy was passing. It wounded four people including one of the minister's guards in Taji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>; Ankawa News, *This morning, the Minister of Environment Sargon Lazar survives assassination attempt*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5577>.
- On 13 July 2011, Minister of State, Bushra Azwaini, was unharmed during an assassination attempt where her convoy was attacked with weapons with silencers in southeast Baghdad; NINA, *Minister of State Bushra Azwaina survived of an assassination attempt in Baghdad*, 13 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFHMDM.
- On 10 July 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a convoy carrying Salam Al-Khafaji, a Deputy Minister at the Displacement and Migration Ministry, wounding two guards and damaging a car; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 10*, 10 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-10/>.
- On 1 June 2011, the Deputy Minister for Human Rights, Abdul-Karim Abdullah, escaped an assassination attempt when a parked car bomb exploded near his convoy in Baghdad's Mansour district. Two passers-by were also wounded in the incident; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 1*, 1 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-1/>.
- On 20 April 2011, Istabraq Al-Shouk, Deputy Minister of Construction and Housing, escaped unharmed when a roadside bomb exploded near his convoy in northern Baghdad. Four passers-by were wounded in the incident; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 20*, 20 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-20/>.

²³⁸ Recent reported incidents included:

- On 29 November 2011, a senior official in the Oil Ministry was seriously wounded when men armed with weapons with silencers opened fire on his car in Baghdad's west-central district of Mansour; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29, 29 November 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
 - On 25 November 2011, Rawfal Abu-Righeef, Director General of Cultural Affairs at the Ministry of Culture, escaped an assassination attempt in Baghdad's Abu Nuwas street; Aswat al-Iraq, *Culture Ministry official escaped assassination*, 25 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145755&l=1.
 - On 23 October 2011, an Oil Ministry media official was injured and his driver killed in an explosive charge blast under their car in Baghdad's Saidiya district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Oil Ministry reporter injured, driver killed in Baghdad*, 23 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145370&l=1.
 - On 26 September 2011, senior Finance Ministry official Mohammed Ali Al-Safi was killed after assailants opened fire on his car in Western Baghdad and in a separate incident, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed Mohammed Ali, Office Manager of the Minister of Health, in the Yarmouk District of Baghdad; Hamid Ahmed, *Senior finance official assassinated in Iraq*, AP, 26 September 2011, <http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Senior-finance-official-assassinated-in-Iraq-2187005.php>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 26*, 26 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-26/>.
 - On 4 September 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers attempted to kill Ibrahim Zaidan, the media department manager at the Electricity Ministry in eastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-4/>.
- ²³⁹ For example, on 26 November 2011, an official working in the PM's office was reportedly assassinated in Baghdad's Nisour Square; Aswat al-Iraq, *Premiership official assassinated today in Baghdad*, 26 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145772&l=1. On 20 May 2011, gunmen reportedly opened machinegun fire on the car of Mohammed Qassem, the office director of MP Raf'e Abdul-Jabbar of the Ahrar political bloc, seriously wounding him, in Amara (Missan); Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi MP's official injured in armed attack in Amara*, 21 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142658&l=1.
- ²⁴⁰ On 26 May 2011, it was reported that a gunman, using a weapon with silencer, shot dead Ali Feisal Al-Lami, Head of the Accountability and Justice Commission of Iraq (De-Ba'athification Commission) while he was driving his car in eastern Baghdad. Al-Lami had also unsuccessfully run for a seat in the March 2010 parliamentary elections. ISF arrested one suspect who was reportedly a member of the intelligence of the former regime; NINA, *Breaking news Baghdad, operation forces command, arrest of Lami's assassinator*, 31 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGKKDE; Roy Gutman, *Close aide to Iraq's Chalabi assassinated*, McClatchy Newspapers, 26 May 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/26/114857/close-aide-to-iraqs-chalabi-assassinated.html>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ²⁴¹ The Commission of Integrity (formerly Commission on Public Integrity) is the main government body charged with preventing and investigating cases of corruption in all ministries and other components of the government nationwide (except for the Kurdistan Region). According to the US Department of State, officials combating corruption were subjected to physical threats and attacks. According to one inspector general those involved in investigating corruption "are facing serious risks without personal security details and other protective measures to do their jobs and stay alive at the same time." In the deadliest attack on Iraq's anti-corruption agency, a car bomb reportedly detonated outside one of The Commission of Integrity's office in eastern Baghdad on 22 December 2011, killing 32 personnel; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semianual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 12, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_January_2012.pdf#view=fit. According to the Commission, 40 personnel have been assassinated while performing their work since 2004; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 38, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. Reported attacks against anti-corruption officials included for example:
- On 19 July 2011, a legal adviser in the Integrity Commission for Wasit Governorate survived an assassination attempt; NINA, *Legal adviser in the integrity survives of an assassination attempt in Wasit*, 19 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHGJGH.
 - On 3 May 2011, an IED blew up close to the house of an employee of Basrah's Integrity Commission, wounding him and causing damage to his car; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Integrity Commission employee injured in central Basra blast*, 3 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142329&l=1.
 - On 27 January 2011, gunmen shot dead an employee of the Integrity Commission in the Amiriya district of western Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-28/>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
 - On 26 September 2010, Laieh Muhammed, who executed arrest warrants for the Commission on Integrity, was killed on his way to work at a checkpoint into the International Zone; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 38, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ²⁴² On 20 April 2011, an IHEC employee in south Mosul had reportedly escaped unharmed when a bomb attached to his car exploded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 20*, 20 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-20/>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ²⁴³ In 2011 and 2012, media reported about attacks on the (deputy) governors of Al-Anbar, Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Ninewa and Salah Al-Din Governorates:
- On 20 March 2012, a car bomb parked near the Faculty of Agriculture in Ramadi detonated as the Al-Anbar Governor's convoy passed by. The Governor Qassim Mohammed remained unharmed, but one civilian was killed and another one wounded; NINA, *Breaking news . Anbar governor survives from assassination attempt*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFDD.
 - On 21 June 2011, two bombs killed at least 25 people and wounded 35 outside the Diwaniyah Governor's house in Diwaniyah city. Most of the victims were guards. ISI claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Al Qaeda affiliate says behind two Iraq attacks*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/al-qaeda-affiliate-says-behind-two-iraq-attacks/>.
 - On 30 May 2011, a roadside bomb targeted the convoy of Ninewa Governor Atheel Al-Nujaifi south of Mosul City (Ninewa), causing no casualties; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 30*, 30 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-30/>.

- On 28 March 2011, a roadside bomb targeting the convoy of one of Baghdad's Deputy Governors, Mohammed Al-Shemari, wounded three civilians when it exploded in eastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 28*, 28 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-28/>.
- On 24 January 2011, the Governor of Salah Al-Din, Ahmed Al-Jubouri, escaped unharmed from a roadside bomb attack in central Tikrit. Five of his security guards were wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 24*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-24/>.
- On 17 January 2011, a suicide bomber in a car targeted the convoy of Al-Anbar Governor Qassim Mohammed in central Ramadi (Al-Anbar), killing one of his bodyguards and wounding five people. The Governor survived unharmed; Reuters, *Suicide bombers target governor of Iraq province*, 17 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-target-governor-of-iraq-province/>.
- ²⁴⁴ In 2011 and 2012, media reported about attacks on local mayors in neighbourhoods/villages of Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din and Wassit Governorates, for example:
 - On 11 February 2012, the mayor of Al-Ghalbiya area near Ba'quba (Diyala) was wounded when an IED detonated next to his house; NINA, *A municipality Cheikh injuring northwest of Baquba*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEHKD.
 - On 19 January 2012, a bomb planted at the house of a neighbourhood mayor in central Ba'quba (Diyala) exploded but no one was hurt; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
 - On 18 January 2012, gunmen stormed the house of Sabbar Mohammed, the mayor of Albausaj village in Latifiyah District (Babel), killing him and three of his children, and wounding a fourth, who is a Sahwa member; NINA, *Mukhtar of a village killed with three of his sons by gunmen near Latifiya area south of Baghdad*, 18 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJKMKG.
 - On 11 January 2012, two gunmen on a motorcycle killed mayor Saeed Hamdan as he left a mosque after evening prayers in the town of Hit (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 11*, 11 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-11/>.
 - On 31 December 2011, an IED detonated against the house of the mayor of Kut (Wassit), causing no casualties; NINA, *IED against the house of Kut's Mayor*, 31 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJIIFI.
 - On 15 December 2011, masked gunmen kidnapped a local mayor and his son, killing the father, in Jurf Al-Sakhr (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 15*, 15 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-15/>.
 - On 26 November 2011, gunmen attacked the farm belonging to the mayor of Dour (Salah Al-Din), Othman Ahmed Al-Douri, and exchanged fire with his security guards, killing one guard and wounding the mayor; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 26*, 26 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-26/>.
 - On 9 November 2011, Hussein Ali Hachem, the mayor of Mosul city, escaped unharmed an assassination attempt when his house in Qayara (Ninewa), south of Mosul, was attacked; Aswat al-Iraq, *North Iraq's Mosul's Mayor escapes assassination*, 9 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145543&l=1.
 - On 14 October 2011, a local mayor was killed and three members of his family wounded when an IED detonated in front of his home in Jurf Al-Milih area north of Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *A local municipal chief killed and three members of his family wounded north of Baquba*, 14 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIIEJD.
 - On 10 October 2011, gunmen killed a village mayor in front of his house in the western outskirts of Mosul (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-11/>.
 - On 5 October 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire and killed a local mayor in the town of Tuz Khurmato (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-5/>.
 - On 26 July 2011, a roadside bomb planted close to a village mayor's house exploded, killing him and wounding his wife and daughter, on the northwestern outskirts of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>.
- ²⁴⁵ In 2011 and 2012, media reported about attacks on chairmen and members of provincial councils of Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk, Ninewa, Thi-Qar and Salah Al-Din Governorates, for example:
 - On 20 March 2012, the chairman of the Baghdad Provincial Council, Kamil Zaydi, survived an assassination attempt when a suicide bomber blew himself up targeting Zaydi's convoy near Baghdad's International Zone; NINA, *Breaking news. Survival of the chairman of Baghdad provincial council, from assassination attempt*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFDF.
 - On 10 March 2012, Murad Anad Al-Jubouri, member of the Kerbala Provincial Council, survived an assassination attempt in Tuareej District, in eastern Kerbala; NINA, *Member of the Kerbala PC survives assassination*, 10 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKGJHK.
 - On 10 February 2012, Hussein Al-Shatab, member of the Salah Al-Din Provincial Council, survived an attack on his house in Mo'tasam district, south of Tikrit; Othman Shalsh *Salahaddin official survives rocket attack*, AKnews, 10 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/289069/>.
 - On 23 January 2012, two rockets fell on the house of Diyala Provincial Council member Hisham Al-Hayali (from the Iraqiyya bloc), causing no casualties, Al-Hayali has reportedly accused Shi'ite militias to be behind the attack; Mahmoud al-Jubouri, *Rocket attack on Iraqi MP's house in Diyala*, AKnews, 23 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285864/>.
 - On 28 November 2011, at least one civilian was killed and 15 people wounded, including five policemen, when three roadside bombs exploded near the house of Ali Mehdi, a Turkmen provincial council member, in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>; NINA, *Person killed, 13 wounded in 3 blasts in Kirkuk*, 29 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJDLLJ.
 - On 16 September 2011, gunmen launched an attack on the house of a Babel Provincial Council member and wounded two bodyguards in Jbela (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 17*, 17 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-17/>.
 - On 15 September 2011, the chairman of the Kerbala Provincial Council, Mohammed Hamead al-Moussawi, escaped an assassination attempt when on a visit to Al-Nukhaib in Al-Anbar Governorate; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: Chairman of Kerbala Province escapes*

assassination attempt in Nukheib township, 15 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144850&l=1.

- On 15 August 2011, a parked motorcycle bomb targeting the convoy of Abdulla Al-Hiyali, a local provincial official, wounded six people, including two of his family members, when it exploded in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
 - On 7 August 2011, police successfully dismantled a bomb stuck under the car of Turkan Shakour Qassab, a member of Kirkuk Provincial Council from the Turkoman list, in central Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa force member killed in Kirkuk*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144164&l=1.
 - On 30 July 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a convoy carrying the head of Ninewa Provincial Council, wounding three of his security guards; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 31*, 31 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-july-31/>.
 - On 19 June 2011, the chairman of the Energy Committee in the Thi-Qar Provincial Council, Hussein Hassab Al-Awad, escaped an assassination attempt, when an explosive charge blew off at his house in Nassiriyah city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Thi-Qar Council's Member escapes assassination attempt*, 19 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143244&l=1.
 - On 17 June 2011, a car bomb targeted the house of Niazi Muhammad Maa'mar, a member of the Salah Al-Din Provincial Council, in Tuz District (Salah Al-Din), killing five and wounding 45. Maa'mar was not inside the house during the time of the attack but some members of his family were severely wounded; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkmen Front denounces attack on local council member's house*, 19 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=133431&l=1.
 - ²⁴⁶For example, the following incidents were reported: On 12 March 2012, Musa Yahya, a Turkic member of the the Taza District Council was assassinated when armed men opened fire on him in central Taza district (Kirkuk); Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councillor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.
 - On 6 March 2012, a homemade bomb detonated inside the office of the head of the city council of Mahmoudiyah (Babel), injuring two of his bodyguards; Raman Brosk, *Security tightened in Baghdad after three bombings*, AKnews, 6 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294217/>.
 - On 17 January 2012, using weapons with silencers gunmen opened fire at Waleed Al-Bahadily, a municipal council member of Adel neighborhood in Baghdad, in front of his house, killing him instantly; NINA, *Municipal councilman killed, 3 persons wounded in western Baghdad*, 17 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJKMFL.
 - On 23 August 2011 a magnetic bomb attached to the car of Nofal Al-Hity, a Hit municipal council member, detonated in the town of Hit (Al-Anbar), killing him and his son and seriously wounding a third person; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
 - On 27 June 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of the head of Khan Dari City Council was dismantled by experts before it exploded in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 27*, 27 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-27/>.
 - On 19 June 2011, gunmen raided the house of a local council leader and killed him near Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 20*, 20 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-20/>.
 - On 26 April 2011, two people were wounded when the home of a municipal official was bombed in the town of Riyadh (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 26*, 26 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-26/>.
- ²⁴⁷Recent reported attacks included for example:
- On 13 March 2012, Samarra's health care director was shot dead by gunmen when leaving his home in Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Othman Shilshil, *Health official shot dead in Samarra*, AKnews, 13 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295587/>.
 - On 11 February 2012, gunmen, using guns with silencers, assassinated an Interior Ministry Inspector General's Office employee while he was driving on the Mohammed al-Qasim Highway in Baghdad; NINA, *Assassinating an employee at the Office of Interior Ministry's Inspector General*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEIEK.
 - On 7 February 2012, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire with weapons with silencers at the convoy of Sajid Al-Dulaimi, the Director of a women's prison, killing her and her driver in Doura district in Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 7*, 7 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-7/>.
 - On 2 February 2012, Dr. Sallahuddin Thanoon, Director General of the Health Department in Ninewa, survived an assassination attempt when an adhesive explosive device placed in his car detonated in the garage of the Ibn Sina Hospital in downtown Mosul; NINA, *Health Director General in Mosul survives assassination attempt*, 2 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKDGGJ.
 - On 28 January 2012, gunmen stormed the house of a national reconciliation official, wounding him and killing his guest near the city of Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 29*, 29 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-29/>.
 - On 27 January 2012, a judicial assistant at Ninewa's Court of Appeal was found dead near his house in southern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 27*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-27/>; NINA, *Judicial assistant killed south Mosul*, 27 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMHGL.
 - On 10 January 2012, two agriculture ministry employees were killed when a bomb attached to their vehicle exploded in Shirqat (Salah Al-Din); BBC, *Iraq violence: Schoolboys among eight people killed*, 10 January 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16497462>.
 - On 30 December 2011, a roadside bomb planted in front of the house of an agriculture ministry employee wounded him and damaged part of his house in Dibis (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
 - On 15 December 2011, the bodies of three government employees were found with their hands tied behind their backs and gunshot wounds to the chest, three days after they were kidnapped in a desert area in Dhuluiya (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 15*, 15 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-15/>.
 - On 11 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an official working at the Ministry of Education killed him in Baghdad's northern Shaab district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.

- On 8 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a government employee at the Citizenship Department, killed him and his cousin, in a town west of Muqadadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 9*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-9/>.
 - On 21 November 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of an employee at the Kirkuk Human Rights Department, killed him, in Kirkuk's Celebrations Square; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Human Rights element killed in Kirkuk explosion*, 21 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=145690.
 - On 13 November 2011, two roadside bombs detonated near the car of an Electricity Ministry employee, killing him and wounding seven others, including four policemen, in Taji; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 13*, 13 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-13/>.
 - On 5 November 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead an official working in Baghdad's International Zone in the east of Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Green Zone official assassinated in Baghdad*, 5 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145523&l=1.
 - On 2 November 2011, Mustapha Shaaban Mustapha, a CoR employee, was shot dead by gunmen who used weapons with silencers in west Baghdad's Mansour district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Parliament employee assassinated in west Baghdad*, 2 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145502&l=1.
 - On 29 October 2011, a bomb killed a Science and Technology Ministry employee when it exploded in Baghdad's southern Saidiya district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 29*, 29 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-29/>.
 - On 25 September 2011, gunmen killed an employee working at the Human Rights Ministry while he was driving in Baghdad's northwestern Hurriya district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
 - On 24 September 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed a Foreign Ministry employee in Baghdad's western district of Jamiaa; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 24*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-24/>.
 - On 18 September 2011, a governmental official and his son were injured by a sticky bomb explosion south of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 injured in sticky bomb in Kirkuk*, 18 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144912&l=1.
 - On 10 September 2011, gunmen shot dead a government employee when they raided his house in Mussayib (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 11*, 11 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-11/>.
 - On 27 August 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at the car of local government official, killing him and his driver, in Jalawla (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 28*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-28/>.
 - On 20 August 2011, an IED attached under the car of an employee in Diyala's Education Department detonated on the main road of Al-Hadeed area northwest of Ba'quba, killing three of the employee's family members; NINA, *Three members of a family killed by an AED in their car in Diyala*, 20 August 2011, http://www.ninaneews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHKMKM.
- ²⁴⁸According to reports, examples include: ,
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the private car of Amanj Fakhraddin, a Kurdish officer at North Oil Company, exploded and wounded Fakhraddin and three others in the car; Abdullah Sabri, *Kirkuk oil officer and three others wounded in car blast*, AKnews, 13 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/289764/>.
 - On 2 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a worker with Iraq's state-run North Oil Company went off and killed him in the town of Al-Zab (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 2*, 2 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-2/>.
 - On 11 December 2011, police found the body of a civil servant at a state-run medicine factory shot in the head and chest two hours after he was kidnapped in Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
 - On 10 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an employee at Iraq's state-run North Oil Company killed him in eastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 10*, 10 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-10/>.
 - On 7 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an employee of Iraq's North Oil Company killed him in southern Kirkuk. In a separate incident, also in Kirkuk, a roadside bomb wounded a senior official of the state-run Iraqi Railways Company; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 7*, 7 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-7/>.
 - On 23 August 2011, gunmen shot and wounded an employee of the Baiji oil refinery near his house in the town of Al-Zab, near Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
 - On 29 June 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead a North Oil Company employee and wounded a civilian in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 30*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-30/>. On 22 June 2011, in Baghdad's northern Waziriya District, a state bank official survived an attack when a bomb attached to his car exploded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 22*, 22 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-22/>.
 - On 9 June 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed Jalal Jassim Mohammed, the head of a company belonging to the Ministry of Industry in the town of Taji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-9/>.
 - On 10 May 2011, a bomb attached to the vehicle of Salam Abdullah, a Director General of the Iraqi Cement State Company, killed him when it went off in Baghdad's southern Doura district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 10*, 10 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-10/>.
 - On 3 May 2011, Hassan Ibrahim, Director of the Iraqi Grains Trading Company (under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade), was wounded in an apparent assassination attempt when a roadside bomb blasted his motorcade in Baghdad's southeastern Al-Wahda neighbourhood. The blast killed his driver and wounded one of his bodyguards; Reuters, *Iraq's grain board chief survives bomb attack*, 3 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqs-grain-board-chief-survives-bomb-attack/>.
- ²⁴⁹According to reports, examples include:
- On 25 September 2011, in the town of Khaldiyah (Al-Anbar), a bomb planted inside a house of a government employee killed his wife and wounded two of his daughters. Another bomb near the house went off when a police patrol arrived at the scene, killing one

policeman and wounding four others. Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/%20%20>.

- On 23 August 2011, a magnetic bomb attached to the car of Nofal Al-Hity, a Hit municipal council member, detonated in the town of Hit (Al-Anbar), killing him and his son and seriously wounding a third person; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
- On 15 August 2011, a parked motorcycle bomb targeting the convoy of Abdulla Al-Hiyali, a local provincial official, wounded six people, including two of his family members, when it exploded in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
- On 31 July 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers opened fire and killed Dawood Salman Rahim, a senior official from the Ministry of Higher Education, and his son while in their car near their home in Baghdad's Ghazaliyah District. In a separate incident, a sticky bomb attached to the car of an Electricity Ministry employee wounded two of his children in Baghdad's southwestern Bayaa District; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: Iraq's Higher Education DG, his son, killed in west Baghdad*, 31 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144042&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 1*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-august-1/>.

²⁵⁰According to reports, examples include:

- On 9 February 2012, Akram Dayni, the brother of Sunni lawmaker and Iraqiyya political bloc member Nahida Al-Dayni, was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds near Baiji (Salah Al-Din). He was kidnapped on 4 February 2012 on the highway from Baghdad to Kirkuk. Reportedly, the family had refused to pay ransom. Dayni's bodyguard reportedly survived with several gunshot wounds; AFP, *Iraq MP's kidnapped brother found dead*, 9 February 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/2012/02/09/iraq-mps-kidnapped-brother-found-dead.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 5*, 5 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-5/>.
- On 25 September 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car of a former parliament speaker's bodyguard wounded him in the Qadisiya district of southwestern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
- On 9 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead the son of a local mayor in Mussayib (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 10*, 10 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-10/>. On 5 June 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed a security guard of the CoR's speaker, Usama Al-Nujaifi, in Baghdad's western Amiriyah District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 5*, 5 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-5/>.
- On 8 March 2011, gunmen using guns with silencers killed the son of a Provincial Council member in central Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen kill young man in Anbar*, 8 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141363&l=1.

²⁵¹According to reports, examples include:

- On 7 September 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers seriously wounded Razzaq Rahman Al-Rahma, a former Diwaniyah Provincial Council member. He died the next day of his injuries; Aswat al-Iraq, *Former member of Diwaniya Province dies due to injuries*, 8 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144711&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-7/>.
- On 28 June 2011, Bayan Dizayee, the former Minister of Reconstruction and Housing and member of the KDP, was injured in an armed attack against her convoy near Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); Aswat al-Iraq, *Ex-minister hurt in armed attack*, 28 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143447&l=1.

²⁵²See chapter "Judges and Lawyers"

- On 26 December 2011, at least seven people were reportedly killed and 34 wounded when a suicide car bomber, who passed six security checkpoints, drove his vehicle into a security cordon at the main entrance of the heavily fortified Ministry of Interior in central Baghdad. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group claims to have hit Green Zone*, 10 January 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-claims-to-have-hit-green-zone/>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Suicide bomber strikes fortified Iraqi compound*, CNN, 26 December 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/26/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber kills 7 outside Iraq ministry*, Reuters, 26 December 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE7BP04320111226>.

²⁵⁴On 25 September 2011, 15 people were reportedly killed and more than 80 wounded when four successive explosions struck outside a Ministry of Interior Passport Office in the Southern city of Kerbala; Tim Arango, *Bombs Strike Shiite Holy City in Iraq*, NY Times, 25 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html>.

²⁵⁵On 20 March 2012, as part of a wave of apparently coordinated attacks across the country, a car bomb near the provincial council building reportedly killed four and wounded 11; Agencies, *Iraq bombs kill scores before Arab League summit*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/iraq-bombs-kill-dozens>.

²⁵⁶The following attacks on provincial government compounds were reported in 2011:

- On 20 September 2011, three suicide bombers struck an Al-Anbar provincial government complex housing the provincial council offices and police headquarters in Ramadi (Al-Anbar), killing four people and wounding at least 15 others; Fadhel Al-Badrani, *Bombers kill 4 at govt centre in Iraq's Anbar*, 20 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-kill-4-at-govt-centre-in-iraqs-anbar/>.
- On 15 August 2011, at least eight people were killed and 14 wounded when a suicide car bomber attacked a municipality building in the town of Khan Bani Saad (Diyala). The same day, a parked car bomb near a government building killed one person and wounded 13 others when it went off in the town of Al-Wajehiya, northeast of Ba'quba (Diyala). And in Balad (Salah Al-Din), a bomb placed near a municipal council building wounded six people when it exploded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
- On 14 June 2011, gunmen and suicide bombers stormed a Provincial Council building in Ba'quba (Diyala) after detonating a car bomb outside, killing at least eight and wounding 25; Reuters, *Bombers strike Iraq govt building, at least 28 dead*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-strike-iraq-govt-building-at-least-28-dead/>.
- On 11 June 2011, two car bombs exploded in quick succession in a central street near the government compound in central Mosul (Nineva), killing six people and injuring 60; Jamal al-Badrani, *Twin car bombs in Iraq's Mosul kill six, injure 60*, Reuters, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/twin-car-bombs-in-iraqs-mosul-kill-six-injure-60/>.
- On 5 July 2011, a car bomb and a roadside bomb blew up in a crowded parking lot outside a municipal building in the town of Taji (Salah Al-Din), killing at least 28 people and wounding 58. The explosions hit police, government workers and Iraqis lining up for

- national identity cards. Reuters, *Iraq civilian deaths in July match highest for 2011*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-civilian-deaths-in-july-match-highest-for-2011/>.
- On 29 March 2011, at least 56 people were killed and scores wounded when gunmen laid siege to a Provincial Council Headquarters in Tikrit (Salah Al-Din). The attackers, who were wearing military uniforms, reportedly set off car bombs, explosive belts and hand grenades as they stormed into the building and took hostages. A government spokesman said that 15 hostages were executed before their captors blew themselves up. Among the dead were three provincial council members and an Iraqi journalist. The Guardian, *Dozens killed in attack on Tikrit council*, 29 March 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/29/iraq-middleeast>.
- ²⁵⁷ On 28 November 2011, a suicide car bomb explosion in a parking lot at the CoR reportedly killed at least one person and wounded six, including MP Muayad Al-Tayyeb, the spokesman for the Kurdish bloc in CoR. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group claims to have hit Green Zone*, 10 January 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-claims-to-have-hit-green-zone/>; Sahar Issa, *First suicide blast since 2007 hits Iraq's restricted Green Zone*, McClatchy Newspapers, 29 November 2011, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/11/29/2523919/first-suicide-blast-since-2007.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber hits Iraq military base, 19 dead*, Reuters, 28 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE7AR09U20111128>. See also Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 6*, 6 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-6/>.
- ²⁵⁸ UNHCR Executive Committee, No. 94 (LIII) - 2002, *Conclusion on the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum*, 8 October 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dafdd7c4.html>. For guidance on how to establish the genuineness and permanence of renunciation, see UNHCR, *Operational Guidelines on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum*, September 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452b9bca2.html>.
- ²⁵⁹ John Drake, *Security Statistics from 2011*, AKE, 28 January 2012, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2012/01/28/security-statistics-from-2011/>.
- ²⁶⁰ Sameer N. Yacoub, *Officials: 18 killed in Iraqi police academy blast*, AP, 19 February 2012, http://articles.boston.com/2012-02-19/news/31077541_1_police-recruits-suicide-bomber-suicide-attacks.
- ²⁶¹ Figures provided by MoI/MoH to SIGIR; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semianual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 7, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit. According to statistics compiled by the MoI, 8,813 police officers have been killed and 7,570 wounded between March 2003 and March 2011; Rebecca Santana and Sameer N. Yacoub, *25 Killed in Slew of Attacks Targeting Iraq Police*, AP, 12 October 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/killed-slew-attacks-targeting-iraqi-police-14718397>.
- ²⁶² Attacks against checkpoints have reportedly “created a climate of fear and intimidation in Baghdad.” For example, it has been reported that on 27 January 2012, gunmen carrying weapons with silencers shot dead two policemen at their checkpoint in Za’afaranyah in southeastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 27*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-27/>. See Ramzy Mardini and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Iraq Trip Report*, Institute for the Study of the War, 4 August 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf.
- ²⁶³ For example, on 27 November 2011, a car bomb reportedly blew up at the crowded front gates of a military base that also houses a prison holding suspected terrorists from AQI and Shi’ite militias, in Taji (Salah Al-Din), killing at least 19 people, mostly guards, and wounding 24; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber hits Iraq military base, 19 dead*, Reuters, 28 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE7AR09U20111128>; Jack Healy, *New Wave of Bombings Raises Toll for Iraqis*, 28 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/middleeast/13-killed-in-car-bomb-attack-outside-baghdad-prison.html>.
- ²⁶⁴ According to reports, examples include:
- On 20 March 2012, a wave of apparently coordinated attacks across the country targeted mostly police checkpoints and patrols, including for example in Kirkuk, where two car bombs exploded near a police headquarters, killing nine people and wounding 42; Agencies, *Iraq bombs kill scores before Arab League summit*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/iraq-bombs-kill-dozens>.
 - On 23 February 2012, simultaneous early morning attacks involving bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 55 people and wounded more than 200. In Baghdad, at least 32 people were killed in 10 explosions in mainly Shi’ite neighbourhoods. More than a dozen blasts and attacks hit other cities and towns in Al-Anbar, Babel, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din Governorates, many of them targeting police. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attacks, Iraqi officials reportedly blamed AQI, which in the past has carried out similar coordinated attacks; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAIEI6zUR_story.html.
 - On 12 October 2011, five apparently coordinated explosions caused by suicide bombers and roadside bombs targeted police across Baghdad and killed at least 25 people and wounded more than 70 people. Furthermore, police defused two car bombs in separate areas in southwestern and northern Baghdad, and a roadside bomb was discovered on the road leading to the police academy in eastern Baghdad. Dan Zak and Asaad Majeed, *Iraq bombings kill, injure dozens*, Washington Post, 13 October 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/12/MN161LGVPM.DTL>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bombers, attacks hit Baghdad police, 28 dead*, 12 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-attacks-hit-baghdad-police-28-dead/>.
 - On 15 August 2011, a series of suicide bombings, car bombs and roadside explosives killed at least 70 people and wounded more than 200 across Iraq. In the worst incident, a roadside bomb followed by a car bomb targeting police near a busy downtown market killed at least 37 people and wounded more than 60 in Kut (Wassit). And in Diyala, 12 people died in two attacks that targeted an Iraqi checkpoint and a military camp. An estimated 20 others were wounded. Laith Hammoudi, *Coordinated attacks kill 68 on Iraq’s deadliest day this year*, McClatchy Newspapers, 15 August 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/15/120705/explosions-rip-iraq-from-north.html>.
 - On 3/4 July 2011, bombers and gunmen launched a string of at least 11 attacks against the ISF across Iraq, including in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Mosul, killing at least eight policemen and soldiers and wounding 20 others. Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>; Muhanad Mohammed, *Attackers kill 8 police and soldiers in Iraq*, Reuters, 4 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attackers-kill-8-police-and-soldiers-in-iraq/>.
- ²⁶⁵ According to reports, examples include:
- On 5 March 2012, alleged AQI fighters, some wearing army uniforms, shot dead execution-style 27 policemen when they attacked checkpoints and the homes of two officers in Haditha; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Gunmen kill 27 in raids on west Iraq checkpoints*, Reuters, 5 March 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-27-in-raids-on-west-iraq-checkpoints/>; Jack Healy, *Gunmen in Uniforms Kill 20 Police Officers in Iraq*, New York Times, 5 March 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/middleeast/police-killed-in-iraq.html>.

- On 17 January 2012, gunmen attacked a police checkpoint on the highway to Jordan and killed five policemen in the town of Rutba; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 17*, 17 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-17/>.
 - On 15 January 2012, six gunmen, three policemen and a civilian died in the assault on the Ramadi police building, which houses an anti-terrorism unit and a jail, and 18 other people were wounded; Reuters, *Ten dead in militant attack in Iraq's Ramadi*, 15 January 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/15/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE80E09T20120115?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71>.
 - On 7 January 2012, gunmen opened fire on a police checkpoint and killed three people, including two policemen, in central Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>.
 - On 3 October 2011, four people, including the director of the police station and an employee in the mayor's office, were killed after ISF stormed a police station in Al-Baghdadi (Al-Anbar) where gunmen disguised as police officers were holding dozens of police and civilians hostage; Rebecca Santana, *Gunmen kill 4 in hostage standoff in western Iraq*, AP, 3 October 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5inqDP7a4QFZqKiNNbh4QIMLWfmUQ?docId=aa20d787197b4439b9f700fc952e26a4>.
 - On 3 March 2011, a suicide bomber killed at least ten people, including eight soldiers, and wounded 26 others, when he blew himself up among soldiers that were collecting their paychecks at a branch of the state-owned Rafidain bank in Haditha (Al-Anbar); Reuters, *Suicide bomber kills 10, wounds 26 in Iraq-sources*, 3 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-10-wounds-26-in-iraq-sources/>.
- ²⁶⁶ On 5 May 2011, a suicide bomber reportedly rammed his car into the entrance of a police headquarters in Hilla during a shift change in the morning, when many police officers were outside the building, killing at least 20 and wounding 80 others. AQI was reportedly responsible for the attack; AP, *US puts al-Qaida in Iraq leader on terrorist blacklist, offers \$10 million bounty*, 4 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-puts-al-qaida-in-iraq-leader-on-terrorist-blacklist-offers-10-million-bounty/2011/10/04/gIQA1W5qKL_story.html.
- ²⁶⁷ On 19 February 2012, a suicide bomber reportedly detonated his car as a group of police recruits left their academy in Baghdad, killing 20 and wounding at least 28 others; AP, *Iraq suicide car bomber kills 20 at police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/19/MN6O1N9SM8.DTL>. On 31 August 2011, a parked car bomb reportedly exploded near a police checkpoint on a commercial street in a largely Sunni area of southwestern Baghdad, killing three people and wounding 20 others; Reuters, *Car bomb kills three, wounds 20 in Iraq*, 31 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/car-bomb-kills-three-wounds-20-in-iraq/>.
- ²⁶⁸ According to reports, examples include:
- On 24 November 2011, triple bombings in a popular open-air market in Basrah killed 19 people and injured dozens more. Most of the victims were members of the ISF, including several senior officers, that arrived at the blast scene after the first bombing; Nabil Al-Jurani, *Triple bombings in south Iraq kill 19, injure 64*, AP, 24 November 2011, http://ap.stripes.com/dynamic/stories/M/ML_IRAQ?SITE=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
 - On 13 June 2011, five policemen were killed and 29 others were wounded when a suicide car bomber blew himself up at a police brigade compound in Basrah. ISI claimed responsibility for the attack; Aswat al-Iraq, *UPDATE / Basra's car bomb blast toll reaches 5 dead, 29 injured*, 13 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143124&l=1; Reuters, *Al Qaeda affiliate says behind two Iraq attacks*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/al-qaeda-affiliate-says-behind-two-iraq-attacks/>.
- ²⁶⁹ Reported incidents included:
- On 20 March 2012, a car bomb exploded near a police checkpoint in Ba'quba, wounding 20, including four policemen; NINA, *Death toll of Baquba explosion raised to 20 wounded*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIELH.
 - On 14 March 2011, a car bomb attack on an Iraqi army headquarters killed at least eight soldiers and wounded 30 others in Kanaan. ISF foiled a second attack and defused a car bomb parked at the scene. ISI later claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group says behind army HQ attack*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-says-behind-army-hq-attack/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 14*, 14 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-14/>.
 - On 19 January 2011, a suicide bomber driving an ambulance killed 15 people and wounded 55 others in an attack on a police headquarters in Ba'quba (Diyala). The blast caused part of the three-storey building, where offices for different departments of Iraqi police and security are located, to collapse; Shashank Bengali and Laith Hammoudi, *Attack on pilgrims kills dozens as Iraqi violence continues*, McClatchy Newspapers, 20 January 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/20/107142/attack-on-pilgrims-kills-dozens.html>.
 - On 3 January 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked an Iraqi intelligence services compound in Ba'quba (Diyala), wounding 28 people, mostly female students from a nearby school; Reuters, *Attack on intel service in northeast Iraq wounds 28*, 3 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attack-on-intel-service-in-northeast-iraq-wounds-28/>.
- ²⁷⁰ On 19 May 2011, two car bombs and a sticky bomb reportedly targeting ISF exploded near a police headquarters in central Kirkuk, killing 27 people and wounding more than 90 others. The third bomb reportedly targeted Colonel Oras Mohammed, the head of Kirkuk's Counter-Terrorism Unit. He was not hurt but four of his bodyguards were killed; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Blasts in northern Iraqi oil city kill 27*, Reuters, 19 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-in-northern-iraqi-oil-city-kill-27/>. And on 9 February 2011, eight people died and 75 others were wounded when three car bombs targeting ISF detonated in quick succession in a residential area in southern Kirkuk. The third explosion, allegedly caused by a suicide truck bomber, targeted a *Peshmerga* building and also caused damages to a nearby KDP office. Investigations by the ISF revealed that the attacks were the responsibility of AQI; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Three car bombs kill 7, wound 78 in Iraq's Kirkuk*, Reuters, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/three-car-bombs-kill-4-wound-20-in-iraqs-kirkuk/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Recent bombings made by al-Qaeda - Kirkuk police*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141036&l=1.
- ²⁷¹ For example, on 19 February 2012, two soldiers were reportedly killed and four others were injured in the morning hours, as mortar rockets fell on the Iraqi Army headquarters in the Nahrawan area of Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Two soldiers killed and four injured as mortar rockets fall on Nineveh HQ*, AKnews, 20 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291095/>. On 16 February 2012, three Iraqi soldiers were killed and a fourth was injured in a checkpoint attack in Ain al-Baydha village, south of Mosul city; Rezan Ahmed, *3 soldiers killed, 1 injured in Nineveh*, AKnews, 16 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/290440/>. On 30 April 2011, eight people were reportedly killed and 19 wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up at an Iraqi army checkpoint next to a popular market in the city of Mosul; Reuters, *Suicide bomber kills 8, wounds 19 in N.Iraq*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-8-wounds-19-in-iraq/>.

²⁷² According to reports, examples include:

- On 4 January 2012, gunmen using hand grenades attacked a police checkpoint, killing one policeman, wounding three others, and setting a police vehicle ablaze in Samarra; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 4*, 4 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-4/>.
- On 25 December 2011, a booby-trapped car driven by a suicide bomber blew off against an Iraqi Army checkpoint south of Dujail, wounding six soldiers and eight civilians; Aswat al-Iraq, *14 persons, including 6 soldiers, injured in booby-trapped car blast in Dujail, Salahal-din Province*, 25 December 2011, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146188&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146188&l=1).
- On 28 July 2011, two suicide bombers killed at least 15 people and wounded more than 30 others as police and soldiers were collecting their salaries at the local Rafidain Bank in central Tikrit; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>.
- On 26 June 2011, at least 12 people were wounded, including nine policemen and three civilians, when a suicide bomber in a wheelchair blew himself up at a police station in Tarmiyah. Another source put the toll at two people killed and 17 wounded; Reuters, *Suicide bomber hits Iraq police station, 12 wounded*, 26 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-hits-iraq-police-station-12-wounded/>;
- On 21 February 2011, a suicide bomber blew up a car outside a shelter housing police officers in Samarra, killing 13 policemen and wounding 25 others. The police officers reportedly belonged to an elite squad from Missan sent to Samarra to protect shrines during a Shi'ite religious event; Sabah al-Bazee, *Suicide bomber kills 13 policemen in Iraq*, Reuters, 21 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-10-wounds-15-in-iraq/>.
- On 18 January 2011, a suicide bomber attacked a police recruitment centre in Tikrit, killing 60 and wounding over 100 persons. AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, calling the police recruits "treacherous daggers"; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>; Sabah al-Bazee, *UPDATE 5-Suicide bomber kills up to 60 police recruits in Iraq*, Reuters, 18 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-5-suicide-bomber-kills-up-to-60-police-recruits-in-iraq/>.

²⁷³ According to the USF-I's Deputy Commanding General for Operations, targeted killings of senior ISF officials has become one of Iraq's major security concerns; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, 30 July 2011, pp. 71-72. See also UN Security Council, *Third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1936 (2010)*, 7 July 2011, para 41, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_435_EN.pdf. See also, The Guardian, *Iraqi police and army officers targeted in new wave of violence*, 15 October 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/15/iraq-police-violence-targets>.

²⁷⁴ For example, reported attacks against senior ISF officials in Baghdad in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 13 March 2012, gunmen killed Khalid Al-Zuhairi, deputy chairman of the security committee in Al-Madain in Baghdad Governorate. His son was seriously wounded in the attack; Mohammed al-Tayyib, *Security official assassinated and son wounded in Baghdad district*, AKnews, 13 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295642/>.
- On 26 February 2012, gunmen attacked a vehicle driven by Colonel Abdullah Hammad in Doura, southern Baghdad. Hammad was wounded while his brother was killed in the attack; Aswat al-Iraq, *8 dead, wounded in Baghdad attacks*, 26 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(0d1t3z3onpk05mmynyt13v55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147131&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(0d1t3z3onpk05mmynyt13v55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147131&l=1).
- On 16 February 2012, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire with weapons with silencers on another car carrying a police Lieutenant-Colonel and Captain, wounding them both in the Binoog District of northern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 16*, 16 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-16/>.
- On 14 February 2012, gunmen assassinated General Aziz Hamdi in Jami'a crossing, west Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Defense Ministry General Assassinated in Baghdad*, 14 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(uh3rtmfu0foapv551hyawb55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146923&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(uh3rtmfu0foapv551hyawb55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146923&l=1).
- On 7 February 2012, gunmen using automatic weapons opened fire at an army officer's house and killed his wife in Abu Ghraib; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 7*, 7 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-7/>.
- On 5 February 2012, gunmen fired at Major Majid Waleed while he was driving his car on Mohammed Al Qasim highway in Baghdad, killing him instantly; NINA, *Major in MOI killed on the highway in Baghdad*, 5 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKDJHH.
- On 24 January 2012, gunmen stormed the home of Hassan Abdulla al-Timimi in the Abu Ghraib area, west of Baghdad, killing him, his wife and their three children. After leaving the house, the insurgents set off two explosions, injuring four of al-Timimi's neighbors; Dan Morse, *At least 19 killed in spate of attacks in Iraq*, Washington Post, 24 January 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/blasts-attacks-kill-14-in-baghdad/2012/01/24/gIQAx2DsMQ_story.html.
- On 16 December 2011, gunmen shot at the convoy of Major General Qassim Al-Moussawi, spokesman of Baghdad Security Operations, and wounded one passerby in the centre of Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 16*, 16 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-16/>.
- On 3 December 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers wounded Iraqi army Brigadier General Ali Fadhil, and killed his wife, while he was driving his car in Baghdad's northeastern Ur district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 4*, 4 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-4/>.
- On 5 November 2011, gunmen assassinated the Deputy Chief of the Borders Police, Brigadier Jaleel Al Abadi, with guns with silencers when he was passing through Zayouna district in eastern Baghdad; NINA, *Deputy of Borders Police Chief killed in Baghdad*, 5 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILFIJ.
- On 5 September 2011, a roadside bomb targeting the convoy of the Baghdad Security Operations Commander in Chief, Lieutenant General Ahmed Hashim and wounded three passers-by when it blew up in central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-5/>.
- On 17 May 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead Colonel Jasim Mohammed of the MoI's Criminal Investigation Department in the Amil District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 17*, 17 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-17/>.
- On 28 April 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead an Iraqi Air Force Brigadier-General while he was driving his car in the western Ghazaliyah district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 28*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-28/>.
- On 27 April 2011, a Brigadier-General in the MoD was seriously wounded when men armed with weapons with silencers opened fire on his car on a highway in Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 27*, 27 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-27/>.

- On 24 April 2011, MoD Brigadier-General Abdul-Ghani Mohammad was seriously wounded when a sticky bomb attached to his car exploded in the western Amiriya District. In a separate incident, MoD Lieutenant-Colonel Yahya Fadhel Abbas escaped unharmed when a sticky bomb attached to his vehicle exploded in central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 24*, 24 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-24/>.
- On 23 April 2011, gunmen in a car, using weapons with silencers, killed Mohammed Qassim, an officer with the National Intelligence Service, in his car in the western Al-Liqa Square; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 23*, 23 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-23/>.
- On 22 April 2011, gunmen in a car opened fire at the car of Ahmed Fadhel, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the MoI, wounding him and killing his driver; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 23*, 23 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-23/>.
- On 22 March 2011, Major General Ahmed Obeidi, Head of the 6th Iraqi Army Division, died in a hospital from wounds sustained three days earlier when gunmen shot at his car in Palestine Street, northeastern Baghdad. In a separate incident, a bomb on a highway in southern Baghdad killed an Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel, Yousif Mohammed and wounded two civilians; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 23*, 23 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-23/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 22*, 22 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-21/>.
- On 8 February 2011, a roadside bomb killed Brigadier General Ihsan Mohammed in front of his house in the western Ghazaliyah district. A second bomb exploded at the scene when police and army arrived, wounding two soldiers, one policeman and one civilian; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 8*, 8 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-8/>.

²⁷⁵For example, reported attacks against senior ISF officials in Kirkuk in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 20 March 2012, an IED targeted the convoy of the police chief of Kirkuk District, Brigadier Sarhad Qadir, in western Kirkuk, causing damages to a number of the vehicles; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS...Kirkuk districts police chief survives assassination attempt*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFJE.
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a police captain's vehicle went off and wounded him in northern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 13*, 13 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-13>.
- On 12 February 2012, gunman fired at the house of the police deputy chief in Kirkuk, Torhan Abdul Rahman, in Arafa area, downtown Kirkuk, causing no casualties; NINA, *House of police deputy chief in Kirkuk fired at*, 12 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEJGH.
- On 30 December 2011, a roadside bomb damaged the house of an Iraqi army captain when it went off in the town of Dibis; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 15 December 2011, a roadside bomb went off near the car of an Iraqi army lieutenant colonel, Salih Hussein, seriously wounding him in western Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 16*, 16 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-16>.
- On 3 October 2011, gunmen killed the head of the Anti-Crime Department in Daquq. He had survived an earlier attempt on his life on 19 August 2011; Aswat al-Iraq, *Anti-crime director killed in Kirkuk*, 3 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145130&l=1.
- On 5 September 2011, Colonel Orhan Haider, the Commander of Kirkuk's Emergency Police, escaped an assassination attempt when a booby-trapped car blew up against his motorcade while on his way to his office on the main Kirkuk-Baghdad highway; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk's security official escapes assassination attempt*, 5 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144652&l=1.
- On 19 August 2011, the Commander of Zab's Supporting Battalion, Hamad Ali Hussein, escaped an assassination attempt when a sticky bomb detonated under his car in the town of Zab. Two security personnel were wounded in the attack; Aswat al-Iraq, *Leading Iraqi security official escapes assassination in Kirkuk*, 20 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144385&l=1.
- On 10 August 2011, an IED blew off against the motorcade of the Police Chief of Azadi, Beston Mohammed Qafary, while on his way to work. Qafary survived unharmed; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk Police Director escapes assassination attempt*, 10 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144218&l=1.
- On 21 July 2011, a rocket was launched on the house of Police Officer Colonel Imad Murshid in a village close to Riyadh. When police arrived at the scene, a bomb exploded, killing a civilian and wounding two others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi citizen killed, two others injured in Kirkuk blast*, 21 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143870&l=1.
- On 19 July 2011, gunmen blew up the house of Colonel Qassim Al-Ussafy, the assistant police chief of Riyadh town (Kirkuk), wounding him and his son; Aswat al-Iraq, *House of a Kirkuk Assistant Police Director blown up*, 20 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143851&l=1.
- On 25 May 2011, an explosive charge, planted on the roadside close to Al-Nida'a Bridge in Kirkuk, exploded and killed the Police Director of Dibbis town, Lt. Brigadier, Hussein Ni'ama Hawas, when on his way to work. Hawas had survived an earlier assassination attempt on 1 December 2010; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: Police Director of Kirkuk's Dibbis township killed in explosive blast*, 25 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142750&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk's Dibbis Police Director escapes assassination*, 1 December 2010, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=139383&l=1.
- On 23 May 2011, the police chief of Al-Rashad town, Major Ahmed Abdul-Ghafour, escaped an assassination attempt in a booby-trapped car blast against his motorcade in southern Kirkuk, killing two persons and wounding 14 others, including Abdul-Ghafour; Aswat al-Iraq, *Police officer escapes assassination attempt in Kirkuk, killing 2 persons and wounding 14 others*, 23 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142702&l=1.
- On 16 May 2011, the director of Police Administrative Affairs in Hawija, Lt. Brigadier Qusay Arif, escaped an assassination attempt when an explosive charge exploded under his vehicle in Hawija; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk Hawija township's Police director escapes assassination attempt*, 17 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142582&l=1.
- On 13 April 2011, the assistant commander of Kirkuk's Al-Urouba district's police, Colonel Najat Hassan, escaped an assassination attempt when an explosive charge blew off under his vehicle while on his way to his office. Hassan was wounded in the incident; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant Police Commander escapes assassination attempt in Kirkuk*, 13 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141955&l=1.

²⁷⁶For example, reported attacks against senior ISF officials in Al-Anbar in 2011 and 2012 included: ,

- On 19 February 2012, an IED attached to the car of First Lieutenant Ala' al-Dulaimi went off near a checkpoint in central Ramadi, wounding him seriously; NINA, *Police officer wounded in Ramadi*, 19 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFKDM.
- On 13 November 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a police lieutenant colonel near his house in central Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 13*, 13 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-13/>.
- On 12 November 2011, the commander of a Fallujah police station was killed by gunmen when on a tour through the city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Police commander killed in Fallouja*, 12 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145576&l=1.
- On 17 April 2011, an IED planted on the roadside west of Ramadi blew off against the motorcade of Al-Anbar's Traffic Police Director, Brigadier Hamad Al-Duleimy. He survived the attack unharmed; Aswat al-Iraq, *Anbar's Traffic Police Director escapes assassination attempt*, 17 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142019&l=1.
- On 16 April 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a police lieutenant-colonel cut off part of his legs when it exploded in the town of Khaldiya; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 16*, 16 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-16/>.
- On 12 April 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a police lieutenant killed him and wounded another person in Fallujah; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, April 12*, 12 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-12/>.
- On 26 March 2011, gunmen carrying guns with silencers shot dead a police colonel near his house in the town of Ramadi (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 27*, 27 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-27/>.
- On 10 January 2011, a roadside bomb killed the police chief of Hit and wounded three policemen when it struck his convoy in Hit town; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 10*, 10 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-10/>.

²⁷⁷According to reports, examples include:

- On 19 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a former civil defense lieutenant's car exploded, killing him and seriously wounding two other passengers in Jalawla; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20*, 20 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-20/>.
- On 5 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a police lieutenant-colonel's car exploded in the late hours of the night, seriously injuring him in Jalawla; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 6*, 6 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-6/>.
- On 29 January 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a police officer's car blew up and wounded him in central Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 29*, 29 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-29/>.
- On 23 January 2012, an IED attached to a civilian car belonging to a military Captain exploded in the outskirts of Jalawla district; NINA, *Officer wounded northeast Baquba*, 23 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLLEM.
- On 23 December 2011, a bomb attached to a car of an Iraqi army officer killed him and wounded his wife and son in the town of Yathrib, near Balad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 24*, 24 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-24/>.
- On 30 October 2011, gunmen using guns with silencers opened fire at the car of Colonel Ali Al-Timimi, head of Jalawla's Criminal Investigation Bureau, while driving back home in Askari neighborhood, in Muqdadiah. Col. Timimi was seriously wounded while his son, who was accompanying him in the car, was killed; NINA, *Head of Criminal Investigation Bureau in Jalawla wounded, his son killed*, 30 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKHKF.
- On 19 May 2011, a parked car bomb targeting the convoy of police Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Hameed Al-Shimari, the Emergency Response Unit Commander in Diyala Governorate, killed two civilians and wounded 10 people in Ba'quba. Al-Shimari survived unharmed but three of his guards were among the wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 19*, 19 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-19/>.

See also Bryar Mohammed, *1,800 policemen killed in 9 years in Diyala*, Aknews, 24 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286181/>.

²⁷⁸For example, attacks reported on senior ISF officials in Ninewa in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 14 March 2012, Colonel Ahmed Kadhim, Internal affairs chief of Ninewa police, survived an assassination attempt when an IED detonated next to him in northern Mosul; NINA, *Internal affairs chief in Nineveh police survives assassination attempt*, 14 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKHGLE.
- On 15 January 2012, Ninewa's police commander, General Ahmed Hassan Al-Jbouri, escaped an assassination attempt by mortar shells and light weapons, west of Mosul; Aswat Al-Iraq, *Ninewa police commander escaped assassination attempt*, 15 January 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(tfceh545awojl0yuusz0jl55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146508&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(tfceh545awojl0yuusz0jl55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146508&l=1).
- On 13 December 2011, gunmen in a car shot dead a police colonel working for the Facility Protection Services (FPS) in front of his house in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 13*, 13 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-13/>.
- On 17 November 2011, police Lt. Col. Jabbar Rasheed, the police chief for Al-Dawasa area, was killed along with three other police officers when a roadside bomb exploded beneath their vehicle near Wadi Hajar bridge in central Mosul; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraq executes 11 'terrorists' says state TV*, CNN, 17 November 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/iraq-executions/index.html>.
- On 1 November 2011, General Ismael Al-Jibouri, the Director of Ninewa's Intelligence Operations, survived unharmed an assassination attempt by a bomb blast that targeted his convoy south of Mosul city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Intelligence General escapes assassination attempt*, 1 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145494&l=1.
- On 19 September 2011, Ninewa's Deputy Police Chief, Brigadier Sa'ad Younis Abdullah, escaped assassination when an IED went off against his convoy in eastern Mosul; NINA, *Niniveh's Deputy Police Chief escapes assassination, 2 bodyguards wounded*, 19 September 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIEJGF.
- On 29 May 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying army Major General Khalid Al-Ubaidi, a previous nominee for the position of Defence Minister, wounded the officer and his security guard in the north of Mosul City; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 29*, 29 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-29/>.

- On 17 May 2011, the manager of the Police Internal Affairs Department in Mosul escaped an attempt on his life but a police officer was wounded when a roadside bomb blew up near their vehicle in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 18, 18 May 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-18/>.
- On 10 May 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of police Lieutenant Colonel Zaid Al-Omari wounded him severely when it exploded in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 10, 10 May 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-10/>.
- On 2 February 2011, gunmen in a car killed a police captain inside his car and wounded a passenger in the northern town of Rabea near the Syrian border; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 2, 2 February 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-2/>.
- Also, on 29 December 2010, three suicide bombers stormed into a police battalion headquarters and killed Lieutenant Colonel Shamil Ahmed, who headed the battalion in Mosul's western area of Bab Sinjar, and was leading a campaign AQI in the area. Reportedly, Ahmed had recently received numerous death threats from the Islamist militant group. He had reportedly escaped an attempt on his life last year; Jamal al-Badrani, *UPDATE 3-Suicide bombers kill police chief in Mosul attack*, Reuters, 29 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-3-suicide-bombers-kill-police-chief-in-mosul-attack/>.

²⁷⁹For example, targeted attacks on senior ISF officials in Salah Al-Din in 2011 and 2012 were reported to include:

- On 20 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a police lieutenant colonel's car exploded and seriously wounded him in central Tuz Khurmato; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20, 20 February 2012*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-20/>.
- On 16 February 2012, gunmen in a car opened fire and killed a police lieutenant colonel and his driver in a village near the city of Tikrit; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, Feb 17, 17 February 2012*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-feb-17/>.
- On 31 January 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a vehicle carrying a police lieutenant-colonel exploded, wounding him in the town of Shirqat; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 31, 31 January 2012*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-31/>.
- On 5 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of Brigadier Ali Resool of the Federal Police blew up and wounded one of his guards in Dujail (Salah Al-Din). An hour later, a bomb was reportedly placed outside of Resool's house, seriously injuring his son; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 5, 5 December 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-5/>.
- On 13 November 2011, an IED blew up against the motorcade of the Assistant Commander of the Iraqi Army's 4th Battalion, Col. Shahin Adid, in Al-Hajjaj village, killing him on the spot and seriously wounding his bodyguard; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT / High ranking Army officer assassinated in Tikrit*, 13 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145578&l=1.
- On 28 August 2011, a roadside bomb targeted the vehicle of police Major Mohammed Taqi, wounding him, his bodyguard and a passer-by in central Tuz Khurmato; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 28, 28 August 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-28/>.
- On 17 August 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked the house of Brigadier Tawfiq Ahmed, Police Commander of Tarmiyah, detonating the car at the house's entrance. Ahmed survived the attack unharmed but three family members were reportedly injured; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS Tarmiya Police Commander escapes assassination*, 17 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHKHJH.
- On 17 July 2011, gunmen shot at a convoy carrying police Brigadier Ahmed Bdaiwi, the head of the major crimes department in Salah Al-Din Governorate, wounding three of his guards in a village near the town of Shirqat; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 17, 17 July 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-17/>.
- On 16 February 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near the local police chief's vehicle, wounding him, one of his guards and a pedestrian, in the town of Tuz Khurmato (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 16, 16 February 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-16/>.
- On 3 February 2011, gunmen in a car attacked the vehicle of a local police captain, killing one of his children, wounding him and two of his other children in the town of Tuz Khurmato; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 3, 3 February 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-3/>.
- On 2 February 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed an official of Iraq's National Intelligence Service in his car, and wounded two of his relatives, near the town of Taji; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 2, 2 February 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-2/>.
- On 19 January 2011, a roadside bomb went off near the convoy of Lieutenant Colonel Salah Mohammed, head of a police unit in Baiji and wounded two of his guards; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 20, 20 January 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-20/>.

²⁸⁰ According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, reported assassinations of security personnel in Southern Iraq occur particularly in the context of ongoing power struggles among Shi'ite parties and armed groups over influence in the ISF; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Relentless Insurgency*, Real Clear World, 25 August 2011, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2011/08/25/iraqs_relentless_insurgency_99641-2.html.

Incidents reported in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 7 March 2012, a police colonel survived unharmed an attack against his car on a highway north of Babel; NINA, *Survival of a police colonel from assassinate attempt in Babel*, 7 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKGFMI.
- On 14 February 2012, gunmen attacked an Iraqi army Captain with silenced guns in Suwayra (Wassit). He survived with severe injuries; Nabil al-Shayib, *Army official survives assassination attempt*, AKnews, 14 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/290018/>.
- On 11 February 2012, a car bomb exploded targeting the convoy of a police station chief, wounding him and at least three other policemen in Mahaweel (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 11, 11 February 2012*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-11/>.
- 23 September 2011, ISF arrested several men allegedly planning to assassinate Shaalan Ali Saleh, the police chief of Souk Al-Shyoukh (Thi-Qar); Aswat al-Iraq, *3 arrested for attempted assassination of police chief in Thi-Qar*, 23 September 2010, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=137118&l=1.
- On 18 August 2011, Lieutenant Yaser Saleem Witwit, a criminal investigation police officer, escaped an assassination attempt when gunmen opened fire at him from a speeding car in front of his house in Hilla (Babel); NINA, *Babil's criminal investigation officer escaped assassination*, 18 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHKJFE.

- On 9 July 2011, a Lt.-Brigadier in the MoD was killed when a sticky bomb exploded under his personal car in Kut (Wassit); Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Army officer killed in Kut explosion*, 11 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143693&l=1.

²⁸¹ Ramzy Mardini and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Iraq Trip Report*, Institute for the Study of the War, 4 August 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf.

²⁸² AKE, *Weekly Security Update*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/category/security/weekly-security-update/>.

²⁸³ According to Baghdad Security Operations, militants reportedly killed more than 38 officials in the first five months of 2011. Interior Ministry sources reported at least 51 such killings to Reuters in the same period; Suadad al-Salhy, *EXCLUSIVE-Shi'ite groups behind Iraq killings, officials say*, Reuters, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/exclusive-shiite-groups-behind-iraq-killings-officials-say/>. In the last two months of 2010, more than 37 successful and attempted assassinations were reportedly registered by the Baghdad Operations Centre; Suadad al-Salhy, *INTERVIEW-Assassination wave targets Iraq security officials*, Reuters, 4 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/interview-assassination-wave-targets-iraq-security-officials/>.

²⁸⁴ Ramzy Mardini and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Iraq Trip Report*, Institute for the Study of the War, 4 August 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf. NINA, the National Iraqi News Agency, reported in May 2011 that ISF found leaflets, signed by AQI, threatening to kill security officials, in Baiji and Samarra (Salah Al-Din) as well as Muqdadiyah (Diyala); NINA, *Threats to security official in Salah al-Deen province*, 14 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGILEI; NINA, *Threat leaflets for local figures found in Diyala*, 14 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGIKMD. See also "Actors of Violence".

²⁸⁵ According to Major-General Hassan al-Baidhani, chief of staff for Baghdad's security operations command, those responsible for the killings were reported to belong to splinter groups of the JAM; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq Shi'ite militia splinters into hit squads, gangs*, Reuters, 21 July 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/21/us-iraq-violence-mehdi-idUSTRE76K22E20110721>; Suadad al-Salhy, *EXCLUSIVE-Shi'ite groups behind Iraq killings, officials say*, Reuters, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/exclusive-shiite-groups-behind-iraq-killings-officials-say/>.

²⁸⁶ Suadad al-Salhy, *EXCLUSIVE-Shi'ite groups behind Iraq killings, officials say*, Reuters, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/exclusive-shiite-groups-behind-iraq-killings-officials-say/>.

²⁸⁷ Suadad al-Salhy, *EXCLUSIVE-Shi'ite groups behind Iraq killings, officials say*, Reuters, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/exclusive-shiite-groups-behind-iraq-killings-officials-say/>.

²⁸⁸ Ramzy Mardini and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, *Iraq Trip Report*, Institute for the Study of the War, 4 August 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Iraq_Trip_Report.pdf.

²⁸⁹ For example, it has been reported that on 26 January 2012, in the early morning, a bomb attack at the home of Ahmed and Jihad Zuwaiyin, two brothers, both policemen and killed all 10 of their family members, including their wives and children, in Mussayib (Babel); AFP, *Bombing of Iraq policemen's home kills 10*, 26 January 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ieub7D77cUJntOywp6jqJizn4OQ?docId=CNG.08e433d11d9885da75e883365c1ae613.131>. Between 1 September 2011 and 31 January 2012, media reported that off-duty ISF members were targeted for assassination in Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diwaniyah, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah Al-Din and Ninewa; see Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, 1 September 2011 until 31 January 2012. Furthermore, NINA, the Iraqi National News Agency, reported in August 2011, that ISI had distributed leaflets in Hawija (Kirkuk) threatening those that collaborate with the ISF; NINA, *Group of Islamic State of Iraq threatens of killing detectives in Kirkuk*, 6 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHIKMK.

²⁹⁰ According to reports, examples include:

- On 13 January 2012, two car bombs targeting police officers' houses blew up separately and wounded at least 15 people in the city of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 13*, 13 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-13>.
- On 17 August 2011, gunmen stormed police officers' houses in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad), killing one police officer and wounding two civilians; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 18*, 18 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-18/>.
- On 26 April 2011, bombs planted around the homes of two policemen exploded, killing a man and a child and wounding four other people, in Hawija (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 26*, 26 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-26/>.
- On 15 March 2011, gunmen detonated three bombs in front of three houses belonging to policemen, wounding two girls and a policeman in southern and central Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 15*, 15 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-15/>.

²⁹¹ Analysis of security incidents as reported by Reuters Alertnet and Aswat Al-Iraq between January 2011 and February 2012.

²⁹² See above examples.

²⁹³ See "Background Information".

²⁹⁴ According to reports, examples include:

- On 14 February 2012, gunmen opened fire from a car, wounding an off-duty *Asayish* security officer in the city of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14*, 14 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-14/>.
- On 27 January 2012, the mutilated body of Peshmerga member Wisam Jumaa was found dead in Saadiya (Diyala); Bryar Mohammed, *Peshmarga cut into pieces in Diyala*, AKnews, 27 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286608/>.
- On 3 January 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the car of an off-duty *Peshmerga* guard seriously wounded him when it exploded in Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 3*, 3 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-3/>.
- On 30 December 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire on an *Asayish* security checkpoint and seriously wounded one officer and a policeman passing by, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 18 December 2011, Adel Hameed, a member of the *Asayish*, was killed when his vehicle exploded in front of the KDP's committee building in Saadiya (Diyala); Bryar Mohammed, *Asayish member killed in Diyala bombing*, AKnews, 18 December 2011, <http://new.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/278893/>.
- On 6 December 2011, a member of the Kurdish security forces was wounded when a roadside bomb targeting his patrol went off near the city of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 6*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-6/>. The same day, gunmen opened fire at a car

carrying an off-duty Kurdish *Peshmerga* soldier, killing him on in eastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq*, December 7, 7 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-7>.

- On 27 November 2011, a roadside bomb went off near the house of an *Asayish* officer, wounding him and his wife, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq*, November 27, 27 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-27>.
- On 26 November 2011, several mortar shells hit the *Peshmerga* headquarters in Zumar district (Ninewa); NINA, *Peshmerga forces arrest 20 persons in Zumar in Niniveh*, 26 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJDJHE.
- On 20 November 2011, gunmen opened fire from a speeding car on the house of Taher Faq, *Asayish* Chief in Tuz Khurmato district (Salah Al-Din), killing one guard and wounding another; NINA, *Kurdish security man killed, another wounded south of Kirkuk*, 20 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIMLFD; Bryar Mohammed, *Kurdish official bodyguard killed in house attack*, Aknews, 20 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/273594/>.
- On 3 October 2011, gunmen with machine guns attacked a *Peshmerga* checkpoint in Bay Doman area of Khanaqeen (Diyala), killing one and wounding four others; NINA, *Element of Peshmerga killed seven others wounded in Diyala*, 3 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIGHIG.
- On 5 May 2011, a roadside bomb targeting the motorcade of the *Asayish* Director in Tuz Khurmato, Nawzad Karimwent, killed two *Asayish* members and wounded four others, including two civilians, in the town of Tuz Khurmato (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, May 5, 5 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-5/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 Kurdish security elements killed, 4 injured in assassination attempt*, 5 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142361&l=1.
- On 1 May 2011, armed men in a speeding car using weapons with silencers shot dead a Kurdish intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Nawzad Talabani, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, May 1, 1 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-1/>.
- On 26 April 2011, three bombs went off consecutively in Arafa, western Kirkuk, killing one person and injuring 19 others, including five *Asayish* members and four policemen; Aswat al-Iraq, *3 blasts in Kirkuk leave 20 casualties*, 26 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142198&l=1.
- On 19 April 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead a *Peshmerga* guard in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, April 25, 25 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-19/>.
- 8 March 2011, a Katyusha rocket landed near a Kurdish security building and wounded a Kurdish security member in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, March 8, 8 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-9/>.
- On 5 March 2011, two *Asayish* members were killed and five wounded when an IED targeting the convoy of the *Asayish* head detonated in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); NINA, *7 Ashayiss Kurdish forces killed and injured in Salahii-ddin province*, 5 March 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGHJMM.

²⁹⁵ Incidents reported in the media in 2011 and 2012 included

- On 19 February 2012, a hand grenade attached to a private car detonated in Khanaqeen (Diyala) and wounded Maj. Wadi Ahmed, a fire officer of the former regime, and four of his relatives; Bryar Mohammed, *Five wounded in Jalawla Bridge hand grenade blast*, AKnews, 20 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291106/>.
- On 13 February 2012, gunmen opened fire on a lieutenant in the former army, in Mahaweel district (Babel), wounding him; NINA, *An officer in the former army injured in Babel. Hilla / NINA--An officer in the former army injured today by an armed attack occurred in Babel*, 13 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEKJH.
- On 21 December 2011, an ex-officer of the former Iraqi Army was shot dead by unidentified gunmen using guns with silencers in front of his house in Baghdad's northern Adhamiyah district; Yazn al-Shammari, *Ex-army officer shot dead in Baghdad*, AKnews, 21 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279682/>.
- On 22 July 2011, gunmen opened fire from a speeding car on Ibrahim Shueib Al-Jumeily, a doctor and Lt-Brigadier in the former Iraqi Army, killing him on the spot in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor in Iraq's former Iraqi Army killed in Kirkuk*, 23 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143890&l=1.
- On 22 June 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car exploded, killing Qahtan Anbar, a senior official in the former Ba'ath Party, in Ba'quba (Diyala). In a separate incident, a sticky bomb attached to his car killed a retired lieutenant colonel who served in Saddam Hussein's army, in Baghdad's southern Saidiya district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, June 22, 22 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-22/>; NINA, *Baathist official, Mayor assassinated in Baquba*, 22 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHDHHD.
- On 13 June 2011, gunmen using a gun with a silencer assassinated Brig.-General, Abdul-Wahid Attiya, a former officer in Saddam Hussein's Army, in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's former Army officer assassinated in Kirkuk*, 14 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143139&l=1.
- On 22 February 2011, gunmen using guns with silencers shot dead Ismael Mohammed Mehdi, an officer at the rank of Brigadier in the former Iraqi Army, in Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *Former officer assassinated in Muqadadiya*, 22 February 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFIEMG.
- On 21 February 2011, gunmen killed an officer at the rank of colonel of the former Iraqi Army in Askari neighborhood, northeastern Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *Former officer assassinated in Muqadadiya*, 22 February 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFIEMG.
- On 12 January 2011, gunmen killed a civilian after chasing him from house to house in eastern Mosul. The victim was a former non-commissioned officer in Saddam Hussein's army; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, January 12, 12 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-12/>.

²⁹⁶ It needs to be noted that the term "Sahwa" does not cover a single, uniform organization; rather, these are local groups made up from mainly former insurgents and tribal members. See also "Background Information".

²⁹⁷ According to Sterling Jensen, who studies the Sahwa movement at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and served as an Arabic interpreter for the US forces in Iraq, "[T]hey're the most targeted and vulnerable people in Iraq," Dan Morse, *Former 'Sons of Iraq' targeted by insurgents after U.S. pullout*, Washington Post, 27 January 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/former-sons-of-iraq-targeted-by-sunni-insurgents-after-us-pullout/2012/01/14/gIQAjf49VQ_story.html. The US Department of State noted an increase in attacks against Sahwa members and Sunni tribal leaders in 2010; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 10, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

²⁹⁸ In 2008, the MNF-I reportedly transferred responsibility for the Sahwa to the Iraqi Government. The latter had committed to integrate 20 percent of the fighters into the ISF and to find jobs for the others in civil service or private sector jobs. To date, the process has been slow and many Sahwa members reportedly feel marginalized; Dan Morse, *Former 'Sons of Iraq' targeted by insurgents after U.S. pullout*, Washington Post, 27 January 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/former-sons-of-iraq-targeted-by-sunni-insurgents-after-us-pullout/2012/01/14/gIQAjf49VQ_story.html.

²⁹⁹ In August 2011, ISI's spokesman Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani in an audio message reportedly asked Sunni Sahwa members who turned against the insurgency and joined forces with the USF-I and the Iraqi Government to return to its ranks, promising to forgive them. He also reportedly threatened to "slaughter" those who did not "repent"; Maamoun Youssef, *Al Qaeda In Iraq Audio Message Reportedly Asks Ex-Members To Return*, AP, 8 August 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/08/al-qaeda-in-iraq-audio-message_n_921328.html. On 15 August 2011, gunmen dressed in military uniforms reportedly executed four Sahwa members and wounded three others after dragging them out of Al-Tawab mosque in the town of Sayafiya (Babel). Reportedly, a note was left near the bodies claiming it was from ISI; Reuters, *Gunmen kill four Sunni fighters near Baghdad*, 16 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-four-sunni-fighters-near-baghdad/>.

³⁰⁰ According to reports, examples include:

- On 19/20 March 2012, gunmen attacked a Sahwa checkpoint in Muqadiyah district (Diyala), killing one Sahwa member; NINA, *Sahwan forces member killed in Baquba*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFGG.
- On 18 March 2012, three Sahwa members were killed and two seriously injured when two IEDs exploded near their checkpoint in Shirqat District (Salah Al-Din); NINA, *Five Sahwa members killed, injured northern Tikrit*, 18 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKHMF.
- On 15 March 2012, a Sahwa member was killed and two others wounded when roadside bomb detonated against their patrol in Shirqat district (Salah Al-Din); NINA, *Sahwa element killed, 2 wounded in Shirqat*, 15 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKHIH.
- On 4 March 2012, two Sahwa members were injured when a roadside bomb planted near a Sahwa checkpoint went off in the district of Tuz; NINA, *Two members of Sahwa forces injured in Salahuddin*, 5 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFLF.
- On 19 February 2012, gunmen in a civilian car attacked a joint Police-Sahwa checkpoint in Abu Khamis, north of Ba'quba (Diyala), killing a policeman and two Sahwa members. In a separate incident, two more Sahwa members were wounded by a roadside bomb near Samarra (Salah Al-Din); AFP, *Suicide bomb kills 15 at Baghdad police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/world/suicide-bomb-kills-15-at-baghdad-police-academy-2012-02-19-1.443803>.
- On 31 January 2012, a roadside bomb went off near a checkpoint and wounded two Sahwa members in southern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 31*, 31 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-31/>.
- On 23 January 2012, an IED exploded near a Sahwa checkpoint in Baiji district (Salah Al-Din), killing one Sahwa member and seriously wounding two others; NINA, *Sahwa element killed, 2 wounded north Tikrit*, 23 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLLF.
- On 18 January 2012, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a security checkpoint, killing a Sahwa member and wounding three other people including two policemen, in central Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
- On 31 December 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed five Sahwa members at a security checkpoint in the town of Khan Bani Saad (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 31*, 31 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-31/>.
- On 10 December 2011, gunmen in a car attacked a joint Sahwa/Police checkpoint, killing one Sahwa member and wounding one policeman in Baghdad's Sa'adiya district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 10*, 10 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-10/>.
- On 1 December 2011, gunmen attacked a Sahwa checkpoint in Shirqat (Salah Al-Din), killing three Sahwa members and wounding two others; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 2*, 2 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-2/>.
- On 29 November 2011, gunmen threw hand grenades at a Sahwa patrol and wounded five people, including two Sahwa fighters, in Tarmiya (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
- On 3 November 2011, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive belt outside the gates of a military base in Ba'quba (Diyala) as Sahwa members lined up to collect their salaries. A car bomb blew up in a nearby parking lot a few minutes later. It was reported that at least six people were killed and 23 wounded in the attacks. Other sources put the death toll at 10 killed and 40 wounded; Reuters, *Bombs kill at least six in Iraq's Baquba*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombs-kill-at-least-six-in-iraqs-baquba/>.

³⁰¹ For example, recent reported incidents included:

- On 18 March 2012, a Sahwa member was wounded when an improvised explosive device exploded near his house off in Shirqat district (Salah Al-Din). A second bomb was deactivated by ISF; NINA, *Sahwa element wounded in Shirqat*, 18 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKHMJJ.
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a Sahwa member's vehicle exploded and seriously wounded him in Muqadiyah (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 13*, 13 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-13/>.
- On 10 February 2012, a Sahwa member was killed in a sticky bomb blast inside his car east of Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa member killed in Fallouja*, 10 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(xfb22255bwnbho55hifmsf55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146858&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(xfb22255bwnbho55hifmsf55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146858&l=1).
- On 4 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a Sahwa member exploded and killed him in central Ba'quba (Diyala). In a separate incident, it was reported that a bomb planted in front of the house of a Sahwa member exploded and severely wounded him and one of his family members in the town of Udham (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 4*, 4 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
- On 1 February 2012, gunmen in a speeding car killed a Sahwa member in the town of Muqadiyah (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 1*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-1/>.

- On 29 January 2012, gunmen opened fire on a Sahwa member in front of his house in Arab Jabbar village of Bani Saad (Diyala), killing him instantly; NINA, *A member of Sahwa forces killed and 8 wanted arrested in Diyala*, 29 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMIGE.
- On 23 January 2012, a Sahwa member was shot and killed in front of his house in the Iskandariyah district (Babel); NINA, *Sahwa member killed north Hilla*, 23 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLLFL. In a separate incident, a Sahwa member was seriously injured when an IED attached to his car exploded in Al-Shurta Al-Raba'a in southwestern Baghdad; NINA, *Sahwa member injured by AED in his car southwestern Baghdad*, 23 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLKMJ. And in Tuz Khurmatu, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a member of the government-backed Sahwa militia exploded and killed him, Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 24, 24 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-24/>.
- On 17 January 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a Sahwa member killed him in central Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 17, 17 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-17/>.
- On 3 January 2012, gunmen opened fire at the house of a Sahwa member, killing him and wounding his wife in the town of Muqadiyah (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 3, 3 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-3/>.
- On 26 December 2011, police found the body of a Sunni Sahwa member with gunshot wounds to the head in Baiji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 26, 26 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-26/>.
- On 8 December 2011, gunmen killed a Sahwa member in front of his house and wounded one of his guards in the northern outskirts of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 9, 9 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-9/>.
- On 20 November 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car exploded, killing a Sahwa member in a town near Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 20, 20 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-20/>.
- On 31 October 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers stormed the house of a Sahwa member and held the women and the children inside the home while they killed the Sahwa member and his brother outside, in the town of Khan Bani Saad (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 31, 31 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-31/>.
- On 26 October 2011, a Sahwa member was killed and two injured when an IED targeting their vehicle exploded in Iskandariyah (Babel); Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa (Awakening) element killed, 2 others injured in Babel*, 26 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145415&l=1.
- On 11 October 2011, gunmen shot dead a Sahwa leader in front of his house in Garma (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-11/>.
- On 4 October 2011, the body of a Sahwa member was found with gunshot wounds to the head and chest in Qayara (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-5/>.
- On 1 October 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Ammar Al-Majmai, a Sahwa leader, and killed at least one relative in Buhriz (Diyala). The gunmen also left a bomb behind, which blew up when ISF rushed to the site, killing one policeman and wounding four others. The same day, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a Sahwa member in Udham (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 1*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-1/>; AlSumaria TV, *Unknown gunmen break into Iraq Sahwa official house*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/Iraq-News/1-69039-Unknown-gunmen-break-into-Iraq-Sahwa-official-house.html>.

³⁰² For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 27 February 2012, a bomb detonated against the vehicle of Sheikh Hatf Al-Jameli, one of the Sahwa leaders in Al-Sabiehat region, eastern Fallujah (Al-Anbar), seriously wounding him along with his companion; Aswat al-Iraq, *IED wounds Sahwa leader in Falluja*, 27 February 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(y01djwazqzbx2w45rddtp055\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147137&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(y01djwazqzbx2w45rddtp055))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147137&l=1).
- On 13 February 2012, Colonel Saad Al-Shimmari, the Sahwa leader for Fallujah (Al-Anbar) and two of his guards were killed. Two others were also wounded in an attack on his convoy on Fallujah-Garma road. Al-Shimmari had reportedly survived at least six earlier assassination attempts on his life; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS...military leader of Fallujah Support, two of his guards killed by armed attack*, 13 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKELED; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa leader killed in Anbar province*, 13 February 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(xfb22255bwnbho55hifmsf55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146895&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(xfb22255bwnbho55hifmsf55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146895&l=1).
- On 26 January 2012, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed Naeem abd Allah Falih, a local Sahwa leader, as he left a mosque in the town of Garma (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 26, 26 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-26/>.
- On 24 January 2012, Mullah Nadim al-Juburi, a former senior AQI leader in Dhuluiya (Salah Al-Din), who joined the Sahwa and sided with the US Forces as of 2008 and member of the national reconciliation commission, was killed by gunmen in Baghdad's Al-Liqa'a Square. The killing came after Al-Juburi made remarks on Iraqi television of ISI's leadership structure and provided names. Several messages on a jihadist Internet forum had warned that Al-Juburi's "days are numbered". Al-Juburi reportedly only returned to Iraq a few days earlier from Jordan, where he had been in exile for the last two years; AFP, *Assassins kill Iraq Qaeda leader-turned-critic*, 25 January 2012, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1179065/1.html; The Voice of Russia, *Former Iraqi Al Qaeda leader killed in Baghdad*, 25 January 2012, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012/01/25/64603824.html>.
- On 23 January 2012, gunmen in a speeding car killed a Sahwa leader and seriously wounded three of his guards in the town of Rashad, near Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 23, 23 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-23/>.
- On 4 January 2012, gunmen in two cars opened fire and killed a Sahwa militia leader and his wife in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 4, 4 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-4/>.
- On 30 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a Sahwa leader killed him and three of his bodyguards when it exploded in Taji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.

- On 29 November 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a Sahwa leader exploded, seriously wounding him, in the town of Mahmudiyah (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
- On 14 November 2011, a Sahwa leader escaped an attack by a bomb blast against his car in Bani Saad area (Diyala); Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa leader escaped death, 19 arrested in Diala*, 14 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145610&l=1.
- On 11 November 2011, an IED planted under the car of Sheikh Ali Al-Sheikhani, blew off in Salah Al-Din's Railway Station, killing him on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Pro-government Sahwa (Awakening) force commander killed in Iraq*, 11 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145540&l=1.
- On 7 September 2011, gunmen raided the house of a Sahwa leader and killed him in front of his wife in the eastern outskirts of Dujail (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-7/>.
- On 14 August 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers wounded Ali Al-Karkhi, a local Sahwa leader, and one of his guards late in Kanaan (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
- On 28 June 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a Sahwa leader's car blew up and killed him in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 28*, 28 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-28/>.
- On 12 June 2011, gunmen killed a government-backed Sunni Sahwa militia leader and his wife in a town near the city of Hilla (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 13*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-12/>.

³⁰³ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 28 January 2012, gunmen opened fire on the house of Sheikh Diab Mahmoud, a Sahwa member, killing his wife and daughter in Garma (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-28/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa commander's wife, daughter killed in Falluja*, 28 January 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(qff0fd2zp42m4xfomnvc2dr2\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146675&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(qff0fd2zp42m4xfomnvc2dr2))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146675&l=1).
- On 19 January 2012, a bomb planted at the house of a Sahwa member exploded, wounding him, his wife and one of his children, in northern Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
- On 17 January 2012, gunmen stormed the house of a Sahwa leader, killing him and three of his sons and wounding three other sons in Latifiyah (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 18*, 18 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-18/>.
- On 11 January 2012, a roadside bomb exploded near the house of a Sahwa member and wounded three of his children in the town of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 12*, 12 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-12/>.
- On 22 December 2011, a family of five, including the parents, a son and two daughters were gunned down in their home in Ba'quba (Diyala). The father and the son were both members of the Sahwa; Prashant Rao, *Bombs kill 57 as Iraq mired in political crisis*, AFP, 22 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i84pYeYLjF7ArcDK_pu3A5J2vuw?docId=CNG.011113bade199475ce97cc632952336b.3a1.
- On 1 December 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers stormed three houses of Sahwa militiamen, killing eight members of two families and wounding five members of a third family in Buhriz (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
- On 20 November 2011, two civilians were wounded when a sticky bomb attached to the car of Hazim Nawaf Shalash, commander of Sahwa force in Balad district (Diyala), went off; NINA, *2 Civilian wounded in Balad*, 20 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIMLFF.
- On 28 September 2011, gunmen wearing military uniforms broke into the house of Sahwa member Hameed Al-Zobaie, in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad), and killed five members of his family, including his wife and three children, and wounded seven guards. Al-Zobaie was not in the house at the time; Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Gunmen kill 5 relatives of Sunni fighter in Iraq*, AP, 28 September 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ikVj7TcAiSLJeC-xQVvXsCVKbiAA?docId=f73917d1178a42aa9ea9d71944e974ec>; AFP, *Gunmen kill five relatives of Iraq militiaman*, 28 September 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/displayarticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/September/middleeast_September563.xml§ion=middleeast&col=.
- On 12 June 2011, gunmen killed a government-backed Sunni Sahwa militia leader and his wife in a town near the city of Hilla (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 13*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-12/>.
- On 12 February 2011, a roadside bomb went off by the house of the local Sahwa leader for Jellam village south of Dour (Salah Al-Din) and wounded two of his sons; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 12*, 12 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-12/>.

³⁰⁴ For example, it was reported that on 24 September 2011, gunmen attacked four houses belonging to former Sahwa members, killing one man and wounding three other people, on the southwestern outskirts of Fallujah (Al-Anbar). This incident shows that even former members of the Sahwa may reportedly still be at risk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 24*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-24/>. On 6 June 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers reportedly carried out simultaneous early morning attacks against three Sahwa checkpoints in Baghdad's Adhamiyah district, killing four Sahwa members and wounding four others. Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 6*, 6 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-6/>.

³⁰⁵ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 24 September 2011, gunmen attacked four houses belonging to former Sahwa members, killing one man and wounding three other people, on the southwestern outskirts of Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 24*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-24/>.

- On 28 June 2011, a former Sahwa member was killed when a sticky bomb placed under his car exploded in the Abu Ghraib district, west of Baghdad; NINA, *Former Sahwa element forces, assassination west of Baghdad*, 28 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHEDDL.
- On 4 April 2011, a roadside bomb killed a former Sahwa member near his house in Baghdad's southern Doura district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 24*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-24/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 4*, 4 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-4/>.
- On 27 February 2011, gunmen shot dead Saad Falih Allo Al-Dulaimi, a former Sahwa member, with guns with silencers when he was driving his car on his way home north-east of Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *Former Sahwa member assassinated*, 28 February 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFIMJM.

³⁰⁶ This unit was established in 2008 in an effort to support the Iraqi police to search women at checkpoints and government offices to reduce increased reliance on female suicide bombers and the threat of male bombers that dress like women; Jack Healy and Yasir Ghazi, *Iraqi Women Work to Halt Bombers, But Paycheck Is Elusive*, New York Times, 27 February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html?_r=1; Tom A. Peter, *Daughters of Iraq: front-line guards against suicide bombers*, Christian Science Monitor, 11 September 2008, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2008/0911/p06s01-wome.html>.

³⁰⁷ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 20 March 2012, gunmen opened fire at tribal chief Sheikh Najih Abbass al-Rawi while he was driving his car through Qaim district (Al-Anbar); NINA, *Tribal chief killed in western Anbar*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIGDL.
- On 20 February 2012, gunmen stormed the house of Sheikh Kattab Shalal, a tribal leader, and killed him in the southern outskirts of Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20*, 20 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-20/>; Anwar Msarbat, *Tribal leader killed in Fallujah shooting*, AKnews, 20 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291111/>.
- On 11 February 2012, an IED planted on the roadside in Garma District (Al-Anbar) exploded when Najm Mustafa Al-Awisi, sheikh of Al-Awisat tribe, was passing by in his car, killing him, along with his brother, his wife and their two-year-old son. He was reportedly an outspoken critic of Sunni armed groups; Sky News, *Seven killed in Iraq attacks*, 12 February 2012, <http://www.skynews.com.au/world/article.aspx?id=717526&vId=>; NINA, *Tribal sheikh, wife, brother, killed by IED eastern Anbar*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEIGI.
- On 8 February 2012, an explosive charge planted in the car of Sheikh Jabbar Hussein, one of the chieftains of Al-Asakira Tribe, blew up on the main road connecting Saadiya with Khanaqeen (Diyala), killing him on the spot and wounding three others in the car; Aswat al-Iraq, *Diala tribal chieftain killed, 3 others injured*, 8 February 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(f342on55tpuoueyay0ka5ctat\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146829&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(f342on55tpuoueyay0ka5ctat))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146829&l=1).
- On 29 December 2011, gunmen opened fire on a tribal leader in front of his house and wounded him late in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 9 December 2011, a tribal sheikh of the Bani-Tamim tribes was injured by a roadside bomb that targeted his car north-east of Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *A tribal sheikh injured in Diyala*, 9 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJFELL.
- On 1 December 2011, police found the beheaded body of Sheikh Thalaj Zaalaa on the western outskirts of Haditha (Al-Anbar). He had been kidnapped one day earlier from his house; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
- On 9 November 2011, Sheikh Ali Al-Shiakhhan, leader of the Makademah Tribe, was killed when a sticky bomb attached to his car exploded near his house in Dujail district (Salah Al-Din); NINA, *Dijail's Makademah Tribe's chief assassinated*, 9 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILHIL.
- On 17 October 2011, 2011, gunmen killed tribal leader Mohammed Khalid Dahir al-Shirabi in Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal personality killed in Mosul*, 17 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145314&l=1. On 2 October 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Imad Al-Bidiri, a leader of the Albdar tribe, killing him and one of his guards, east of Diwaniyah City; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
- On 2 October 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Imad Al-Bidiri, a leader of the Albdar tribe, killing him and one of his guards, east of Diwaniyah City; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
- On 19 September 2011, gunmen shot dead Sheikh Latief Naif Al-Gurairi, a tribal leader, in his office in Baghdad's central Karrada District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 20*, 20 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-20/>.
- On 7 September 2011, gunmen raided the house of a tribal chief and shot and killed him in eastern Diwaniyah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-7/>.
- On 23 August 2011, gunmen broke into the house of Misha'al Mohammed Owayid, one of the chieftains of Al-Jugheifa Tribe west of Mosul, killing him and his son during their Ramadan breakfast in central Mosul (Ninewa); Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal leader and his son, killed in Mosul*, 23 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144439&l=1.
- On 2 May 2011, Sheikh Ahmed Hacham Al-Darraji survived an assassination attempt with serious injuries when he was shot at with machine guns in front of his house in Samarra's Al-Huweish district (Salah Al-Din); Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal Chieftain seriously injured in armed attack*, 2 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142300&l=1.
- On 7 April 2011, Sheikh Abdulrahman Ali Aziz Al-Dalwi, chief of five Kirkuk tribes and the head of independent tribes' general affairs; was shot dead by gunmen near his house in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 8*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-8/>; Kirkuk Now, *Thousands from Kirkuk attend funeral of the chief of the Kirkuk tribes, Abdulrahman Ali Aziz*, 8 April 2011, <http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2011/04/kirkuk-tribes-mourn/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot down senior Kirkuk notable*, 7 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141861&l=1.

See also "*Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams*".

³⁰⁸ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Al-Samarrai, a cleric and head of the Sunni Endowment, has repeatedly been targeted, allegedly for being vocal in his criticism of AQI and ISI. On 28 August 2011, a suicide attack against the Sunni Umm Al-Qura mosque in Baghdad's western Ghazaliyah district was reportedly targeting him. He was wounded in the attack, which however killed 32 and wounded 39 others; Bill Roggio, *Al Qaeda suicide bomber kills 28 Iraqis in attack in Baghdad mosque*, The Long War Journal, 28 August 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/al_qaeda_suicide_bom_4.php; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq mosque bomb targeted moderate Sunnis - officials*, Reuters, 29 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-mosque-bomb-targeted-moderate-sunnis-officials/>; Reuters, *Suicide attack kills at least 24 at Baghdad mosque*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-attack-kills-at-least-24-at-baghdad-mosque/>. The US government said Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri (aka as Abu Du'a), the alleged AQI leader, was responsible for this attack. AP, *US puts al-Qaida in Iraq leader on terrorist blacklist, offers \$10 million bounty*, 4 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-puts-al-qaida-in-iraq-leader-on-terrorist-blacklist-offers-10-million-bounty/2011/10/04/gIQA1W5qKL_story.html.
 - On 12 September 2011, Ahmed Mahmud Al-Jabalawi, imam of the Sunni Al-Shuhada mosque, was shot dead by gunmen using pistols with silencers when on his way to the mosque for morning prayers in Ba'quba (Diyala). Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraqi police: Gunmen ambush Shiite pilgrims, killing 22*, CNN, 12 September 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-12/world/iraq.violence_1_shiite-pilgrims-karbala-gunmen?_s=PM:WORLD. Reportedly, the imam was known for his outspoken criticism of AQI. AFP, *Gunmen kill 22 passengers on bus coming from Syria in Iraq's western province*, 13 September 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/13/166624.html>.
 - On 16 February 2011, gunmen, dressed in military uniforms attacked the house of Sheikh Ali Dayih, the leader of the Albu-Fahad tribe, in Garban area of Habbaniyah town (Al-Anbar), instantly killing him and his brother. Reportedly, Sheikh Dayih was fighting AQI in recent years. Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal Chief, his brother, killed in Anbar Province*, 16 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141012&l=1.
 - On 4 February 2011, armed men blew up the home of an Anbar University professor and cleric who criticized AQI during prayers the week before. The cleric was not in the house at the time of the attacks, in an area south of Fallujah (Al-Anbar), but two of his sons were wounded. Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 4*, 4 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
 - On 8/9 September 2010, Jabbar Saleh Al-Jibouri, a Sunni cleric and medic, was stabbed, beheaded and set alight in his home near Muqdadiah (Diyala). Reportedly, Al-Jibouri used to provide medical treatment to Sahwa members. Al-Jibouri had only returned to the area three months earlier after having been displaced as a result of AQI threats in 2007. Reuters, *Gunmen behead, set alight Sunni cleric in Iraq*, 9 September 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/09/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE6883RL20100909>.
- ³⁰⁹ In the run-up to the elections, media reported that at least five candidates of the Iraqi List and Kurdish Islamic Group political parties were killed. Elections-related violence as reported by UNAMI Human Rights Office and OHCHR included:
- On 22 January 2010, gunmen attacked the office of the National Congress Party in central Basrah. They were repelled by security guards and no casualties were reported.
 - On 7 February, gunmen assassinated Dr. Suha Abdullah Al-Shemagh, a candidate of the Iraqi List, in central Mosul.
 - On 28 February, UNAMI received reports that an unnamed member of the Kurdish Islamic Group had been shot dead in front of his house in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din).
 - On 6 March, Sirwan Kakai'e, a candidate of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), reportedly escaped an assassination attempt in Kirkuk.
- UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. iv, 53-53, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ³¹⁰ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 35, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ³¹¹ Including for example members of Dawa, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Badr Organization, Fadhila, and the Sadrist Trend. Incidents in 2011 and 2012 involving Shi'ite party officials reportedly included:
- On 26 February 2012, an IED detonated at a Sadrist cleric's home in Basrah; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 27 February 2012.
 - On 19 January 2012, an IED planted in front of the house of Ahmed Hussein, a member of Ahrar bloc within the Sadrist Trend and former member of the Wasit Provincial Council, detonated in Kut (Wassit), causing only material damage; NINA, *Device's Explosion targeted a former member of Wasit provincial Council of Ahrar bloc*, 19 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLEGL.
 - On 14 November 2011, gunmen assassinated a member of the Sadrist Trend in Jableh (Babel); NINA, *Sadrist assassinated north Hilla*, 14 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIMDEK.
 - On 25 October 2011, gunmen blew up the house of a Sadrist Trend's member in the area of Haswa (Babel). The explosion caused the death of a woman and a child and wounded two members of the family; NINA, *A house of one partisan of Sadrist trend blown up north of Hilla*, 25 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIJJJJ.
 - On 7 September 2011, Fadhil Al-Zirgani, an ISCI official in Kut (Wassit), escaped an assassination when gunmen opened fire at him while he was on his way to his house in Kut; NINA, *SIIC official escapes assassination in Kut*, 7 September 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHMLMF.
 - On 2 September 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed Nasir Saad, a Dawa Party member, near his house in the northern Baghdad District of Binoog; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 3*, 3 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-3/>.
 - On 25-26 August 2011, Thamir Ubaid, Dawa Party office head and former head of Jbela municipal council, was shot dead in his car in Rashidiya/Jbela (Babel) along with several relatives. Reportedly, AQI was responsible for the attack; NINA, *Arresting 7 men involved in the assassination of Dawa Party leader northern Babel*, 28 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHLJJI; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 26*, 26 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-26/>; IBC, Database, *Aug 25-26 Dawa Party office head shot dead in car in Rashidiya/Jbela, south of Baghdad*, accessed 17 October 2011, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k17559>.
 - On 24 August 2011, a bomb exploded in front of the house of Abdul Rahman Abu Raghif, a Dawa Party member, wounding six people including two of his sons, in the Zaafaraniyah District of Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 24*, 24 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-24/>.
 - On 11 June 2011, gunmen placed bombs inside the house of Dhiaa Al-Majmae, a leader in the Badr Organization, in Aziz Balad area (Salah Al-Din), destroying only the house; NINA, *Bombing the house of leader in Badr organization in Salahuddine*, 11 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FLGLMIJ.

- On 29 May 2011, two guards were injured in two successive explosions targeting the ISCI headquarters in north-east Hilla (Babel); Aswat al-Iraq, *Two persons injured in 2 blasts against the Supreme Islamic Council's HQ in Hilla*, west Iraq, 29 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142816&l=1.
- On 16 May 2011, a bomb placed inside the headquarters of the Fadhila Party in Iskandariyah (Babel) killed two guards; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two killed in bomb blast in Hilla*, 16 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142579&l=1.
- On 9 May 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of Hassan Jasim, an ISCI leader, killed him in northeast Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 9*, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-9/>.
- On 3 April 2011, a roadside bomb in front of the house of ISCI member Ali Majed, killed a bodyguard and wounded three civilians in the Jihad district of southwestern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 3*, 3 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-3/>.
- On 17 February 2011, a leading cleric in the Sadrist movement, Sheikh Jassim Al-Mutairi, was assassinated by armed men using guns with silencers after leaving a mosque in a small town west of Kerbala; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 17*, 17 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-17>.
- On 31 January 2011, Ali al-Shura, a member of the Shi'ite Shabaniya movement (linked to the Iraqi National Alliance), was killed by a roadside bomb in east Baghdad. Two of his guards were wounded; Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Baghdad Attacks Kill Engineer, Politician*, AP, 31 January 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12800327>.
- On 16 January 2011, an explosion near a headquarters of the Badr Organization in Baghdad's Kamaliya area, killed one Badr member and injured three civilian by-standers; NINA, *Badr element killed in eastern Baghdad explosion*, 16 January 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFDLFK.
- On 9 January 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers killed a member of the Badr Organization outside his house in Baghdad's northwestern Hurriya district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 9*, 9 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-9/>.

³¹² See "Actors of Violence".

³¹³ For example, according to reports, on 2 August 2011, Iyad Jamaluddin, a Shi'ite cleric and former member of the CoR belonging to the Ahrar Party was seriously injured when a rocket hit his house in Baghdad's Jadiriya neighbourhood. Jamaluddin, who is known for his public position against Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs, has reportedly accused armed groups controlled by Iran to be behind the attack; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 4 August 2011, cited in: MEMRI Blog, *Iraqi Liberal Anti-Iran Shi'a Cleric Survives Missile Attack on Home*, http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/39884.htm; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's former MP, Iyad Jamaluddin, injured in rocket attack on his Baghdad house*, 3 August 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(dkiuzp55fptsq2453hrtw45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144096&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(dkiuzp55fptsq2453hrtw45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144096&l=1). For the recent violence between followers of Shi'ite cleric Mahmoud Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi and Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, see "Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams". See also "Actors of Violence".

³¹⁴ See "Actors of Violence".

³¹⁵ See chapter "Actors of Violence".

³¹⁶ After the devastating attack on a Sunni mosque in Baghdad on 28 August 2011, in which IIP lawmaker Khalid Al-Fahdawi was reportedly killed, the IIP allegedly said that ISI/AQI was leading a campaign against moderate Sunnis aligned with the Iraqi Government. It also held the organization responsible for the killing of seven other IIP leaders. According to Rasheed Al-Azawi, an IIP leader, ISI/AQI has been distributing leaflets calling for the killing of all IIP members; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq mosque bomb targeted moderate Sunnis - officials*, Reuters, 29 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-mosque-bomb-targeted-moderate-sunnis-officials/>. Reported attacks on the IIP in 2011 included for example: on 27 August 2011, gunmen shot and killed Flaih Hamad Saadoun and Saleh Ibrahim Amadan and wounded Flaih Naif Hamad, three provincial IIP leaders, at a fake checkpoint on the main road in the town of Amriyat Al-Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Xinhua, *Six people killed in Iraq's violence*, 27 August 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-08/27/c_131078816.htm; NINA, *Gunmen kill two Islamic Party member a third injured in Fallujah*, 27 August, 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHLJFF. On 16 December 2011, two policemen were reportedly wounded when gunmen in a speedy car threw a hand grenade at the IIP office in central Fallujah (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 16*, 16 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-16>.

³¹⁷ For example, attacks on Sunni or secular party officials and party offices were reported to include:

- On 6 June 2011, a roadside bomb killed hospital official Ehab Al-Ani in Al-Qaim (Al-Anbar). The initial investigation reportedly indicated that Al-Ani was specifically targeted because of his ties to Iraqiyya; Adam Schreck, *2 candidates from Iraq's Sunni-backed party killed*, AP, 6 June 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9G5B6L01.
- On 12 May 2011, Iraqiyya member and former election candidate, Row'a Al-Ogaidi, and her bodyguard were shot dead in Mosul by an unidentified armed group; NINA, *Substitute nominee from Iraqiya and a body guard killed in Mosul*, 12 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGJIIF.
- On 15 February 2011, armed men attacked the house of Iraqiyya member Ra'ad Al-Dahlaki in northern Ba'quba, injuring two guards. Al-Dahlaki was not in the house at the time of the attack; NINA, *Dahlaki's house attacked in Diyala*, 16 February 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFHFLI.
- On 7 February 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near the Iraqiyya offices in Ba'quba (Diyala), wounding two security guards and a civilian; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 7*, 7 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-7/>.
- On 14 October 2010, a roadside bomb targeted the motorcade of Kereem Mahood, member of Iraqiyya, in southwestern Baghdad. The bomb missed the motorcade, but the explosion killed four nearby civilians and seriously injured another three; Sahar Issa, *Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 14 October, 2010*, 14 October 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/10/14/v-print/102044/round-up-of-daily-violence-in.html>.

³¹⁸ For example, it was reported that on 23 August 2011, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, Secretary-General of the Iraqi Sahwa Conference Movement and leader in Iraq's Unity Coalition, was unharmed during an assassination attempt when an IED targeted his convoy on the highway between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib, NINA, *BREAKING NEWS, Abu Risha survives an assassination attempt*, 23 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHLFDJ. See also "Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders".

³¹⁹ See "Background Information".

³²⁰ For example, reported attacks in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 22 February 2012, a car bomb exploded near the headquarters of the political party *Goran* in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 23 February 2012.
 - On 27 January 2012, security forces found the dead body of Wisam Jomaa, a PUK member, in an orchard located on the outskirts of Saadiya district (Diyala). He had been kidnapped three days earlier. The body bore signs of gunshot wounds and torture; NINA, *A dead body of a member of (PUK) in Diyala*, 27 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMHFE.
 - On 7 January 2012, Nassir Mohsen, a Kurdistan Communist Party official, survived an assassination attempt when a roadside bomb struck his vehicle in Saadiya district (Diyala); Bryar Mohammed, *Communist party official injured in attack*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282986/>.
 - On 24 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a PUK member wounded him when it exploded in southeastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 24*, 24 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-24/>.
 - On 6 December 2011, a Katyusha rocket landed at the KDP headquarters in Tal Afar (Ninewa) and wounded one guard; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 6*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-6/>.
 - On 21 November 2011, an IED blew up against a civilian car close to the KDP headquarters in Dibbis town (Kirkuk), wounding two persons, including Jabbar Mohammed Ibrahim, Kirkuk's Youth and Sports Director, who is also a senior KDP official; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk's Youth & Sports Director injured in explosive charge blast*, 21 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145694&l=1.
 - On 17 November 2011, at least 10 people were wounded when three roadside bombs exploded near a PUK office in central Mosul as they were lining up to get fuel from a near-by station; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraq executes 11 'terrorists' says state TV*, CNN, 17 November 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/iraq-executions/index.html>.
 - On 16 November 2011, a suicide car bomb struck the convoy of Hraim Kamal Agha, the head of Mosul's PUK office, in southern Mosul; Agha escaped the attack unharmed but three passers-by were wounded; Xinhua, *Suicide car bomb hits convoy of Kurdish party official in Iraq's Mosul*, 16 November 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-11/16/c_131251284.htm.
 - On 10 November 2011, security forces defused a bomb placed near the committee of the PUK in Jalawla (Diyala); KurdNet, *Bomb near PUK committee defused*, 11 November 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/11/kurdlocal1000.htm>.
 - On 30 October 2011, gunmen stormed a PUK office in Ba'quba (Diyala) and injured two guards; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 31*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-31/>.
 - On 17 October 2011, gunmen blew up a headquarters of the Iraqi Turkmen Front in Kirkuk city, causing no casualties, but completely destroying the premises; NINA, *Turkmen Front headquarters blow up in Kirkuk*, 17 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHIII.
 - On 10 October 2011, an IED detonated next to the Iraqi Turkmen Front's office in southern Kirkuk, causing only damages to the office building; NINA, *IED against Turkmen party office in Kirkuk*, 10 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHJIF.
 - On 17 August 2011, Ahmed Amen, a PUK affiliate and engineer was reportedly strapped into an explosive vest and released close to a KDP office and a local mosque before the vest was detonated, killing him on the spot; KurdNet, *PUK member assassinated in Jalawla in disputed Diyala province*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/8/kurdsiniraq120.htm>. The same day, at least one civilian was killed when a series of bombs exploded in quick succession near KDP headquarters in Kirkuk; Reuters, *Civilian killed in Kirkuk blasts near KDP headquarters*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWSIkppUNEI>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 17*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-17/>.
 - On 15 August 2011, gunmen in a car shot dead Abbas Hassan Rashid, who was in charge of the PUK branch office in Saadiya, and one of his bodyguards in front of the PUK headquarters in the town of Saadiya (Diyala). AQI was reportedly held responsible for the assassination; KurdNet, *Kurdish PUK party official killed in Iraq's disputed Diyala province*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/8/kurdsiniraq116.htm>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kurdish Party official killed in Diala, east Iraq*, 15 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144294&l=1.
 - On 4 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed Kurdish politician Saleh Shaker in front of the PUK's headquarters in the town of Saadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 4*, 4 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-4/>.
 - In June 2011, PUK member Adib Abdul-Khaliq was shot dead in Jalawla (Diyala); KurdNet, *PUK member assassinated in Jalawla in disputed Diyala province*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/8/kurdsiniraq120.htm>.
 - On 12 May 2011, the Assistant Chairman of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Arshad Al-Salihy, escaped an assassination attempt when a rocket fell on his house in southern Kirkuk city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant Chairman of Iraqi Turkomen Front escapes assassination attempt*, 12 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142495&l=1.
 - On 29/30 January 2011, Hilo Nadir, a PUK member, was shot dead in central Kirkuk; Iraq Body Count Database, *Member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan shot dead in al-Shuhada, central Kirkuk*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k16448>.
 - On 8 January 2011, Adib Abdul-Khaliq, a PUK committee member, was shot dead in Jalawla (Diyala); AKnews, *PUK member assassinated in Jalawla*, 9 January 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/208901>.
 - On 6 November 2010, three booby-trapped cars exploded simultaneously outside the homes of three PUK officials in north Kirkuk, wounding 35 people; KurdNet, *Car bombs targets Kurdish PUK's officials in Kirkuk, wounds 34*, 6 November 2010, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2010/11/kirkuk642.htm>.
- ³²¹ For example, the following incidents were reported:
- In October 2011, sticky bombs attached onto several cars severely wounded two suspected informants for the USF-I in Diyala; Andrew E. Kramer, *Village in Iraq Falters With Exit of U.S. Troops*, NY Times, 15 November 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/world/middleeast/iraqi-town-falters-as-united-states-troops-exit.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2.
 - On 1 March 2011, a former translator for the USF-I was killed when a bomb exploded near his house in southern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 2*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-2/>.

• On 15 February 2011, an Iraqi interpreter was killed by a sniper while accompanying a US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Al-Damouk neighborhood in eastern Kut (Wassit); Aswat al-Iraq, *U.S. engineering team's interpreter killed in Kut*, 15 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140997&l=1.

• On 16 September 2010, Ghassan Adnan, an interpreter for the USF-I, was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Ba'quba (Diyala); Iraq Body Count Database, *Interpreter by bomb attached to car in west Baquba*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k15790>.

³²² For an overview of the targeting of US-affiliated Iraqis since 2003, see The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, pp. 20-21, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>.

³²³ See "Actors of Violence".

³²⁴ Leaked documents from one US contracting company, Titan Corp., reportedly revealed that 360 Iraqi interpreters working for Titan Corp. or its successor company were killed between March 2003 and March 2008. The total number of killed interpreters is likely to be much higher; Joe Coon, *Iraqi interpreters: Those who aided U.S. need visas – now*, OregonLive.com, 12 November 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/11/iraqi_interpreters_those_who_a.html. See also Human Rights First, *Living in Limbo*, p. 29, December 2010, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Living-in-Limbo-final.pdf>. For example, on 1 March 2011, a former translator for the USF-I was reportedly killed when a bomb exploded near his house in southern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 2*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-2/>. On 15 February 2011, an Iraqi interpreter was reportedly killed by a sniper while accompanying a US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Al-Damouk neighborhood in eastern Kut (Wassit); Aswat al-Iraq, *U.S. engineering team's interpreter killed in Kut*, 15 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140997&l=1. And on 16 September 2010, Ghassan Adnan, an interpreter for the USF-I, was reportedly killed by a bomb attached to his car in Ba'quba (Diyala); Iraq Body Count Database, *Interpreter by bomb attached to car in west Baquba*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k15790>. See also The List Project, which is tracking threats and attacks against former USF-I employees, including in 2012; The List Project, *End Game in Iraq*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://thelistproject.org/end-game-in-iraq/>.

³²⁵ By July 2011, about 9,000 Iraqis were reportedly employed by the USF-I in various capacities, according to Major General Jeffrey Buchanan, spokesman for the USF-I. All of them had reportedly lost their employment as a result of the USF-I's withdrawal from Iraq; AFP, *US military's Iraqi linguists face uncertain road*, 22 August 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/22/us-militarys-iraqi-linguists-face-uncertain-road.html>. According to the List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, a US NGO, tens of thousands have worked for the MNF-I since 2003. The US Department of Defense estimates that over 36,000 Iraqis were working for it in Iraq as of the second quarter of 2009. The Congressional Budget Office reported that as of August 2008, roughly 70,000 Iraqis were working for US government agencies or their contractors in Iraq; The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *The Crisis*, accessed 18 March 2012, http://thelistproject.org/withdrawal/?page_id=436. According to a report by Al Jazeera, more than 140,000 Iraqis worked for the US between 2003 and 2011; Gregg Carlstrom, *Iraqis who aided US left behind and fearful*, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html>.

³²⁶ According to reports, they feared exposure to reprisals at the hands of armed groups or segments of the population, who consider them "traitors" and "collaborators". This is particularly true for those individuals that lived and worked full-time at the relatively safe military bases from which they will be expelled after their closure; Gregg Carlstrom, *Iraqis who aided US left behind and fearful*, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html>; Andrew E. Kramer, *Village in Iraq Falter With Exit of U.S. Troops*, NY Times, 15 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/world/middleeast/iraqi-town-falters-as-united-states-troops-exit.html>; Tariq, *U.S. pullout leaves Iraqi interpreters out on limb*, Los Angeles Times, 7 November 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/opinion/la-oe-tariq-iraqi-translators-visa-20111107>; AFP, *US military's Iraqi linguists face uncertain road*, 22 August 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/22/us-militarys-iraqi-linguists-face-uncertain-road.html>; Khalid al-Ansary, *Iraqi asylum seekers fret over U.S. withdrawal*, Reuters, 8 August 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/us-iraqi-us-refugees-idUSTRE7773UJ20110808>; Tim Arango, *Visa Delays Put Iraqis Who Aided U.S. in Fear*, NY Times, 12 July 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middleeast/13baghdad.html?hp>. See also: The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *The Crisis*, accessed 18 March 2012, http://thelistproject.org/withdrawal/?page_id=436. According to this US-based NGO, founded in 2007, violence against individuals affiliated with the USF-I has already increased and is expected to further escalate. The List Project to Resettle Iraqis, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, p. 13, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>; see also Tim Lester and Tim Young, *Iraqi interpreters' acts of heroism lost in translation*, The Age, 5 June 2011, <http://www.theage.com.au/national/iraqi-interpreters-acts-of-heroism-lost-in-translation-20110604-1fmgh.html#ixzz1ONQBkCUP>.

³²⁷ Catholic Online, *Iraq: Have Thousands of U.S. Friendly Iraqis Been Targeted for Assassination?*, 19 December 2011, http://www.catholic.org/international/international_story.php?id=44101; Gregg Carlstrom, *Iraqis who aided US left behind and fearful*, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html>.

³²⁸ Gregg Carlstrom, *Iraqis who aided US left behind and fearful*, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html>. The List Project reported that prominent Shi'ite clerics issued statements condemning the US and its "collaborators": on 28 October 2011, Grand Ayatollah Mahmoud Hassani Sarkhi had reportedly released a statement in conjunction with a celebration for Mohammed Sadiq Al-Sadr (a revered Shi'ite cleric allegedly killed by the former regime and Muqtada Al-Sadr's father) telling his followers to "[R]eject the occupation, the invaders and the collaborators, and those who prepared for their arrival and are satisfied with their work." The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *End Game in Iraq*, accessed on 18 March 2012, http://thelistproject.org/withdrawal/?page_id=1985; the original statement (in Arabic) is available at: http://www.al-hasanynet/News_Print.php?ID=1410. On 1 September 2011, it was reported that after threats against USAID contractors in Baghdad by JAM, their Iraqi staff of USAID were informed that they would move their compound to a more secure location. On 31 October 2011, a US State Department representative informed Iraqi USAID contractor staff that Muqtada Al-Sadr announced a war on US-affiliated Iraqis and has given them an ultimatum to leave with the US by the end of 2011. It was further suggested that Iraqi staff take extra security measures to protect themselves; The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *End Game in Iraq*, accessed on 18 March 2012, http://thelistproject.org/withdrawal/?page_id=1985. The List Project analyzed a strategic plan by ISI, issued in Fallujah in 2010, in which it plans for the steady targeting of US-affiliated Iraqis in the wake of the USF-I withdrawal. According to the plan, it foresees "nine bullets for the traitors and one for the crusaders", "cleansing" and "targeting"; The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, pp. 13-14, 20-21, 42, 47, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>. See also "Actors of Violence".

³²⁹ According to a November report of the Iraqi newspaper *Sabah al-Jadid*, many former interpreters in Balad (Salah Al-Din) threw away any paperwork that identified them as such; Gregg Carlstrom, *Iraqis who aided US left behind and fearful*, Al Jazeera, 18 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/20111215164220357796.html>. See also The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, p. 13, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>. The US Government has a special immigrant visa programme for Iraqis at risk due to their former employment with its forces; however, it has been reported that its implementation has been cumbersome and slow and actual admissions and departures have been lower than anticipated. See for example, Trudy Rubin, *Worldview*:

Will U.S. honor vow to rescue Iraqi aides?, The Inquirer, 16 October 2011, http://articles.philly.com/2011-10-16/news/30286380_1_iraqi-refugees-sivs-interpreters; The Miami Herald, *Don't abandon U.S. friends*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/26/2332265/dont-abandon-us-friends.html>; Tim Arango, *Visa Delays Put Iraqis Who Aided U.S. in Fear*, New York Times, 12 July 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/middleeast/13baghdad.html?hp>; The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, pp. 23-30, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>. See also Human Rights First, *Living in Limbo*, p. 30, December 2010, <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/Living-in-Limbo-final.pdf>.

³³⁰ Andrew E. Kramer, *Village in Iraq Faltering With Exit of U.S. Troops*, NY Times, 15 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/world/middleeast/iraqi-town-falters-as-united-states-troops-exit.html>. Cases of US-affiliated Iraqis that were denied employment by the GoI due to their previous work with the US have been reported. Allegedly, many former USF-I employees fear to reveal their prior work experience to a potential new employer as they may be once more exposed to threats or violence. TheList Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies, *Tragedy on the Horizon*, May 2010, p. 49, <http://thelistproject.org/Withdrawal.pdf>.

³³¹ According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, “[T]he sacking and arrests of rivals and independent figures, and their subsequent replacement with loyalists, has become common practice pursued by Maliki to consolidate power and marginalize political opponents”; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 1, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf.

³³² See “Journalists”.

³³³ HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>.

³³⁴ According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, “[T]he sacking and arrests of rivals and independent figures, and their subsequent replacement with loyalists, has become common practice pursued by Maliki to consolidate power and marginalize political opponents”; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 1, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf.

³³⁵ According to the US Department of State, “[I]ntimidation and political influence were factors in some allegations of corruption, and officials sometimes used the “de-Ba’athification” process to pursue political and personal agendas”; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 38, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. The International Crisis Group describes how the timing of investigations being launched against officials (and political rivals) into corruption or other illegal practices raises doubts over the real motives; International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq’s Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, pp. 7, 22, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf).

³³⁶ Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf; Joel Wing, *Iraq’s Baathist Crackdown Lacks Legal Basis*, AKnews, 22 November 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/8/274009/>.

³³⁷ According to HRW’s Middle East Director, Sarah Leah Whitson, “[A]fter the formal withdrawal last month, the political clampdown has intensified, and Maliki has threatened his political opponents with jail”; cited in: Michael S. Schmidt, *Rising Strife Threatens Tenuous Iraqi Stability*, New York Times, 22 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/world/middleeast/stability-in-iraq-threatened-amid-power-struggle.html?_r=1&ref=iraq. According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, arrests of alleged former Ba’ath Party members have “accelerated after the U.S. decided to exit Iraq, in accordance with the 2008 U.S.- Iraq Security Agreement”; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 1, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf.

³³⁸ According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, those detained in mass arrests in October and November 2011 are mostly Sunnis from across the country; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 1, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf. Generally, those arrested on terrorism-related charges and/or accused of Ba’athist ties are largely reported to be Sunni Arabs. According to Amnesty International, most detainees were Sunni Muslims suspected of supporting Sunni armed groups fighting the GoI. However, Amnesty also accounted for “many hundreds” of Shi’ites suspected of supporting Shi’ite militias such as the JAM; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-11>; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, pp. 5-6, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

³³⁹ In January 2008, a new “Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice” (“De-Ba’athification Law”) was issued, replacing the earlier framework established by the former CPA. However, despite some positive changes, the new law was reported as largely preserved the previous De-Ba’athification system; see Miranda Sissons, *Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New “Accountability and Justice” Law*, International Center for Transitional Justice, 22 January 2008, p. 2, http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/incl/trial_DeBaathification.pdf; AFP, *Iraq to reinstate ex-Baathists*, 12 January 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i0I07OBgQR2XmF_VG97sCIHCE9yA; CPA Order No. 1, *De-Ba’athification Of Iraqi Society*, 16 May 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_1_De-Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_.pdf; CPA Order No. 2, *Dissolution Of Entities*, 23 August 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.

³⁴⁰ According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, “[T]he ruling Shi’a bloc has used de-Ba’athification measures as a political tool to marginalize Sunni opponents; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 4, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf. De-Ba’athification has reportedly been used in a sectarian manner as it was mainly used to purge Sunni officials from the Iraqi administration whereas Shi’ite and Kurdish former Ba’athists were “silently “un-Baathified” and thus co-opted;“ Reidar Visser, *Blacklisted in Baghdad*, *Foreign Affairs*, 27 January 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65939/reidar-visser/blacklisted-in-baghdad?page=show>.

³⁴¹ According to Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War, the Justice and Accountability Law was “often-misinterpreted and politically exploited;” Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf. See also Joel Wing, *Iraq’s Baathist Crackdown Lacks Legal Basis*, AKnews, 22 November 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/8/274009/>. See also Miranda Sissons, *Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New “Accountability and Justice” Law*, International Center for Transitional Justice, 22 January 2008, p. 5, http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/incl/trial_DeBaathification.pdf; Mussab Al-Khairalla, *Iraq parliament passes law to rehire Baathists*, Reuters, 12 January 2008, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/01/12/uk-iraq-debaathification-idUKL1218093220080112>.

³⁴² Reidar Visser has reportedly said about the mass arrests of mainly Sunnis in October 2011 that , “[T]his is of course not the first time vague accusations of Baathism are being used as a basis for vigilante witch hunts against political opponents in Iraq;” Reidar Visser, *The Latest Wave of Arrests: Baathists and Terrorists Are Two Different Things*, Gulf Analysis, 26 October 2011,

<http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/10/26/the-latest-wave-of-arrests-baathists-and-terrorists-are-two-different-things/>. See also Reidar Visser, *More Anti-Baath Legislation in Iraq*, Gulf Analysis, 22 November 2011, <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/category/de-baathification/>. According to the US Department of State, "(...) officials sometimes used the "de-Ba'athification" process to pursue political and personal agendas"; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 38, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also, France24, *Iraq governor suspended for alleged Ba'ath party affiliation*, 27 October 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iQiCLRbZxnm-tAuS7976f1N-5rQ?docId=CNG.f8d6dcdf2470cc008581e945560bb3e1.161>.

³⁴³ Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf. For example, in October 2011, 140 professors and faculty members from the University of Tikrit (Salah Al-Din) had reportedly been dismissed from their employment for alleged Ba'athist ties. Ali Saleh Hussein, the president of Tikrit University, reportedly resigned in protest at the layoffs. It is noteworthy that at the time of the dismissals, the JAC was reportedly defunct as under the "Erbil Agreement" political factions agreed to name new members; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 12 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf; Joel Wing, *Iraq's Baathist Crackdown Lacks Legal Basis*, AKnews, 22 November 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/8/274009/>. A leaked US diplomatic cable dating 28 February 2010 reportedly revealed that PM Al-Maliki replaced more than 100 alleged Ba'athists with members of his own Dawa Party in senior commands at the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA); Elliott Woods, *Iraq: Under Worse Management*, Bloomberg Businessweek, 18 January 2012, p. 5, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/iraq-under-worse-management-01182012_page_5.html.

³⁴⁴ In the run-up of the March 2010 parliamentary elections, it was reported that some 500 candidates were disqualified by the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) due to their alleged ties with the former Ba'ath Party. Sixty-three candidates were later reportedly reinstated under the auspices of an ad hoc CoR committee. Ultimately the cassation chamber completed its vetting process for the others prior to the elections, reportedly reinstating another 26 candidates. While the 2008 De-Ba'athification Law prevents active Ba'athists and high-level former Ba'athists from running for elected office, it was reported that due process was clearly violated in the disqualification process. Reidar Visser called it a "gross miscarriage of justice against hundreds of candidates"; Reidar Visser, *Nomination Trouble for the De-Baathification Appellate Bench*, Gulf Analysis, 8 July 2011, <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/nomination-trouble-for-the-de-baathification-appellate-bench/>; Reidar Visser, *Blacklisted in Baghdad*, *Foreign Affairs*, 27 January 2010, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65939/reidar-visser/blacklisted-in-baghdad?page=show>; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 4, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 36, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. Given that both the head of the JAC, Ali Al-Lami, as well as Ahmed Chalabi, the former head of the De-Ba'athification Commission were both running for office as well, further raised doubts over the disqualifications; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS, 24 January 2012, p. 10, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

³⁴⁵ The Justice and Accountability Law is reportedly only concerned in defining what levels of Ba'ath Party membership would prevent a person from holding government employment or in running for election. However, the law does not provide a legal basis to prosecute Ba'ath Party members.

³⁴⁶ While the 2005 constitution outlawed the Ba'ath Party, Article 135(5) explicitly provides that "mere membership of the Baath party is not a sufficient basis for transfer to the court". Article 7 of the constitution outlaws propagation of a number of political ideologies, including Ba'athism; however, to date no law has been issued as requested by the constitution.

³⁴⁷ According to reports, PM Al-Maliki also said that the arrests had taken place without arrest warrants as required by Iraqi law; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, p. 2, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf.

³⁴⁸ According to Reidar Visser, public officials' statements on the suspects Ba'ath Party ranks, reportedly showed that the terms "Ba'athist" and "terrorist" have almost become interchangeable; Reidar Visser, *The Latest Wave of Arrests: Baathists and Terrorists Are Two Different Things*, Gulf Analysis, 26 October 2011, <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/10/26/the-latest-wave-of-arrests-baathists-and-terrorists-are-two-different-things/>. See also Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf; Joel Wing, *Iraq's Baathist Crackdown Lacks Legal Basis*, AKnews, 22 November 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/8/274009/>. Along the same lines, it was reported that in November 2011, PM Al-Maliki publicly called on members of the Ba'ath Party to declare their rejection of the party in writing, and threatened legal prosecution if they do not; AFP, *Iraq PM calls for Baath party 'repentance'*, 9 November 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5haVtiQATt4KdLW0S-M-TlxwJmOIA?docId=CNG.ad48cd53bae60f1823c70df75c824a6d.471>.

³⁴⁹ Ramzy Mardini of the Institute for the Study of War concluded that "[G]iven Maliki's history of centralization, the U.S. withdrawal, and Iraq's upcoming elections, it is likely that consolidating power and purifying the security sector from rivals are the principle motivating factors in his decision-making"; Ramzy Mardini, *Maliki Arrests Potential Opposition*, Institute for the Study of War, 21 December 2011, pp. 3, 6, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_MalikiArrestsPotentialOpposition.pdf.

³⁵⁰ HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>.

³⁵¹ It has been reported that the vast majority of detainees are suspected of terrorism-related offences, including supporting and funding armed groups, on the basis of the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law adopted in November 2005, which defines terrorism as "any criminal act carried out by an individual or an organized group targeting an individual, a group of individuals, national or private institutions and causing damage to private or public properties with the aim of affecting the safety or security situation or national unity, or to terrorise and scare people or spread disturbance in order to achieve terrorist aims." According to Amnesty International, the law is so broad that it "can be used to muzzle peaceful opposition to the government"; Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, p. 14, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

³⁵² See "Background Information".

³⁵³ Amnesty International, *New Order, Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions And Torture In Iraq*, September 2010, p. 32, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>.

³⁵⁴ See "Background Information".

³⁵⁵ See "Background Information".

³⁵⁶ The Commission of Integrity's annual report for 2010 states that the "COI investigators are faced with threats, intimidation, risks, and adverse political influences daily"; COI, Annual Report 2010, cited in: SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, pp. 95, 100, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-

[January 2012.pdf#view=fit](#). See also Patrick Cockburn, *Iraq regime tries to silence corruption whistleblowers*, Independent, 29 September 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-regime-tries-to-silence-corruption-whistleblowers-2362637.html>; James Glanz and Riyadh Mohammed, *Premier of Iraq Is Quietly Firing Fraud Monitors*, New York Times, 17 November 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/18/world/middleeast/18maliki.html?pagewanted=all>.

³⁵⁷ Radhi Hamza Al-Radhi, who headed the Commission of Integrity from 2004 to 2007, reportedly sought asylum in the US due to assassination fears. Reports indicate that he said that in 2007 a rocket nearly missed his residence within Baghdad's International Zone. The attack came at a time when the COI had just completed the prosecution of former Minister of Defense Hazim Al-Sha'alan and his associates. A confidential source within the Ministry of Defence had reportedly told him that he was on a "list for elimination"; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, pp. 105, 106, <http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report - January 2012.pdf#view=fit>. See also International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.

³⁵⁸ See "Actors of Violence".

³⁵⁹ See also "Members of Political Parties".

³⁶⁰ See "Academics".

³⁶¹ See "Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders".

³⁶² See "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

³⁶³ Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, unofficial English translation available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

³⁶⁴ In May and June 2010, popular protests had reportedly occurred in the governorates of Al-Anbar, Basrah, Kerbala, Najef, Thi-Qar and Wassit. Several deaths and injuries among civilians were reported due to the use of live fire by the ISF. For example, on 19 June 2010, ISF had reportedly killed two protesters and wounded two others after protesters tried to enter the provincial council building in Basrah; HRW, *Iraq: Stop Blocking Demonstrations*, 17 September 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/17/iraq-stop-blocking-demonstrations>. Waheed, the Minister for Electricity, subsequently resigned on 21 June 2010; BBC, *Iraq electricity minister resigns after deadly protests*, 21 June 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10371581>. See also Hamid Ahmed, *Iraqi PM to country: Stay away from Friday demo*, AP, 24 February 2011, http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-02-24/world/28630105_1_al-maliki-iraqi-officials-anti-government-protest; HRW, *Iraq: Stop Blocking Demonstrations*, 17 September 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c984629b.html>.

³⁶⁵ The regulations require protest organizers to obtain written approval from the MoI and the provincial governor concerned before submitting an application to the relevant police department, no less than 72 hours ahead of a planned event. The regulations do not set out clear criteria for grants or denials of such requests, suggesting substantial discretionary powers; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 2, 4, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. According to HRW, the new regulations "effectively impeded Iraqis from organizing lawful protests" and are in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Iraq is a state party. The ICCPR clearly states that restrictions on peaceful demonstrations should be exceptional and narrowly permitted only if found to be "necessary in a democratic society" to safeguard "national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." HRW received information from a senior MoI official who reportedly said that on the day the new regulations were issued, the PM's office sent a secret order to the MoI instructing the minister not to approve any demonstrations dealing with electricity shortages or other government services, and telling him to "make up excuses if needed". Falah Alwan, President of the Federation of Workers' Councils and Unions in Iraq, had reportedly told HRW that the new regulations had made protests in relation to the lack of government services impossible; HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>; HRW, *Stop Blocking Demonstrations*, 17 September 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/17/iraq-stop-blocking-demonstrations>.

³⁶⁶ The regulations do not include any limits to the use of force against protestors nor do they make any mention of the proportionality principle; HRW, *Stop Blocking Demonstrations*, 17 September 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/17/iraq-stop-blocking-demonstrations>. In May 2011, the Council of Ministers approved a Law on the Freedom of Expression, of Opinion, Assembly, and Peaceful Demonstration. The law would authorize officials to restrict freedom of assembly to protect "the public interest" and in the interest of "general order or public morals." At the time of writing, the law was still awaiting approval by the CoR; HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>; See also Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS Report for Congress, 27 December 2011, p. 26, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

³⁶⁷ In February 2011, it was reported that protests took place in various locations of Central and Southern Iraq, including:

- On 23 February 2011, at least 14 persons were injured in clashes between protesters and security forces in Thi-Qar; Aswat al-Iraq, *14 people wounded in Thi-Qar protests*, 23 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141131&l=1.
- On 21 February 2011, about 50 protesters set up two tents in Baghdad's Tahrir Square ahead of the proclaimed "Day of Rage" on 25 February 2011. Assaultants, some reportedly armed with knives and clubs, attacked at least 20 of the sleeping protesters, allegedly with tacit approval by the police, which had vacated the area minutes earlier; HRW, *Iraq: Police Allow Gangs to Attack Protesters*, 24 February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/24/iraq-police-allow-gangs-attack-protesters>.
- On 17 February 2011, in Nasseriyah (Thi-Qar), hundreds of people staged a protest demanding better services and the dissolution of the municipality council. The premises of the Nasseriyah municipal council were burned by a mob. More demonstrations were reported from Basrah, Kut and Kirkuk; Liz Sly and Ali Qeis, *Two Iraqi protesters killed amid unrest in normally peaceful Kurdistan*, 18 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/17/AR2011021706418.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Religious group accused of standing behind Nassiriya incidents*, 18 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141049&l=1.
- On 16 February 2011, police opened fire on peaceful protestors calling for the resignation of the governor in Kut (Wassit), killing three and wounding more than 50 others, according to local security sources. As a result of the shootings, protestors stormed the provincial governor's headquarters and home and set them ablaze. In Diwaniyah, at least three persons were reportedly injured by police gunfire. As a result, the municipal councils of Al-Hamza and Ifaq resigned; Liz Sly and Ali Qeis, *Violence erupts during anti-government protests in southern Iraq city*, Washington Post, 17 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/16/AR2011021606942.html>; Michael S. Schmidt and Suraid Adnan, *Police Fire on Protesters in Iraq*, New York Times, 16 February 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17iraq.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Demonstrations in Diwaniya, south Iraq, demanding services*, 16 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141015&l=1.

- On 10 February 2011, Iraqi lawyers led a protest of some 3,000 persons in Baghdad denouncing failures of the judicial system, the abuse of prisoners and widespread corruption. Similar but smaller protests were also held in Basrah and Mosul; Bushra Juhi, *Lawyers lead anti-government protest in Baghdad*, AP, 11 February 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12881803&Ts_I92b8VbU.
- ³⁶⁸ The protesters had reportedly defied an official curfew. Ahead of the protests, PM Al-Maliki reportedly called on the Iraqi population not to demonstrate, warning of sabotage by AQI and people loyal to former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Several influential religious leaders, including Muqtada Al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, had reportedly urged people to defer protests; DPA, *Tense calm after 18 people killed in Iraq protests*, 26 February 2011, http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1622188.php/Tense-calm-after-18-people-killed-in-Iraq-protests; Hamid Ahmed, *Iraqi PM to country: Stay away from Friday demo*, AP, 24 February 2011, http://articles.sfgate.com/2011-02-24/world/28630105_1_al-maliki-iraqi-officials-anti-government-protest; Michael S. Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, *Iraq's Top Shiite Leaders Urge Delay of Protests*, New York Times, 24 February 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/middleeast/24iraq.html>.
- ³⁶⁹ Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 2, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also “Background Information”.
- ³⁷⁰ It was only on 30 March 2011 that the Iraqi authorities had reportedly announced that the ISF were banned from using live ammunition against demonstrators except in cases of self-defence. Those violating the new regulations would be held accountable; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's PM bans use of fire against demonstrators*, 30 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141712&l=1.
- ³⁷¹ In several locations, clashes erupted between protesters and ISF as protestors reportedly aimed to storm government buildings and police stations or threw stones at the security forces. Demonstrators were reported to have used violence only after ISF had used force against them, including sound bombs and live ammunition; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 3, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>; Charles McDermid with Karim Lami, *The Missing Ingredient in Iraq's Day of Rage*, Time, 25 February 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0.8599.2055525.00.html>.
- ³⁷² Reported casualties on 25 February 2011 included:
 - In Baghdad, at least three persons were reportedly killed in clashes with ISF after demonstrations turned violent as protestors tried to reach the fortified International Zone and knocked down blast walls erected by the ISF ahead of the protests; Charles McDermid with Karim Lami, *The Missing Ingredient in Iraq's Day of Rage*, Time, 25 February 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0.8599.2055525.00.html>.
 - In Tikrit (Salah Al-Din), four people were killed after soldiers opened fire against protestors seeking entry to local governorate offices; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>.
 - In Kirkuk, three people were reportedly killed in Kirkuk, where angry protestors raided a police station; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>.
 - In Mosul, protestors stormed and set ablaze a provincial council building. In the ensuing shoot-out, six people were reportedly killed. Also, angry protestors attacked with stones the convoy of the provincial governor and his brother, parliament speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi when they tried to reach the government building in the morning; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>; Xinhua, *Three protestors killed in Iraq's northern Mosul*, 25 February 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-02/25/c_13750318.htm.
 - In Fallujah (Al-Anbar), six protestors were reportedly killed; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>.
 - In Basrah, at least one protestor was killed and over 80 persons, mostly policemen, were wounded in clashes between protestors and ISF. One week later, ISF dispersed a demonstration in front of the Basrah Provincial Council after clashes with protestors during which one protestor was wounded and a number of journalists were arrested; Aswat al-Iraq, *Demonstrator killed, 84 injured, including policemen, in Basra*, 26 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141196&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Journalists detained in Basra*, 4 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141306&l=1.
- ³⁷³ On 26 February 2011, it was reported that at least eight people were wounded in Samarra (Salah Al-Din) during clashes between ISF and angry mourners during the funeral procession for two people killed in protests the day before. Mohammed Tawfeeq, *More deaths and clashes follow Iraq demonstrations*, CNN, 26 February 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-26/world/iraq.protests_1_protesters-security-forces-demonstrators?_s=PM:WORLD. In different areas of Al-Anbar, five more deaths were reported. Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>. In Tikrit, two persons reportedly died from injuries sustained one day earlier. Mohammed Tawfeeq, *More deaths and clashes follow Iraq demonstrations*, CNN, 26 February 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-26/world/iraq.protests_1_protesters-security-forces-demonstrators?_s=PM:WORLD. On 27 February 2011, at least 27 protestors were reportedly injured in clashes with the ISF after protestors attempted to storm the provincial council building in Amara (Missan). Aswat al-Iraq, *Demonstrators injured in Missan Sunday reach 27, medical source says*, 27 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141216&l=1; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraqi PM Maliki pledges reform after 'Day of Rage'*, The Washington Post, 27 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/27/AR2011022700985.html>.
- ³⁷⁴ It has been reported that vehicle and bike bans and increased checkpoints have been imposed making it harder for people to reach protest areas. For example, on 4 March 2011, with new Friday protests expected, authorities reportedly barred anyone from entering Nassiriya town; Aswat al-Iraq, *Massive demonstration begins in central Nassiriya*, 4 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141298&l=1. See also, Aswat al-Iraq, *Tight security measures before protest in Falluja*, 11 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141404&l=1; Bushra Juhi and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, *Iraqis defy checkpoints, vehicle bans in demos*, AP, 4 March 2011, <http://news.yahoo.com/hundreds-gather-baghdad-anti-government-demo-20110304-001356-179.html>. On 13 April 2011, new regulations were issued reportedly barring street protests and allowing protests only in three football stadiums in Baghdad (Al-Shaab, Kashafa and Zawraa stadiums). According to HRW, the regulation was never enforced; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; HRW, *Iraq: Attacks by Government-Backed Thugs Chill Protests*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/30/iraq-attacks-government-backed-thugs-chill-protests>; HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>. HRW, *Iraq: Attacks by Government-Backed Thugs Chill Protests*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/30/iraq-attacks-government-backed-thugs-chill-protests>; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests*

and Repression in Iraq, April 2011, p. 3, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>.

³⁷⁵ Some of whom are alleged to be ISF members in plainclothes; AFP, *Iraq's protest movement: despondent and divided*, 31 January 2012, <http://www.brecorder.com/world/middle-east/44279-iraqs-protest-movement-despondent-and-divided.html>. On 10 June 2011, groups of mainly young, armed men reportedly beat and stabbed peaceful protesters and sexually molested female demonstrators in Baghdad, while security forces stood by and watched in several instances. Several injured protesters reportedly avoided seeking medical help due to fears of being arrested in the ambulance or in the hospital. In late February 2011, dozens of government supporters reportedly beat and stabbed peaceful protesters in Baghdad's Tahrir Square under the eyes of the police. In the early hours of 21 February 2011, dozens of men, some wielding knives and clubs, reportedly attacked some 50 protesters who had set up two tents in Tahrir Square; HRW, *Iraq: Attacks by Government-Backed Thugs Chill Protests*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/30/iraq-attacks-government-backed-thugs-chill-protests>.

³⁷⁶ Amnesty International, *Iraqi activists' torture allegations spark fears for detained protesters*, 10 March 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-activists-torture-allegations-spark-fears-detained-protesters-2011-03-10>.

³⁷⁷ HRW reported that in the end of May / beginning of June 2011, ISF detained, interrogated and beat several protest organizers in Baghdad. For example, on 28 May 2011, ISF reportedly raided the offices of the human rights group "Where Are My Rights" in Baghdad's Bab Al-Mu'adham neighborhood as members met with other protest organizers from the February 25 Group. Members of both groups told HRW that soldiers raided the building with guns drawn, took away 13 activists in handcuffs and blindfolds and confiscated mobile phones, computers and documents; HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>. See also chapter "NGO Workers and Rights Activists".

³⁷⁸ HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>.

³⁷⁹ On 10 June 2011, several women were reportedly sexually assaulted and insulted in Baghdad's Tahrir Square by alleged government-sponsored thugs; Marcia G. Yerman, *Yanar Mohammed -- Iraqi Women's Vigilant Champion*, Women's Media Center, 28 June 2011, <http://womensmediacenter.com/blog/2011/06/exclusive-yanar-mohammed---iraqi-womens-vigilant-champion/>; OWFI, *Iraqi Human Rights Activists Protesting for Democracy Are Sexually Assaulted and Beaten*, 11 June 2010, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/press-release/132-iraqi-human-rights-activists-protesting-for-democracy-are-sexually-assaulted-and-beaten>. See also HRW, *Iraq: Attacks by Government-Backed Thugs Chill Protests*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/30/iraq-attacks-government-backed-thugs-chill-protests>. See also chapter "NGO Workers and Rights Activists".

³⁸⁰ See chapter on "Journalists".

³⁸¹ According to Hussam Al-Ssair, a journalist and poet arrested on 25 February 2011, "[I]t was like they were dealing with a bunch of al-Qaeda operatives, not a group of journalists." And Hadi Al-Mahdi, a theater director and radio anchor, reported that he was blindfolded and beaten repeatedly with sticks, boots and fists and also threatened to be raped with a stick; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>. According to Amnesty International, there is "(...) disturbing evidence of targeted attacks on political activists, torture and other ill-treatment of people arrested in connection with the protests, and attacks or threats against journalists, media outlets, government critics, academics and students"; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 3, 7, 8, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>.

³⁸² HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>.

³⁸³ Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 8, 13, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 49, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

³⁸⁴ For example, Hadi Al-Mahdi, theater director and radio anchor, had reportedly said that while in detention he was accused of being a tool of outsiders seeking to topple the Iraqi Government. They reportedly wanted him to admit that he was a member of former President Saddam Hussein's banned Ba'ath Party; Stephanie McCrummen, *Iraq 'Day of Rage' protests followed by detentions, beatings*, The Washington Post, 26 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/26/AR2011022601854.html>. An official in the Thi-Qar Provincial Council accused Ba'athists of "enraging" protesters and three former Ba'athists were reportedly arrested; Aswat al-Iraq, *Thi-Qar Council blames Baathists for "enraging" protesters*, 25 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141179&l=1.

³⁸⁵ See "Background Information".

³⁸⁶ AFP, *Iraq's protest movement: despondent and divided*, 31 January 2012, <http://www.brecorder.com/world/middle-east/44279-iraqs-protest-movement-despondent-and-divided.html>; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS Report for Congress, 27 December 2011, p. 25, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>.

³⁸⁷ Articles 38(C) and 46, Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

³⁸⁸ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 54-55, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

³⁸⁹ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 55, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

³⁹⁰ See "Background Information".

³⁹¹ Until January 2006, the Governorate of Sulaymaniyah was governed by a PUK-led administration, while the Governorates of Erbil and Dahuk were governed by a KDP-led administration. An agreement between the PUK and the KDP on the joint administration of the Kurdistan Region was reportedly reached on 21 January 2006 and the KRG assumed office on 7 May 2006.

³⁹² UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 50, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

³⁹³ The *Parastin* is the KDP's domestic intelligence agency and the *Dazgay Zaniyari* is the PUK's domestic intelligence agency; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 8, 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

³⁹⁴ The *Asayish* is the official security agency in the Kurdistan Region. Law No. 46 of 2004 describes the role of the *Asayish* as follows: "protect the population, provide stability and security in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and to combat terrorism, espionage and drug-related crime" (Article 6). The *Asayish* does not fall under the jurisdiction of any ministry, but reports directly to the presidency of the KRG. However, in reality, there are still two separate *Asayish* entities, each under the control of the KDP and the PUK in their respective areas of influence, both within the Kurdistan Region but also in areas *de facto* under their control; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on*

Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 8 April 2011, pp. 8, 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 27, 50, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. The *Asayish* run their own detention centres that are not under control of the KRG authorities, but rather the KDP and the PUK, respectively. Reportedly, there is an *Asayish* facility in every city and town, each one with a detention centre or prison; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 8, 10, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage - Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 10, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Hope and Fear - Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, April 2009, p. 9, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2009/en/c2e5ae23-b204-4b46-b7f5-06dc1501f62f/mde140062009en.pdf>.

³⁹⁵ According to Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International's Director for the Middle East and North Africa, "The two political parties that jointly rule Iraq's three Kurdish provinces continue to operate armed militia which act almost as a law unto themselves and have been permitted to commit human rights abuses with impunity;" Amnesty International, *Restraint urged in Iraq's Kurdistan Region following more protester deaths*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/restraint-urged-iraq's-kurdistan-region-following-more-protester-deaths-2011-02-21>.

³⁹⁶ See "Background Information".

³⁹⁷ See "Journalists and other media personnel in the Kurdistan Region".

³⁹⁸ The KIU, the KIG and Goran have reportedly gained increasing popular support due to the widespread disillusionment with the ruling parties; The Majalla, *The Kurdish Crisis*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/12/article55228153>; Joel Wing, *Clash Between Political Parties In Iraq's Kurdistan*, AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/276551/>. The KIU, which was formerly allied with the KDP, decided to run on its own list in the December 2005 CoR elections. As a result, alleged KDP supporters, reportedly attacked KIU offices in several towns, resulting in four dead and dozens wounded, The KIU was again attacked during the 2009 Kurdish parliamentary elections in 2009; UNAMI HRO, *Human Rights report, 1 November - 31 December 2005*, p. 3, <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%2005%20EN.PDF>; Jonathan Finan, *For Kurds, A Surge Of Violence In Campaign*, The Washington Post, 14 December 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/13/AR2005121302119_pf.html. The US Department of State reported that the Kurdish parliament allegedly continues to postpone planned elections in order to avoid anticipated losses by the PUK in favour of Goran; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 37, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

³⁹⁹ All three parties are represented in the Kurdistan Parliament. In the last parliamentary elections in July 2009, the KDP/PUK alliance won 59 seats of a total of 111 seats, Goran 25 seats and a joint Islamist and Socialist list (Reform and Service List, which includes KIU and KIG) won 13 seats; Kurdistan Regional Government, *The Kurdistan Parliament*, 30 November 2006, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://web.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?nr=160&lngnr=12&smap=04070000&anr=15057>.

⁴⁰⁰ According to Amnesty International, "Members and supporters of political opposition groups were threatened, harassed, attacked or arrested"; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011 - Iraq*, May 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq/report-2011#section-65-12>; Amnesty International, *Iraq: Civilians under Fire*, April 2010, p. 11, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>. See also Joel Wing, *Clash Between Political Parties In Iraq's Kurdistan*, AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/276551/>. See also IWPR, *Kurdish War of Words*, 28 January 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/kurdish-war-words>.

⁴⁰¹ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 57, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Iraq: Civilians under Fire*, April 2010, p. 17, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁴⁰² In the months following the 25 July 2009 Kurdistan parliamentary elections, in which Change Movement won 25 out of 111 seats, hundreds of government employees, especially members of the security services, had their employment reportedly terminated, allegedly for supporting the Change List. KRG President Barzani formed a committee to investigate the allegations, but reportedly no action was taken; US Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 11 March 2010, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136069.htm>. On the other hand, the KDP and PUK reportedly give preference in government employment to their respective members; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 36, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁴⁰³ For example, on 9/10 April 2011, in two separate incidents, the cars of Adil Hassan, a journalist working for KIU, and the car of Soran Omer, a journalist working for the KIG, were reportedly set on fire in Sulaymaniyah. Also on 10 April 2011, KDP security forces reportedly arrested reporter Farhad Muhamad and cameraman Abdulla Ahmed, both working for the KIU satellite TV station *Speda*, in Zakho (Dahuk), while they were covering protests to demand better public services. On 5 April 2011, Balen Othman, a reporter for the KIU news website *Kurdiu.org*, was reportedly arrested by members of the KDP security forces while taking photos in the centre of Erbil and released after being taken to the *Asayish* office. The same day, Umed Omarawayi, a reporter for *Payam TV* and *Komal* newspaper (operated by KIG), was reportedly harassed by police officers in Soran (Erbil), while taking photos in the town's hospital; RSF, *Journalist Still Being Arrested, Harassed And Intimidated Amid Continuing Protests*, 11 April 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-journalist-still-being-arrested-11-04-2011.40003.html>. See also RSF, *More Attacks On Journalists Covering Demonstrations, TV Cameraman Missing*, 4 April 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-more-attacks-on-journalists-04-04-2011.39949.html>; RSF, *Death Threats And Targeted Physical Attacks On Journalists In Iraqi Kurdistan*, 28 February 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-death-threats-and-targeted-28-02-2011.39637.html>.

⁴⁰⁴ For example, on 1 October 2011, TV executive Hoshiyar Abdallah, who heads the Change-affiliated KNN TV station, was reportedly arrested in Sulaymaniyah on a charge of defaming the former Minister of Water Resources, Abdul Latif Muhammad Jamal by accusing him of corruption. Abdallah was released on bail after two days; RSF, *Attacks And Acts Of Intimidation Against Journalists*, 21 October 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-attacks-and-acts-of-intimidation-21-10-2011.41261.html>. On 2 August 2010, the KDP had reportedly filed three lawsuits for defamation against the newspaper *Roznama* (which is funded by Goran), its editor-in-chief, and one author. *Roznama* had reportedly accused the ruling parties of benefitting from oil smuggling; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 51, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁴⁰⁵ On 2 December 2011, crowds reportedly ransacked, torched or otherwise damaged up to 30 liquor stores, several hotels, and a massage parlour in and around the town of Zakho (Dahuk). The attacks were allegedly instigated by a Friday prayer sermon in Zakho (Dahuk Governorate). Angry pro-government supporters belonging to the KDP suspected an alleged KIU-affiliated cleric behind the violence and reportedly counter-attacked KIU party offices and party-affiliated media premises. The KIU denied any connections to the riots and reportedly blamed the KDP for orchestrating attacks against the KIU. Independent regional newspaper *Hawalti* reported that the concerned cleric, Mullah Othman, was actually a supporter of the KDP and had only talked about a massage parlour located near the mosque. According to Mohamed Abdel Dayem, CPJ's Middle East and North Africa program coordinator, "[T]he recent spate of attacks on the press is a part of political score-settling between opposing political factions and their supporters;" The Majalla, *The Kurdish Crisis*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/12/article55228153>; CPJ, *In Iraqi Kurdistan, riots lead to press freedom abuses*, 6 December 2011,

<http://www.cpi.org/2011/12/in-iraqi-kurdistan-riots-lead-to-press-freedom-abu.php>; RSF, *News Media Torched, Journalists Attacked And Arrested In Outbreak Of Violence*, 5 December 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-news-media-torched-journalists-05-12-2011.41511.html>; AP, *Sermons spark riots in Iraqi Kurdish city*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-03/riot-zahko-iraq/51611328/1>; Ankawa News, *After his instigating for the recent violent acts, Mullah Ismail Osman said: "In my speech, I talked about the Massage Center but the Islamists exploited the situation"*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5603>. In the following days, more shops were reportedly targeted, including four liquor shops in Deraluk town (Dahuk) and a beauty parlor in Sulaymaniyah; AKnews, *Arsons spread across Kurdistan region*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276289/>. See also "Members of Religious Minorities – Christians" and "Yazidis".

⁴⁰⁶ Attacks were reported against the KIU party offices in Dahuk, Zakho and Sumeil and against party-affiliated media premises, including of *Speda* (a KIU-affiliated satellite TV station) and the local KIU radio and TV station in Zakho. Reportedly, shots were fired at the *Speda* and KNN (TV stations affiliated with Goran) offices in Erbil; CPJ, *In Iraqi Kurdistan, riots lead to press freedom abuses*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.cpi.org/2011/12/in-iraqi-kurdistan-riots-lead-to-press-freedom-abu.php>; RSF, *News Media Torched, Journalists Attacked And Arrested In Outbreak Of Violence*, 5 December 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-news-media-torched-journalists-05-12-2011.41511.html>; AP, *Sermons spark riots in Iraqi Kurdish city*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-03/riot-zahko-iraq/51611328/1>.

⁴⁰⁷ AP, *Sermons spark riots in Iraqi Kurdish city*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-12-03/riot-zahko-iraq/51611328/1>.

⁴⁰⁸ The Majalla, *The Kurdish Crisis*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/12/article55228153>. Reportedly, the KIU's parliamentary chief, a member of its governing board, and its party chief in Dahuk, among others, were arrested; Joel Wing, *Clash Between Political Parties In Iraq's Kurdistan*, AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/276551/>.

⁴⁰⁹ Journalists were reportedly targeted in Dahuk, Sumel (Dahuk Governorate), Erbil and Sulaymaniyah including journalists working for *Speda* TV and *Radio Xabur* (both KIU-affiliated) as well as KNN (Goran-affiliated), and Aljazeera; CPJ, *In Iraqi Kurdistan, riots lead to press freedom abuses*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.cpi.org/2011/12/in-iraqi-kurdistan-riots-lead-to-press-freedom-abu.php>; RSF, *News Media Torched, Journalists Attacked And Arrested In Outbreak Of Violence*, 5 December 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-news-media-torched-journalists-05-12-2011.41511.html>. See also "Journalists and Other Media Personnel in the Kurdistan Region".

⁴¹⁰ See for example, Ankawa News, *Mullah Denies Responsibility for Kurdish Riots*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5618>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Kurdish leader: Clerics 'instigated ... acts of sabotage,' wounding 25*, CNN, 3 December 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12-03/middleeast/world_meast_iraq-kurdistan-attack_1_kurdish-leader-security-officers-muslim-clerics?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST.

⁴¹¹ The commission, appointed by KRG President Massoud Barzani, consisted of a parliamentarian, a KIU-member and two non-Muslim religious representatives; RSF, *Black December For Media Freedom In Iraqi Kurdistan*, 3 January 2012, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-black-december-for-media-freedom-03-01-2012.41621.html>.

⁴¹² The commission had reportedly recommended that judicial authorities look into the possibility of holding accountable those responsible for the violence; RSF, *Black December For Media Freedom In Iraqi Kurdistan*, 3 January 2012, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-black-december-for-media-freedom-03-01-2012.41621.html>.

⁴¹³ Kamaran Subhan, *Sulaimaniya protesters to declare strike if not responded within 48 hours*, AKnews, 1 March 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/221841/>.

⁴¹⁴ In Sulaymaniyah, daily sit-ins were reportedly held on the central Sara Square, which became known as *Azady* (Freedom) Square. In Erbil, organizers were reportedly denied authorization to hold protests and when they attempted to stage protests on Erbil's main square on 25 February and 11 March 2011, they were reportedly violently dispersed; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 10, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Security forces break through demo in Sulaimaniya*, 19 April 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(edwmuu55oafs4o3mt5a5rw55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142068&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(edwmuu55oafs4o3mt5a5rw55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142068&l=1). After clamping down on protests in Sulaymaniyah's Sara Square on 19 April 2011, unauthorized protests were reportedly banned; Dilshad Saifaddin, *Opposition offices attacked in Sulaimaniya*, AKnews, 23 April 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/234237/>. Law No. 11/2010 regulates demonstrations throughout the Kurdistan Region. It stipulates that protestors obtain prior permission and that the local authority has the right to deny the request. It was reported that civil society and opposition parties had opposed the law, believing the authorities would use the requirement to limit their freedom of assembly; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 27, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 52, 58-59, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁴¹⁵ See for example, HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prevent Attacks on Protesters*, 7 March 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/iraqi-kurdistan-prevent-attacks-protesters>.

⁴¹⁶ It was reported that ten people died and more than 250 others were injured; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>. According to Amnesty International, "[I]t appears clear that the two main political parties in the Kurdistan region have sought to mobilize their own security agencies and party militants to undermine and weaken the protest movement and are prepared to use extreme means, including excessive force, arbitrary arrests, torture and threats, to achieve their objective"; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 10, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. In some instances, it had been reported that protestors also resorted to violent means, in particular stone-throwing. One member of the security forces was reportedly shot dead in Halabja for unclear circumstances. According to the KRG MoI, 122 members of the security forces were reportedly wounded during clashes with protestors; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 10, 11, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. Amnesty International recorded the following casualties for the early days of the protests:

- On 26 February 2011, anti-riot police reportedly threw a sound bomb into the crowd protesting on Sara Square, injuring at least eight people. The police then reportedly started shooting in the air to disperse the protestors. It was also reported that a stray bullet fatally hit a bystander.
- On 25 February 2011, after a peaceful demonstration at a central square in Kalar (Sulaymaniyah), some of the protestors had reportedly proceeded to the KDP office and started throwing stones at it. KDP guards and *Asayish* officers reportedly responded by shooting in the air. After *Peshmerga* forces arrived at the scene, the security forces had reportedly started to shoot live ammunition at protestors, killing two, including a bystander, and wounding 23 others. Five persons, including several security men, were reportedly wounded by stones.
- On 19 February 2011, hundreds of protestors reportedly started walking towards the KDP headquarters in Sulaymaniyah to protest against the shooting of a 5-year-old boy two days earlier. According to Amnesty International, video clips clearly reveal that security forces, including some in plain clothes, were shooting at demonstrators with rifles and pistols, killing two protestors and wounding 14

others.

- On 17 February 2011, armed KDP militia reportedly opened fire killing a 15-year-old boy and wounding 50 others, when protestors started to throw stones at the KDP headquarters in Sulaymaniyah.

See Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 11, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also Dilshad Saifaddin, *Opposition deputy's car torched in Sulaimaniya*, AKnews, 21 April 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/233869/>. A number of persons were reportedly arbitrarily arrested and detained for several days in relation to the protests. Arrests were mainly reported from Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Kalar and Halabja. Those arrested were not formally charged; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 11, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. Some were reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment. For example, Sharwan Azad Faqi, an NGO worker, was reportedly arrested and beaten by several security men wearing civilian clothes in Erbil on 25 February 2011. He was taken to the *Asayish* in Erbil and detained for four days. Amnesty International confirmed that he bore visible marks of torture in his face when he met delegates less than two weeks after his release. Faqi reported that he was forced to sign a confession without reading it; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage: Protests and Repression in Iraq: Testimonies / Case studies*, 12 April 2011, p. 2, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/020/2011/en/32f3afce-1f26-4cf7-bfb9-b5875acc46bb/mde140202011en.pdf>. For more testimonies, see Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 12-13, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also Rebin Hasan, *Asayish refutes reports of torturing detainees of recent unrest*, AKnews, 1 March 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/221958>.

⁴¹⁷ KIU, KIG and Goran have reportedly supported the anti-government protests. On 26 February 2011, they issued a 17-point reform programme, which included a call for new elections to be held within three months. Later, they reportedly boycotted the regional parliament and called for the dissolution of the Kurdistan government. In May 2011, these parties had reportedly said that their budgets, paid by the KRG, had been cut. They alleged that this was done in retaliation for their support for the protests; Raber Y. Aziz, *Opposition forces to take legal action against government for budget cut*, AKnews, 1 May 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/236147>. For example, on 21 April 2011, unknown assailants reportedly exploded the car of Kurdistan Sewkani, a member of the Sulaymaniyah Provincial Council and head of the Council's KIU faction; Dilshad Saifaddin, *Opposition deputy's car torched in Sulaimaniya*, AKnews, 21 April 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/233869/>.

⁴¹⁸ For example, Fatima Ahmed, a political activist, was reportedly threatened by three armed men in plain clothes that came to her house after she contacted other women to join a planned protest on the "Day of Rage" in Erbil on 25 February 2011. They had reportedly threatened her by saying "If you don't stop your political opposition activities we will kidnap you, rape you and videotape the rape." Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 2, 13-16, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. Members of the Kurdistan Students' Union (KSU), a KDP-affiliated organization, reportedly pressurized students at Erbil University to vacate the University ahead of a planned sit-in on 24 February 2011. All higher education facilities in Erbil were reportedly closed from 24 February to 1 April 2011; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prevent Attacks on Protesters*, 7 March 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/iraqi-kurdistan-prevent-attacks-protesters>. Karwan Kamal, a lawyer defending protestors in the city of Sulaymaniyah survived an assassination attempt; an unknown gunman reportedly shot at Kamal, when he and a friend were leaving a restaurant on 26 June 2011. Kamal was hit in his leg and (Shrapnel are the fragments thrown out by an exploding bomb-not gunshots) his friend and a bystander were also injured. According to Amnesty International, "[T]here is strong reason to believe that Karwan Kamal was targeted for his work to defend pro-reform protesters;" Amnesty International, *Attacks target activists in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 29 June 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/attacks-target-activists-iraqi-kurdistan-2011-06-29>.

⁴¹⁹ For example, Sharwan Azad Faqi, an NGO worker, was reportedly arrested and beaten by several security men wearing civilian clothes in Erbil on 25 February 2011. He was taken to the *Asayish* in Erbil and detained for four days. Amnesty International confirmed that he bore visible marks of torture in his face when he met delegates less than two weeks after his release. Faqi reported that he was forced to sign a confession without reading it; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage: Protests and Repression in Iraq: Testimonies / Case studies*, 12 April 2011, p. 2, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/020/2011/en/32f3afce-1f26-4cf7-bfb9-b5875acc46bb/mde140202011en.pdf>. Also, a protest organizer was reportedly abducted and tortured. On 26 May 2011, protest leader Ismail Abdulla was reportedly abducted by a group of armed men wearing Kurdish military uniforms. They took him to a remote spot, where he was reportedly subjected to severe beatings, cut with knives and threatened with death if he continued to participate in any further protests. They then dumped him on the outskirts of Sulaymaniyah city. He had to be hospitalized due to the injuries sustained. Abdulla reportedly holds PUK forces responsible for the attack. He alleged that he had received threatening phone calls and text messages prior to his abduction; article published by Lvin Press in Kurdish language on 27 May 2011, http://www.lvinpress.com/K_Direje.aspx?Jimare=3765&Besh=Hewal&Cor=1. The article was translated to English by Kurd Net, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Sulaimaniyah protest leader abducted and tortured*, 28 May 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/5/state5137.htm>; Amnesty International, *Attacks target activists in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 29 June 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/attacks-target-activists-iraqi-kurdistan-2011-06-29>; HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>. For more testimonies, see Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, pp. 12-13, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991ffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>. See also Rebin Hasan, *Asayish refutes reports of torturing detainees of recent unrest*, AKnews, 1 March 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/221958>.

⁴²⁰ See "Journalists and other media personnel in the Kurdistan Region".

⁴²¹ Two KIU offices were reportedly attacked in Sulaymaniyah; Dilshad Saifaddin, *Opposition offices attacked in Sulaimaniya*, AKnews, 23 April 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/234237/>. On 17 February 2011, several premises of Goran were reportedly set on fire, including the party's headquarters in Erbil, and offices in Bansalawa, Shaqlawah and Soran (all in Erbil Governorate). The party's office in Dahuk was reportedly robbed; Dana Asaad, *unrest in kurdistan*, Niqash, 21 February 2011, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2786&lang=en>; Amnesty International, *Restraint urged in Iraq's Kurdistan Region following more protester deaths*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/restraint-urged-iraq-s-kurdistan-region-following-more-protester-deaths-2011-02-21>.

⁴²² In April 2011, the KRG issued a report of its investigation into the violence during the 60 days of protests. It concluded that both sides, security forces and protesters, committed violence and that "the police and security forces were poorly trained in handling it appropriately." However, at the time of writing, UNHCR is not aware if anybody was held accountable for the violence; Amnesty International, *Days of*

Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq, April 2011, pp. 13-14, 16, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/mde140132011en.pdf>; HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>.

⁴²³ Motives for such attacks are often not clear and according to UNAMI/OHCHR, it is possible that some professionals have been targeted for personal or criminal reasons; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁴²⁴ AKnews, *Assassination of lecturers continues in Mosul*, 10 September 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/261187/>.

⁴²⁵ Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Parliament delegation in Kirkuk on fact-finding mission after stepping up of assassinations*, 28 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145064&l=1. See also “Security Incidents”.

⁴²⁶ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 21, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 2, 31, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁴²⁷ Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, unofficial English translation available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

⁴²⁸ The 1951 Civil Code provides that any person, including a journalist, is liable for “moral injury,” including “any encroachment (assault) on the freedom, morality, honor, reputation, social standing, or financial position (credibility) of others.” The vague term “moral injury” leaves wide discretion to the judiciary; Civil Code Law, Law No. 40 of 1951 as amended, cited in: HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 42, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. The US Department of State reported that many media professionals said that the fear of prosecution effectively prevented them from practicing their profession; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 23, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁴²⁹ The Iraqi Penal Code contains several provisions criminalizing defamatory speech targeting public officials and institutions, see for example, Paragraphs 225 and 226 of the Penal Code, which penalizes those who publicly insult, *inter alia*, the president or his representatives, the CoR, the government, the courts or the armed forces (fines or imprisonment up to seven years); Law No. (111) of 1969 as amended, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category.LEGAL.NATLEGBOD..IRO.452514424.0.html>. For an overview of all relevant provisions in the Penal Code, see HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 47-48, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also CPJ/JFO, *CPJ, JFO cite press freedom abuses in Iraq*, 10 June 2009, <http://cpj.org/2009/06/cpj-jfo-cite-press-freedom-abuses-in-iraq.php>.

⁴³⁰ The Law of Publications (Law No. 206 of 1968), in articles 16-21 bans materials that are “offensive” or “violate general moral values”; cited in: HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 42, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁴³¹ CPA Order No. 14, *Prohibited Media Activity*, 10 June 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_14_Prohibited_Media_Activity.pdf.

⁴³² Ahead of the March 2010 elections, the Communications and Media Commission had reportedly issued new regulations on the broadcast media banning and punishing incitement of violence and sectarianism. Rights organizations reportedly criticized the regulations for its vague and broad wording and harsh penalties (suspension, fines and the confiscation of equipment). On the basis of these regulations, the Commission reportedly ordered the closure of the Baghdad and Basrah offices of Al-Baghdadiyya on 1 November 2010. The station had broadcasted the demands of gunmen that had reportedly attacked Our Lady of Salvation Catholic cathedral in Baghdad on 31 October 2010. The Commission reportedly accused Al-Baghdadiyya of being a mouthpiece for the attackers whose demands amounted to “incitement to violence”; Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2011 - Iraq*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c84f71b.html>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 44, 49, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; HRW, *Iraq: Suspend Restrictive Broadcast Rules*, 12 April 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/09/iraq-suspend-restrictive-broadcast-rules>.

⁴³³ For example, in November 2010, two Al-Baghdadia TV Station employees, producer Haidar Salam and video editor Mohammed Al-Johair, were reportedly arrested under article 1/2/4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law after the channel aired the demands of gunmen that had attacked Our Lady of Salvation Catholic cathedral in Baghdad on 31 October 2010; RSF, *Al-Baghdadia TV Announces it is Pulling out of Iraq for Good*, 2 November 2010, http://en.rsf.org/iraq-al-baghdadia-tv-bureaux-closed-two-02-11-2010_38728.html.

⁴³⁴ According to the US Department of State, “self-censorship due to fear of reprisals by the government, political parties, criminal gangs, insurgent and sectarian forces, or tribes,” was the major restriction on the freedom of speech and press; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 21, 23, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2011 - Iraq*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c84f71b.html>.

⁴³⁵ IWPR, *Iraqi Media Freedoms Under Threat*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db661c2c.html>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 21, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁴³⁶ According to RSF, media “(...) employees were exposed to the violence and hatred of groups opposed to those supporting the media”; RSF, *The Iraq War: A Heavy Toll for the Media*, August 2010, p. 7, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_iraq_2003-2010_gb.pdf.

⁴³⁷ For example, in July 2010, ISI had reportedly claimed responsibility for the bombing of the “corrupted” Al Arabiyya satellite TV channel, which killed six people and destroyed the Baghdad Bureau, stating on a website that the operation was reportedly aimed to hit the “mouthpieces of the wicked and evil.” The statement continued, “[W]e will not hesitate to hit any media office and chase its staffers if they insist on being a tool of war against almighty God and his Prophet”; AP, *Al Qaeda Group Claims Iraq TV Channel Bomb*, 29 July 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/29/world/main6723631.shtml>. It was reported that Al Arabiyya, which is considered as “pro-Western” by some, has repeatedly been targeted since 2003; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 33, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁴³⁸ The Iraqi Media Network, which includes Al-Iraqiya television and Al-Sabah newspaper, has reportedly suffered the highest death toll for any media organization. It was established and funded by the US Department of Defense before being transferred to the Iraqi authorities. Between 2003 and September 2010, 15 Iraqi Media Network staffers have reportedly been killed. For example, on 7 September 2010, Riad Al-Saray, an anchorman for Al-Iraqiya, was reportedly killed when gunmen opened fire on his car in western Baghdad. Al-Saray reportedly hosted religious-based programs promoting reconciliation between Shi’ites and Sunnis; CPJ, *Al-Iraqiya anchorman gunned down in Iraq*, 7 September 2010, <http://cpj.org/2010/09/al-iraqiya-anchorman-gunned-down-in-iraq.php>.

⁴³⁹ For example, on 27 November 2010, gunmen reportedly opened fire on the home of well-known TV presenter Nahed Najeeb in Kirkuk. Najeeb survived unharmed. According to RSF/JFO, there are indications that Najeeb was targeted on the basis of his Turkic ethnicity; RSF, *News Media Targeted By Al-Qaeda And Other Terror Groups*, 2 December 2010, http://en.rsf.org/iraq-news-media-targeted-by-al-qaeda-01-12-2010_38929.html.

⁴⁴⁰ For example, on 17 February 2011, journalist Hilal Al-Ahmadi was reportedly gunned down in Mosul as he was leaving home for work. Al-Ahmadi was a well-known freelance journalist whose work for several publications focused on corruption; UNESCO, *Director-General condemns killing of Iraqi journalist Hilal al-Ahmadi*, 10 March 2011, <http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php>.

[URL_ID=31285&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html](#); CPJ, *Journalist killed in Iraq by unidentified gunmen*, 17 February 2011, <http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/journalist-killed-in-iraq-by-unidentified-gunmen.php>.

⁴⁴¹ According to HRW, police routinely failed to thoroughly investigate attacks against journalists and perpetrators are rarely held accountable; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 32, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also RSF, *The Iraq War: A Heavy Toll for the Media*, August 2010, p. 8, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_iraq_2003-2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁴² CPJ's annual Impunity Index, first published in 2008, identifies countries where journalists are murdered regularly and governments fail to solve the crimes. For the 2011 index, CPJ examined unresolved journalist murders that occurred between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2010. Out of 92 recorded journalist killings, none were resolved by 31 December 2010; CPJ, *Getting Away With Murder*, 1 June 2011, <http://www.cpj.org/reports/2011/06/2011-impunity-index-getting-away-murder.php#more>. Also according to CPJ, Iraq was the reported to be the deadliest country in the world for journalists for six consecutive years, between 2003 and 2008 CPJ, *For Six Straight Year, Iraq Deadliest Nation for Press*, 18 December 2008, <http://cpj.org/reports/2008/12/for-sixth-straight-year-iraq-deadliest-nation-for.php>.

⁴⁴³ See for example, Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2011 - Iraq*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c84f71b.html>, Tara Conlan, *Pakistan and Iraq most dangerous countries for journalists*, The Guardian, 12 October 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/oct/12/pakistan-iraq-most-dangerous-journalists?newsfeed=true>.

⁴⁴⁴ Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF) placed Iraq as 152nd on its Press Freedom Index 2011/2012, down 22 places and “worryingly approaching its 2008 position 158th.”; RSF, *Press Freedom Index 2011/2012*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html>.

⁴⁴⁵ In most cases, 151 out of 174, the motives could be established. Most of those killed (62%) were reportedly murdered, while others died as a result of crossfire/combat. The vast majority (83%) of those murdered, were reportedly killed at the hands of “political groups”, the remainder were reportedly killed by criminal groups (2%) or government officials (2%). In 13 percent of the cases, the perpetrators remain unknown. CPJ also recorded that 41 percent of those murdered had reportedly received threats, 27 percent were reportedly abducted and 9 percent were reportedly tortured prior to the killing; CPJ, *151 Journalists Killed in Iraq since 1992/Motive Confirmed*, accessed 5 February 2012, <http://www.cpj.org/killed/mideast/iraq/>. RSF, based on data from 2003-2010, found similar results. It assessed that 68 percent of the journalists reportedly killed were deliberately targeted, in most cases by armed groups (88%); RSF, *The Iraq War: A Heavy Toll for the Media*, August 2010, p. 8, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_iraq_2003-2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁴⁶ According to CPJ, 61 percent of those killed since 2003 were reportedly working for the television (36% for the print media, 5% radio and 1% internet); CPJ, *151 Journalists Killed in Iraq since 1992/Motive Confirmed*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.cpj.org/killed/mideast/iraq/>; see also RSF, *The Iraq War: A Heavy Toll for the Media*, August 2010, p. 7, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_iraq_2003-2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁴⁷ IWPR, *Iraqi Media Freedoms Under Threat*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db661c2c.html>.

⁴⁴⁸ CPJ, *Journalist killed in Iraq by unidentified gunmen*, 17 February 2011, <http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/journalist-killed-in-iraq-by-unidentified-gunmen.php>.

⁴⁴⁹ According to reports, CPJ accounted for five journalists and one media worker killed in 2011. CPJ in 2011 recorded 66 attacks against journalists and media workers, including:

- 26 Detentions
- 10 Assaults
- 8 Equipment seizures or destruction
- 6 Killed (including one media worker)
- 6 Injured
- 5 Raids
- 2 Obstructions
- 3 Drive-by shootings.

CPJ, *Attacks on the Press in 2011*, 21 February 2012, <http://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2011-iraq.php>.

According to the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) six journalists were reportedly killed so far in 2011, making Iraq the second most dangerous country after Pakistan; Tara Conlan, *Pakistan and Iraq most dangerous countries for journalists*, The Guardian, 12 October 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/oct/12/pakistan-iraq-most-dangerous-journalists?newsfeed=true>. RSF accounted for seven journalists killed in 2011; RSF, *Well-Known Irreverent Journalist Shot Dead in his Home*, 8 September 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-well-known-irreverent-journalist-08-09-2011.40948.html>.

⁴⁵⁰ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 23 December 2011, an explosive charge, planted by unknown gunmen, blew off under the car of Nidal Hussein, a broadcaster with Baghdad TV, a satellite channel affiliated with the IIP, seriously wounding her and her daughter; Aswat al-Iraq, *Baghdad TV Channel's Announcer, her daughter, seriously injured*, 24 December 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146166&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146166&l=1).
- On 14 November 2011, gunmen in a car, using weapons with silencers, shot and wounded Omar Al-Dulaimi, the head of a journalists' association in Diyala Governorate, in central Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 14*, 14 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-14/>.
- On 16 September 2011, the home of journalist Faris Abbas Al-Samawi was attacked with gunfire in Hilla (Babel), resulting in the wounding of Al-Samawi's teenage daughter; Aswat al-Iraq, *Attack on journalist's house denounced*, 18 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144916&l=1.
- On 8 April 2011, gunmen shot dead Taha Hamad Jaafar, Director of the Al-Masar TV channel, and Abid Farhan, an official with a political prisoner advocacy group, in an attack on their vehicle in the town of Mahmudiyah (Babel). On 4 May 2011, the Iraqi authorities reported that three arrests had been made in connection with the killings. A video was shown to journalists in which the three men confessed to belonging to AQ; RSF, *Authorities Report Three Arrests in Al-Masar TV Chief's Fatal Shooting*, 5 May 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-tv-station-director-gunned-down-08-04-2011.39995.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 8*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-8/>.
- On 25 March 2011, gunmen planted several IEDs around the house of Majid Hameed, Al Arabiyya correspondent, in Al-Anbar, and detonated it, causing no casualties; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen blow up Arabiya channel correspondent's house in Anbar*, 25 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141628&l=1.

⁴⁵¹ According to HRW, “Government officials, political party figures, and militias may all be responsible for the violence, intended to silence some and intimidate the rest”; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 30, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁴⁵² For example, the following incidents were reported: On 19 August 2011, gunmen set fire to the building of the Holy Quran radio

- station in central Kirkuk, causing severe damage to the building; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: Unknown gunmen set fire to Holy Quran Radio Station in Kirkuk*, 20 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144387&l=1.
- On 26 July 2010, a suicide car bomber detonated his vehicle in front of the Al Arabiyya satellite TV station, killing six people and destroying the Baghdad bureau. ISI later claimed responsibility for the attack; AP, *Al Qaeda Group Claims Iraq TV Channel Bomb*, 29 July 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/29/world/main6723631.shtml>.
- ⁴⁵³ UNESCO, *UNESCO Country Programming Document for the Republic of Iraq*, 2011-2014, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002136/213680e.pdf>.
- ⁴⁵⁴ RSF reported that on 19 October 2011, unidentified gunmen reportedly fired on *Al-Iraqiya* TV reporter Abd Al-Hasan Al-Rukaabi as he was driving his car near the southern town of Nassariyah (Thi-Qar). Al-Rukaabi survived the attack with injuries to his neck; RSF, *Attacks and Acts of Intimidation Against Journalists*, 21 October 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-attacks-and-acts-of-intimidation-21-10-2011.41261.html>.
- ⁴⁵⁵ RSF reported that on 17 October 2011 ISF raided the home of Khalil Al-Alwani, a reporter with Al-Sharq, in Fallujah. According to Al-Alwani, the raid occurred without court order. He alleged that the aim of the raid was to arrest him in relation to articles he had written about the situation in Al-Anbar. The authorities reportedly denied any involvement in the raid; RSF, *Attacks and Acts of Intimidation Against Journalists*, 21 October 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-attacks-and-acts-of-intimidation-21-10-2011.41261.html>.
- ⁴⁵⁶ RSF reported that local authorities closed Al-Sada on the grounds that its programmes contained music “contrary to local morality”. The station had come under pressure since its establishment in the beginning of 2011, including pressure from the local governor not to launch the station, the duty to pay an annual tax and threats against the station’s staff; RSF, *New Wave of Abuses and Intimidation Against Journalists*, 29 October 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-new-wave-of-abuses-and-29-10-2011.41313.html>.
- ⁴⁵⁷ The Journalistic Freedoms Observatory recorded 372 violations and attacks against journalists and other media workers between May 2010 and May 2011, representing an increase of 55% compared to the previous year; JFO, *Journalists Face Humiliation in Tikrit*, 30 July 2011, <http://www.jfoiraq.org/newsdetails.aspx?back=1&id=824&page>. For example, on 28 July 2011, ISF reportedly detained *Salaheddeen* TV cameraman Haidar Abid Hassan in Tikrit, while he was covering a terrorist attack there. According to RSF, Hassan was forcibly taken to a military vehicle and subjected to beatings and psychological harassment in connection with his work as a journalist; RSF, *Alarming Statement And Constant Harassment Offer No Respite For Journalists*, published 4 August 2011, updated 22 August 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-alarming-statement-and-constant-04-08-2011.40750.html>. See also US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 23, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 2-3, pp. 37-44, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁴⁵⁸ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 38-39, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁴⁵⁹ For example, on 8 May 2011, ISF reportedly arrested Hussein Zaboon Muhsin Muhamadawwi, the editor of the Shi’ite newspaper *Iraquna*. RSF said on 24 June 2011, that the reasons for his arrest and his whereabouts were unknown; RSF, *Attacks on Journalists and Media in Iraq and Yemen, Two Bloggers Freed in Saudi Arabia*, published 1 June 2011, updated 24 June 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-attacks-on-journalists-and-media-01-06-2011.40389.html>. On 14 April 2010, the Baghdad Operations Command allegedly arrested Saad Al-Aossi, editor-in-chief of the weekly *Al-Shahed* newspaper. Al-Aossi was reportedly detained days after publishing an opinion piece that criticized Prime Minister Al-Maliki’s intransparent filling of high-level government positions. Al-Aossi was reportedly released 16 months later in August 2011; RSF/IFEX, *Editor released after 16 months in prison*, 18 August 2011, http://www.ifex.org/iraq/2011/08/18/alawsi_released/; Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2011 - Iraq*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c84f71b.html>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 22, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; CPJ, *2010 prison census – 145 journalists jailed worldwide*, 1 December 2010, <http://www.cpj.org/imprisoned/2010.php>.
- ⁴⁶⁰ For example, the following incidents were reported:
- On 22 May 2011, ISF stormed the headquarters of local radio station *Sawat Al-Nahda Al-Democratiya* after it aired a programme about the housing crisis and other social issues. The station’s recording and transmitting equipment was seized; RSF, *Attacks on Journalists and Media in Iraq and Yemen, Two Bloggers Freed in Saudi Arabia*, published 1 June 2011, updated 24 June 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-attacks-on-journalists-and-media-01-06-2011.40389.html>.
 - On 23 February 2011, more than 20 ISF members raided the office of the prominent Iraqi press freedom group, Journalistic Freedoms Observatory (JFO), in Baghdad. They extensively damaged the office and seized equipment and documents. In the days before, the JFO had reportedly expressed support for the right of Iraqis to protest peacefully and the media’s right to report on the protests. HRW, *Iraq: Security Forces Raid Press Freedom Group*, 26 February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/26/iraq-security-forces-raid-press-freedom-group>. The same day, the Baghdad headquarters of Nina news agency and the offices of the Baghdad Media Centre were reportedly raided by ISF; RSF, *Authorities Prohibit Live Satellite TV Coverage of Tomorrow’s Big Demonstration*, 23 February 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-authorities-prohibit-live-24-02-2011.39626.html>.
- ⁴⁶¹ HRW, *Iraq: Intensifying Crackdown on Free Speech, Protests*, 22 January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/22/iraq-intensifying-crackdown-free-speech-protests>. For example, the following incidents were reported:
- On 22 July 2011, photographer Saad Allah Al-Khaledi, who was covering a demonstration in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square, was detained by ISF. He was reportedly forced into a car, beaten and subjected to threats with a gun held against his head. He reported that at some point, when he was blindfolded and his hands tied, he heard one of his captors saying: “Move away from him so that you don’t get blood on you when I shoot him in the head;” RSF, *Alarming Statement And Constant Harassment Offer No Respite For Journalists*, published 4 August 2011, updated 22 August 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-alarming-statement-and-constant-04-08-2011.40750.html>. See also RSF, *Overview of Media Freedom Violations of Past Few Days*, 8 March 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/maghreb-et-moyen-orient-overview-of-media-freedom-08-03-2011.39693.html>.
 - On 25 May 2011, reporters and cameramen from local and international satellite TV stations were beaten and detained and had their equipment destroyed or confiscated by ISF while covering a demonstration in central Baghdad’s Tahrir Square; RSF, *Attacks on Journalists and Media in Iraq and Yemen, Two Bloggers Freed in Saudi Arabia*, published 1 June 2011, updated 24 June 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-attacks-on-journalists-and-media-01-06-2011.40389.html>.
 - On 8 May 2011, several journalists were physically attacked and briefly detained while covering a demonstration to demand the departure of US troops in Ramadi; RSF, *Attacks on Journalists and Media in Iraq and Yemen, Two Bloggers Freed in Saudi Arabia*, published 1 June 2011, updated 24 June 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-attacks-on-journalists-and-media-01-06-2011.40389.html>.
 - On 25 February 2011, Hadi Al-Mahdi and three other journalists were detained by at least 15 soldiers after they had attended a pro-reform demonstration in Tahrir Square. The four journalists were detained overnight for interrogation at the headquarters of the army’s 11th division, where Al-Mahdi was reportedly beaten, given electric shocks and threatened with rape, before being released without charge. On 8 September 2011, Hadi Al-Mahdi, a prominent radio journalist with Radio Demozy and an outspoken political critic, was shot twice in the head in his flat in the Karrada district of Baghdad, ahead of a planned protest he was due to attend in the Baghdad’s Tahrir Square the next day. Al-Mahdi was said to have feared for his life after receiving a string of threats in recent weeks, during which

he had been attending weekly pro-reform protests. The MoI committed to investigate the killing however, by the end of January 2012, no one had been charged; AFP, *Iraq's protest movement: despondent and divided*, 31 January 2012, <http://www.brecorder.com/world/middle-east/44279-iraqs-protest-movement-despondent-and-divided.html>; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; Amnesty International, *Outspoken Iraqi Radio Journalist Shot Dead at Home*, 9 September 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/outspoken-iraqi-radio-journalist-shot-dead-home-2011-09-09>.

See also "Protestors".

⁴⁶² Reportedly, government and party officials filed 55 lawsuits in Iraq from January to October 2010, up from 35 in 2009; according to Hashim Al-Mosawi, legal counsel at the Iraqi Journalist Rights Defense Association, quoted in HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 43, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁴⁶³ According to HRW, "[T]he government has become more effective at clamping down on negative scrutiny by using the country's broad criminal and civil libel laws to silence those who criticize members of the government"; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 42, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also CPJ, *Attacks on the Press 2010 - Iraq*, 15 February 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d5b95cec.html>. For example, CoR speaker Osama Al-Nujaifi had reportedly demanded a formal apology and 150 million dinars in damages from daily *Al-Mada* editor Fakhri Karim and reporters Daoud Al-Ali and Ali Hussein for articles criticizing the quotas applied in the selection of parliamentarians, political bargaining over posts and the shortcomings of a law reducing parliamentarians' salaries; RSF, *Attacks on Journalists and Media in Iraq and Yemen, Two Bloggers Freed in Saudi Arabia*, published 1 June 2011, updated 24 June 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/saudi-arabia-attacks-on-journalists-and-media-01-06-2011.40389.html>. For further examples, see RSF, *Lawsuits And Violence By Security Forces Become Daily Events For Iraqi Journalists*, 13 July 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-lawsuits-and-violence-by-security-13-07-2011.40634.html>.

⁴⁶⁴ See for example, RSF, *Court throws out sports ministry's libel suit*, 4 November 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cd91d81c.html>.

⁴⁶⁵ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 23, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁶ RSF, *Press Freedom Index, Iraq*, 2010, <http://en.rsf.org/report-iraq.152.html>. The Press Freedom Index is compiled from questionnaires including questions about every kind of violation directly affecting journalists such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats and news media, such as censorship, confiscation of newspaper issues, etc.

⁴⁶⁷ Mu'aid Al-Lami, head of the Iraqi Journalists' Syndicate, which represents 12,000 journalists and survivor of two assassination attempts, had reportedly told HRW that before 2008, "killing was the preferred method of silencing journalists in Iraq. Today it's with lawsuits"; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 34, 43, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also Saman Dazzayi, *Journalist safety most threatened by Iraqi security forces*, AKnews 4 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276149/>; IWPR, *Iraqi Media Complain of Tightening Curbs*, 10 December 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d071ce01a.html>. In July 2010, the Court of Publication and Media was established in Baghdad to adjudicate civil and criminal media offenses such as defamation. Some rights groups had reportedly expressed concern that the court may further negatively impact on the freedom of press; however, the court has dismissed at least two lawsuits to date. In September 2010, the court heard its first defamation lawsuit filed by the Ministry of Sports and Youth against *Al-Alam* newspaper and its editor Ziyad Al-Ajili, who also heads the Journalistic Freedom Observatory, after it reported about alleged mismanagement and corruption in relation to an Olympic city project built in Basrah. The ministry claimed damages of 1 billion Iraqi Dinars. In October 2010, the court ruled in favor of the newspaper, reportedly saying that the article did not defame the ministry and satisfied the right to information about a subject of general interest; IWPR, *Iraqi Media Complain of Tightening Curbs*, 10 December 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d071ce01a.html>; RSF, *Court Throws Out Sports Ministry's Libel Suit*, published on 4 November 2010, updated on 5 November 2010, <http://en.rsf.org/irak-libel-suit-against-head-of-partner-20-10-2010.38623.html>. Another lawsuit was reportedly filed by the Hajj Commission against journalist Majed Kaabi, who in an article published in the "Bi'aa" newspaper on 9 June 2011 accusing the commission of not doing its job properly; the lawsuit was also rejected by the court; RFE/RL, *Iraqi court dismisses case against journalist*, 7 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e9ea791c.html>.

⁴⁶⁸ The law, which took effect in November 2011, is available in Arabic at: http://www.parliament.iq/Iraqi_Council_of_Representatives.php?name=articles_ajsdyawqwqjjasdba46s7a98dasdasda7das4da6sd8asdsawe_wqeqw465e4qwq4wq6e4qw8eqwe4qw6eqwe4sadjk&file=showdetails&sid=5241.

⁴⁶⁹ According to Mohamed Abdel Dayem, CPJ's Middle East and North Africa program coordinator, "[T]he Journalist Protection Law evidently fails to protect journalists. What the government has done is pile one badly written law on top of at least two older, restrictive laws (i.e. the 1969 Penal Code and the 1968 Law of Publications). The result is a legal nightmare for journalists"; CPJ, *Iraq's journalist protection law doesn't protect them*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/iraqs-journalist-protection-law-doesnt-protect-the.php>. RSF said that it regards the new law as "pointless at best and dangerous at worst." For a full discussion of the law, see RSF, *New Law Fails To Protect Journalists, Creates New Problems*, published 6 September 2011, updated 7 September 2011, <http://en.rsf.org/iraq-new-law-fails-to-protect-06-09-2011.40930.html>. Article 19 said that the law falls below international human rights standards on freedom of expression and the right to information; Article 19, *Iraq: Law on journalists' protection fails to protect rights*, 14 September 2011, <http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2734/en/iraq-law-on-journalists-protection-fails-to-protect-rights>.

⁴⁷⁰ On 23 January 2012, the Society for Defending Press Freedom in Iraq reportedly challenged the law and called for its repeal in court. The group's president, Oday Hatem, had reportedly told CPJ that the law's main problem was that it could be used by the Iraqi authorities to restrict media freedoms; CPJ, *Iraq's journalist protection law doesn't protect them*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/iraqs-journalist-protection-law-doesnt-protect-the.php>.

⁴⁷¹ In January 2012, Ali al-Fayad, a reporter for the daily *Al-Zaman* in Wassit Governorate was reportedly released after being detained for five days without a judicial warrant, an action that the new law allegedly prevents under Article 10. The journalist was told that he was detained for writing about the termination of police officers' jobs in Wassit; CPJ, *Iraq's journalist protection law doesn't protect them*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.cpj.org/2012/01/iraqs-journalist-protection-law-doesnt-protect-the.php>.

⁴⁷² According to RSF, there are a reported 850 media outlets, including 415 print media, officially registered in the Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Journalists Syndicate has reportedly registered 5,000 journalists; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, pp. 2, 7, http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁷³ Actually, some media have "become involved as political actors, which has led to difficulties differentiating political groups from the media (...)." RSF differentiates between four groups of media organizations in the Kurdistan Region:

1. Media groups directly affiliated with the ruling political parties (for example KDP's daily *Khabat*, the *Gali Kurdistan Channel*, controlled by the PUK);
2. Media groups indirectly affiliated with the ruling political parties, also known as "shadow media" (for example, the newspaper *Rudaw* and *Civil Magazine*, which are funded primarily by the KDP, and the newspaper *Aso* funded by the PUK);
3. Media groups directly affiliated with opposition political parties (for example, *Speda* satellite channel, which belongs to KIU, the

satellite news channel KNN, affiliated with Goran, and the KIG's weekly, *Komal*);

- Media groups which claim to be independent (for example *Hawlati*, *Awene*, *Lvin* and smaller publications such as the *Standard* and *Chatr Press*).

RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, pp. 8-9, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf. See also AKnews, *Iraq's Kurdistan Govt moves to shut down unlicensed media outlets and blocking unlicensed websites*, 15 May 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/5/state5091.htm>.

⁴⁷⁴ The law only covers print media; Kurdistan Region Presidency, *Press Law in the Kurdistan Region*, Law No. 35, 2007, <http://www.krp.org/docs/presslaw-KRI.pdf>. According to RSF, the law constitutes a significant improvement of press freedom in the Kurdistan Region, but also contains some flaws, including the vague formulation of press offences, leaving room for interpretation and arbitrariness, as well as the exorbitant fines foreseen in the case of press offences (for example, Article 9, para 1, of Chapter V stipulates that a journalist who has written an incriminating article, and his/her chief editor, can be punished by fines ranging from 1 to 5 million Iraqi Dinars – considering the average salary of a journalist, this provision can result in self-censorship; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, p. 10, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁷⁵ According to RSF, party-affiliated news outlets are rarely prosecuted; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, pp. 10, 16, 17, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>. See also “*Journalists and Media Professionals - Central and Southern Iraq*”.

⁴⁷⁶ For example, on 17 May 2011, the KDP had reportedly brought a defamation lawsuit against the *Lvin* editor-in-chief, Ahmed Mira, for publishing an article about an alleged plot by the KDP and the PUK to assassinate opposition leaders. According to court documents obtained by HRW, the KDP is seeking total damages of one billion dinars (US\$ 864,000) and an order to shut down the magazine by revoking its license. Earlier in May 2011, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the PUK leader, filed his own lawsuit over the same article, resulting in the temporary detention of Ahmed Mira and a *Lvin* reporter; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>.

⁴⁷⁷ According to Sarah Leah Whitson, HRW's Middle East Director, “[S]uch libel suits by Kurdistan government officials are nothing more than a thinly-veiled effort to punish critics and create an atmosphere of fear and self-censorship”; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>.

⁴⁷⁸ RSF points out that the notorious “red lines” can vary, depending on the location and the media outlet's political affiliation. However, commonly religion, sex, tribal leaders and key political figures (e.g. Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani), corruption, neighbouring countries (in particular Iran) and the unresolved status of Kirkuk are identified as “red lines” or taboos; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, pp. 12-13, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁷⁹ For example, on 24 April 2011, Sheikh Jaffar Mustafa, Minister of Peshmerga, reportedly made a death threat against Ahmed Mira, *Lvin*'s editor-in-chief, in a (taped) telephone conversation. Even though Mira reported the threat to the KRG Prime Minister, reportedly no investigation was initiated, which prompted Mira to publish an article about the threat on 7 May 2011; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>. A journalist, who has written articles critical of the KRG and received several anonymous threats told HRW in late April 2011, “[M]any of my Facebook friends told me that security forces called and threatened them, saying they had better take me off their Facebook 'friend list,' and many of them have”; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>. RSF reported that many journalists, most of whom work for independent party newspapers, complained about receiving frequent anonymous death threats targeting them personally or those close to them. Threats are often reported to be received following the publication of an article and are made by mobile phone text messages, e-mail, fax, etc.; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, p. 17, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁸⁰ For example, on 11 May 2011, security forces in plain clothes reportedly detained and beat a Kurdistan News Network (KNN) reporter, Bryar Namiq, breaking his hand, when he went to the Parliament office in Sulaymaniyah to cover a shooting incident there. He was reportedly put in the back of a car and dumped in a different part of the city; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>.

⁴⁸¹ The Metro Center to Defend Journalists, a local press freedom group, said that it recorded 359 attacks on and violations of press freedom by the KRG's security forces in 2011. Attacks on journalists reportedly included “four bullet injuries, torching of four media offices, eight beatings, 57 threats, 52 cases of journalists' equipment being confiscated, 81 cases of blocking journalists from doing their job, and one instance of targeting a journalist with a bomb.” Furthermore, Metro Center documented raids on journalists' homes and nine cases of shooting at journalists. The organization said that no one had been prosecuted in relation to these attacks and violations; over 350 attacks on journalists in 2011, and no one has been caught; Idris ABubakir, *Over 350 attacks on journalists in 2011, and no one has been caught*, AKnews, 15 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/284387/>. Based on HRW interviews with over 20 journalists in the Kurdistan Region, the organisation concluded that security forces repress journalists through threats, arbitrary arrests, beatings, and harassment, and by confiscating and destroying their equipment. HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prominent Kurdish Journalist Assaulted*, 30 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-kurdistan-prominent-kurdish-journalist-assaulted/>. See also CPJ, *In Iraqi Kurdistan, riots lead to press freedom abuses*, 6 December 2011, <http://cpj.org/2011/12/in-iraqi-kurdistan-riots-lead-to-press-freedom-abu.php>; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, p. 18, http://en.rsfor.org/IMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁸² Harassment of journalists reportedly reached a peak at the time of the March 2010 CoR elections, allegedly due to the KRG's fear of support for the opposition Goran Movement. Examples reported by RSF included:

- Kawa Garmiyani, a reporter with *Awene* newspaper in the town of Kalar (Sulaymaniyah), was beaten by security forces and prevented from taking photos.
- In Halabja (Sulaymaniyah), security forces attacked a reporter for the Kurdistan News Network (KNN), a satellite television channel affiliated with Goran, while he was filming PUK polling violations.
- Independent and opposition journalists were prevented from entering voting stations or taking photos of them although the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) said all journalists had the right to do so.
- Residents helped Rabar Uzer, a reporter for the KIU website to escape when PUK security forces tried to confiscate his camera and beat him in the city of Sulaymaniyah.
- Akar Fars and Rzgar Muhsin, two journalists working for Yekgirtu's TV station in Erbil, were attacked and badly beaten by security forces, who took their camera, defaced the station's logo and detained them for 20 minutes.
- Ibrahim Ali, *Lvin*'s correspondent in Erbil, was prevented from taking photos although he had a press ID that had been approved by the IHEC.

- Hemn Mamand, Awene's reporter in Erbil, received a threatening phone call from an unidentified phone number. Shwan Sidiq, a reporter for the magazine Civil, was attacked by police in Erbil. "While I was busy taking photos, security forces accosted me, roughed me up and took my camera," he told RSF.
- Journalists working for Speda TV in Bazyan (a district of Kalar) were attacked by PUK security forces.
- Security forces harassed journalists accompanying Salahadin Bahadin, the head of Yekgirtu, when he went to vote.
- Rudaw's reporter Ari Othman was attacked and injured in Erbil by a group of men in civilian dress.
- Anwar Sabah, a reporter for the satellite TV station Payam, was prevented from filming election-day incidents in Erbil.

RSF, *Legislative elections become nightmare for independent and opposition journalists*, 9 March 2010, <http://www.rsf.org/Legislative-elections-become.html>. Also, during regional elections on 25 July 2009, an increase in threats against journalists was reported; RSF, *Between Freedom And Abuses: The Media Paradox In Iraqi Kurdistan*, November 2010, p. 17, http://en.rsf.org/TMG/pdf/rsf_rapport_kurdistan_irakien_nov_2010_gb.pdf.

⁴⁸³ On 17 February 2012, *Asayish* reportedly arrested two journalists that planned to cover anticipated protests on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of popular protests in Sulaymaniyah; Dilshad Saifaddin, *Two journalists arrested in Sulaimaniya*, AKnews, 17 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/290516/>. The Metro Center to Defend Journalists, a local press freedom group, documented more than 200 cases of attacks and harassment of Kurdish journalists between February and May 2011, and RSF tallied 44 physical attacks against media workers and outlets and 23 arrests; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prominent Kurdish Journalist Assaulted*, 30 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-kurdistan-prominent-kurdish-journalist-assaulted/>. For example, recent reported incidents included:

- On 6 March 2011, about 10 gunmen stormed the office of the privately owned *Radio Dang* in Kalar (Sulaymaniyah). They handcuffed the night guard of the building, broke most of the broadcasting equipment and confiscated other items. The radio station has been broadcasting programmes encouraging people to demonstrate and calling for political reforms in the Kurdistan Region; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prevent Attacks on Protesters*, 7 March 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/iraqi-kurdistan-prevent-attacks-protesters>; Shamal Aqrawi, *Gunmen storm Iraqi radio station, halt broadcasts*, Reuters, 6 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-storm-iraqi-radio-station-halt-broadcasts/>.
- On 20 February 2011, dozens of armed men attacked the private *Nalia Radio and Television* (NRT) in Sulaymaniyah, shooting up broadcasting equipment, wounding a guard and burning down the building. NRT, which broadcast footage of the protests, had begun its broadcast only two days earlier. According to Twana Othman, a manager at Nalia TV, the attackers were wearing military uniforms but disguised their faces; CPJ, *Reporter missing in Libya; attacks continue in Yemen, Iraq*, 22 February 2011, <http://cpj.org/2011/02/libyan-journalist-missing-media-attacked-in-libya.php>.
- On 17 February 2011, *Hawlati*, an independent bi-weekly newspaper, evacuated its offices after receiving threats from uniformed security forces stationed at a nearby KDP office. Tariq Fattah, the director of *Hawlati*, told CPJ, that "[T]he guards of the KDP were shouting at the door of the paper that we are traitors and that we are standing behind and leading the demonstrations;" CPJ, *Reporter missing in Libya; attacks continue in Yemen, Iraq*, 22 February 2011, <http://cpj.org/2011/02/libyan-journalist-missing-media-attacked-in-libya.php>; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prevent Attacks on Protesters*, 7 March 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/iraqi-kurdistan-prevent-attacks-protesters>.

The threat of attacks and arrests has sent some journalists into hiding. For example, Soran Umar, a protest organizer and freelance journalist, has reportedly been in hiding since 19 April 2011 as a result of an alleged kidnapping attempt. A freelance photojournalist, Zmnako Ismail, who actively covered the Sulaymaniyah protests, is also reported to be in hiding. He says that he is at risk of arrest and abuse. His Facebook account has reportedly been hacked; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>.

⁴⁸⁴ Metro Center to Defend Journalists reported in August 2011 that bodyguards of KRG President Massoud Barzani attacked journalists during his visit to border areas after renewed bombardment. Reportedly, they confiscated the journalists' cameras and erased all pictures; Aswat al-Iraq, *Metro Center charges Massoud Barzani's bodyguards of atrocities*, 27 August 2011, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(33prckbxail5ygf5sz0hxlaf\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144510](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(33prckbxail5ygf5sz0hxlaf))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144510).

⁴⁸⁵ In early December 2011, Kurdish mobs, allegedly linked to the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and instigated by a Friday prayers' sermon, reportedly attacked mainly Christian and Yazidi businesses across Dahuk Governorate. In what appeared to be retaliatory acts, KDP supporters reportedly attacked KIU party offices and party-affiliated media premises; see "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities" and "Christians, including converts".

⁴⁸⁶ RSF had reportedly condemned "a wave of media freedom violations in Iraqi Kurdistan during December, especially a series of arrests of journalists that were carried out in a completely illegal manner." By 3 January 2012, RSF said that five media premises had been torched, ransacked or otherwise targeted (including the KIU-affiliated satellite TV station Speda, Xabir TV and Xabir Radio, and the news website Kurdiu); twelve journalists were reported to be illegally arrested or jailed (Xabir TV/Radio and Speda); and more than 15 physical attacks on journalists were reported (Speda TV, KNN, NRT, Al Jazeera, Xandanm and Somar News); RSF, *Black December For Media Freedom In Iraqi Kurdistan*, 3 January 2012, http://en.rsf.org/iraq-black-december-for-media-freedom-03-01-2012_41621.html. According to the Metro Center to Defend Journalists, six media offices belonging to the opposition party KIU were torched, six journalists arrested and another 16 journalists subjected to assaults within 48 hours of the outbreak of the riots on 2 December 2011; AKnews, *Press freedom first victim of political unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 4 December 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276081/?tpl=print.tpl>. See also CPJ, *In Iraqi Kurdistan, riots lead to press freedom abuses*, 6 December 2011, <http://cpj.org/2011/12/in-iraqi-kurdistan-riots-lead-to-press-freedom-abu.php> and "Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities".

⁴⁸⁷ According to Metro Center, "[I]n all political crises, without any legal justification, security forces arrest journalists and confiscate or break their equipment"; AKnews, *Press freedom first victim of political unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 4 December 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276081/?tpl=print.tpl>.

⁴⁸⁸ For example, on 29 August 2011, Asos Hardi, the director of the Awene Press and Publishing Company, which publishes the independent newspaper *Awene* in Iraqi Kurdistan, and a member of HRW's Middle East and North Africa advisory committee, was reportedly attacked as he was leaving his office. He was knocked to the ground with a blow to the back of his head with a pistol and severely beaten. Hardi was hospitalized and received 32 stitches for six wounds to his head. Hardi believes that he was targeted for his journalistic work and raised doubts over the KRG authorities' claim to investigate the attack. HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prominent Kurdish Journalist Assaulted*, 30 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-kurdistan-prominent-kurdish-journalist-assaulted/>. In late April 2011, two journalists, afraid to be named for fear of reprisal, had reportedly told HRW that eight men in civilian clothes chased after them in Erbil. The men appeared in two vehicles on the street just before the journalists were supposed to meet with a regional official who had asked for a meeting with some members of the media. The journalists believe that the men were plainclothes security forces who were aware of the meeting and were trying to kidnap them. HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media> On 4 May 2010, Sardasht Osman, a freelance journalist

for several news outlets, was reportedly abducted in Erbil by unidentified gunmen. His body was found two days later in Mosul. He was reported to have received anonymous threats because of articles criticizing senior Kurdish political leaders and raising allegations of corruption. Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2011 - Iraq*, 23 September 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e7c8471b.html>.

⁴⁸⁹ Idris ABubakir, *Over 350 attacks on journalists in 2011, and on one has been caught*, AKnews, 15 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/284387/>. In the well-known case of Sardasht Osman, whose body was found in Mosul a few days after his abduction by unidentified gunmen, a KRG-appointed investigative committee reported in September 2010 that Osman had been killed by Ansar Al-Islam. The latter reportedly denied responsibility for the killing. Osman's family rejected the investigative committee's findings and rights organizations have reportedly harshly criticized the investigation as not transparent. According to CPJ, "[T]he investigation of his murder is emblematic of the deeply entrenched culture of impunity in Iraq. Authorities took no discernible action in the case until they faced intense international pressure. Then, investigators produced a cursory, 430-word report that vaguely accused Osman of having links to an extremist group that led to his killing. The report, which cited no supporting evidence for its claims, was widely denounced for lacking credibility and transparency"; CPJ, *Getting Away With Murder*, 1 June 2011, <http://cpj.org/reports/2011/06/2011-impunity-index-getting-away-murder.php#more>. According to HRW, the KRG authorities have not yet taken sufficient steps to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the killing of Sardasht Osman; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Growing Effort to Silence Media*, 24 May 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/24/iraqi-kurdistan-growing-effort-silence-media>. And RSF said "[W]e question the Kurdistan regional government's determination to shed light on this murder and condemn the lack of transparency surrounding its investigation"; RSF, *Tribute To Sardasht Osman*, 4 May 2011, http://en.rsf.org/iraq-tribute-to-sardasht-osman-04-05-2011_40220.html.

⁴⁹⁰ CPJ, *Getting Away With Murder*, 1 June 2011, <http://cpj.org/reports/2011/06/2011-impunity-index-getting-away-murder.php#more>; RSF, *Tribute To Sardasht Osman*, 4 May 2011, http://en.rsf.org/iraq-tribute-to-sardasht-osman-04-05-2011_40220.html; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Prominent Kurdish Journalist Assaulted*, 30 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-kurdistan-prominent-kurdish-journalist-assaulted/>.

⁴⁹¹ BRusselsTribunal recorded 467 academics killed in Iraq between 2003 and January 2012; BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, updated 20 January 2012, <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Academics.htm>; Iraq Solidaridad accounted for 315 University academics assassinated between 2003 and 2 May 2011 (note: this figure does not include teachers, school directors or students); Iraq Solidaridad, *List of Iraqi academics assassinated in Iraq during the US-led occupation*, updated 2 May 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 9, http://www.iraqsolidaridad.org/2011/docs/Lista_profesores_ENGLISH_02_MAY_2011.pdf. The Iraq Ministry of Education accounted for 31,598 violent attacks against educational institutions between March 2003 and October 2008. It was further reported that in this timeframe, 259 academics were assassinated, 72 were abducted and 174 were detained. The Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights accounted for 340 university professors and 446 students killed by insurgents and militias between 2005 and 2007; UNESCO, *Education under Attack 2010 - Iraq*, 10 February 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7aa9df5.html>.

⁴⁹² BrusselsTribunal recorded more than 110 (in 2006) and more than 60 (in 2007) assassinations of academics. Since 2008, there was a clear drop in the occurrence of such killings and in 2009, BRusselsTribunal accounted for 10 assassinations. However, in 2010, BRusselsTribunal recorded 17 killings and in 2011, 15 killings. Furthermore, there were a number of attempted killings (see below examples); BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, updated 20 January 2012, <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Academics.htm>.

⁴⁹³ On 9 April 2011, an IED, stuck to the car of a teacher's car, reportedly blew off in Fallujah, killing him on the spot and wounding two policemen; Aswat al-Iraq, *Teacher killed, 2 policemen injured in Falluja IED blast*, 9 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141877&l=1. On 4 February 2011, gunmen reportedly stormed the house of Professor Khamis Daham, specialized in Islamic Science, in Al-Bu Hawaa region in southern Fallujah and opened fire on the family inside, injuring two of his sons. The gunmen then reportedly blew up the house; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen wound 2 brothers, detonate 2 houses in Falluja*, 4 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140835&l=1.

⁴⁹⁴ On 27 February 2012, gunmen reportedly attacked a University of Dijlah professor's home in Musayyab, injuring two; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 27 February 2012.

⁴⁹⁵ Reported incidents in Baghdad in 2011 included:

- On 21 December 2011, gunmen killed Firas yawoz Abdul Qadir Awchi, scientific assistance dean at the Law Faculty at Al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, when he was leaving to his office; BRussels Tribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, updated 20 January 2012, <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Academics.htm>.
- On 23 August 2011, gunmen using firearms with silencers shot dead Baghdad University Professor Dr. Hussein Kadhim and wounded his son in front of the professor's house in the Adil district of western Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
- On 29 May 2011, Professor Dr. Hazem Shammari, a political analyst and university lecturer at the college of political science, was seriously wounded by a bomb attached to his car in western Baghdad; NINA, *University Prof, lieutenant police injured in Baghdad*, 30 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGKILE; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 29*, 29 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-29/>.
- On 29 March 2011, Dr. Mohammad Hussein Al-Alwan, the Dean of Mustansiriya University's Dentistry College, was killed when a bomb attached to his car went off in Baghdad's west-central Mansour district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Faculty of Dentistry dean killed in Baghdad*, 29 March 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141702&l=1.
- On 26 March 2011, a bomb attached to the car of Zaid Abdulmonem Ali, professor at the Baghdad Cancer Research Center, killed him and wounded three others, including his wife, when it went off in Al-Nisour Square in central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 26*, 26 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Univ. professor killed, 3 civilians wounded near Baghdad*, 26 March 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141638&l=1.
- On 26 February 2011, gunmen using firearms with silencers killed Saad Abduljabbar, a professor in the Technological University in Baghdad, while he was driving his car in the south-west district of Saidiya; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 26*, 26 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *University professor shot dead near Baghdad*, 26 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141204&l=1.
- On 17 February 2011, gunmen broke into the house of Professor Ali Abdul-Hussein Al-Saedy (Ali Shalash), a professor in the Veterinary College of Baghdad University, in northwest Baghdad's Al-Khadraa district and hanged him inside his house; Aswat al-Iraq, *Professor in Baghdad University, hanged by extremists in his house*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141029&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 17*, 17 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-17/>.
- On 11 January 2011, a bomb planted near the house of Dr. Talib Jalil, an instructor in the Institute of Technologies, wounded him as he was leaving his home in the western Ghazaliyah district; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, January 11*, 11 January 2011,

<http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-11/>; NINA, *University instructor injured in western Baghdad*, 11 January 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFDFJF.

⁴⁹⁶ Reported incidents in Diyala included:

- On 10 February 2012, gunmen shot dead a teacher in front of his house in Khan Bani Saad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 11*, 11 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-11/>.
- On 11 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a school teacher wounded him in the town of Muqdadiya; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
- On 4 June 2011, gunmen opened fire at Dr. Isma'el Khalil Al-Mahdawi, an instructor at the Asma'e College of the University of Diyala, when he was on his way backhome in western Ba'quba, seriously wounding him; NINA, *University instructor wounded in Diyala*, 4 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGLEMI.
- On 17 April 2011, a teacher was wounded in Abu Saida District, when an IED detonated inside his car as he was driving along a rural road in the area; NINA, *Teacher wounded, 4 wanted in Diyala arrested*, 17 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFFKL.
- On 1 May 2011, Mohammed Sabah, a teacher, was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Ba'quba; Xinhua, *Civilian killed, 7 injured in Iraq bomb attacks*, 1 May 2011, <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/1869423.html>.

⁴⁹⁷ Reported incidents in Ninewa in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 13 March 2012, gunmen shot dead Abdulah Ahmed al-Hamdani, a university academic, and his sister, a final year student at Mosul University's College of Dentistry, in the Al-Hadba area in Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Mosul gunmen kill academic and his sister*, AKnews, 13 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295739/>.
- On 7 December 2011, Mosul university instructor Ali Saraj was killed near his house in Nur neighborhood, eastern Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Double murder in Mosul*, AKnews, 7 December 2011, <http://static.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276789/>.
- On 20 November 2011, gunmen killed a university instructor and wounded his brother in an assault in Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Gunmen kill university instructor in Mosul*, AKnews, 20 November 2011, <http://new.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/273550/>. On 3 October 2011, Ibrahim Mohammed Al-Qassab, a professor in the Education College at Mosul University, was shot dead in his home in Al-Jami'a, Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot dead univ. professor in Mosul*, 3 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141889&l=1.
- On 10 September 2011, Hamad Majeed Sadeq, a secondary school teacher, was shot dead near his home in Maamoun, south Mosul; AKnews, *Assassination of lecturers continues in Mosul*, 10 September 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/261187/>.
- On 9 April 2011, gunmen killed Yasser Ahmed Sheet, the Assistant Dean of Mosul University's College of Fine Arts, in front of his home in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 9*, 9 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-9/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot dead university professor in Mosul*, 9 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141889&l=1.
- On 8 March 2011, gunmen using firearms with silencers killed Amer Selmi, a university professor, near his house in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 8*, 8 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-8/>; BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 21, <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/pdf/academicsBT151108.pdf>.
- ⁴⁹⁸ In 2011 and 2012, the following incidents were amongst others reported in Kirkuk: On 12 March 2012, school teacher Mahmood Khidir Abdullah was killed when a bomb attached to his car exploded in Kirkuk city's popular market place; Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councilor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a teacher's car exploded, wounding him and two other passengers in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 13*, 13 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-13/>.
- On 8 January 2012, a bomb wounded a Kirkuk University employee and his wife when it exploded near their house in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>.
- On 4 November 2011, gunmen in military attire kidnapped two Kirkuk university professors, Musa Mustafa, the Dean of Imam Al Sadeq College, and Dr. Sami Ridha, a professor in the Technology College, in the Wasiti neighborhood of western Kirkuk. In addition, ISF defused a sticky bomb attached to a teacher's car, 40 km west of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 university professors kidnapped in Kirkuk*, 5 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145516&l=1; NINA, *Gunmen in military uniforms kidnap two college professors in Kirkuk*; 5 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILFDE. On 6 December 2011, Musa Mustafa, the Dean of Imam al Sadeq College was reportedly released from captivity after the payment of US \$800,000. Allegedly, AQI was behind the kidnapping; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kidnapped academic released for US\$800,000 in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276621/>.
- On 31 May 2011, gunmen kidnapped a female teacher in Benjeh-Ali area, southeastern Kirkuk; NINA, *Female teacher kidnapped, woman killed in Kirkuk*, 31 May 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGKKLE.
- On 6 March 2011, Aiad Ibrahim Mohamed Al-Jebory, a neurosurgeon specialist at the College of Medicine in Tikrit University, was picked up with his brother during a military raid on his village in Hawija (Kirkuk). His body was delivered the following day to Tikrit Hospital. His brother's fate is unknown; Iraq Solidaridad, *List of Iraqi academics assassinated in Iraq during the US-led occupation*, updated 2 May 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 15, http://www.iraqsolidaridad.org/2011/docs/Lista_profesores_ENGLISH_02_MAY_2011.pdf.
- ⁴⁹⁹ On 23 October 2011, gunmen reportedly opened fire on a teacher, Ismail Al-Wadi, and his daughter, close to their house east of Tikrit, killing them on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Teacher, his daughter, killed in Tikrit attack*, 23 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145372&l=1. On 11 June 2011, gunmen reportedly stormed the house of Yunis Hassan Salman, a teacher, killing him and four members of his family near Al-Dour town; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-11/>; <http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=19099&title=Violence>.

⁵⁰⁰ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 14 October 2010, Saad Abd Al-Wahab Al-Shaabab, the former Dean of the College of Computer Engineering and Information Technology at the University of Technology in Baghdad, was killed by a plastic explosive stuck to his car in Adhamiyah district of Baghdad. Al-Shaabab had left Iraq in 2006 and only recently returned to Baghdad; CEOSI Iraqi University sources on *Alane News Agency*, <http://www.alanews.org>, October 15, 2010; see Iraq Solidaridad, *List of Iraqi academics assassinated in Iraq during the US-*

led occupation, updated 2 May 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 9, http://www.iraqsolidaridad.org/2011/docs/Lista_profesores_ENGLISH_02_MAY_2011.pdf.

- On 14 August 2010, gunmen killed Mohamed Ali Al-Din, a pharmacy professor, in Nu'amaniyah (Wassit). Al-Din had returned from the USA to Iraq only a few months earlier; BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 20, <http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/academicsBT151108.pdf>.

- On 29 June 2010, Ali Sayegh Zidane, a cancer specialist, was assassinated in Baghdad after recently returning to Iraq; BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 20, <http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/academicsBT151108.pdf>.

⁵⁰¹ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 21 February 2012, a university student was injured when an adhesive bomb placed in his car detonated in the Amiriya area in western Baghdad; NINA, *College student injured in west of Baghdad*, 21 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFMFF.

- On 24 January 2012, a car bomb exploded near two schools in the Shula district of northwestern Baghdad, killing two people and wounding 15 others; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 24*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-24/>.

- On 30 November 2011, gunmen in a civilian car opened fire from their machine guns on Kurdish high school student Sherwan Arsalan Jamal while he was getting out of school in Almaz neighbourhood, north of Kirkuk; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kurdish student shot dead in Kirkuk*, 30 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/275514/>.

- On 7 July 2011, a parked car bomb near a primary school wounded 10 civilians when it exploded in Fallujah (Al-Anbar) Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 8*, 8 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-8/>.

- On 20 April 2011, gunmen killed a high school student in the Domeez neighborhood, southern Mosul (Ninewa); NINA, *High school student killed in Mosul*, 20 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFLFG.

- On 3 April 2011, gunmen set fire to an intermediate school in Altun-Kupri town (Kirkuk), causing damage to its administration and school records. Aswat al-Iraq, *Two civilians injured in Kirkuk rocket attack*, 3 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141766&l=1.

⁵⁰² US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4da56dbcc.html>.

⁵⁰³ In Salah Al-Din, for example, the Ministry of Higher Education reportedly demoted 140 professors and university personnel in Tikrit University for their former Ba'ath Party affiliation. The president of the University reportedly resigned in protest of these measures; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sadr support "uprooting Baath elements"*, 26 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145425&l=1. See also "Background Information" and "(Perceived) Political Opponents".

⁵⁰⁴ According to the International Crisis Group, there was a notable increase in attacks against judges in 2011 compared to 2010 and 2009; International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, p. 5, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf). The US Department of State also observed a spike in attacks against judges across the country in August-September 2010, when 12 assassination attempts were recorded; US of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. For further incidents in 2010, see UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵⁰⁵ Including reported attacks on the following persons:

- On 24 October 2011, the Chairman of Kerbala's Bar Association, Qais Al-Amiry, survived unharmed an assassination attempt by unknown gunmen in Kerbala city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Karbala lawyers demand protection after their Chairman exposed for assassination*, 25 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145399&l=1.

- On 26 September 2011, gunmen wounded judge Munir Hadad, a spokesman for the Iraqi High Tribunal, in a drive-by shooting in central Baghdad; Hamid Ahmed, *Senior finance official assassinated in Iraq*, AP, 26 September 2011, <http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Senior-finance-official-assassinated-in-Iraq-2187005.php>.

- On 16 May 2011, a MoI bomb squad defused a sticky bomb attached to a car belonging to the head of the Criminal Court of Ninewa Governorate; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 16*, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-16/>.

- On 2 January 2011, gunmen planted bombs near his house in a town near Balad, wounding Hardan Khalaf, the Public Attorney of Balad town (Salah Al-Din), along with eight members of his family and killing his nephew; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 2*, 2 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-2/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Man killed, 9 injured, in attack against judge's house in Salahddin's Balad city*, 2 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140254&l=1.

- On 29 December 2010, the Chief of the Criminal Court in Al-Madaen south of Baghdad was seriously wounded when a bomb, attached to his private car, was detonated; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

- On 17 August 2010, Judge Kamal Jaber Bandr, the head of the Iraqi Cassation Court, was injured in an assassination attempt when his booby-trapped car exploded in Qadissiya in Baghdad; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵⁰⁶ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 19 February 2012, police found the burned body of the criminal court judge Abdelrizak Al-Qubaisi in his house in Al-Qaim; AFP, *Suicide bomber kills 15 at Baghdad police academy*, 20 February 2012, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/suicide-bomber-kills-15-at-baghdad-police-academy-2012-02-20-1.443926>.

- On 1 January 2012, an unknown gunman broke into a lawyer's house in central Fallujah and stabbed him to death; NINA, *Lawyer stabbed to death in Falluja*, 1 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJJIDL.

- On 13 December 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers and a bomb attacked a minibus carrying Justice Ministry officials near a police checkpoint in central Fallujah, wounding six people, including three judges, one of them the chief judge of the criminal court in Ramadi; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Violence flares across Iraq*, CNN, 13 December 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/13/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>.

- On 23 April 2010, the house of a lawyer was bombed in the town of Khaldiyah; Jane Arraf, *Bomb attacks kill 50, wound almost 200 in Iraq*, CS Monitor, 23 April 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/23/92778/bomb-attacks-kill-50-wound-almost.html>.

- On 7 January 2010, a bomb exploded in the home of a lawyer in Hit, killing him; Hamid Ahmed, *Blasts Kill 6 in Iraq's Western Anbar Province*, AP, 7 January 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9499235>.

⁵⁰⁷ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 17 December 2011, judge Mohammed Shaya'a was seriously injured in an armed attack with firearms equipped with silencers in west Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Judge injured in Baghdad armed attack*, 17 December 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(0a33up45xogke1a5q3tapm45\)\)/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146059](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(0a33up45xogke1a5q3tapm45))/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146059).
- On 30 October 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a lawyer's car went off, killing him and wounding a nearby traffic policeman in the northern Adhamiyah district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq*, October 31, 31 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-31/>.
- On 23 June 2011, an IED attached to the car of Hamid Mahmoud, a lawyer, detonated near the Adhamiyah Palace in northern Baghdad, wounding the lawyer; NINA, *Lawyer wounded in northern Baghdad*, 23 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHDHIIH.
- On 9 June 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers killed Basim Tahir, a judge in the Personal Affairs Court, in the Jamiaa District of western Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-9/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three persons, among them a judge killed in Baghdad*, 9 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143047&l=1; Xinhua, *Two killed in Baghdad violence*, 9 June 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/09/c_13920359.htm.
- On 21 February 2011, Brig. Abdul-Mun'im Mowla, Baghdad's Internal Security Forces' Appeals Judge, escaped an assassination attempt when an IED blew up against his motorcade in the southern Doura district. Two guards were wounded; Aswat al-Iraq, *Baghdad Judge escapes assassination attempt*, 21 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141096&l=1.
- On 12 January 2011, a bomb planted near the home of a judge wounded him as he was leaving his house in the southern Doura district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 12*, 12 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-12/>.
- On 4 January 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed Duha Ali Abd Awn, a female lawyer, with guns with silencers near Muthanna Airport in central Baghdad. According to Aswat al-Iraq, she survived the assassination attempt with injuries; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 4*, 4 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-4/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Lawyer escapes assassination attempt in Baghdad*, 4 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140308&l=1.
- On 2 January 2011, Waad Abdul-Hussein, a lawyer from the Association Defending Iraqi Prisoners, was shot dead in east Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Employee in Iraq's Association Defending Political Prisoners shot dead*, 2 January 2011, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Employee+in+Iraq's+Association+Defending+Political+Prisoners+shot...-a0245774627>.
- On 19 March 2012, a judge in the Ministry of Interior, Qais Jiad, was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Jurf Al-Sakhr; NINA, *Judge killed by AED explosion northwest Babel*, 19 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIDLG. On 31 October 2011, a lawyer was killed and another one kidnapped in Hilla (Babel). NINA, *A lawyer killed by gunmen in Hilla*, 31 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKIDH.

⁵⁰⁹ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 30 January 2012, a bomb blast damaged the house of a court official in central Ba'quba, but caused no casualties; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 30*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-30/>.
- On 8 November 2011, an IED placed near a judge's house in Ba'quba's Suk al-Kabeer area, went off damaging the house without causing in casualties; NINA, *3 IEDs in Baquba wounding 3 persons, damaging judge's house*, 8 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILHEF.
- On 17 August 2010, a roadside bomb injured three judges (Yasir Al-Tamimi, Rafed Abrahmi and Kamel Al-Khazraji) in their car in Balad Ruz; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- On 1 January 2010, an attorney was assassinated in Khalis; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵¹⁰ For example,

- On 5 March 2012, Judge Assim Omar survived an assassination attempt when an IED struck his vehicle when he was driving to work in the central Zab district. His driver was seriously wounded; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kirkuk judge survives assassination attempt*, AKnews, 5 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293961/>.
- On 9 February 2012, an IED went off against a lawyer's car in the village of Sabaghiya, in Zab district (Kirkuk), seriously wounding him; NINA, *Lawyer wounded west of Kirkuk*, 9 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEGEG.
- On 21 December 2011, judge Saad Abdulla was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Kirkuk. One of the judge's guards was seriously wounded. Reportedly, a second IED detonated inside the hospital to which the judge was transferred wounding two civilians; Abdullah Ameri, *Kirkuk judge killed, IED exploded in hospital*, 21 December 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279522/>.
- On 18 December 2011, judge Abdul-Razzaq Al-Jobouri survived three IED explosions which targeted his house in Kirkuk; Abdullah Ameri, *Kirkuk judge killed, IED exploded in hospital*, 21 December 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279522/>.
- On 7 December 2011, prosecutor Nadhim Aziz Al-Taie was killed when a bomb attached to his vehicle went off in Yajj area; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Prosecutor killed, official injured in Kirkuk blasts*, AKnews, 7 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276838/>.
- On 30 November 2011, gunmen attacked the house of a judge in Kirkuk, causing no casualties; NINA, *Two houses in Kirkuk come under armed attack*, 30 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJEDKE.

⁵¹¹ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 2 March 2012, gunmen shot dead lawyer Mahmoud Al-Hamdani, who had also been a candidate for Iraqiyya in the 2010 CoR elections, in Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Lawyer assassinated west of Mosul*, 2 March 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydyqryt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147217&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydyqryt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147217&l=1).
- On 7 December 2011, gunmen killed lawyer Nadhem al-Jobouri in Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 7*, 7 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-7/>; Rezan Ahmed, *Double murder in Mosul*, AKnews, 7 December 2011, <http://static.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276789/>.

- On 17 August 2011, a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol escorting an investigation judge's convoy killed one policeman and wounded another in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 17*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-17/>.
 - On 6 June 2011, police disarmed a bomb planted next to the residence of a Ninewa judge; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report – Observations*, 30 July 2011, p. 6, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section1_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit.
 - On 16 May 2011, a MoI bomb squad defused a sticky bomb attached to a car belonging to the head of the Criminal Court of Ninewa Governorate; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 16*, 16 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-16/>.
- ⁵¹² For example, the following incidents were reported:
- On 22 February 2012, a car bomb exploded in front of a court house in Bajji, injuring four persons; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 23 February 2012.
 - On 30 April 2011, gunmen detonated bombs at the house of Tuma Jabar Lafta (Tuma al-Timimi), a judge in Karkh (Baghdad), killing him, his wife and two daughters in Taji (Salah Al-Din). In a separate attack, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a policeman who was assigned to provide security for the judge; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 30*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-30/>; AP, *Iraqi judge, wife and daughter killed*, 30 April 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=§ion=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2011/April/middleeast_April67_6.xml.
 - On 21 April 2011, a bomb targeting the vehicle of a Samarra Investigation Judge, Shihab Ahmed, exploded in Samarra, killing a university student and wounding five persons, including a judge's guard. Ahmed was not in the convoy at the time; NINA, *Judge targeted in Samara*, 21 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFLKD.
 - On 20 April 2011, the chief judge of Salah Al-Din Court survived an assassination attempt when a car bomb parked on the main road of central Tikrit exploded. Four persons, including one of the judge's guards, were injured; NINA, *Salah-il-Din chief Judge attacked*, 20 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFKFI.
 - On 2 January 2011, gunmen planted bombs near the house of Hardan Khalaf, the Public Attorney of Balad town, wounding him along with eight members of his family and killing his nephew, in a town near Balad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 2*, 2 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-2/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Man killed, 9 injured, in attack against judge's house in Salahddin's Balad city*, 2 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140254&l=1.
- ⁵¹³ SIGIR, *Quarterly Report – Observations*, 30 July 2011, p. 6, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section1_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit.
- ⁵¹⁴ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ⁵¹⁵ Information provided by Chief Justice of the Higher Judicial Council (HJC), Medhat al-Mahmoud to SIGIR; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, pp. 12, 78-79, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit.
- ⁵¹⁶ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 16, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ⁵¹⁷ In February 2012, Saad Al-Lami, one of the judges on a nine-member panel investigating terrorism-related charges against Iraqi Vice-President Al-Hashimi reportedly expressed fear for his life and the lives of his family after Al-Hashimi publicly named him as one of the investigating judges; Jack Healy, *Iraqi Official Was Behind 150 Attacks, Judges Say*, New York Times, 16 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/middleeast/iraqi-vice-president-faces-new-accusations-of-violence.html>. According to Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud, the level of threats against judges in cities such as Mosul and Ba'quba is so high that judges from Baghdad are temporarily deployed to these areas to handle sensitive cases that could jeopardize the security of local judges; SIGIR, *Quarterly Report and Seminannual Report to the United States Congress*, 30 January 2012, p. 78, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit. For example, Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani, the acclaimed ISI spokesman, reportedly claimed responsibility for the assassination of three judges in Baghdad, who convicted AQI members and sentenced them to death. Maamoun Youssef, *Al Qaeda In Iraq Audio Message Reportedly Asks Ex-Members To Return*, AP, 8 August 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/08/al-qaeda-in-iraq-audio-message_n_921328.html. In August 2010, ISI reportedly claimed that it was responsible for the targeting of 12 judges, warning that “fighters will not remain idle as Sunni Muslims are sentenced to death and killed in Shi'ite prisons;” Ammar Karim, *Two Iraq judges killed in violence claimed by Al-Qaeda*, Middle East Online, 24 August 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=40825>. Amnesty International reported that lawyers may refuse to represent defendants accused of terrorism-related charges for fear for their lives; Amnesty International, *Urgent Action - Two Dozen Facing Execution After Unfair Trial*, 20 July 2011, p. 2, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/039/2011/en/55f9dcbe-b6f2-43b4-ac9d-40e258e2b6aa/mde140392011en.pdf>.
- ⁵¹⁸ According to the International Crisis Group, “[T]he court system in general continues to suffer from undue political interference, which mostly takes the form of threats of physical violence against judges and their friends and family. Often the threat no longer even needs to be made: on the rare occasions when a case involving high-level corruption are forwarded to a particular judge, he or she will not give it a fair hearing and will either dismiss it on procedural grounds or issue a reduced sentence”; International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, p. 24, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.
- ⁵¹⁹ In February 2012, ISI/AQI in an internet statement reportedly claiming responsibility for coordinated attacks across the country on 23 February 2012, made explicit reference to “Shi'ite judges and investigators” that it intends to track down; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Group claims responsibility for deadly Iraq attacks*, CNN, 24 February 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/24/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>. See also chapter “Government Officials and Employees”.
- ⁵²⁰ For example, legal personnel dealing with cases of domestic violence have reportedly been subjected to harassment at the hands of the victim's family; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 46, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, p. 5, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.
- ⁵²¹ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 76, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁵²² UPI, *Killers target Iraq's ravaged elite again*, 11 April 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/04/11/Killers-target-Iraqs-ravaged-elite-again/UPI-91351302548597/.

⁵²³ IRIN, *IRAQ: Wasit Province initiative to get doctors to return*, 11 February 2010, <http://m.irinnews.org/88072.htm>.

⁵²⁴ Paul C. Webster, *Iraq's health system yet to heal from ravages of war*, *The Lancet*, Volume 378, Issue 9794, Pages 863 - 866, 3 September 2011, [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(11\)61399-8/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(11)61399-8/fulltext).

⁵²⁵ UPI, *Killers target Iraq's ravaged elite again*, 11 April 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/04/11/Killers-target-Iraqs-ravaged-elite-again/UPI-91351302548597/; Dina Al-Shebeeb, *Iraqi scientists, doctors targeted*, *Al Arabiya*, 9 April 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/09/144874.html>.

⁵²⁶ UPI, *Killers target Iraq's ravaged elite again*, 11 April 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/04/11/Killers-target-Iraqs-ravaged-elite-again/UPI-91351302548597/. According to Hayder Nasser, an Iraqi physician who serves as UNICEF's Child Survival and Development Specialist for the Middle East, the return of medical professionals has been slow mainly due to the lack of security. Syed Jaffar Hussain, WHO's Country Director for Iraq, further observed that the health care system lacks organization due to ongoing factional divisions at the government level, further deterring doctors from returning; Paul C. Webster, *Iraq's health system yet to heal from ravages of war*, *The Lancet*, Volume 378, Issue 9794, pp. 863-866, 3 September 2011, [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(11\)61399-8/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(11)61399-8/fulltext).

⁵²⁷ For examples of targeted attacks on doctors and other medical professionals in 2010, see UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁵²⁸ On 24 July 2011, an assistant doctor was reportedly shot and killed in his house in Garma; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant doctor killed in his Falluja house, west Iraq*, 24 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143910&l=1. On 22 July 2011, gunmen reportedly killed a nurse at a clinic in a village near the town of Garma; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 24, 24 July 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-24/>.

⁵²⁹ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 10 November 2011, a bomb attached to the car of a surgeon exploded, killing him and wounding his son in Baghdad's southern Doura district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 11*, 11 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-11/>.
- On 29 October 2011, gunmen abducted Dr. Houm Suhail Malalah, a paediatrician at Illwiya Children Hospital, while on his way home in Zayouna area, in eastern Baghdad; NINA, *Gunmen abduct doctor in eastern Baghdad*, 29 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKGFQ.
- On 25 January 2011, gunmen opened fire on Dr. Laith Khalid Hussein of southern Baghdad/sal-Madaen Hospital and his driver in northern Baghdad's Uteifiya district, seriously wounding him and killing his driver; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi doctor wounded, his driver killed, in Baghdad*, 25 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140689&l=1.
- On 10 January 2011, an IED detonated in a car parked in front of the house of a doctor and his doctor-wife, in central Baghdad's Karrada district, wounding a number of persons; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two explosive charges blow up close to doctor's house in central Baghdad*, 10 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140444&l=1.

⁵³⁰ In the second half of 2011, there has been a reported spike in kidnappings and killings of doctors in Kirkuk city. According to security sources, armed groups have killed more than seven doctors and kidnapped at least five others. Others reportedly received threatening phone calls. Reportedly, many doctors cut their working hours or fled Kirkuk altogether; Abdullah Ameri, *Assassination of doctors in Kirkuk continues*, *AKnews*, 18 October 2011, <http://173.201.38.81/en/aknews/3/267837/>; NINA, *Kirkuk's Health Director: Doctors, medical staff still being threatened*, 12 September 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIDJDF.

For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 10 January 2012, the mutilated and severed body of Khalil Ibrahim Awdal, a paramedic, was found in Shorija neighbourhood of Kirkuk; Jamshid Zangana and Hiwa Husamaddin, *Kirkuk paramedic found in pieces*, *AKnews*, 10 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/283467/>.
- On 18 October 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire on Ziad Ibrahim, a pharmacist, in Kirkuk's Domiz area, killing him instantly; Abdullah Ameri, *Assassination of doctors in Kirkuk continues*, *AKnews*, 18 October 2011, <http://173.201.38.81/en/aknews/3/267837/>.
- On 5 September 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a vehicle carrying prominent Turkic neurologist Yeldrim Abbas (Yuldrom Abbas Damirchy), killing him and his brother in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7, 7 September 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-5/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi doctor, his brother, killed in Kirkuk*, 6 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144670&l=1.
- On 22 July 2011, in central Kirkuk, gunmen killed Dr. Ibrahim al-Jumaily, a paediatrician, when he resisted an attempt to kidnap him in front of his house; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 22, 22 July 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-22/>. Reportedly, he was a Colonel in the former Iraqi Army; NINA, *Paediatrician killed in Kirkuk*, 22 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHHDDF.
- On 2 July 2011, gunmen opened fire on the house of a doctor in Kirkuk's Adan district, causing damage to the house; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three wanted persons detained, gunmen attack doctor's house in Kirkuk*, 2 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143501&l=1.
- On 23 June 2011, a paediatrician was kidnapped from his clinic in northern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 24, 24 June 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-24/>.
- On 20 June 2011, a Turkic doctor was abducted from his house in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1.
- On 19 June 2011, gunmen kidnapped Adwal Ali Mahmud, a well-known Turkic doctor, from his house in central Kirkuk city. Only a few days later, gunmen kidnapped Safi Harzan, a Kurdish doctor; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, *Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors*, *Rudaw*, 7 May 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1.

⁵³¹ For example, the following incidents were reported:

- On 21 January 2012, two gunmen killed a Christian nurse after they stormed his private medical clinic in northern Mosul city; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 21, 21 January 2012*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-21/>; NINA, *Christian male nurse killed northern Mosul*, 21 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLHMF.
- On 11 December 2011, gunmen in a car killed doctor Samir Al-Hamdani, head of Mosul's central morgue, near his house in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 11, 11 December 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.

- On 15 November 2011, gunmen attacked a physician in his private clinic in Qayara, of Mosul city, killing him on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Physician and a cop killed in Mosul*, 15 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145620&l=1.
 - On 1 October 2011, a doctor with the rank of a major in the Iraqi Army was killed when an explosive charge planted under his car detonated on Telkeif road, north of Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor officer killed in sticking charge blast in Mosul*, 1 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145104&l=1.
 - On 26 July 2011, gunmen killed Dr. Hayfa Juma, a Shabak gynecologist in her clinic in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor assassinated in Mosul*, 26 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143966&l=1; Iraq Body Count, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k17397>.
 - On 13 March 2011, gunmen in a car shot dead an employee in a medical centre near his home in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 13*, 13 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-13/>.
 - On 15 January 2011, an armed man stormed a private hospital and wounded Nuyia Youssif Nuyia, a Chaldean Catholic specialist cardiologist, with a gun equipped with a silencer in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 17*, 17 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-17/>; Layla Yousif Rahema, *Christian doctor assaulted in Mosul*, Asia News, 17 January 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Christian-doctor-assaulted-in-Mosul-20516.html>.
- ⁵³² For example, the following incidents were reported:
- On 26 July 2011, gunmen killed Dr. Hayfa Juma, a Shabak gynecologist in her clinic in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor assassinated in Mosul*, 26 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143966&l=1; Iraq Body Count, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k17397>.
 - On 22 July 2011, gunmen killed a nurse at a clinic in a village near the town of Garma (Al-Anbar); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 24*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-24/>.
 - On 10 January 2011, an IED detonated in a car parked in front of the house of a doctor and his doctor-wife, in central Baghdad's Karrada district, wounding a number of persons; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two explosive charges blow up close to doctor's house in central Baghdad*, 10 January 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140444&l=1.
 - On 11 August 2010, gunmen attacked the home of the head of Baghdad's maternity hospital, killing her and assaulting her husband; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁵³³ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, "Perpetrators of crimes committed over many years continue to be unaccountable;" UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. iv, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁵³⁴ See above examples involving doctors of Turkmen, Kurdish, Shabak and Christian identity.
- ⁵³⁵ For example, on 5 June 2010, a magnetic bomb reportedly attached to a car carrying Shihab Ahmed Salah, the Head of Al-Ubaidi Hospital, seriously wounded him in the town of Al-Qaim. He had reportedly been a candidate in the March 2010 parliamentary elections; Reuters, *Factbox - Security developments in Iraq, 6 June*, 6 June 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/KAM622133.htm>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁵³⁶ Doctors reportedly also face tribal demands for blood money at the hands of relatives of patients who die in a doctor's care, especially in Southern Iraq. On 26 November 2011, doctors in Wassit Governorate closed their private clinic in protest against tribal threats. In a case reported by the media, a doctor in Diwaniyah had to pay 80 million Iraqi Dinars (US \$74,000) to the relatives of a patient who died in surgery; Aswat al-Iraq, *Southern Iraq's Wassit doctors close clinics in protest to tribal threats*, 26 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145765&l=1; Channels TV, *Iraqi Hospitals to hire Foreign Medical Staff*, 10 November 2011, http://www.channelstv.com/global/news_details.php?nid=30104&cat=World%20News; Aseel Kami, *Attacks ebb but Iraqi doctors face death, extortion*, Reuters, 1 February 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/01/us-iraq-doctors-idUSTRE6102RH20100201>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁵³⁷ By then, the Iraqi Ministry of Health estimated that at least 620 Iraqi medical professionals, including 134 doctors, had been killed and many more threatened since 2003; AP, *Iraq says doctors can carry guns for protection*, 29 September 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26947184/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/iraq-says-doctors-can-carry-guns-protection/#.TsUMuWb8X-Y.
- ⁵³⁸ The draft law reportedly foresees a possible prison sentence of three years or a fine of no less than 10 million Iraqi Dinars (around US \$8,000) against anyone who demands a tribal settlement from a doctor; Aseel Kami, *Attacks ebb but Iraqi doctors face death, extortion*, Reuters, 1 February 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/01/us-iraq-doctors-idUSTRE6102RH20100201>; RFE/RL, *Iraqi cabinet approves bill to protect doctors*, 20 January 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b59adbd23.html>.
- ⁵³⁹ It is estimated that between 2003 and 2007, 94 aid workers were reportedly killed and 248 were injured while working in Iraq, including 22 UN staff killed and over 100 injured following a bombing on 19 August 2003 at the former UN Headquarters in Baghdad; OCHA, *World Humanitarian Day Factsheet 2010*, August 2010, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/389/WHD_percent20Factsheet_percent20English.pdf.
- ⁵⁴⁰ On 18 January 2010, four employees of the Mawtini Organization for Relief and Development in Baghdad were reportedly killed when their headquarters was targeted. Between 25-26 January 2010, it was reported that a series of coordinated hotel bombings took place in Baghdad that destroyed the offices of the International Rescue Committee, and damaged those of ACTED, Mercy Corps and the International Medical Committee. ISI later issued a public statement claiming responsibility for the bombings; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 43-44, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁵⁴¹ For example, the following incidents were reported:
- On 27 December 2011, the head of the Iraqi Red Crescent Office in Kirkuk, Yaqoub Yousif Lazim, was wounded when a bomb attached to his car went off in western Kirkuk; NINA, *Head of Red Crescent in Kirkuk wounded*, 27 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJIDEJ.
 - On 20 November 2011, Amer Khalaf Abdullah, a member of a human rights organization was killed by a sticky bomb attached to his car southwest of Kirkuk; NINA, *Human rights activist killed by AED in his car southwest of Kirkuk*, 20 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIMKMG.

- On 30 October 2011, the Legal Advisor to the Political Prisoners' Organization was killed when a sticky bomb attached to his car exploded in Baghdad's Adhamiyah district; NINA, *Legal Advisor to Political Prisoners' body killed in Baghdad*, 30 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKHKH.
- On 11 June 2011, the beheaded body of Namir Ryhan, an activist from a local human rights NGO, was found in his home in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-11/>; AP, *Officials: 11 Killed in Separate Attacks in Iraq*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/11/officials-10-killed-in-separate-attacks-in-iraq/>.
- On 8 April 2011, gunmen shot dead Abid Farhan, an official with a political prisoner advocacy group together with Taha Hamad Jaafar, Director of the al-Masar television channel, in an attack on their vehicle in the town of Mahmudiyah (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 8*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-8/>.
- On 2 January 2011, Waad Abdul-Hussein, a lawyer from the Association Defending Iraqi Prisoners, was shot dead in east Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Employee in Iraq's Association Defending Political Prisoners shot dead*, 2 January 2011, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Employee+in+Iraq's+Association+Defending+Political+Prisoners+shot...-a0245774627>.
- ⁵⁴² OCHA, *World Humanitarian Day Factsheet 2010*, August 2010, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/389/WHDD_percent20Factsheet_percent20English.pdf.
- ⁵⁴³ International Crisis Group, *Failing Oversight Iraq's Unchecked Government*, Middle East Report N°113, 26 September 2011, p. i, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf>.
- ⁵⁴⁴ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 44, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ⁵⁴⁵ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 43, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.
- ⁵⁴⁶ Several organizations involved in organizing popular protests have reportedly been arrested and abused by ISF and the groups' offices were raided. Reported incidents included:
 - On 30 September 2011, OWFI activist Aya Al Lamie was reportedly abducted by members of the ISF, dressed in civilian clothes, after attending a weekly protest on Baghdad's Tahrir Square. She was taken to a security facility in Jadiriya and severely beaten before she was released later in the day after being told: "[T]his was a first warning!"; OWFI, *20 year old OWFI activist Aya Al Lamie Kidnapped from Tahrir Square and tortured*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/press-release/135-20-year-old-owfi-activist-aya-al-lamie-kidnapped-from-tahrir-square-and-tortured>.
 - On 10 June 2011, OWFI members, who have been assembling in Tahrir Square every Friday since protests started in February 2011, have been attacked and sexually harassed by alleged government-sponsored thugs; Marcia G. Yerman, *Yanar Mohammed -- Iraqi Women's Vigilant Champion*, Women's Media Center, 28 June 2011, <http://womensmediacenter.com/blog/2011/06/exclusive-yanar-mohammed---iraqi-womens-vigilant-champion/>; OWFI, *Iraqi Human Rights Activists Protesting for Democracy Are Sexually Assaulted and Beaten*, 11 June 2010, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/press-release/132-iraqi-human-rights-activists-protesting-for-democracy-are-sexually-assaulted-and-beaten>. See also HRW, *Iraq: Attacks by Government-Backed Thugs Chill Protests*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/30/iraq-attacks-government-backed-thugs-chill-protests>.
 - On 28 May 2011, ISF raided the offices of the activist group "Ayna Haqqi" (or "Where is My Right"), which has been involved in organizing street protests in Baghdad, when they were meeting with other protest organizers from the February 25 Group. They arrested 13 activists and confiscated mobile phones, computers and documents. Rights group considered the arrests, which occurred without arrest warrants, as a government crack-down ahead of a planned protests; HRW, *Iraq: Protest Organizers Beaten, Detained*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/02/iraq-protest-organizers-beaten-detained>; New York Times, *Iraq Arrests Seen as Effort to Quell More Protests*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *11 activists in Baghdad arrested*, 28 May 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=142805.
 - On 13 April 2011, ISF entered the adjoining offices of the Federation of Workers Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI) and the Organization of Women's Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) in Baghdad, where the February 25 Group held meetings. They arrested Firas Ali, one of the group's members; HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>.
 - On 8 April 2011, several activists from the "February 25 Group", a youth group involved in organizing weekly protests, were arrested and allegedly tortured after joining peaceful protests in Baghdad's Tahrir Square; OWFI, *The Iraqi government detains and tortures peaceful demonstrators from Tahrir Square*, 8 April 2011, <http://equalityiniraq.com/activities/130-the-iraqi-government-detains-and-tortures-peaceful-demonstrators-from-tahrir-square>; HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>.
 - On 22 March 2011, ISF arrested Nabil, an activist and protest organizer with the "February 25 Group". HRW witnessed signs of physical abuse immediately after his release from detention; HRW, *Iraq: Widening Crackdown on Protests*, 21 April 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/21/iraq-widening-crackdown-protests>.
 - On 23 February 2011, ISF raided the office of the NGO Journalistic Freedoms Observatory in Baghdad, confiscating or destroying IT equipment and its archive. The organization has been campaigning for media freedom in Iraq for several years and protested against restrictions on media coverage of demonstrations in Iraq; Amnesty International, *Days of Rage – Protests and Repression in Iraq*, April 2011, p. 9, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/120411-%E2%80%9898days-rage-protests-and-repression-iraq%E2%80%99-testimonies-case-studies-2011-04-11>; HRW, *Iraq Forces Raid Press Freedom Group*, 26 February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/26/iraq-security-forces-raid-press-freedom-group>.

Furthermore, LGBTI activists reported that on 16 June 2010, ISF raided a safe house in Kerbala and violently beat up and blindfolded the six occupants, including three men, one woman and two transgender people, before taking them away in vans. Reportedly, the police confiscated computer equipment found in the house before burning it down. Two days later, one of the men turned up in hospital with a throat wound claiming he had been tortured; UNAMI has not been able to ascertain the whereabouts of the other five individuals; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, NY Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

⁵⁴⁷ Articles 42 and 43 (1A); Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, unofficial English translation available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

⁵⁴⁸ Article 14 reads: "Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, color, religion, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status"; Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, unofficial English translation available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

⁵⁴⁹ Article 2(1B and C).

⁵⁵⁰ Article 43(2).

⁵⁵¹ Article 2(2).

⁵⁵² Article 2(1).

⁵⁵³ Article 2(1).

⁵⁵⁴ Article 2(1A).

⁵⁵⁵ However, the Law of Civil Affairs No. 65 of 1972 explicitly allows non-Muslims to convert to Islam; USCIRF, *2010 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq*, 17 November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148821.htm>.

⁵⁵⁶ A 1972 law makes conversion of minor children to Islam automatic if either parent converts to Islam. According to USCIRF, the Higher Judicial Council confirmed the continued validity of the law, but the MoHR reportedly advocated for the law to be repealed; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁷ Law No. 105 of 1970 prohibits the practice of the Bahai Faith, and a 2001 resolution prohibits the practice of the Wahhabi branch of Islam; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁸ Article 41 of the Constitution provides that “Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or choices (...).” However, the implementing legislation required by the constitution has not yet been enacted. The 1959 Personal Status Law (Law 188), which is based on Shari’a (Islamic law) principles, calls for the adjudication of cases in accordance with Shari’a principles in the absence of applicable legislative text. As a result, Shari’a principles become applicable on non-Muslims. Proclamation No. 6 provides that the civil courts consult the religious authority of the non-Muslim parties for their opinion under the applicable religious law and apply this opinion in court; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, pp. 4-5, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁵⁵⁹ Rights groups have repeatedly raised concern that these provisions leave room for discrimination against minorities, especially minority women; see for example, Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 12, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁵⁶⁰ Muslims make up for 97 percent of the Iraqi population, out of which 60-65 percent are Shi’ites and 32-37 percent are Sunnis. Religious minority groups account for the remaining three percent; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 2, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; CIA, *The World Factbook*, 10 November 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>.

⁵⁶¹ In the 2010 CoR elections, political parties were largely organized along either religious or ethnic lines; IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, pp. 31-33, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf); US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 36, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4da56dbcc.html>. See also Lara Jakes, *Iraq emerges from war a society divided by sect*, AP, 27 November 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/11/27/international/i082343S64.DTL&type=politics>.

⁵⁶² See “Actors of Violence”.

⁵⁶³ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 2, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4da56dbcc.html>.

⁵⁶⁴ See “Background Information”.

⁵⁶⁵ Marwan Ibrahim, *Iraq’s Kirkuk ‘may be fertile ground for militants’*, AFP, 26 November 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jXZGTp2Q2TmzUZ1iOqic1K0W5q4A?docId=CNG.d2cb7fceed198fb5fc3ea88ef8ea035.781>.

⁵⁶⁶ See “Actors of Violence”.

⁵⁶⁷ See “(Perceived) Political Opponents”.

⁵⁶⁸ On 23 January 2012, IS/IAQI reportedly posted messages on a jihadist forum, claiming responsibility for the most recent attacks on Shi’ite pilgrims and announcing more attacks against the “rawafid”, “the rejecters”, a name used by Sunni extremists for the Shi’ites; AFP, *Bombing of Iraq policemen’s home kills 10*, 26 January 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ieub7D77cUJntOywp6jqJzn4OQ?docId=CNG.08e433d11d9885da75e883365c1ae613.131>. According to the US Department of State, “The overwhelming majority of the mass-casualty attacks targeted the Shia population”; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 12, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also chapter “Actors of Violence”.

⁵⁶⁹ After the 22 December 2011 attacks aimed mainly at Shi’ites across Baghdad, Anthony Cordesman of the CSIS said, “[T]hese acts have been essentially acts to provoke another round of sectarian fighting between Sunni and Shi’ite;” Pam Dockings, *Analysts: Al-Qaida in Iraq Aims to Stir Sectarian Strife*, Voice of America, 29 December 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Al-Qaida-in-Iraq-Aims-to-Stir-Sectarian-Strife-136395608.html>. See also Raheem Salman and Alexandra Zavis, *Iraq bombings targeting Shiites kill 71*, Los Angeles Times, 5 January 2012, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-bombings-20120106.0.792291.story>; Martin Chulov, *Iraq’s shias targeted in deadly bomb blasts*, The Guardian, 5 January 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/iraq-shias-targeted-bomb-blasts?newsfeed=true>. According to Mustafa Alani, a Geneva-based analyst and an Iraq expert with the Gulf Research Center, “[T]he attacks are a reaction to political developments in Iraq. The Sunnis feel the Shi’ites are squeezing them out of the government, and militants see the sectarian tensions in politics as a golden opportunity to reactivate their terror campaign;” Barbara Surk, *Suicide bomber kills 33 at Shiite funeral in Iraq*, AFP, 28 January 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hc9ZB_bqsl_1VqxsY1HxSJ7fPyWw?docId=88ce86a5551a458f80ded7d993fcbfb7. And Gala Riani, a Middle East analyst at IHS Global Insight, said, “[T]he political crisis has set up a perfect scenario for Sunni militants to re-establish themselves. It’s very sectarian in nature and gives them fuel for their fire;” Adam Schreck, *Scores Killed In Iraq Bombings Targeting Shiites*, AP, 5 January 2012, http://www.salon.com/writer/adam_schreck/.

⁵⁷⁰ Since 2010, reported attacks on Shi’ite pilgrims in Baghdad (including pilgrims from Iran) or on mosques, included:

- On 11 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi’ite pilgrims wounded five people in Baghdad’s southwestern Radhwaniya district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 11*, 11 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-11/>.

- On 10 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims killed one person and wounded nine others in the western Ghazaliya District; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 11*, 11 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-11/>.
 - On 9 January 2012, two bombs exploded near crowds of Shi'ite pilgrims walking through Baghdad on the occasion of Arbaeen, killing at least 15 people and wounding 52 others; Kareem Raheem, *Blasts hit Shi'ite pilgrims in Iraq, 15 dead, 52 hurt*, Reuters, 9 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE8081IM20120109>.
 - On 5 December 2011, attacks against Shi'ite pilgrims in various parts of Baghdad (Mashtal, Za'afaraniyah and Ur) killed at least 13 and wounded almost 40 others; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, December 5*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-5>.
 - On 4 December 2011, attacks against Shi'ite pilgrims in Baghdad's south-western Amel and Bayaa districts killed one and wounded 16 others; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, December 5*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-5>.
 - On 13 November 2011, a roadside bomb targeting a bus carrying pilgrims wounded 15 people, among them were 13 Iranians, in Kadhimiyah; AFP, *Iraq attacks wound 20, including Iran pilgrims*, 13 November 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/displayarticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2011/November/middleeast_November317.xml§ion=middleeast&col=.
 - On 17 June 2011, a car bomb exploded near a Shi'ite mosque in the central Karrada district killing three people and injuring seven others; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 17*, 17 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-17/>.
 - On 27 January 2011, a car bomb explosion at a funeral wake in the Shi'ite Shula neighbourhood killed more than 45 people and wounded between 65 and 120 others; Aseel Kami, *Car bomb at Iraq funeral wake kills at least 35*, Reuters, 27 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bomb-at-iraq-funeral-wake-kills-35-clashes-erupt/>.
 - On 25 January 2011, a roadside bomb wounded seven pilgrims in a minibus in the northern Shaab district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 25*, 25 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-25/>.
 - On 23 January 2011, four car bombs, mostly targeting Shi'ite pilgrims, killed at least six people and wounded 29 others in a seemingly coordinated series of attacks during the major Shi'ite religious rite of Arbaeen; Reuters, *Car bombs around Baghdad kill 6, wound 29*, 23 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/car-bombs-around-baghdad-kill-6-wound-29/>.
 - On 20 January 2011, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims in the southern Doura district killed one pilgrim and wounded nine others; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 20*, 20 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-20/>.
 - On 7 July 2010, at least 43 people were killed and more than 160 others were wounded in several attacks on Shi'ite pilgrims commemorating Imam Musa Al-Kadhim, a revered Shi'ite saint, in Baghdad despite heightened security measures with 200,000 security force members assigned to patrol streets, check cars and search pilgrims as they walked to the shrine; Leila Fadel and Jinan Hussein, *At least 43 killed across Baghdad in attacks aimed at Shi'ite pilgrims*, Washington Post, 8 July 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/07/AR2010070701331.html>.
- ⁵⁷¹ In 2010, 2011, and 2012, Kerbala and Najef reportedly saw several large-scale attacks targeting Shi'ite pilgrims, often on the occasion of religious holidays, including:
- On 20 March 2012, as part of apparently coordinated attacks across the country, two car bombs exploded in a crowded shopping and restaurant area in Kerbala, killing 13 and wounding 50 others; Lara Jakes, *Al-Qaida claims responsibility for Iraq attacks*, AP, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaida-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>, 21 March 2012, <http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/al-qaida-claims-responsibility-1391499.html>.
 - On 15/16 July 2011, three attacks during the annual Shi'ite pilgrimage on the occasion of the anniversary of Imam Mohammed Al-Mehdi's birthday killed 13 and wounded over 100 people, including women and children, in Kerbala; Aswat al-Iraq, *113 persons killed, injured in Karbala province*, 16 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143783&l=1.
 - On 24 January 2011, two bombs tore into crowds of Shi'ite pilgrims, killing at least 12 and wounding over 160 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *QRD arrests 16 gunmen involved in Karbala bombings*, 25 January 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140698&l=1.
 - On 20 January 2011, two simultaneous car bombs killed up to 63 pilgrims and wounded more than 200 others at checkpoints near the northern and southern entrances to the city of Kerbala ahead of the culmination of the major Shi'ite Muslim religious festival of Arbaeen; Shashank Bengali and Laith Hammoudi, *Attack on pilgrims kills dozens as Iraqi violence continues*, McClatchy Newspapers, 20 January 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/20/107142/attack-on-pilgrims-kills-dozens.html>.
 - On 8 November 2010, at least 10 people were killed and a dozen others were wounded in attacks on Iranian pilgrims in Najef and Kerbala. Reuters, *Car bomb kills 3 in Iraq's holy city of Najaf*, 8 November 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A70UT.htm>; Reuters, *Car bomb kills 7, including Iranians, in Iraq city*, 8 November 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A706J.htm>.
 - On 26 July 2010, two car bombs targeting Shi'ite pilgrims during a religious festival in the holy city of Kerbala killed 25 and wounded 68 people during the *Shabaniyah* religious holiday; AP, *Twin parked car bombs targeting Shi'ite pilgrims kill 25 in Iraqi holy city of Karbala*, 26 July 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/07/26/twin-car-bombs-targeting-shiite-pilgrims-kill-iraqi-city-karbala/>.
 - On 6 March 2010, a car bomb detonated in a parking lot used by religious pilgrims in the holy city of Najef, killing three people and wounding 54 others; BBC, *Deadly Iraq car bomb near Shia shrine in Najaf*, 6 March 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8553122.stm>; Saad Fakhrideen, *Iraq car bomb kills 3 in Najaf*, Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/05/world/la-fg-iraq-najaf6-2010mar06>.
 - On 12 February 2010, a female suicide bomber blew herself up near a convoy of pilgrims in central Kufa (Najef), killing four Shi'ite pilgrims and wounding ten others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Female suicide bomber attack leaves 14 casualties in Kufa*, 12 February 2010, <http://en.aswatiraq.info/?p=126924>.
 - On 5 February 2010, coordinated blasts targeting Shi'ite pilgrims on the final day of Arbaeen in the holy city of Kerbala killed 43 and wounded more than 140 others; Liz Sly and Caesar Ahmed, *Iraq bombings kill 43 in Karbala*, Los Angeles Times, 6 February 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/06/world/la-fg-iraq-attack6-2010feb06>; Aljazeera, *Deadly blasts hit Iraq Karbala city*, 6 February 2010, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/02/20102595844693762.html>.
 - On 3 February 2010, at least 20 people were killed and 117 others were wounded when a motorcycle loaded with explosives detonated near a crowd of pilgrims walking just outside Kerbala city; Liz Sly and Caesar Ahmed, *Iraq bombings kill 43 in Karbala*, Los Angeles Times, 6 February 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/06/world/la-fg-iraq-attack6-2010feb06>; Aljazeera, *Deadly blasts hit Iraq Karbala city*, 6 February 2010, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/02/20102595844693762.html>.

- On 14 January 2010, 25 persons were killed and 72 others were wounded as three bombs exploded near the Imam Ali Shrine in Najef; UNHCR, *Annex to the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009*, pp. 1-2, July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/openssl.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4c4feff72>.

⁵⁷² For example, reported incidents included:

- On 16 January 2012, a car bomb blew up while the bomber was driving it, killing at least three people and wounding another 18, in central Hilla; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 16*, 16 January 2012, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-16>.
- On 14 January 2012, the last day of Arbaeen, a suicide bomber disguised as a policeman killed 64 and wounded more than 130 others in an attack on Shi'ite pilgrims visiting Al-Khatwa mosque in Zubayar, west of Basrah city. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, saying "Sunni heroes of heroes" infiltrated Shi'ite processions with explosive vests, killing scores of "nonbelievers and Iranian agents" during Arbaeen commemorations; AP, *Iraq's al-Qaida claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites*, 6 February 2012, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/national_world&id=8533308; Aswat al-Iraq, *64 killings, 137 wounded in Basrah explosion*, 14 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(i0zhgdzzwjzfrzwobzyg45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(i0zhgdzzwjzfrzwobzyg45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>.
- On 12 January 2012, a roadside bomb exploded near Shi'ite pilgrims and wounded four of them in the town of Latifiyah (Babel). The same day, also in Babel Governorate, a car bomb exploded near a vegetable market killing one person and wounding 12 others, including Shi'ite pilgrims, in the town of Kifl. Another police source put the toll at 10 people wounded and said a bomb had been placed inside a car. Also, a roadside bomb went off near a vehicle, wounding five, in the town of Jbela (Babel). It was not clear whether the victims were pilgrims; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 12*, 12 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-12/>.
- On 8 January 2012, a bomb placed inside a car wounded at least 13 Shi'ite pilgrims when it exploded near the town of Mussayab (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>.
- On 7 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims killed at least two people and wounded 20 others in the town of Mahmudiyah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 7*, 7 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-7/>.
- On 5 January 2012, 48 pilgrims were killed and dozens wounded when a suicide bomber detonated himself while the pilgrims were heading from Nassariyah (Thi-Qar) to Kerbala ahead of Arbaeen. ISI/AQI claimed responsibility for the attack; AP, *Iraq's al-Qaida claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites*, 6 February 2012, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/national_world&id=8533308; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.
- On 5 December 2011, three bombs tore through crowds of Shi'ite pilgrims in the town of Hilla (Babel), killing at least 22 - mostly women and children - and wounding 63 more. In a separate incident, in Latifiyah (Babel), gunmen using hand grenades attacked Shi'ite pilgrims marching to the holy city of Kerbala to mark the festival of Ashura, killing two and wounding four others; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, December 5*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-5>.
- On 30 September 2011, a car bomb exploded near a mosque outside the town of Hilla (Babel) as mourners gathered for the funeral of a prominent tribal sheikh, killing at least 17 people and wounding 70 others; Raheem Salman, *Iraq car bomb kills 17 at funeral near Hillah*, Los Angeles Times, 1 October 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-iraq-bombing-20111001>.
- On 25 August 2011, a suicide bomber blew up his car near the Dawood Al-Ashoor mosque in Basrah as worshippers were leaving after prayer, killing four people and wounding dozens more; Reuters, *Attacks across Iraq kill 14, wound dozens*, 25 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attacks-across-iraq-kill-14-wound-dozens/>.

⁵⁷³ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 19 January 2012, four bombs planted at the house of a Shi'ite family in central Ba'quba (Diyala) blew up, causing no casualties. In a separate incident, three food stores owned by Shi'ites in Ba'quba were blown up, also causing no casualties; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
- On 7 January 2012, a bomb attached to a car carrying Shi'ite pilgrims killed one passenger and wounded three others when it exploded in Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 7*, 7 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-7/>.
- On 1 December 2011, a car bomb exploded in a street market in the mainly Shi'ite Iraqi town of Khalis, killing 10 people and wounding 25 others; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
- On 30 November 2011, a parked car bomb exploded near a Shi'ite procession, wounding seven people, in Balad Ruz; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 30*, 30 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-30/>.
- On 20 January 2011, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims killed one pilgrim and wounded two others in the town of Kanaan; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 20*, 20 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-20/>.

⁵⁷⁴ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 16 January 2012, a car bomb exploded in a residential complex housing displaced Shi'ite Muslims of Shabak ethnicity, killing at least eight people and wounding four others, east of the city of Mosul; Jamal al-Badrani, *Car bomb kills at least 9 in Iraq's Mosul*, Reuters, 16 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80F0E520120116>.
- On 14 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims wounded five people, including two policemen, when it went off near a main road leading to a Shi'ite mosque east of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>.
- On 5 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting a minibus carrying Shi'ite pilgrims from the predominantly Shi'ite town of Tal Afar to Kerbala killed one child and wounded five women when it exploded southwest of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 5*, 5 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-5/>.

- Aswat al-Iraq, *Child killed, 5 women injured in explosion against Imam Hussein Day's visitors in Mosul*, 5 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(maccrjvqg05ifo45r5n1rwm1\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146366&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(maccrjvqg05ifo45r5n1rwm1))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146366&l=1).
- On 6 December 2011, six Katyusha rockets set for firing at Shi'ite pilgrims who celebrate the Ashura Day have been disarmed in Tal Afar district; AKnews, *Rockets set for targeting Shiite pilgrims disarmed in Nineveh*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276623/>.
- ⁵⁷⁵ In 2011 and 2012, the following incidents were reported from Salah Al-Din Governorate:
- On 6 January 2012, two militants were killed when a bomb they were trying to plant exploded near a main road used by Shi'ite pilgrims in Tarmiya; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 7*, 7 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-7>.
 - On 26 December 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a bus carrying Iranian pilgrims, wounding three of them; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 26*, 26 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-26/>.
 - On 21 October 2011, a Shi'ite mosque under construction was badly damaged when explosives planted inside the mosque exploded in the outskirts of Dujail; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 21*, 21 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-21/>.
 - On 5 October 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a bus carrying Iranian pilgrims and wounded at least four in the town of Taji; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-5/>.
 - On 12 February 2011, during a commemoration of the death of Hasan Al-Askari, one of 12 revered Shi'ite imams, a suicide bomber targeting Shi'ite pilgrims detonated an explosive vest at a bus depot at the entry to Samarra, killing 48 people and wounding 80 others; Reuters, *Iraq has fewer violent deaths in February*, 1 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-has-fewer-violent-deaths-in-february/>; Sabah al-Bazee, *Suicide bomber kills 13 policemen in Iraq*, Reuters, 21 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-10-wounds-15-in-iraq/>.
 - On 10 February 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked a group of Shi'ite pilgrims near the town of Dujail as they headed to Samarra for a religious commemoration, killing eight and wounding 30 others; Sabah al-Bazee, *Suicide bomber kills 13 policemen in Iraq*, Reuters, 21 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-10-wounds-15-in-iraq/>.
 - On 5 February 2011, a parked car bomb exploded, wounding nine civilians including an Iranian pilgrim, in the city of Samarra; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 5*, 5 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-5/>.
- ⁵⁷⁶ On 6 December 2011, two mortar rounds reportedly landed near al-Mustafa mosque in Ras Domiz area, southern Kirkuk, where pilgrims were gathering to commemorate *Ashura*, a major religious ritual, killing one civilian and wounding eight others; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 6*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-6/>; Abdullah al-Amiri, *One killed, eight wounded in mortar attack on Shiite mosque in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276618/>.
- ⁵⁷⁷ See "Turkmen".
- ⁵⁷⁸ See "Shabak".
- ⁵⁷⁹ See "Individuals with Ethnicity-Based Claims".
- ⁵⁸⁰ On 12 September 2011, at a fake checkpoint, gunmen reportedly dressed in military uniforms forced their way onto a bus of Shi'ite pilgrims traveling from Kerbala to Syria and executed all 22 men on board. According to Iraqi officials, three men affiliated with AQI have been arrested in connection to the killings; Hasun Haffar, Nakhil murderers caught in Anbar, AKnews, 21 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279576/>; AP, *Gunmen in Iraq Take Over Bus Filled With Shiite Pilgrims and Kill 22 Men*, 12 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html>.
- ⁵⁸¹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 2 November 2011, three consecutive motorbike bombings on central Basrah's busy Jamhuriya Street, near shops and cafes, killed at least 12 people and wounded over 60 others; BNO News, *At least 12 killed, 60-plus injured after motorcycle blasts in southeastern Iraq*, 2 November 2011, <http://channel6news.com/2011/11/at-least-12-killed-60-plus-injured-after-motorcycle-blasts-in-southeastern-iraq/>.
 - On 22 September 2011, a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant near a Shi'ite mosque in the town of Al-Iskandariyah (Babel), killing four and wounding 17 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Four killed, 17 injured in Babel blast*, 23 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144980&l=1; Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Officials: Bomb kills 2 near Iraq mosque*, AP, 22 September 2011, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/09/22/general-ml-iraq_8695108.html.
 - On 1 June 2011, six people were killed and at least 11 others were wounded when a bomb exploded at a wedding party in Al-Hamiya village in Mussayib (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 1*, 1 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-1/>.
 - On 7 August 2010, three bombs detonated in a popular market in Basrah, killing 43 people and wounding 185 others; BBC, *The death toll from a Basra market blast rises to 43*, 8 August 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10907112>.
 - On 10 May 2010, a coordinated series of suicide bombings and assassinations across the country included two bombings in a market in Suwayra (Wassit) that killed 16 civilians and injured more than 80 others and three bombings in Basrah, one of them in a central market, killing 20; Rebecca Santana and Lara Jakes, *In Iraq's bloodiest day of 2010, attacks kill 100*, AP, 11 May 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9FK8S480; The Times, *102 dead as bombers fill power vacuum caused by Iraqi election*, 11 May 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article7122359.ece>.
 - On 14 January 2010, 25 people were killed and 72 others were wounded as three bombs exploded simultaneously in a crowded local market near the Imam Ali shrine in Najef; Qassim Zein and Hannah Allam, *Deadly bombings strike Iraqi holy city of Najaf*, McClatchy Newspapers, 14 January 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/01/14/82373/deadly-bombings-strike-iraqi-holy.html>; AFP, *Bomb blasts in Najaf kill 15*, 14 January 2010, <http://www.france24.com/en/20100114-bomb-blasts-najaf-kill-15>.
- ⁵⁸² For example, Shi'ites in the mixed governorates of Salah Al-Din and Diyala have reportedly been targeted in towns such as Tal Afar (Nineva), Khalis or Khanaqeen (Diyala), where many Shi'ites live. Reported incidents included:
- On 7 March 2012, two bombs that exploded in swift succession outside a crowded restaurant in the predominantly Turkmen city of Tal Afar (Nineva) killed 20 and wounded 21 others; Rezan Ahmed, *UPDATE on Talafaar bombings: 20 killed, 21 injured*, AKnews, 8 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294556/>; AP, *Double bombing kills 14 in northern Iraq*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/03/08/double-bombing-kills-northern-iraq/BQTPVPYADROoMov9mc4JyL/story.html>;

- Mohammed Tawfeeq, *15 dead in Iraq bomb attacks*, CNN, 7 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/07/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>.
- On 14 December 2011, two car bombs left three people dead and another 35 injured after they exploded near shops and restaurants in the town of Tal Afar; Reuters, *Bombs kill three, injure 35 in north Iraq-police*, 14 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombs-kill-three-injure-35-in-north-iraq-police/>.
 - On 1 December 2011, a car bomb exploded in a street market in the mainly Shi'ite Iraqi town of Khalis, killing 10 people and wounding 25 others; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
 - On 21 May 2010, a minivan packed with explosives blew up at a crowded market in front of a coffee shop in the mainly Shi'ite town of Khalis, killing at least 30 people and wounding 80 others; BBC, *Iraqi car bomb toll in Diyala rises to 30*, 22 May 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/10141868.stm; Reuters, *Bomb at market in northern Iraq kills 30*, 21 May 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE64K1XG.htm>.
 - On 26 March 2010, twin bombings struck a coffee shop in central Khalis, killing 59 and wounding 73 others; Reuters, *Death toll in Iraq bombing rises to 59*, 27 March 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62Q0ZS20100327>.
- ⁵⁸³For example, reported attacks in predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhoods of Baghdad included:
- On 27 January 2012, 32 people were killed and 71 others wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives near a funeral procession in the predominantly Shi'ite Za'afaraniyah neighbourhood; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-28>.
 - On 24 January 2012, four car bombs exploded in mainly Shi'ite areas of Baghdad (Sadr City, Shula and Hurriya), killing 14 people and wounding 75 others; Kareem Raheem, *Car bombs kill 14, wound 75 in Iraq capital*, 24 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80N08E20120124>.
 - On 5 January 2012, explosions struck the Baghdad's largest Shi'ite neighborhood of Sadr City and the neighbourhood of Kadhemiyah in north-western Baghdad, which is home to a revered Shi'ite shrine, killing at least 30 people; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.
 - On 22 December 2011, apparently coordinated attacks targeting mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods across Baghdad killed at least 69 people and wounded nearly 200 others; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>; Prashant Rao, *Bombs kill 57 as Iraq mired in political crisis*, AFP, 22 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i84pYeLjF7ArcDK_pu3A5J2vuw?docId=CNG.011113bade199475ce97cc632952336b.3a1.
 - On 27 October 2011, a twin bombing killed at least 18 people and wounded 36 others in the Ur neighborhood. The first explosion at a music store killed two people. The second bomb struck just minutes later, as rescue workers and others rushed to the scene; Sameer N. Yacoub, *Officials: Twin Bombs Kill 18 in Baghdad*, AP, 27 October 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/story/2011-10-27/Baghdad-explosion/50958402/1>.
 - On 13 October 2011, at least 16 people were killed by two blasts in Baghdad's predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhood of Sadr City; BBC, *Bomb blasts in Iraq's Sadr City kill 16*, 13 October 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15300037>. Ansar Al-Islam reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks; Thomas Joscelyn, *The Terrorists' War in Iraq Continues*, The Weekly Standard, 26 October 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/terrorists-war-iraq-continues_604035.html.
 - On 10 October 2011, at least 10 people were killed in three successive blasts in Baghdad's mainly Shi'ite Washash district. The first blast was followed by two more when emergency services arrived at the site to tend to the wounded; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bombers, attacks hit Baghdad police, 28 dead*, 12 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-attacks-hit-baghdad-police-28-dead/>. Ansar Al-Islam reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks; Thomas Joscelyn, *The Terrorists' War in Iraq Continues*, The Weekly Standard, 26 October 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/terrorists-war-iraq-continues_604035.html.
 - On 27 September 2011, a car bomb exploded near a popular restaurant in a Shi'ite neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad, killing three people and wounding ten others; Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Gunmen kill 5 relatives of Sunni fighter in Iraq*, AP, 28 September 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ikVj7TcAiSLJeC-xQVyXsCVKbiAA?docId=f73917d1178a42aa9ea9d71944e974ec>.
 - On 23 June 2011, three bombs killed at least 23 people and wounded a dozen others when they exploded in a busy market and near a religious site in the mainly Shi'ite district of Al-Shurta Al-Rabaa in southwestern Baghdad. A parked car bomb exploded a short time later in the southern Abu Dsheer District, killing two people and wounding 10 others; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 23*, 23 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-23/>.
 - On 3 May 2011, a car bomb explosion near a market in Baghdad's predominantly Shi'ite District of Abu Dsheer killed nine people and wounded 27 others; Reuters, *Car bomb blast in Iraq kills nine, 27 wounded*, 3 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/car-bomb-blast-in-iraq-kills-nine-27-wounded/>.
 - On 2 November 2010, car bombs, roadside bombs and mortar shells in quick succession killed more than 60 people and wounded 360 others across Baghdad's mostly Shi'ite neighborhoods; Reuters, *Baghdad bombs death toll reaches 64, minister says*, 3 November 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A20CM.htm>; Jane Arraf, *Scores killed as series of bombs rock a dazed Baghdad*, Christian Science Monitor, 2 November 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/02/103031/bombers-strike-baghdad-killing.html>.
- ⁵⁸⁴ Sectarian strife, especially Sunni-on-Shi'ite violence, has reportedly been on the rise since the fall of the former regime in 2003. However, the bombing of the holy Shi'ite Al-Askari shrine in Samarra (Salah Al-Din) in February 2006 by Sunni insurgents, who had repeatedly attacked Shi'ite civilians in an aim to ignite sectarian violence, resulted in large-scale tit-for-tat killings and forced displacements of both Sunni and Shi'ite civilians at the hands of extremist groups and militia-infiltrated security forces; Ashraf Al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, *Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq*, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 2006, pp. 5, 8, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/\\$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf).
- ⁵⁸⁵ Maps comparing the demographic make-up of Baghdad before 2006 and after 2007 have reportedly been showing a pattern of Shi'ite expansion in the east and northwest, the clear reduction of mixed neighborhoods and the concentration of Sunnis in the west of the city; see for example, BBC, *Baghdad: Mapping the violence*, accessed 18 March 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/baghdad_navigator/. See also the map collection developed by Dr. Michael Izady for Columbia University's Gulf/2000 Project, which show Baghdad's demographic changes, <http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml>. For an overview of sectarian violence in Baghdad between 2006 and 2007, see Institute for the Study of the War, *Maps Of Ethno-Sectarian*

Violence In Baghdad - December 2006 To December 2007, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.understandingwar.org/map/maps-ethno-sectarian-violence-baghdad-december-2006-december-2007>. Most violence and sectarian-induced displacement reportedly took place in and around Baghdad, but it was also significant in other mixed areas, especially Latifiya, Yusufiya and Mahmudiya (north Babel), Balad, Dujail and Samarra (Salah Al-Din), Ba'quba and Muqdadiya (Diyala), Mosul and Basrah. All Iraqi cities, to some degree, have reportedly seen sectarian violence given their mixed populations; Ashraf Al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, *Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq*, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 2006, pp. 2, 17-18, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/\\$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf). As a result of large-scale killings, many Sunnis and Shi'ites were reportedly forced to leave their areas of origin where they either constituted a minority or where armed groups of the opposite sect established control; Ashraf Al-Khalidi and Victor Tanner, *Sectarian Violence: Radical Groups Drive Internal Displacement in Iraq*, The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, October 2006, p. 2, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpDocuments\)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/\\$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/32A4EE04F73CD176C125720B004F151A/$file/10112006_Tanner_Iraq_FINAL.pdf).

⁵⁸⁶ In Baghdad, it was reported that tens of thousands were killed and more than 10 percent of the population was displaced as of February 2006; IAU/IOM/UN Habitat, *Urban Baghdad: Impact of Conflict on Daily Life*, June 2011, pp. 2, 3, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1372/Urban%20Baghdad-Impact%20of%20conflict%20on%20daily%20life-May%2022-Final.pdf>.

⁵⁸⁷ Reportedly, IDPs overwhelmingly fled to areas where their own sectarian group was dominant, Shi'ites fled to Shi'ite-dominated areas and Sunnis to Sunni areas, a pattern that led to demographic homogenization and greater segregation of communities. According to IDMC and Brookings, “*In Baghdad, militant groups, including several affiliated to political actors and state institutions, sought to establish sectarian boundaries across what had been mixed neighbourhoods, systematically displacing members of opposing sects to consolidate their control.*” More than 1.5 million people were reportedly internally displaced in the aftermath of the Samarra mosque bombing in February 2006, most of them Shi'ites (60%) and Sunnis (30%), and the remainder minority groups; IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, pp. 6, 7, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf). Elizabeth G. Ferris, *The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq*, Brookings Institution, Policy Paper Number 5, August 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2008/08_iraq_ferris/08_iraq_ferris.pdf.

⁵⁸⁸ It is estimated that a total of 2 million Iraqis fled after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, mainly to neighbouring countries, especially Syria and Jordan. Among those registered with UNHCR, the majority fled from Baghdad.

⁵⁸⁹ “*Neighbourhoods that once were mixed are now visibly dominated by one sectarian group, their territory marked with flags, sectarian pictures and graffiti; all of which were associated with abductions and assassinations which had triggered the initial displacements.*” IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 8, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf). Reportedly, the formerly predominantly Sunni but mixed Doura neighbourhood has become largely Shi'ite. The predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhood of Jadiriya, which used to have Sunni and Christian minorities, has become practically homogenous Shi'ite; Richard Engel, *Post-US Iraq: Welcome to Shia-stan*, MSNBC, 14 December 2011, <http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/news/2011/12/14/9422243-post-us-iraq-welcome-to-shia-stan>. The Los Angeles Times reported that Sunnis “*are now confined to a few enclaves scattered across the city. Adhamiya is surrounded by a 15-foot concrete wall, installed to keep insurgents in as well as Shiite militias out, and residents say they feel nervous every time they venture out into the majority Shiite city beyond.*”; Liz Sly, *In Baghdad, Sunnis await elections with unease*, Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/05/world/la-fg-iraq-sunnis6-2010mar06>.

⁵⁹⁰ According to the US Department of State, the GoI has no comprehensive policy for undoing sectarian cleansing that occurred as a result of sectarian violence in mainly 2006 and 2007. At the same time, the GoI has reportedly encouraged returns and promised to provide essential services to returnees in Baghdad and Diyala Governorates; however, humanitarian organizations and Sunni leaders reportedly claim that the GoI does not fulfill its promises as it seeks to discourage Sunni Arab refugees and IDPs from returning to their former areas. GoI officials have reportedly said that practical obstacles such as property disputes prevent large-scale returns; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 32, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. For example, due to fear from further violence, only a few Sunnis were reportedly said to have returned to Baghdad's formerly mixed neighbourhood of Hurriyah after they were displaced by sectarian violence in mainly 2006. Hurriyah neighbourhood is reportedly under control of the Shi'ite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq. According to Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey S. Buchanan, USF-I chief spokesman, Shi'ite militias will keep Sunnis from returning to their former homes. Until today, Hurriyah's Sunni mosques, reportedly all destroyed in 2006, remain in shatters; Lara Jakes, *Iraq emerges from war a society divided by sect*, AP, 27 November 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/11/27/international/i082343S64.DTL&type=politics>. See also Heath Druzin, *The violence has waned, but the fear remains*, Stars and Stripes, 19 August 2010, <http://www.stripes.com/news/special-reports/the-violence-has-waned-but-the-fear-remains-1.115300>.

⁵⁹¹ Richard Engel, *Post-US Iraq: Welcome to Shia-stan*, MSNBC, 14 December 2011, <http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/news/2011/12/14/9422243-post-us-iraq-welcome-to-shia-stan>; Lara Jakes, *Iraq emerges from war a society divided by sect*, AP, 27 November 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/11/27/international/i082343S64.DTL&type=politics>.

⁵⁹² Many families, who have reportedly been forced to flee sectarian violence, still fear to return to their places of origin. According to USIP “*(...) the forced homogeneity is undoubtedly a factor in present stability, and people going back to places where they would constitute a religious minority might well generate violent responses. Of course, the opposite logic may also prevail, but many are unwilling to gamble on it.*” Patricia Weiss Fagen, *Refugees and IDPs after Conflict - Why They Do Not Go Home*, USIP, Special Report 268, April 2011, pp. 8, 11, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR268Fagen.pdf>. UNHCR Returnee Monitoring also showed that not all returnees are able to return to their place of origin, in particular in areas in which the demographic make-up has been altered as a result of sectarian violence. Among refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 33 percent of those monitored in Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basrah and Ninewa Governorates reportedly returned to a different district in their original Governorate. This is at least partly due to the homogenization of formerly mixed neighbourhoods and districts as a result of sectarian violence; UNHCR Iraq, *Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011*.

⁵⁹³ According to a report by AP, “[T]he numbers so far are small and not easy to track with precision, but anecdotal accounts and a rise in business at real estate agencies in Sunni neighborhoods reveal a Sunni community contemplating the worse-case scenario and acting before it's too late.” Reportedly, real estate prices in Sunni neighbourhoods such as Adel, Adhamiyah and Khadra have recently risen; Rebecca Santana, *Fearful, Iraq's Sunnis Leave Mixed Neighborhoods*, AP, 1 January 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/fearful-iraqs-sunnis-leave-mixed-neighborhoods-15269268#.TweMqWbgK2w>; Raheem Salman and Alexandra Zavis, *Iraq bombings targeting*

Shiites kill 71, Los Angeles Times, 5 January 2012, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iraq-bombings-20120106.0.792291.story>.

⁵⁹⁴ According to IDMC/NRC, "Sunni and Shi'a communities are being persecuted in areas where they are a minority;" IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 36, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).

⁵⁹⁵ For example, on 16 April 2011, at least six gunmen reportedly stormed the home of a Shi'ite family living in Baghdad's mostly Sunni Jihad neighborhood and killed all four family members. Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Gunmen Kill Iraqi Family of 4 in Baghdad Home*, AP, 17 April 2011, <http://www.aolnews.com/2011/04/17/gunmen-kill-iraqi-family-of-4-in-baghdad-home/>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Gunmen storm house, kill four relatives in Baghdad*, CNN, 17 April 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-17/world/iraq.attack_1_gunmen-storm-house-iraq-interior-ministry-sunni?_s=PM:WORLD. See also US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁵⁹⁶ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 26 January 2012, Sheikh Qutadeh Mansour, preacher of Ali Bin Abi Talib Mosque in Heet, was killed when an improvised explosive device was detonated against his car; NINA, *Karmeh Sahwa commander, Heet's Mosque preacher assassinated*, 26 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMGKE.
- On 11 July 2011, police said they found the bodies of a Sunni cleric and his brother, who were kidnapped ten days earlier, with gunshot wounds to the heads and chests, in the town of Rutba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 11*, 11 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-11/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 3*, 3 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-3/>.
- On 1 March 2011, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest near a mosque after the evening prayer, killing one civilian and severely wounding the cleric and another two people in Ramadi; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 2*, 2 March 2011. On 4 February 2011, gunmen blew up the home of an Anbar University professor and cleric who criticized AQI during prayers the week before. The cleric was not at the house, in an area south of Fallujah, but two of his sons were wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 4*, 4 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
- On 24 January 2011, Ali Mohammed Al-Alwani, the Sunni imam of Al-Tawfiq mosque, was shot dead in Fallujah; Alsumaria TV, *Iraq mosque muezzin killed in armed attack*, 25 January 2011, <http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/print-news-1-59434.html>.
- On 10 November 2010, Abbas Mahmoud, the imam of the Sunni Al-Jazeera mosque, was shot dead near his home in Garma; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 10*, 10 November 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/node/374332>.

⁵⁹⁷ For example, on 25 October 2011, Sheikh Safa Jasim, a Sistani representative, was reportedly wounded in an attack against his home north of Hilla; his wife and son were killed and three other sons were wounded in the attack; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 26*, 26 October 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-26>. On 6 October 2011, another Sistani representative, Sheikh Karim Al-Khalidi, was reportedly shot in his chest and seriously wounded on his way home from prayer in the town of Al-Qassim; AFP, *Gunmen wound top Shi'ite cleric's aide*, 7 October 2011, <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/76342/gunmen-wound-top-shiite-clerics-aide>.

⁵⁹⁸ For example, on 23 July 2011, shots were reportedly fired at Sheikh Mohammed Falak, a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shi'ite leader, in the town of Zubayr (Basrah) as he was leaving a mosque. Falak was not hurt but a policeman at the scene was wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 24*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-24/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Representative of Shi'ite Clergyman Sistani, escapes assassination attempt*, 24 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143912&l=1.

⁵⁹⁹ For example, recent reported incidents included:

- On 9 September 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead the imam of a mosque near the mosque in the southeastern Zaafaranyah District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 10*, 10 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-10/>.
- On 28 August 2011, a suicide attack against the Sunni Umm Al-Qura mosque in the western Ghazaliyah district was reportedly targeting Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Al-Samarrai, a cleric and head of the Sunni Endowment. Al-Samarrai has been vocal in his criticism of AQI and ISI and has repeatedly been targeted. He was wounded in the attack; Bill Roggio, *Al Qaeda suicide bomber kills 28 Iraqis in attack in Baghdad mosque*, The Long War Journal, 28 August 2011, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/al-qaeda-suicide-bom-4.php>; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq mosque bomb targeted moderate Sunnis - officials*, Reuters, 29 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-mosque-bomb-targeted-moderate-sunnis-officials/>; Reuters, *Suicide attack kills at least 24 at Baghdad mosque*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-attack-kills-at-least-24-at-baghdad-mosque/>.
- On 13 August 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed Adil Jaiban, a Shi'ite mosque imam, using weapons equipped with silencers in the Baladiyah District of eastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 13*, 13 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-13/>; NINA, *Clergyman assassinated in eastern Baghdad*, 13 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHJKKK.

⁶⁰⁰ For example, on 4 March 2012, gunmen reportedly fired a grenade at a house in front of the Big Mosque in Diwaniya city, which belongs to the mosque preacher Sheikh Arkan Kazem, causing only material damage; NINA, *Security authority announce launching a grenade at the preacher of mosque in Qadisiyah*, 4 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFKKE; on 26 September 2011, gunmen on a motorcycle reportedly opened fire on the imam of Al-Nahda Mosque in central Diwaniyah after evening prayers, seriously wounding him and killing one of his relatives. Reportedly, he may have been targeted for his political views expressed in a sermon; Aswat al-Iraq, *Mosque Imam escapes assassination, his companion killed in Diwaniya*, 27 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145045&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 26*, 26 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-26/>; AKE, *Weekly Security Update for 5 October 2011*, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/category/security/weekly-security-update/>.

⁶⁰¹ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 20 May 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near the house of Saadoun Al-Mashaikhi, a mosque imam, while he was returning from prayer, wounding him and killing two people, including his son in southern Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 20*, 20 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-20/>.
- On 28 April 2011, gunmen killed Basheer Al-Sumaidaie, an imam, and his wife and daughter when they stormed his house in the town of Imam Weis, east of Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 29*, 29 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-29/>.

- On 8/9 September 2010, Jabbar Saleh Al-Jibouri, a Sunni cleric and medic, was stabbed, beheaded and set alight in his home near Muqdadiyah. Reportedly, Al-Jibouri used to provide medical treatment to Sahwa members. Al-Jibouri had only returned to the area three months earlier after having been displaced as a result of AQI threats in 2007; Reuters, *Gunmen behead, set alight Sunni cleric in Iraq*, 9 September 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/09/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE6883RL20100909>.

⁶⁰² For example, on 12 October 2011, unknown gunmen reportedly shot dead Sheikh Mohannad Al-Maamar, a senior Shi'ite cleric and Sistani representative, along with his escort, near his house in a southern neighbourhood of Kerbala; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; PUK Media, *Religious man killed along with his escort in Kerbala*, 12 October 2011, http://www.pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9970:religious-man-killed-along-with-his-escort-in-karbala&catid=25:iraq&Itemid=386.

⁶⁰³ In the Governorate of Ninewa, there have been reports of dozens of mosque imams and preachers killed in the past several years; Aswat al-Iraq, *Mosul mosque preacher shot dead by gunmen*, 22 July 2010, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/?p=134776>. For example, on 26 January 2012, Adnan Mahmoud, imam and preacher of Sadiq Mosque of Cairo in Mosul, and his brother were reportedly killed when they stepped out of the mosque after prayer; Rezan Ahmed, *Imam and brother murdered outside mosque*, Aknews, 26 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286463/>. On 17 February 2011, armed men reportedly shot dead Sheikh Ali Fakhri in front of his house in Rashidiya town; Aswat al-Iraq, *Muslim cleric killed in Ninewa*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141043&l=1.

⁶⁰⁴ For example, on 30 November 2011, armed men reportedly attacked the home of Sheikh Khalid Al-Naisani in Samarra, killing him, his wife, their 17-year-old son and two other people who were at his house; AFP, *Five dead in attack on home of Iraq cleric*, 30 November 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?col=§ion=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2011/November/middleeast_November825.xml. On 13 June 2011, the imam of a mosque was reportedly wounded when gunmen stormed his house and shot him in Balad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 13*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-13/>.

⁶⁰⁵ A Sunni mosque's imam and his two sons were reportedly wounded when they came under gunmen's fire in northern Wassit province; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sunni Imam, his 2 sons injured in Shiite Wassit*, 8 June 2010, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/?p=133088>.

⁶⁰⁶ USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9e90c22b.html>. For example, on 12 September 2011, Ahmed Mahmud al-Jabalawi, imam of the Sunni Al-Shuhada mosque, was reportedly shot dead by gunmen using pistols equipped with silencers when on his way to the mosque for morning prayers in Ba'quba (Diyala). Reportedly, the imam was known for his outspoken criticism of AQI; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraqi police: Gunmen ambush Shiite pilgrims, killing 22*, CNN, 12 September 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-12/world/iraq.violence.1.shiite-pilgrims-karbala-gunmen?_s=PM:WORLD; AFP, *Gunmen kill 22 passengers on bus coming from Syria in Iraq's western province*, 13 September 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/13/166624.html>. Members of the Sunni Waqf, or Endowment, have also been targeted on several occasions. For example, on 25 July 2011, Sheikh Omar Ali Mohammed, head of the Sunni Endowment in Diyala, was reportedly wounded when a roadside bomb detonated in central Ba'quba; NINA, *Injury of the Sunni Waqf director in Diyala*, 25 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHHGK. See also "Sahwa Members, Traditional tribal, religious and community leaders" and "Government Officials and Employees".

⁶⁰⁷ According to UNAMI/OHCHR, religious or sectarian hatred may be a motive behind the killing of Shi'ite religious figures; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶⁰⁸ According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, local representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani have been assassinated as part of intra-Shi'ite power struggles over political and religious dominance in Southern Iraq. Examples of reported attacks against Al-Sistani representatives included:

- On 3 March 2012, a bomb targeted a number of houses belonging to relatives of Abdul Hakim Safi, the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Basrah Governorate. The explosion damaged the facades of houses surrounding Al-Safi Mosque central of Basrah, but caused no casualties; NINA, *A bomb exploded near homes of Cleric Sistani representative's relatives in Basra*, 3 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFIFI.
- On 3 March 2012, police defused an explosive charge that was planted near the house of Sheikh Mohammad Jaafar Baqer Al-Nasseri, an assistant to Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, near the Saheb al-Zaman mosque in northern Nasseriyah (Thi-Qar); Aswat al-Iraq, *Police foils life attempt of al-Sistani's assistant in Nassiriya*, 3 March 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1).
- On 26 February 2012, an IED detonated near the home of a representative of Ayatollah Al-Sistani in north Basrah. The same day, two handgrenades were aimed at Ayatollah Al-Sistani's representatives in Diwaniyah; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 27 February 2012.
- On 25 October 2011, Sheikh Safa Jasim, a Sistani representative survived with injuries an attack against his home north of Hilla (Babel); his wife and son were killed and three other sons were wounded in the attack; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 26*, 26 October 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-26>.
- On 12 October 2011, unknown gunmen driving a car shot dead Sheikh Mohannad Al-Maamar, a senior Shi'ite cleric and Sistani representative, along with his escort, near his house in a southern neighbourhood of Kerbala; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; PUK Media, *Religious man killed along with his escort in Kerbala*, 12 October 2011, http://www.pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9970:religious-man-killed-along-with-his-escort-in-karbala&catid=25:iraq&Itemid=386.
- On 6 October 2011, another Sistani representative, Sheikh Karim Al-Khalidi, was shot in his chest and seriously wounded when on his way home from prayer in the town of Al-Qassim (Babel); AFP, *Gunmen wound top Shiite cleric's aide*, 7 October 2011, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/76342/gunmen-wound-top-shiite-clerics-aide>.
- On 23 July 2011, shots were fired at Sheikh Mohammed Falak, a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shi'ite leader, in the town of Zubayr (Basrah) as he was leaving a mosque. Falak was not hurt but a policeman at the scene was wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 24*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-24/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Representative of Shiite Clergyman Sistani, escapes assassination attempt*, 24 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143912&l=1.

See also chapters "Members of Political Parties" and "Actors of Violence".

⁶⁰⁹ Mahmoud Al-Hassani Al-Sarkhi is reported to be a controversial Shi'ite cleric who staunchly opposed the US invasion but also Iranian influence in Iraq. He came out strongly against Iranian-backed political parties such as Dawa, ISCI and Badr, is an outspoken critic of the Shi'ite religious establishment around Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Najef and fell out with Shi'ite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr. Al-Sarkhi reportedly declared himself an *Ayatollah*, a title many religious Shi'ites strongly contest. In the past, his followers violently clashed on several occasions with the ISF and Al-Sarkhi instigated his followers to attack the Iranian consulates in Basrah and Kerbala in June 2006 after Iranian television news broadcast questioned Al-Sarkhi's religious credentials. There are allegations that Al-Sarkhi is responsible for the assassination of Shi'ite rivals. Al-Sarkhi did not appear in public for several years; IWPR, *Unholy war in Kerbala*, Iraqi Crisis Report 230, 15 August 2007, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/unholy-war-karbala>; Sam Dagher, *As British troops exit Basra, Shiites vie to fill power vacuum*, Christian Science Monitor, 17 September 2007, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0917/p01s08-wome.html>; Kathleen Ridolfo, *Iraq: Radical Cleric Challenges Shi'ite Establishment*, RFE/RL, 24 August 2006, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070797.html>; John Pilger, *Government Fights Militia in Southern Iraq*, 18 August 2006, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/pilger.php?articleid=9555>; Solomon Moore, *Raid by Army Sparks Clash With Iraqi Cleric's Followers; 4 Killed*, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/16/world/fg-iraq16>.

⁶¹⁰ The attacks have reportedly caused no casualties. Leaflets were found in Mussayib (Babel) accusing Al-Sistani followers for the attacks against Al-Sarkhi and inciting further violence; Aswat al-Iraq, *Police foils life attempt of al-Sistani's assistant in Nassiriya*, 3 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1); Aswat al-Iraq, *Clashes erupt between security and religious followers*, 24 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(mj0s3faghaklfj45nluxrenj\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147091](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(mj0s3faghaklfj45nluxrenj))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147091); NINA, *Leaflets in Musayyib district of Babel province accused Sistani's representatives of setting fire to al-Sarkhi offices*, 20 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFKIK; Yousef al-Babili, *Babil bomb attack attempt on Shiite cleric's representative thwarted*, AKnews, 20 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291100/>; NINA, *House of cleric representative in Babel fired at*, 20 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFLGG; NINA, *Set fire to one of Cleric Sarkhi's offices in Qadisiyah*, 20 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFLDK; All Iraq News, *Burning Sarkhi's mosque in Diwaniya*, 20 February 2012, http://www.alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4553:burning-al-sarkhi-shrine-in-diwaniya&catid=36:security&Itemid=37; NINA, *Setting fire to an office of Senior Cleric, Sarkhi west of Basra*, 19 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFJFG; NINA, *Two people arrested in Babel with possession of leaflets inciting against the followers of Sistani*, 19 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFJFL; All Iraq News, *Sarkhi's Office burned in Diwaniyah*, 19 February 2012, http://alliraqnews.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4526:sarkhis-office-burned-in-diwaniyah&catid=36:security&Itemid=37; Aswat al-Iraq, *Residence of followers of Sistani attacked*, 18 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(h2cr5n55530bhmxkq2te55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146979](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(h2cr5n55530bhmxkq2te55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146979); Aswat al-Iraq, *Attacks on religious leader representative's residence*, 18 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(pmodyfhqrdaax55vsx0a0fc\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146973&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(pmodyfhqrdaax55vsx0a0fc))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146973&l=1); NINA, *Breaking news. Grenade attack on four houses of eminent partisans of Cleric Sistani in Qadisiyah*, 18 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFHIL.

⁶¹¹ The amendment of the *Electoral Law No. 26 of 2009 Amending the Electoral Law No. 16 of 2005*, approved on 9 December 2009, granted five seats to Christian minorities distributed among the governorates of Baghdad (2), Ninewa (1), Kirkuk (1), Dahuk (1) and Erbil (1), with all five seats constituting one constituency. The other minorities were allocated one seat, including one each going to the Yazidis and Shabak in Ninewa Governorate, and one to the Sabaeen-Mandaeans in Baghdad (each seat is a separate constituency); UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 40, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. However, minority representatives reportedly criticized the law saying that the scope of the law was too restrictive. The Sabaeen-Mandaean seat is restricted to Baghdad, meaning that only those with a residency in the governorate were able to vote for the Sabaeen-Mandaean candidate. However, the majority of Sabaeen-Mandaeans are reportedly said to be living scattered in various governorates or have been forced to flee abroad. A case brought before the Iraqi Federal Court in February 2010 by the Mandaean High Council asked that the Sabaeen-Mandaeans be considered as a national constituency (like Christians), but at the time of writing the case is still pending. Yazidi representatives on the other hand have reportedly said that based on their size, they should have been granted a higher number of seats in the CoR. This claim was recognized by the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, which ruled on 14 June 2010, that the Yazidi community should be provided with more than one seat taking into consideration the community's population numbers. The court's decision will come into effect at the next CoR election in 2014; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 13, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 40, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶¹² USCIRF reported that a minority caucus including all ethnic and religious minorities' political parties in the CoR was established in early 2011. According to USIP, which is working to help build its capacity, the caucus' goals for this parliamentary term include reforming the education curriculum to reflect Iraq's minority communities more positively, eliminating discrimination in education and employment, improving the delivery of basic services in minority communities, increasing minorities' participation in all levels of government, and having greater control over local affairs; USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>.

⁶¹³ Sargon Lawson Sliwah [Karkis Sleiwa] from the Rafidain/Assyrian Democratic Movement holds the Ministry of Environment; Iraq Business News, *Full List of Iraq's New Cabinet*, 22 December 2010, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2010/12/22/full-list-of-iraqs-new-cabinet/>. In the previous cabinet, three minority members were represented, including two Christian ministers (Ministry for Human Rights, Ministry for Industry and Oil) and one Yazidi, as Minister of State for Civil Society Affairs; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶¹⁴ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶¹⁵ According to the US Department of State, members of non-Muslim religious groups are "practically non-existent" in the security and police forces; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, pp. 6, 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 15, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

- ⁶¹⁶ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 12, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁶¹⁷ Minority groups are reportedly often considered to have ties to the supposedly Christian “West” and, by association, with the USF-I/MNF-I. According to HRW, they are perceived as accounting for a large number of the interpreters working for the USF-I; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁶¹⁸ Reportedly, Christians and Yazidis, whose religions do not prohibit alcohol sale/use, are known to sell liquor, making them easily identifiable as minorities. Furthermore, Christians and Sabeen-Mandaens are reported to be traditionally working as jewelers and goldsmiths, making them preferred targets for kidnappings for ransom; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁶¹⁹ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 11, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁶²⁰ Ferhad Ibrahim, *Droht eine Zerstörung der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt im Irak?* (in German language), homepage of the German Bundestag, September 2011, <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/09/Beilage/004.html#8>. The last UNAMI/OHCHR human rights report on Iraq observed an increase of violence targeting religious and ethnic minorities during the first quarter of 2010, which coincided with the parliamentary elections, and the last quarter of 2010; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 40, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁶²¹ Ferhad Ibrahim, *Droht eine Zerstörung der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt im Irak?* (in German language), homepage of the German Bundestag, September 2011, <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/09/Beilage/004.html#8>.
- ⁶²² According to Wijdan Michael, Iraq’s then human rights minister, armed groups sought to “to empty Iraq of Christians”; USCIRF, *1/21/2011: Commissioner Nina Shea Testifies on Recent Attacks Targeting Minorities in Iraq and Egypt*, 21 January 2011, <http://www.uscifr.gov/government-relations/congressional-testimony/3520-1212011-commissioner-nina-shea-testifies-on-recent-attacks-targeting-minorities-in-iraq-and-egypt.html>.
- ⁶²³ USIP, *USIP Making a Difference: The Plight of Christians and other Minorities in Iraq*, 16 March 2011, <http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-making-difference-the-plight-christians-in-iraq>.
- ⁶²⁴ According to Nina Shea of USCIRF, “[V]ictimised by discrimination, marginalization, displacement and violence, they do not receive adequate protection and justice from the state and lack the militia or tribal structures necessary to defend themselves in the absence of government protection. As a result, Christians and other small religious minorities have been emigrating in mass numbers, while those remaining in Iraq fear for their safety;” USCIRF, *1/21/2011: Commissioner Nina Shea Testifies on Recent Attacks Targeting Minorities in Iraq and Egypt*, 21 January 2011, <http://www.uscifr.gov/government-relations/congressional-testimony/3520-1212011-commissioner-nina-shea-testifies-on-recent-attacks-targeting-minorities-in-iraq-and-egypt.html>. Given minorities’ dire situation, USCIRF recommended that Iraq be placed on the State Department’s list of “countries of particular concern,” a designation reserved for states that have engaged in “systematic, ongoing, and egregious” violations of religious freedom; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>; see also Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 65, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁶²⁵ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 65, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁶²⁶ According to the US Department of State, “[V]iolence against adherents of various religious groups resulted in approximately 275 deaths, over 750 injuries, significant internal displacement, some external displacement as refugees, and restricted religious freedom”; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, pp. 6, 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 7, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁶²⁷ According to Minority Rights Group International, “[P]articularly in the disputed territories, smaller communities including Christians, Shabak, Turkmen and Yazidis are pressured by Arab and Kurdish political groupings seeking to gain their votes and secure control of the areas where they live. If they resist this pressure, they often risk losing access to jobs or services;” Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 13, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. Minorities such as Yazidis and Christians have also reported that Kurdish Peshmerga confiscated properties without compensation. Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>. Reports indicate that the Kurdish authorities in the disputed areas do however provide for some services, including payment of salaries for Yazidi religious instruction at certain state-funded schools; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁶²⁸ The unresolved status of the disputed area reportedly also results in gaps as to who is in charge to provide public services, leaving certain disputed areas underdeveloped and neglected; For example, it is reported that in the disputed areas of Ninewa, the Kurdish Peshmerga *de facto* control certain areas such as Sinjar, which is predominantly inhabited by Yazidis. At the same time, these areas are still reported to be under *de iure* administration of the central government (through the Ninewa provincial authorities). As a result of this split, neither party has an interest in investing in services in these areas; Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 15, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁶²⁹ Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for a referendum to determine whether citizens of the disputed areas wish to formally join the autonomous Kurdistan Region or remain under administration of the central authorities. There were allegations, denied by the KRG, that minority groups are subjected to intimidation, harassment, political disenfranchisement and economic discrimination at the hands of the Kurdish authorities or security forces, which have reportedly established *de facto* control over many of the disputed areas and seek to further their territorial claims. USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>. HRW reported that in some cases, “low-level violence” was used against those opposing Kurdish dominance in the disputed areas. HRW, *World Report 2011 - Iraq*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d3e801ed.html>.
- ⁶³⁰ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 9, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁶³¹ According to Minority Rights Group International, “the sources of abuse include family members, community members, armed gangs and, in 9 per cent of cases, government officials;” Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 3, 5, 23, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁶³² According to Minority Rights Group International, “(...) the specific conditions for minorities, coupled with the lack of safety for women

in general, has curtailed the freedom of movement women from minority communities might have previously enjoyed.” Among minority women surveyed in Iraq, only 25 percent have reportedly said that they thought that women felt safe when leaving the home (among Sabaeen-Mandaean women, less than 10% said to feel safe). Fear from abduction and forced marriage limit the freedom of movement of Yazidi women and girls. Sabaeen-Mandaean women reportedly fear forced conversion to Islam. And fear from verbal and sexual harassment at checkpoints also reportedly inhibits women’s freedom of movement; Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 24-25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶³³ Three quarters of the minority women interviewed for the Minority Rights Group International report have reportedly responded that they believed that women for security reasons needed to hide their religious affiliation, either by not wearing their religious symbols or traditional make-up, by wearing the *hijab* even if they are secular or non-Muslims, or by not speaking in their traditional languages. Two Christian women students interviewed said that they reportedly received threats at Mosul University for not wearing the *hijab*. Sabaeen-Mandaean women reported that they would be subjected to physical and verbal abuse in public, including in their workplace, if they did not adhere to an Islamic dress code; Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 11, 25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶³⁴ Mumtaz Lalani, *Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities*, Minority Rights Group International, June 2010, p. 3, <http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=956>.

⁶³⁵ For example, in the wake of the 31 October 2010 attack on a Christian church in Baghdad, the CoR speaker reportedly created a committee to address the situation of Christians and other minorities. The committee reportedly recommended many actions to the GoI, including public condemnations of attacks, increased security and compensation for victims; USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>.

⁶³⁶ Reportedly, the increased security measures around some places of worship have not increased the feeling of safety for minority group members and only 47 percent of those interviewed said that they felt safe visiting places of worship (with those living in the Kurdistan Region expressing more safety); Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 11, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. According to USCIRF, the GoI increased security at churches and in Christian areas, including by conducting searches for explosive devices before church services, increasing patrols in Christian neighborhoods and providing training for more Christians to protect churches. Furthermore, the GoI indicated that it would provide compensation to the families of those killed and injured in the 31 October 2010 attack and financial assistance to repair the church. In late 2010, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani called for the creation of a special government office to address Christian affairs, although this had not been done as of this writing; USCIRF *Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>. During the first anniversary of the 31 October 2010 attack, security measures at the church reportedly included rifle-armed police on rooftops in the area and ISF searching people and their bags as they entered the church; Amelie Herenstein, *Iraqi Christians mark anniversary of massacre*, AFP, 1 November 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h1Wp-AZM_xVdI9P79jqLKJRWpiLw?docId=CNG.454170910956617c4e43dfe923f4a7a4.391.

⁶³⁷ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 11, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶³⁸ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 15, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶³⁹ According to HRW, “[A]rmed groups continued to persecute ethnic and religious minorities with impunity” and “(...) minorities have not received sufficient government protection from targeted violence, threats, and intimidation. Perpetrators are rarely identified, investigated, or punished;” HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 65, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. According to the US Department of State, “[T]he government carried out few investigations of alleged sectarian-based crimes; arrests following murder or other crimes were rare during the reporting period;” US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 9, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 22, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶⁴⁰ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 15, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶⁴¹ According to Minority Rights Group International, “(...) fear of discrimination prevents some groups from reporting crimes and concerns to police. Faili Kurd respondents said 77 per cent felt this to be the case. Half the Yazidi respondents felt they had experienced discrimination when taking claims to local police services, while Bahá’í, Palestinian and Mandaean respondents to the survey said they were afraid to seek help from local police, for fear they might be discriminated against and therefore lose their claims;” Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 22, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶⁴² Minority Rights Group International found for example that in among the Christians interviewed in Dahuk Governorate, 82 percent had reportedly said that they were free to practice their religion. Among Christians in Kirkuk, only 5 percent were able to do so; Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 11, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁶⁴³ The last census covering all of Iraq’s Governorates, in 1987, showed 1.4 million Christians. Since 2003, the number has dropped to less than half; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁴ Iraqi Christians belong to different churches, including the Chaldean Catholic Church, the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Syrian Catholic Church, the Assyrian Church of the East, the Roman Catholic Church, the Armenian Catholic Church, and the Armenian Orthodox Church. Close to two-thirds of Iraqi Christians belong to the Chaldean Catholic Church and close to one-third to the Assyrian Church of the East.

⁶⁴⁵ SIGIR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, p. 68, 30 July 2011, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section4_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit; United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 41, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁶⁴⁶ According to USIP, 60% of the Christians in Iraq have become IDPs; USIP, *USIP Making a Difference: The Plight of Christians and other Minorities in Iraq*, 16 March 2011, <http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-making-difference-the-plight-christians-in-iraq>.

⁶⁴⁷ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁸ See chapter “Actors of Violence”.

⁶⁴⁹ Reportedly, Christians are also associated with the sale of alcohol, making them a target in an increasingly strict Islamic environment; see “*Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores*”.

⁶⁵⁰ In particular their religious ties with the “West” and the foreign “invaders” have reportedly made them a target. Furthermore, many Christians were reported to be employed by the MNF-I/USF-I since 2003; Kenneth Katzmann, *Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights*, CRS Report for Congress, 27 December 2011, p. 27, <http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf>; Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 8, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. See also “*Individuals Affiliated with the USF-I, Foreign Governments, NGOs or Companies*”.

⁶⁵¹ According to Chaldean Catholic Archbishop Bashar Warda of Erbil, up to 573 Christians have been killed in religiously and politically motivated attacks since 2003. He also stated that 66 churches have been attacked or bombed as well as two convents, a monastery and a church-run orphanage; John Newton and Andre Stiefenhofer, *Young Christian beheaded in northern Iraq*, Catholic Herald, 19 May 2011, <http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2011/05/19/young-christian-beheaded-in-northern-iraq/>. Other sources say that an estimated 900 Christians were killed in 25 attacks on Christian churches and monasteries between 2003 and the end of 2010; Usama Mahdi, *al-Iraq yarfuḥ da’awat kharijiya li-hijrat masihiyihi*, (in Arabic language), Elaph, 23 January 2011, www.elaph.com/Web/news/2011/1/626862.html, in: Ferhad Ibrahim, *Droht eine Zerstörung der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt im Irak?* (in German language), homepage of the German Bundestag, September 2011, <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/09/Beilage/004.html#8>. Amnesty International accounted for some 65 attacks on Christian churches in Iraq between mid-2004 and the end of 2009; Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20>. According to the Mosul-based Hammurabi Human Rights Organization, more than 800 Christians, including 12 clergy, were killed between 2003 and 2010 and 5,000 Christians were kidnapped and tortured while 51 churches saw attacks; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 40-41, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. According to Nina Shea of USCIRF, since 2003, “(...) Christians from every walk of life have been raped, tortured, kidnapped, beheaded, and evicted from their homes;” USCIRF, *1/21/2011: Commissioner Nina Shea Testifies on Recent Attacks Targeting Minorities in Iraq and Egypt*, 21 January 2011, <http://www.uscirf.gov/government-relations/congressional-testimony/3520-1212011-commissioner-nina-shea-testifies-on-recent-attacks-targeting-minorities-in-iraq-and-egypt.html>.

⁶⁵² After the 31 October 2010 attack, ISI reportedly released a statement saying “[A]ll Christian centers, organizations and institutions, leaders and followers, are legitimate targets for the mujahedeen (holy warriors) wherever they can reach them.” It stated that the attack at the church was launched to avenge the treatment of formerly Christian women that converted to Islam in Egypt; Reuters, *Iraqi religious heads call for Christians’ protection*, 13 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-religious-heads-call-for-christians-protection/>; Worthy Christian News, *Iraq Christians Fear More Deadly Attacks Amid Militant Warnings*, 15 November 2010, <http://www.worthynews.com/9740-iraq-christians-fear-more-deadly-attacks-amid-militant-warnings>; Jane Arraf, *In Iraq, Christians fear they could be wiped out - like Jews before them*, CS Monitor, 9 November 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1109/In-Iraq-Christians-fear-they-could-be-wiped-out-like-Jews-before-them>. ISI reportedly warned Christians against proselytizing and cooperating with occupation forces. Waleed Ibrahim, *Attack fears cloud Christmas for Baghdad Christians*, Reuters, 24 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attack-fears-cloud-christmas-for-baghdad-christians/>.

⁶⁵³ Since 2003, Iraq has reportedly seen several waves of Christians fleeing, especially from Mosul. In October 2008, it was reported that more than 12,000 Christians left after a wave of assassinations killed 14 Christians. In February 2010, more than 5,000 reportedly fled after at least 12 Christians were killed; Steven Lee Meyers, *More Christians Flee Iraq After New Violence*, New York Times, 12 December 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html?pagewanted=all>; Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20>; RFE/RL, *Exodus Of Christians From Iraq Intensifies*, 2 February 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_christians_/2295319.html; OCHA, *Iraq – Displacement in Mosul*, Situation Report No. 3, 6 March 2010, p. 1, <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/OCHA%20Iraq%20SitRep%20No.3%20-%20Displacement%20in%20Mosul%20-%206%20March%202010.pdf>. By 31 January 2012, the number of Christian IDPs in the Kurdistan Region has reportedly decreased significantly. Of the 1,354 families displaced by 31 January 2011 to the Kurdistan Region and Ninewa Governorate, 489 families reportedly remained displaced in these areas by 31 January 2012. In 2011, many Christian IDPs reportedly chose to emigrate or, to a lesser extent, return to their places of origin due to growing security fears, a lack of work opportunities, and difficulties to transfer their education documents. Promises of government assistance have reportedly not materialized; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2012, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>.

⁶⁵⁴ Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>.

⁶⁵⁵ According to Malcolm Smart, Amnesty International Director for the Middle East and North Africa, “[A]ttacks on Christians and their churches by armed groups have intensified in past weeks and have clearly included war crimes.” The NGO said that Christians in Mosul have been increasingly targeted for assassination by gunmen, with reports in Iraqi media of at least five killed in November and more reports of killings and abductions of Christians in December 2010. It also reported that Christians in Baghdad were subjected to increasing bomb and rocket attacks on their homes, as well as systematic threats in the mail or by text message; Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20>. The Iraqi MoHR reported that in 2010, a total of 83 Christians were killed and 188 were injured, compared to 2009 when 11 Christians were killed; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 41, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. It also reported that Christians in Mosul and other cities remained largely absent from the public sphere for fear of being targeted. This assessment is in line with a report released by the Barnabas Fund, a Christian NGO that collected testimonies from Iraqi Christian refugees in Syria and which says that Iraqi “are living behind locked doors. They are compelled to take long leaves of absence from work, in Mosul and other cities, as a result of the dangers they face at work. The universities are almost empty of Christian students, as are the schools;” Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20>. IOM observed an “atmosphere of extreme insecurity” among Christians in Baghdad despite increased security measures following the church attack. IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Christian%20Displacement%2031%20January%202011%20EN%20Final.pdf>. IOM also reported that rumours of further violence have been spread to encourage Christians in Baghdad to flee and sell their properties at low prices. IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Christian%20Displacement%2031%20January%202011%20EN%20Final.pdf>.

⁶⁵⁶ According to Lieutenant General Robert Cone, the US Deputy Commanding General for Operations in Iraq, AQI seemed determined to continue attacks against Christians and “(...) has shifted to try and go after the Christians where they live,” after security measures were

reinforced around the 144 churches in Iraq after the 31 October 2010 attack on a cathedral in Baghdad; Serena Chadhry, *INTERVIEW-Iraq's al Qaeda focused on Christian attacks-US*, Reuters, 6 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/interview-iraqs-al-qaeda-focused-on-christian-attacks-us/>. For example, reported incidents included:

- On 23 February 2011, attackers stormed the home of a Christian man in the Karrada district of central Baghdad and stabbed him to death; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 23*, 23 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-23/>.
 - On 30 December 2010, a series of at least six coordinated bombings in and around Baghdad targeted homes of Christians, killing at least three and wounding more than a dozen more. Aaron C. Davis, *Series of Baghdad bombings target Christians, police say*, Washington Post, 30 December 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123004248.html>; Reuters, *Two killed in attacks on Christians in Iraq capital*, 30 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/two-killed-in-attacks-on-christians-in-iraq-capital/>.
 - On 15 November 2010, gunmen stormed two adjacent homes in Al-Tahrir neighborhood in the eastern part of Mosul and shot dead two Christian men. In a separate incident, also in Mosul, assailants bombed another house belonging to a Christian family, wounding a bystander; Jomana Karadsheh, *Gunmen storm Christians' homes in northern Iraq, killing two*, CNN, 15 November 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-15/world/iraq.violence_1_iraqi-christians-christian-families-iraqi-interior-ministry-official?_s=PM:WORLD; Sinan Salaheddin, *Gunmen Kill 2 Christians in Northern Iraq*, AP, 16 November 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12160593>.
 - On 10 November 2010, a series of bomb and mortar attacks targeting Christian homes in Baghdad's neighbourhoods of Doura, Adhamiyah, Amiriyah, Karrada, Camp Sara and Mansour, killed at least five people and injured more than 30 others; Jim Muir, *Christian areas targeted in deadly Baghdad attacks*, BBC, 10 November 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11724378>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 10*, 10 November 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/node/374332>.
- Fearing further bloodshed, several church leaders reportedly urged Christians to keep Christmas 2010 low-key and limit celebrations to prayers and mass. Namo Abdulla, *Iraqi Christians mark safer Christmas in Kurdistan*, Reuters, 25 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-christians-mark-safer-christmas-in-kurdistan/>; Washington Times, *Iraqi churches cancel Christmas festivities*, 22 December 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/22/iraqi-churches-cancel-christmas-festivities/#>; Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20>.

⁶⁵⁷ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 15 January 2011, an armed man stormed a private hospital and wounded Nuyia Youssif Nuyia, a Chaldean Catholic specialist cardiologist, with a gun equipped with a silencer in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 17*, 17 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-17/>; Layla Yousif Rahema, *Christian doctor assaulted in Mosul*, Asia News, 17 January 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Christian-doctor-assaulted-in-Mosul-20516.html>.
- On 30 November 2010, a young Christian man was killed by gunmen when they stormed his grocery shop in eastern Mosul; iCasualties, 30 November 2010, <http://icasualties.org/Iraq/iraqideaths.aspx?hndPeriod=Nov-10>.
- On 22 November 2010, two Christian brothers were killed in Mosul when gunmen broke into their workplace in an industrial part of the city and shot them; Jomana Karadsheh, *Deadly attacks on Iraqi Christians continue*, CNN, 22 November 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/22/iraq.christians.targeted/index.html>.

⁶⁵⁸ Recent attacks against Christians as reported in the media included:

- On 21 January 2012, two gunmen killed a Christian nurse after they stormed his private medical clinic in northern Mosul city; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 21*, 21 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-21>; NINA, *Christian male nurse killed northern Mosul*, 21 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLHMF.
- On 25 December 2011, a Christian was shot dead by a group of armed men near his house in the city of Mosul; Trend News Agency, *Iraqi Christian shot dead on Christmas Day*, 25 December 2011, <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/1973624.html>.
- On 13 December 2011, gunmen killed a Christian man and his wife in their car in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 13*, 13 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-13/>.
- On 4 December 2011, a Christian was killed and four of his family members were injured when an IED exploded in his house in Kirkuk; NINA, *One Christian killed, 4 of his family members injured in Kirkuk*, 4 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJEJML.
- On 2 October 2011, Bassam Isho, a Catholic restaurant employee, was shot dead by unknown assailants in the district of Muthana in Kirkuk. The same day, gunmen stormed a restaurant and shot dead a Christian man in eastern Mosul; Asia News, *IRAQ - Double targeted killings against the Christian community in Kirkuk*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Double-targeted-killings-against-the-Christian-community-in-Kirkuk-22796.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
- On 1 October 2011, the body of Emmanuel Polos Hanna was found shot dead in Kirkuk on the road to Baghdad; Asia News, *IRAQ - Double targeted killings against the Christian community in Kirkuk*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Double-targeted-killings-against-the-Christian-community-in-Kirkuk-22796.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.

⁶⁵⁹ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 21 September 2011, armed men in Daquq, south of Kirkuk, reportedly kidnapped three Christians when they returned from a hunting trip. Their car was set on fire and their hunting dogs killed. They were reportedly released unharmed after the payment of ransom; Worthy Christian News, *Iraq Christians Kidnapped Amid Heightened Security Concerns*, 29 September 2011, <http://www.worthynews.com/10990-iraq-christians-kidnapped-amid-heightened-security-concerns>; Ankawa.com, *Christians in Iraq victims of targeted killings and kidnappings*, 5 October 2011, <http://barnabasfund.org/US/News/News-analysis/Christians-in-Iraq-victims-of-targeted-killings-and-kidnappings.html>.
- On 16 May 2011, police found the body of Assyrian Christian Ashur Yacob Issa (Ashur Jacob), who had been kidnapped for ransom three days earlier, in Kirkuk city. Ransom negotiations between the kidnappers and the family reportedly failed as the family could not pay 100,000 US\$. The victim's body reportedly bore signs of torture and had been beheaded. According to Chaldean Catholic Archbishop Bashar Warda of Erbil, "[T]he murder was meant to intimidate Christians so that in the future they will more readily pay ransom demands;" John Newton and Andre Stiefenhofer, *Young Christian beheaded in northern Iraq*, Catholic Herald, 19 May 2011, <http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2011/05/19/young-christian-beheaded-in-northern-iraq/>; AINA, *Iraq Assyrian Killed, Mutilated in*

North Iraq, 17 May 2011, <http://www.christiansofiraq.com/assyriankilled-mutilatedin-northerniraq.html>; Asia News, *Kirkuk: young Christian abducted, tortured and beheaded*, 16 May 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Kirkuk-young-Christian-abducted-tortured-and-beheaded-21576.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Body of abducted Christian citizen found in Kirkuk*, 16 May 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142569&l=1.

⁶⁶⁰ For example, on 30 May 2011, Arkan Jihad Yacob, an Orthodox Christian and vice-director of a cement factory, was reportedly shot and killed execution-style on his way to work in Mosul. He had reportedly been the victim of two attempted ransom abductions in the past, but in both cases was able to thwart the attacks; Asia News, *Orthodox Christian shot to death in Mosul*, 30 May 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Othodox-Christian-shot-to-death-in-Mosul-21701.html>. In some cases, victims of kidnapping were reportedly killed despite the payment of ransom. For example, on 19 August 2010, Luay Barham Al-Malik was reportedly killed by his kidnapers despite the fact that his family had paid a US \$15,000 ransom; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 41, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also “Actors of Violence – Criminal Groups”.

⁶⁶¹ On Easter Sunday, 24 April 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near an entrance to the Catholic Sacred Heart Church in Baghdad’s central Karrada district, reportedly wounding two police officers and two civilians. In a second attack not far away, four Iraqi police officers were reportedly wounded in a firefight with gunmen outside the Mary the Virgin Catholic Church; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 24*, 24 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-24/>; Aaron C. Davis, *Easter attacks near churches rattle Christians as spike in Iraq violence continues*, Washington Post, 24 April 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/easter-attacks-near-churches-rattle-christians-as-spike-in-iraq-violence-continues/2011/04/24/AFS5sYcE_story.html. Ahead of Christmas 2011, ISF reportedly introduced strict security measures to counter potential attacks against churches in Mosul, including by setting up additional checkpoints in Christian neighbourhoods; Rizan Ahmed, *New Year church plot*, AKNews, 14 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/278172/>.

⁶⁶² On 6 January 2011, the Iraqi Army reportedly foiled an attack against a Syriac Catholic church in Mosul, after receiving intelligence of the threat. They defused six bombs and two explosive vests found near the church in central Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 6*, 6 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-6/>.

⁶⁶³ On 15 August 2011, bombs reportedly exploded against the Syrian Orthodox church of St. Ephrem in Kirkuk, damaging the church but causing no casualties. According to the pastor, this was the third attack against his church in the last five years; CBN News, *Bomb Damages Second Christian Church in Iraq*, 19 August 2011, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/August/Bomb-Damages-Second-Christian-Church-in-Iraq/>. Merely two weeks earlier, on 2 August 2011, in part of a coordinated attack, a car bomb reportedly exploded in front of the Syrian Catholic Church of the Holy Family in central Kirkuk, injuring at least 23 people and severely damaging the church and nearby houses. Police also found car bombs outside the Christian Anglican church and the Mar Gourgis church, both in downtown Kirkuk, but defused them before they exploded. According to Leonard Leo, the chairman of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, the “(...) bombing of a Syriac Christian church in Kirkuk and the attempted bombing of two other churches that day demonstrate that terrorists continue to target Iraqi civilians based on their religion or belief”; USCIRF, *Iraq: Security for Christians, Other Religious Minorities Must Be Key Part of Troop Negotiations*, 4 August 2011, <http://www.uscifr.gov/news-room/press-releases/3646-8042011-iraq-security-for-christians-other-religious-minorities-must-be-key-part-of-troop-negotiations.html>; AP, *23 hurt as car bomb explodes near Iraqi church; two other attacks on Christians foiled*, 2 August 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43982676/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/hurt-car-bomb-explodes-near-iraqi-church-two-other-attacks-christians-foiled/; Reuters, *Bombers target churches in northern Iraq-police*, 2 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-target-churches-in-northern-iraq-police/>.

⁶⁶⁴ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>. See chapter “Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores”.

⁶⁶⁵ IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2012, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>.

⁶⁶⁶ Serena Chaudhry, *FEATURE-Iraqi Christians find safety in north, but no jobs*, Reuters, 21 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/feature-iraqi-christians-find-safety-in-north-but-no-jobs/>; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf.

⁶⁶⁷ Asia News, *Zakho, Iraqi Islamic extremists attack Christian-owned shops and properties*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Zakho-Iraqi-Islamic-extremists-attack-Christian-owned-shops-and-properties-23351.html>.

⁶⁶⁸ Reportedly shops in the towns of Zakho and Sumeil and the Christian village of Shiuz were targeted; Asia News, *Zakho, Iraqi Islamic extremists attack Christian-owned shops and properties*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Zakho-Iraqi-Islamic-extremists-attack-Christian-owned-shops-and-properties-23351.html>. On 5 December 2011, four more liquor shops were reportedly attacked in the town of Derlok; Rivan Al-Hakim, *Four stores of alcoholic beverages burned in the town of Derlok*, Ankawa News, 4 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5602>.

⁶⁶⁹ See “Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities”.

⁶⁷⁰ More violence was reported in the next days and included the burning of a Christian cultural club, and attempted attacks on Christians near Erbil and Sulaymaniyah that were however put down by the security forces; Damaris Kremida, *Islamic Rioters Attack Christian Shops In Northern Iraq*, Compass Direct News, 7 December 2011, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/07122011-islamic-rioters-attack-christian-shops-in-northern-iraq/>. It was also reported that around 100 persons attacked the Assyrian church of Mar Daniel and Christians homes in Almansoria town (Dahuk) with stones, but were then stopped by security forces; Ankawa News, *Breaking news, this morning The Church and the Christian houses attacked by stones in the town of Almansoria*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5595>.

⁶⁷¹ Ankawa News, *Leaflets threatening to kill the owners of the burned shops in case of re-open them*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.ankawa.com/english/?p=5619>.

⁶⁷² Some consider religious intolerance as the motive behind the violence. Others believe that political tensions between the KDP and opposition parties boiled over, or that popular dissatisfaction over public services and the two-party power monopoly erupted in violence, leaving members of religious minorities caught in the middle; see for example, CDN, *Islamic Rioters Attack Christian Shops in Northern Iraq*, 6 December 2011, http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/iraq/article_124228.html; AKNews, *Arsons spread across Kurdistan region*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276289/>; The Majalla, *The Kurdish Crisis*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/12/article55228153>; Joel Wing, *Clash Between Political Parties In Iraq's Kurdistan*, AKNews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/8/276551/>.

⁶⁷³ IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2012, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>. See also Ben Piven,

Kidnapping stokes fears in Iraqi Kurdistan, Al Jazeera, 17 December 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/12/201112152183786223.html>.

⁶⁷⁴ Although the Koran reportedly threatens apostates with eternal retribution, it does not clearly specify any punishment in this world. Rather, the punishment for apostasy is found in the Hadith (the written record of Prophet Mohammed's words and deeds). Although some contemporary Islamic scholars have repudiated the traditional interpretation that the punishment required for apostasy is death, it is still widely held; for a discussion on the subject, see Melinda A. Haring, *The Right to Change One's Religion: Apostasy as the Litmus Test for Religious Freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan's Constitutions*, Georgetown University, 2010, http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/polisci/pdf/The_Right_to_Change.pdf; Timothy G. Burroughs, *Turning Away From Islam In Iraq: A Conjecture As To How The New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates*, Hofstra Law Review, Volume 37 Issue 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 517, http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n02_DD1_Burroughs_final.pdf. While there are no Shari'a courts in Iraq that could sentence a convert to death, individual actors may take matters into their own hands and carry out attacks against converts. It is also unclear how the Iraqi legal system would deal with cases of apostasy, as the Iraqi constitution and laws include conflicting provisions. In particular, the constitution mandates in Article 2 that Islam be considered a "foundation source of legislation" and that no law may be enacted that contravenes the "established provisions of Islam", but it also guarantees the freedom of religion in Article 2(2), establishes that "no law be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms" stipulated in the Constitution in Article 2 (1C), and guarantees protection from religious coercion in Article 37 (2), which would preclude the Iraqi state from penalizing individuals for leaving Islam. Legal experts interviewed by IWPR in relation to the killing of a convert in 2010 said that judges would have to refer to Islamic principles in dealing with such a case. The former head of Iraqi Lawyers Union told IWPR that Islamic Law could be considered as a mitigating factor; Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, *Iraqi Interpreter's Killing Pits Faith Against Law*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 344, 9 July 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-interpreters-killing-pits-faith-against-law>; Timothy G. Burroughs, *Turning Away From Islam In Iraq: A Conjecture As To How The New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates*, Hofstra Law Review, Volume 37 Issue 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 517, http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n02_DD1_Burroughs_final.pdf.

⁶⁷⁵ According to Joel Rosenberg of the Joshua Fund, a US-based Christian charity, there has been a trend in Iraq in conversions from Islam to Christianity since the First Gulf War, including some 20,000 between 2003 and 2008; Fox News, *Thousands of Muslims Converting to Christianity (Iraq)*, 8 September 2008, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oi-C3uouDLs>.

⁶⁷⁶ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶⁷⁷ Open Doors, *In Iraq Some Christian Children "Don't Exist"*, 1 September 2011, <http://www.opendoorsusa.org/pray/prayer-updates/2011/September/In-Iraq-Some-Children-Don't-Exist>.

⁶⁷⁸ Compass Direct News, *The Double Lives of Iraq's Christian Children*, 11 October 2011, http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/iraq/article_121814.html. See also US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶⁷⁹ Article 17 Personal Status Law (Law No. 188 of 1959), unofficial English translation available at: http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/iraqi_personal_status_law_1959_english_translation.pdf.

⁶⁸⁰ Timothy G. Burroughs, *Turning Away From Islam In Iraq: A Conjecture As To How The New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates*, Hofstra Law Review, Volume 37 Issue 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 551, 592-593, http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n02_DD1_Burroughs_final.pdf.

⁶⁸¹ Compass Direct News, *The Double Lives of Iraq's Christian Children*, 11 October 2011, http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/iraq/article_121814.html; Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, *Iraqi Interpreter's Killing Pits Faith Against Law*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 344, 9 July 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-interpreters-killing-pits-faith-against-law>; George Thomas, *Iraq's 'Safe Haven' a refuge from torture*, CBN, 21 May 2009, <http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/545200.aspx>.

⁶⁸² On 14 June 2010, Hameed Al-Daraji was reportedly shot dead in Samarra (Salah Al-Din). According to security officials, his son, who has alleged links with AQI, confessed in custody that he had killed his father over his conversion to Christianity; Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, *Iraqi Interpreter's Killing Pits Faith Against Law*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 344, 9 July 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-interpreters-killing-pits-faith-against-law>. See also USCIRF, *2011 Report on International Religious Freedom - Iraq*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. According to Timothy G. Burroughs, "(...) vigilante violence may present a far greater threat to apostates than state punishment or penalties. The belief that an apostate is persona non grata persists throughout much of the Greater Middle East; extremists invoke it as a justification for murder and militancy, (...)" Timothy G. Burroughs, *Turning Away From Islam In Iraq: A Conjecture As To How The New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates*, Hofstra Law Review, Volume 37 Issue 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 555-556, 595, http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n02_DD1_Burroughs_final.pdf.

⁶⁸³ Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, *Iraqi Interpreter's Killing Pits Faith Against Law*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 344, 9 July 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-interpreters-killing-pits-faith-against-law>; see Timothy G. Burroughs, *Turning Away From Islam In Iraq: A Conjecture As To How The New Iraq Will Treat Muslim Apostates*, Hofstra Law Review, Volume 37 Issue 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 519-, http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n02_DD1_Burroughs_final.pdf.

⁶⁸⁴ Abeer Mohammed and Neil Arun, *Iraqi Interpreter's Killing Pits Faith Against Law*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 344, 9 July 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/iraqi-interpreters-killing-pits-faith-against-law>.

⁶⁸⁵ Compass Direct News, *The Double Lives of Iraq's Christian Children*, 11 October 2011, http://www.compassdirect.org/english/country/iraq/article_121814.html.

⁶⁸⁶ George Thomas, *Iraq's 'Safe Haven' a refuge from torture*, CBN, 21 May 2009, <http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/545200.aspx>.

⁶⁸⁷ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. On restrictions of freedom of religion and alleged acts of persecution against Sabaeen-Mandaeans in Iraq under the former regime, see Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, pp. 5-6, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>.

⁶⁸⁸ Traditionally, many members of the Sabaeen-Mandaean community are jewelers and goldsmiths, which reportedly makes them a likely target for ransom kidnappings by criminal gangs; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁶⁸⁹ The Mandaean Associations Union recorded 31 murders of Mandaeans, 14 kidnappings with severe assaults, torture and humiliation with ransom paid, and 33 attacks, including attempted murders, mortar attacks, house bombings, threatening letters, arson attacks against elderly people, threat of forced conversion, and paying of a religious tax between September 2009 and September 2011; Mandaean Associations

Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, p. 9, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁰ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 67, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁶⁹¹ Cable from the US Embassy in Damascus, Syria, dated 8 December 2009, released by WikiLeaks ID #238684, on the subject "Sabaeen Mandaean Refugees Torn Between Resettlement And Preserving Iraqi Roots"; <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09DAMASCUS852>; Sidney Morning Herald, *Religions and their followers find a safe haven*, 22 April 2011, <http://www.smh.com.au/national/religions-and-their-followers-find-a-safe-haven-20110421-1dq18.html>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 67, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁶⁹² The Qur'an is said to guarantee protection to a group mentioned as "sabians", but provides no details as to who they were. While it is believed that the Qur'an refers to the Sabaeen-Mandaean as "People of the Book" (*Ahl Al-Kitab*), which would provide them with toleration and protection, including the right to worship and protection of their property, their status has at times been disputed by religious scholars. After 2003, some Shi'ite scholars reportedly issued religious edicts (*fatwas*) against the Mandaean, calling them "non-believers" and "filthy". The Sabaeen-Mandaean spiritual leader, Sheikh Satar Jabar Hilou, said that Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the highest Shi'ite religious authority in Iraq, failed to clearly counter such false perceptions. He also stated that the Iraqi Government had not given sufficient "attention and protection" to the Mandaean; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Cable from the US Embassy in Damascus, Syria, dated 8 December 2009, released by WikiLeaks ID #238684, on the subject "Sabaeen Mandaean Refugees Torn Between Resettlement And Preserving Iraqi Roots"; <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09DAMASCUS852>. For a discussion on the Sabaeen-Mandaean's status in Islam, see UNHCR, *UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-seekers*, pp. 70-71, August 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb0557.html>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁶⁹³ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights Annual Report*, September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>. STP, *Series of murders of Mandaean -- Baghdad cannot protect religious minority*, 27 May 2010, <http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=2283&stayInsideTree=1>. See also US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; Nicole Pride and Ashanti Martin, *An Ancient Language on the Brink of Extinction Finds New Life*, Rutgers University, November 2010, <http://news.rutgers.edu/focus/issue.2010-11-01.4539130324/article.2010-11-09.8975191736>.

⁶⁹⁴ Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁵ NINA, *The Mandaean community in southern Iraq celebrates New Year*, 18 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VO=FHGDIDJ.

⁶⁹⁶ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; USCIRF, *International Religious Freedom Report 2010 – Iraq*, 17 November 2010, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148821.htm>.

⁶⁹⁷ Including Sheikh Satar Jabar Hilou who is said to live in Australia. Reportedly, 23 out of 28 religious leaders have been killed or have fled the country since 2003; Baha al-Kadhimi, *Sabaeen-Mandaean demand governmental support*, AKnews, 21 May 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/1/241313/>.

⁶⁹⁸ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 42, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

The Society for Threatened Peoples (STP) observed a "series of murders" of Sabaeen-Mandaean in 2010. STP and the Mandaean Associations Union recorded the following attacks in 2010:

- On 26 November 2010, Saif Ref'at suffered severe injuries in a car explosion in Dora district, Baghdad.
- On 10 November 2010, Abdul Kareem Shetal Zagi was looted under the threat of guns in Sadr City district, Baghdad.
- On 8 September 2010, Emad Najrus Doukhi Al-Othmany was kidnapped in Baghdad's Sha'ab district and tortured. He was reportedly released four days later after paying ransom.
- On 26 June 2010, Riyadh Salim Hato was killed in Falooja, South of Baghdad. In a separate incident, Tawfeek Sabti Al-Othmani and his son Audi were killed in Basrah Governorate. Another son, Hazem, was injured in the attack.
- On 25 May 2010, Arshad Amjad Al Sayfi was reportedly killed and his brother Ahmed wounded in an attack by gunmen in Bayaa in Baghdad. Ahmed died on 4 June 2010 as a result of the injuries sustained.
- On 22 May 2010, Baha Sori Zaggi was reportedly murdered when on his way home from work in Baghdad. According to the Mandaean Associations Union, he had been kidnapped before and was released after paying a ransom of US \$25,000. He was an IDP and was returned from a refugee country back to Dora in Baghdad. He had received threats prior to his assassination.
- On 25 April 2010, Bassam Hassaney Raheim was killed with firearms equipped with silencers in a market in Suwayra (Wassit). He died three days later.
- On 8 February 2010, Niem Younes Medlol, who had returned to Iraq from Syria, reportedly due to the lack of resettlement and his dire economic situation, was killed with a gun equipped with a silencer in a market in Al-Saidiya in Baghdad.

See Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, p. 7, and annex, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>; STP, *Series of murders of Mandaean -- Baghdad cannot protect religious minority*, 27 May 2010, <http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=2283&stayInsideTree=1>.

⁶⁹⁹ For example, on 5 June 2011, Salem Latef Ghanem and Asad Sabih Ghanem were reportedly abducted on their way to Basrah after they were reportedly stopped by a policed uniform unit. They were detained and kept in an isolated hut in the marshes. They were severely tortured until they disclosed all their valuables. On 23 February 2011, Salim Ayeshe was reportedly found dead tied to a chair in his own house in Baghdad with multiple shots to his body. And on 13 January 2011, while walking home after work, Iyad Neseri Alshawi, a young man with four children, was reportedly shot in the head and was killed; Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, p. 7, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>; see also United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>. According to the Mandaean Associations Union, many attacks against Sabaeen-Mandaean go unreported due to the victim's fear of further retribution, especially in the case of kidnappings against ransom. Mandaean Associations Union, *Mandaean Human Rights annual Report*, September 2011, pp. 7, 8, 9, <http://www.mandaeanunion.org/HMRG/MHRG%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁰ Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>.

⁷⁰¹ For example, HRW reported that Mandaean community leader Naiel Thejel Ganeen from Basrah was abducted at gunpoint in 2006. During his nine days of captivity, they repeatedly referred to him as “*negis*” (impure) and demanded that he pay them *jizya*, a tax that early Islamic rulers demanded from their non-Muslim subjects in return for communal autonomy and military protection; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 66, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. According to Elizabeth Ferris and Matthew Hall, the Sabaeans-Madaeans’ “*reputation as wealthy merchants put the community at heightened risk for ransom kidnappings. Following the 2003 invasion, they quickly became targets for both armed gangs and radical groups (the two often blurring), both in Baghdad and in Basra.*” Elizabeth Ferris and Matthew Hall, *Update on Humanitarian Issues and Politics in Iraq*, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, University of Bern, July 6, 2007, p. 7, <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/20070706.pdf>.

⁷⁰² US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; Minority Rights Group (MRG), *Uncertain Refuge, Dangerous Return: Iraq’s Uprooted Minorities*, September 2009, p. 7, <http://www.minorityrights.org/8132/reports/uncertain-refuge-dangerous-return-iraqs-uprooted-minorities.html>.

⁷⁰³ “*People in our religion get harassed all the time. We can’t touch the food or fish of Muslims. Teachers don’t let Sabean students drink from or share the same cup of water with other students—they need to bring their own cups in order to drink*”; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 68, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁴ The curriculum in public schools requires Islamic religious instruction (with the exception of the Kurdistan Region). While non-Muslim students are not obliged to participate, some non-Muslim students reported that they felt pressured to do so; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 7, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁵ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 67, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁶ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁷ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁰⁸ It is reported that the Yazidi religion is monotheistic and syncretistic, encompassing elements from Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Gnostic beliefs and traditions. The Yazidi religion is closed to outsiders as Yazidis do not intermarry nor do they accept converts. The Yazidis worship *Malak Taus* (or “Peacock Angel”), the chief of angels, who is often equated by Muslims and Christians to the “fallen angel”, or devil. The central role of *Malak Taus* earned the Yazidis the undesired reputation as “devil-worshippers” and has been the basis for a long history of persecution; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 72, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Sebastian Maisel, *Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yazidis in the New Iraq*, The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief No. 18, August 2008, p. 2, <http://www.mideasti.org/files/Yezidis-in-the-New-Iraq.pdf>.

⁷⁰⁹ Sebastian Maisel, *Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yazidis in the New Iraq*, The Middle East Institute Policy Brief, No. 18, August 2008, p. 1, <http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Yezidis-in-the-New-Iraq.pdf>.

⁷¹⁰ According to Minority Rights Group International, their numbers have fallen from 700,000 in 2005 to approximately 500,000, through migration and killings; Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 10, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. According to the Yazidi Human Rights Organization, there are 650,000 to 750,000 Yazidis in Iraq; Yazidi Human Rights Organization, <http://www.yezidihumanrights.org/>, accessed 18 March 2012; USCIRF provides an estimate of 500,000 to 600,000; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. HRW estimates that they number between 550,000 and 800,000; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 72, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷¹¹ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; Sebastian Maisel, *Social Change Amidst Terror and Discrimination: Yazidis in the New Iraq*, The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief No. 18, August 2008, p. 2, <http://www.mideasti.org/files/Yezidis-in-the-New-Iraq.pdf>.

⁷¹² Many low-scale attacks may go unreported given the community’s obscurity and lack of influential lobby; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 71, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷¹³ Four suicide truck bombers reportedly killed more than 400 people and destroyed hundreds of houses in the Yazidi villages of Kahtaniya and Al-Jazeera in the Sinjar District. Reuters/AFP, *U.S. Army Says Mastermind Of Iraqi Yazidi Attacks Killed*, 9 September 2007, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/09/B4E819B4-B246-4D2D-9DD2-EE912F77DB52.html>; The Telegraph, *Iraq bombs: 500 die in worst terror attack*, 20 August 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/08/16/wiraq316.xml>. The attack was reportedly attributed to AQI; Greg Bruno and Julia Jeffrey, *Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia)*, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 April 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/profile-al-qaeda-iraq-k-al-qaeda-mesopotamia/p14811>.

⁷¹⁴ Reported incidents included:

- On 3 June 2010, a bomb placed in a car exploded near a liquor shop in the predominantly Yazidi town of Sinjar, killing two Yazidis and injuring 10 others; Xinhua, *2 killed, 10 injured in northern Iraq’s car bombing*, 4 June 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/04/c_13332389.htm.
- On 29 August 2009, a bomb placed in a truck exploded at a market in the Yazidi town of Sinjar, killing at least three persons and injuring 40 others; CNN, *Iraq explosions kill 14*, 29 August 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-29/world/iraq.violence_1_deadliest-attack-wounding-nine-police-officers?_s=PM:WORLD.
- On August 13, 2009, two suicide bombers detonated explosives in a popular café in the town of Sinjar, killing 21 Yazidis and injuring 30 others; AP, *Double Suicide Bombing Kills 21 in NW Iraq*, 13 August 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/13/world/main5239708.shtml>.

⁷¹⁵ Incidents reported in the media in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 28 January 2012, gunmen using guns with silencers shot dead a man and his wife from the Yazidi minority after storming in their house in a village near Sinjar (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-28>.
- On 11 October 2011, gunmen broke into a house in Al-Jazeera compound in Baaj District (Ninewa) and shot dead a Yazidi man and his wife; NINA, *Ezidi citizen, his wife killed northwestern Mosul*, 11 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHKMH.

- On 25 September 2011, gunmen kidnapped two men from the minority Yazidi sect from their car in Sinjar; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
 - On 19 September 2011, Elias Badal, a Yazidi leader, was shot dead by ISF in his home near Sinjar; AKnews, *Nineveh criticizes security raid of Yazidi leader*, 20 September 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/262796/>.
 - On 8 June 2011, police said they found the body of a kidnapped man from the minority Yazidi sect with gunshot wounds in an area west of the city of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 8*, 8 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-8/>.
 - On 15 March 2011, gunmen in military uniforms using civilian cars kidnapped five men from the Yazidi sect in a village in Baaj district (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 15*, 15 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-15/>.
 - On 29 January 2011, security forces found a Yazidi young man strangled to death in Sinjar town; Assafir Press, *Yazidi young man strangled to death in Sinjar*, 29 January 2011, http://www.assafirpress.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:yazidi-young-man-strangled-to-death-in-sinjar-&catid=13:politics&Itemid=26.
 - On 16 January 2011, police found the dead bodies of three female Yazidis from the same family on the road between Telkeif and Al-Sheikhan districts; Aswat al-Iraq, *3 female Yazidi bodies found in Mosul*, 17 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140581&l=1.
- ⁷¹⁶ In early December 2011, up to 30 liquor shops in Zakho (Dahuk), some of them owned by Yazidis, were reportedly vandalized or torched; See “*Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities*” and “*Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores*”.
- ⁷¹⁷ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 24, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁷¹⁸ Yazidi society follows a strict hierarchical caste system. The Yazidis are born into any of the three castes: the *Murids* (the laity) and the *Sheikhs* and the *Pirs* (the clergy). Marriage across classes is forbidden.
- ⁷¹⁹ Reportedly, there have been 70 recorded suicides in Sinjar and the surrounding area in 2011, including by self-immolation. Frequently, dire economic conditions or the influence of soap operas on television are cited as the reasons behind the spike; however, there are indications that at least some cases are actual “honour killings” at the hands of the families; Khudr Khallat, *Suicide increasing in Sinjar - calls for humanitarian intervention*, Aknews, 15 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/284354/>; Abdul-Muhaymen Basel, *honour killings: plague of suicides in north may actually be murder*, Niqash, 10 January 2012, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2968>; IOM, *Special Report: Increased Incidents of Suicide Among Yazidis in Sinjar, Ninewa*, July 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_279.pdf; Yahia al Barzanji, *foreign soap operas blamed for youth suicide and bad behaviour*, Niqash, 1 June 2011, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2848>. See also “*Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances*”.
- ⁷²⁰ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 24, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁷²¹ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 9, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also “*IFA in the Kurdistan Region*”.
- ⁷²² US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁷²³ Law No. 105 of 1970 prohibits the practice of the Baha’i faith; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. According to the MRG, many Muslims consider Baha’is as apostates or heretics; Mumtaz Lalani, *Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities*, Minority Rights Group International, June 2010, p. 4, <http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=956>.
- ⁷²⁴ Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁷²⁵ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.
- ⁷²⁶ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.
- ⁷²⁷ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 6, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; Mumtaz Lalani, *Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities*, Minority Rights Group International, June 2010, p. 4, <http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=956>.
- ⁷²⁸ Their faith, “Kakaism”, is reportedly derived from the word for “brotherhood”. As a belief, it is a combination of Zoroastrianism and Shi’ism, similar to Yazidism; Minority Rights Group International, *Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq’s Minorities*, 10 June 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c43f4322.html>.
- ⁷²⁹ Preti Taneja, *Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 8, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁷³⁰ Michiel Leezenberg, *Between Assimilation and Deportation: The Shabak and the Kakai in Northern Iraq*, p. 168, in: *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, Collected Papers of the Symposium, Berlin 1995, edited by K. Kehl Bodrogi, B. Kellner-Heinkele & A. Otter-Beaujean, 1997, http://books.google.com/books?id=TUhwYBmBnI4C&pg=PA167&lpg=PA167&dq=edmonds+1957&source=web&ots=ARVgucLpDw&sig=_hUZ-gsWKTWfj3TIDxsOW7WpXrs#v=onepage&q=edmonds%201957&f=false.
- ⁷³¹ Michiel Leezenberg, *Gorani Influence on Central Kurdish: Substratum or Prestige Borrowing?*, ILLC - Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1992, <http://home.hum.uva.nl/oz/leezenberg/papersml.html>.
- ⁷³² Z. Mir-Hosseini, *Inner Truth and Outer History: The Two Worlds of the Ahl-e Haqq of Kurdistan*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.26, 1994, pp. 267-268, cited in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahl-e_Haqq#cite_note-9.
- ⁷³³ The worst attack against the Kaka’i was recorded in November 2009, when a parked car bomb reportedly targeted civilians near a shrine holy to the Kaka’i sect in one of the crowded marketplaces in central Kirkuk. The bomb reportedly killed six civilians, injuring another eight; US Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 11 March 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b9e52ea6e.html>.

⁷³⁴ Minority Rights Group International, *Still Targeted: Continued Persecution of Iraq's Minorities*, 10 June 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c43f4322.html>.

⁷³⁵ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷³⁶ Roy Gutman, *WikiLeaks shakes security of Iraq's tiny Jewish community*, McClatchy Newspapers, 7 October 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/10/07/126581/security-of-iraqs-tiny-jewish.html>. According to Minority Groups International, there are nine Jews left in Iraq; Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>.

⁷³⁷ Roy Gutman, *WikiLeaks shakes security of Iraq's tiny Jewish community*, McClatchy Newspapers, 7 October 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/10/07/126581/security-of-iraqs-tiny-jewish.html>.

⁷³⁸ USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>.

⁷³⁹ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 50, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁰ According to USCIRF, “[W]omen and secular Iraqis also experienced serious religious freedom violations;” USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>. See also US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>.

⁷⁴¹ For an overview of the situation of women prior to 2003, see HRW, *Background on Women's Status in Iraq Prior to the Fall of the Saddam Hussein Government*, November 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/wrd/iraq-women.htm>.

⁷⁴² Safa ‘Abd al-Amir, a school principal, who survived an assassination attempt with serious injuries shortly after announcing her candidacy for the 2010 CoR elections, said in an interview with HRW: “According to the extremists’ beliefs, an unveiled progressive woman running for political office sets a bad example for other women.” Despite some initial police investigations, the case was reportedly never brought to justice; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 10-11, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; USCIRF, *USCIRF Annual Report 2011 - Countries of Particular Concern: Iraq*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dbe90c22b.html>.

⁷⁴³ After the withdrawal of British troops from the city of Basrah in September 2007, Shi’ite militias and militia-infiltrated security forces reportedly filled the security vacuum and mutilated and killed 133 women in 2007 alone, “claiming religious or customary sanctions.” Reportedly, “a majority of these victims were women’s rights activists, doctors and prominent professionals who were outspoken about the rising curb on women’s rights and civil liberties by militant groups;” *Journal of International Peace Operations, Women Fighting for Peace in Iraq*, Volume 7, Number 4, January-February 2012, <http://web.peaceops.com/archives/1885>. According to ISF sources in Basrah, 79 of the victims were killed for “violating Islamic teachings”, 47 for honor-related reasons and seven on the basis of their political affiliations. After the Gol’s crackdown on militias in Basrah in 2008, the situation has reportedly improved. However, the crimes were reportedly never investigated as the ISF were reportedly themselves implicated in the killings; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 9, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also Women’s World Wide Web, *From Shelter to Freedom: the life-saving work and history of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq*, p. 3, 2010, http://www.womensworldwideweb.org/images/W4_Yanar_Mohammed_FINAL.pdf.

⁷⁴⁴ US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2011 - Iraq*, 13 May 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dce1562c.html>.

⁷⁴⁵ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 11, 25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 13, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 48, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4da56dbcc.html>.

⁷⁴⁶ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 48, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁷ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷⁴⁸ See chapter “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances”.

⁷⁴⁹ See chapter “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals”.

⁷⁵⁰ “Emo” in the West generally identifies teens or young adults who listen to alternative music, wear tight-fitting clothes, and have distinctive long or spiky haircuts. However, the term is apparently used to describe non-conformist youth, but also gay and effeminate men. According to John Drake of the British-based AKE security consulting firm, to Iraqis, the term “Emo” is widely synonymous with “gay;” AP, *Violent ‘Emo Killings’ Rattle Iraqi Youth*, 11 March 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/03/11/148419422/violent-emo-killings-rattle-iraqi-youth>; HRW, *Iraq: Investigate ‘Emo’ Attacks*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/iraq-investigate-emo-attacks>. An official Ministry of Interior statement of 13 February 2012 reportedly called emos “Satanists”, casting doubts as to whether the Iraqi authorities are willing to protect the youth, according to HRW; HRW, *Iraq: Investigate ‘Emo’ Attacks*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/iraq-investigate-emo-attacks>. Shi’ite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr reportedly said Emos were “crazy fools” and a “lesion on the Muslim community” in a statement on his website, but maintained that they should be dealt with “within the law”. The violence however also drew condemnation from Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who reportedly said that targeting “Emo” youth was an act of “terrorism” and a “bad phenomenon for the peaceful co-existence project;” Emily Alpert, *Iraq killings said to target ‘emos’ for nonconformist style*, Los Angeles Times, 16 March 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/iraq-emo-killings-gay.html; Reuters, *Iraq militants stone ‘emo kids’ to death*, 13 March 2012, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/world/2012/03/13/iraq-militants-stone-emo-kids-to-death>; Richard Spencer, *Iraq religious militias target ‘emo’ youths*, Independent, 12 March 2012, <http://www.independent.ie/world-news/middle-east/iraq-religious-militias-target-emo-youths-3046772.html>; Dina Al-Shibeeb, *Iraq’s ‘Emo’ Killings Raise Horror and Religious Debate*, Albawaba, 12 March 2012, <http://www.albawaba.com/editorchoice/iraqs-emo-killings-raise-horror-and-religious-debate-416505>. The US Embassy in Baghdad condemned “the recent violence and killings in Iraq by groups who appear to be targeting individuals based on their sexual orientation, gender identity, or personal expression;” Embassy of the United States – Baghdad, Iraq, *U.S. Embassy Condemns Attacks On ‘Emo’ Youth In Iraq*, March 2012, <http://iraq.usembassy.gov/violencestatement.html>.

⁷⁵¹ It was reported that those targeted included men considered to be “too feminine” and women perceived as “masculine”; International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC), *Emerging from Iraq: Reports of Kidnapping and Murder of Gay and Lesbian People*, 5 March 2012, <http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/1492.html>; Dan Littauer, *New wave of attacks on ‘gays and lesbians’ in Iraq*, Gay Star News, 7 March 2012, <http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/new-wave-attacks-‘gays-and-lesbians’-iraq060312>; OWFI/Iraq LGBT, *Campaign of Iraqi gay killings by smashing skulls with concrete blocks*, 2 March 2012,

<http://www.equalityiniraq.com/press-release/150-campaign-of-iraqi-gay-killings-by-smashing-skulls-with-concrete-blocks>.

⁷⁵² IGLHRH said in a press statement that a Shi'ite militia was believed to be responsible for the violence. According to Iraqi human rights activists, an unidentified group had reportedly posted death threats against "the adulterous individuals" in predominantly Shi'ite neighborhoods of Baghdad and Basrah. The postings reportedly listed the individuals' names and ages and gave them four days to stop their behavior or "else face the wrath of God", according to IGLHRC; International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC), *Emerging from Iraq: Reports of Kidnapping and Murder of Gay and Lesbian People*, 5 March 2012, <http://www.iglhr.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/1492.html>; OWFI / Iraqi LGBT, *Campaign of Iraqi gay killings by smashing skulls with concrete blocks*, 2 March 2012, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/press-release/150-campaign-of-iraqi-gay-killings-by-smashing-skulls-with-concrete-blocks>. According to Samer Muscati of HRW, it is not clear who is behind the attacks; Emily Alpert, *Iraq killings said to target 'emos' for nonconformist style*, Los Angeles Times, 16 March 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/iraq-emo-killings-gay.html. See also Reuters, *Iraq militants stone 'emo kids' to death*, 13 March 2012, <http://www.timeslive.co.za/world/2012/03/13/iraq-militants-stone-emo-kids-to-death>. See also Rami Ruhayem, *Iraq's Emo killings: A horror story out of control?*, BBC, 21 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17450437>.

⁷⁵³ Rami Ruhayem, *Iraq's Emo killings: A horror story out of control?*, BBC, 21 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17450437>; HRW, *Iraq: Investigate 'Emo' Attacks*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/iraq-investigate-emo-attacks>; Jack Healy, *Threats and Killings Striking Fear Among Young Iraqis, Including Gays*, New York Times, 11 March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/killings-strike-fear-in-iraqi-gay-and-emo-youth.html?_r=2.

⁷⁵⁴ Rami Ruhayem, *Iraq's Emo killings: A horror story out of control?*, BBC, 21 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17450437>; HRW, *Iraq: Investigate 'Emo' Attacks*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/iraq-investigate-emo-attacks>; Jack Healy, *Threats and Killings Striking Fear Among Young Iraqis, Including Gays*, New York Times, 11 March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/world/middleeast/killings-strike-fear-in-iraqi-gay-and-emo-youth.html?_r=2.

⁷⁵⁵ Rami Ruhayem, *Iraq's Emo killings: A horror story out of control?*, BBC, 21 March 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17450437>; HRW, *Iraq: Investigate 'Emo' Attacks*, 16 March 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/16/iraq-investigate-emo-attacks>; Lara Jakes, *Advocates Demand Protection for Iraqi Emos*, AP, 16 March 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/al-qaida-group-iraq-claims-police-killings-15934161#.T2fPtH3C2w>.

⁷⁵⁶ Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>.

⁷⁵⁷ In the 1990s, former President Saddam Hussein reportedly introduced a law banning alcohol in an attempt to promote his religious credentials. This resulted in the closure of many shops and bars. After the fall of the former regime in 2003, it was reported that alcohol was initially more openly sold, before this trend was reportedly reversed by growing extremist influence; Adel Kamal, *Dying for a Drink: Mosul's Liquor Ban Leads to Desperate Measures*, Niqash, 19 May 2011, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2839&lang=en>.

⁷⁵⁸ W. G. Dunlop, *Selling booze in Baghdad a dangerous business*, 27 September 2011, <http://www.mysinthew.com/node/64284>; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea J. Carter, *Iraq liquor store owners fear for their lives amid attacks*, CNN, 7 June 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/world/iraq.liquor.backlash_1_liquor-stores-liquor-license-alcohol-sales?_s=PM:WORLD.

⁷⁵⁹ The legal situation of shops and clubs selling alcohol in Baghdad reportedly remains unclear after a 2010 decision by the Baghdad Provincial Council to revive the 1994 law that banned Muslims from selling alcohol and required anyone selling alcohol to have a license. The revival of the old law reportedly led to a new wave of crackdowns and attacks upon places, which sold or used alcohol. The political debate as to whether alcohol should be banned or not reportedly mirrors the ongoing struggle between more liberal and more conservative trends over the role of Islam in today's Iraq. The implementation of the law has reportedly been arbitrary with authorities shutting down shops as of November 2010, and then again rescinding the decision in early 2011 in the wake of popular protests in Baghdad over corruption, lack of services and restrictions of personal freedom. However, in July 2011, the head of the Baghdad Provincial Council, Kamil Al-Zaidi, reportedly called for harsher sentences for those running a shop without a license; AKnews, *Baghdad Council Demands Harsher Sentences for Alcohol Sale*, 23 July 2011, <http://iraqdailytimes.com/baghdad-council-demands-harsher-sentences-for-alcohol-salesmen/>; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea J. Carter, *Iraq liquor store owners fear for their lives amid attacks*, CNN, 7 June 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/world/iraq.liquor.backlash_1_liquor-stores-liquor-license-alcohol-sales?_s=PM:WORLD; Tim Arango, *In Iraq, Bottoms Up for Democracy*, New York Times, 16 April 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/weekinreview/17booze.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁷⁶⁰ In Mosul city, there is reportedly no outright ban on alcohol; however, as a result of the apprehensive atmosphere in the city, which continues to be a hotspot for Sunni armed groups, merely one shop run by a Christian is reported to be open in a highly secured area. Nevertheless, the shop was reportedly attacked in 2008 and 2009. Alcohol is reportedly more freely available in the predominantly Christian areas in the rural Ninewa Plains; Adel Kamal, *Dying for a Drink: Mosul's Liquor Ban Leads to Desperate Measures*, Niqash, 19 May 2011, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2839&lang=en>.

⁷⁶¹ AKnews, *Baghdad Council Demands Harsher Sentences for Alcohol Sale*, 23 July 2011, <http://iraqdailytimes.com/baghdad-council-demands-harsher-sentences-for-alcohol-salesmen/>.

⁷⁶² On 7 March 2011, police patrols reportedly arrived unannounced at liquor shops with orders from the Baghdad Provincial Council to close down all unlicensed shops; 12 March 2011, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/03/12/baghdad-clamps-down-on-unlicensed-liquor-stores/>. And on 13 January 2011, men armed with handguns and steel pipes reportedly raided and vandalized the Christian Ashurbanipal social club that also runs a bar in one building as well as several liquor shops in Baghdad. Allegedly, the intruders belonged to either the ISF or the Provincial Council acting with the protection of police. Witnesses said that police cars were blocking off a street during the raid. A police major reportedly said that the men who raided the club were employees of the provincial council. But the head of the provincial council reportedly said that they were police officers in civilian clothes; Muhanad Mohammed, *Club, shops attacked in Iraq alcohol clamp down*, Reuters, 17 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/club-shops-attacked-in-iraq-alcohol-clampdown/>; John Leland, *Baghdad Raids on Alcohol Sellers Stir Fears*, NY Times, 15 January 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16iraq.html>.

⁷⁶³ It was reported that during July and August 2011, at least 30 attacks against alcohol shops were recorded, with the large majority in Baghdad and several others in Basrah. According to Baghdad Governor Abdel Razak the reason for the attacks on liquor shops are either "ideological or moral;" W. G. Dunlop, *Selling booze in Baghdad a dangerous business*, 27 September 2011, <http://www.mysinthew.com/node/64284>; W. G. Dunlop, *Selling booze in Baghdad a dangerous business*, 27 September 2011, <http://www.mysinthew.com/node/64284>. Between March and May 2011, 25 stores were reportedly bombed in Baghdad; Mohammed Tawfeeq and Chelsea J. Carter, *Iraq liquor store owners fear for their lives amid attacks*, CNN, 7 June 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/world/iraq.liquor.backlash_1_liquor-stores-liquor-license-alcohol-sales?_s=PM:WORLD. Recent reported incidents included:

- On 12 February 2012, an IED detonated on a liquor store in southern Kirkuk, causing no casualties; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, *Security Information Report*, 13 February 2012.
- On 12 December 2011, four civilians were seriously injured in an attack on a liquor shop in Baghdad's central Battaween district;

- Aswat al-Iraq, *4 civilians injured in attack on alcohol shop in Baghdad*, 13 December 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(k0hmujavxauzqpauno3pix45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145878&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(k0hmujavxauzqpauno3pix45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145878&l=1).
- On 29 October 2011, a liquor store owner was gunned down in front of his home in Deli Abbas (Diyala); AFP, *Iraq violence kills five*, 30 October 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gXOyEyBwf3m80acFcB1oQogsW86A?docId=CNG.db36fbaf46eee355ae8cab_e781314432.8a1.
 - On 17 October 2011, a bomb blast near a Baghdad liquor store killed seven people and injured 18 others, including several policemen. It was not immediately clear whether the liquor store or the police officers were the targets; AP, *Bomb near Baghdad liquor store kills 7 people, 18 injured*, 17 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/bomb-near-baghdad-liquor-store-kills-7-people-18-injured/2011/10/17/gIQA VzZ4rL_story.html.
 - On 12 September 2011, three civilians were injured in an explosive charge blast against a liquor shop in Baghdad's Nidhal Street; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three civilians injured in attack on Baghdad alcohol shop*, 12 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144798&l=1.
 - On 23 August 2011, a roadside bomb wounded two people when it exploded near a liquor store in central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, August 23, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
 - On 21 August 2011, at least three people were wounded when a bomb exploded in front of a liquor shop in the Karrada district of central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, August 21, 21 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-21/>.
 - On 12 August 2011, at least five persons were injured in an explosive charge blast against a liquor shop in west Baghdad's Yarmouk district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Five persons injured in alcohol shop blast in Baghdad*, 13 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144254&l=1.
 - On 11 August 2011, two bombs exploded in succession near a liquor store, wounding four people in the Karrada district of central Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, August 11, 11 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-12/>.
 - On 2 August 2011, two bombs exploded near a liquor store in southern Baghdad's Al-Risala district, killing three policemen and wounding 16 people, mostly civilians; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq*, August 3, 3 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-3/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three cops killed, 15 injured, in blast close to alcohol shop in Baghdad*, 3 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144095&l=1.
- ⁷⁶⁴ Some attacks are reportedly driven by criminal motives; W. G. Dunlop, *Selling booze in Baghdad a dangerous business*, 27 September 2011, <http://www.mysinthew.com/node/64284>.
- ⁷⁶⁵ See “*Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities*” and “*Religious Minorities – Christians*”.
- ⁷⁶⁶ Since 2003, Sunni and Shi'ite extremists reportedly targeted artists, actors and singers, accusing them of engaging in “un-Islamic” or “Western” activities such as music, theatre and television. The situation was particularly dire during the height of violence between 2006 and 2008. During this time, many artists, singers and actors reportedly fled the country. According to the Iraqi Artists' Association, at least 115 singers, 65 actors and 60 painters were killed between 2003 and 2008; Afif Sarhan and Caroline Davies, *Iraqi artists and singers flee amid crackdown on forbidden culture*, The Guardian, 11 May 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/11/iraq>. See also IRIN, *Iraq: Singing “the devil’s music” will get you killed*, 23 November 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61962>; Khaled Yacoub Oweis, *Exiled Iraqi artists play on in Syria*, Reuters, 24 October 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/25/people-syria-iraq-opera-de-idUSOWE45878520071025>; IRIN, *IRAQ: Artists become targets in rising atmosphere of intolerance*, 24 April 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26311>. In 2008, the Iraqi Ministry of Culture estimated that about 80 percent of artists had fled Iraq; Afif Sarhan and Caroline Davies, *Iraqi artists and singers flee amid crackdown on forbidden culture*, The Guardian, 11 May 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/may/11/iraq>. Most attacks were reportedly perpetrated with impunity. For example, Seif Yehia was reportedly beheaded for singing western songs at weddings in November 2007 and Ibrahim Sadoon, a painter, was reportedly shot dead as he drove through Baghdad; in both cases, nobody was brought to justice to date; Index on Censorship, *Take Action to End Impunity: Seif Yehia and Ibrahim Sadoon*, 14 November 2011, <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2011/11/take-action-to-end-impunity-seif-yehia-and-ibraheem-sadoon/>. It has been reported that extremist groups have also repeatedly targeted journalists whom they claim were promoting immorality; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 33, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁷⁶⁷ Birgit Svensson, *Returning to Something Like Normality*, Qantara.de, 14 November 2011, <http://en.qantara.de/Returning-to-Something-Like-Normality/17785c18385i0p9/index.html>; AFP, *Baghdad film festival reopens after four years*, 3 October 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=/data/middleeast/2011/October/middleeast_October48.xml§ion=middleeast; Melik Kaylan, *The Music Chief of Baghdad*, Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703333504576080452174478650.html>; Hadani Ditmars, *Culture from chaos: where next for Iraqi art?*, The Guardian, 12 March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/mar/12/iraq-war-art-heritage>; AFP, *Art flowers again in Iraq as violence ebbs*, 9 March 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jP_p5G-XEAinWkIBXRUGyddtqPIQ.
- ⁷⁶⁸ Aseel Kami, *Iraq's artists lament decline in cultural life*, Reuters, 14 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/uk-iraq-artists-idUSLNE82D02Z20120314>. An award-winning actress stated, “(...) now it's the religious parties we have to be careful about offending. There are a whole new set of red lines that we can't cross;” Statement by actress Bushra Ismail, cited in: Hadani Ditmars, *Culture from chaos: where next for Iraqi art?*, The Guardian, 12 March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/mar/12/iraq-war-art-heritage>. For example, depicting the human shape could be considered “immoral” or against Islam; Kelly McEvers, *Many Iraqi Artists Struggle, Suffer In Silence*, NPR, 30 March 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/30/133601522/many-iraqi-artists-struggle-suffer-in-silence>.
- ⁷⁶⁹ On 27 October 2011, a twin bombing at a music store reportedly killed 32 and wounded 71 people in a Shi'ite neighborhood of Baghdad. However, it is not known who and for which motive the attack was perpetrated; Bushra Juhi, *Baghdad: Bombings Death Toll Rises To 32*, AP, 28 October 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/28/baghdad-bombings-death-toll_n_1063436.html. On 27 April 2011, the general director of Iraq's Theatre and Cinema Department in the Ministry of Culture, Shafiq Al-Mahdi, escaped an assassination attempt. A bomb attached to his car reportedly exploded just as he was to enter the National Theatre in Baghdad's central Karrada district. Two of the theatre's guards were reportedly wounded in the incident. AFP, *Iraq culture chief escapes assassination bid*, 27 April 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jik5NVnrV6uhlw0TIf0nzo7YU6QQ?docId=CNG.e8e90619ea9f57952ae0e6582e0Iea81.231>; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq*, April 27, 27 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-27>.
- ⁷⁷⁰ Tim Arango, *In Iraq, Bottoms Up for Democracy*, New York Times, 16 April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/weekinreview/17booze.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; Deborah Amos, *Secularists, Islamists Clash In Iraqi Culture War*, NPR, 23 December 2010, <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/23/132283717/secularists-islamists-clash-in-iraqi-culture-war>.

⁷⁷¹ Alarabiya, *Music & theatre classes back to life in Iraq*, 4 January 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/01/04/132190.html>; Alarabiya, *Iraq's education ministry bans theatre & music classes*, 7 December 2010, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/12/07/128836.html>; Hadani Ditmars, *Culture from chaos: where next for Iraqi art?*, The Guardian, 12 March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2010/mar/12/iraq-war-art-heritage>.

⁷⁷² Kelly McEvers, *Many Iraqi Artists Struggle, Suffer In Silence*, NPR, 30 March 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/30/133601522/many-iraqi-artists-struggle-suffer-in-silence>.

⁷⁷³ See chapter "Protestors".

⁷⁷⁴ According to the CIA's World Factbook, Arabs constitute the majority of the population (75-80%), followed by the Kurds (15-20%), while minority groups such as Turkmen, Assyrians and others account for the remaining 5 percent; CIA, *The World Factbook*, last updated 21 February 2012, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>.

⁷⁷⁵ See chapter "Religious minorities".

⁷⁷⁶ In the March 2010 CoR elections, Turkmen political parties joined the three main lists: the State of Law list included the Islamic Turkmen Union, the National Iraqi Alliance contained both the Turkmen Islamic Union of Iraq and the Turkmen Loyalty Movement, while Iraqiyya included the Iraqi Turkomen Front. Turkmen politicians won seven seats in the CoR and were allocated three ministries, including the Ministry of Agriculture (Izzadin Al-Dawla, Iraqiyya), Ministry of Youth and Sports (Muhammad Jasim Jaffar, Iraqi National Alliance) and the State Minister for Provincial Affairs (Dr. Turan Müftü, Iraqiyya); Hasan Kanbolat, *Maliki government and Turkmen in Iraq*, Today's Zaman, 25 December 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=230641; Charles Recknagel, Muhammad Tahir, *Iraq's Turkomans Feel New Political Strength*, RFE/RL, 1 April 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Iraqs_Turkomans_Feel_New_Political_Strength_/1999870.html; Al Jazeera, *Q&A: Iraq's 2010 elections*, 3 March 2010, <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/iraqelection2010/2010/03/20103244723763210.html>; Niqash, *The rise of the Turkmen, Diaa al-Khalidi*, 4 September 2008, <http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=74&id=2283&lang=0>.

⁷⁷⁷ See chapter "Individuals with Religion-Based Claims".

⁷⁷⁸ Community representatives estimate "Black Iraqis", who mostly adhere to Shi'ite Islam, to number up to two million. The largest Black Iraqi community can reportedly be found in Basrah and a significant number also resides in Sadr City in Baghdad. Black Iraqis claim to suffer from political, social and economic discrimination and exclusion. Representatives of the Black Iraqis claimed that they too should be recognized as a distinct minority group and be given a fixed representation in the CoR. It is estimated that 80 percent of the Black Iraqis are illiterate, over 80 percent unemployed, and some 600 families living in poverty. Those employed are reported to commonly work in unqualified jobs as laborers or domestic workers; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 8, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 4 April 2011, p. 51, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁷⁷⁹ The Roma, or Kawliyah, originate from India, but have reportedly been living in Iraq for hundreds of years. They can mainly be found in isolated villages nearby major cities such as Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul and in Southern Iraq. The Kawliyah are a distinct ethnic group with their own language, traditions and culture, although they have never been recognized as such in Iraq. They usually have been reported adopting the dominant religion of the host country while preserving aspects of their particular belief systems, in Iraq, usually Sunni or Shi'a Islam. The Kawliyah kept their language, known as "Alratin" (or "Ruttin"), a mixture of Persian, Indian, Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic. There are no reliable figures on the number of Kawliyah in Iraq, but estimates range from 50,000 to 200,000. According to Abbas Mohammad Saidi, a member of the Human Rights Commission in Diwaniyah, there are an estimated 60,000 individuals in Diwaniyah Governorate. Since 2003, the Kawliyah community in Iraq has reportedly been subjected to persecution for a variety of reasons, in particular they are collectively reputed as alcohol sellers and prostitutes, both considered "un-Islamic". After the fall of the former regime, Shi'ite militias reportedly targeted them for their (perceived) support for or preferential treatment by the former regime. In 2003 and 2004, there were reports of Roma villages being destroyed and looted by Shi'ite militias. Reportedly, Roma women are forced to provide sexual services and suffer from harassment and verbal abuse; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 9, 23, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; Iqbal Tamimi, *The Roma of Iraq- a forgotten community*, London Progressive Journal, 18 September 2011, <http://londonprogressivejournal.com/article/view/845>; see UNHCR, *UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-seekers*, pp. 93-96, August 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb05557.html>.

⁷⁸⁰ Among Black Iraqis and Kawliyah, the rate of illiteracy is reportedly disproportionately high, preventing them from accessing employment; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 16, 18, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁸¹ In 1980, under the former regime, Faili Kurds were reported to be specifically targeted. Many were reportedly killed and between 220,000 and 300,000 were reportedly deported, stripped of their Iraqi citizenship and their properties confiscated due to their perceived Iranian origin and links with Iran. In August 2011, the CoR recognized the former regime's persecution of the Faili Kurds as "genocide" and in November 2010, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tariq Aziz, was found guilty for displacing and killing Faili Kurds. Aziz at the time was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council, which decreed that all Faili Kurds be stripped off their Iraqi citizenship (Decree 666). The 2006 Iraqi Nationality Law repealed past discriminatory laws and decrees and provided that Faili Kurds could re-acquire their Iraqi citizenship. However, according to the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, only about 20,000 Faili Kurd families had taken the necessary steps to have their citizenship reinstated since 2003. An estimated 100,000 Faili Kurds reportedly continue to be "non-citizens", reportedly mainly because they could not show that they were registered in the 1957 national census. Many are reportedly unable to provide this evidence as many civil records were destroyed or lost or because people had simply not been included in the census. The Faili Kurds live mainly in Baghdad, in Diyala (mainly Jalawla, Khanaqeen and Mandali) and in the Southern Governorates of Wassit, Missan and Basrah (including in Badra, Jassan, Kut, Nu'omaniyah and Azizia). Most of them adhere to the Shi'ite branch of Islam; Jasim Alsabawi, *Fayli Kurds Struggle in Iraq*, Rudaw, 26 January 2012, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/4357.html>; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, pp. 8, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; Mandalawi Sazan M, *Scars that won't heal: Iraq recognises Fayli Kurd persecution as 'genocide'*, Niqash, 11 August 2011, <http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2878>; Elizabeth Campbell, *The Faili Kurds of Iraq: Thirty Years Without Nationality*, Refugees International / World Bridge Blog, 2 April 2010, <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/faili-kurds-iraq-thirty-years-without-nationality>, Martin Chulov, *Tariq Aziz given additional 10-year jail term for persecution of Shia Kurds*, The Guardian, 29 November 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/29/tariq-aziz-iraq-sentence-kurds>.

⁷⁸² See "Background Information".

⁷⁸³ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. In 2006, there were widespread reports of

Kurdish forces abducting and forcibly transferring Arabs and Turkmen to detention centres in the Kurdistan Region. While no new such cases have been reported in recent years, a number of these detainees are reportedly still held in the Kurdistan Region, commonly on terrorism charges; see “*Individuals (Perceived as) Opposing the KRG Authorities*”.

⁷⁸⁴ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 13, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁸⁵ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 13, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 71-72, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁷⁸⁶ Marwan Ibrahim, *Iraq's Kirkuk 'may be fertile ground for militants'*, AFP, 26 November 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jXZGTp2Q2TmzUZ1iOqic1K0W5q4A?docId=CNG.d2cb7fceed198fb5fc3ea88ef8ea035.781>. See also “*Background Information*”.

⁷⁸⁷ According to HRW, “[A]rmed groups continued to persecute ethnic and religious minorities with impunity;” HRW, *World Report 2011 - Iraq*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d3e801ed.html>. See also US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4da56dbcc.html>.

⁷⁸⁸ For example, on 23 February 2012, three people were reportedly killed and at least 21 others wounded after nine bombs exploded in the Jalawla district in Diyala; Fryad Mohammed and Bryar Mohammed, *Kurdistan willing to expedite force to protect Kurds in Diyala*, 24 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/291906/>; on 18 January 2012, gunmen using weapons with silencers reportedly shot dead two Kurdish Shi'ites in central Mandili (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 18*, 18 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-18/>; on 29 October 2010, a suicide bomber reportedly detonated a belt packed with explosives at a café in the northern Iraqi town of Balad Ruz (Diyala), killing at least 21 people, mostly Shi'ite Faily Kurds; AP, *Deadly suicide attack rocks café in northern Iraq*, 29 October 2010, <http://www.france24.com/en/20101029-iraq-suicide-attack-cafe-northern-shiite-kurds-sunni>. See also Rawaz Koyee, *Iraq endures political vacuum*, *Kurdish Globe*, 25 February 2012, <http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=4DB162ED5A5E9993AB3FF2FD4A6BB4B1>.

⁷⁸⁹ See also chapter “*Shi'ite civilians, including pilgrims*”.

⁷⁹⁰ See also “*Government Officials and Employees*” and “*Members of Political Parties*”.

⁷⁹¹ A Turkic representative interviewed by Minority Rights Group International said that while Turkmen enjoy the right to education in their mother tongue in the Kurdistan Region, they in practice suffer from a shortage of teachers. As a result, Turkmen pay for teachers to come from outside the area; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 19, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁹² Amnesty International, *New order, same abuses - Unlawful detentions and torture in Iraq*, September 2010, pp. 24-25, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/006/2010/en/c7df062b-5d4c-4820-9f14-a4977f863666/mde140062010en.pdf>. An

UNAMI-sponsored initiative to resolve these cases has reportedly not yet brought substantial progress due to prevalent political tensions: UNAMI in 2010 facilitated an initiative to seek solutions for detainees and prisoners from Ninewa held in the Kurdistan Region. In April 2010, the “Ninewa Detainee Committee” was established to identify and categorize the caseload and to make recommendations as to how their case could be resolved. The committee was made of representatives from the *Asayish*, the Deputy PM's Office, the Police and the Ninewa Governorate Council. On 5 July 2010, the *Asayish* named 147 pre-trial detainees and prisoners from Ninewa held in *Asayish* custody. However, as a result of heightening tensions between the KRG and the Ninewa provincial authorities, the committee's activities were reportedly suspended. Similar efforts were reportedly made in relation to Arab and Turkmen detainees from Kirkuk held in the Kurdistan Region. As a result of these efforts, UNAMI was reportedly granted access to the detainees from outside the Kurdistan Region; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 27, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁷⁹³ The Turkmen originally came from Central Asia, in a migration that took place over several hundred years, beginning in the 7th century AD. The first Turkic people settled in Iraq in the early Islamic era, in the late 7th century, and their numbers increased throughout history. Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>.

⁷⁹⁴ Part of the reason for the vast difference in estimates is the former government's reportedly *Arabization* policy that forcibly expelled Turkmen from their traditional lands in Iraq and forced them to register officially as Arabs. Furthermore, demographics and numbers, and therefore political influence, are reported to be highly disputed among Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen, especially in Kirkuk. Reportedly, each of the three groups has its own evidence proving that Kirkuk has historically been dominated by it. According to Minority Rights Group International, there were 600,000 Turkmen in Iraq before 2003; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁹⁵ According to Minority Rights Group International, 60 percent are Sunnis and the remainder Shi'ites, with the latter reportedly living at the southern end of the Turkmen settlements, in more rural areas; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.

⁷⁹⁶ Ahmed Al-Hurmezi, *The Human Rights Situation of the Turkmen Community in Iraq*, Middle East Online, 9 December 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=42958>.

⁷⁹⁷ Reported incidents included:

- On 7 March 2012, two bombs that exploded in swift succession outside a crowded restaurant in the predominantly Turkmen city of Tal Afar (Ninewa) killed 20 and wounded 21 others; Rezan Ahmed, *UPDATE on Talafaar bombings: 20 killed, 21 injured*, AKnews, 8 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294556/>; AP, *Double bombing kills 14 in northern Iraq*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/03/08/double-bombing-kills-northern-iraq/BQTPVPYADR0oMov9mc4IyL/story.html>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *15 dead in Iraq bomb attacks*, CNN, 7 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/07/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>.
- On 14 December 2011, two car bombs left three people dead and another 35 injured after they exploded near shops and restaurants in the predominantly Turkmen town of Tal Afar (Ninewa); Reuters, *Bombs kill three, injure 35 in north Iraq-police*, 14 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombs-kill-three-injure-35-in-north-iraq-police/>.
- On 6 December 2011, six Katyusha rockets set for firing at Shi'ite pilgrims who celebrate the Ashura Day have been disarmed in Tal Afar district; AKnews, *Rockets set for targetting Shiite pilgrims disarmed in Nineveh*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276623/>.
- On 16 May 2010, a double bomb attack at a football match in the predominantly Shi'ite Turkmen town of Tal Afar (Ninewa) killed 25 people and injured 120 others; Khalid al-Tayi, *Iraq double bomb attack kills 25 at football match*, AFP, 16 May 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZn9lxYftuhz8OcD3yAs3fxfckA>; Aljazeera, *Blast hits Iraq football match*, 16 May 2010, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/05/2010514161932327374.html>.

- On 16 October 2009, a suicide bomber who hid among the Sunni congregation in a Tel Afar (Ninewa) mosque first shot and killed the imam, Abdul-Satar Hassan, and then sprayed gunfire at worshippers before blowing himself up, killing at least 15 people and wounding 95 others; Chelsea J. Carter, *Iraq Mosque: Suicide Bomber Kills 12 Worshippers In Tal Afar*, AP, 16 October 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-10-16-baghdad-bombing_N.htm.
- On 10 August 2009, two truck bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the Shabak/Turkmen village of Khazna Tabtah in Al-Hamdaniyah District (Ninewa), killing at least 34 people and injuring 179 others. The blasts were so powerful that they completely destroyed at least 30 houses; OCHA/UNAMI, *Iraq - Khazna Tabtah & Shrekhan Sufla Villages, Mosul, Ninewa*, Situation Report 4, 12 August 2009, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Sitrep4%20-%20Khazna%20Tabtah%20&%20Shrekhan%20Sufla.%20Mosul.%20Ninewa_120809%20_final%20draft_.pdf.
- On 7 August 2009, a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the main mosque in the Turkmen village of Shrekhan Sufla in Tilkeif District (Ninewa), killing up to 45 people and wounding 217 others during Friday prayers, including a significant number of women and children; OCHA/UNAMI, *Iraq - Khazna Tabtah & Shrekhan Sufla Villages, Mosul, Ninewa*, Situation Report 4, 12 August 2009, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Sitrep4%20-%20Khazna%20Tabtah%20&%20Shrekhan%20Sufla.%20Mosul.%20Ninewa_120809%20_final%20draft_.pdf; Ernesto Londoño and Dlován Brwari, *Suicide Bombing in Northern Iraq. Series of Blasts in Baghdad Kill at Least 50*, The Washington Post, 8 August 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/07/AR2009080700283.html>; Sam Dagher, *Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Iraq*, New York Times, 7 August 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html>.
- On 9 July 2009, a double suicide bombing killed at least 34 people and injured 70 others in the predominantly Turkmen town of Tal Afar (Ninewa); AP, *Dozens killed in Iraqi bombings*, 9 July 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/09/dozens-killed-iraqi-bomb-attack>; BBC, *Dozens killed in Iraqi bombings*, 9 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8141646.stm.
- On 20 June 2009, up to 85 people were killed and over 170 others were wounded when a suicide truck bomber detonated more than 1,000 kg of explosives close to the Al-Rasul mosque in Taza, a Shi'ite Turkmen town 20 km south of Kirkuk. The attack completely destroyed 95 homes and a further 100 homes suffered over 40% damage. According to OCHA and UNAMI, up to 600 people have been affected by this incident; OCHA/UNAMI, *Iraq - Taza Bombing*, Situation Report, 30 June 2009, <http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Taza%20SITREP%204%20July.pdf>.

⁷⁹⁸ Reported incidents included:

- On 12 March 2012, Musa Yahya, a Turkmen member of the Taza District Council was assassinated when armed men opened fire on him in central Taza district (Kirkuk); Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councilor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.
- On 28 November 2011, at least one civilian was killed and 15 people wounded, including five policemen, when three roadside bombs exploded near a Turkman provincial council member's house in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
- On 17 October 2011, gunmen blew up an ITF headquarters in Kirkuk city, causing no casualties. NINA, *Turkmen Front headquarters blow up in Kirkuk*, 17 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHII.
- On 10 October 2011, an IED detonated next to the ITF's office in southern Kirkuk, causing only damages to the office building; NINA, *IED against Turkman party office in Kirkuk*, 10 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHJIF.
- On 18 September 2011, gunmen in a speedy car shot dead the bodyguard of a Turkmen member of the Kirkuk's Provincial Council and wounded two policemen; Xinhua, *2 killed, 4 wounded in insurgents' attacks in Iraq*, 18 September 2011, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.asp?id=16996.
- On 7 August 2011, police successfully dismantled a bomb stuck under the car of Turkic Shakour Qassab, a member of Kirkuk Provincial Council from the Turkoman list, in central Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa force member killed in Kirkuk*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144164&l=1.
- On 12 May 2011, the then Assistant Chairman of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Arshad Al-Salihy, escaped an assassination attempt when a rocket fell on his house in southern Kirkuk city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant Chairman of Iraqi Turkomen Front escapes assassination attempt*, 12 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142495&l=1.
- On 18 June 2010, a bomb blast targeted the house of Niazi Muhammad Maa'mar, a Turkmen member of the Salah Al-Din Provincial Council and former member of the CoR, in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din). Maa'mar was not in the house, but eight others were killed and 63 more were wounded; UNHCR, *Annex to the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009*, p. 7, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4c4feff72>.
- On 22 November 2009, a gunman assassinated a member of the Executive Committee of the ITF, Yauz Ahmad Efendi, at his home in Mosul, AFP, *Iraqi Turkmen politician killed at his Mosul home*, 22 November 2009, <http://www.france24.com/en/node/4931273>.
- On 26 December 2009, a roadside bomb targeted the motorcade of Mohammed Taqi Al-Mawla, a Turkmen member of the CoR, on the main route between Tal Afar and Sinjar (Ninewa). The explosion caused only material damages to the vehicle; Sahar Issa, *Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Saturday 26 December, 2009*, McClatchy Newspapers, 26 December 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/12/26/81305/round-up-of-daily-violence-in.html>.
- On 29 July 2009, a sticky bomb exploded and injured Mustafa Rahu, Head of Council of Turkmen Notables, in Mosul; Mohammed Al Dulaimy, *Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Thursday 30 July 2009*, McClatchy Newspapers, 30 July 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/07/30/72739/round-up-of-daily-violence-in.html>.
- On 4 February 2009, gunmen shot Mahmoud Ali Nafotji, an ITF leader, in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); IBC, *Turkmen Front leader shot dead in Tuz Khurmatu*, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k9394>.

⁷⁹⁹ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 22 November 2011, kidnappers killed a Turkic man in Kirkuk after receiving a US\$100,000 ransom from his family; AKnews, *Militants kill kidnapped Turkmen after receiving ransom*, 22 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/274022/>.
- On 21 November 2011, police found the body of a Turkmen government employee, who had been kidnapped several days earlier; AKnews, *Militants kill kidnapped Turkmen after receiving ransom*, 22 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/274022/>.
- On 21 September 2011, Qassim Mohammed, a Shi'ite Turkic businessman, was killed by a sticky bomb attached to his car in Kirkuk; AFP, *Iraq attacks kill six*, 21 September 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/22012/World/Region/Iraq-attacks-kill-six.aspx>.
- On 5 September 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a vehicle carrying prominent Turkic neurologist Yeldrim Abbass (Yuldrom Abbas Damirchy), killing him and his brother in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*,

- 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-5/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi doctor, his brother, killed in Kirkuk*, 6 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144670&l=1.
- On 20 June 2011, a Turkic doctor was abducted from his house in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1.
 - On 19 June 2011, gunmen kidnapped Adwal Ali Mahmud, a prominent Turkic doctor, from his house in central Kirkuk city. Only a few days later, gunmen kidnapped Safi Harzan, a Kurdish doctor; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, *Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors*, Rudaw, 7 May 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1.
- ⁸⁰⁰ In addition, the Chairman of the Iraqi Turkomen Front and member of the Iraqiyya coalition, Arshad Al-Salehy, reportedly blamed the Iraqi Government for closing its eyes to the ongoing abductions and assassinations of Turkmen personalities. Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's Turkomen Front says Turkomen did not celebrate Eid al-Adha holidays due to fear from aggressive attacks*, 10 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=145548.
- ⁸⁰¹ According to the *Encyclopedia of the Orient*, the Shabak are both “a people and a religion. The Shabaks live in the region of Mosul, Iraq, and are united in culture and language, but they cover more than one ethnic group and among them there is more than one religion.” Though some, and in particular the Kurdish parties, identify the Shabak as Kurds, they have their own values, traditions and dresses and consider themselves as a distinct ethnic group. Most Shabak reportedly consider themselves Muslims (mainly belonging to the Shi’ite branch of Islam, with a smaller Sunni minority), though they follow their own unique form of Islam, which includes elements of Christianity and other religions and has its own sacred book known as *Buyruk*, written in the Turkoman language. There is a close relationship between the Shabak and the Yazidis, and the Shabak perform pilgrimage to Yazidi shrines. The Shabak reside mainly in Ninewa Governorate (Mosul and in the disputed villages in the Ninewa Plains such as Hamdaniya, Bartilla, Bashiqa, Al-Namroud). Their language, Shabaki, is a Zaza-Gorani dialect, similar to Kurdish, with many borrowings from Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Until 1952, under British rule, the Shabak were considered as a distinct ethnic group. However, the former regime registered them as Arabs and deported an estimated 3,000 Shabak families to Kirkuk and Erbil as they considered themselves Kurds. Their 22 villages were reportedly destroyed. It is not known how many Shabak remain in Iraq nowadays and estimates range from 60,000 to 500,000; According to the *Encyclopedia of the Orient*, there are 60,000 to 400,000 Shabak in Iraq; *Encyclopedia of the Orient, Shabak*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://lexicorient.com/e.o/shabak.htm>. The US Department of State, with reference to Shabak leaders, says there are 400,000 to 500,000 Shabak in Iraq; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. HRW estimates that there are between 200,000 to 500,000 Shabak in Iraq; HRW, *At A Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 71, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. The Society for Threatened People, *Terrorists are trying to stir up the ethnic groups against each other*, 10 August 2009, <http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=1958&highlight=shabak>.
- ⁸⁰² Khudr Khallat, *Al-Qaeda and Baath Party behind increase in Shabak attacks, says official*, AKnews, 11 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295195/>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 71, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁸⁰³ Khudr Khallat, *Al-Qaeda and Baath Party behind increase in Shabak attacks, says official*, AKnews, 11 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295195/>; IRIN, *IRAQ: Overall violence down - but attacks on minorities continue*, 5 December 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=94389>; Society for Threatened People, *An interview with Kalid Wale, President of the Union of the Shabak in Iraq*, 15 December 2009, <http://www.gfbv.de/inhaltsDok.php?id=1794&highlight=shabak>; Society for Threatened People, *Terrorists are trying to stir up the ethnic groups against each other*, 10 August 2009, <http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=1958&highlight=shabak>. Other human rights organizations speak of 2,000 Shabak reportedly killed since 2003; Ferhad Ibrahim, *Droht eine Zerstörung der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt im Irak?* (in German language), homepage of the German Bundestag, September 2011, <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/09/Beilage/004.html#8>.
- ⁸⁰⁴ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 71, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁸⁰⁵ Ferhad Ibrahim, *Droht eine Zerstörung der ethnischen und religiösen Vielfalt im Irak?* (in German language), homepage of the German Bundestag, September 2011, <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/09/Beilage/004.html#8>.
- ⁸⁰⁶ Two truck bombs reportedly detonated almost simultaneously in a residential area of the Shabak/Turkmen village of Khazna Tabtah in Al-Hamdaniyah District (Ninewa), reportedly killing at least 34 people and injuring 179 others. The blasts were so powerful that they completely destroyed at least 30 houses; OCHA/UNAMI, *Iraq - Khazna Tabtah & Shrekhan Sufla Villages, Mosul, Ninewa*, Situation Report 4, 12 August 2009, <http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Sitrep4%20-%20Khazna%20Tabtah%20&%20Shrekhan%20Sufla.%20Mosul.%20Ninewa.120809%20final%20draft.pdf>. It was reported that the attack was likely the responsibility of Sunni Islamists, who repeatedly had reportedly called for the killing of Shabak given that they are “non-believers” or supporters of the USA or Iran. For example, Mulla Salim Khadr, a Shabak leader, reportedly said that Ansar Al-Sunna had issued a statement in early January 2011, in which it called for the killing of Shabak and Shi’ite Turkmen for their affiliation with the US; Shafaq Media, *Shabak minority fears of attacks increase against them in Mosul News Agencies*, 12 January 2011, <http://www.shafaq.com/en/component/content/article/691-shabak-minority-fears-of-attacks-increase-against-them-in-mosul-news-agencies-.html>. Shortly before the August 2009 attack, a member of the Army of Naqshibandi, a Sunni insurgent group operating in Ninewa, told The National that the Shabak were “in league with Iran and therefore traitors;” Nizar Latif and Phil Sands, *String of blasts kills dozens in Iraq*, The National, 11 August 2009, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/worldwide/middle-east/string-of-blasts-kills-dozens-in-iraq>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 71, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. Also in 2009, on July 8, a bomb reportedly exploded near a Shi’ite mosque located in a Shabak neighborhood in the city of Mosul, killing nine persons and injuring 22 others. The same day, another bomb detonated in a different Shabak neighborhood injuring seven people; USCIRF, *International Religious Freedom Report 2010 – Iraq*, 17 November 2010, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148821.htm>.
- ⁸⁰⁷ For example, on 24 February 2010, unidentified gunmen reportedly killed two Shabak men in their shop in the eastern part of Mosul; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. iv, 9, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. And in January 2010, Christians and Shabak were reportedly injured in a bomb explosion in the town of Bartella (Ninewa); Minority Rights Group International, *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2011 - Iraq*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36e5f.html>. The Iraqi MoHR did not record any attacks against members of the Shabak community during 2010. Compared with 2009 when 59 Shabak and Yazidis were reportedly killed and another 52 were injured; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 42, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
- ⁸⁰⁸ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 19 December 2011, a Shabak high school student was shot dead and his brother was wounded, when a gunman opened fire on them in the Kokjali area east of Mosul city, which is mainly inhabited by Shabak; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak student killed east of Mosul*, AKnews, 19 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279101/>.
- On 3 November 2011, a Shabak man was killed by gunfire in front of his house in Badoush (Ninewa); AKnews, *Mosul attacks leaves two dead*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/270907/>.
- On 22 October 2011, two Shabak men were shot and killed out of a passing car in Mosul's eastern Dora Al-Hamam area; AKnews, *Four civilians killed in Mosul armed actions*, 22 October 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/268553/>.
- On 31 July 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a Shabak man near his home in the village of Bazuya (Ninewa); Aswat al-Iraq, *Shabak civilian shot dead in Nineveh*, 31 July 2011, <http://new.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/254595/>.
- On 26 July 2011, gunmen killed Dr. Hayfa Juma, a Shabak gynecologist in her clinic in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>.
- On 11 July 2011, a Shabak man was killed and his wife was wounded when gunmen opened fire on them from a speeding car near Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Shabak civilian shot dead in Nineveh*, 31 July 2011, <http://new.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/254595/>.
- On 27 and 28 June 2011, gunmen shot dead two Shabak in separate incidents near Bartella and Mosul. One was the owner of a real estate office and the other one a secondary school student; DPA, *Scattered attacks in Iraq leave six people dead*, 28 June 2011, http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1648095.php/Scattered-attacks-in-Iraq-leave-six-people-dead; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, June 27*, 27 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-27/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's Shabak Community man killed in Mosul*, 27 June 2011, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/printer.aspx?id=143420>.
- On 19 April 2011, ISF found the bodies of two Shabak men with gunshot wounds to their heads and chest. They had been abducted earlier in Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 kidnapped Shabaks found dead in Ninewa*, 19 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142079&l=1.
- On 10 January 2011, gunmen on foot killed two Shi'ites from the Shabak minority in two separate incidents in eastern Mosul. One of them was a doctor and was killed inside his clinic; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Jan 10*, 10 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-10>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Second Shabak civilian gunned down in Mosul*, 10 January 2011, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/printer.aspx?id=140472>.
- ⁸⁰⁹ On 16 January 2012, a car bomb reportedly exploded in a residential complex housing displaced Shi'ite Muslims of Shabak ethnicity, killing at least eight people and wounding four others, in Bartella district (Ninewa); Jamal al-Badrani, *Car bomb kills at least 9 in Iraq's Mosul*, Reuters, 16 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80F0E520120116>. Other reported attacks against Shabak in 2012 included:
 - On 22 March 2012, gunmen opened fire from a taxi car on two Shabak men who sold groceries on carts in eastern Mosul's Al-Karama area. The two men died on the spot; Razan Ahmed and Khudr al-Khallat, *Five killed and seven injured in series of attacks in Nineveh*, 22 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/297255/>.
 - On 12 March 2012, a Shabak man was killed and his wife was seriously wounded in an attack on their house in northern Mosul city; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak man killed and wife injured in Mosul house attack*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295401/>.
 - On 9 March 2012, gunmen broke into a Shabak's house in Mosul's Al-Sadr area and shot him dead and wounded his mother; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak man killed and mother wounded in Mosul house attack*, AKnews, 10 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294867/>.
 - On 5 March 2012, a Shabak man was killed and his brother was seriously wounded when gunmen opened fire on them when they left their house in eastern Mosul's al-Atshana area; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak man shot dead and brother wounded in Mosul*, AKnews, 5 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293964/>.
 - On 31 January 2012, twin IEDs detonated in a Shabak village in north Mosul, injuring three civilians and one policeman; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 1 February 2012.
 - On 20 January 2012, gunmen gunned down two Shabak civilians in Rashidiya district, 10 km north of central Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Three killed in drive-by shooting in Mosul*, AKnews, 21 January 2012, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285466/>.
 - On 18 January 2012, gunmen shot dead a Shabak man and wounded his brother outside their home in Mosul's northern Al-Sada area; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak man shot dead in Mosul*, AKnews, 18 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285143/>.
- ⁸¹⁰ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, Figure 11, p. 25, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁸¹¹ Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 9, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. According to Reidar Visser of historiae.org, the Kurdish authorities pursue a "conscious strategy" of labeling the Shabak as "Kurds" in order "to assert control of the Shabak (who inhabit a series of villages in what the Kurds consider "disputed" parts of the Nineveh governorate), partly by assimilating them and partly by trying to co-opt their leaders." Reidar Visser also describes that certain Assyrian Christian leaders try to impose their idea of seeking to establish a federal "minority region" in the Ninewa Plains on the Shabak; Reidar Visser, *The Shabak React to the Atrocities of Khazna Tepe*, Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 10 August 2009, <https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/the-shabak-react-to-the-atrocities-of-khazna-tepe/>.
- ⁸¹² HRW reported alleged assassination attempts against Shabak leader Hunein Qaddo, whose convoy came reportedly under fire from men wearing Kurdish security uniforms (7 January 2009) and Qusay Abbass, an elected member of Ninewa's Provincial Council, who was reportedly hospitalized after *Peshmerga* shot him twice at a checkpoint (7 March 2010); on 16 August 2009, Abbas convoy was reportedly targeted by an IED in Mosul; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 71-72, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 13, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>. Among the Shabak community, there are those that reportedly call for the incorporation of their areas into the Kurdistan Region under the mechanism of Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, while others reject the idea and blame the Kurdish authorities for not preventing or even orchestrating attacks committed against them. Reidar Visser, *The Shabak React to the Atrocities of Khazna Tepe*, Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 10 August 2009, <https://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/the-shabak-react-to-the-atrocities-of-khazna-tepe/>; Society for Threatened People, *Terrorists are trying to stir up the ethnic groups against each other*, 10 August 2009, <http://www.gfbv.de/pressemit.php?id=1958&highlight=shabak>.
- ⁸¹³ At the time of writing the MRG report, services had reportedly not been reinstated; Preti Taneja, *Iraq's Minorities: Participation in Public Life*, Minority Rights Group International, 28 November 2011, p. 17, <http://www.minorityrights.org/11106/reports/iraqs-minorities-participation-in-public-life.html>.
- ⁸¹⁴ Article 14 reads: "Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender." The Constitution of the Kurdistan

Region even obliges the KRG to “(...) seek to remove all obstacles hindering equality in all spheres of life, and in civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights.”

⁸¹⁵ Article 29 (First B) obliges the State to “guarantee the protection of motherhood” and Article 30 (First) to “guarantee to the individual and the family – especially children and women – social and health security, the basic requirements for living a free and decent life, and shall secure for them suitable income and appropriate housing.”

⁸¹⁶ Article 29 (Fourth).

⁸¹⁷ Article 49 (Fourth) reads: “The elections law shall aim to achieve a percentage of representation for women of not less than one quarter of the members of the Council of Representatives.”

⁸¹⁸ Article 2 provides that Islam is “a foundation source of legislation” and “no law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.” Given that not all laws are founded in Shari’a law, these provisions could be used to void provisions that currently provide protection to women. Of further concern is Article 41, which stipulates, “Iraqis are free in their commitment to their personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs or choices (...)” See for example, Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, pp. 25-29, 53-54, 97, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>.

⁸¹⁹ Iraq acceded to the CEDAW in 1986 with reservations. In 2011, the CoR passed a law to cancel Iraq’s reservations on the Convention; see UN, Division for the Advancement of Women, *Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm>; NCCI, *Iraq’s Female Face*, Op-Ed 15 November 2011, http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=341&lang=en.

⁸²⁰ Article 47 of The constitution of 2005 mandates that female members of parliament constitute 25 percent of the CoR. In the March 2010 parliamentary elections, 86 women were elected to the 325-member CoR, though only five of them won their seats without the quota. However, upon forming the new 44-member cabinet in December 2010, it was reported that no woman was appointed for a senior cabinet position and only two ministries of state were offered to women. Bushra Hussein Saleh (INA/Fadhila) was appointed as minister of state without portfolio, while another women lawmaker was offered the position of state minister of women’s affairs, which she refused to protest against women’s marginalization in the government. On 13 February 2011, Ibtihal Al-Zaidi (INA) was appointed as Minister of State for Women’s Affairs. In July 2011, PM Al-Maliki obtained parliamentary approval to downsize his large cabinet. As a result, Bushra Hussein Saleh lost their post, leaving only one remaining female minister, the Minister of State for Women’s Affairs. In Ibtihal Al-Zaidi’s own words, the “the Ministry is no more than an executive-consultation bureau with a limited budget and no jurisdiction on implementing resolutions or activities.” It is noteworthy that her predecessor, Nawal al-Samaraie, reportedly resigned from her post for the lack of jurisdiction and budget; NCCI, *Iraq’s Female Face*, Op-Ed 15 November 2011, http://www4.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=31&lang=en; Reuters, *Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq Prime Minister, Trims Seize Of Cabinet*, 30 July 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/30/nuri-al-maliki-iraq-prime_n_914034.html; Reidar Visser, *The Iraqi Government Gets Downsized: Political and Constitutional Considerations*, Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 30 July 2011, <http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2011/07/30/>; Michael S. Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, *Iraqi Women Feel Shunted Despite Election Quota*, New York Times, 12 March 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/13baghdad.html>; AP, *Iraq cabinet’s lack of women draws protest*, 23 December 2010, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2010/12/23/iraq-government-cabinet-women.html>; John Leland and Jack Healy, *After Months, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve a Government*, New York Times, 21 December 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html>; IRIN, *IRAQ: Minister of women’s affairs tenders resignation*, 9 February 2009, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=82820>. In the Kurdistan Region, February 2009 amendments to the election law reportedly increased the legal quota for women in the regional parliament from 25 to 30 percent. Currently, 36 out of 111 members of parliament are reported to be women. However, as on the central level, women’s representation in the cabinet is low and decreasing with only one female minister, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, represented in the KRG (compared to three under the previous government). According to recent reports, women’s political representation is diminishing as a number of female mayors and high-ranking civil servants in Iraqi Kurdistan have been removed from their posts and replaced by men in recent months; Nawzad Mahmoud, *Female Leaders Decline in Kurdistan*, Rudaw, 21 September 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/3993.html>; Shorsh Khalid, *Glass Ceiling for Female Kurdish Politicians*, IWPR, Iraq Crisis Report Issue 334, 29 April 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/glass-ceiling-female-kurdish-politicians>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 34, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁸²¹ Despite the overall enhanced political representation, women’s representation has reportedly been decreasing in each round of government formation since 2003. The interim government of 2005 included six women ministers and the cabinet of 2006, four female ministers; NCCI, *Iraq’s Female Face*, Op-Ed 15 November 2011, http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=341&lang=en; Michael S. Schmidt and Yasir Ghazi, *Iraqi Women Feel Shunted Despite Election Quota*, New York Times, 12 March 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/13baghdad.html>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 37, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁸²² Women reportedly remain underrepresented in the government and in higher administration; UN Country Team Iraq, *Iraq Facts & Figures – Youth and Women*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://iq.one.un.org/Facts-and-Figures>; IAU, *Violence Against Women Factsheet*, November 2010, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.

⁸²³ Personal Status Law (Law No. 188 of 1959); unofficial translation by the American Bar Association available at: http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/iraq_personal_status_law_1959_english_translation.pdf. The law reportedly discriminates against women in particular by granting men privileged status in matters of divorce and inheritance. It further allows men to have up to four wives.

⁸²⁴ For an extensive study on Iraqi law and how it relates to women rights, see Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>.

⁸²⁵ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 29, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁸²⁶ According to the Iraqi MoHR, 3,254 civilians died in 2010, including 308 women, and 174 children. Furthermore, some 13,788 were wounded, including 1,718 women and 773 children; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 4, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also relevant chapters on Government Officials and Employees, Members of the Iraqi Security Forces, Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders, Members of Political Parties and Professionals.

⁸²⁷ HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>; Kael Alford, *Iraqi voices: For women, freedoms under fire*, 15 December 2011, <http://photoblog.msnbc.msn.com/news/2011/12/15/9444042-iraqi-voices-for-women-freedoms-under-fire>.

⁸²⁸ See chapters “Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores” and “Members of Religious Minorities”.

⁸²⁹ According to HRW, “[T]he deterioration of security has promoted a rise in tribal customs and religiously-inflected political extremism,

which have had a deleterious effect on women's rights, both inside and outside the home;" HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 1, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸³⁰ According to OCHA, "[R]eports of violence against women and gender-based violence (GBV), including harmful traditional practices, honour killings, and sexual exploitation and abuse are on the increase;" OCHA, *Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan*, p. 15, <http://ochairaq.org/2010-Iraq-HAP.pdf>. See also Jane Arraf, *Domestic violence plagues Iraq*, Aljazeera, 8 February 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/02/20122810251221962.html>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 21, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸³¹ According to Amnesty International, "[A]ll parties to the armed conflict in Iraq have been involved in violent crimes specifically aimed at women and girls, including rape. Perpetrators have included members of armed groups, militias, Iraqi government forces and foreign military forces. In addition, women and girls continue to be attacked and sometimes killed by male relatives and Islamist armed groups or militias for their perceived or alleged transgression of traditional roles or moral codes. Most of these crimes are committed with impunity;" Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁸³² Retaliation by the family or tribe has reportedly included "honour killing", forced marriage, coerced suicide or severe restrictions on the freedom of movement and other aspects of daily life; Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 25, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

Additional reasons preventing victims from reporting violence as listed by the Heartland Alliance include:

- Fear of further abuse
- Fear of losing children
- Fear of loss of shelter and basic needs
- Weak response by law enforcement and courts
- Feelings of shame
- Fear of not being believed
- Fear of being blamed for being responsible for the rape or assault
- Lack of protection and services for rape victims; Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 24-25, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸³³ According to the Heartland Alliance, "[P]rotective laws that do exist are often underutilized, sometimes due to the lack of protection and practical options available to women and girls who assert their rights under the law. Judges continue to treat crimes of violence against women and girls leniently by allowing perpetrators to act either with impunity or by handing out light sentences for crimes such as rape, sex trafficking and murder;" Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 6, 25, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. According to Amnesty International, "[I]n the case of violence against women and girls, (...) the climate of impunity is underpinned by Iraqi legislation and jurisprudence, which provides for lenient punishment for attackers who are deemed to have acted in defence of "honour"; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, pp. 6, 19, 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.

⁸³⁴ US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 46, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

⁸³⁵ Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 37-38, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸³⁶ IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.

⁸³⁷ Several women, some with their children, were reportedly held at an undisclosed detention facility in the Muthanna Iraqi Army base. They reportedly included the wives of two suspected AQI leaders, Omar Al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub Al-Masri, who were detained along with their children after their husbands were reportedly killed in an air strike in April 2010; Jane Arraf and Mohammed Al-Dulaimy, *Witness: Secret Iraq prison for women and children*, Christian Science Monitor, 26 May 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0526/Witness-Secret-Iraq-prison-for-women-and-children>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 19, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁸³⁸ "The link between having suffered forced marriage, rape, sex trafficking and other forms of gender-based violence and criminal allegations is frequently ignored and disregarded by police, investigators, prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice system;" Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 7, 13, 19, 21, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸³⁹ For example, Rasha Nameer Jaafer al-Hussain and Bassima Saleem Kiryakos, who are both working in the media team of Iraqi Vice-President Tareq Al-Hashimi, have been reportedly arrested without arrest warrants on 1 January 2012. Since then, their whereabouts have been unknown. It is believed that they have been arrested in relation to the terrorism-related charges brought against Al-Hashimi. Amnesty International expressed concern over the women's fate, saying that they are at risk of torture or other ill-treatment. Bassima Kiryakos had reportedly already been detained for three days in December 2011, during which she was reportedly subjected to beatings before being released without charge; Amnesty International, *Iraq must reveal whereabouts of Vice-President's detained aides*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/iraq-must-reveal-whereabouts-vice-president-s-detained-aides-2012-01-30>; Amnesty International, *Urgent Action - Iraqi Women Held Without Charge*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/003/2012/en/ebf92f34-9b9e-42c8-a2ac-0d959507f991/mde140032012en.pdf>. On average, victims of gender-based violence included in a legal aid programme operated by the Heartland Alliance in partnership with local NGOs, were reportedly held for six months before a trial was held; in some cases observed by the Heartland Alliance, this period was further extended by the order of a judge; Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 14, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See also "Background Information".

⁸⁴⁰ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 15, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸⁴¹ Between 2003 and December 2010, 1,145 persons were reportedly sentenced to death, including 39 women. Many of them were sentenced after trials, which reportedly failed to conform to international standards for fair trial. Out of 257 persons executed between 2005 and 2010, six were women; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. iv, 29, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also “Background Information”.

⁸⁴² AFP, *Iraq executes 17 people in one day*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.news24.com/World/News/Iraq-executes-17-people-in-one-day-20120201>.

⁸⁴³ UN News Centre, *Iraq's execution of 34 people in one day 'shocking' – UN human rights chief*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41019&Cr=Iraq>.

⁸⁴⁴ According to the CFSVA of 2008, one in ten Iraqi households is headed by women, with more households headed by women in urban areas (11%) than in rural areas (8%). More than 80 percent of these women are reportedly widows. Most FHH can be found in the Governorates of Erbil (12.4%), Baghdad (12.2%) Sulaymaniyah and Muthanna (both 11.8%). According to IOM, among the displaced one in eight households are headed by a female. In Qadissiyah (Diwaniyah) Governorate, 19 percent of IDP families are female-headed, rising to 40 percent in Afaq District, and in Kerbala Governorate, 16 percent of IDP families (20% in Al-Hindiya District) are headed by women; IAU, *Qadissiya Governorate Profile*, December 2010, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/462/GP-Qadissiya.pdf>; IAU, *Kerbala Governorate Profile*, December 2010, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/466/GP-Kerbala.pdf>; IOM, *Female Headed Households*, Special Focus Report, November 2010, pp. 1, 2, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Female%20Headed%20Households.pdf; IAU, *Factsheet on Iraqi Women*, 2007, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Iraqi_Women-FINAL.pdf; COSIT, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation/Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRSO) / Ministry of Health/WFP, *CFSVA*, 2008, pp. 26, 91, <http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp192255.pdf>.

⁸⁴⁵ According to OXFAM, there are an estimated one million widows in the country, with 330,000 in Baghdad alone, many of whom lost their husbands following the Iraq conflict since 2003; STV News, *Seized cash to help women in Iraq*, 21 November 2011, <http://news.stv.tv/scotland/280802-seized-cash-to-help-women-in-iraq>; see also Amelie Herenstein, *Hidden victims of Iraq conflict: Women expect little change for better*, Middle East Online, 21 December 2011, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=49604>. According to Nermin Othman, the former acting Minister of Women's Affairs, the estimated number of widows and divorcees reached two million out of a total population of 30 million. More than 50 percent of Iraq's widows had reportedly lost their husbands after 2003; NCCI, *Iraqi Widows and Orphans Face Government Corruption*, 30 November 2010, http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155&Itemid=95&lang=en.

⁸⁴⁶ According to the Minister of Women's Affairs, Ibtihal Al-Zaidi, there are up to two million female breadwinners in Iraq, most of them widows; Aseel Kami, *The daily struggle of Iraq's widows of war*, Reuters, 9 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/09-us-iraq-widows-idUSTRE7A841T20111109>. ICRC estimates that there are over one million women in Iraq who must head their households; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 1, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁴⁷ Between September and December 2010, ICRC conducted in-depth interviews with 11 particularly vulnerable female heads of household in North Ninewa, Kirkuk City, North Diyala, Baghdad and Al-Anbar). The vast majority (92%) of the women interviewed were reported to be widows; the others were wives of detainees or of men who had gone missing, or divorcees. According to ICRC, only about one widow in four does move back to her father's or her in-law's household. Of the women surveyed by ICRC, only one in four moved to live with their parents or in-laws. All women noted that they felt like a burden, and preferred to live on their own; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, pp. 1, 3, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 22, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸⁴⁸ According to the ICRC survey, 43 percent of the women were displaced as a result of conflict. Most of them left their homes after the loss of their husband; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 4, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁴⁹ Under a government welfare programme, administered by the Directorate for Women, the poorest among the widows reportedly receive a modest benefit ranging from US \$43 to 150 per month, depending on the number of children. However, many women are unable to work through the necessary administrative procedures while the concerned directorate is reportedly unable to process all the applications due to a lack of resources and personnel. As a result, not all eligible women actually receive the welfare benefit. According to official figures, only 40 percent are reportedly registered. The ICRC survey, which focussed on particularly vulnerable women heads of household, revealed that only 19 percent receive the benefits. While all women surveyed were found to be registered with the public distribution system (PDS), they receive their food rations on an irregular basis and mostly incomplete; ICRC, *Iraq: working to achieve a brighter future for women heading households*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/iraq-news-2012-03-08.htm>; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 8, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>. Widows whose husband died as a result of “terrorism” are also reportedly entitled to a one-time compensation of up to 2.5 million Iraqi Dinars (US \$2,100); HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 22, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also Oxfam, *In Her Own Words: Iraqi women talk about their greatest concerns and challenges*, 8 March 2009, pp. 3, 4, 7, <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-in-her-own-words-iraqi-women-survey-08mar2009.pdf>.

⁸⁵⁰ Nearly half (46%) of the women surveyed by ICRC obtained only a minimal education. Only 9 percent, being mostly teachers, have more than a primary-school education. Almost 45 percent of the women surveyed were illiterate; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 3, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁵¹ Among the women surveyed by ICRC, most were reportedly married before they reached 20 years of age. After marriage, they became mothers and housewives, and accordingly they did not acquire any professional skills; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 3, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁵² ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, pp. 3, 5, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>. Nevertheless, the level of women engaged in paid employment remains reportedly low. According to the Iraq Family Health Report 2006/7, over 86 percent of the women are not working. The Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) III 2006 (COSIT, UNICEF, 2007) provided a similar result (89.8%); *2006/7 Iraq Family Health Survey*, p. 17, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/ifhs_report_en.pdf.

⁸⁵³ The *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009* revealed that only roughly half of young men aged 10 to 30 support women's work (while more than 90% of young women did). Also, the large majority of young women (92.3%) and men (92.1%) agreed that females must take the approval of their caretaker before practicing any work; Ministry of Youth and Sport/COSIT/KRSO/UNFPA, *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009*, Summary Report, 2009, pp. 25, 42, http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2010/youth_nys.pdf.

⁸⁵⁴ Fifty percent of the women interviewed by ICRC were working at the time the survey was taken. Most women only reportedly started working after the loss of their husband. One third of the women were reportedly found to run their own business, putting them in a relatively better situation than those employed. The others work mostly as farmers, seamstresses, bakers or cleaners. Women in Iraq reportedly earn

much less than their male counterparts; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, pp. 7, 9, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁵⁵ ICRC found that some 30 percent of the women surveyed do not have a stable source of income through employment or regular allowances from relatives or others. They therefore reportedly depend on ad hoc aid, such as the welfare contributions on the occasion of Ramadan, food donations and household gifts; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 9, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>. See also ICRC, *Iraq: working to achieve a brighter future for women heading households*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2012/iraq-news-2012-03-08.htm>

⁸⁵⁶ According to ICRC, even those women that have some job income and/or receive limited assistance from relatives or neighbours, struggle to make a living. Almost 70 percent of the women surveyed spend more money than they earn and need to borrow money to cover their basic needs. ICRC found that almost 50 percent of the women heading households surveyed live in poor conditions, with only basic amenities. Relatives and neighbours usually donate a number of household items. Almost a third of their homes reportedly lack insulation and basic furniture. About 10 percent of the women surveyed squat in abandoned buildings, putting them under threat of eviction. Families headed by women can often not afford education for their children and health services; ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, pp. 4, 6, 7, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁵⁷ ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 9, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁵⁸ ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 1, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 2, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸⁵⁹ See ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, p. 6, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁶⁰ According to HRW, “[M]ut’ah (also known as pleasure marriage) is a temporary marriage contract between a man and an unmarried woman for a specific timeframe (ranging from an hour to months) that often stipulates the “wife” will be paid a designated sum of money. Women who become pregnant are not entitled to child support. Often, the marriages are conducted in secret, unbeknownst to family members. Some clerics argue the practice prevents adultery while critics view it as a form of prostitution. The practice is not addressed in Iraq’s Personal Status Code;” HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 2, 17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. As a result, it is reported that the marriage is not legally recognized. A pleasure marriage reportedly ends without the need for divorce when its term expires. The woman reportedly has no right to inheritance or alimony; however, a child born out of a “temporary marriage” reportedly has the right to inherit from his father; IWPR, *Temporary Marriages Stir Iraqi Sensitivities*, Iraqi Crisis Report Issue 353, 23 September 2010, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/temporary-marriages-stir-iraqi-sensitivities>; Paula I. Nielson, *Temporary Marriage in Modern Iran and Iraq*, 12 January 2010, <http://paula-i-nielson.suite101.com/temporary-marriage-in-modern-iran-and-iraq-a188688>. It has been reported that widows may be pressured into such marriages in exchange for jobs, charity or services; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 2, 17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Kelly McEvers, *Abuse Of Temporary Marriages Flourishes In Iraq*, NPR, 19 October 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130350678>; Temporary marriages are reportedly being misused to the disadvantage of mainly poor or widowed women; IWPR, *Temporary Marriages Stir Iraqi Sensitivities*, 23 September 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c9c63e42.html>. According to Rana Khalid Mussawi, a women activist in Basrah, two main groups of women engage in “temporary marriages”: “[E]ither widows and divorcees who get married desperately because they need to feed their children, and this group is the majority, or women who want easier lives”; Afif Sarhan, *Iraq: Temporary Marriages Boom in South*, Islam Online, 12 February 2009, <http://www.wluml.org/node/5743>.

⁸⁶¹ According to ICRC, up to 47 percent of the children in households headed by women do not go to school. Nearly 40% of the families surveyed have at least one boy under the age of 16 working, usually in markets or on farms; See ICRC, *Households Headed by Women in Iraq: A Case for Action*, August 2011, pp. 6, 7, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2011/iraq-women-survey-2011-08-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁶² OWFI, *Iraqi Women Forced into Sexual Slavery*, 28 January 2010, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/articles/114-iraqi-women-forced-into-sexual-slavery>. See also chapter “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking”.

⁸⁶³ Since 2007, likely in a tactical shift introduced by Sunni armed groups, there was a reported surge in female suicide bombers (in 2007, eight such attacks were reported and in 2008 36 attacks were reported). Women, who can hide the explosives under their loose-fitting traditional robes and can take advantage of more relaxed security checks applied on women, are reported to more easily evade detection and, accordingly, enjoy a higher level of freedom of movement to approach the intended targets. In response to the rise in female suicide bombers, the USF-I created the “Daughters of Iraq,” a programme that reportedly trains Iraqi women to detect female suicide bombers. Since 2009, suicide attacks by women have reportedly dwindled significantly, possibly as a result of a general decline in attacks and enhanced security measures (in 2009, there were four such attacks, in 2010, one, and no reports of female suicide bombers were found in 2011); Jack Healy and Yasir Ghazi, *Iraqi Women Work to Halt Bombers, But Paycheck Is Elusive*, N Times, 27 February 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html?_r=1; CNN, *U.S. trains Iraqi women to find female suicide bombers*, 24 June 2008, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/24/daughters.of.iraq/index.html>; Steve Niva, *Behind the Surge in Iraqi Women Suicide Bombers*, Foreign Policy in Focus, 11 August 2008, http://www.fpi.org/articles/behind_the_surge_in_iraqi_women_suicide_bombers. The last reported attack occurred on 1 February 2010, when a female suicide bomber reportedly killed at least 41 people after she blew herself up among Shi’ite pilgrims in Baghdad; The Telegraph, *Iraq: female suicide bomber kills 41 in attack on Shia pilgrims*, 1 February 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/7127237/Iraq-female-suicide-bomber-kills-41-in-attack-on-Shia-pilgrims.html>.

⁸⁶⁴ Law No. 8 (2011).

⁸⁶⁵ HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM a Positive Step*, 25 July 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/25/iraqi-kurdistan-law-banning-fgm-positive-step>; Hemn Hadi and Patrick Smith, *Ban on female genital mutilation passed*, AKnews, 24 June 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/6/state5212.htm>.

⁸⁶⁶ By February 2012, no special courts have been established. In a first step, a judge specialized in violence against women cases has been appointed within the regular court; information available to UNHCR, February 2012.

⁸⁶⁷ HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM a Positive Step*, 25 July 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/25/iraqi-kurdistan-law-banning-fgm-positive-step>.

⁸⁶⁸ Reportedly, in order to avoid confrontation with clerics and conservatives, the KRG until today has not announced the law on the governmental website, and its implementation, although promised by the Prime Minister, has not been discussed in any way so far. WADI, which also provided an English translation, had reportedly printed the law in a booklet and distributed it widely across the Kurdistan Region; *Suaad Abdulrahman and Arvid Vormann, Iraqi Kurdistan: Free yourself from FGM – A new approach*, Eye See Media, 8 November 2011, <http://www.eyeseeonline.com/2011/11/iraqi-kurdistan-free-yourself-from-fgm—a-new-approach/>. See also, Irfan Al-Alawi, *Female Genital Mutilation “An Obligation” According to Iraqi Muslim Cleric*, Stonegate Institute, 18 August 2011, <http://www.stonegateinstitute.org/2360/female-genital-mutilation-iraq>; Thomas V. Der Osten-Sacken, *Female Genital Mutilation “is an*

obligation” says Mullah in Iraqi-Kurdistan, Stop FGM in Kurdistan, 15 August 2011, <http://stopfgmkurdistan.wordpress.com/2011/08/15/female-genital-mutilation-is-an-obligation-says-mullah-in-iraqi-kurdistan/>.

⁸⁶⁹ The KRG reportedly recorded more than 3,700 cases of violence against women in 2011, including “systematic torture”, “honour crimes” and cases of self-immolation. The authorities recorded 76 cases, in which women were murdered or committed suicide in addition to 330 cases of self-immolation, which is a common suicide method among Kurdish women. According to the authorities, the numbers have dropped compared to previous years; however, this account is reportedly disputed by women activists who say that many cases go unreported due to the “culture of tolerance” vis-à-vis violence against women; Rozh Ahmad, *Kurdish Activists: Women’s Abuse Under-Reported*, Rudaw, 19 January 2012, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4339.html>.

⁸⁷⁰ Campaign against the Kurdish people (and other ethnic groups) in Northern Iraq, led by the former regime of Saddam Hussein in the final stages of Iran-Iraq War, between 1986 and 1989.

⁸⁷¹ Reportedly, in the Kurdistan Region, vulnerable widows and divorcees can apply for social welfare assistance. The applicant must meet certain eligibility criteria. She must be registered in the governorate concerned, meaning that her PDS card must be issued in the governorate. Furthermore, she has to be considered “vulnerable” (either she is the sole breadwinner of the family, or the head of household without employment or still studying at high school/university. Reportedly, women heads of household who have been imprisoned for more than one year or who are below the age of 18 are also eligible. The applicant must produce a range of documents, including the civil ID card, valid PDS card, nationality certificate as well as her divorce certificate, or her husband’s death certificate and the heirs’ certificate. In addition, she must have her childrens’ ID cards. If she qualifies for the welfare assistance, she will reportedly receive 150,000 Iraqi Dinars per month (125 US\$). It is noteworthy that female heads of household from other governorates, including IDPs, will not be able to receive welfare assistance in the Kurdistan Region as they do not have a PDS card issued in any of the governorates of the Kurdistan Region; UNHCR/PAC information, January 2012.

⁸⁷² Reportedly, widows applying to the central government authorities are referred to the KRG authorities, and vice versa; ASUDA, *Integrated Action On Social Protection For Widows In Iraq*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.asuda.org/>.

⁸⁷³ Rape and other forms of sexual and gender based violence, such as domestic violence and trafficking, may reportedly amount to persecution, particularly where the State is unwilling or unable to provide effective protection. For further guidance see UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f1c64.html>; and UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 7 May 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html>. According to the Committee against Torture, the failure of the State to exercise due diligence to intervene, to stop, sanction and to provide remedies to victims of gender-based violence, such as rape, domestic violence and trafficking, facilitates and enables non-State actors to commit such acts with impunity; the State’s indifference or inaction provides a form of encouragement and/or *de facto* permission; see UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), *General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties*, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 January 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47ac78ce2.html>. See also UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being Trafficked*, HCR/GIP/06/07, 7 April 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa4.html>.

⁸⁷⁴ Article 393 of the Iraqi Penal Code. The unofficial English translation, as prepared by the US Armed Forces Judge Advocate General, is available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452514424.html>. Note however that in this translation, a number of pages are missing. A full translation is available on the website of The University of Utah, SJ Quinney College of Law, Global Justice Project, <http://gjni.org/2009/04/12/penal-code-111-of-1969/>. See also below “Domestic Violence”.

⁸⁷⁵ See below “Women in Detention”.

⁸⁷⁶ Though statistics are not available, hundreds of women and girls have reportedly been raped and/or forcibly married to AQI militants in areas under the organization’s control. US officials speculated that AQI deliberately used this tactic to grow a new generation of fighters. Marriages with local women and girls was also reportedly meant to strengthen AQI’s foothold among the local population. The law does reportedly not recognize these marriages, as they had never been officially registered. As a result, these women, whose husbands have often been killed or detained, are said to be unable to claim any rights. Reportedly, the women often do not even know the identity of the men. Furthermore, they reportedly fear to be arrested and detained for having been associated with armed groups. Reportedly, children born out of a (forced) marriage are not recognized by law if the marriage has not been officially registered. As a result, these children are reportedly not able to obtain identity documents, preventing them from accessing services such as education. Both the woman and the child are reportedly ostracized by society; Arwa Damon, *Raped by al Qaeda*, CNN, 12 September 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2011/09/12/damon-rape-al-qaeda.cnn?iref=allsearch>; Kelly McEvers and Isra’ al Rubei’i, *Iraqi Women Wed To Insurgents Find Little Hope*, NPR, 28 January 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/28/133213152/iraqi-women-wed-to-insurgents-find-little-hope>; Leila Fadel, *Children of al-Qaeda in Iraq pay for sins of their fathers*, Washington Post, 21 September 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/20/AR2010092006336.html>. Some women have reportedly been raped and then persuaded to cleanse their shame by blowing themselves up as suicide bombers; BBC, *Iraq’s ‘female bomber recruiter’*, 4 February 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7869570.stm>.

⁸⁷⁷ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 21, 26, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See also below “Early and forced marriages”.

⁸⁷⁸ See “Victims or Persons at Risk of Trafficking”.

⁸⁷⁹ Basma AlKhateeb, *Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace*, Social Watch Report 2010, p. 120, http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/iraq2010_eng.pdf; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁸⁸⁰ Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 21, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 47, 49, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 8, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁸⁸¹ “Women’s groups complain that, too often, police blame the victim, doubt her credibility, show indifference, and conduct inadequate investigations;” HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 15-16, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. The Heartland Alliance reported that law enforcement officials regularly check whether the violence was “legitimated if not at least understandable”, for example by conducting “virginity tests”, including on girls/women that were killed for honour reasons; Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 7,

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸⁸² HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 2, 15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸⁸³ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 16, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸⁸⁴ See chapter “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking”.

⁸⁸⁵ In Iraq, adultery constitutes a criminal act. According to Article 377 (1) of the Penal Code, “[A]n adulteress and the man with whom she commits adultery are punishable by detention”. Adultery is punishable with imprisonment ranging from three months to five years (Article 26 of the Iraqi Penal Code). As there is no mentioning that adultery must be consensual, the victim of rape may be labelled as adulterer and fall under this provision; Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, p. 33-34, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>. Furthermore, adultery is “a grave social offense against family/community/tribal honor, leading women to face serious threats of honor killing by their husband’s and natal families. The mere suspicion or allegation of adultery places all parties at risk, but especially women and girls who carry the heavy burden of maintaining honor.” Women accused of or convicted of adultery loose custody of their children; Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 21, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. Article 377 is reportedly often used by abusive men to threaten and intimidate their wives or to gain a divorce; Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 21, 31, 36, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See below “Honour-based Violence”.

⁸⁸⁶ According to the Heartland Alliance, law enforcement and judicial personnel merely focus on the criminal charges brought against of a woman or girl without consideration to possible underlying gender-based violence such as forced prostitution, sexual violence or domestic abuse; Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 7, 13, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 14-15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf> and chapter “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking”.

⁸⁸⁷ Article 396 (1) and (2) of the Iraqi Penal Code criminalizes a person who “sexually assaults” or “attempts to do so without his or her consent and with the use of force, menaces, deception or other means” a man or a woman or a boy or a girl under the age of 18. However, Article 398 reads: “If the offender mentioned in this Section then lawfully marries the victim, any action becomes void and any investigation or other procedure is discontinued and, if a sentence has already been passed in respect of such action, then the sentence will be quashed (...).” The law provides that the sentence will be reinstated or proceedings will resume if the defendant divorces the victim without legal justification during a period of three years after the end of proceedings.

⁸⁸⁸ Basma AlKhateeb, *Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace*, Social Watch Report 2010, p. 120, http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/iraq2010_eng.pdf.

⁸⁸⁹ Basma AlKhateeb, *Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace*, Social Watch Report 2010, p. 121, http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/iraq2010_eng.pdf.

⁸⁹⁰ Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 21, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

⁸⁹¹ Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, p. 40, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>.

⁸⁹² Article 427 of the Iraqi Penal Code.

⁸⁹³ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 8, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁸⁹⁴ For example, in May 2009, a delegation from the CoR’s Human Rights Committee visited Al-Kadhimiyah women’s prison in Baghdad and was given testimony from two female prisoners who had reportedly said they had been raped repeatedly after their arrest. Amnesty International in recent years has recorded the following types of torture and ill-treatment in Iraqi detention and prison facilities, which are applied on men, women and children:

- Rape and threat of rape
- Beatings with cables and hosepipes,
- Electric shocks,
- Suspension by the limbs,
- Piercing the body with drills,
- Asphyxiation with plastic bags,
- Removal of toenails with pliers, and
- Breaking of limbs.

Amnesty International, *Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds - Abuse And Neglect Of Detainees In Iraq*, February 2011, pp. 8, 15, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2011/en/48c3c6e6-9607-4926-abd7-d1da1c51a976/mde140012011en.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Iraq: Civilians under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>;

Elizabeth Palmer, *Inside Iraq’s Only Women’s Prison*, CBS News, 16 July 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/22/eveningnews/main3642350.shtml?tag=currentVideoInfo;videoMetaInfo>. Heartland Alliance through its legal aid programme reported of “some cases, in which women reported having been tortured at the time of arrest and detention.” Abuses reportedly included in particular beatings, electric shocks, and the use of solitary confinement, and occurred mostly at the time of arrest or during the investigation stage; Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 16, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁸⁹⁵ Amnesty International, *Broken Bodies, Tortured Minds - Abuse And Neglect Of Detainees In Iraq*, February 2011, p. 8, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/001/2011/en/48c3c6e6-9607-4926-abd7-d1da1c51a976/mde140012011en.pdf>; Jane Arraf and Mohammed Al-Dulaimy, *Witness: Secret Iraq prison for women and children*, Christian Science Monitor, 26 May 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0526/Witness-Secret-Iraq-prison-for-women-and-children>.

⁸⁹⁶ Tina Susman and Caesar Ahmed, *In Iraq, a story of rape, shame and 'honor killing'*, Los Angeles Times, 23 April 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/23/world/fg-iraq-woman23>.

⁸⁹⁷ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 18, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

⁸⁹⁸ Article 41 of the Penal Code provides: “There is no crime if the act is committed while exercising a legal right. The following are considered to be in exercise of a legal right: (1) The punishment of a wife by her husband, the disciplining by parents and teachers of children under their authority within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom;” Law No. (111) of 1969, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category.LEGAL.NATLEGBOD..IRQ.452514424.0.html>.

⁸⁹⁹ See “Children with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances”.

- ⁹⁰⁰ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 22, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰¹ At the time of writing, the law has not been issued; UNHCR, March 2012; IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.
- ⁹⁰² HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 20-21, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. According to Ibtihal Al-Zaidi, the Iraqi Minister of State for Women's Affairs, official statistics show that 20 percent of Iraqi women face domestic abuse. According to Sundus Abbas, the head of the Women's Leadership Institute, a rights group with branches in seven Iraqi governorates, the figure of women who face sexual and domestic abuse may be as high as 73 percent; Yara Bayoumy and Aseel Kami, "Honor killings" require tougher laws, say Iraqi women, Reuters, 6 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-iraq-women-idUSTRE82510920120306>. In Sulaymaniyah Governorate, there has reportedly been a growing number of physical assaults against women recorded by the local authorities. According to Directorate of Investigation of Violence Against Women, more than 1,200 cases of physical assault have been recorded between 2008 and 2010 in Sulaymaniyah Governorate alone. According to the data, cases of "beating" have increased from 381 cases in 2008 to 460 in 2010; Nawzad Mahmoud, *Physical Assault Against Women On Rise In Sulaimani*, Rudaw, 25 November 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4175.html>. According to Kurdish official records, in the first six months of 2010, at least 671 women suffered "serious domestic violence" and at least 63 women were sexually abused; Amnesty International, *Annual Report: Iraq 2011*, 28 May 2011, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-iraq-2011?page=show>. According to the most recent Iraq Family Health Survey, a representative survey of 9,345 households and 14,675 women of reproductive age, covering all governorates in Iraq, one in five women (21%) in Iraq aged 15-49 had suffered physical violence at the hands of the husband. Fourteen percent of women who suffered physical violence were reportedly pregnant at the time. Reportedly, thirty-three percent had suffered emotional violence, and 83 percent had been subjected to controlling behaviour by their husbands. Figures were generally higher among women in the Central and Southern Governorates than for women in the Kurdistan Region; Ministry of Health/Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation/WHO, *Iraq Family Health Survey 2006/7*, pp. 3, 23-25, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/ifhs_report_en.pdf (further: "2006/7 Iraq Family Health Survey"). The UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/Ministry of Health Multiple Indicator Cluster (MIC) Survey 2006 showed that more than 35 percent of women (aged 15-49 years) in Thi-Qar and between 29 and 35% of women in Wassit and Missan Governorates had reportedly experienced physical domestic violence; UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/Ministry of Health, MIC Survey 2006, cited in: IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 1, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.
- ⁹⁰³ The MIC Survey 2006 revealed that 59 percent of women aged 15-49 believe that it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife under certain circumstances. This figure rises to 70 percent and 71 percent, respectively, among women in rural areas and among women with no formal education. Reportedly, women aged between 15 and 24 are as likely to tolerate abuse as older generations; UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO/Ministry of Health, MIC Survey 2006, cited in: IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 1, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf. The *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009*, showed that more than one quarter of the young women aged 10-30 and half of the young men thought that the husband has the right to beat his wife if she disobeyed him. Moreover, 68 percent believe that it was acceptable to kill a girl for profaning her family's honour; IAU, *Factsheet on Iraqi Women*, 2007, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/Iraqi_Women-FINAL.pdf; Ministry of Youth and Sport/COSIT/KRSO/UNFPA, *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009*, Summary Report, 2009, p. 42, http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2010/youth_nys.pdf. And a 2003 study conducted by Physicians for Human Rights in Southern Iraq revealed that more than 50 percent of the surveyed women and men agreed that a husband has the right to beat a disobedient wife; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 22, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰⁴ IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.
- ⁹⁰⁵ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 21, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰⁶ According to the US Department of State, "[E]xisting laws were widely unenforced, including those on domestic violence"; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 46, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. See also Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰⁷ Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 29-31, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.
- ⁹⁰⁸ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.
- ⁹⁰⁹ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 35, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 21, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁹¹⁰ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 21, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.
- ⁹¹¹ Cruel and inhumane tribal treatment of females is said to be one of the reasons for young females to run away from their homes, sometimes lured by males who were reportedly connected to prostitution rings. Once alone, without a family and penniless, they reportedly became vulnerable victims to a thriving sex industry. OWFI, *Prostitution and Trafficking of Women and Girls in Iraq*, 5 March 2010, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/images/stories/pdf/prostitutionandtrafficking-OWFIreport.pdf?6dcb5c0485db6830947a0e9cf1d291b1=c84de48e94826923e465b86563505e4e>. See also chapter "Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking".
- ⁹¹² On "honour crimes" committed against boys and men, see Danish Immigration Service, *Honour Crimes against Men in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Availability of Protection*, 23 March 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bd95eae2.html>.
- ⁹¹³ For example, in a case described on Latitudes Radio, a girl and a boy, who were reportedly refused marriage by their families and accused of adultery, were both mutilated with the girl having her nose cut off and the boy his ears; Andrea Wenzel, *Challenging Gender-Based Violence in Iraqi Kurdistan*, Latitudes Radio, 23 February 2011, <http://www.latitudesradio.org/shows/2011-02/challenging-gender-based-violence-iraqi-kurdistan>.
- ⁹¹⁴ See for example, John Leland and Namu Abdulla, *A Killing Set Honor Above Love*, New York Times, 20 November 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21honor.html?pagewanted=all>.
- ⁹¹⁵ See for example, HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 18, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Basma AlKhateeb, *Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace*, Social Watch Report 2010, p. 121, http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/iraq2010_eng.pdf.
- ⁹¹⁶ Basma AlKhateeb, *Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace*, Social Watch Report 2010, p. 121, http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/iraq2010_eng.pdf; Tracey Shelton, *Life In Women Shelter In Erbil*, Rudaw, 17 July 2010, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/3029.html>; Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, *Gender, Sexuality And The Criminal Laws In The Middle East And North Africa: A Comparative Study*, Women For Women's Human Rights (WWHR) - New Ways, February 2005, pp. 22-23, 24,

<http://www.wvhr.org/files/GenderSexualityandCriminalLaws.pdf>. For example, near Kirkuk in 2008, a father reportedly killed two of his teenage daughters and injured a third one on the suspicion that they had relationships. Medical examinations showed that they were still virgins; Yara Bayoumy and Aseel Kami, "Honor killings" require tougher laws, say Iraqi women, Reuters, 6 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-iraq-women-idUSTRE82510920120306>.

⁹¹⁷ John Leland and Namu Abdulla, *A Killing Set Honor Above Love*, New York Times, 20 November 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21honor.html?pagewanted=all>; Robert Fisk, *Robert Fisk: The crimewave that shames the world*, The Independent, 7 September 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-crimewave-that-shames-the-world-2072201.html>.

⁹¹⁸ Article 128(1) of the Law No. (111) of 1969, Penal Code, reads:

"Legal excuse either discharges a person from a penalty or reduces that penalty. Excuse only exists under conditions that are specified by law. Notwithstanding these conditions, the commission of an offence with honorable motives or in response to the unjustified and serious provocation of a victim of an offence is considered a mitigating excuse."

Article 130 of the Penal Code reads:

"If there exists a mitigating excuse for a felony for which the penalty is death, the penalty shall be reduced to life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of years or detention for a period of not less than 1 year. If the penalty is life imprisonment or imprisonment for a term of years; the penalty shall be reduced to a period of detention of not less than 6 months unless otherwise stipulated by law."

⁹¹⁹ Article 409 of the Penal Code reads:

"Any person who surprises his wife in the act of adultery or finds his girlfriend in bed with her lover and kills them immediately or one of them or assaults one of them so that he or she dies or is left permanently disabled is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 3 years. It is not permissible to exercise the right of legal defense against any person who uses this excuse nor do the rules of aggravating circumstance apply against him."

According to UNAMI, the husband's testimony in court is sufficient evidence to prove adultery; UNAMI, *Human Rights Report 1 January to 30 June 2009*, p. 13, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UNAMI_Human_Rights_Report15_January_June_2009_EN.pdf. In March 2012, a father who had reportedly killed two daughters and injured a third for honour-related reasons was sentenced to only two years in prison; Yara Bayoumy and Aseel Kami, "Honor killings" require tougher laws, say Iraqi women, Reuters, 6 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-iraq-women-idUSTRE82510920120306>.

⁹²⁰ According to the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, the fact that "honourable motives" are not defined by the Penal Code, provides "a very broad mitigating excuse;" Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, p. 32, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>.

⁹²¹ An Iraqi Human Rights Ministry report said 249 women were murdered in 2010, including for reasons of "honour", without providing further details; Yara Bayoumy and Aseel Kami, "Honor killings" require tougher laws, say Iraqi women, Reuters, 6 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-iraq-women-idUSTRE82510920120306>. The Iraqi Ministry for Human Rights in October 2010 reported that at least 84 women had been killed in "honour killings" in 2009 in Iraq excluding the Kurdistan Region; Amnesty International, *Annual Report: Iraq 2011*, 28 May 2011, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-iraq-2011?page=show>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 20, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 32, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>. According to Bushra Mohammed Zaki, a women's activist, 49 women from Kirkuk were either murdered or killed themselves, mostly by self-immolation; Jamshid Zangana, *A women shelter for Kirkuk*, AKnews, 14 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/284212/>.

⁹²² Law No. 14, Article 1, of 2002 amended the Iraqi Penal Code as follows: "It is no longer possible to refer to articles 128, 130 and 131 of Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as a pretext for the clearance of one's family honour through act of murder;" cited in: Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, *Gender, Sexuality And The Criminal Laws In The Middle East And North Africa: A Comparative Study*, Women For Women's Human Rights (WWHR) - New Ways, February 2005, p. 29, <http://www.wvhr.org/files/GenderSexualityandCriminalLaws.pdf>.

"Honour" is now considered an aggravating circumstance; Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, p. 44, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>.

⁹²³ According to the Warvin Institute for Women's Issues, a local NGO based in Erbil, the prevalence of "honour killings" is increasing. In September 2011 alone, 25 women were killed in the Kurdistan Region; Kurdish Globe, *NGO survey finds abuse against women rising*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=FA04F9BD289C1663DBDF0C9A43AFA61>. According to the KRG authorities, violence against women is on the decrease; John Leland and Namu Abdulla, *A Killing Set Honor Above Love*, New York Times, 20 November 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21honor.html?pagewanted=all>. See also Dilshad Ahmed, *Violence against women in Rania*, AKnews, 1 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293254/>.

⁹²⁴ See for example, Soran Bahadin, *It was not accidental, the women were murdered in Iraqi Kurdistan*, Rudaw, 6 November 2010, http://www.rudaw.net/english/culture_art/3275.html.

⁹²⁵ Wasseem Bassem, *Why so many Iraqi women kill themselves?*, Azzaman, 2 August 2011, <http://www.azzaman.com/English/index.asp?fname=news%5C2011-08-02%5CKurd.htm>.

⁹²⁶ Self-immolation is reportedly the most common method of suicide among Kurdish women between 14 and 30 years of age and is often used as an escape from an abusive situation; Izaddin Rasool, *Factors in Attempted Female Suicide in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, School of Social Sciences, University of Bangor/UK, Draft Conference Paper for the 2nd Global Conference "Suicide – A Making Sense of: Project", 31 October - 2 November 2011, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/rasoolspaper.pdf>; Rozh Ahmed, *Iraqi Kurdish Activists: Women's Abuse Under-Reported*, Rudaw, 19 January 2012, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4339.html>.

⁹²⁷ Robert Fisk, *Robert Fisk: The crimewave that shames the world*, The Independent, 7 September 2010, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-crimewave-that-shames-the-world-2072201.html>.

⁹²⁸ The newspaper Dar Al-Hayat reported that the number of women burning themselves is increasing. While in 1991, 39 cases have been recorded by the police, the figure had reportedly rose to 441 cases in 2010. According to the newspaper's estimates, 14,000 girls have burnt themselves since 1990 and every 20 hours one more girl commits suicide. Other cases go unreported. These figures however do not indicate how many girls and women have committed suicide or have been killed by their families; Al Arabiya, *Of women who set themselves on fire in Iraq's Kurdistan*, 23 November 2011, <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/23/178790.html>.

⁹²⁹ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 7, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹³⁰ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 10, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹³¹ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 10, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹³² It is reported that, in total, there are five shelters in the Kurdistan Region. In each of the three Governorates, there is one governmental shelter under the authority of MoLSA/KRG. These have a capacity to host up to 12 women at the time; however, given the authorities' commitment to provide protection, the shelters often host more women in need. UNHCR was informed that at times, up to 30 women have been sheltered at the same time. In principle, the length of stay should not exceed six months; however, if a case has not been resolved by that time, the women concerned are allowed to stay on an exceptional basis. Some women reportedly stay for up to three years in the governmental shelters. Furthermore, there are two more shelters in Sulaymaniyah, one of them is the Aram Shelter run by the Women's Union and the other one is Asuda, which is run by the Asuda local NGO and funded by UN agencies and NGOs. Aram has a capacity to shelter 15 women at the time for a maximum stay of three months. Asuda, also with a capacity to host 15 women, does not have a limit as regards the length of stay, rather the women stay until their case has been resolved; UNHCR/PAC information, January 2012.

⁹³³ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁹³⁴ According to the US Department of State, "[O]ther than marrying or returning to their families (which often resulted in the family or community revictimizing the shelter resident), there were few options for women who were housed at shelters." US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 47, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. Latitudes Radio described the case of Hapsa, who was accused by her family of adultery and continues to be threatened by her family. She has not left the Aram shelter for nine years with no prospects for the future; Andrea Wenzel, *Challenging Gender-Based Violence in Iraqi Kurdistan*, Latitudes Radio, 23 February 2011, <http://www.latitudesradio.org/shows/2011-02/challenging-gender-based-violence-iraqi-kurdistan>.

⁹³⁵ For example, in the case of rape, a woman may be obliged by her family to marry the perpetrator, which, according to Iraqi law, results in the closing of all related criminal proceedings. In cases in which a woman had initially rejected a forced marriage by her family, she may have to agree to that marriage to avoid an "honour crime".

⁹³⁶ Rudaw, an English-language newspaper published by the Rudaw Media Company in Erbil, accounted for 10 women who had left a shelter in Erbil (Nawa Center opened in 2007) and were killed afterwards by their relatives; Rudaw, *When Women Are Victims of Tradition*, 3 November 2010, http://www.rudaw.net/english/culture_art/3265.html. According to Bahar Rafiq, an experienced psychologist working at a women's shelter in Erbil, "[I]f we speak realistically, we don't have any families taking their daughters back. In my experience the violent families are safer than those that pretend to accept." Rafiq also mentions a case, which she thought to be an exception as the father was well educated and lived in Europe. He committed not to harm his daughter. However, after taking her back from the shelter, she disappeared and the father returned to Europe; Tracey Shelton, *Life In Women Shelter In Erbil*, Rudaw, 17 July 2010, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/interview/3029.html>. See also Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁹³⁷ Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 10, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹³⁸ UNHCR received information that there were several cases in which a woman was attacked and killed by her family when she was transferred from the shelter to the court; UNHCR/PAC information, January 2012. On 11 May 2008, a gunman shot and seriously injured a woman, whose husband had accused her of adultery, in the Asuda Women Centre in Sulaymaniyah. This incident showed that despite security measures taken to protect the women, they may still be at risk of being targeted by family members even inside the shelter; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>; IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf; Khanum Raheem Lateef, *Women's shelter attacked by gunmen*, Asuda, 12 May 2008, <http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=14781>.

⁹³⁹ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁹⁴⁰ This is also reported to be the case in the Kurdistan Region if the threat against the woman or girl is so serious that there is reason to believe that the shelters would not provide sufficient physical protection. Reportedly, some judges are biased against shelters and ordered women/girls to be held in protective detention. To keep women or girls in detention in order to provide for their physical protection poses numerous problems, in particular: "victims are held with suspected criminals that may include individuals with a violent past; family problems may be exacerbated when a victim/detainee is accused of further causing family dishonor and shame; and victims of gender-based violence are caught up in the criminal justice system, possibly charged with a crime for which they never committed." Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 15, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See also Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, pp. 22, 23, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 13, 15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 33, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Mohammed Jamjoom, *Sex Slave Girls Face Cruel Justice in Iraq*, CNN, 4 May 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-04/world/iraq.women.prisons.1_trafficked-iraq-sexual-slavery?_s=PM:WORLD. See also chapter "Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking or Forced Prostitution".

⁹⁴¹ Danish Immigration Service, *Honour Crimes against Men in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the Availability of Protection*, 23 March 2010, p. 12, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bd95eae2.html>.

⁹⁴² Jane Arraf, *Domestic violence plagues Iraq*, Aljazeera, 8 February 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/02/20122810251221962.html>.

⁹⁴³ UNHCR Iraq, March 2012. See also Jane Arraf, *Domestic violence plagues Iraq*, Aljazeera, 8 February 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/02/20122810251221962.html>.

⁹⁴⁴ UNHCR Information, February 2012; IAU, *Violence Against Women in Iraq Factsheet*, November 2010, p. 2, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1149/Violence%20against%20women%20Factsheet_Final.pdf.

⁹⁴⁵ Jamshid Zangana, *A women shelter for Kirkuk*, AKnews, 14 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/284212/>.

⁹⁴⁶ FGM, as practiced in the Kurdistan Region, reportedly involves the cutting of the clitoris and sometimes parts of the inner and/or outer labia of girls, usually aged 4 to 12 years, in order to curb their sexual desire and preserve their "honour" before marriage. The operation is usually undertaken in secret by midwives using a razor blade or a knife. The operation regularly causes severe physical and psychological consequences. Fear and trauma, lasting pain and infertility are common consequences; Stop FGM in Kurdistan, *Female Genital Mutilation: It's a crime not culture*, accessed 18 March 2012, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/fgm_e.htm#mapa. A HRW report describes the experiences of young girls and women who undergo FGM and the impact it has on their physical and mental health; see HRW, "They

“Took Me and Told Me Nothing”, 16 June 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/06/16/they-took-me-and-told-me-nothing-0>. A study revealed that girls who have undergone FGM are more prone to mental disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The research found “*alarmingly high rates*” of PTSD (44 percent), depression (34 percent), anxiety (46 percent) and somatic disturbances (37 percent) among a group of 79 circumcised girls in the Kurdistan Region, aged 8-14, who did not otherwise suffer any traumatic events. These rates were reported to be up to seven times higher than among non-circumcised girls from the same region and were comparable to rates among people who suffered early childhood abuse. According to the author of the study, the Kurdistan Region has just 13 psychologists and only one with expertise in psychotherapy; Jan Ilhan Kizilhan, *Impact of psychological disorders after female genital mutilation among Kurdish girls in Northern Iraq*, European Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 25, N° 2, 2011, pp. 92-100, <http://scielo.isciii.es/pdf/ejpen/v25n2/original4.pdf>; IRIN, *IRAQ: New research highlights link between FGM/C and mental disorders*, 13 January 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94638>.

⁹⁴⁷ For this study, 1,692 standardized interviews were conducted with girls and women from 14 years of age and up between September 2007 and May 2008. The study covered the three Northern Governorates of Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah in addition to the districts of Garman and New Kirkuk, which belong *de facto*, but not *de jure*, to the Kurdistan Region. *De jure*, these districts belong to Diyala and Kirkuk Governorates. In the Governorate of Dahuk, WADI found a significant lower rate of FGM than in the other areas surveyed (7% compared to rates of 63-81%). WADI, which was not able to use its own teams to conduct the survey in Dahuk, could not find a plausible explanation for the large deviation of the data and decided to exclude the results obtained in Dahuk from the report. The results of the survey therefore are based on 1,408 interviews, including 565 in Erbil, 534 in Sulaymaniyah, and 309 in Garman and New Kirkuk; WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, pp. 2-4, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf. WADI - Association for Crisis Assistance and Development Co-operation - is a German NGO, which supports programmes of development, gender-mainstreaming and conflict resolution in Northern Iraq, Israel, Jordan and Syria since 1992. Since 2005, WADI is part of the Stop-FGM-in-Kurdistan campaign, an initiative of local and international NGO for a legal ban on FGM; see www.wadinet.de.

⁹⁴⁸ In the Governorate of Erbil, 63 percent of the women had undergone FGM. In Sulaymaniyah Governorate, the rate was 77.9 percent. The Kurdish districts of Garman and New Kirkuk were particularly affected with a rate of 81.2 percent; WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, p. 5, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf.

⁹⁴⁹ For more details, see WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, pp. 6-7, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf.

⁹⁵⁰ Among Sunni Muslims interviewed by WADI, 75.4 percent had reportedly undergone FGM. The survey also included 5.2 percent non-Sunni Muslims. Among these, three Shi'ites (23.1% of the Shi'ites) and 13 Kaka'i (39.4% of the Kaka'i) indicated that they had been mutilated. No indications of mutilations among Christians and Yazidis could be found. According to WADI, these results show a clear link between Islam and FGM in the Kurdistan Region, even if among Muslim scholars it is disputed whether FGM was a religious duty; WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, p. 18, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf. See also Arvid Vormann, *Some results from Kirkuk – Female Genital Mutilation goes beyond borders*, 4 September 2011, <http://stopfgmkurdistan.wordpress.com/2011/09/04/fgm-in-kirkuk-first-findings/>.

⁹⁵¹ Some 74.8 percent of the Kurdish women surveyed indicated that they had undergone FGM. This compares to only one in eight women of Arabic origin, two in every nine women of Turkmen origin and one in every 20 women of other ethnic origins. Of the 40 non-Kurdish mothers of daughters under the age of 14, none had her daughter(s) genitally mutilated. These results support the assumption that FGM is practiced in a systematic way only among Kurdish women; WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, pp. 22, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf. According to WADI, it is likely that FGM is also a problem in areas outside the Kurdistan Region: “*In the light of our experiences from Kurdistan, it may be the case that, rather than not being practiced, FGM in other regions of Iraq is being practiced but still hidden.*” Preliminary results from a new study conducted in Kirkuk showed that 78 percent of the Kurds but only 25 percent of the Arabs and Turkmen there have undergone FGM. Among Christians of different denominations, no cases of FGM were found; Arvid Vormann, *Some results from Kirkuk – Female Genital Mutilation goes beyond borders*, 4 September 2011, <http://stopfgmkurdistan.wordpress.com/2011/09/04/fgm-in-kirkuk-first-findings/>; see also Falah Muradkhan Shakaram *Female Genitale Mutilation in Kirkuk – outlook for a campaign*, Awene In Kurdish language), 27 December 2010, English translation <http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/updates/update008e.htm>.

⁹⁵² Among women under the age of 20, the FGM rate was 57 percent, while in the 30-39 age group, it was 73.8 percent. The rate rose to 95.7 percent among women over 80 years of age. However, there are regional variations. While in Garman and Sulaymaniyah a significant drop of FGM prevalence among women under 20 could be observed, in Erbil, such a decline took place earlier. In fact, today a slight increase can, reportedly, be observed in Erbil. WADI predicts that the overall decrease might continue, as only 46.2 percent of the interviewees said that FGM continued to be common in their community. According to WADI, in an optimistic assessment, the current FGM rate could be below 50 percent; WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, pp. 5-6, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf. A survey conducted by the Kurdistan Ministry of Health in July 2010 seems to confirm the lower prevalence of FGM. The survey, which involved 5,112 women, found that 41 percent had been mutilated. The study found no prevalence of FGM in the Governorate of Dahuk. The rate of FGM was higher in the Governorate of Sulaymaniyah than in Erbil Governorate; Ari Osman, *Government Says 41 Percent of Kurdish Women Are Circumcised*, Rudaw, 1 December 2010, http://www.rudaw.net/english/culture_art/3332.html; Aswat al-Iraq, *41% of women in Iraq's Kurdistan circumcised – survey*, 28 November 2010, <http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/articles/article040e.htm>.

⁹⁵³ The study showed a clear interrelationship between a lack of education and FGM. Whereas the FGM rate was 84 percent among illiterates, it was 57.6 percent among those with a secondary school education and down to 37 percent among those with a university degree. Similar correlations were observed in relation to the education of the husband and that of the parents, in particular that of the mother; for more details, see WADI, *Female Genital Mutilation in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 2010, pp. 11-17, 36, http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/study_fgm_iraqi_kurdistan_en.pdf.

⁹⁵⁴ Falah Muradkhan Shakaram *Female Genitale Mutilation in Kirkuk – outlook for a campaign*, Awene In Kurdish language), 27 December 2010, English translation available at: <http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/updates/update008e.htm>.

⁹⁵⁵ Stop FGM in Kurdistan, *Reaching Our Main Goal: Banning FGM Effectively*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/projects.htm>.

⁹⁵⁶ Article 6 of the law stipulates a penalty for anyone, including medical professionals and midwives, who “*instigate, assist, or carry out*” the procedure. According to HRW, penalties include prison terms ranging from six months to three years in addition to fines of up to 10 million Iraqi Dinars (US \$8,500). AKnews reported that penalties include 3 to 6 years imprisonment or a fine of up to 5 million Iraqi Dinars (US \$4,300). If medical practitioners are caught being engaged in instigating, assisting or carrying out such procedures, they will be banned from working for three years; Hemn Hadi and Patrick Smith, *Ban on female genital mutilation passed*, AKnews, 24 June 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/6/state5212.htm>. HRW acknowledged the KRG's commitment to eradicate the practice, but stressed that “*(...) the government needs a long-term strategy to deal with this harmful practice because criminalizing it is not enough;*”

HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Law Banning FGM a Positive Step*, 25 July 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/25/iraqi-kurdistan-law-banning-fgm-positive-step>.

⁹⁵⁷ Arvid Vormann, *Some results from Kirkuk – Female Genital Mutilation goes beyond borders*, 4 September 2011, <http://stopfgmkurdistan.wordpress.com/2011/09/04/fgm-in-kirkuk-first-findings/>; Falah Muradkhan Shakaram *Female Genitale Mutilation in Kirkuk – outlook for a campaign*, Awene In Kurdish language), 27 December 2010, English translation available at: <http://www.stopfgmkurdistan.org/html/english/updates/update008e.htm>.

⁹⁵⁸ Article 29(1) (B) and Article 29(4).

⁹⁵⁹ The General Assembly has set the international standard for the minimum age of marriage at 15 years of age; UN General Assembly, *Resolution 2018 (1965) - Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages*, 1 November 1965, A/RES/2018, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f05a63.html>. CEDAW in Article 16 states that women shall have the same rights as men in marriage (a), including “the same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent” (b). However, Iraq has put a reservation on Article 16 as it was deemed “un-Islamic” at the time; Article 16, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, A/RES/34/180, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f2244.html>; CEDAW, *Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW - Iraq*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm>.

⁹⁶⁰ Iraq’s Personal Status Law, which is considered one of the most progressive personal status laws in the Middle East in terms of women’s rights, applies to both Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. Where, however, the Personal Status Law does not make explicit provision for a situation, Shari’a law is applicable. It may then be applied differently to members of the two communities as they follow different schools of jurisprudence. Non-Muslims were allowed to keep their separate systems. Their family matters are adjudicated by the Personal Matters Court, which seeks advice from the relevant religious authorities. Since 2003, the role of Islam and Shari’a law remains highly contentious. To date, reportedly no enabling legislation has been promulgated as required by Article 41 of the Constitution, which sets forth that Iraqis be free in matters of personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs or choices. It remains unclear whether the Personal Status Law would be modified or cancelled altogether, leaving different sects to apply their own sets of laws and interpretation as was done before the introduction of the Personal Status Law in 1959. Certainly, any such decision would strongly affect the lives of Iraqis as it regulates relationships within families. Particular concerns are expressed with regard to women, LGBTI and minority rights; see Law No. (188) of 1959, Personal Status Law (as amended), <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=category&docid=469cdf3011&skip=0&category=LEGAL&publisher=NATLEGBOD&coi=IRQ&querysi=personal&searchin=title&display=10&sort=date>.

⁹⁶¹ Article 9 of the Personal Status Law provides that a forced marriage is void. However, once the marriage has been consummated, the marriage is considered valid by law, leaving those subjected to a forced marriage, mostly women, without legal protection; Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, p. 100, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>. According to a Baghdad lawyer specialized in family cases, “[W]e have the laws and they used to be enforced under the old regime. This government is weak, the police are weak and offer little protection to men or women’s rights;” Nizar Latif, *‘I hate my father for my forced marriage, I hate my tribe, and I don’t love my wife’*, The National, 25 July 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/i-hate-my-father-for-my-forced-marriage-i-hate-my-tribe-and-i-dont-love-my-wife?pageCount=0>.

⁹⁶² Article 7 of the Personal Status Law.

⁹⁶³ The law provides no definition as to what “an urgent necessity” would constitute. Therefore, cultural or religious “necessities” could reportedly be used to force a 15-year old to marry; Institute for International Law and Human Rights, *Women and the Law in Iraq*, December 2010, pp. 99-100, <http://iilhr.org/documents/womenandlawiniraqEN.pdf>. Reportedly, the reason for lowering the minimum marriage age to 15 years was that it was considered to be in line with tribal practices; Fatima Agha Al-Hayani, *Legal Modernism in Iraq: A Study of the Amendments to Family Law*, Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993, cited in: Dr. Sherifa Zuhur, *Gender, Sexuality And The Criminal Laws In The Middle East And North Africa: A Comparative Study*, Women For Women’s Human Rights (WWHR) - New Ways, February 2005, footnote 14, <http://www.wwhr.org/files/GenderSexualityandCriminalLaws.pdf>.

⁹⁶⁴ Also men may be forced or pressured to agree to an arranged marriage in line with traditional or tribal customs; see for example, Nizar Latif, *‘I hate my father for my forced marriage, I hate my tribe, and I don’t love my wife’*, The National, 25 July 2010, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/i-hate-my-father-for-my-forced-marriage-i-hate-my-tribe-and-i-dont-love-my-wife?pageCount=0>.

⁹⁶⁵ There are no figures available but Iraqi government officials reportedly confirmed a growing number of early marriages; Isha Sesay, *Iraq’s child brides*, CNN (video), 18 December 2009, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xbjhw6_iraq-s-child-brides_news.

⁹⁶⁶ The Iraq Family Health Survey 2006-2007 revealed that 9.4% of girls were married at the age of 15. The rate was highest in the Kurdistan Region with 10.3%; Ministry of Health/Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation/WHO, *Iraq Family Health Survey 2006/7*, p. 2, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/ifhs_report_en.pdf. Also, according to the findings of the *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009*, a third of young women (and almost half of the men) believe that a girl must marry her relative if it is her guardian’s wish; Ministry of Youth and Sport/COSIT/KRSO/UNFPA, *Iraq National Youth and Adolescents Survey 2009*, Summary Report, 2009, p. 42, http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2010/youth_nys.pdf.

⁹⁶⁷ Given that marriages of girls are often concluded according to religious customs and are not registered in court, there are no statistics available. However, the problem of early marriages, including to much older men, reportedly continues to be widespread. According to Inad Salman, judge at the Rusafa Personal Status Court in Baghdad, some 6,000 minor girls have been married to older men in 2010. In October 2011 alone, at least 120 marriages took place in Iraq between underage girls and men over 45; Mohammed al-Tayyeb, *Marriage of minors persists in Iraq*, Aknews, 2 November 2011, <http://static.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/270629/>. See also US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 49, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

⁹⁶⁸ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 7, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹⁶⁹ Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 34, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹⁷⁰ Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, pp. 6, 28, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>; War Child, *Til Lunch Do Us Part- The four hour marriage in Iraq*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.warchild.org.uk/features/til-lunch-do-us-part>. See also “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking or Forced Prostitution”.

⁹⁷¹ The law as amended provides that a forced marriage is “suspended” if the marriage is consummated. However, the amendment has little practical effect as the girl would still have to initiate legal proceedings to terminate the “suspended” marriage; Alliance for Human Needs &

Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 35, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>.

⁹⁷² Law 15 of 2008: Amendments to Personal Status Code 188 of 1959, <http://www.gipi.org/library/primary/kurdistan-region-legislation/>.

⁹⁷³ See for example, Falah Muradkan-Shaker, *Iraqi-Kurdistan seen from a women's perspective*, Kurdish Aspect, 21 January 2011, <http://www.kurdishaspect.com/doc012111FM.html>.

⁹⁷⁴ According to Tanyel B. Taysi, "Zhin be Zhin (woman for woman) marriage is a cultural institution in which a woman is traded for another in a marriage arrangement. For example, man "A" has his eye on a daughter of man "B." In return for agreeing to this marriage, man "B" is given the daughter or sister of man "A." It is in essence a very severe form of the commoditization of women, as these women or girls are utilized as bargaining chips. To protest a Zhin be Zhin can leave a woman at risk of honor-related violence, as it is seen as her duty to submit to being traded;" Tanyel B. Taysi, *Eliminating Violence Against Women Perspectives on Honor-Related Violence in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Sulaimaniya Governorate*, 16 March 2009, p. 26, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/asuda_report_16mar2009.pdf. See for example the case of "Hapsa" from the town of Ranya (Sulaymaniyah), who was supposed to be married according to "Zhin bi Zhin"; Andrea Wenzel, *Challenging Gender-Based Violence in Iraqi Kurdistan*, Latitudes Radio, 23 February 2011, <http://www.latitudesradio.org/shows/2011-02/challenging-gender-based-violence-iraqi-kurdistan>. See also Izaddin Rasool, who explains that in an exchange marriage, the fate of one couple's marriage is linked to the other couple's marriage, i.e. if one couple seeks divorce, the other couple should also be divorced or pay for the expenses of the second marriage; Izaddin Rasool, *Factors in Attempted Female Suicide in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, School of Social Sciences, University of Bangor/UK, Draft Conference Paper for the 2nd Global Conference "Suicide – A Making Sense of: Project", 31 October - 2 November 2011, pp. 7-8, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/rasoolpaper.pdf>; Najeeba Mohammad, *Brides Pay High Price*, IWPR, Iraqi Crisis Report No. 215, 14 June 2007, <http://iwpr.net/report-news/brides-pay-high-price>.

⁹⁷⁵ Izaddin Rasool, *Factors in Attempted Female Suicide in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, School of Social Sciences, University of Bangor/UK, Draft Conference Paper for the 2nd Global Conference "Suicide – A Making Sense of: Project", 31 October - 2 November 2011, p. 8, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/rasoolpaper.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁶ Izaddin Rasool, *Factors in Attempted Female Suicide in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, School of Social Sciences, University of Bangor/UK, Draft Conference Paper for the 2nd Global Conference "Suicide – A Making Sense of: Project", 31 October - 2 November 2011, pp. 9, 16, <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/rasoolpaper.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁷ Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>. "Women are also suffering violence at the hands of their fathers, brothers and other relatives, particularly if they try to choose how to lead their own lives. Many face terrible retribution if they refuse to be forcibly married or dare to associate with men not selected by their families – even though Iraqi legislation specifically prohibits forced marriage, and the right to choose a spouse is guaranteed under international law applicable in all parts of Iraq. Some women are reported to have been killed by male relatives who the authorities have then failed to bring to justice;" Amnesty International, *Iraq, Human Rights Briefing*, March 2010, p. 12, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/004/2010/en/c2bb7123-1e17-4abf-8202-6f6f81448644/mde140042010en.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁸ Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

⁹⁷⁹ UNICEF, *Universal Periodic Review - Human Rights Council: UNICEF Inputs - Iraq*, 1 December 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cd12f3d2.html>.

⁹⁸⁰ For example, in the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011), it was reported that "[C]hildren were among the victims of the violence. On 25 July, in Kirkuk governorate, a car bomb killed seven people including two children aged 10 and 11, and injured seven other children. On 30 July, in Salah ad-Din governorate, three children were killed in an exchange of fire between Iraqi security forces and insurgents. On 15 August, a car bomb in a market in Al-Kut killed more than 60 people, including 16 children;" UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011)*, 28 November 2011, para 57, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_736_EN.pdf. The Iraqi MoHR reported that in 2010, 174 children were killed and 773 were injured in conflict-related incidents, primarily in the Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa governorates. In 2009, 362 children were killed and 1,044 injured. The Country Task Force for the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), which comprises members of relevant UN agencies operating in Iraq as well as NGO representatives, accounted for 194 children killed and 232 children injured in conflict-related incidents during 2010; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 4, 36, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. Of the 45,779 victims killed between 2003 and 2011, for whom IBC was able to obtain age data, 3,911 (8.54%) were children under age 18; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011*, 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>.

⁹⁸¹ The abduction of children reportedly remains a serious problem. In 2009 alone, the MoI estimated that at least 265 children were abducted and issued several public warnings. However, many more incidents may not be reported to the authorities for fear of reprisal. The Ministry of Education instructed schools to take precautions and security patrols and checkpoints around schools were increased. Armed groups reportedly abduct children to finance their activities and, in one case reported by the UN, to secure the release of prisoners; UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, p. 9, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>; UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011)*, 28 November 2011, para 57, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_736_EN.pdf. In January 2012, it was reported that ISF freed five kidnapped children and arrested seven suspected members of a child kidnapping ring, which allegedly also engaged in the illicit trade of organs taken from kidnapped children; Mohammed al-Qaisi, *Baghdad police free five children from organ selling gang*, Mawtani.com, 25 January 2012, http://www.mawtani.com/cocoon/iii/xhtml/en_GB/features/iii/features/iraqtoday/2012/01/26/feature-01.

⁹⁸² Estimates on the number of orphans in Iraq vary. According to MoLSA, there are approximately 4.5 million orphans in Iraq, 70 percent of whom are believed to have lost their parents since 2003. From the total number, around 600,000 children are living in the streets without a home. Only 700 children are living in the 18 orphanages existing in Iraq; SOS Children's Villages, *Investigation Launched into Orphan Abuse in Iraq*, 9 July 2011, <http://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/news/news/orphan-charity-news/pages/investigation-orphan-abuse-iraq-064.aspx>; Deborah Lutterbeck, *4.5 Million Orphans in Iraq: Protests Over Food and Shelter*, GRTV, 22 February 2011, <http://tv.globalresearch.ca/2011/02/45-million-orphans-iraq-protests-over-food-and-shelter>. The Iraqi Orphan Foundation, a UK registered charity, estimates that there are 3 million orphans in Iraq; Iraqi Orphan Foundation, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqiorphanfoundation.com/index.html>. According to the "Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq" (CFSVA) of 2008, 3.8 percent of the Iraqi population (approximately 1.12 million) is orphaned, having either lost father, or mother or both. In 80 percent of the cases, the child reportedly lost his/her father. The CFSVA found the highest rates of orphans in the Governorates of Diyala (5.4%), Erbil (4.9%) and Al-Anbar (4.6%); COSIT, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation/Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRISO) / Ministry of Health/WFP, CFSVA, 2008, p. 33, <http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/wfp192255.pdf>.

⁹⁸³ Reportedly mothers or fathers at times abandon their children when they themselves get married again after a death or divorce. Also, families would rather abandon children they are unable to take care of than having to live with the shame of bringing them to an orphanage; Jane Arraf, *Iraq's abandoned children*, Al Jazeera, 10 May 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/05/201151041017174884.html>.

⁹⁸⁴ MoLSA has reportedly initiated an investigation into allegations raised by a CoR member that children in orphanages and juvenile correction units have been subjected to abuse, early marriages and organ theft; SOS Children's Villages, *Investigation Launched into Orphan Abuse in Iraq*, 9 July 2011, <http://www.soschildrensvillages.ca/news/news/orphan-charity-news/pages/investigation-orphan-abuse-iraq-064.aspx>.

⁹⁸⁵ Since 2003, more than 1.6 million people, including many children, reportedly lost their homes. IOM reported in 2011, that about 50 percent of IOM-assessed IDPs are under the age of 18; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, pp. 1, 5, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq,%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. Among Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR offices in the region, 37.4 percent are children aged 0-17; UNHCR Iraq, *Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered Iraqis and Non-Iraqis*, 29 February 2012.

⁹⁸⁶ According to UNDP, around one million Iraqi children are affected by explosive remnants of war and 2,000 children have been killed or maimed by cluster bombs alone since 1991; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 37, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

⁹⁸⁷ The magnitude of mental disorders among Iraq's children and youth after decades of conflict and sanctions is not known; however, studies and reports suggest that a high number of children suffer from mental disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, which, if untreated, has lifelong negative consequences. For example, the Iraq Mental Health Survey 2006/2007 indicated an overall lifetime prevalence of mental disorders of 16 percent and an overall 12-month prevalence of 11 percent among adults, with anxiety disorders being most dominant. The results showed that women were more affected by mental disorders than men, and those separated, widowed and divorced having a higher prevalence than those married. Treatment was very low despite an overall lifetime exposure to traumatic events of 56 percent; WHO, *Iraq Mental Health Survey 2006/7*, 2009, http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/imhs_report_en.pdf. A study by the Iraqi Society of Psychiatrists in collaboration with WHO found that 70 percent of children in the Shaab district of North Baghdad are suffering from trauma-related symptoms, including stuttering and bedwetting; James Palmer, *Trauma severe for Iraqi children*, USA Today, 16 April 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20070416/1a_ledel6.art.htm. A 2007 study showed that 37 percent of children and young adolescents aged 1 to 15 who were patients at primary health facilities (total of 3,079 children assessed) in Mosul had a mental disorder, including PTSD (10.5%), enuresis (6%), separation anxiety disorder (4.3%), specific phobia (3.3%) stuttering and refusal to attend school (3.2% each), learning and conduct disorders (2.5% each), stereotypic movement (2.3%) and feeding disorder in infancy or early childhood (2.0%). The highest prevalence of mental disorders was among children 10–15 years old (49.2%) while the lowest was among 1–5 year olds (29.1%). Overall, boys were found to be more affected than girls (40.2% and 33.2%, respectively); however, the results showed a reverse trend for PTSD and specific phobia; Asma Al-Jawadi and Shatha Abdul-Rhman, *Prevalence of childhood and early adolescence mental disorders among children attending primary health care centers in Mosul, Iraq: a cross-sectional study*, *BMC Public Health*, October 2007, <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/274>. From January to March 2006, WHO and the Iraqi Ministry of Health conducted three studies on the prevalence of mental disorders in children in Baghdad, Mosul and Dahuk. The first study found that out of 600 primary school children from 16 schools in Baghdad nearly half of them reported exposure to a major traumatic event during the previous two years. Fourteen percent had PTSD (more common among girls than boys). In the second study in Mosul, 1,090 adolescents from eight secondary schools were screened for mental disorders. Thirty percent had symptoms of PTSD (again, more common among girls). There was a higher rate of PTSD in the older adolescents, almost none of whom had received any treatment. The third study, in Dahuk, involved 120 working street children and 120 school children. The prevalence of mental disorders was higher in the working children than the school children (36% vs. 13%); Ali H Razokhi, Issam K Taha, Nezar Ismat Taib, Sabah Sadik and Naema Al Gasseer, *Mental health of Iraqi children*, *The Lancet*, Volume 368, Issue 9538, pp. 838 - 839, 2 September 2006, [http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(06\)69320-3/fulltext](http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(06)69320-3/fulltext). IDP and refugee children are likely exposed to additional traumatic stress factors related to displacement that may affect their psychological wellbeing and development; see for example, UNHCR, *UNHCR assists displaced children in Iraq's Kurdistan region*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4eae3e36.html>; Abdul Kareem S. Al Obaidi, *Iraqi Psychiatrist in Exile Helping Distressed Iraqi Refugee Children in Egypt in Non-Clinical Settings*, *Canadian Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, May 2010, 19(2), 72–73, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2868550/>. See also: AbdulKareem Al-Obaidi, Boris Budosan, Linda Jeffrey, *Child and adolescent mental health in Iraq: current situation and scope for promotion of child and adolescent mental health policy*, *Intervention – International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict*, March 2010, Volume 8, Issue 1, p 40–51, http://journals.lww.com/interventionjnl/Fulltext/2010/03000/Child_and_adolescent_mental_health_in_Iraq_.5.aspx#; César Chelala, *Iraqi Children Bear the Costs of War*, *Common Dreams*, 5 March 2009, <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/03/05-0>; IRIN, *IRAQ: Children's mental health affected by insecurity, say specialists*, 7 February 2006, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26114>.

⁹⁸⁸ Reports indicate that domestic violence against children is widespread and has increased since 2003, though statistical data is difficult to obtain. Corporal punishment of children remains legal in the home. According to Article 41 of the Iraqi Penal Code “*the punishment of a wife by her husband, the disciplining by parents and teachers of children under their authority within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom*” is a legal right. Regulations state that corporal punishment should not be used in schools, however, the Penal Code applies; Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, *Iraq- Briefing For The Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review – 7th session*, 2010, http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session7/IQ/GIEACP_UPR_IRQ_S07_2010_GlobalInitiativeEndAllCorporalPunishmentChild.pdf.

According to a 2010 UNICEF report, 85 percent of children aged 2-14 experienced violent discipline, including physical punishment and/or psychological aggression in 2005-2006. Nearly three quarters reportedly experienced physical punishment, three in ten children experienced severe physical punishment (being hit or slapped on the face, head or ears or being hit over and over with an implement) and 82 percent experienced psychological aggression (being shouted at, yelled at, screamed at or insulted). Boys were slightly more likely than girls to experience violent discipline (87% and 83%, respectively); UNICEF, *Child Disciplinary Practices At Home – Evidence from a Range of Low- and Middle-Income Countries*, 2010, pp. 38, 72, 88, http://www.childinfo.org/files/report_Disipl_FIN.pdf. A 2008 study of the situation of children's rights in Iraq found a high level of family violence, especially for girls, including physical and psychological violence as well as neglect. Corporal punishment in schools was found to be common – for example, 48% of teachers in the South Region of the country said that they had used physical violence to discipline children. In the Central Region, 83% of children's drawings showed negative images of life in school, at home and in neighbourhoods, with many mentions of violence; Save the Children *Iraq: A Child Rights Situation Analysis*, October 2008, pp. 34-35, http://www.savethechildren.dk/Files/Filer/Nyheder/2009/081031_IRAQ_CRSA_2008_Final.pdf. For more information on early and forced marriages, domestic violence against women, “honour killings” and FGM, see chapter “*Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances*”.

⁹⁸⁹ There are hardly any specialized facilities for persons with special needs. Many disabled persons reportedly live on the edge of society,

begging in the streets to earn a living. Ongoing violence in Iraq leaves more children with disabilities every year. Baraum, an Iraqi NGO for the care of children, reported that more than 900 children were disabled as a result of terrorist attacks from January 2010 to February 2011. According to their survey, 80 percent sustained physical disabilities, while the remaining 20 percent had mental disabilities and psychological problems because they witnessed explosions; Mohammed al-Qaisi, *Terrorist operations left 900 Iraqi children disabled last year*, 11 May 2011, http://www.mawtani.com/cocoon/iii/xhtml/en_GB/features/iii/features/iraqtoday/2011/05/11/feature-02. Children with intellectual disabilities have reportedly been recruited by armed groups and trained as suicide bombers; UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, p. 6, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>; AKI, *Iraq: Al-Qaeda 'used 24 child suicide bombers in last two years*, 1 October 2008, <http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.2527067244>; IRIN, *Mentally handicapped children used in attacks*, 10 April 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=71257>.

⁹⁹⁰ Forty-one percent of the Iraqi population is below the age of 15; Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Labour Force Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1582/LB%20Factsheet-English.pdf>. According to COSIT in 2008, 43 percent of the Iraqi population are 0-14 years of age; COSIT, *Iraq in Figures*, October 2008, p. 7, <http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2008/allreports/IRAQ%20IN%20FIGURE.pdf>.

⁹⁹¹ Twenty-three percent of Iraqis are reportedly living on less than US \$2 per day. Rising food prices (they doubled between 2004 and 2008) reportedly led to a 20 percent drop in protein acquisition in poorer households and further aggravates undernutrition among children and women; UNICEF, *UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children*, 2011, p. 2, http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/files/HAC2011_4pager_Iraq_rev1.pdf. Seven out of every 100 Iraqis, a total of 2.1 million persons, are reportedly undernourished, though disparities exist between the governorates with the governorates of Babel, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Muthanna and Salah Al- Din Governorates being particularly affected by food deprivation. In 2007, more than one in five children in Iraq (22%) aged under five years showed stunted growth, 5 percent suffered from wasting and 9 percent were underweight; IAU, *World Food Day Factsheet*, December 2010, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1123/world%20food%20day.pdf>; AO/WFP/UNICEF/COSIT/KRSO, *Food Deprivation in Iraq*, August 2010, pp. 2, 3, 16, <http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2010/Food%20Deprivation%20in%20Iraq.pdf>.

⁹⁹² See "Background Information".

⁹⁹³ See "Background Information".

⁹⁹⁴ Illiteracy is reportedly high, affecting in particular young rural women among whom 50 percent are illiterate. CFSVA of 2008 estimated the national literacy rates at around 80 percent for children aged 10 years old and over, meaning that one in five Iraqis is illiterate. In rural areas, one in four is illiterate. The lowest literacy rates can be found in the three Northern Governorates and in the Southern Governorates of Missan, Muthanna and Diwaniyah, where literacy rates stand between 69 and 76 percent (as compared to literacy rates of 88-93 percent in the Central Governorates of Baghdad, Diyala and Kirkuk). Women are particularly affected by illiteracy, especially in rural areas. Available data indicates that among women aged 15 to 24 living in rural areas close to 50 percent are literate, compared to 72-80 percent of women living in urban and metropolitan areas, respectively. Illiteracy affects life in many ways. A household headed by an illiterate Iraqi is reportedly more likely to be deprived (insufficient water, sanitation, food, assets and electricity) than a household headed by a literate individual. Households with illiterate mothers have higher incidence of disease than those households where a mother can read; IAU, *Literacy in Iraq Fact Sheet*, September 2010, http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1050/Literacy%20Day%20Factsheet_Sep8.pdf; UN, *On Global Action Week for Education the UN Calls for More Funds to Improve Access to Quality Public Education in Iraq*, 20 April 2010, http://www.uniraq.org/documents/EFA%20week%202010%20press%20release20100420_Eng.pdf; CFSVA 2008, p. 29.

⁹⁹⁵ Unemployment among the 15-24 years age group is reportedly high at 18 percent (27% of females, 17% of males) and higher in urban areas compared to rural areas. The highest rate of youth unemployment can be found in the Governorates of Al-Anbar and Thi-Qar with 26-33 percent unemployed. Of particular concern is the fact that unemployment is higher among youth with higher education; Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Labour Force Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1582/LB%20Factsheet-English.pdf>. According to the 2009 Iraq Youth Survey, up to 23 percent of males and 21 percent of females aged 15-24 are unemployed. Given the lack of opportunities, 33 percent of those unemployed intend to go abroad in search of work; IRIN, *IRAQ: Youth unemployment driving emigration*, 20 July 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93278>. See also, Dahr Jamail, *Iraq: A country in shambles*, Al Jazeera, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/20121411519385348.html>. See also "Background Information".

⁹⁹⁶ For further guidance see UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 7 May 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html>; and UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being Trafficked*, HCR/GIP/06/07, 7 April 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa4.html>.

⁹⁹⁷ UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, HCR/GIP/09/08, 22 December 2009, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2f4f6d2.html>.

⁹⁹⁸ Article 29 Third.

⁹⁹⁹ Article 37 Third, *Constitution of the Republic of Iraq*, 15 October 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.

¹⁰⁰⁰ CPA, Order No. 89, *Amendments to the Labor Code – Law No. 71 of 1987*, 30 May 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ae11a.html>.

¹⁰⁰¹ Iraqi Labour Law, Article 90.

¹⁰⁰² *Iraqi Labour Law*, Article 91. Additional legal requirements regarding the employment of children under 18 include a maximum 7-hour workday, a pre-employment medical examination, a daily rest period of one hour after four hours of work and a 30-day paid vacation per year. Employers must maintain a register of names of employees under the age of 18, post a copy of the labour provisions protecting children and keep medical fitness certificates of employed children on file. However, youth 15 years or older who are employed in family enterprises are excluded from most of these provisions, putting them at greater risk for involvement in the worst forms of child labour. Penalties for violation of these provisions are imprisonment for between 10 days and three months or fines up to 12 times the monthly minimum wage; see *Iraqi Labour Law*, Articles, 92-94 and 96.

¹⁰⁰³ Article 91.3.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Article 37(3).

¹⁰⁰⁵ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, pp. 386, 387-388, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰⁶ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, p. 388, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰⁷ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, p. 386, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>. In the Kurdistan Region, children are reportedly seen begging for a living, some

of whom may be homeless. It appears that some are Arab IDPs displaced from other areas of Iraq. The KRG in all three governorates established homes for children who are either homeless or are unable to live with their families for various reasons; however, there are reportedly few programmes aimed at their long-term reintegration into society; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 39, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰⁰⁸ See chapter “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking”.

¹⁰⁰⁹ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, p. 387, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰¹⁰ See chapter “IFA in Southern and Central Iraq”.

¹⁰¹¹ Article 91 (3a), CPA, Order No. 89, *Amendments to the Labor Code – Law No. 71 of 1987*, 30 May 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ae11a.html> ; CPA, Order No. 22, *Creation of a New Iraqi Army*, 18 August 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

¹⁰¹² Section 6 (2 and 3), CPA, Order No. 22, *Creation of a New Iraqi Army*, 18 August 2003, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030818_CPAORD_22_Creation_of_a_New_Iraqi_Army.pdf.

¹⁰¹³ Article 97, CPA, Order No. 89, *Amendments to the Labor Code – Law No. 71 of 1987*, 30 May 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49997ae11a.html>

¹⁰¹⁴ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, p. 386, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰¹⁵ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, p. 7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰¹⁶ See “Actors of Violence”.

¹⁰¹⁷ The number of children recruited and used by armed groups remains difficult to ascertain because of the restrictive security situation; however, the UN Secretary-General reported that “children have been systematically used by insurgent groups;” UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, pp. 5-7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>. See also US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, pp. xxxvi, 386, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰¹⁸ According to the UN Secretary-General, armed groups allegedly use children as suicide bombers because they arouse less suspicion and accordingly enjoy greater freedom of movement. Reportedly, children have unknowingly been used as “proxy bombers”, carrying explosives to be remotely detonated. Since 2008, there have been consistent reports that ISI/AQI operate a youth wing for children under the age of 14 called “Birds of Paradise” (“*Tiyour al-Janna*”) to carry out suicide attacks. Reportedly, AQI specifically targets vulnerable children for forced recruitment such as orphans, street children and mentally disabled children. According to an Iraqi security official, “[F]rom interrogations, we found out that all these children either lost their loved ones in attacks or were forced into the organization by families who sympathize with al-Qaeda;” IRIN, *Iraq: Finding hope for former child fighters*, 14 October 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89468>. Reportedly, AQI also recruits drug addicts and tempts adolescents by offering large sums of money. Reportedly, there are some 150 members of the Birds of Paradise in Diyala; Mahmoud al-Jabbouri, *Diyala Sahwat to track al-Qaeda outside of province as terror group mobilises*, AKnews, 11 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/289345/>. See also UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, pp. 5-7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 36, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also Nizar Latif, *Al Qaeda exploits Iraq’s orphans for a new army of militants*, The National, 7 December 2011, <http://newsessentials.wordpress.com/2011/12/07/al-qaeda-exploits-iraqs-orphans-for-a-new-army-of-militants/>; StrategyPage, *The Avenging Orphans*, 23 December 2011, <http://www.strategypage.com/htm/w/hterr/20111223.aspx>; Jason Ditz, *Iraqi General Hails Arrest of al-Qaeda Kids*, AntiWar.com, 19 April 2009, <http://news.antiwar.com/2009/04/19/iraqi-general-hails-arrest-of-al-qaeda-kids/>. See also Lucy Keating, *Al Qaeda’s deadly exploitation of children*, Iraq War Logs, 23 October 2010, <http://www.iraqwarlogs.com/2010/10/23/al-qaeda-s-deadly-exploitation-of-children/>.

¹⁰¹⁹ For example, in August 2010, armed gunmen reportedly entered a house in Sadiyah, north of Baghdad, killed three persons and then sent two children, 10 and 12 years old, to report the attack to the ISF. When the ISF arrived at the scene, explosives planted in the house killed eight soldiers and wounded four. The two children were not injured and were later placed in the care of relatives; UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, p. 7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰²⁰ UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Iraq*, 15 June 2011, p. 7, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/350/96/PDF/N1135096.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁰²¹ IRIN, *IRAQ: Finding hope for former child fighters*, 14 June 2010, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=89468>; US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, September 2011, p. 389, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰²² See “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Domestic Violence”.

¹⁰²³ See “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances - Sexual Violence and Harassment”.

¹⁰²⁴ See “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Honour-Based Violence”.

¹⁰²⁵ See “Victims of or Persons at Risk of Trafficking or Forced Prostitution”.

¹⁰²⁶ See “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Female Genital Mutilation”.

¹⁰²⁷ See “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Early and Forced Marriages”.

¹⁰²⁸ UNAMI reported that there were 520 boys and girls held with adults (though in separate cells) in various pre-trial facilities in Iraq (excluding the Kurdistan Region) and 759 boys and 29 girls held in facilities for convicts; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 38, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰²⁹ UN Security Council, *First report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 2001 (2011)*, 28 November 2011, para 59, http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2011_736_EN.pdf.

¹⁰³⁰ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 38, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰³¹ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 38, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰³² In some cases, female children are reportedly kept in female prisons and detention centres; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 39, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰³³ Adopted in 2003, the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, defines

trafficking as: “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of person by means of the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim for the purposes of exploitation, which includes: 1) exploitation of prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation; 2) forced labor or services; 3) slavery or practices similar to slavery; 4) servitude; and 5) the removal of organs”; UN General Assembly, *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, 15 November 2000, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4720706c0.html>.

¹⁰³⁴ Article 37(3), Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 15 October 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f50804.html>.
¹⁰³⁵ NCCI, *Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law Still Pending*, January 2012, http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=353%3AAanti-trafficking-in-persons-law-still-pending&catid=52%3Ahuman-rights&lang=en; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰³⁶ Penal Code, Law No. (111) of 1969, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452514424.html>; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰³⁷ CPA Order 89, 30 May 2004, Articles 91(3) and 97, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040530_CPAORD89_Amendments_to_the_Labor_Code-Law_No.pdf.

¹⁰³⁸ Norwegian Church Aid in April 2010 issued its report “*Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation and Prostitution of Women and Girls in Iraq*”, which is based on first-hand knowledge gained through a consultative process with women and women’s organizations in Iraq and neighbouring countries, over a period of three years; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 17, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. See also the latest report of the US Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, which states that “*Iraq is a source and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to sex trafficking and forced labor*”; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰³⁹ According to women’s organizations, trafficking within Iraq takes places in all areas of the country. For example, Kurdish women may be trafficked to Baghdad or Basrah. Women from the South may be trafficked northwards to the Kurdistan Region; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, pp. 17, 18, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. See also Rebecca Murray, *Female Trafficking Soars in Iraq*, IPS, 27 August 2011, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/08/27-2>; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰⁴⁰ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 32, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰⁴¹ Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 18, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴² According to NCA, a range of factors resulted in the increase of sex trafficking and prostitution in the region, including “*the US-led 2003 war and the chaos it has generated; the growing insecurity in areas of lawlessness; corruption of authorities; the upsurge in religious extremism; economic hardship; marriage pressures; gender based violence and recurrent discrimination suffered by women; kidnappings of girls and women; the impunity of perpetrators of crimes, especially those against women; and the development of new technologies associated with the globalization of the sex industry*”; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 17, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. “*Huge numbers of refugees and IDPs, lawlessness that allowed for the rise of organized crime, a society tolerant of smuggling, and the presence of military and peacekeeping forces have created a perfect storm in Iraq that has allowed for trafficking to increase dramatically*”; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, pp. 10, 11,16, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴³ According to Samer Muscati of HRW, “*(...) there is this black hole in terms of information*” concerning trafficking as the Iraqi authorities do not monitor the situation nor do they prosecute offenders; Rebecca Murray, *Female Trafficking Soars in Iraq*, IPS, 27 August 2011, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/08/27-2>. OWFI estimates that some 4,000 Iraqi women, one fifth of whom are children, disappeared between 2003 and 2010. Many are believed to have been trafficked for sexual exploitation by criminal gangs or their families, within and out of Iraq; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 11 http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf. Iraqi women activists interviewed by HRW estimated that hundreds if not thousands of Iraqi women have been trafficked since 2003; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 11-12, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 8 http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 6, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Women who have themselves been exploited for many years reportedly often turn into recruiters of girls and women in the sex industry. However, pimps, traffickers and managers of brothels and sex clubs are commonly men; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁶ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 13, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Women are for example trafficked into the UAE with the promise of employment as domestic workers. The National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) reported in May 2010 that most of the women are trafficked to the UAE to be forced into prostitution, rather than the employment they had been promised. Anecdotal evidence suggests that as many as 50 percent of the women trafficked into Dubai are forced into prostitution. Once they arrive in the UAE, their passports are taken from them and they are forced to work as prostitutes to pay for travel and living expenses, ending up in a vicious cycle of abuse and exploitation; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, pp. 26, 27, 30,

http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 12, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 8., http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf. Girls that ran away from home because of abuse, forced marriage or threat of “honour crimes” are said to be particularly targeted, for example at bus stations, when they aim to escape. Hair salons, beauty parlours and jewellery shops are reportedly places where poor women or girls may be trapped with promises of luxuries they could otherwise not afford; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 13, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. Others are abducted and then raped; the rape is reportedly filmed in order to blackmail them into prostitution. Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. Traffickers reportedly also marry girls and women and then sell them into prostitution. Traffickers allegedly deceive women and girls into marriage, or use marriage as a means to legally travel with them out of the country. According to the Karamatuna Report of 2011, the latter is “facilitated by a culture within Iraqi society of not raising questions about a girl’s status and whereabouts when she is married;” Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 18, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf. See also Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. Women and girls are reportedly subjected to torture, beatings, rape and sexual assault in order to comply with the traffickers’ wishes. Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 8, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf. In order to prevent their escape, trafficked girls and women are said to be subjected to numerous violations “including starvation, confinement, beatings, physical abuse, rape, gang rape, threats of violence to the victims and the victims’ family, forced drug use and the threat of revealing their activities to their family and their families’ friends.” US Department of Health and Human Services, The Campaign to Rescue & Restore Victims of Human Trafficking, cited in: Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, pp. 6-7, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁹ US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, 15 December 2010, p. 386, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Heartland Alliance for Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, p. 19, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵¹ Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 21, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 12, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. Some impoverished Iraqi families have reportedly abandoned their daughters at borders, from where traffickers take them to their destination outside Iraq, usually with forged documents or through marriages; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 18, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰⁵² It was reported that Iraqi refugee women and girls in Syria and Lebanon are forced into “summer marriages” with tourists from the Gulf; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, pp. 18, 25, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf. See also Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰⁵³ The term “muta’a” has become an euphemism for prostitution and places where couples conclude a temporary marriage are reportedly used as brothels; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 20, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>; see also Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 16-17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. See also “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances”.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 19, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵⁵ According to OWFI, 65 percent of females purchased by men were under 18 years old; OWFI, 2008, cited in: Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, p. 23, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 12, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Reportedly, a virgin teenage girl is sold for around US \$5,000, to be trafficked to popular destinations like the Kurdistan Region, Syria and the UAE. Non-virgins are sold for about half the price; Rebecca Murray, *Female Trafficking Soars in Iraq*, IPS, 27 August 2011, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/08/27-2>. In some brothels of Sulaymaniyah, men reportedly pay US \$200-500 “to turn a girl into a woman.” Teenage girls sold to the Gulf countries are reportedly sold for up to US \$10,000-20,000. After some time, the girl will be returned to the trafficker who then brings her back into the local sex industry. Girls are reportedly also subjected to multiple hymen surgeries in order to be sold as virgins several times; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, p. 19, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual*

Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, pp. 22, 23, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq's Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 13, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 32, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰⁵⁹ The Supreme Committee to Combat Human Trafficking was established on 31 December 2009 and includes representatives from the Ministry of Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of State for Women's Affairs. However, it reportedly does not have any authority to implement its own recommendations; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq's Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, pp. 6-7, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 33, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, 15 December 2010, pp. 387-388, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶⁰ On 12 July 2011, the CoR held a first reading of the draft Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law; NCCI, *What Role is There for NGOs in the Iraqi Fight Against Trafficking in Persons?*, 2011, http://www.ncciraq.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=325&lang=en. The law, if passed, would reportedly punish human trafficking with life imprisonment and a fine of up to 25 million Iraqi Dinars, if the victim is female, under the age of fifteen, or has special needs. The law would however not ban „muta'a“ marriages as a means for international trafficking; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq's Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 19, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶¹ Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq's Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 21, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, 15 December 2010, p. 388, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶² Rebecca Murray, *Female Trafficking Soars in Iraq*, IPS, 27 August 2011, <http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/08/27-2>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 17, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>;

¹⁰⁶³ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, p. 12, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; OWFI, *Prostitution and Trafficking of Women and Girls in Iraq*, 5 March 2010, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/images/stories/pdf/prostitutionandtrafficking-OWFIreport.pdf?6dcb5c0485db6830947a0e9cf1d291b1=c84de48e94826923e465b86563505e4e>.

¹⁰⁶⁴ HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>. Law enforcement personnel lack training to identify and investigate cases of trafficking; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq's Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 22, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Iraq's existing criminal laws could be used to prosecute and punish trafficking offenders; Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>; US Department of Labor, *2010 Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Iraq*, 15 December 2010, p. 387, <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2010TDA.pdf>.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰⁶⁷ UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), *Violence Against Women Factsheet, Nov 2010*, November 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4cf4a67d2.html>.

¹⁰⁶⁸ According to Iraq's Anti-Prostitution Law, prostitution is a criminal offence and carries sentences of three months to two years of imprisonment; Combating Prostitution Law (Law No. 8 of 1988), Articles 2, 4, translation by the Global Justice Project: Iraq, <http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/gjpi-law-on-combating-prostitution-no-8-of-1988-eng.doc>. Coercion is not recognized as a legal defense to a charge of prostitution; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 31, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. According to the Heartland Alliance, which assists victims of gender-based violence through a legal aid programme, a significant number of women and girls charged with prostitution have been forced; however, such circumstances are reportedly often not taken into consideration by the judges and the women are convicted of prostitution and sentenced to prison terms; Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights, *Institutionalized Violence Against Women and Girls in Iraq*, 2011, pp. 19-20, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/49420024/Institutionalized-Violence-Against-Women-and-Girls-in-Iraq>. See also “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Women in Detention”.

¹⁰⁶⁹ According to the Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, “(...) some victims of trafficking were incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as prostitution;” Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>. See also HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 14-15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷⁰ It is reported that, for some women, remaining in prison even after completing their sentence, is the only protection from further exploitation or “honour killing”; Malka Marcovich, *Trafficking, Sexual Exploitation And Prostitution Of Women And Girls In Iraq*, Norwegian Church Aid, April 2010, pp. 22, 23, <http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/726/Report.%20Trafficking%20in%20Iraq%20%28PDF%29.pdf>; HRW, *At a Crossroads*, February 2011, pp. 13, 15, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0211W.pdf>; Mohammed Jamjoom, *Sex Slave Girls Face Cruel Justice in Iraq*, CNN, 4 May 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-04/world/iraq.women.prisons_1_trafficked-iraq-sexual-slavery?_s=PM:WORLD.

¹⁰⁷¹ According to the Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, “some victims of trafficking were incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as prostitution;” Office To Monitor And Combat Trafficking In Persons, *Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 – Country Narratives: Iraq*, June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164232.htm>.

¹⁰⁷² For example due to illegal entry, use of false documents, or on the basis of local laws prohibiting prostitution; Alexandra Micha, Iman Abou-Atta, Marie-Charlotte Macaud and Sarah Barnes, *An Investigation into the Sex Trafficking of Iraqi Women and Girls*, Social Change

through Education in the Middle East (SCEME)/Karamatuna, 10 November 2011, pp. 20-21, 26, 27, 32-33, http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/karamatuna-web_resource.pdf.

¹⁰⁷³ According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, survivors can suffer from “drug and alcohol addiction; physical injuries...traumatic brain injury...sexually transmitted diseases...sterility, miscarriages, menstrual problems; other diseases...forced or coerced abortions...mind/body separation/disassociated ego states, shame, grief, fear, distrust, hatred of men, self-hatred, suicide, and suicidal thoughts,” as well as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; US Department of Health and Human Services, The Campaign to Rescue & Restore Victims of Human Trafficking, cited in: Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 25, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>. Most NGOs providing services to victims of trafficking in Iraq are reportedly underfunded and under-staffed and lack the capacities to provide all necessary services; Kyle H. Goedert, *Iraq’s Next Battle: Combating Sexual Slavery in Post-Conflict Iraq*, Senior Honors Thesis, Class of 2011 Department of Near Eastern Studies University of Michigan, p. 26, <http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/86579/1/goedertk.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷⁴ UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being Trafficked*, HCR/GIP/06/07, 7 April 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa.html>.

¹⁰⁷⁵ International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, *Emerging from Iraq: Reports of Kidnapping and Murder of Gay and Lesbian People*, 5 March 2012, <http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/1492.html>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, 2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 8 April 2011, p. 52, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷⁶ According to HRW, “[S]ome sweeping and unspecific provisions in the criminal code give police and prosecutors broad scope to punish people whose looks, speech, or conduct they simply dislike.” These include for example, paragraph 401 (immodest acts in public), 402 (indecent advances), 403 (publications violating public decency), 501 (indecent state of undress) and 502 (loitering with indecent intent); see UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, 2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also US Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 8 April 2011, p. 52, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 27-28, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁷⁷ HRW, for example, reported that Sadrists mosques and JAM officials have warned about the spreading dangers of the “third sex;” HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, p. 3, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0809webcover.pdf>. The same report also provides background information on relevant norms and procedural standards of Shari’a law in relation to homosexual conduct; see pp. 5-7.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Most reports mentioned here deal with violence perpetrated against (perceived) gay men. HRW, which to date authored the most comprehensive report about the situation of gay men in Iraq, reported that it was unable to find any women engaged in same-sex relationships during its research. The fact that most information in this chapter relates to men and that only limited information is available on the treatment of lesbian, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in Iraq should not be interpreted as meaning that these persons are not at risk; see also HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, p. 43, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Also parts of the Iraqi media are reported to be openly anti-gay in its reporting, as are certain government officials and religious figures, contributing to the sense of impunity for perpetrators of violence against LGBTI individuals. For example, on 29 June 2010, the newspaper Al-Bayyana Al-Jadidah reported the arrest of gay men who allegedly confessed to committing “unethical” acts. The article ended with “greetings to those awake eyes (security/informant forces) that pursue all homosexuals;” US Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq, 8 April 2011, p. 53, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. Matt McAllester of the NY Magazine described that as of early 2009, “a wave of anti-gay hysteria hit the country”. He reported about religious sermons and TV features portraying gays as evil and “puppies” and reported that there were “purges” of gay men mainly in Baghdad’s Sadr City and Karrada districts; Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, New York Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>. Amnesty International reported of public statements by some Muslim clerics and government officials condemning homosexuality; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>; Gay City News, *Iraq Gay Murders Surge*, 16 April 2010, <http://www.wluml.org/node/5205>. See also HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 34-36, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Most commonly the JAM of Muqtada Al-Sadr is seen responsible for targeted killings of gay men in Iraq. However, other Shi’ite militias such as Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) have reportedly claimed responsibility for some killings; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 3, 22, 26, 48, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>. See also “Actors of Violence – Armed Shi’ite Groups”.

¹⁰⁸¹ In October 2009, New York Magazine exposed the brutal killing of gay men as a means for militias to exploit anti-gay prejudice to shore up popular support; Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, NY Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

¹⁰⁸² HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 41-46, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>. See also “Actors of Violence - Family, Community, Tribe”. For information on “honour killings”, see also chapter “Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances – Honour-Based Crimes”.

¹⁰⁸³ HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 4, 48, 50, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>. See also “Actors of Violence – Armed Sunni Groups”.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Reports came frequently from the predominantly Shi’ite district of Sadr City in Baghdad; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, 2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Amnesty International, *Civilians under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0809webcover.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Reportedly, public signs were calling for gay men to be punished for their immoral behaviour. Amnesty International provided graphic evidence of a graffiti in Kufa reading “Death to gays and dirty people”; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, pp. 21, 22, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 2, 23-24, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁸⁶ HRW, *World Report January 2010 Country Summary Iraq*, <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87714>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iraq0809webwcover.pdf>; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Reportedly, police raided a private gay party in Kalar (Sulaymaniyah), arresting 25 men, on 15 September 2011. While most have been released shortly afterwards, three men remain unaccounted for. Several of those detained claimed to have been subjected to violent beatings while being held in solitary confinement; Michael Luongo, *New Reports of Anti-Gay Crackdown in Kurdistan*, Gay City News, 26 October 2011, http://www.chelseanow.com/articles/2011/10/26/gay_city_news/news/doc4ea81645e7e21474852610.txt; Wadi Blog, *Mass-arrest signifies new wave of anti-gay persecution in Iraq*, October 2011, <http://www.wadinet.de/blog/?p=7408>.

¹⁰⁸⁸ See Iraqi LGBT, *About*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://iraqilgbt.org.uk/about/>.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Dan Littauer, *New wave of attacks on 'gays and lesbians' in Iraq*, Gay Star News, 7 March 2012, <http://www.gaystarnews.com/article/new-wave-attacks-'gays-and-lesbians'-iraq060312>. See also Paul Canning, *US and UK failing to take Iraq's gay pogrom seriously*, Guardian, 23 June 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/23/gay-people-iraq>.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, New York Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

¹⁰⁹¹ Taylor Asen and Zach Strassburger, *The Gay Iraqi Crisis*, Foreign Policy, 18 June 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/17/the_gay_iraqi_crisis; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>; Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, New York Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>; OWFI, *Iraqi Gays Face Gruesome Torture/ Murder Technique*, 26 August 2009, <http://www.equalityiniraq.com/articles/107-iraqi-gays-face-gruesome-torture-murder-technique>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁹² See chapter "Individuals Perceived as Contravening Traditional Practices or Social Mores".

¹⁰⁹³ According to the US Department of State's 2010 Human Rights Report, "[A]s of year's end, authorities had not announced any arrests or prosecutions of any persons for abusing, killing, torturing, or detaining any LGBT individuals;" US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 53, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>; HRW, *World Report January 2010 Country Summary Iraq*, <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87714>; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 4, 5, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁹⁴ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; Amnesty International, *Civilians Under Fire*, April 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/002/2010/en/c9dc5d8d-95fa-46e4-8671-cd9b99d0378c/mde140022010en.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹⁵ According to Iraqi LGBT, Iraqi Police conducted violent raids against safe houses and engaged in harassment, abuse and assaults on gay men. The organization reported that for example on 5 July 2010, in the city of Nasseriyah (Thi-Qar), three gay men were seized, beaten and taken handcuffed into a vehicle belonging to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and have not been heard of since; Iraqi LGBT, *Iraq: The war against sexual minorities continues*, 4 August 2010, <http://iraqilgbt.org.uk/news-home/iraq-the-war-against-sexual-minorities-continues/>; Iraqi LGBT reported that on 16 June 2010, 12 police officers burst into a safe house in Kerbala and violently beat up and blindfolded the six occupants, including three men, one woman and two transgender people, before taking them away in vans. Reportedly, the police confiscated computer equipment found in the house before burning it down. Two days later, one of the men reportedly turned up in hospital with a throat wound claiming he had been tortured. UNAMI has not been able to ascertain the whereabouts of the other five individuals; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. See also Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, NY Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

¹⁰⁹⁶ HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 4, 28-29, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹⁰⁹⁷ UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 43, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf; see also Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, NY Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, *Since Invasion, Gays in Iraq Lead Lives of Constant Fear*, Los Angeles Times, 5 August 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/05/world/fg-iraqgay5>.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Reportedly, militias monitor internet traffic and work with owners of internet cafes to track down Iraqis that frequent gay websites; Iraqi LGBT, *Terror campaign against LGBT Iraqis continues*, 15 November 2009, <http://iraqilgbt.org.uk/news-home/terror-campaign-against-lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender-iraqis-continues-unchecked-by-iraqi-government/>. Furthermore, militias check the mobile phones of those caught to learn about their gay acquaintances or force them to reveal their gay friends' names by the threat or actual use of torture; Taylor Asen and Zach Strassburger, *The Gay Iraqi Crisis*, Foreign Policy, 18 June 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/17/the_gay_iraqi_crisis; Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, New York Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

¹⁰⁹⁹ See Michael Luongo, *New Reports of Anti-Gay Crackdown in Kurdistan*, Gay City News, 26 October 2011, http://www.chelseanow.com/articles/2011/10/26/gay_city_news/news/doc4ea81645e7e21474852610.txt.

¹¹⁰⁰ Iraqi LGBT, *Iraq: The war against sexual minorities continues*, 4 August 2010, <http://iraqilgbt.org.uk/news-home/iraq-the-war-against-sexual-minorities-continues/>; Matt McAllester, *The Hunted*, New York Magazine, 4 October 2009, <http://nymag.com/news/features/59695/>.

¹¹⁰¹ Taylor Asen and Zach Strassburger, *The Gay Iraqi Crisis*, Foreign Policy, 18 June 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/17/the_gay_iraqi_crisis; HRW, *They want us exterminated; murder, torture, sexual orientation and gender in Iraq*, August 2009, pp. 2, 53-57, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/08/16/they-want-us-exterminated>.

¹¹⁰² For further guidance see UNHCR, *UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, 21 November 2008, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.html>; and UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 7 May 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html>.

¹¹⁰³ See UNHCR, *UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, 21 November 2008, para 25 ff., <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.html>. The right to freedom of opinion and expression encompasses "the expression of identity or personhood through speech, deportment, dress, bodily characteristics, choice of name, or any other means, as well as the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, including with regard to human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, through any medium and regardless of frontiers"; see Principle 19 of the *Yogyakarta Principles - Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity*, March 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48244e602.html>. As recognized by numerous national jurisdictions, persecution does not cease to be persecution for the purpose of the 1951 Convention because those persecuted can eliminate the harm by taking avoiding action within the country of nationality or habitual residence. See, for instance, the UK Supreme Court judgment in *HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v*.

Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2010] UKSC 31, 7 July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c3456752.html>; and *Appellant S395/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs*; *Appellant S396/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs*, [2003] HCA 71, 9 December 2003 (High Court of Australia), para 81, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3fd9eca84.html>.

¹¹⁰⁴ Even in the absence of enforcement of the legal provisions criminalizing “homosexual conduct”, the pervading or generalized climate of homophobia, as evidenced by societal attitudes, etc., may be sufficient indication of the risks faced by LGBTI individuals in Iraq. See UNHCR, *UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity*, 21 November 2008, para 21–22, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48abd5660.html>.

¹¹⁰⁵ It is important to note that persons fleeing their country of origin in situations of armed conflict may have a well-founded fear of persecution based on one or more of the 1951 Convention grounds. When examining the link to a 1951 Convention ground in the claims of persons who are fleeing a situation of armed conflict, there is no requirement that the individual be known to, and sought personally by the agent(s) of persecution. Whole communities may risk or suffer persecution for 1951 Convention reasons, and there is no requirement that an individual suffer a form or degree of harm which is different from that suffered by other individuals with the same profile. Furthermore, many ordinary civilians may be at risk of harm from bombs, shelling, suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices. These methods of violence may be used against targets or in areas where civilians of specific ethnic or political profiles predominantly reside or gather, and for this reason, may be linked to a 1951 Convention ground. See UNHCR, *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*, January 1992, para 164, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html>. The 1951 Convention forms the cornerstone of international protection for refugees and should be rigorously and properly applied. The criteria for refugee status in the 1951 Convention should be interpreted in such a manner that individuals or groups of persons who meet these criteria are duly recognized and protected under that instrument. Only when an asylum-seeker is found not to meet the refugee criteria in the 1951 Convention should extended/broader refugee criteria and/or complementary/subsidiary regimes be examined. See UNHCR Executive Committee, *Conclusion on the Provision on International Protection Including through Complementary Forms of Protection*, No. 103 (LVI) – 2005, 7 October 2005, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43576e292.html>.

¹¹⁰⁶ See for example, *Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama*, 22 November 1984, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36ec.html> and Organization of African Unity, *Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (“OUA Convention”)*, 10 September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36018.html>.

¹¹⁰⁷ In the European Union, for example, “subsidiary protection” shall be granted to persons who have been found not to meet the criteria for refugee status under the 1951 Conventions, but are at risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict: Article 15 - Serious harm. Serious harm consists of: (a) death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” See European Union: Council of the European Union, *Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted*, 2004/83/EC, 19 May 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4157e75e4.html> (Article 15).

¹¹⁰⁸ IBC accounted for 4,045 civilians killed in 2010 (compared to 4,704 in 2009). According to IBC statistics, 4,087 civilian deaths have been recorded by 31 December 2011; IBC, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

¹¹⁰⁹ IBC recorded between 105,721 and 115,476 deaths in its database by 1 March 2012. IBC estimates that analysis of the Iraq War Logs released by WikiLeaks will add another 13,750 civilian deaths; IBC website, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/>.

¹¹¹⁰ Since the peak in violence in 2006 and 2007 with 28,062 and 24,940 civilian casualties, respectively, violence dropped significantly in 2008 (down to 9,357) and 2009 (4,704); see IBC, *Database*, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

¹¹¹¹ IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011*, 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>. See also IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010*, 30 December 2010, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2010/>. According to Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, “[T]he stabilization of Iraq has become wedged on a plateau, beyond which further improvement will be a slow process;” Michael Knights, *Iraq’s Hybrid Insurgents -- The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>. See also UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, p. 3, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹¹¹² According to recently published Iraqi government statistics, nearly 70,000 persons have been killed and 239,000 wounded in violence between 5 April 2004 and 31 December 2011. However, these figures are significantly lower than those from other sources, including the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, which said in October 2009 that 85,694 people had been killed between 2004 and 2008; W.G. Dunlop and Salam Faraj, *Bombs kill eight as Iraq says 70,000 dead 2004-2011*, AFP, 29 February 2012, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jffj606UZNLkbfNiDk6X3Vxi8ng?docId=CNG.d358a1ce576ac020d9abf2a88e8185a0.631>. The Iraqi Government accounted for a total of 2,645 deaths (including 1,578 civilians) in 2011 and 3,254 persons killed in 2010 (compared to 4,068 killed in 2009); UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp. 3–4, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf. Figures provided by IBC are significantly higher than those provided by the Iraqi authorities; however, longer-term official figures released in 2009 by the Ministry of Human Rights showed somewhat higher totals than IBC for 2004–2006, indicating that a full accounting of civilian casualties will likely be above, not below, IBC’s count; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011*, 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>; AFP, *Final toll for Iraq War 162,000, say analysts*, 3 January 2012, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10776517. According to figures compiled by UNAMI, 2,953 civilians were killed in 2010 compared to 3,056 civilians killed in 2009; UNAMI Human Rights Office/OHCHR, *2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq*, January 2011, pp.3–4, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.

¹¹¹³ IBC, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

¹¹¹⁴ IBC accounted for 282 civilian casualties in February 2012 (provisory figure); IBC, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>. According to official statistics, 91 civilians, 39 police and 21 soldiers were killed in February 2012, totalling 151 persons; Reuters, *Iraq monthly death toll 151 in February*, 2 March 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-iraq-toll-idUSTRE8210IQ20120302>.

¹¹¹⁵ Civilian deaths attributable to “anti-government/occupation attacks” have significantly increased in 2011: 1,200 in 2011, up from 888 in 2010; IBC, *Iraqi deaths from violence 2003–2011*, 2 January 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>.

¹¹¹⁶ See “*Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)*”.

¹¹¹⁷ See “*Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders*”.

¹¹¹⁸ See “*Government Officials and Employees*”.

¹¹¹⁹ See “*Shi’ite civilians, including pilgrims*”.

¹¹²⁰ At the height of the conflict in 2006/2007, the average daily number of deaths by suicide attacks and car bombs was 16 and 21, respectively. In 2008, the number dropped to 10 per day, in 2009 to 8.3 per day and in 2010 to 7.3; IBC, *Database*, accessed 8 February 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

¹¹²¹ This figure was highest during the peak of the sectarian conflict in 2006/2007 when dozens of people were executed on a daily basis (57 per day in 2006 and 41 per day in 2007). Since then, the number of civilians executed has dropped to a low of 3.9 per day in 2010, but has again increased over the course of 2011; IBC, *Database*, accessed 8 February 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/>.

¹¹²² See “Government Officials and Employees” and “Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)”.

¹¹²³ Three attacks reportedly caused more than 50 casualties in 2011:

- On 22 December 2011, a series of coordinated attacks claimed by ISI/AQI ripped through markets, cafes and government buildings in Baghdad and killed 69 people;
- On 29 March 2011, a siege to a Provincial Council headquarters in Tikrit (Salah Al-Din), resulted in at least 58 people killed and 98 wounded;
- On 18 January 2011, also in Tikrit, a suicide bomber targeting a police recruitment centre killed 60 people and wounded over 100.

AP, *Al-Qaida in Iraq claims responsibility for Baghdad blasts*, 27 December 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/27/al-qaida-in-iraq-baghdad>; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>; Sabah al-Bazee, *UPDATE 5-Suicide bomber kills up to 60 police recruits in Iraq*, Reuters, 18 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-5-suicide-bomber-kills-up-to-60-police-recruits-in-iraq/>.

¹¹²⁴ According to a Baghdad security official who spoke to McClatchy on the condition of anonymity “Armed groups are choosing their targets very carefully. They are targeting members of the security forces and government officials. It is not as random as it used to be”; Sahar Issa, *If you think Iraq's secure, read this about Wednesday's violence*, McClatchy Newspapers, 13 October 2011, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/12/2451338/if-you-think-iraqs-secure-read.html>.

¹¹²⁵ See “Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)”.

¹¹²⁶ See “Government Officials”.

¹¹²⁷ See “Shi'ite civilians, including pilgrims”.

¹¹²⁸ See “Christians”.

¹¹²⁹ Iraq is reportedly littered with more than 25 million mines and other explosive remnants of war, in particular along the borders with Iran and Turkey; ICRC, *Iraq: Facts and Figures, January to December 2011*, p. 2, March 2012. According to the Deputy Iraqi Minister of Environment, 25 percent of the world's unexploded land mines are buried in Iraq; AP, *Land mines' grim legacy plagues Iraq*, 6 April 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-04-06/news/29389331_1_land-mines-iran-iraq-war-northern-kurdish-region; ICRC, *Iraq: unexploded munitions put civilians at risk*, 18 January 2011, Operational Update No 01/11, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d37dcb42.html>.

¹¹³⁰ ICRC, *Iraq: Facts and Figures, January to December 2011*, p. 2, March 2012. According to the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey 2004-2006 (LIS), conducted in populated areas in 13 out of Iraq's 18 governorates, 1,622 communities are affected, with 3,673 separate areas suspected of being contaminated or hazardous. In total, it is believed that 1,730 square kilometers of land are contaminated. According to the LIS, the highest number of incidents happened during farming and herding activities and 99% of the victims recorded were civilians; Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, *Iraq Mine Action Strategy: 2010 To 2012*, accessed 18 March 2012, pp. 4, 5, http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/nma-strat/NMAS-Iraq-2010-12.pdf.

¹¹³¹ Iraq Landmine Impact Survey 2004-2006, cited in IAU, *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnances Factsheet*, April 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1333/Landmine%20Factsheet.pdf>. According to HRW, “[T]he ongoing attacks, along with an abundance of abandoned landmines and cluster munitions, have created a disproportionately high number of persons with physical and mental disabilities, many of whom have not received support for rehabilitation and re-integration into the community;” HRW, *World Report 2011 - Iraq*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d3e801ed.html>.

¹¹³² Of these, 27 persons were reportedly killed and another 55 were injured. Most of the casualties occurred in the Kurdistan Region and have been recorded by the concerned authorities. There is no reliable data available for Central and Southern Iraq and those included were identified through media reports. Therefore, the actual casualty figures are expected to be significantly higher; International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, Iraq: Casualties and Victim Assistance*, updated 18 October 2011, accessed 14 December 2011, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1054#_ftnref1. In 2009, landmines and UXO reportedly killed or injured approximately two Iraqis every week, mostly young men between the ages of 15 to 29 years old. In the Kurdistan Region, a reported 44% of victims in the past forty years were breadwinners. According to UNICEF, children are also often affected: in the Kurdistan Region, 24% of the victims were reportedly children under the age of 14. Child victims often face societal discrimination with little prospects for education and employment; UNICEF, 2009 needs assessment in Kurdistan Region, cited in: IAU, *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnances Factsheet*, April 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1333/Landmine%20Factsheet.pdf>.

¹¹³³ US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, *Inspection of Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Iraq*, June 2010, p. 1, <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/145258.pdf>.

¹¹³⁴ IAU, *Landmines and Unexploded Ordnances Factsheet*, April 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1333/Landmine%20Factsheet.pdf>; AP, *Land mines' grim legacy plagues Iraq*, 6 April 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-04-06/news/29389331_1_land-mines-iran-iraq-war-northern-kurdish-region. For example, most oil fields in Iraq are mined and oil production requires clearing of land mines and UXO; see for example, Aref Mohammed, *Landmines hamper Iraq oil boom, delay investment*, Reuters, 16 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-iraq-landmines-idUSTRE7AF1C820111116>.

¹¹³⁵ Iraq reportedly still has an estimated 25 million landmines and millions of other unexploded bombs; Aref Mohammed, *Landmines hamper Iraq oil boom, delay investment*, Reuters, 16 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-iraq-landmines-idUSTRE7AF1C820111116>.

¹¹³⁶ According to IDMC, a few returnee families have been affected by landmines/UXO, but the presence of landmines and UXO certainly deter IDPs from returning. Returnees are also at higher risk because they are reportedly not aware of contaminated areas; IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 39, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).

¹¹³⁷ See for example, MAG, *IRAQ: Saving lives of returnees in Dohuk*, 1 June 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220485/127538316483.htm>. See also OCHA, *Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan*, p. 18, <http://ochairaq.org/2010-Iraq-HAP.pdf>.

¹¹³⁸ Article 7 Transparency Report for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; see OCHA, *Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan*, p. 18, <http://ochairaq.org/2010-Iraq-HAP.pdf>. According to the Iraqi Minister of Environment, Iraq will clear approximately 70% of its landmines by 2018; AP, *Land mines' grim legacy plagues Iraq*, 6 April 2011, http://articles.boston.com/2011-04-06/news/29389331_1_land-mines-iran-iraq-war-northern-kurdish-region.

¹¹³⁹ Widyan Al Ubudy, *Depleted uranium suspect cause of birth deformities in Fallujah*, UPI, 23 September 2011, <http://www.upiu.com/human-rights/2011/09/23/Depleted-uranium-suspect-cause-of-birth-deformities-in-Fallujah/UPIU-7571316765718/>; John Reynolds, *Children pay ultimate price of Iraq's poisonous wartime legacy*, The Irish Times, 13 June 2011, <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2011/06/13/1224298811463.html>; OCHA, *Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan*, p. 18, <http://ochairaq.org/2010-Iraq-HAP.pdf>. See also Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development et. al., *Fallen of the Agenda – More and Better Aid Needed for Iraq Recovery*, July 2010, p. 8, http://www.handicap-international.org.uk/Resources/Handicap%20International/PDF%20Documents/Other%20Organisations/More%20and%20Better%20Aid%20Needed%20for%20Iraq%20Recovery_Brief_2010.pdf.

¹¹⁴⁰ According to AKE, there was an average of 56 attacks per week in 2011. It accounted for a total of 1,716 explosive attacks in 2011, with 78 of them involving suicide bombers; John Drake, *Security Statistics from 2011*, AKE, 28 January 2012, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2012/01/28/security-statistics-from-2011/>. According to the HRW World Report 2012, “[A]ttacks by armed groups killed hundreds of civilians and security forces. Assaults targeted provincial councils and government officials, checkpoints, markets, and mosques. In one of the worst attacks, a string of over 40 coordinated assaults in 17 cities on August 15 killed more than 90 people, including many unarmed civilians and members of the security forces”; HRW, *World Report 2012: Iraq*, January 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-iraq>. According to the US Department of State’s 2010 human rights report, “Violence against the civilian population perpetrated by terrorist groups remained a problem during the year, and bombings, executions, and killings were regular occurrences throughout all regions and sectors of society.” US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, pp. 2-3, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

¹¹⁴¹ According to AKE, between October and December 2011, Baghdad was the most violent part of the country with an average of 2-3 attacks per day (accounting for 38 percent of all the violence in Iraq over the period). Baghdad was followed by the Governorate of Ninewa, where the city of Mosul saw an average of 1-2 attacks per day; John Drake, *Security Statistics from 2011*, AKE, 28 January 2012, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2012/01/28/security-statistics-from-2011/>. SIGIR reportedly had similar results for the period of May to July 2011 when more than 40 percent of the attacks were recorded in Baghdad, followed by Kirkuk and Mosul, which together accounted for 23 percent of all attacks in the country. SIGIR observed a slight security improvement in Mosul while conditions in Kirkuk seemed to worsen compared to the previous reporting period; GOI/MOI information provided to SIGIR, 14 July 2011, see SIGIR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, 30 July 2011, p. 71, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2011/Section4_-_July_2011.pdf#view=fit. According to the Olive Group, the five predominately Sunni governorates (Al-Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din) and western Baghdad were responsible for an average of 68.5% of all incidents in each month from January to June 2011; Michael Knights, *Iraq's Hybrid Insurgents -- The JRTN*, Washington Institute, 31 August 2011, <http://www.thecuttingedge.com/index.php?article=52553>.

¹¹⁴² Michael Knights, *A Violent New Year in Iraq*, The National Interest, 16 February 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/violent-new-year-iraq-6517>.

¹¹⁴³ Michael Knights, *A Violent New Year in Iraq*, The National Interest, 16 February 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/violent-new-year-iraq-6517>.

¹¹⁴⁴ Reported attacks included:

- On 23 February 2012, simultaneous early morning attacks involving bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 55 people and wounded more than 200 others. In Baghdad, at least 32 people were killed in 10 explosions in mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods. More than a dozen blasts and attacks hit other cities and towns in Al-Anbar, Babel, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din Governorates, many of them targeting police. ISI/AQI reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks; Bushra Juhi, *Al-Qaeda claims deadly Iraq attacks*, AP, 25 February 2012, <http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/alqaeda-claims-deadly-iraq-attacks-20120225-1tuk1.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAIE6zUR_story.html.
- On 5 January 2012, an apparently coordinated wave of bombings targeting Shi'ite Muslims killed at least 78 people and wounded more than 100 others in Nasseriyah and Baghdad; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.
- On 26 December 2011, at least seven people were killed and 34 others were wounded when a suicide car bomber, who passed six security checkpoints, drove his vehicle into a security cordon at the main entrance of the heavily fortified Ministry of Interior in central Baghdad; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Suicide bomber strikes fortified Iraqi compound*, CNN, 26 December 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/26/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber kills 7 outside Iraq ministry*, Reuters, 26 December 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAF7RE7BP04320111226>.
- On 22 December 2011, apparently coordinated attacks targeting mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods across Baghdad killed at least 69 and wounded nearly 200 others; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>; Prashant Rao, *Bombs kill 57 as Iraq mired in political crisis*, AFP, 22 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i84pYeYLjF7ArcDK_pu3A5J2vuw?docId=CNG.011113bade199475ce97cc632952336b.3a1.

¹¹⁴⁵ Major attacks in the last three months of 2011 reportedly included:

- On 26 December 2011, at least seven people were killed and 34 others were wounded when a suicide car bomber, who passed six security checkpoints, drove his vehicle into a security cordon at the main entrance of the heavily fortified Ministry of Interior in central Baghdad; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Suicide bomber strikes fortified Iraqi compound*, CNN, 26 December 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/26/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber kills 7 outside Iraq ministry*, Reuters, 26 December 2011, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAF7RE7BP04320111226>.
- On 22 December 2011, apparently coordinated attacks targeting mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods across Baghdad killed at least 69 and wounded nearly 200 others; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>; Prashant Rao, *Bombs kill 57 as Iraq mired in political crisis*, AFP, 22 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i84pYeYLjF7ArcDK_pu3A5J2vuw?docId=CNG.011113bade199475ce97cc632952336b.3a1.
- On 26 November 2011, a series of bombings rocked Baghdad and Abu Ghraib, killing at least 15 people and wounding more than 25 others. According to Iraqi officials, blasts first went off near the town of Abu Ghraib, in an area frequented by day laborers, killing at least seven people. A few hours later, three bombs ripped through a marketplace in Baghdad's Bab Al-Sharqi district, killing another

eight people and wounding at least 19 others; VOA News, *Baghdad Bombings Kill 15*, 26 November 2011, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Baghdad-Bombings-Kill-15-134527403.html>.

- On 27 October 2011, a twin bombing in the predominantly Shi'ite Ur neighborhood killed 18 people and wounded 36 others. The first explosion at a music store killed two people. The second bomb struck just minutes later, as rescue workers and others rushed to the scene; Sameer N. Yacoub, *Officials: Twin Bombs Kill 18 in Baghdad*, AP, 27 October 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/officials-bomb-explosion-baghdad-kills-14826939>.
- On 26 October 2011, a booby-trapped car exploded in Suez district and another car exploded in Al-Zihour district, along with an explosive charge blast in Dargazaliya district, in Mosul, killing two civilians and wounding 15 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two civilians killed, 15 injured in Mosul blasts*, 26 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145409&l=1.
- On 17 October 2011, a bomb blast near a liquor store in eastern Baghdad killed seven people and injured another 18, including several policemen. It was not immediately clear whether the liquor store was the target or the police officers; AP, *Bomb near Baghdad liquor store kills 7 people, 18 injured*, 17 October 2011, <http://news.yahoo.com/bomb-near-baghdad-liquor-store-kills-7-people-190106944.html>.
- On 13 October 2011, at least 16 people were killed by two blasts in the predominantly Shi'ite neighbourhood of Sadr City. BBC, *Bomb blasts in Iraq's Sadr City kill 16*, 13 October 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15300037>. Ansar Al-Islam reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks; Thomas Joscelyn, *The Terrorists' War in Iraq Continues*, The Weekly Standard, 26 October 2011, http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/terrorists-war-iraq-continues_604035.html.
- On 12 October 2011, five apparently coordinated explosions caused by suicide bombers and roadside bombs targeted police across the capital (Alwiyah, Hurriya, Ilaam and Washash), killing at least 25 people and wounding more than 70 others. Furthermore, police defused two car bombs in separate areas in southwestern and northern Baghdad, and a roadside bomb was discovered on the road leading to the police academy in eastern Baghdad; Dan Zak and Asaad Majeed, *Iraq bombings kill, injure dozens*, Washington Post, 13 October 2011, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/12/MN161LGVPM.DTL>; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bombers, attacks hit Baghdad police, 28 dead*, 12 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-attacks-hit-baghdad-police-28-dead/>.

The media reported other major attacks resulting in at least 15 casualties (killed and wounded) in Baghdad on 31, 28 and 15 August, 23 June, 3 May, 11 April, 3 February, and on 27, 23 and 13 January 2011.

¹¹⁴⁶ Reported major attacks in 2012 included:

- On 23 February 2012, simultaneous early morning attacks involving bombings and shootings across Iraq killed at least 55 people and wounded more than 200 others. In Baghdad, at least 32 people were killed in 10 explosions in mainly Shi'ite neighbourhoods. More than a dozen blasts and attacks hit other cities and towns in Al-Anbar, Babel, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din Governorates, many of them targeting police. ISI/AQI reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks; Bushra Juhi, *Al-Qaeda claims deadly Iraq attacks*, AP, 25 February 2012, <http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/alqaeda-claims-deadly-iraq-attacks-20120225-1tuk1.html>; Kareem Raheem, *Iraq attacks kill 60, raise sectarian fears*, Reuters, 23 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-attacks-kill-60-raise-sectarian-fears/>; Asaad Alazawi and Ernesto Londoño, *At least 55 killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, Washington Post, 23 February 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/more-than-50-killed-in-wave-of-bombings-across-iraq/2012/02/23/gIQAEl6zUR_story.html.
- On 19 February 2012, a suicide bomber detonated his car as a group of police recruits left their academy in Baghdad, killing 20 and wounding at least 28 others; AP, *Iraq suicide car bomber kills 20 at police academy*, 19 February 2012, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/19/MN601N9SM8.DTL>.
- On 27 January 2012, 32 people were killed and 71 others were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives near a funeral procession in the Shi'ite Za'aferaniyah neighbourhood; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-28>.
- On 24 January 2012, four car bombs exploded in mainly Shi'ite areas of Baghdad (Sadr City, Shula and Hurriya), killing 14 people and wounding 75 others; Kareem Raheem, *Car bombs kill 14, wound 75 in Iraq capital*, 24 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80N08E20120124>.
- On 5 January 2012, explosions struck the Baghdad's largest Shi'ite neighborhood of Sadr City and the neighbourhood of Kadhemiyah in north-western Baghdad, which is home to a revered Shi'ite shrine, killing at least 30 people; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJrTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.

¹¹⁴⁷ See chapter "Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

¹¹⁴⁸ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 20 March 2012, the chairman of the Baghdad Provincial Council, Kamil Zaydi, survived an assassination attempt when a suicide bomber blew himself up targeting Zaydi's convoy near Baghdad's International Zone; NINA, *Breaking news. Survival of the chairman of Baghdad provincial council, from assassination attempt*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFDF.
- On 14 March 2012, Al-Iraqiyya bloc MP Talal al-Zawbaie said that he escaped an assassination attempt while he was driving his car near the entrance of the International Zone in central Baghdad. He said that a man wearing a police uniform opened fire on his vehicle; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT / MP Zawbaie says survived assassination attempt near GZ*, 14 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(gznxhq55tnqr4s2oza4oce55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147456&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(gznxhq55tnqr4s2oza4oce55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147456&l=1).
- On 11 March 2012, Iraqiyya bloc MP Khalid al-Alwani escaped an assassination attempt when an IED detonated against his convoy west of Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Islamic MP escapes bomb blast*, 11 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147370&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(bpv24s45zb4lhyzseefcbz2g))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147370&l=1).
- On 7 February 2012, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire with weapons with silencers at the convoy of Sajidah Al-Dulaimi, the Director of a women's prison, killing her and her driver in Doura district in Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 7*, 7 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-7/>.
- On 1 February 2012, Qais Al-Shathir, a CoR member who left the Iraqiyya political bloc recently, escaped injury when a roadside bomb exploded near his convoy, wounding two of his bodyguards and three passers-by in Baghdad's southeastern Ameen district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 1*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-1>.
- On 17 January 2012, gunmen opened fire with guns equipped with silencers at Waleed Al-Bahadily, a municipal council member of Adel district in Baghdad, in front of his house, killing him instantly; NINA, *Municipal councilman killed, 3 persons wounded in western Baghdad*, 17 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJKMFL.

- On 29 November 2011, a senior official in the Oil Ministry was seriously wounded when men armed with weapons with silencers opened fire on his car in Baghdad's west-central district of Mansour; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29, 29 November 2011*, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
 - On 26 November 2011, an official working in the PM's office was assassinated in Baghdad's Nisour Square; Aswat al-Iraq, *Premiership official assassinated today in Baghdad*, 26 November 2011, http://en.aswatiliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145772&l=1.
 - On 25 November 2011, Rawfal Abu-Righeef, Director General of Cultural Affairs at the Ministry of Culture, escaped an assassination attempt in Baghdad's Abu Nuwas street; Aswat al-Iraq, *Culture Ministry official escaped assassination*, 25 November 2011, http://en.aswatiliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145755&l=1.
 - On 23 October 2011, an Oil Ministry media official was injured and his driver killed in an explosive charge blast under their car in Baghdad's Saidiya district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Oil Ministry reporter injured, driver killed in Baghdad*, 23 October 2011, http://en.aswatiliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145370&l=1.
 - On 9 October 2011, MP from the Ahrar Bloc, Maha Al-Douri, survived unharmed an assassination attempt when gunmen using firearms equipped with silencers shot at her car in Bab Al Sharji area in Baghdad; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS...Maha Al Douri survives assassination attempt*, 9 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHHHG.
- ¹¹⁴⁹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 11 February 2012, gunmen, using guns equipped with silencers, assassinated an Interior Ministry Inspector General's Office employee while he was driving on the Mohammed al-Qasim Highway in Baghdad; NINA, *Assassinating an employee at the Office of Interior Ministry's Inspector General*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEIEK.
 - On 11 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an official working at the Ministry of Education killed him in Baghdad's northern Shaab district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
 - On 5 November 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers shot dead an official working in Baghdad's International Zone in east of Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Green Zone official assassinated in Baghdad*, 5 November 2011, http://en.aswatiliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145523&l=1.
 - On 2 November 2011, Mustapha Shaaban Mustapha, a CoR employee, was shot dead by gunmen who used guns equipped with silencers in west Baghdad's Mansour district; Aswat al-Iraq, *Parliament employee assassinated in west Baghdad*, 2 November 2011, http://en.aswatiliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145502&l=1.
 - On 29 October 2011, a bomb killed a Science and Technology Ministry employee when it exploded in Baghdad's southern Saidiya district; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 29*, 29 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-29/>.
 - On 25 September 2011, gunmen killed an employee working at the Human Rights Ministry while he was driving in Baghdad's northwestern Hurriya district; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
 - On 24 September 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers killed a Foreign Ministry employee in Baghdad's western district of Jamiaa; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 24*, 24 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-24/>.
- ¹¹⁵⁰ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 9 September 2011, gunmen using guns equipped with silencers shot dead the imam of a mosque near the mosque in the southeastern Zaafaranyah District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 10*, 10 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-10/>.
 - On 28 August 2011, a suicide attack against the Sunni Umm Al-Qura mosque in the western Ghazaliyah district was reportedly targeting Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Al-Samarrai, a cleric and head of the Sunni Endowment. Al-Samarrai has been vocal in his criticism of AQI and ISI and has repeatedly been targeted. He was wounded in the attack; Bill Roggio, *Al Qaeda suicide bomber kills 28 Iraqis in attack in Baghdad mosque*, The Long War Journal, 28 August 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/al_qaeda_suicide_bom_4.php; Suadad Al-Salhy, *Iraq mosque bomb targeted moderate Sunnis - officials*, Reuters, 29 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-mosque-bomb-targeted-moderate-sunnis-officials/>; Reuters, *Suicide attack kills at least 24 at Baghdad mosque*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-attack-kills-at-least-24-at-baghdad-mosque/>.
 - On 13 August 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed Adil Jaijan, a Shi'ite mosque imam, using weapons equipped with silencers in the Baladiyah District of eastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 13*, 13 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-13/>; NINA, *Clergyman assassinated in eastern Baghdad*, 13 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHJKKK.
- ¹¹⁵¹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 2 September 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers killed Nasir Saad, a Dawa Party member, near his house in the northern Baghdad District of Binoog; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 3*, 3 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-3/>.
 - On 24 August 2011, a bomb exploded in front of the house of Abdul Rahman Abu Raghif, a Dawa Party member, wounding six people including two of his sons, in the Zaafaranyah District of Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 24*, 24 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-24/>.
 - On 9 May 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of Hassan Jasim, a leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), killed him in northeast Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 9*, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-9/>.
 - On 3 April 2011, a roadside bomb in front of the house of ISCI member Ali Majed, killed a bodyguard and wounded three civilians in the Jihad district of southwestern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 3*, 3 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-3/>.
- ¹¹⁵² For example, reported incidents included:
- On 23 December 2011, an explosive charge, planted by unknown gunmen, exploded under the car of Nidal Hussein, a broadcaster with Baghdad TV, a satellite channel affiliated with the IIP, seriously wounding her and her daughter; Aswat al-Iraq, *Baghdad TV Channel's Announcer, her daughter, seriously injured*, 24 December 2011, [http://en.aswatiliraq.info/\(S\(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146166&l=1](http://en.aswatiliraq.info/(S(pujlae25dkzc542de5pk5z55))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146166&l=1).

- On 21 December 2012, gunmen killed Firas Yawoz Abdul Qadir Awchi, scientific assistance dean at the Law Faculty at Al-Mustansiriya University in Baghdad, when he was leaving to his office; BRussels Tribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, updated 20 January 2012, <http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Academics.htm>.
 - On 20 December 2011, a University teacher was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Adhamiyah, Baghdad; PUK Media, *University teacher, 2 iraqi soldiers killed in Baghdad*, 20 December 2011, http://www.pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10933&Itemid=.
 - On 17 December 2011, judge Mohammed Shaya'a was seriously injured in an armed attack with firearms equipped with silencers in west Baghdad; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Judge injured in Baghdad armed attack*, 17 December 2011, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(0a33up45xogke1a5q3tapm45\)\)/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146059](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(0a33up45xogke1a5q3tapm45))/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=146059).
 - On 10 November 2011, a bomb attached to the car of a surgeon exploded, killing him and wounding his son in Baghdad's southern Doura district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 11*, 11 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-11/>.
 - On 30 October 2011, the Legal Advisor to the Political Prisoners' Organization was killed when a sticky bomb attached to his car exploded in Baghdad's Adhamiyah district; NINA, *Legal Advisor to Political Prisoners' body killed in Baghdad*, 30 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKHKH.
 - On 29 October 2011, gunmen abducted Dr. Houm Suhail Malalah, a paediatricist at Illwiya Children Hospital, while on his way home in Zayouna area, in eastern Baghdad; NINA, *Gunmen abduct doctor in eastern Baghdad*, 29 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIKGFQ.
 - On 8 September 2011, Hadi Al-Mahdi, a prominent radio journalist with Radio Demozy and an outspoken political critic, was shot twice in the head in his flat in Baghdad's Karrada district, ahead of a planned protest he was due to attend in the Baghdad's Tahrir Square the next day. Al-Mahdi was said to have feared for his life after receiving a string of threats in recent weeks, during which he had been attending weekly pro-reform protests; Amnesty International, *Outspoken Iraqi Radio Journalist Shot Dead at Home*, 9 September 2011, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/outspoken-iraqi-radio-journalist-shot-dead-home-2011-09-09>.
 - On 23 August 2011, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers shot dead Baghdad University Professor Dr. Hussein Kadhim and wounded his son in front of the professor's house in the Adil district of western Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
 - On 11 June 2011, the beheaded body of Namir Ryhan, an activist from a local human rights NGO, was found in his home in Abu Ghraib (Baghdad); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-11/>; AP, *Officials: 11 Killed in Separate Attacks in Iraq*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/11/officials-10-killed-in-separate-attacks-in-iraq/>.
- ¹¹⁵³ See chapter "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals".
- ¹¹⁵⁴ On Easter Sunday, 24 April 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near an entrance to the Catholic Sacred Heart Church in Baghdad's central Karrada district, reportedly wounding two police officers and two civilians. In a second attack not far away, four Iraqi police officers were reportedly wounded in a firefight with gunmen outside the Mary the Virgin Catholic Church; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 24*, 24 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-24/>; Aaron C. Davis, *Easter attacks near churches rattle Christians as spike in Iraq violence continues*, Washington Post, 24 April 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/easter-attacks-near-churches-rattle-christians-as-spike-in-iraq-violence-continues/2011/04/24/AFS5sYcE_story.html. In the most devastating single incident targeting Christians since 2003, the attack on Our Lady of Salvation Catholic cathedral in Baghdad had reportedly left more than 50 Christians, including two priests, and seven policemen dead and triggered a fresh exodus of at least 1,000 Christian families, or 6,000 persons, from Baghdad, Mosul and Basrah fleeing to the Kurdistan Region or further abroad; Steven Lee Meyers, *More Christians Flee Iraq After New Violence*, New York Times, 12 December 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html?pagewanted=all>; Amnesty International, *Iraqi Christians fear spike in Christmas attacks*, 20 December 2010, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/iraqi-christians-fear-spike-christmas-attacks-2010-12-20/>; RFE/RL, *Exodus Of Christians From Iraq Intensifies*, 2 February 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/iraqi-christians_/2295319.html.
- ¹¹⁵⁵ For example, on 30 December 2010, a series of at least six coordinated bombings in and around Baghdad reportedly targeted homes of Christians, killing at least three and wounding more than a dozen more; Aaron C. Davis, *Series of Baghdad bombings target Christians, police say*, Washington Post, 30 December 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/30/AR2010123004248.html>; Reuters, *Two killed in attacks on Christians in Iraq capital*, 30 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/two-killed-in-attacks-on-christians-in-iraq-capital/>. Other reported incidents included:
- On 23 February 2011, attackers stormed the home of a Christian man in the Karrada district of central Baghdad and stabbed him to death; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 23*, 23 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-23/>.
 - On 15 November 2010, gunmen stormed two adjacent homes in Al-Tahrir neighborhood in the eastern part of Mosul and shot dead two Christian men. In a separate incident, also in Mosul, assailants bombed another house belonging to a Christian family, wounding a bystander; Jomana Karadshah, *Gunmen storm Christians' homes in northern Iraq, killing two*, CNN, 15 November 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-15/world/iraq.violence_1_iraqi-christians-christian-families-iraqi-interior-ministry-official?_s=PM:WORLD; Sinan Salaheddin, *Gunmen Kill 2 Christians in Northern Iraq*, AP, 16 November 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12160593>.
 - On 10 November 2010, a series of bomb and mortar attacks targeting Christian homes in Baghdad's neighbourhoods of Doura, Adhamiyah, Amiriyah, Karrada, Camp Sara and Mansour, killed at least five people and injured more than 30 others; Jim Muir, *Christian areas targeted in deadly Baghdad attacks*, BBC, 10 November 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11724378>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 10*, 10 November 2010, <http://reliefweb.int/node/374332>.
- ¹¹⁵⁶ See chapter "Individuals Perceived as Contravening Conservative Islamic or Social Norms".
- ¹¹⁵⁷ See chapter "Protestors".
- ¹¹⁵⁸ According to the Ninewa Operations Command, Ninewa saw 287 bombings caused by IEDs and 26 car bombs between January and mid December 2011, resulting in 145 civilians and 123 ISF members being killed; Rizan Ahmed, *New Year church plot*, AKnews, 14 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/278172/>.
- ¹¹⁵⁹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 20 March 2012, as part of a wave of apparently coordinated attacks across the country, two car bombs exploded near a police headquarters in Kirkuk, killing nine people and wounding 42 others; Agencies, *Iraq bombs kill scores before Arab League summit*, 20 March 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/iraq-bombs-kill-dozens>.
 - On 7 March 2012, two bombs that exploded in swift succession outside a crowded restaurant in the predominantly Turkmen city of Tal Afar (Ninewa) killed 20 and wounded 21 others; Rezan Ahmed, *UPDATE on Talafaar bombings: 20 killed, 21 injured*, AKnews, 8

- March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294556/>; AP, *Double bombing kills 14 in northern Iraq*, 8 March 2012, <http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/03/08/double-bombing-kills-northern-iraq/BQTPVPYADROoMov9mc4yL/story.html>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *15 dead in Iraq bomb attacks*, CNN, 7 March 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/07/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html>.
- On 5 March 2012, three people were killed and two others were injured when two mortar rockets fell on a popular market west of Mosul city's Al-Yabisat area; Rezan Ahmed, *Three killed and two injured in Mosul mortar rocket market blast*, AKnews, 5 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293934/>.
 - On 14 February 2012, a car bomb exploded outside a popular restaurant in eastern Mosul, killing three people and wounding 19 others; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Three dead, two dozen wounded in Iraq explosions*, CNN, 14 February 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/14/world/meast/iraq-violence/>.
 - On 26 January 2012, a parked three-wheeled motorbike blew up, killing three people and wounding six others, in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 26*, 26 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-26>.
 - On 13 January 2012, two car bombs targeting police officers' houses blew up separately and wounded at least 15 people in the city of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 13*, 13 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-13>.
 - On 3 December 2011, at least one person was killed and 12 others were wounded when three roadside bombs exploded in quick succession in southeastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 3*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-3/>.
 - On 29 November 2011, at least four people were wounded when a roadside bomb exploded near an Iraqi army checkpoint in western Mosul. In a separate incident, a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol killed one policeman and wounded two others in the village of Shura, south of Mosul; *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
 - On 28 November 2011, at least one civilian was killed and 15 people were wounded, including five policemen, when three roadside bombs exploded near a Turkman provincial council member's house in central Kirkuk; *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
 - On 23 November 2011, armed men using car bombs and mortars launched an attack near the police headquarters and government buildings in the town of Hawija (Kirkuk), wounding nine people including two soldiers and a policeman; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 23*, 23 November 2011, <http://reliefweb.int/node/461104>.
 - On 16 November 2011, a civilian was killed and 13 people were wounded, including two Iraqi soldiers, when a roadside bomb exploded near an army patrol in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 16*, 16 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-16>.
 - On 26 October 2011, a booby-trapped car exploded in Suez district and another car blew up in Al-Zihour district, along with an explosive charge blast in Dargazaliya district, in Mosul, killing two civilians and wounding 15 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two civilians killed, 15 injured in Mosul blasts*, 26 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145409&l=1.
 - On 15 August 2011, as part of a series of suicide bombings, car-bombs and roadside explosives across the country, one person died and 12 were wounded in two car bombings in Kirkuk; Laith Hammoudi, *Coordinated attacks kill 68 on Iraq's deadliest day this year*, McClatchy Newspapers, 15 August 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/15/120705/explosions-rip-iraq-from-north.html>.
 - On 3/4 July 2011, bombers and gunmen launched a string of at least 11 attacks against the ISF across Iraq, including in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul and elsewhere, killing at least eight police and soldiers and wounding 20 others; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>.
 - On 11 June 2011, two car bombs exploded in quick succession in a central street near the government compound in central Mosul, killing six people and injuring 60 others; Jamal al-Badrani, *Twin car bombs in Iraq's Mosul kill six, injure 60*, Reuters, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/twin-car-bombs-in-iraqs-mosul-kill-six-injure-60/>.
 - On 19 May 2011, two car bombs and a sticky bomb targeting ISF exploded near a police headquarters in central Kirkuk, killing 27 people and wounding more than 90 others. The third bomb reportedly targeted Colonel Oras Mohammed, the head of Kirkuk's Counter-Terrorism Unit. He was not hurt but four of his bodyguards were killed; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Blasts in northern Iraqi oil city kill 27*, Reuters, 19 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-in-northern-iraqi-oil-city-kill-27/>.
 - On 30 April 2011, eight people were killed and 19 others were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up at an Iraqi army checkpoint next to a popular market in Mosul; Reuters, *Suicide bomber kills 8, wounds 19 in N.Iraq*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-8-wounds-19-in-niraq/>.
 - On 16 March 2011, a car bomb near the Kirkuk General Hospital killed three and wounded 39 people in central Kirkuk. Reportedly, Ansar Al-Sunna was responsible for the attack; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 16*, 16 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-16/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Final result of Kirkuk blast – 39 injuries*, 16 March 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141493&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two persons behind recent attacks in Kirkuk arrested*, 5 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141809&l=1.
 - On 11 March 2011, a parked car bomb wounded 20 people when it exploded in a market in Rahim Mawa, a mainly Kurdish area, north of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 11*, 11 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-11/>.
 - On 9 February 2011, eight people died and 75 others were wounded when three car bombs targeting ISF detonated in quick succession in a residential area in southern Kirkuk. The third explosion, allegedly caused by a suicide truck bomber, targeted a *Peshmerga* building and also caused damages to a nearby KDP party office. Investigations by the ISF revealed that the attacks were the responsibility of AQI; Reuters, *Death toll rises to 48 in Iraq suicide bombing*, 13 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/death-toll-rises-to-48-in-iraq-suicide-bombing/>; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Three car bombs kill 7, wound 78 in Iraq's Kirkuk*, Reuters, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/three-car-bombs-kill-4-wound-20-in-iraqs-kirkuk/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Recent bombings made by al-Qaeda - Kirkuk police*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141036&l=1.
- ¹¹⁶⁰ Reported (attempted) church attacks in 2011 included:
- On 15 August 2011, bombs exploded against the Syrian Orthodox church of St. Ephrem in Kirkuk, damaging the church but causing no casualties. According to the pastor, this was the third attack against his church in the past five years; CBN News, *Bomb Damages Second Christian Church in Iraq*, 19 August 2011, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/August/Bomb-Damages-Second-Christian-Church-in-Iraq/>.
 - On 2 August 2011, in part of a coordinated attack, a car bomb exploded in front of the Syrian Catholic Church of the Holy Family in central Kirkuk, injuring at least 23 people and severely damaging the church and nearby houses. Rev. Imad Yalda, the church's priest,

was the only person inside the church at the time of the blast and was wounded. Police also found car bombs outside the Christian Anglican church and the Mar Gourgis church, both in downtown Kirkuk, but defused them before they exploded; AP, *23 hurt as car bomb explodes near Iraqi church; two other attacks on Christians foiled*, 2 August 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43982676/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/hurt-car-bomb-explodes-near-iraqi-church-two-other-attacks-christians-foiled/; Reuters, *Bombers target churches in northern Iraq-police*, 2 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-target-churches-in-northern-iraq-police/>.

- On 6 January 2011, the ISF foiled an attack against a Syriac Catholic church in Mosul, after receiving intelligence of the threat. They defused six bombs and two explosive vests found near the church in central Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 6*, 6 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-6/>.

¹¹⁶¹ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 14 February 2012, gunmen opened fire from a car, wounding an off-duty *Asayish* security officer in the city of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 14*, 14 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-14/>.
- On 3 January 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of an off-duty *Peshmerga* guard seriously wounded him when it exploded in Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 3*, 3 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-3/>.
- On 30 December 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire on an *Asayish* security checkpoint and seriously wounded one officer and a policeman passing by, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 24 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a PUK member wounded him when it exploded in south-eastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 24*, 24 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-24/>.
- On 11 December 2011, two bombs exploded in quick succession and wounded three policemen and four Kurdish *Asayish* security officers as they gathered after the first explosion in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
- On 6 December 2011, a Katyusha rocket landed at the KDP headquarters in Tal Afar (Ninewa) and wounded one guard; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 6*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-6/>.
- On 27 November 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near the house of an *Asayish* officer, wounding him and his wife, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 27*, 27 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-27/>.
- On 26 November 2011, several mortar shells hit the *Peshmerga* headquarters in Zumar district (Ninewa), causing no casualties; NINA, *Peshmerga forces arrest 20 persons in Zumar in Niniveh*, 26 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJDJHE.
- On 21 November 2011, an IED blew up against a civilian car close to the KDP headquarters in Dibbis town (Kirkuk), wounding two persons, including Jabbar Mohammed Ibrahim, Kirkuk's Youth and Sports Director, who is also a senior KDP official; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk's Youth & Sports Director injured in explosive charge blast*, 21 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145694&l=1.
- On 17 November 2011, at least 10 people were wounded when three roadside bombs exploded near a PUK office in central Mosul as they were lining up to get fuel from a near-by fuel station; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraq executes 11 'terrorists' says state TV*, CNN, 17 November 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/17/world/asia/iraq-executions/index.html>.
- On 16 November 2011, a suicide car bomb struck the convoy of Hraim Kamal Agha, the head of Mosul's PUK office, in southern Mosul; Agha escaped the attack unharmed but three passers-by were wounded; Xinhua, *Suicide car bomb hits convoy of Kurdish party official in Iraq's Mosul*, 16 November 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-11/16/c_131251284.htm.
- On 17 August 2011, at least one civilian was killed when a series of bombs exploded in quick succession near KDP headquarters in Kirkuk; Reuters, *Civilian killed in Kirkuk blasts near KDP headquarters*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWSIkppUNEI>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 17*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-17/>.
- On 1 May 2011, gunmen in a speeding car using weapons equipped with silencers shot dead a Kurdish intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Nawzad Talabani, in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 1*, 1 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-1/>.
- On 26 April 2011, three bombs consecutively exploded in Arafa, western Kirkuk, killing one person and injuring 19 others, including five *Asayish* members and four policemen; Aswat al-Iraq, *3 blasts in Kirkuk leave 20 casualties*, 26 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142198&l=1.
- On 19 April 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead a *Peshmerga* guard in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 25*, 25 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-19/>.
- On 8 March 2011, a Katyusha rocket landed near a Kurdish security building and wounded a Kurdish security member in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 8*, 8 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-9/>.
- On 9 February 2011, eight people died and 75 others were wounded when three car bombs targeting ISF detonated in quick succession in a residential area in southern Kirkuk. The third explosion, allegedly caused by a suicide truck bomber, targeted a *Peshmerga* building and also caused damages to a nearby KDP party office. Investigations by the ISF revealed that the attacks were the responsibility of AQI; Aswat al-Iraq, *Recent bombings made by al-Qaeda - Kirkuk police*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141036&l=1; Reuters, *Death toll rises to 48 in Iraq suicide bombing*, 13 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/death-toll-rises-to-48-in-iraq-suicide-bombing/>; Mustafa Mahmoud, *Three car bombs kill 7, wound 78 in Iraq's Kirkuk*, Reuters, 9 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/three-car-bombs-kill-4-wound-20-in-iraqs-kirkuk/>.

¹¹⁶² See "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

¹¹⁶³ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 12 March 2012, Musa Yahya, a Turkmen member of the Taza District Council was assassinated when armed men opened fire on him in central Taza district (Kirkuk); Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councilor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.

- On 1 March 2012, CoR member Mohammed Iqbal from Iraqiyya, survived an assassination attempt when a car bomb exploded against his convoy in western Mosul; NINA, *MP Mohammad Iqbal survive from an assassination attempt in Mosul*, 2 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFHGE.
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the private car of Amanj Fakhraddin, a Kurdish officer at the North Oil Company, exploded and wounded Fakhraddin and three others in the car; Abdullah Sabri, *Kirkuk oil officer and three others wounded in car blast*, AKnews, 13 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/289764/>.
- On 2 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a worker with the state-run North Oil Company exploded and killed him in the town of Al-Zab (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 2*, 2 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-2/>. The same day, Dr. Sallahuddin Thanoon, Director General of the Health Department in Ninewa, survived an assassination attempt when an adhesive explosive device placed in his car detonated in the garage of the Ibn Sina Hospital in downtown Mosul; NINA, *Health Director General in Mosul survives assassination attempt*, 2 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKDGGJ.
- On 27 January 2012, a civil servant who worked at a Mosul court was found dead near his house in southern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 27*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-27/>.
- On 8 January 2012, gunmen killed a municipal government employee in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 9*, 9 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-9/>.
- On 30 December 2011, a roadside bomb planted in front of the house of an agriculture ministry employee wounded him and damaged part of his house in Dibis (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 11 December 2011, police found the body of a civil servant at a state-run medicine factory shot in the head and chest two hours after he was kidnapped in Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
- On 10 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an employee at state-run North Oil Company killed him in eastern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 10*, 10 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-10/>.
- On 7 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying an employee of the North Oil Company killed him in southern Kirkuk. In a separate incident, also in Kirkuk, a roadside bomb wounded a senior official of the state-run Iraqi Railways Company; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 7*, 7 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-7/>.
- On 21 November 2011, an employee at the Kirkuk Human Rights Department was killed by a sticky bomb attached to his car, in Kirkuk's Celebrations Square; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Human Rights element killed in Kirkuk explosion*, 21 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default.aspx?page=article_page&c=slideshow&id=145690.
- On 15 November 2011, gunmen kidnapped a government employee near the city of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 16*, 16 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-16/>.
- On 10 October 2011, gunmen killed a village mayor in front of his house in the western outskirts of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-11/>.
- On 18 September 2011, a governmental official and his son were injured by a sticky bomb explosion south of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 injured in sticky bomb in Kirkuk*, 18 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144912&l=1.
- On 23 August 2011, gunmen shot and wounded an employee of the Baiji oil refinery near his house in the town of Al-Zab, near Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
- On 7 August 2011, police successfully dismantled a bomb stuck under the car of Turkan Shakour Qassab, a member of Kirkuk Provincial Council from the Turkoman list, in central Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa force member killed in Kirkuk*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144164&l=1.
- On 30 July 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a convoy carrying the head of Ninewa Provincial Council, wounding three of his security guards; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 31*, 31 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-july-31/>.

¹¹⁶⁴For example, reported incidents included:

- On 4 October 2011, the body of a Sahwa member was found with gunshot wounds to the head and chest in Qayara (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-5/>.
- On 27 August 2011, a roadside bomb wounded a Sahwa member in Taza (Kirkuk); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 27*, 27 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-27/>.
- On 7 August 2011, an IED blew up close to a Sahwa checkpoint in Taza (Kirkuk), killing one Sahwa member; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa force member killed in Kirkuk*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144164&l=1.
- On 26 July 2011, gunmen using machine guns shot dead Sahwa member Hazim Sajit in front of his house in southern Kirkuk, killing him instantly; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa officer killed in south Kirkuk*, 26 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143958&l=1.
- On 18 July 2011, a roadside bomb exploded, killing one Sahwa member and wounding another, in Al-Rashad south-west of Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 18*, 18 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-18/>.
- On 5 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car, using weapons equipped with silencers, attacked a security checkpoint manned by Sahwa members near Hawija (Kirkuk), killing three; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>.
- On 18 June 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead a Sahwa member in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 18*, 18 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-18/>.
- On 8 June 2011, a roadside bomb killed a Sahwa member when it exploded near a Sahwa checkpoint in the town of Rashad near Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 8*, 8 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-8/>.

¹¹⁶⁵For example, reported incidents included:

- On 29 December 2011, gunmen opened fire on a tribal leader in front of his house and wounded him late in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 30*, 30 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-30/>.
- On 17 October 2011, gunmen killed tribal leader Mohammed Khalid Dahir al-Shirabi in Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal personality killed in Mosul*, 17 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145314&l=1.
- On 23 August 2011, gunmen broke into the house of Misha'al Mohammed Owayid, one of the chieftains of Al-Jugheifa Tribe west of Mosul, killing him and his son during their Ramadan breakfast in central Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal leader and his son, killed in Mosul*, 23 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144439&l=1.
- On 6 May 2011, Shahadha Hamad Ahmed, a tribal chief, was gunned down in his son's home, in Al-Nahrawan, west Mosul; AFP, *Car bomb hits Iraq police station where 24 killed*, 6 May 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hpHqIvIrB5-wQVNReyMI_1Kd8LOA?docId=CNG.fc1f41b1dbc6694f50f2e37c1bbd5ca8.1f1.
- On 29 April 2011, gunmen opened fire on Sheikh Mutashar Al-Okaydi, a notable of the Al-Okaydat clan, on a main street in the area of Al-Mosul Al-Jadida (New Mosul) in the western part of the city, just ten meters away from a police checkpoint, killing him instantly; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal notable killed near checkpoint in Mosul*, 29 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142255&l=1.
- On 7 April 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead Sheikh Abdulrahman Ali Aziz Al-Dalwi, chief of five Kirkuk tribes and the head of independent tribes' general affairs, an ethnic Kurd, near his house in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 8*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-8/>; Kirkuk Now, *Thousands from Kikruk attend funeral of the chief of the Kirkuk tribes, Abdulrahman Ali Aziz*, 8 April 2011, <http://kirkuknow.com/english/index.php/2011/04/kirkuk-tribes-mourn/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot down senior Kirkuk notable*, 7 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141861&l=1.
- On 3 March 2011, gunmen raided the house of Ali Al-Jabban, the son of the Al-Jabban clan chief, in Tal Afar district (Ninewa) and shot him dead; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal chief's son killed near Mosul*, 3 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141295&l=1.
- ¹¹⁶⁶ On 26 January 2012, Adnan Mahmoud, imam and preacher of Sadiq Mosque of Cairo in Mosul, and his brother were reportedly killed when they stepped out of the mosque after prayer; Rezan Ahmed, *Imam and brother murdered outside mosque*, AKnews, 26 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/286463/>. On 17 February 2011, gunmen reportedly shot dead Sheikh Ali Fakhri in front of his house in Rashidiya town (Ninewa); Aswat al-Iraq, *Muslim cleric killed in Ninewa*, 17 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141043&l=1.
- ¹¹⁶⁷ According to Turkmen sources, there has been a spike in attacks against Turkmen personalities in Kirkuk in 2011. The ITF had announced in September 2011 the formation of a Turkmen armed force in Kirkuk, reportedly saying that the Kirkuk Police had failed to protect the citizens; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkmen Front charges Parliament with security deterioration in Kirkuk*, 27 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145046&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkmen force formed to protect Turkomen in Kikuk*, 14 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144847&l=1. Recent security incidents involving Turkmen as reported in the media included:
 - On 12 March 2012, Musa Yahya, a Turkmen member of the the Taza District Council was assassinated when armed men opened fire on him in central Taza district (Kirkuk); Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councilor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.
 - On 28 November 2011, at least one civilian was killed and 15 people were wounded, including five policemen, when three roadside bombs exploded near the house of Ali Mehdi, a Turkmen provincial council member, in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Person killed, 13 wounded in 3 blasts in Kirkuk*, 29 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJDLJL.
 - On 17 October 2011, gunmen blew up an ITF headquarters in Kirkuk city, causing no casualties, but completely destroying the premises; NINA, *Turkmen Front headquarters blow up in Kirkuk*, 17 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHIII.
 - On 10 October 2010, an IED detonated next to the ITF's office in southern Kirkuk, causing only damages to the office building; NINA, *IED against Turkman party office in Kirkuk*, 10 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHJIF.
 - On 21 September 2011, Qassim Mohammed, a Shi'ite Turkic businessman, was killed by a sticky bomb attached to his car in Kirkuk; AFP, *Iraq attacks kill six*, 21 September 2011, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/22012/World/Region/Iraq-attacks-kill-six.aspx>.
 - On 18 September 2011, gunmen in a speedy car shot dead a bodyguard for a Turkmen member of Kirkuk's Provincial Council and wounded two policemen; Xinhua, *2 killed, 4 wounded in insurgents' attacks in Iraq*, 18 September 2011, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.asp?id=16996.
 - On 5 September 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a vehicle carrying prominent neurologist Yeldrim Abbas, killing him and his brother in central Kirkuk. The same day, Colonel Orhan Haider, the Commander of Kirkuk's Emergency Police, escaped an assassination attempt, when a booby-trapped car blew up against his motorcade while on his way to his office on the main Kirkuk-Baghdad highway; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-5/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kirkuk's security official escapes assassination attempt*, 5 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144652&l=1.
 - On 7 August 2011, police successfully dismantled a bomb stuck under the car of Turkan Shakour Qassab, a member of Kirkuk Provincial Council from the Turkoman list; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa force member killed in Kirkuk*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144164&l=1.
 - On 19 June 2011, gunmen kidnapped Adwal Ali Mahmud, a well-known Turkic doctor, from his house in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, *Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors*, Rudaw, 7 May 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html>.
 - On 12 May 2011, the Assistant Chairman of the Iraqi Turkmen Front, Arshad Al-Salihy, escaped an assassination attempt when a rocket fell on his house in southern Kirkuk city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant Chairman of Iraqi Turkomen Front escapes assassination attempt*, 12 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142495&l=1.
- ¹¹⁶⁸ For example, reported incidents included:
 - On 22 March 2012, gunmen opened fire from a taxi car on two Shabak men who sold groceries on carts in eastern Mosul's Al-Karama area. The two men died on the spot; Razan Ahmed and Khudr al-Khallat, *Five killed and seven injured in series of attacks in Nineveh*,

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- 22 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/297255/>.
- On 5 March 2012, a Shabak man was killed and his brother was seriously wounded when gunmen opened fire on them as they left their house in eastern Mosul's al-Atshana area; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak man shot dead and brother wounded in Mosul*, AKnews, 5 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293964/>.
 - On 31 January 2012, twin IEDs detonated in a Shabak village in north Mosul, injuring three civilians and one policeman; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 1 February 2012.
 - On 28 January 2012, gunmen killed a man and his wife from the Yazidi minority community after storming into their house in a village near Sinjar (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 28*, 28 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-28>.
 - On 21 January 2012, two gunmen killed a Christian nurse after they stormed his private medical clinic in northern Mosul city; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 21*, 21 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-21>; NINA, *Christian male nurse killed northern Mosul*, 21 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLHMF.
 - On 20 January 2012, gunmen gunned down two Shabak civilians in Rashidiya district, 10 km north of central Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Three killed in drive-by shooting in Mosul*, AKnews, 21 January 2012, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285466/>.
 - On 16 January 2012, a car bomb exploded in a residential complex housing displaced Shi'ite Muslims of Shabak ethnicity, killing at least eight people and wounding four others, in Bartella District (Ninewa); Jamal al-Badrani, *Car bomb kills at least 9 in Iraq's Mosul*, Reuters, 16 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80FOE520120116>.
 - On 14 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims wounded five people, including two policemen, when it exploded near a main road leading to a Shi'ite shrine in the town of Bartella, east of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three Shiite visitors, 2 policemen, injured in Ninewa explosive charge*, 14 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(i0zhgdzzwjzfrzobzyg45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146484&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(i0zhgdzzwjzfrzobzyg45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146484&l=1).
 - On 25 December 2011, a Christian was shot dead by a group of armed men near his house in the city of Mosul; Trend News Agency, *Iraqi Christian shot dead on Christmas Day*, 25 December 2011, <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/1973624.html>.
 - On 19 December 2011, a Shabak high school student was shot dead and his brother was wounded, when a gunman opened fire on them in the Kokjali area east of Mosul city, which is mainly inhabited by Shabak; Rezan Ahmed, *Shabak student killed east of Mosul*, AKnews, 19 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279101/>.
 - On 13 December 2011, gunmen killed a Christian man and his wife in their car in western Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 13*, 13 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-13/>.
 - On 6 December 2011, six Katyusha rockets set for firing at Shi'ite pilgrims who celebrate the Ashura Day have been disarmed in Tal Afar district; AKnews, *Rockets set for targeting Shiite pilgrims disarmed in Nineveh*, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276623/>.
 - On 4 December 2011, a Christian was killed and four of his family members were injured when an IED exploded in his house in Kirkuk; NINA, *One Christian killed, 4 of his family members injured in Kirkuk*, 4 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJEIML.
 - On 5 November 2011, gunmen kidnapped a five-year-old Turkic child near his house in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 6*, 6 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-6/>.
 - On 22 November 2011, kidnappers killed a Turkic man in Kirkuk after receiving a US\$100,000 ransom from his family; AKnews, *Militants kill kidnapped Turkmen after receiving ransom*, 22 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/274022/>.
 - On 21 November 2011, the body of a Turkic government employee, kidnapped several days earlier, was found by police; AKnews, *Militants kill kidnapped Turkmen after receiving ransom*, 22 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/274022/>.
 - On 3 November 2011, a Shabak man was killed by gunfire in front of his house in Badoush (Ninewa); AKnews, *Mosul attacks leaves two dead*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/270907/>.
 - On 22 October 2011, two Shabak men were shot and killed out of a passing car in Mosul's eastern Dora Al-Hamam area; AKnews, *Four civilians killed in Mosul armed actions*, 22 October 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/268553/>.
 - On 2 October 2011, Bassam Isho, a Catholic restaurant employee, was shot dead by unknown assailants in the district of Muthana in Kirkuk. The same day, gunmen stormed a restaurant and shot dead a Christian man in eastern Mosul; Asia News, *IRAQ - Double targeted killings against the Christian community in Kirkuk*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Double-targeted-killings-against-the-Christian-community-in-Kirkuk-22796.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
 - On 1 October 2011, the body of Emmanuel Polos Hanna was found shot dead in Kirkuk on the road to Baghdad; Asia News, *IRAQ - Double targeted killings against the Christian community in Kirkuk*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Double-targeted-killings-against-the-Christian-community-in-Kirkuk-22796.html>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
 - On 25 September 2011, gunmen kidnapped two men from the minority Yazidi sect from their car in Sinjar (Ninewa); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
- In late 2010, Mosul reportedly saw a series of attacks on Christian homes and shops, including:
- On 30 November 2010, a Christian young man was killed by gunman when they stormed his grocery shop in eastern Mosul; iCasualties, 30 November 2010, <http://icasualties.org/iraq/iraqideaths.aspx?hndPeriod=Nov-10>.
 - On 22 November 2010, two Christian brothers were killed in Mosul when gunmen broke into their workplace in an industrial part of the city and shot them. The same day, the police found an elderly Christian woman strangled in her home in central Mosul; Jomana Karadsheh, *Deadly attacks on Iraqi Christians continue*, CNN, 22 November 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/22/iraq.christians.targeted/index.html>.
 - On 16 November 2010, a bomb attached to the vehicle of a Christian man detonated in eastern Mosul, killing him and his 6-year-old daughter; Jomana Karadsheh, *Deadly attacks on Iraqi Christians continue*, CNN, 22 November 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/11/22/iraq.christians.targeted/index.html>.
 - On 15 November 2010, gunmen stormed two adjacent homes in Al-Tahrir neighborhood in eastern Mosul and shot dead two Christian men. In a separate incident, assailants bombed another house belonging to a Christian family, wounding a bystander; Jomana Karadsheh, *Gunmen storm Christians' homes in northern Iraq, killing two*, CNN, 15 November 2010, <http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11->

[15/world/iraq.violence_1_iraqi-christians-christian-families-iraqi-interior-ministry-official?_s=PM:WORLD](#); Sinan Salaheddin, *Gunmen Kill 2 Christians in Northern Iraq*, AP, 16 November 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=12160593>.

¹¹⁶⁹For example, reported attacks against professionals in Ninewa Governorate included:

- On 13 March 2012, gunmen shot dead Abdulah Ahmed al-Hamdani, an academic of the University of Mosul, and his sister, a final year student at Mosul University's College of Dentistry, in the Al-Hadba area in Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Mosul gunmen kill academic and his sister*, AKnews, 13 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295739/>.
- On 2 March 2012, gunmen shot dead lawyer Mahmoud Al-Hamdani, who had also been a candidate for Iraqiyya in the 2010 CoR elections, in Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Lawyer assassinated west of Mosul*, 2 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqvdyqyrt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147217&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqvdyqyrt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147217&l=1).
- On 27 February 2012, a high school student was shot by unidentified gunmen in Mosul's central Bab al-Saray's market; Rezan Ahmed, *Three killed and three injured in Mosul attacks*, AKnews, 27 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/292497/>.
- On 21 January 2012, two gunmen killed a Christian nurse after they stormed his private medical clinic in northern Mosul city; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 21*, 21 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-21>; NINA, *Christian male nurse killed northern Mosul*, 21 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLHMF.
- On 27 December 2011, the head of the Iraqi Red Crescent Office in Kirkuk, Yaqoub Yousif Lazim, was wounded when a bomb attached to his car exploded in western Kirkuk; NINA, *Head of Red Crescent in Kirkuk wounded*, 27 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJIDEQ.
- On 7 December 2011, gunmen killed lawyer Nadhem al-Jobouri in the city of Mosul. In a separate incident, Mosul university instructor Ali Saraj was killed near his house in Nur neighborhood, eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 7*, 7 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-7>; Rezan Ahmed, *Double murder in Mosul*, AKnews, 7 December 2011, <http://static.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276789/>.
- On 11 December 2011, gunmen in a car killed doctor Samir Al-Hamdani, head of Mosul's central morgue, near his house in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 11*, 11 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-11/>.
- On 20 November 2011, a university instructor was killed and his brother injured when gunmen assaulted them in Mosul; Rezan Ahmed, *Gunmen kill university instructor in Mosul*, AKnews, 20 November 2011, <http://new.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/273550/>.
- On 15 November 2011, gunmen attacked a physician in his private clinic in Qayara, of Mosul city, killing him on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Physician and a cop killed in Mosul*, 15 November 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145620&l=1.
- On 3 October 2011, Ibrahim Mohammed Al-Qassab, a professor in the Education College at Mosul University, was shot dead in his home in Al-Jami'a, Mosul; Aswat Al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot dead univ. professor in Mosul*, 3 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141889&l=1.
- On 1 October 2011, a doctor with the rank of a major in the Iraqi Army was killed when an explosive charge planted under his car detonated on Telkeif road, north of Mosul; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor officer killed in sticking charge blast in Mosul*, 1 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145104&l=1.
- On 10 September 2011, Hamad Majeed Sadek, a secondary school teacher, was shot dead near his home in Maamoun, south Mosul; AKnews, *Assassination of lecturers continues in Mosul*, 10 September 2011, <http://cdn.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/261187/>.
- On 17 August 2011, a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol escorting an investigation judge's convoy killed one policeman and wounded another in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 17*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-17/>.
- On 26 July 2011, gunmen killed Dr. Hayfa Juma, a Shabak gynecologist in her clinic in eastern Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor assassinated in Mosul*, 26 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143966&l=1; IBC, *Database*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/k17397>.

¹¹⁷⁰As a result, a cross-party parliamentary committee was reportedly formed in September 2011 to investigate the situation in Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Parliament delegation in Kirkuk on fact-finding mission after stepping up of assassinations*, 28 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145064&l=1. For example, attacks against professionals as reported in the media included:

- On 12 March 2012, school teacher Mahmoud Khidir Abdullah was killed when a bomb attached to his car exploded in Kirkuk city's popular market place; Abdullah al-Amiri, *District councilor and teacher killed in Kirkuk*, AKnews, 12 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295528/>.
- On 5 March 2012, Judge Assim Omar survived an assassination attempt when an IED struck his vehicle when he was driving on his way to work in the central Zab district. His driver was seriously wounded; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kirkuk judge survives assassination attempt*, AKnews, 5 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/293961/>.
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a teacher's car exploded, wounding him and two other passengers in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 13*, 13 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-13>.
- On 9 February 2012, an IED detonated against a lawyer's car in the village of Sabaghiya, in Zab district (Kirkuk), seriously wounding him; NINA, *Lawyer wounded west of Kirkuk*, 9 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEGEG.
- On 10 January 2012, the mutilated and severed body of Khalil Ibrahim Awdal, a paramedic, was found in Shorija neighbourhood of Kirkuk; Jamshid Zangana and Hiwa Husamaddin, *Kirkuk paramedic found in pieces*, AKnews, 10 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/283467/>.
- On 8 January 2012, a bomb wounded a Kirkuk University employee and his wife when it exploded near their house in southern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>.
- On 21 December 2011, judge Saad Abdulla was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Kirkuk. One of the judge's guards was seriously wounded. Reportedly, a second IED detonated inside the hospital to which the judge was transferred, wounding two civilians. Already on 18 December 2011, another Kirkuk judge, Abdul-Razzaq Al-Jobouri survived three IED explosions which targeted his house in Kirkuk; Abdullah Ameri, *Kirkuk judge killed, IED exploded in hospital*, 21 December 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/3/279522/>.

- On 7 December 2011, prosecutor Nadhim Aziz Al-Taie was killed when a bomb attached to his vehicle exploded in Yajj area; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Prosecutor killed, official injured in Kirkuk blasts*, AKnews, 7 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276838/>.
 - On 30 November 2011, gunmen attacked the house of a judge in Kirkuk, causing no casualties; NINA, *Two houses in Kirkuk come under armed attack*, 30 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJEDKF. The same day, gunmen in a civilian car opened fire from their machine guns on Kurdish high school student Sherwan Arsalan Jamal while he was getting out of his school in Almaz neighbourhood, north of Kirkuk; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kurdish student shot dead in Kirkuk*, 30 November 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/275514/>.
 - On 20 November 2011, Amer Khalaf Abdullah, a member of a human rights organization was killed when a sticky bomb attached to his car exploded southwest of Kirkuk; NINA, *Human rights activist killed by AED in his car southwest of Kirkuk*, 20 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIMKMG.
 - On 4 November 2011, gunmen in military attire kidnapped two Kirkuk university professors, Musa Mustafa, the Dean of Imam Al Sadeq College, and Dr. Sami Ridha, a professor in the Technology College, in the Wasiti neighborhood of western Kirkuk. In addition, ISF defused a sticky bomb attached to a teacher's car, 40 km west of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 university professors kidnapped in Kirkuk*, 5 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145516&l=1; NINA, *Gunmen in military uniforms kidnap two college professors in Kirkuk*, 5 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILFDE. On 6 December 2011, Musa Mustafa, the Dean of Imam al Sadeq College was reportedly released from captivity after the payment of US \$800,000. Allegedly, AQI was behind the kidnapping; Abdullah al-Amiri, *Kidnapped academic released for US\$800,000 in Kirkuk*; AKnews, 6 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/276621/>.
 - On 5 September 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a vehicle carrying prominent neurologist Yeldrim Abbass, killing him and his brother in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-5/>.
 - On 22 July 2011, gunmen killed a doctor when he resisted an attempt to kidnap him in front of his house in central Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 22*, 22 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-22/>.
 - On 2 July 2011, gunmen opened fire on the house of a doctor in Kirkuk's Adan district, causing damage to the house; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three wanted persons detained, gunmen attack doctor's house in Kirkuk*, 2 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143501&l=1.
 - On 25 June 2011, the 9-year old son of Kirkuk dentist Fadhel Khurshid was abducted close to his house in southwestern Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor's son abducted in third similar operation in Kirkuk in 2 weeks*, 26 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143392&l=1.
 - On 23 June 2011, a pediatrician was kidnapped from his clinic in northern Kirkuk; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 24*, 24 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-24/>. On 20 June 2011, a Turkic doctor was abducted from his house in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1.
 - On 19 June 2011, gunmen kidnapped Adwal Ali Mahmud, a well-known Turkic doctor, from his house in the city of Kirkuk; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkoman doctor abducted from his house in Kirkuk*, 20 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143271&l=1; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, *Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors*, Rudaw, 7 May 2011, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html>.
- ¹¹⁷¹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 4 January 2012, 11 bombs exploded in separate areas of the city of Ba'quba, killing a 6-year-old girl and wounding 12 other people; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 4*, 4 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-4/>.
 - On 3 November 2011, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive belt outside the gates of a military base in Ba'quba (Diyala) as Sahwa members lined up to collect their salaries. A car bomb blew up in a nearby parking lot a few minutes later. At least six people were killed and 23 others were wounded in the attacks. Other sources put the death toll at 10 killed and 40 wounded; Reuters, *Bombs kill at least six in Iraq's Baquba*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombs-kill-at-least-six-in-iraqs-baquba/>.
 - On 10 September 2011, a bomb exploded in a cafe, killing two people and wounding eight others, in a village north of the city of Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 10*, 10 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-10/>.
 - On 15 August 2011, as part of a series of suicide bombings, car bombs and roadside explosives across the country, 12 people died in two attacks that targeted an Iraqi checkpoint and a military camp in Diyala. An estimated 20 others were wounded; Laith Hammoudi, *Coordinated attacks kill 68 on Iraq's deadliest day this year*, McClatchy Newspapers, 15 August 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/15/120705/explosions-rip-iraq-from-north.html>.
 - On 25 July 2011, a motorbike bomb exploded in Muqadiyah, killing five, including a child, and wounding 12 others; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>.
 - On 14 June 2011, gunmen and suicide bombers disguised as Iraqi soldiers stormed a Provincial Council building in Ba'quba after detonating a car bomb outside, killing at least eight and wounding 25 others. ISI reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack; Bill Roggio, *Suicide attack kills 35 Iraqis north of Baghdad*, The Long War Journal, 5 July 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/suicide_attack_kills_4.php; Reuters, *Bombers strike Iraq govt building, at least 28 dead*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-strike-iraq-govt-building-at-least-28-dead/>.
 - On 28 April 2011, at least eight people were killed and 17 others were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up inside a mosque shortly after evening prayers in Balad Ruz; Reuters, *Suicide bomber kills 8, wounds 17 in Iraq mosque*, 28 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-8-wounds-17-in-iraq-mosque/>.
 - On 11 April 2011, six members of a family died in the explosion of a roadside bomb and four people were killed by a second blast as they tried to help victims of the first blast, in a village near the town of Khan Bani Saad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 11*, 11 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-11/>.
 - On 14 March 2011, a car bomb attack on an Iraqi army headquarters killed at least eight soldiers and wounded 30 others in Kanaan. ISF foiled a second attack and defused a car bomb parked at the scene. Reportedly, ISI later claimed responsibility for the attack; Reuters, *Iraqi al Qaeda group says behind army HQ attack*, 21 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraqi-al-qaeda-group-says-behind-army-hq-attack/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 14*, 14 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-14/>.

- On 17 February 2011, a car bomb exploded at a car showroom in the Iraqi town of Muqdadiah, killing at least 13 people and wounding 33 others; Reuters, *Car bomb in Iraq kills 13, wounds 33-sources*, 17 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/car-bomb-in-iraq-kills-13-wounds-33-sources/>.
- On 20 January 2011, a suicide bomber drove a car into a police headquarters, killing at least three people and wounding around 30 others in Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 20*, 20 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-20/>.
- On 19 January 2011, a suicide bomber driving an ambulance killed 15 people and wounded 55 others in an attack on a police headquarters in Ba'quba. The blast caused part of the three-storey building, where offices for different departments of Iraqi police and security are located, to collapse; Shashank Bengali and Laith Hammoudi, *Attack on pilgrims kills dozens as Iraqi violence continues*, McClatchy Newspapers, 20 January 2011, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/20/107142/attack-on-pilgrims-kills-dozens.html>.
- On 3 January 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked an Iraqi intelligence services compound in Ba'quba, wounding 28 people, mostly female students from a nearby school; Reuters, *Attack on intel service in northeast Iraq wounds 28*, 3 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attack-on-intel-service-in-northeast-iraq-wounds-28/>.

¹¹⁷² For example, reported incidents included:

- On 26 August 2011, a roadside bomb went off near a mosque and wounded three civilians in Tarmiyah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 26*, 26 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-26/>.
- On 28 July 2011, two suicide bombers killed at least 15 people and wounded more than 30 as police and soldiers were collecting their salaries at the local Rafidain Bank in central Tikrit; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>.
- On 5 July 2011, a car bomb and a roadside bomb exploded in a crowded parking lot outside a municipal building in the town of Taji, killing at least 28 people and wounding 58 others. The explosions hit police, government workers and Iraqis lining up for national identity cards; Bill Roggio, *Suicide attack kills 35 Iraqis north of Baghdad*, The Long War Journal, 5 July 2011, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/suicide_attack_kills_4.php; Reuters, *Iraq civilian deaths in July match highest for 2011*, 1 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-civilian-deaths-in-july-match-highest-for-2011/>.
- On 26 June 2011, at least 12 people were wounded, including nine policemen and three civilians, when a suicide bomber in a wheelchair blew himself up at a police station in Tarmiyah. Another source put the toll at two people killed and 17 others wounded; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 26*, 26 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-26/>; Reuters, *Suicide bomber hits Iraq police station, 12 wounded*, 26 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-hits-iraq-police-station-12-wounded/>.
- On 6 June 2011, a suicide bomber detonated a car at the entrance to a complex of palaces once used by former President Saddam Hussein in his hometown of Tikrit, killing 13 people and wounding 15 others. Among the dead was the head of military intelligence in Tikrit; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>; Reuters, *Suicide car bomber kills 13 in Saddam's hometown*, 6 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-car-bomber-kills-13-in-saddams-hometown/>.
- On 3 June 2011, two apparently coordinated blasts in the town of Tikrit, one targeting worshippers in a mosque, killed 21 and wounded 70 others; Reuters, *Blasts kill at least 15 in Iraq's Tikrit*, 28 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/blasts-kill-at-least-15-in-iraqs-tikrit/>.
- On 29 March 2011, at least 58 people were killed and 98 others wounded when gunmen in military uniforms laid siege to a Provincial Council Headquarters in Tikrit. ISI later claimed responsibility for the attack in what it said was a response to crimes committed against Sunni prisoners; Reuters, *Al Qaeda claims responsibility for Iraq's Tikrit attack*, 2 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/al-qaeda-claims-responsibility-for-iraqs-tikrit-attack/>.
- On 21 February 2011, a suicide bomber blew up a car outside a shelter housing police officers in Samarra, killing 13 policemen and wounding 25 others; Reuters, *Iraq has fewer violent deaths in February*, 1 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-has-fewer-violent-deaths-in-february/>.
- On 12 February 2011, during a commemoration of the death of Hasan Al-Askari, one of 12 revered Shi'ite imams, a suicide bomber targeting Shi'ite pilgrims detonated an explosive vest at a bus depot at the entry to Samarra, killing 48 people and wounding 80 others; Reuters, *Iraq has fewer violent deaths in February*, 1 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/iraq-has-fewer-violent-deaths-in-february/>; Sabah al-Bazee, *Suicide bomber kills 13 policemen in Iraq*, Reuters, 21 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-10-wounds-15-in-iraq/>.
- On 10 February 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked a group of Shi'ite pilgrims near the town of Dujail as they headed to Samarra for a religious commemoration, killing eight and wounding 30 others; Sabah al-Bazee, *Suicide bomber kills 13 policemen in Iraq*, Reuters, 21 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-at-least-10-wounds-15-in-iraq/>.
- On 18 January 2011, a suicide bomber attacked a police recruiting centre in Tikrit, killing 60 people and wounding over 100 others. AQI claimed responsibility for the attack, calling the police recruits "treacherous daggers"; Muhanad Mohammed, *UPDATE 2-Two bombs kill 12 Shi'ites heading to rite in Iraq*, Reuters, 24 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-2-two-bombs-kill-12-shiites-heading-to-rite-in-iraq/>.

¹¹⁷³ IAU, *Salah al-Din Governorate Profile*, October 2011, <http://www.iauiraq.org/reports/GP-Salah%20al-Din%20v2.pdf>.

¹¹⁷⁴ Reported recent incidents included for example,

- On 20 March 2012, a car bomb exploded near a police checkpoint in Ba'quba, wounding 20 persons, including four policemen; NINA, *Death toll of Baquba explosion raised to 20 wounded*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIELH.
- On 24 February 2012, a car parked near a checkpoint in the centre of Raq Market in Samarra detonated, injuring four people, including two policemen; Othman Shalsh, *Four wounded in Samarra market blast*, AKnews, 24 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291891/>.
- On 23 February 2012, as part of widespread coordinated attacks across Iraq, bombings and armed attacks in Tuz Khurmatu, Baiji, Sulayman Bak, Dujail and Balad districts of Salah Al-Din Governorate resulted in more than 80 people dead or wounded; Othman Shalsh, *Four wounded in Samarra market blast*, AKnews, 24 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291891/>. Furthermore, three people were killed and at least 21 others wounded after nine bombs exploded in the Jalawla district in Diyala; Fryad Mohammed and Bryar Mohammed, *Kurdistan willing to expedite force to protect Kurds in Diyala*, 24 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/4/291906/>. Also in Diyala Governorate, the explosion of car bomb which targeted the house of the Baladruz police chief killed three civilians and caused damage to several adjacent houses. And two people were killed and eight wounded after a car bomb detonated in a garage in Ba'quba; Mohammed al-Jobouri and Bryar Mohammed, *Five killed and 10 wounded after Diyala rocked by bomb attacks*, AKnews, 23 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291706/>.

- On 22 February 2012, police forced a suicide car bomber to detonate it in Shirqat without causing casualties; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS Salah al-Deen police force suicide car bomber to blow it in Shirqat with no casualties*, 22 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEGFIH.
 - On 11 February 2012, a bomb exploded against a police patrol on a highway northwest of Tikrit, seriously injuring one officer and three police members; NINA, *Injuring a police officer and three other policemen northwest of Tikrit*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEHGE.
 - On 30 January 2012, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb at a police checkpoint, killing three policemen and wounding three other people, including a civilian, in central Ba'quba (Diyala). In separate incident, a roadside bomb went off near a police patrol in central Ba'quba, killing one policeman and wounding three others. Also, a roadside bomb went off near an army convoy and wounded one soldier in southern Ba'quba; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 30*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-30/>.
 - On 10 January 2012, a bomb exploded in the village of Yathrib, near Tikrit, killing three boys on their way to school; BBC, *Iraq violence: Schoolboys among eight people killed*, 10 January 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16497462>.
 - On 4 January 2012, eleven bombs exploded in separate areas of the city of Ba'quba (Diyala), killing a 6-year-old girl and wounding 12 other people; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 4*, 4 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-4/>.
 - On 25 December 2011, a suicide car bomber attacked a joint police and army checkpoint, killing two soldiers and wounding 12, including four soldiers and eight civilians, in an area near the town of Dujaal; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 25*, 25 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-25/>.
 - On 2 December 2011, one policeman was killed and five persons were wounded, including four policemen in two roadside bombs in Tuz Khurmato; Reuter Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 2*, 2 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-2/>.
 - On 1 December 2011, a car bomb exploded in a street market in the mainly Shi'ite Iraqi town of Khalis (Diyala), killing 10 people and wounding 25 others. The same day, seven policemen were wounded when one of three roadside bombs they were trying to defuse went off in Taji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
 - On 27 November 2011, a car bomb blew up at the crowded front gates of a military base that also houses a prison holding suspected terrorists from AQI and Shi'ite militias, in Taji (Salah Al-Din), killing at least 19 people, mostly guards, and wounding 24 others; Kareem Raheem, *Suicide bomber hits Iraq military base, 19 dead*, Reuters, 28 November 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/28/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE7AR09U20111128>; Jack Healy, *New Wave of Bombings Raises Toll for Iraqis*, 28 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/world/middleeast/13-killed-in-car-bomb-attack-outside-baghdad-prison.html>.
 - On 16 November 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near an Iraqi police patrol, wounding six people including four policemen, in central Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 17*, 17 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-17/>.
- ¹¹⁷⁵ See "Shi'ite Civilians, including Pilgrims".
- ¹¹⁷⁶ For example, reported incidents included
- On 30 November 2011, armed men attacked the home of Sheikh Khalid Al- Naisani in Samarra, killing him, his wife, their 17-year-old son and two other people who were at his house; AFP, *Five dead in attack on home of Iraq cleric*, 30 November 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?col=§ion=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2011/November/middleeast_November825.xml.
 - On 12 September 2011, Ahmed Mahmud al-Jabalawi, imam of the Sunni Al-Shuhada mosque, was shot dead by gunmen using handguns with silencers when on his way to the mosque for morning prayers in Ba'quba (Diyala). Reportedly, the imam was known for his outspoken criticism of AQI; AFP, *Gunmen kill 22 passengers on bus coming from Syria in Iraq's western province*, 13 September 2011, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/13/166624.html>; Mohammed Tawfeeq, *Iraqi police: Gunmen ambush Shiite pilgrims, killing 22*, CNN, 12 September 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-09-12/world/iraq.violence_1_shiite-pilgrims-karbala-gunmen?s=PM:WORLD.
 - On 13 June 2011, the imam of a mosque was wounded when gunmen stormed his house and shot him in Balad (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 13*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-13/>.
 - On 20 May 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a house of Saadoun Al-Mashaikhi, a mosque imam, while he was returning from prayer, wounding him and killing two people, including his son in southern Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 20*, 20 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-20/>.
 - On 28 April 2011, gunmen killed Basheer Al-Sumaidaie, an imam, and his wife and daughter when they stormed his house in the town of Imam Weis, east of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 29*, 29 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-29/>.
- ¹¹⁷⁷ See "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".
- ¹¹⁷⁸ For example,
- On 13 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a Sahwa member's vehicle blew up and seriously wounded him in Muqdadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 13*, 13 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-13/>.
 - On 8 February 2012, an explosive charge planted in the car of Sheikh Jabbar Hussein, one of the chieftains of Al-Asakira Tribe, blew up on the main road connecting Saadiya with Khanaqeen (Diyala), killing him on the spot and wounding three others in the car; Aswat al-Iraq, *Diala tribal chieftain killed, 3 others injured*, 8 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(f342on55tpuoeay0ka5ctat\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146829&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(f342on55tpuoeay0ka5ctat)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146829&l=1).
 - On 4 February 2012, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a Sahwa member exploded and killed him in central Ba'quba (Diyala). In a separate incident, a bomb planted in front of the house of a Sahwa member went off and severely wounded him and one of his family members in the town of Udham (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 4*, 4 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
 - On 1 February 2012, gunmen in a speeding car killed a Sahwa member in the town of Muqdadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, February 1*, 1 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-february-1/>.

- On 19 January 2012, a bomb planted at the house of a Sahwa member exploded, wounding him, his wife and one of his children, in northern Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
 - On 18 January 2012, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at a security checkpoint, killing a Sahwa member and wounding three other people including two policemen, in central Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 19*, 19 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-19/>.
 - On 17 January 2012, a sticky bomb attached to a car carrying a Sahwa member killed him in central Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 17*, 17 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-17/>.
 - On 11 January 2012, a roadside bomb exploded near the house of a Sahwa member and wounded three of his children in the town of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 12*, 12 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-12/>.
 - On 3 January 2012, gunmen opened fire at the house of a Sahwa member, killing him and wounding his wife in the town of Muqadiyah (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 3*, 3 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-3/>.
 - On 26 December 2011, police found the body of a Sahwa member with gunshot wounds to the head in Baiji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 26*, 26 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-26/>.
 - On 22 December 2011, a family of five, including the parents, a son and two daughters were gunned down in their home in Ba'quba (Diyala). Both father and son were Sahwa members; Prashant Rao, *Bombs kill 57 as Iraq mired in political crisis*, AFP, 22 December 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i84pYeYLjJF7ArcDK_pu3A5J2vuw?docId=CNG.011113bade199475ce97cc632952336b.3a1.
 - On 9 December 2011, a tribal sheikh of the Bani-Tamim tribes was injured by a roadside bomb that targeted his car north-east of Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *A tribal Sheikh injured in Diyala*, 9 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VO=FJFELL.
 - On 3 November 2011, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive belt outside the gates of a military base in Ba'quba (Diyala) as Sahwa members lined up to collect their salaries. A car bomb blew up in a nearby parking lot a few minutes later. At least six people were killed and 23 wounded in the attacks. Other sources put the death toll at 10 killed and 40 wounded; Reuters, *Bombs kill at least six in Iraq's Baquba*, 3 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombs-kill-at-least-six-in-iraqs-baquba/>.
 - On 1 October 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Ammar Al-Majmai, a Sahwa leader, and killed at least one relative in Buhriz (Diyala). Gunmen left a bomb behind, which blew up when ISF rushed to the site. A policeman was killed and four others were seriously wounded. The same day, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a Sahwa member in Udham (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 1*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-1/>; AlSumaria TV, *Unknown gunmen break into Iraq Sahwa official house*, 1 October 2011, <http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/Iraq-News/1-69039-Unknown-gunmen-break-into-Iraq-Sahwa-official-house.html>.
 - On 7 September 2011, gunmen raided the house of a Sahwa leader and killed him in front of his wife in the eastern outskirts of Dujail (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-7/>.
 - On 14 August 2011, gunmen using weapons with silencers wounded Ali Al-Karkhi, a local Sahwa leader, and one of his guards late in Kanaan (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
 - On 2 August 2011, gunmen attacked a checkpoint manned by Sahwa in a town east of Ba'quba (Diyala), killing three members; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 2*, 2 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-2/>.
- ¹¹⁷⁹ Reported recent incidents included for example,
- On 13 March 2012, Samarra's health care director was shot dead by gunmen when leaving his home; Othman Shilshil, *Health official shot dead in Samarra*, AKnews, 13 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/295587/>.
 - On 11 February 2012, the mayor of Al-Ghalbiya area near Ba'quba (Diyala) was wounded when an IED detonated next to his house; NINA, *A municipality Cheikh injuring northwest of Baquba*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VO=FKEHKD.
 - On 10 February 2012, Hussein Al-Shatab, member of the Salah Al-Din Provincial Council, survived an attack on his house in Mo'tasam district, south of Tikrit; Othman Shalsh *Salahaddin official survives rocket attack*, AKnews, 10 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/289069/>.
 - On 30 January 2012, a bomb blast damaged the house of a court official in central Ba'quba (Diyala), but caused no casualties; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 30*, 30 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-30/>.
 - On 28 January 2012, gunmen stormed the house of a national reconciliation official and wounded him and killed a guest near the city of Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 29*, 29 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-29/>.
 - On 23 January 2012, two rockets fell on the house of Diyala Provincial Council member Hisham Al-Hayali (from the Iraqiyya bloc), causing no casualties, Al-Hayali accused Shi'ite militias to be behind the attack; Mahmoud al-Jubouri, *Rocket attack on Iraqi MP's house in Diyala*, AKnews, 23 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285864/>.
 - On 10 January 2012, two agriculture ministry employees were killed when a bomb attached to their vehicle exploded in Shirqat (Salah Al-Din); BBC, *Iraq violence: Schoolboys among eight people killed*, 10 January 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16497462>.
 - On 25 December 2011, Abdul-Kareem Samarayi, the Minister of Science and Technology, was unharmed when a roadside bomb hit his motorcade in Balad (Salah Al-Din), injuring two of his guards; Yazin Shamri, *Minister survives bombing*, AKnews, 25 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/280431/>.
 - On 15 December 2011, the bodies of the three government employees were found with their hands tied behind their backs and gunshot wounds to the chest, three days after they were kidnapped in a desert area in Dhuluiya (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 15*, 15 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-15/>.

- On 8 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a government employee at the Citizenship Department, killed him and his cousin, in a town west of Muqadadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 9*, 9 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-9/>.
 - On 26 November 2011, gunmen attacked a farm belonging to the mayor of Dour (Salah Al-Din), Othman Ahmed Al-Douri, and exchanged fire with his security guards, killing one guard and wounding the mayor; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 26*, 26 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-26/>.
 - On 13 November 2011, two roadside bombs went off near the car of an Electricity Ministry employee, killing him and wounding seven others, including four policemen, in Taji; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 13*, 13 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-13/>.
 - On 14 October 2011, a mayor was killed and three members of his family wounded when an IED went off in front of his home in Jorf Al-Milih area north of Ba'quba (Diyala); NINA, *A local municipal chief killed and three members of his family wounded north of Baquba*, 14 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHIEJD.
 - On 5 October 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire and killed a local mayor in the town of Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 5*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-5/>.
 - On 27 August 2011, gunmen in a speeding car opened fire at the car of local government official, killing him and his driver, in Jalawla (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 28*, 28 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-28/>.
 - On 20 August 2011, an IED attached under the car of an employee in Diyala's Education Department detonated on the main road of Al-Hadeed area northwest of Ba'quba, killing three of the employee's family members; NINA, *Three members of a family killed by an AED in their car in Diyala*, 20 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHKMKK.
 - On 15 August 2011, a parked motorcycle bomb targeting the convoy of Abdulla Al-Hiyali, a local provincial official, wounded six people, including two of his family members, when it exploded in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>.
 - On 26 July 2011, a roadside bomb planted close to a village mayor's house exploded, killing him and wounding his wife and daughter, on the northwestern outskirts of Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 26*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-26/>.
 - On 28 June 2011, a roadside bomb exploded when Ba'quba Mayor Abdulla al-Hayali's convoy was passing, wounding him and two of his guards, in central Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 28*, 28 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-28/>.
 - On 22 June 2011, A gunman on a bicycle, using a weapon with a silencer, killed the mayor of the Gatoon neighbourhood in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 22*, 22 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-22/>.
 - On 20 June 2011, the mayor of Jadidat Al-shat, near Ba'quba (Diyala), Mezhir Talib (Nisr al-Maamoury) was shot dead in his house; Xinhua, *Gunmen kill senior official, kidnap two people in Iraq*, 20 June 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/20/c_13940073.htm.
 - On 19 June 2011, gunmen raided the house of a local council leader and killed him near Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 20*, 20 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-20/>.
 - On 17 June 2011, a car bomb targeted the house of Niazi Muhammad Maa'mar, a Turkmen member of the Salah Al-Din Provincial Council, in Tuz District (Salah Al-Din), killing five and wounding 45. Maa'mar was not inside the house during the time of the attack but some members of his family were severely wounded; Aswat al-Iraq, *Turkmen Front denounces attack on local council member's house*, 19 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=133431&l=1.
 - On 9 June 2011, gunmen, using weapons with silencers, killed Jalal Jassim Mohammed, the head of a company belonging to the Ministry of Industry in the town of Taji (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-9/>.
 - On 8 June 2011, Ali Hussein, General Manager of Diyala Governorate Health Department, escaped unharmed when a bomb attached to a parked car exploded near his passing convoy and wounded four passers-by in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 8*, 8 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-8/>.
- ¹¹⁸⁰ In particular, several attacks on Kurdish party officials and offices, mostly from the PUK, have been reported in the disputed areas. For example,
- On 22 February 2012, a car bomb exploded near the headquarters of Goran in Tuz Khurmatu (Salah Al-Din); UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 23 February 2012.
 - On 27 January 2012, security forces found the dead body of Wisam Jomaa, a PUK member, in an orchard located on the outskirts of Saadiya district (Diyala). He had been kidnapped three days earlier. The body bore signs of gunshot wounds and torture; NINA, *A dead body of a member of (PUK) in Diyala*, 27 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMHFE.
 - On 7 January 2012, Nassir Mohsen, a Kurdistan Communist Party official, survived an assassination attempt when a roadside bomb struck his vehicle in Saadiya district (Diyala); Bryar Mohammed, *Communist party official injured in attack*, AKnews, 8 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/282986/>.
 - On 10 November 2011, security forces defused a bomb placed near the committee of the PUK in Jalawla (Diyala); KurdNet, *Bomb near PUK committee defused*, 11 November 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/11/kurdlocal1000.htm>.
 - On 30 October 2011, gunmen stormed an office of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party in Ba'quba (Diyala) and injured two guards; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 31*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-31/>.
 - On 17 August 2011, Ahmed Amen, a PUK affiliate and engineer was reportedly strapped into an explosive vest before being released close to a KDP office and a local mosque before the vest was detonated, killing him on the spot; KurdNet, *PUK member assassinated in Jalawla in disputed Diyala province*, 17 August 2011, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2011/8/kurdsiniraq120.htm>.
 - On 15 August 2011, gunmen in a car shot dead Abbas Hassan, who is in charge of the PUK office in Saadiya, and one of his bodyguards in front of the PUK headquarters in the town of Saadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 15*, 15 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-15/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Kurdish Party official killed in Diala, east Iraq*, 15 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144294&l=1.
 - On 4 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed Kurdish politician Saleh Shaker in front of the PUK's headquarters in the town of Saadiya (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 4*, 4 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-4/>.

- On 8 January 2011, Adib Abdul-Khaliq, a PUK committee member, was shot dead in Jalawla (Diyala); AKnews, *PUK member assassinated in Jalawla*, 9 January 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/208901>.
- On 13 November 2010, Ibrahim Nawzad Rahim Khardal, a teacher and leading PUK official, was killed by official by bomb attached to car in Saadiya (Diyala); Aswat al-Iraq, *Key PUK member killed in Diala*, 14 November 2010, <http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Key+PUK+member+killed+in+Diala.-a0242068671>.

Furthermore, there have been reported attacks on Iraqiyya members: on 15 February 2011, armed men reportedly attacked the house of Iraqiyya member Ra'ad Al-Dahlaki in Rakat Al-Haj Sihail area of northern Ba'quba (Diyala), injuring two guards. Al-Dahlaki was not in the house at the time of the attack; NINA, *Dahlaki's house attacked in Diyala*, 16 February 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FFHFLI. And on 7 February 2011, a roadside bomb reportedly exploded near the offices of the Iraqiyya political coalition, wounding two security guards and a civilian, in Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 7*, 7 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-7/>.

¹¹⁸¹ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 22 February 2012, a car bomb exploded in front of a court house in Bajij, injuring four persons; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 23 February 2012.
- On 10 February 2012, gunmen shot dead a teacher in front of his house in Khan Bani Saad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 11*, 11 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-11/>.
- On 22 November 2011, gunmen shot dead Luei Al-Shamani, a pharmacist, inside his pharmacy in Samarra (Salah Al-Din); Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq Pharmacist killed in armed attack east of Samarra, north Baghdad*, 23 November 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145729&l=1.
- On 14 November 2011, gunmen in a car, using weapons with silencers, shot and wounded Omar Al-Dulaimi, the head of a journalists' association in Diyala Governorate, in central Ba'quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 14*, 14 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-14/>.
- On 8 November 2011, an IED placed near a judge's house in Ba'quba (Diyala), went off damaging the house without causing in casualties; NINA, *3 IEDs in Baquba wounding 3 persons, damaging judge's house*, 8 November 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FILHEF.
- On 23 October 2011, gunmen opened fire on a teacher, Ismail Al-Wadi, and his daughter, close to their house east of Tikrit (Salah Al-Din), killing them on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Teacher, his daughter, killed in Tikrit attack*, 23 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145372&l=1.
- On 11 June 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Yunis Hassan Salman, a teacher, killing him and four members of his family near Al-Dour town (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 11*, 11 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-11/>; AFP, *Violence north of Baghdad kills nine*, 11 June 2011, <http://213.158.162.45/~egyptian/index.php?action=news&id=19099&title=Violence>.
- On 4 June 2011, gunmen opened fire at Dr. Isma'el Khalil Al-Mahdawi, an instructor at the Asma'e College of the University of Diyala, when he was on his way home in western Ba'quba (Diyala), seriously wounding him; NINA, *University instructor wounded in Diyala*, 4 June 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGLEMI.
- On 1 May 2011, teacher Mohammed Sabah was killed by a bomb attached to his car in Ba'quba (Diyala); Xinhua, *Civilian killed, 7 injured in Iraq bomb attacks*, 1 May 2011, <http://en.trend.az/regions/met/iraq/1869423.html>.
- On 30 April 2011, gunmen detonated bombs at the house of Tuma Jabar Lafta (Tuma al-Timimi), a judge in Baghdad's Karkh Court, killing him, his wife and two daughters in Taji (Salah Al-Din). In a separate attack, gunmen using weapons with silencers shot dead a policeman who was assigned to provide security for the judge; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 30*, 30 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-30/>; AP, *Iraqi judge, wife and daughter killed*, 30 April 2011, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=§ion=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2011/April/middleeast_April67_6.xml.
- On 21 April 2011, a bomb targeting the vehicle of a Samarra Investigation Judge, Shihab Ahmed, exploded in Samarra (Salah Al-Din), killing a university student and wounding five persons, including a judge's guard. Ahmed was not in the convoy at the time; NINA, *Judge targeted in Samara*, 21 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFLKD.
- On 20 April 2011, the chief judge of Salah Al-Din Court survived an assassination attempt when a car bomb parked on the main road of central Tikrit (Salah Al-Din) exploded. Four persons, including one of the judge's guards, were injured; NINA, *Salah-il-Din chief Judge attacked*, 20 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFKFI.
- On 17 April 2011, a teacher was wounded in Abu Saida District (Diyala), when an IED detonated inside his car as he was driving along a rural road in the area; NINA, *Teacher wounded, 4 wanted in Diyala arrested*, 17 April 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGFFKL.
- On 25 March 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a doctor in Jalawla hospital went off on the main road in Jalawla (Diyala), seriously injuring the doctor; Aswat al-Iraq, *Doctor survives life attempt in Diala*, 25 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141626&l=1.
- On 2 January 2011, gunmen planted bombs near the house of Hardan Khalaf, the Public Attorney of Balad town, wounding him along with eight members of his family and killing his nephew, in a town near Balad (Salah Al-Din); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, January 2*, 2 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-jan-2/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Man killed, 9 injured, in attack against judge's house in Salahaddin's Balad city*, 2 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140254&l=1.

¹¹⁸² Michael S. Schmidt and Duraid Adnan, *Two More Attacks in Restive Iraqi Province*, New York Times, 3 October 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/world/middleeast/two-more-attacks-in-restive-iraqi-province.html>; Timothy Williams and Zaid Thaker, *Bombs Explode Outside Homes of Iraqi Police Officers, Killing 4*, New York Times, 7 June 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html?ref=middleeast>; Steven Lee Meyers, *Iraq Suicide Bomber Strikes in Anbar*, New York Times, 18 February 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/world/middleeast/19iraq.html>; Mohammed Hussein and Timothy Williams, *Suicide Attack Kills 7 in Iraq Inside Government Compound*, New York Times, 13 January 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/middleeast/14iraq.html>.

¹¹⁸³ Statements made by the spokesman for the US military in Iraq, Maj. Gen Jeffrey S. Buchanan. Furthermore, provincial leaders in Al-Anbar claim that the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi Government, which has sent the Iraqi Army to Al-Anbar in 2010 over concerns of corruption in the local police forces, has an interest in keeping Al-Anbar unstable in order to decrease Sunni influence at the national level. Consequently, they argue, that the Iraqi Army does not sufficiently fight AQI in Al-Anbar; Michael S. Schmidt, *Baghdad Assailed over Attack in Anbar*, New York Times, 13 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/world/middleeast/anbar-provincial-leaders-assail-iraqi-government.html>. A rise in sectarian tensions was observed after 12 September 2011, when gunmen executed 22 Shi'ite pilgrims traveling through Al-Anbar; AP, *Gunmen in Iraq Take Over Bus Filled With Shiite Pilgrims and Kill 22 Men*, 12 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html>.

¹¹⁸⁴ Including in Ramadi, Garma, Haditha and Saqlawiya. Major attacks in 2010, 2011 and 2012 targeting government buildings and police stations as reported in the media included:

- On 24 January 2012, a roadside bomb exploded on a road leading to government offices, killing two people and wounding three others; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 24*, 24 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-24/>.
- On 15 January 2012, six policemen and a civilian died in the assault on the Ramadi police building, which houses an anti-terrorism unit and a jail, and 18 other people were wounded; Reuters, *Ten dead in militant attack in Iraq's Ramadi*, 15 January 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/15/us-iraq-violence-idUSTRE80E09T20120115?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&rpc=71>.
- On 3 October 2011, four people, including the chief of the local police, were killed after ISF stormed a police station in Al-Baghdadi where gunmen disguised as police officers were holding dozens of policemen and civilians hostage. Rebecca Santana, *Gunmen kill 4 in hostage standoff in western Iraq*, AP, 3 October 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5inqDP7a4OFZqKiNNbh4QIMLWfmUQ?docId=aa20d787197b4439b9f700fc952e26a4>.
- On 20 September 2011, three suicide bombers struck an Al-Anbar provincial government complex in Ramadi, which houses the municipal council, the office of the provincial governor and the police department, killing four people and wounding at least 15 others; Fadhel Al-Badrani, *Bombers kill 4 at govt centre in Iraq's Anbar*, 20 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-kill-4-at-govt-centre-in-iraqs-anbar/>.
- On 25 August 2011, a car bomb at the Garma district police station killed five police officers, wounded six others and almost leveled the building; Annie Gowen, *Series of bomb attacks in Anbar Province kill 15*, Washington Post, 25 August 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/suicide-bomber-kills-7-policemen-in-iraqi-city/2011/08/25/gIQA3rz3cJ_story.html.
- 21 June 2011, a police bomb squad defused a car bomb a few hundred meters from local government buildings in Ramadi, but a second car bomb nearby exploded as police attempted to deactivate it, wounding one officer; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 21*, 21 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-21/>.
- On 2 June 2011, at least nine people were killed and more than a dozen injured when four bombs exploded in quick succession in Ramadi. Two bombs exploded near the eastern gate of a local government compound that hosts the governor's office, police command and several other security directorates. Another bomb exploded near the Ramadi hospital where military and civilian rescuers were rushing to bring the victims for treatment; Aljazeera, *Deaths as multiple blasts rock western Iraq*, 2 June 2011, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/06/201162193045114913.html>.
- On 3 March 2011, a suicide bomber killed at least 10 people, including eight soldiers, and wounded 26, when he blew himself up among soldiers that were collecting their paychecks at a branch of the state-owned Rafidain bank in Haditha; Reuters, *Suicide bomber kills 10, wounds 26 in Iraq-sources*, 3 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-10-wounds-26-in-iraq-sources/>.
- On 27 December 2010, twin suicide bombings rocked a local government compound in Ramadi, which houses the Al-Anbar Provincial Council and the police headquarters, killing 17 people and wounding 47 others, many of them police officers; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Twin suicide bombings kill 17 in Iraqi city*, 27 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/twin-suicide-bombings-kill-17-in-iraqi-city/>.
- On 12 December 2010, a suicide car bomb targeting the governmental compound in Ramadi killed at least 13 and wounded 41; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Car bomb kills 13 and wounds dozens in Iraq's Ramadi*, Reuters, 12 December 2010, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/12/12/us-iraq-violence-idUKTRE6BB0D120101212>.
- On 4 July 2010, a female suicide bomber blew herself up at the entrance to the provincial government's compound in Ramadi, killing at least four and wounding 23; AFP, *Four die in Iraq attack by female suicide bomber*, 4 July 2010, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/displayarticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2010/July/middleeast_July63.xml§ion=middleeast&col=.
- On 18 February 2010, a suicide bomber killed at least 13 people and wounded two dozen when he exploded himself at an entrance to the governmental compound in Ramadi, which includes the Al-Anbar Provincial Council, the governor's office and the police headquarters; Al-Arabiya, *Suicide bomber kills 13 in Iraq's Anbar province*, 18 February 2010, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/02/18/100705.html>.
- On 13 January 2010, a water truck loaded with explosives was detonated inside a local government compound in Saqlawiya, which includes the municipal council and police station, killing seven persons and wounding six; Mohammed Hussein and Timothy Williams, *Suicide Attack Kills 7 in Iraq Inside Government Compound*, New York Times, 13 January 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/middleeast/14iraq.html>.

¹¹⁸⁵ For example, reported attacks against civilian targets in 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 7 March 2012, at least four civilians were injured after a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the Abdullah Bin Mubarak Mosque in central Hit; Anwar Ibrahim, *At least four injured in Anbar suicide bombing*, AKnews, 7 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294353/>.
- On 22 February 2012, a suicide bomber riding a motorbike drove into a café in Ramadi city, killing one and injuring three others; Ali Al-Qaisi, *Suicide bomber kills one and injures three others in Ramadi*, AKnews, 22 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291637/>. The same day, a motorcycle bomb exploded in a car park in Ramadi, causing only damage to parked cars. The authorities imposed a bicycle and motorcycle ban in Ramadi; NINA, *Ban on motorcycles, bicycles in Ramadi*, 22 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKGFJF.

- On 15 December 2011, two bombs attached to bicycles blew up in succession near a school, killing two people and wounding three others in central Ramadi; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 15*, 15 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-15>.
- On 8 August 2011, three IED exploded at the beginning of a popular soccer tournament inside and close to the Abu-Risha Sports Stadium in Ramadi, killing two and wounding seven persons, including the Al-Anbar Governor's Advisor for Sports Affairs, Sadiq Jamil; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sport Stadium's blast toll up to 2 dead, 7 injured*, 7 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144145&l=1.
- On 3 August 2011, two bombs exploded just minutes apart in Ramadi, killing at least seven people and wounding eight more; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 3*, 3 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-3/>.
- On 7 July 2011, a parked car bomb detonated near a primary school in Fallujah, wounding 10 civilians; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 8*, 8 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-8/>.
- On 11 April 2011, two bombs detonated near a crowded market in central Fallujah and killed up to six people and wounded 25; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 11*, 11 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-11>.
- On 24 February 2011, a suicide bomber blew himself up during a commemoration ceremony at the occasion of Prophet Mohammad's birthday in a cultural centre in Ramadi, killing at least 15 people, including a journalist for Al-Ijtihad satellite channel, and wounding 21 others, including Al-Anbar Deputy Governor Hikmet Khalaf; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Suicide bomber kills 15 in Iraq*, 24 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-15-in-iraq/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Journalist killed in Ramadi blast*, 24 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141159&l=1.
- On 3 February 2011, three bombs killed at least six persons and wounded at least 12 others in different areas in Ramadi. Other sources put the death toll at eight with around 22 people wounded; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Suicide bomber kills 15 in Iraq*, 24 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bomber-kills-15-in-iraq/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 3*, 3 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-3/>.
- ¹¹⁸⁶ The ISF see frequent attacks on their convoys and checkpoints. Recent reported incidents included,
 - On 5 March 2012, dozens of alleged AQI fighters, some wearing army uniforms, shot dead 27 policemen when they attacked checkpoints and the homes of two officers in Haditha; Fadhel al-Badrani, *Gunmen kill 27 in raids on west Iraq checkpoints*, Reuters, 5 March 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-27-in-raids-on-west-iraq-checkpoints/>; Jack Healy, *Gunmen in Uniforms Kill 20 Police Officers in Iraq*, New York Times, 5 March 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/middleeast/police-killed-in-iraq.html>.
 - On 7 January 2012, gunmen opened fire on a police checkpoint and killed three people, including two policemen, in central Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>.
 - On 14 September 2011, a bomb exploded inside a bus carrying Iraqi soldiers to a restaurant at Camp Habbaniya, a military base east of Ramadi, killing six soldiers and wounding 10; Yasir Ghazi, *Terrorists Kill More Than 20 Across Iraq*, New York Times, 14 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html>.
 - On 6 September 2011, gunmen dressed in military uniform set up an ambush in Haditha, opening fire on an Iraqi Army patrol, killing an officer and seven soldiers and injuring one soldier; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: 8 soldiers, including officer, killed in Anbar*, 9 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144673&l=1.
 - On 29 August 2011, a parked car bomb targeting an Iraqi army patrol went off in the centre of Fallujah and wounded seven soldiers and nine civilians sitting in a nearby café; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 29*, 29 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-29/>.
 - On 24 August 2011, a booby-trapped car driven by a suicide bomber exploded against a police checkpoint east of Ramadi, killing seven policemen and wounding three others and two civilians; Aswat al-Iraq, *Seven policemen killed, 3 others, 2 civilians injured in Ramadi*, 25 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144487&l=1.
 - On 16 August 2011, two sticky bombs blew up under police cars in Rawa, wounding six policemen; Aswat al-Iraq, *6 Anbar cops wounded in blasts*, 16 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144342&l=1.
- ¹¹⁸⁷ See chapter "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".
- ¹¹⁸⁸ See chapter "Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders".
- ¹¹⁸⁹ See chapter "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".
- ¹¹⁹⁰ For example, reports of apparently coordinated attacks on houses of ISF members included:
 - On 15 March 2011, gunmen detonated three bombs in front of three houses belonging to policemen and wounded two girls and a policeman in southern and central Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 15*, 15 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-15/>.
 - On 7 June 2010, a series of organized attacks on the homes of police officers in Fallujah, Garma, Annaz and Hit, killed four persons, including two officers, and wounded at least 20; Timothy Williams and Zaid Thaker, *Bombs Explode Outside Homes of Iraqi Police Officers, Killing 4*, New York Times, 7 June 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08iraq.html?ref=middleeast>.
 - On 24 May 2010, two bombs targeting the house of a senior police officer killed his guard and wounded four members of his family in central Ramadi. Two separate bomb blasts targeted the homes of two police officers in central Ramadi, causing no casualties; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, May 24*, 24 May 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE64N0RX>.
 - On 26 April 2010, four roadside bombs planted around the house of a policeman in Ramadi exploded before daybreak, killing him and wounding three others; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, April 26*, 26 April 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE63P07P>.
 - On 23 April 2010, nine persons were killed and dozens more were wounded after bombs were detonated at the homes of police officers and a judge in Khaldiyah; BBC, *Dozens killed in Baghdad in 'revenge al-Qaeda attacks'*, 23 April 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8639223.stm.
- ¹¹⁹¹ Reported attacks on government officials and employees in 2011 and 2012 included for example,
 - On 20 March 2012, a car bomb parked near the Faculty of Agriculture in Ramadi detonated as the Al-Anbar Governor's convoy passed by. The Governor Qassim Mohammed remained unharmed, but one civilian was killed and another one wounded; NINA, *Breaking news . Anbar governor survives from assassination attempt*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIFDD.

- On 11 January 2012, two gunmen on a motorcycle killed Mayor Saeed Hamdan as he left a mosque after evening prayers in the town of Hit; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 11*, 11 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-11/>.
- On 25 September 2011, a bomb planted inside the house of a government employee killed his wife and wounded two of his daughters in Khaldiyah. Another bomb near the house went off when a police patrol arrived at the scene, killing one policeman and wounding four; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 25*, 25 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-25/>.
- On 15 September 2011, the Chairman of the Kerbala Provincial Council, Mohammed Hamead Al-Moussawi, escaped an assassination attempt when on a visit to Al-Nukhaib where gunmen had executed 22 Shi'ite pilgrims on their way from Syria through Al-Anbar to Kerbala; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: Chairman of Karbala Province escapes assassination attempt in Nukheib township*, 15 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144850&l=1.
- On 23 August 2011, a magnetic bomb attached to the car of Nofal Al-Hity, a Hit municipal council member, detonated in the town of Hit, killing him and his son and seriously wounding a third person; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 23*, 23 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-23/>.
- On 8 March 2011, gunmen using guns with silencers killed the son of a Provincial Council member in central Fallujah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen kill young man in Anbar*, 8 March 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141363&l=1.
- On 17 January 2011, a suicide bomber in a car targeted the convoy of Al-Anbar Governor Qassim Mohammed in central Ramadi, killing one of his bodyguards and wounding five people. The Governor survived unharmed; Reuters, *Suicide bombers target governor of Iraq province*, 17 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/suicide-bombers-target-governor-of-iraq-province/>.

Since 2003, Al-Anbar has seen five provincial governors, all of whom worked under tremendous pressure due to persistent threats and attacks against their lives and the lives of their families. The first governor resigned in July 2004 after the kidnapping of four of his children. An interim governor then replaced him until the newly elected Provincial Council appointed Raja Nawaf Farhan Al-Mahalawi as governor in January 2005. Al-Mahalawi was kidnapped and killed by insurgents only five months later. He was succeeded by Maamoun Sami Rashid Al-Awani, who survived more than two dozen assassination attempts but completed his term. He was replaced by the current governor, Qassim Mohammad Abid Hammadi Al-Fahadawi after the January 2009 provincial elections, who so far has survived at least four attempts on his life, including a massive bombing in December 2009 that severely injured him and another car bombing on 17 January 2011; SIGIR, *Quarterly reports to Congress – Focus on Anbar*, April 2011, p. 6, http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/April2011/Anbar_April_2011.pdf.

¹¹⁹² For example, reported attacks on party officials included:

- On 16 December 2011, two policemen were wounded when gunmen in a speedy car threw a hand grenade at the IIP office in central Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 16*, 16 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-16/>.
- On 27 August 2011, gunmen shot and killed Flaih Hamad Saadoun and Saleh Ibrahim Amadan and wounded Flaih Naif Hamad, three provincial Islamic Party leaders, at a fake checkpoint on the main road in the town of Amriyat Al-Fallujah; Xinhua, *Six people killed in Iraq's violence*, 27 August 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-08/27/c_131078816.htm; NINA, *Gunmen kill two Islamic Party member a third injured in Fallujah*, 27 August, 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHLJFF.
- On 23 August 2011, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, Secretary-General of the Iraqi Sahwa Conference Movement and leader in Iraq's Unity Coalition, survived unharmed an assassination attempt when an IED blasted targeted his convoy on the highway between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib; NINA, *BREAKING NEWS Abu Risha survives an assassination attempt*, 23 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHLFDJ.
- On 11 July 2011, Ahmed Awad Al-Qubeisy, a candidate for the post of the Mayor of Rutba, was found beheaded along with his two brothers, near Rutba; Aswat al-Iraq, *3 murdered brothers found in Anbar*, 11 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143702&l=1.
- On 5 June 2010, a bomb killed Ehab Al-Ani, director of Al-Obaidi Hospital in Al-Qaim, inside his clinic. The initial investigation indicated that Al-Ani was specifically targeted because of his ties to Iraqiyya; Adam Schreck, *2 candidates from Iraq's Sunni-backed party killed*, AP, 6 June 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSPBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9G5B6L01; Aswat al-Iraq, *Another Allawi bloc member killed Saturday*, 5 June 2010, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=132768&l=1.
- On 28 March 2010, Ghanim Al-Karbooli, candidate for Iraqiyya, was killed when his house in Al-Qaim was booby-trapped and blown up. His brother and a female member of the family were also killed, and six other family members were injured. As the neighbours came running to the house, another bomb went off, killing three and injuring ten of the neighbours. A few minutes later, another bomb went off nearby, causing no casualties. The final causality count included six killed and 16 injured; Sahar Issa, *Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Sunday 28 March, 2010*, McClatchy Newspapers, 28 March 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/28/91211/round-up-of-daily-violence-in.html>.
- On 28 February 2010, a car bomb targeting the convoy of Sunni parliamentary candidate Ashur Hamid Al-Karbouli killed two people, including a campaign worker, and wounded four in the town of Khaldiyah. Al-Karbouli was not in the convoy; AP, *Fatal car bomb targets Iraqi election convoy*, 28 February 2010, <http://www.torontosun.com/news/world/2010/02/28/13057751-ap.html>.

¹¹⁹³ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 20 March 2012, gunmen opened fire at tribal chief Sheikh Najih Abbas al-Rawi while he was driving his car through Qaim district (Al-Anbar); NINA, *Tribal chief killed in western Anbar*, 20 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIGDL.
- On 20 February 2012, gunmen stormed a house, dragged out a tribal leader and killed him in the southern outskirts of Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 20*, 20 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-20/>.
- On 11 February 2012, an IED planted on the roadside in Garma District (Al-Anbar) exploded when Najm Mustafa Al-Awisi, sheikh of Al-Awisat tribe, was passing by in his car, killing him, his wife and brother; NINA, *Tribal sheikh, wife, brother, killed by IED eastern Anbar*, 11 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEIGI.
- On 1 December 2011, police found the beheaded body of Sheikh Thalaj Zaalan on the western outskirts of Haditha (Al-Anbar). He had been kidnapped one day earlier from his house; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 1*, 1 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-1/>.
- On 2 June 2011, gunmen in a car opened fire and killed Sheikh Hamid Sarhan near his home in Fallujah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 2*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-2/>.

- On 16 February 2011, gunmen dressed in military uniform attacked the house of Sheikh Ali Dayih, the leader of the Albu-Fahad tribe, in Habbaniya, instantly killing him and his brother. Reportedly, Sheikh Dayih was fighting AQI in recent years; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal Chieftain, his brother, killed in Anbar Province*, 16 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141012&l=1.
 - On 5 February 2011, an IED went off near a funerary procession of a local resident of Fallujah, leaving Hamid Al-Halbousi, the chief of Al-Halabsa clan in Al-Anbar Governorate, and two others tribal chiefs wounded; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal chief killed, 2 wounded in Falluja blast*, 5 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140855&l=1.
 - On 28 March 2010, five people were killed and 33 injured in a bomb attack targeting a tribal leader's house. The tribal leader, named as Sheikh Turki Hamad Mikhlif, had been involved in fighting AQI in Al-Anbar; BBC, *Iraq blasts target Anbar tribal leader's house*, 28 March 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8591546.stm>.
- ¹¹⁹⁴ A high number of religious scholars and mosque imams have reportedly been targeted for assassination in 2010 and 2011. In August 2010, the Al-Anbar authorities reportedly introduced security measures to protect religious figures from being targeted, including by providing licenses to carry light weapons; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tight security measures to protect scholars, imams in Anbar*, 5 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=135287&l=1. Reported attacks in 2011 and 2012 included for example,
- On 26 January 2012, Sheikh Qutadeh Mansour, preacher of Ali Bin Abi Talib Mosque in Heet, was killed when an improvised explosive device went off against his car; NINA, *Karmeh Sahwa commander, Heet's Mosque preacher assassinated*, 26 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJMGKF.
 - On 11 July 2011, police said they found the bodies of a Sunni cleric and his brother, who were kidnapped ten days earlier, with gunshot wounds to the heads and chests, in Rutba; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 11*, 11 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-11/>; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 3*, 3 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-3/>.
 - On 1 March 2011, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest near a mosque imam after the evening prayer, killing one civilian and severely wounding the cleric and two others in Ramadi; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 2*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-2/>.
 - On 4 February 2011, gunmen blew up the home of an Anbar University professor and cleric who criticized AQI during prayers the week before. The cleric was not at the house, in an area south of Fallujah, but two of his sons were wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 4*, 4 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
 - On 24 January 2011, Ali Mohammed Al-Alwani, imam of Al-Tawfiq mosque, was shot dead by gunmen riding a motorbike in Fallujah; Alsumaria TV, *Iraq mosque muezzin killed in armed attack*, 25 January 2011, <http://www.alsumaria.tv/en/print-news-1-59434.html>.
 - On 2 July 2010, gunmen opened fire from guns with silencers on Sheikh Saadi, the imam of Al-Salam Mosque in Ramadi, killing him instantly. The sheikh was the brother of the Mufti of Iraq, Sheikh Abdelmalek Al-Saadi; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen shoot dead Mufti's brother in Ramadi*, 2 July 2010, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=134010&l=1.
- ¹¹⁹⁵ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 19 February 2012, police found the burned body of criminal court judge Abdelrizak Al-Qubaisi in his house in Al-Qaim; AFP, *Suicide bomber kills 15 at Baghdad police academy*, 20 February 2012, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/region/suicide-bomber-kills-15-at-baghdad-police-academy-2012-02-20-1.443926>.
 - On 1 January 2012, an unknown gunman broke into a lawyer's house in central Fallujah and stabbed him to death; NINA, *Lawyer stabbed to death in Falluja*, 1 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJJJDL.
 - On 24 July 2011, gunmen attacked the house of an assistant doctor, opened fire and killed him on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Assistant doctor killed in his Falluja house, west Iraq*, 24 July 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143910&l=1.
 - On 9 April 2011, an IED stuck to a teacher's car, exploded in central Fallujah, killing him on the spot and wounding two policemen; Aswat al-Iraq, *Teacher killed, 2 policemen injured in Falluja IED blast*, 9 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141877&l=1.
 - On 25 March 2011, gunmen planted several IEDs around the house of Majid Hameed, Al Arabiya correspondent, in Al-Anbar Governorate, and detonated it, causing no casualties; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen blow up Arabiya channel correspondent's house in Anbar*, 25 March 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141628&l=1.
 - On 4 February 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Professor Khamis Daham, specialized in Islamic Science, in Al-Bu Hawaa region in southern Fallujah, and opened fire on the family inside, injuring two of his sons before blowing up the house; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen wound 2 brothers, detonate 2 houses in Falluja*, 4 February 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140835&l=1.
 - On 7 July 2010, a reporter for al-Iraqiya state-run TV station in Al-Anbar survived an armed attack when gunmen opened fire on his house in Ramadi. He had reportedly received death threats from AQI; Aswat al-Iraq, *TV reporter in Ramadi survives armed attack*, 7 July 2010, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=134174&l=1.
 - On 5 June 2010, a magnetic bomb attached to the car of Shihab Ahmed Salah, the head of Al-Ubaidi Hospital, seriously wounded him in Al-Qaim; Reuters, *Factbox - Security developments in Iraq, 6 June*, 6 June 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/KAM622133.htm>.
 - In June 2010, the hospital in Al-Qaim was reportedly closed for several weeks after receiving threats against doctors and medical personnel. Aswat al-Iraq, *Hospital closed in Qaim due to gunmen's threats*, 23 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=133591&l=1.
 - In June 2010, gunmen attacked a medical compound in central Heit, killing one police officer and wounding two passers-by Aswat al-Iraq, *Officer, gunman killed in attack on medical compound in Anbar*, 30 June 2010, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=133924&l=1.
 - On 8 May 2010, gunmen searched the home of Khaled Quraghuli, a journalist with Al-Anbar and a professor at the University of Al-Anbar, in Ramadi, hitting him and firing several shots before departing; Aswat al-Iraq, *Gunmen kill student, injure civilian in Mosul*, 10 May 2010, <http://en.aswatiraq.info/?p=131490>.
 - On 23 April 2010, the house of a lawyer was bombed in Khaldiyah; Jane Arraf, *Bomb attacks kill 50, wound almost 200 In Iraq*, CS Monitor, 23 April 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/23/92778/bomb-attacks-kill-50-wound-almost.html>.
 - On 7 January 2010, a bomb exploded in the home of a lawyer in Heit, killing him; Hamid Ahmed, *Blasts Kill 6 in Iraq's Western Anbar Province*, AP, 7 January 2010, reported in USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2010-01-07-iraq-violence_N.htm.
- ¹¹⁹⁶ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 16 February 2011, gunmen dressed in military uniforms attacked the house of Sheikh Ali Dayih, the leader of the Albu-Fahad tribe, in Habbaniya, instantly killing him and his brother. Reportedly, Sheikh Dayih was fighting AQI in recent years; Aswat al-Iraq, *Tribal Chieftain, his brother, killed in Anbar Province*, 16 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141012&l=1.
 - On 4 February 2011, gunmen blew up the home of an Anbar University professor and cleric who criticized AQI during prayers the week before. The cleric was not in the house at the time of the incident, in the area south of Fallujah, but two of his sons were wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 4*, 4 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4/>.
 - On 7 July 2010, a reporter for al-Iraqiya state-run TV station in Al-Anbar survived an armed attack when gunmen opened fire on his house in Ramadi. He had reportedly received death threats from AQI; Aswat al-Iraq, *TV reporter in Ramadi survives armed attack*, 7 July 2010, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=134174&l=1.
 - On 28 March 2010, five people were killed and 33 more were injured in a bomb attack targeting a tribal leader's house. The tribal leader, named as Sheikh Turki Hamad Mikhlif, has been involved in fighting AQI in the Al-Anbar; BBC, *Iraq blasts target Anbar tribal leader's house*, 28 March 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8591546.stm>.
- ¹¹⁹⁷ See "Shi'ite civilians, including pilgrims".
- ¹¹⁹⁸ See "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)", "Members of Political Parties", "Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams" and "Actors of Violence".
- ¹¹⁹⁹ Including in Babel, Basrah, Diwaniyah, Thi-Qar and Muthanna; see "Sunni and Shi'ite Scholars and Mosque Imams".
- ¹²⁰⁰ For example, reported attacks on the ISF in Babel in 2011 and 2012 included:
- On 11 February 2012, a car bomb went off targeting the convoy of a police station chief, wounding him and at least three other policemen in Mahaweel (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 11*, 11 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-11/>.
 - On 18 November 2011, a parked car bomb targeting an Iraqi police patrol exploded, killing two people and wounding seven others in Mahmudiyah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 18*, 18 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-18>.
 - On 14 September 2011, a car bomb parked outside a restaurant in the town of Al-Shumali near Hilla exploded as local police were eating breakfast inside, killing 15 people and wounding 41 others, including women and children; AP, *Bomb kills 17 at Shiite funeral south of Baghdad*, 30 September 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-30/iraq-blast/50615894/1>.
 - On 15 August 2011, as part of coordinated attacks across the country, a booby-trapped car, parked on the main roadside in Iskandariyah, exploded, killing two civilians and wounding two others, including a policeman. In a separate incident, four policemen were killed and four others were injured when a mortar shell hit a police checkpoint in Mussayib; Aswat al-Iraq, *Four cops killed, 4 others injured in mortar shell attack in Musayyab, Babel Province*, 16 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144320&l=1.
 - On 5 May 2011, a suicide bomber rammed his car into the entrance of a police headquarters in Hilla during a shift change in the morning, killing at least 20 and wounding 80 others. The US government said that Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali Al-Badri (aka as Abu Du'a), the alleged AQI leader, was responsible for the attack; AP, *US puts al-Qaida in Iraq leader on terrorist blacklist, offers \$10 million bounty*, 4 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-puts-al-qaida-in-iraq-leader-on-terrorist-blacklist-offers-10-million-bounty/2011/10/04/gIQA1W5qKL_story.html.
- ¹²⁰¹ Babel Governorate sees regular attacks, often in places where civilians gather such as mosques, restaurants or markets. Recent reported incidents included:
- On 20 March 2012, as part of a string of apparently coordinated attacks across Iraq, a bomb detonated near a popular cafe in Hilla, killing seven people and wounding more than 30 others; NINA, *Casualties number of Hilla explosion up to 7 dead*, 21 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VO=FKIGLI.
 - On 19 March 2012, three persons were wounded when gunmen attacked a cafe in Musayyib with machine guns and handgrenades; NINA, *3 Wounded in attack north of Hilla*, 19 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VO=FKIEFL.
 - On 16 January 2012, a car bomb blew up while the bomber was driving it, killing at least three people and wounding another 18, in central Hilla; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 16*, 16 January 2012, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-16>.
 - On 12 January 2012, a roadside bomb exploded near Shi'ite pilgrims and wounded four of them in the town of Latifiyah. The same day, a car bomb exploded near a vegetable market, killing one person and wounding 12 others, including Shi'ite pilgrims, in the town of Kifl, a police source said. Another police source put the toll at 10 people wounded and said a bomb had been placed inside a car. Also, a roadside bomb detonated near a vehicle, wounding five, in the town of Jbela. It was not clear whether the victims were pilgrims; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 12*, 12 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-12/>.
 - On 8 January 2012, a bomb placed inside a car wounded at least 13 Shi'ite pilgrims when it exploded near the town of Mussayab; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 8*, 8 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-8/>. The same day, a sticky bomb attached to a bus carrying Afghan pilgrims blew up and wounded nine people in northern Hilla; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 9*, 9 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-9>.
 - On 7 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims killed at least two people and wounded 20 others in the town of Mahmudiyah; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 7*, 7 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-7>.
 - On 30 September 2011, a car bomb exploded near a mosque outside the town of Hilla as mourners gathered for the funeral of a prominent tribal sheikh, killing at least 17 people and wounding 70 others; Raheem Salman, *Iraq car bomb kills 17 at funeral near Hillah*, Los Angeles Times, 1 October 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-iraq-bombing-20111001>.
 - On 22 September 2011, a car bomb exploded outside a restaurant near a Shi'ite mosque in the town of Al-Iskandariyah, killing four people and wounding 17 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *Four killed, 17 injured in Babel blast*, 23 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144980&l=1; Saad Abdul-Kadir, *Officials: Bomb kills 2 near Iraq mosque*, AP, 22 September 2011, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/09/22/general-ml-iraq_8695108.html.
 - On 16 September 2011, eight persons were wounded when a car bomb exploded near the Governor's convoy north of Hilla; Aswat al-Iraq, *Hilla toll reaches 8 injuries - official*, 16 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144873&l=1.

- On 14 September 2011, a car bomb parked outside a restaurant in the town of Al-Shumali near Hilla exploded as local police were eating breakfast inside, killing 15 people and wounding 41 others; AP, *Bomb kills 17 at Shiite funeral south of Baghdad*, 30 September 2011, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-09-30/iraq-blast/50615894/1>.

¹²⁰² For example, reported incidents included:

- On 15 February 2012, gunmen wearing army uniforms attacked a policeman's house using grenades and machineguns, killing his wife and two daughters and seriously wounding him in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb 15*, 15 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-15/>.
- On 11 February 2012, a car bomb exploded targeting the convoy of a police station chief, wounding him and at least three other policemen in Mahaweel; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 11*, 11 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-11/>.
- On 18 August 2011, Lieutenant Yaser Saleem Witwit, a criminal investigation police officer, escaped an assassination attempt when gunmen opened fire at him from a speeding car in front of his house in Hilla; NINA, *Babil's criminal investigation officer escaped assassination*, 18 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHKJFE.
- On 8 August 2011, a bomb planted inside a policeman's house in Haswa wounded four of his family members. The policeman was not around at the time of the blast; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 8*, 8 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-8/>.
- On 4 July 2011, two roadside bombs planted in front of a policeman's house exploded in Haswa, killing the homeowner and wounding two other policemen. Gunmen also shot dead a policeman near his house in the town of Mussayib; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>.
- On 5 March 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of an off-duty policeman killed him and another person in Iskandariyah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 5*, 5 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-5/>.

¹²⁰³ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 29 November 2011, a sticky bomb attached to the car of a Sahwa leader exploded, seriously wounding him, in the town of Mahmudiyah (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, November 29*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-29/>.
- On 26 October 2011, a Sahwa member was killed and two others were injured when an IED targeting their vehicle exploded in Iskandariyah; wat al-Iraq, *Sahwa (Awakening) element killed, 2 others injured in Babel*, 26 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145415&l=1.
- On 15 August 2011, gunmen dressed in military uniforms executed four Sahwa members and wounded three others after dragging them out of Al-Tawab mosque in the town of Sayafiya. Reportedly, a note was left near the bodies claiming it was from ISI; Reuters, *Gunmen kill four Sunni fighters near Baghdad*, 16 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/gunmen-kill-four-sunni-fighters-near-baghdad/>.
- On 12 July 2011, a roadside bomb wounded a Sahwa member in central Mussayib; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 12*, 12 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-12/>.
- On 8 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car killed two Sahwa members in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 8*, 8 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-8/>.
- On 4 July 2011, a bomb exploded at a farm belonging to a Sahwa member and wounded him in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 5*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-5/>.
- On 12 June 2011, gunmen killed a Sahwa leader and his wife near Hilla; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 13*, 13 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-12/>.
- On 5 June 2011, gunmen killed a Sahwa member in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 5*, 5 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-5/>.
- On 31 May 2011, gunmen in a car opened fire at a local Sahwa leader, killing him and wounding his bodyguard in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, June 1*, 1 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-1/>.
- On 4 April 2011, five Sahwa members were killed when a bomb exploded outside the town of Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 4*, 4 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-4/>.
- On 19 March 2011, a Sahwa member was shot and killed in front of his house in Iskandariyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Sahwa fighter killed in Babel*, 19 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141539&l=1.
- On 18 March 2011, gunmen stormed a house and killed two brothers belonging to the Sahwa in Jurf Al-Sakhr; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, March 19*, 19 March 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-march-19/>.
- On 25 February 2011, gunmen opened fire at a Sahwa-manned checkpoint, killing two militia members and wounding another in northern Hilla; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 25*, 25 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-25/>.

¹²⁰⁴ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 6 March 2012, a homemade bomb detonated inside the office of the head of the city council of Mahmoudiyah, injuring two of his bodyguards; Raman Brosk, *Security tightened in Baghdad after three bombings*, AKNews, 6 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/294217/>.
- On 18 January 2012, gunmen stormed the house of Sabbar Mohammed, the mayor of Albausaj village in Latifiyah District, killing him and three of his children, and wounding a fourth, who is a Sahwa member; NINA, *Mukhtar of a village killed with three of his sons by gunmen near Latifiya area south of Baghdad*, 18 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJKMKG.
- On 15 December 2011, masked gunmen kidnapped a local mayor and his son, killing the father, in Jurf Al-Sakhr (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 15*, 15 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-15/>.
- On 16 September 2011, armed men launched an attack on the house of a Babel Provincial Council member and wounded two bodyguards in Jbela. The same day, eight persons were wounded when a car bomb exploded near the Governor's convoy north of Hilla; Aswat al-Iraq, *Hilla toll reaches 8 injuries - official*, 16 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144873&l=1.

- On 10 September 2011, gunmen shot dead a government employee when they raided his house in Mussayib; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 11*, 11 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-11/>.
 - On 26 August 2011, a member of a local council and two of his family members were killed and a fourth was injured, in an armed attack on their car in Iskandariyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three persons killed, 4th injured from single family in Babel*, 27 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144517&l=1.
 - On 9 July 2011, gunmen in a speeding car shot dead the son of a local mayor in Mussayib; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 10*, 10 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-10/>.
 - On 19 April 2011, in central Mussayib, Jawad Al-Jiboury, a member of the Council of Representatives belonging to Al-Ahrrar bloc, escaped unharmed when a roadside bomb exploded near his convoy; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 19*, 19 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-19/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi legislature escapes assassination attempt*, 19 April 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142070&l=1.
- ¹²⁰⁵ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 29 May 2011, two guards were injured in two successive explosions targeting the ISCI headquarters in Hilla; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two persons injured in 2 blasts against the Supreme Islamic Council's HQ in Hilla*, west Iraq, 29 May 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142816&l=1.
 - On 16 May 2011, a bomb placed inside the headquarters of the Fadhila Party in Iskandariyah killed two guards; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two killed in bomb blast in Hilla*, 16 May 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142579&l=1.
 - On 24 December 2010, suspected AQI militants bombed the home of Mohammed Al-Karafi, a follower of Muqtada Al-Sadr, killing him as well as his wife, his two sons and his nephew, in Haswa. Four other people in the home were also wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, December 24*, 24 December 2010, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-dec-24/>.
- ¹²⁰⁶ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 19 March 2012, a judge in the Ministry of Interior, Qais Jiad, was killed when a bomb attached to his car exploded in Jurf Al-Sakhr; NINA, *Judge killed by AED explosion northwest Babel*, 19 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIDLG.
 - On 27 February 2012, gunmen attacked a University of Dijlah professor's home in Musayyab, injuring two; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 27 February 2012.
 - On 15 December 2011, a security source said that police has registered the kidnapping of a University professor from Babel; NINA, *University professor disappeared in Babil*, 15 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJGEKL.
 - On 16 September 2011, the home of journalist Faris Abbas Al-Samawi was attacked with gunfire in Hilla, resulting in the wounding of his teenage daughter; Aswat al-Iraq, *Attack on journalist's house denounced*, 18 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144916&l=1.
 - On 8 April 2011, gunmen shot dead Taha Hamad Jaafar, Director of the Al-Masar television channel, and Abid Farhan, an official with a political prisoner advocacy group, in an attack on their vehicle in the town of Mahmudiyah; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, April 8*, 8 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-8/>.
- ¹²⁰⁷ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 19 February 2012, ISF foiled a bomb attack on Ayad Shareef, the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Babel; Yousef al-Babili, *Babil bomb attack attempt on Shiite cleric's representative thwarted*, AKNews, 20 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/291100/>.
 - On 25 October 2011, Sheikh Safa Jasim, a Sistani representative survived with injuries an attack against his home north of Hilla (Babel); his wife and son were killed and three other sons were wounded in the attack; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, October 26*, 26 October 2011, <http://m.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-october-26>.
 - On 6 October 2011, another Sistani representative, Sheikh Karim Al-Khalidi, was shot in his chest and seriously wounded when on his way home from prayer in the town of Al-Qassim (Babel); AFP, *Gunmen wound top Shiite cleric's aide*, 7 October 2011, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/76342/gunmen-wound-top-shiite-clerics-aide>
- ¹²⁰⁸ Reported attacks included:
- On 15 August 2011, a roadside bomb followed by a car bomb targeting police near a busy downtown market of Kut killed 40 people and wounded 68 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *108 killed, injured, in final result of Kut's Monday blast*, 17 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144347&l=1.
 - On 3 and 25 August 2010, two attacks in Kut killed 12 and 26 people, respectively; Reuters, *Death toll in Iraq's Kut bomb rises to 26*, 25 August 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE6700M820100825>; BBC, *Dozens killed in wave of bombings across Iraq*, 25 August 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11081603>; Reuters, *Explosions kill 12, wound 55 in Iraqi city of Kut*, 3 August 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE672118.htm>.
 - On 10 May 2010, a coordinated series of suicide bombings and assassinations across the country were reported, included two bombings in a market in Suwayra that killed 16 civilians and injured more than 80 others; Rebecca Santana and Lara Jakes, *In Iraq's bloodiest day of 2010, attacks kill 100, AP, 11 May 2010*, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9FK8S480; The Times, *102 dead as bombers fill power vacuum caused by Iraqi election*, 11 May 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article7122359.ece>.
- ¹²⁰⁹ For example, reported incidents included:
- On 10 February 2012, police dismantled a car bomb and arrested its driver in Suwayra district. Reportedly, the bomb was to be used against civilians in the town's commercial district; NINA, *Car bomb dismantled north of Kut*, 10 February 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKEHED.
 - On 25 October 2011, a car bomb prepared to explode in a residential area in Kut was defused by ISF; NINA, *Wasit police defuse a car bomb*, 25 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIJKGF.
 - On 12 October 2011, the Iraqi Army dismantled a car bomb in Hay; Aswat al-Iraq, *Car bomb dismantled in Kut*, 12 October 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145236&l=1.
 - On 30 September 2011, the ISF foiled an attempt to blow up a passenger bus by a sticky bomb in central Kut; Aswat al-Iraq, *Attempt to blow up passenger car in Kut foiled*, 30 September 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145089&l=1.

- On 5 September 2011, ISF found four bombs ready to be detonated and successfully dismantled them in Nu'amaniyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *4 bombs dismantled in Wassit*, 5 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144667&l=1.
- On 17 March 2011, police seized a car bomb in northern Kut; Aswat al-Iraq, *Car bomb seized in Kut*, 17 March 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141516&l=1.
- On 22 February 2011, ISF foiled an attempt to blow up an Iraqi Army Camp in Nu'amaniyah with a military bus loaded with explosives; Aswat al-Iraq, *Attempt to blow up army camp north of Kut foiled*, 22 February 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141120&l=1.
- On 18 January 2011, the ISF dismantled two Katyusha rockets that were reportedly aimed at a Kut residential area; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two Katyusha rockets, ready for launching, dismantled in Wassit*, 28 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140745&l=1.

¹²¹⁰ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 3 March 2012, the wife of the former Director of Wassit's Electricity Department, Hashem Ali Jaafar, died of wounds sustained during an armed attack on their house last month, during which three women and a child were wounded by a sharp knife; Aswat al-Iraq, *Local official's wife dies of wounds sustained in armed attack in Kut*, 3 March 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(1vaq345qmdcm045oqydqryt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147232&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(1vaq345qmdcm045oqydqryt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147232&l=1).
- On 14 February 2012, gunmen attacked an Iraqi army officer in the rank of captain with guns equipped with silencers in Suwayra. He survived with severe injuries; Nabil al-Shayib, *Army official survives assassination attempt*, AKNews, 14 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/290018/>.
- On 19 January 2012, an IED planted in front of the house of Ahmed Hussein, a member of Ahrar bloc within the Sadrist Trend and former member of the Wassit Provincial Council, detonated in Kut, causing only material damage; NINA, *Device's Explosion targeted a former member of Wasit provincial Council of Ahrar bloc*, 19 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLEGL.
- On 31 December 2011, an IED detonated against the house of the mayor of Kut, causing no casualties; NINA, *IED against the house of Kut's Mayor*, 31 December 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJIIFI.
- On 7 September 2011, Fadhil Al-Zirgani, an ISCI official, escaped an assassination attempt when gunmen opened fire at him while he was on his way to his house in Kut; NINA, *SIIC official escapes assassination in Kut*, 7 September 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHMLMF.
- On 11 August 2011, gunmen attacked a government employee in a market close to his house in Al-Dhobbat neighborhood in the centre of Kut, killing him instantly; NINA, *Government employee killed by unidentified gunmen in Kut*, 11 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHJIII.
- On 10 August 2011, a group of gunmen opened fire against an employee of the Sunni Waqf (Endowment) in Kut, killing him on the spot; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraq's Sunni Endowment employee killed in Kut*, 11 August 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144235&l=1.
- On 19 July 2011, a legal adviser in the Integrity Commission for Wassit Governorate survived an assassination attempt; NINA, *Legal adviser in the integrity survives of an assassination attempt in Wassit*, 19 July 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHGJGH.
- On 9 July 2011, a Lt.-Brigadier in Iraq's Defense Ministry was killed when a sticky bomb exploded under his personal car; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Army officer killed in Kut explosion*, 11 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143693&l=1.
- On 16 June 2011, an IED killed a man, who tried to plant it in front of the house of the Deputy Chairman of the Support Council of Suwayra; Aswat al-Iraq, *Armed man killed while planting explosive charge in Wassit Province*, 16 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143193&l=1.
- On 2 April 2011, gunmen using guns equipped with silencers shot dead Karim Abid Hmoud, a prominent merchant and chairman of the Duleim Tribe in Wassit, along with his bodyguard in his house in Nu'amaniyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi merchant, who ordered his large house to become an orphanage, assassinated*, 3 April 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=141772&l=1.
- On 14 August 2010, armed men in Nu'amaniyah killed Mohamed Ali Al-Din, a pharmacy professor. Al-Din had returned from the USA to Iraq only a few months earlier; BRusselsTribunal, *List of assassinated Iraqi Academics*, accessed 18 March 2012, p. 20, <http://www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/academicsBT151108.pdf>.

¹²¹¹ Kerbala, and to a lesser extent Najef Governorate, reportedly saw a number of large-scale attacks in 2010, 2011 and 2012, mostly directed against Shi'ite pilgrims on the occasion of religious holidays. Most recently, on 20 March 2012, as part of apparently coordinated attacks across the country, two car bombs reportedly exploded in a crowded shopping and restaurant area in Kerbala, killing 13 and wounding 50 others; Lara Jakes, *Al-Qaida claims responsibility for Iraq attacks*, AP, 21 March 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/m/story?id=15959016&sid=76>. On 25 September 2011, 15 people were reportedly killed and more than 80 others were wounded when four successive explosions struck outside a Ministry of Interior Passport Office in central Kerbala city; Tim Arango, *Bombs Strike Shiite Holy City in Iraq*, New York Times, 25 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html>. For attacks targeting Shi'ite civilians and pilgrims in Kerbala and Najef, see "Shi'ite Civilians, including Pilgrims".

¹²¹² For example, on the occasion of *Arbaeen* in January 2011, 120,000 police and soldiers were deployed in Kerbala; Muhanad Mohammed, *UPDATE 2-Two bombs kill 12 Shi'ites heading to rite in Iraq*, Reuters, 24 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/update-2-two-bombs-kill-12-shiites-heading-to-rite-in-iraq/>.

¹²¹³ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 10 March 2012, Murad Anad Al-Jubouri, member of the Kerbala Provincial Council, survived an assassination attempt in Tuaireej District, in eastern Kerbala; NINA, *Member of the Karbala PC survives assassination*, 10 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKGJHK.
- On 24 October 2011, the Chairman of Kerbala's Bar Association, Qais Al-Amiry, was unharmed during an assassination attempt by unknown gunmen in Kerbala city; Aswat al-Iraq, *Karbala lawyers demand protection after their Chairman exposed for assassination*, 25 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145399&l=1.
- On 12 October 2011, unknown gunmen driving a car shot dead Sheikh Mohammad Al-Maamar, a senior Shi'ite cleric and Al-Sistani representative, along with his escort, near his house in a southern neighbourhood of Kerbala; Fars News Agency, *Gunmen Attack Residence of Ayatollah Sistani's Representative*, 26 October 2011, <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9007270820>; PUK Media, *Religious man killed along with his escort in Karbala*, 12 October 2011,

http://www.pukmedia.com/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9970:religious-man-killed-along-with-his-escort-in-karbala&catid=25:iraq&Itemid=386.

- On 6 August 2011, ISF in Najaf defused an IED placed near the house of the Friday prayers imam, Sadruddine Al-Qubbanji, in Al-Ghadeer area of Najef city; NINA, *IED defused near Najaf Sadruddine Al Qubbanji's house*, 6 August 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FHILHH.
- On 17 February 2011, a leading cleric in the Sadrist movement, Sheikh Jassim Al-Mutairi, was assassinated by armed men using guns equipped with silencers after leaving a mosque in a small town west of Kerbala; <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-17>.

¹²¹⁴ According to John F. Drake of AKE, “[O]ngoing police operations targeting suspected terrorists and criminals continue to highlight the fact that the south of the country is not entirely ‘safe’”; John F. Drake, *Weekly Security Update for 9th February 2012*, Iraq Business News, 9 February 2012, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/tag/iraq/>. See for example, Nabil al-Shayib, *Three alleged al-Qaeda militants detained in Wassit*, AKnews, 27 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/292505/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Two hundred arrested in Wasit province*, 19 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146984&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146984&l=1); Aswat al-Iraq, *2 al-Qaeda members arrested in Wassit*, 20 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146999&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146999&l=1); Aswat al-Iraq, *Gang and 10 wanted criminals arrested in Basra*, 17 February 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146963&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146963&l=1); Aswat al-Iraq, *20 wanted arrested in Basra*, 31 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146728&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(d2e4vuuddbuit355ey4hf145))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146728&l=1).

¹²¹⁵ Reported major attacks in 2010, 2011 and 2012 included:

- On 14 January 2012, the last day of *Arbaeen*, a suicide bomber disguised as a policeman killed 64 and wounded more than 130 others in an attack on Shi'ite pilgrims visiting the Al-Khatwa mosque in Zubayar, west of Basrah city; Aswat al-Iraq, *64 killings, 137 wounded in Basrah explosion*, 14 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(i0zhgdzzwzjnzfrzobzyg45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(i0zhgdzzwzjnzfrzobzyg45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146495&l=1); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>.
- On 5 January 2012, 48 pilgrims were killed and more than 100 others were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated himself while they were heading from Nasseriyah (Thi-Qar) to Kerbala ahead of *Arbaeen*; Adam Schreck, *78 killed in Iraq bombings targeting Shi'ites*, AP, 6 January 2012, <http://bostonglobe.com/news/world/2012/01/06/least-killed-iraq-bombings-targeting-shiites/xhLNeVZVHVJtTeuzC1oXIJ/story.html>.
- On 24 November 2011, triple bombings in a popular open-air market in Basrah killed 25 people and injured dozens more. Most of the victims were members of the ISF that arrived at the blast scene after the first bombing; Andrew E. Kramer, *In Iraq, Bombs Kill at Least 11 in 2 Attacks*, New York Times, 26 November 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/world/middleeast/baghdad-and-nearby-highway-hit-by-deadly-bombings.html?ref=middleeast>; Nabil Al-Jurani, *Triple bombings in south Iraq kill 19, injure 64*, AP, 24 November 2011, http://ap.strips.com/dynamic/stories/M/ML_IRAQ?SITE=DCSAS&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.
- On 2 November 2011, three consecutive motorbike bombings on central Basrah's busy Jamhuriya Street, near shops and cafes, killed at least 12 people and wounded over least 60 others; BNO News, *At least 12 killed, 60-plus injured after motorcycle blasts in southeastern Iraq*, 2 November 2011, <http://channel6newsline.com/2011/11/at-least-12-killed-60-plus-injured-after-motorcycle-blasts-in-southeastern-iraq/>.
- On 25 August 2011, a suicide bomber blew up his car near the Dawood Al-Ashoor mosque in Basrah's Abu Al-Khaseeb as worshippers were leaving after prayer, killing five people and wounding 35 others; Aswat al-Iraq, *5 killed, 20 wounded in Basra explosion*, 26 August 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144502&l=1; Reuters, *Attacks across Iraq kill 14, wound dozens*, 25 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/attacks-across-iraq-kill-14-wound-dozens/>.
- On 7 August 2010, three bombs detonated in a popular market in Basrah, killing 43 people and wounding 185 others; BBC, *The death toll from a Basra market blast rises to 43*, 8 August 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10907112>.
- On 21 June 2011, two bombs killed at least 25 people and wounded 35 others, mostly guards, outside a Provincial Governor's house in Diwaniyah city; Reuters, *Bombers strike Iraq govt building, at least 28 dead*, 5 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/bombers-strike-iraq-govt-building-at-least-28-dead/>; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 21*, 21 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-21/>.
- On 13 June 2011, five policemen were killed and 29 others were wounded when a suicide car bomber blew himself up at a police brigade compound in Basrah. ISI reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack; Aswat al-Iraq, *UPDATE / Basra's car bomb blast toll reaches 5 dead, 29 injured*, 13 June 2011, http://en.aswatiraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143124&l=1; Reuters, *Al Qaeda affiliate says behind two Iraq attacks*, 6 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/al-qaeda-affiliate-says-behind-two-iraq-attacks/>.
- On 10 May 2010, a coordinated series of suicide bombings and assassinations spread across the country with three bombings in Basrah and one of them in a central market, killing 20 people; Rebecca Santana and Lara Jakes, *In Iraq's bloodiest day of 2010, attacks kill 100*, AP, 11 May 2010, http://images.salon.com/wires/world/2010/05/10/D9FK8S480_ml_iraq/index.html; The Times, *102 dead as bombers fill power vacuum caused by Iraqi election*, 11 May 2010, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article7122359.ece>.

¹²¹⁶ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 21 March 2012, an IED stuck to a car detonated against the house of a former CoR member for the Sadrist bloc in Basrah, causing only material damages; NINA, *Material damages in explosion of two cars in Basra*, 21 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKIGLJ.
- On 4 March 2012, gunmen fired a grenade on a house in front of the Big Mosque in Diwaniya city, which belongs to the mosque preacher Sheikh Arkan Kazem, causing only material damage; NINA, *Security authority announce launching a grenade at the preacher of mosque in Qadisiyah*, 4 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFKEE.
- On 3 March 2012, a bomb targeted a number of houses belonging to relatives of Abdul Hakim Safi, the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in Basrah Governorate. The explosion damaged the facades of houses surrounding Al-Safi Mosque central of Basrah, but caused no casualties; NINA, *A bomb exploded near homes of Cleric Sistani representative's relatives in Basra*, 3 March 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FKFIFI.
- On 3 March 2012, police defused an explosive charge that was planted near the house of Sheikh Mohammad Jaafar Baqer Al-Nasseri, an assistant to Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, near the Saheb al-Zaman mosque in northern Nasseriyah (Thi-Qar); Aswat al-Iraq, *Police foils life attempt of al-Sistani's assistant in Nassiriya*, 3 March 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(a1vaq345qmdcm045oqydrqt))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147235&l=1).

- On 18 February 2012, the residence of a Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani representative was targeted by a bomb in Thi-Qar, causing no casualties. The same day, the residence of another Al-Sistani representative was also attacked by a grenade in Diwaniyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Attacks on religious leader representative's residence*, 18 February 2012, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(kzehqm55delwv3iuxrpg455\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146973&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(kzehqm55delwv3iuxrpg455))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146973&l=1).
- On 12 October 2011, a municipality engineer was assassinated in Diwaniyah; Aswat al-Iraq, *Plan to assassinate VIPs in Diwaniya*, 12 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145237&l=1.
- On 2 October 2011, gunmen stormed the house of Imad Al-Bidiri (or Imad Mahdi Sakban), a leader of the Albder tribe, killing him and one of his guards, east of Diwaniyah city; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, October 3*, 3 October 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-october-3>.
- On 26 September 2011, gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire on the imam of Al-Nahda Mosque in central Diwaniyah after evening prayers, seriously wounding him and killing one of his relatives; Aswat al-Iraq, *Mosque Imam escapes assassination, his companion killed in Diwaniya*, 27 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145045&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 26*, 26 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/security-developments-in-iraq-september-26/>.
- On 6 September 2011, gunmen attacked the home of a tribal sheikh in eastern Diwaniyah and killed him. In a separate incident, gunmen using weapons equipped with silencers seriously wounded Razzaq Rahman Al-Rahma, a former Diwaniyah Provincial Council member. He died the next day of his injuries; Aswat al-Iraq, *Former member of Diwaniya Province dies due to injuries*, 8 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144711&l=1; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, September 7*, 7 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-september-7/>.
- On 23 July 2011, shots were fired at Sheikh Mohammed Falak, a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, Iraq's most revered Shi'ite leader, in the town of Zubayr (Basrah) as he was leaving a mosque. Falak was not hurt but a policeman at the scene was wounded; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 24*, 24 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-24/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Representative of Shiite Clergyman Sistani, escapes assassination attempt*, 24 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143912&l=1.
- On 19 June 2011, the Chairman of the Energy Committee in the Thi-Qar Provincial Council, Hussein Hassab Al-Awad, escaped an assassination attempt, when an IED exploded at his house in Nassiriyah city (Thi-Qar). Al-Awad is a member of the Al-Ahrar political bloc, which holds seven seats in the council; Aswat al-Iraq, *Thi-Qar Council's Member escapes assassination attempt*, 19 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143244&l=1.
- On 20 May 2011, gunmen with machine guns opened fire on the car of Mohammed Qassem, the office director of MP Raf'e Abdul-Jabbar of the Ahrar political bloc, seriously wounding him, in Amara (Missan); Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi MP's official injured in armed attack in Amara*, 21 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142658&l=1.
- On 3 May 2011, an IED exploded close to the house of an employee of Basrah's Integrity Commission, wounding him and causing damage to his car; Aswat al-Iraq, *Iraqi Integrity Commission employee injured in central Basra blast*, 3 May 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142329&l=1.
- On 7 January 2011, a former JAM member was killed when an IED placed inside his car in southern Nassiriyah (Thi-Qar) exploded in his garage. His brother was killed too and another person was injured; Aswat al-Iraq, *2 killed, 1 wounded in Nasseriya blast*, 7 January 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=140395&l=1.

¹²¹⁷ As a result, the local authorities reportedly imposed a nightly vehicle and motorbike curfew; NINA, *Night curfew on vehicles and motorbikes in Diwaniya due to the recent assassinations*, 10 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIHJEG. According to a security source from Diwaniyah, cited by Aswat al-Iraq, there is a hitlist containing the names of prominent figures, including tribal and religious leaders as well as artists singled out for assassination. Aswat al-Iraq, *Plan to assassinate VIPs in Diwaniya*, 12 October 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=145237&l=1.

¹²¹⁸ See for example, NINA, *IED targeting US convoy goes off western Kut*, 19 October 2011, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FIIMEJ; Aswat al-Iraq, *URGENT: US Army patrol attacked in south Iraq's Thi-Qar Province*, 11 September 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=144775&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Air Base in Nassiriya, south Iraq, under Katusha raid*, 27 July 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143971&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Six civilians injured in rocket attack on U.S. base in Diwaniya*, 23 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143335&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *U.S. Army patrol attacked by explosive charge in Babel, south Iraq*, 21 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143297&l=1; Aswat al-Iraq, *Explosive charge blows up against U.S. Army patrol in Babel*, 8 June 2011, http://en.aswataliraq.info/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=143017&l=1.

¹²¹⁹ See chapter "Protestors".

¹²²⁰ The Kurdistan Region has reportedly seen a limited number of terrorist attacks since 2003, mostly targeting Kurdish Government and Party institutions. Most recently, on 27 February 2011, security forces reportedly clashed with militants in a house under construction in the city of Sulaymaniyah and killed five of them, including one who was wearing an explosive vest, according to Sulaymaniyah Governor Bahrouz Mohammed; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, February 27*, 27 February 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-27/>. On 1 November 2010, Kurdish security forces reportedly killed a would-be suicide bomber driving a lightweight truck laden with 250 kg of explosives as he attempted to enter Erbil through the Kirkuk-Erbil main way (Qushtapa Checkpoint). The Kurdish security authorities believe that the bomber was a member of ISI; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 2 November 2010; Aswat al-Iraq, *Security forces kill suicide bomber in Arbil*, 1 November 2010, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/?p=138517>; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 1*, 1 November 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A01A4.htm>. See also FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹²²¹ See "Actors of Violence".

¹²²² According to the US Department of State, AQKB was established in 2007 from the remnants of other terrorist organizations, including AQI and Ansar Al-Islam and "has sworn allegiance publicly to other terrorist groups, including Al-Qa'eda and AQL." The group is operating along the borders of Iran and Iraq and has reportedly claimed responsibility for several attacks against the KRG, which it considers as "traitors", including a car bombing at the Kurdish Ministries of the Interior and Security in Erbil that killed 19 people in May 2007, an ambush in Penjwin (Sulaymaniyah Governorate) that killed seven border guards and one PUK security personnel in July 2007 and a failed suicide attack targeting security officers in Sulaymaniyah, in which two police officers were wounded, in September 2010. In January 2012, the US Department of State reportedly added AQKB to the list of specially designated global terrorist entities that will be subject to US sanctions; Bill Roggio, *US adds Al Qaeda Kurdish Battalions to list of terror groups*, The Long War Journal, 5 January 2012,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/01/us_adds_al_qaeda_kur.php; Office of Foreign Assets Control, *Changes To List Of Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons Since January 1, 2011*, accessed 18 March 2012, http://fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/library/fac_sdn/sdnew12.pdf.

¹²²³ See chapters “*Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities*” and “*Religious Minorities – Christians*”.

¹²²⁴ In areas of Central Iraq, where the Kurdish parties reportedly exert *de facto* full or partial control, attacks on civilians and Kurdish party and security offices and representatives are reportedly common; see “*Security Incidents – Central Iraq*.” See also Michael R. Gordon and Andrew W. Lehren, *Tensions High Along Kurdish-Arab Line*, New York Times, 23 October 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/middleeast/24kurds.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>; Charles McDermid, *In Northern Iraq, a Census Raises Tensions*, Time, 1 October 2010, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2022986,00.html>.

¹²²⁵ The Governments of Turkey and Iran reportedly continue to carry out military operations in the mountainous border areas, which armed Kurdish groups, the PKK and the PJAK, use as a refuge. Both groups are reportedly held responsible for multiple attacks against Turkish or Iranian soldiers. Turkish and Iranian military operations against the PKK and PJAK have reportedly included occasional troop movements and both aerial and artillery bombardments, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement and material damages to homes and livestock. HRW reported in September 2011 that Iran and Turkey’s cross-border attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan have killed at least 10 civilians and displaced hundreds since mid-July 2011. The human rights organization said that there were indications that Turkish and Iranian attacks did not sufficiently consider the impact on civilians or, in the case of Iran, may have even deliberately targeted civilian areas; HRW, *Iraqi Kurdistan: Cross-Border Attacks Should Spare Iraqi Civilians*, 1 September 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/02/iraqi-kurdistan-cross-border-attacks-should-spare-iraqi-civilians>; HRW, *Iran/Iraq: Iranian Attacks Should Not Target Iraqi Civilians*, 12 July 2010, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/12/iraniraq-iranian-attacks-should-not-target-iraqi-civilians>.

¹²²⁶ See chapter “*Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities*”.

¹²²⁷ See chapter “*Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities*”.

¹²²⁸ See chapter “*Individuals Perceived as Opposing the KRG Authorities*”.

¹²²⁹ UNHCR, *Iraq Situation in Numbers Report*, December 2011.

¹²³⁰ As a result of targeted attacks against Christians in late 2010 and early 2011, a total of 1,354 Christian families were reportedly displaced to the Kurdistan Region as well as within Ninewa Governorate. However, due to growing security fears, a lack of work opportunities, and difficulties to transfer their education documents, a significant number of IDPs reportedly chose to emigrate abroad or, to a lesser extent, to return to their places of origin. By 31 January 2012, 489 Christian IDP families remain displaced in mainly the Kurdistan Region; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2012, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>.

¹²³¹ IOM, *Diyala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 2, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Diyala.pdf>.

¹²³² IOM, *IOM continues its support to families displaced along the border in northern Iraq*, October 2011, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Flash%20Report%20-%20IOM%20Distributes%20Relief%20Items%20to%20100%20Families%20Displaced%20near%20Iraq-Iran%20Border.pdf>; IOM, *Families Displaced by Military Action along Iraq-Iran Border Receive IOM Assistance*, 26 July 2011, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-notes/pbnAF/cache/offonce/lang/en?entryId=30102>; IRIN, *IRAQ: Hundreds displaced by Iranian shelling*, 25 July 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=93312>.

¹²³³ As a result of drought, displacement was reportedly recorded in mainly Salah Al-Din and Ninewa Governorates. According to IOM, “[W]ater scarcity also has the tendency to cause psychological damage amongst already vulnerable IDP populations, as it becomes yet another source of stress for those affected by it.” To a lesser extent, also the Governorates of Al-Anbar, Basrah Diyala, Kerbala and Kirkuk have seen drought-related displacement; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 14, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. And in April 2011, more than 5,000 persons, including IDPs, were reportedly displaced by heavy rains and massive flooding from affected areas in Kerbala, Ninewa, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah Governorates. In Sinjar district (Ninewa), which was reportedly most affected, around 400 houses were completely damaged due to strong wind and heavy rains resulting in flash floods. Most of the houses were reportedly made of mud or had weak structures, or they were located on low lands; IFRC, *Iraq: Flash Floods*, 23 May 2011, <http://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/11/MDRIQ004do.pdf>.

¹²³⁴ This reportedly includes 527,186 refugee returnees and 1,031,720 IDP returnees registered by MoDM, DDM, City Councils and UNHCR Protection and Assistance Centres; UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, December 2011, p. 3, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3434.pdf. UNHCR has assisted some 9,600 voluntary returns to Iraq between 2006 and 2011. The majority (4,490 persons) returned from Iran to Iraq, followed by returns from Syria (2,698) and Egypt (1,285); UNHCR, *Iraq Situation in Numbers Report*, December 2011.

¹²³⁵ A total of 260,690 IDP and refugee returnees were registered between January and December 2011, including 193,610 IDP returnees and 67,080 refugee returnees; UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, December 2011, p. 3, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3434.pdf. Of the total 67,080 refugee returns in 2011, 23,140 persons were reportedly (34%) returned to Baghdad Governorate, followed by Najef (7,260 persons); UNHCR, *Iraq Situation in Numbers Report*, December 2011.

¹²³⁶ Between August and December 2011, UNHCR Iraq reportedly monitored 1,766 Iraqi refugee returnee families (representing 8,830 individuals) in Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basrah and Ninewa through direct interviews (90 percent) and phone interviews (10 percent). Monitoring results showed that more than half (57 percent) of those monitored reportedly returned to the aforementioned governorates in response to perceived security improvements in their location of return. Another four percent mentioned improvements in the economic situation, i.e. improved access to employment; UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011.

¹²³⁷ Since June 2011, the financial assistance granted to refugee returnees displaced between 1 January 2006 and 1 January 2008 was reportedly increased from 1.5 million Iraqi Dinars to 4 million Iraqi Dinars; UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, December 2011, p. 1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3434.pdf. Among the returnee refugees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 97% of those eligible for the returnee grant have successfully received or are in the process of receiving MoDM returnee cash assistance. During this period, a total of 52,362 returnee families have reportedly been cleared by MoDM to receive the returnee cash assistance grant of 4 million Iraqi Dinars in four separate payments; UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011.

¹²³⁸ Seventeen percent of the refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011 returned primarily as they reportedly no longer felt safe in their country of asylum, mainly from Syria. It is also worth noting that refugee returnees perceptions of the security situation in both the country of asylum (particularly, at this time, Syria) and Iraq are inter-related and relative to each other and therefore a deterioration in one location may result in a relative perceived improvement in the other; UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011. In 2011, based on available statistics, UNHCR has not yet recorded a steep increase of returns from Syria related

to the ongoing security deterioration in the country. However, a further deterioration of the security situation may result in more returns to Iraq. In February 2012, the Iraqi Minister of Displacement and Migration, Dindar Najman, reported the return of 200 Iraqi families from Syria within a period of two weeks, saying that the actual number could be higher as not all returnees register with the concerned authorities; Fryad Mohammed, *Iraqi families flee from Syria*, AKnews, 2 February 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/287829/>. See also Sam Dagher, *Syria Chaos Pushes Iraqis Back Home*, Wall Street Journal, 17 February 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204062704577220483777114856.html>.

¹²³⁹ Among those monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 19 percent had reportedly indicated that they could no longer afford to stay in the country of asylum; UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011.

¹²⁴⁰ Among refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 59 percent have reportedly been able to return to their original neighbourhood (46 percent returned to their original house and 13 percent returned to a different house within their old neighbourhood). However, one third of those monitored (33 percent) have reportedly returned to a different district in their original Governorate. This is at least partly due to the homogenization of formerly mixed neighbourhoods and districts as a result of reported sectarian violence in mainly 2006 and 2007. The remaining eight percent returned to a different neighbourhood in their original district (6%) or to a different governorate (2%); UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011.

¹²⁴¹ Among refugee returnees monitored between August and December 2011, 41 percent had reportedly said that they were unemployed. At the same time, 75 percent of the returnees monitored reportedly stated that their household's current income was insufficient to meet their basic needs, indicating the prevalence of not only unemployment, but also underemployment amongst a large proportion of returnees. Twelve percent indicated that they were living on pensions received in Iraq. A significant number also indicated no source of income or a precarious source of income that may not last (14% no income, 11% living on assistance provided by family and friends, and 3% living on savings). Needs may be further exacerbated by additional vulnerabilities such as medical needs, disabilities or trauma. Among the refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 17 percent claimed to have special needs. A significant majority of these returnees, 27 percent, have reportedly claimed that they or someone within their household has a serious medical condition (other than a physical/ mental disability or trauma), while 11 percent of households claimed to contain elderly in need of care or elderly headed households; another 16 percent claimed to be disabled or have a disabled family member, 8 percent claimed to be a survivor of violence/ torture and 15 percent claimed to be female headed households or unaccompanied women. However, it needs to be noted that UNHCR does not have the ability to verify the returnees' claims and therefore it is expected that some returnees monitored may give inaccurate information regarding their current economic situation in expectation of greater assistance; UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011. 64 percent of refugee and IDP returnees surveyed by IOM have reportedly indicated that they had "some kind of employment". Unemployment among returnees was reported to be particularly high in the Governorates of Dahuk, Diyala and Najef, where approximately 70 percent of the returnee heads of household were unemployed; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 9, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹²⁴² Among the refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR between August and December 2011, 15 percent have reportedly indicated that they had experienced security incidents affecting their family or their specific location of return in the six months preceding the interviews, including abuse/harassment (40%), targeted murder (13%), large explosions (10%), mines/UXO (9%), military operations (8%), kidnappings/disappearance (8%), and physical assaults (5%); UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011.

¹²⁴³ See "Background Information".

¹²⁴⁴ UNHCR, *Iraq Situation in Numbers Report*, December 2011. Compared to 2008 figures, this constitutes a decrease of 23 percent, though there are regional variations. Most significantly, the number of IDPs in Baghdad and Diyala (the two governorates which had seen the highest number of IDPs since 2003) reportedly dropped by 45 percent and 16 percent, respectively, between 2008 and 2011 (in Baghdad down from 550,000 IDPs in 2008 to 300,000 in 2011, in Diyala down from 136,000 to 114,000). At the same time, the number of IDPs in Ninewa increased by 67 percent (up from 106,000 in 2008 to 178,000 in 2011). The other two central governorates, Kirkuk and Salah Al-Din remained largely stable (Kirkuk saw a reduction of 7 percent, Salah Al-Din remained unchanged); UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, December 2011, p. 1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3434.pdf.

¹²⁴⁵ The large majority, 60 percent or more than 101,000 Iraqis, are registered with UNHCR in Syria, followed by Jordan, where more than 29,000 Iraqis are registered by 29 February 2012. The vast majority of the Iraqis registered with UNHCR in all countries in the region originate from Baghdad (total of 105,000 Iraqis or 68 percent), followed by Ninewa (total of 16,900 Iraqis or 11 percent); UNHCR Iraq, *Statistical Report on UNHCR Registered Iraqis and Non-Iraqis*, 29 February 2012. In 2011, UNHCR has undertaken more than 35,000 new registrations, down from a peak in 2007, when offices in the region registered more than 168,000 Iraqi refugees. While Syria still accounts for the largest share in new registrations, there has been a drop compared to recent years, while other countries, especially Turkey, saw an increase in new registrations, likely reflecting the current instable situation in Syria causing refugees to choose an alternative destination (in 2010, Syria accounted for nearly 60 percent of the new registrations, in 2011, its share dropped to 44 percent; Turkey, on the other hand, saw an increase from 9.4 percent in 2010 to 22.8 percent in 2011. Also Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt witnessed small increases); UNHCR, *Iraq Situation in Numbers Report*, December 2011.

¹²⁴⁶ UNHCR, *UNHCR chief calls for end to displacement chapter during Iraq visit*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4d3d98986.html>.

¹²⁴⁷ UNHCR, *IDPs in settlements in Iraq*, April 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_660.pdf.

¹²⁴⁸ Evictions from state-owned property are reportedly carried out pursuant to Council of Ministers Decision 440 of 2 December 2008 and came into force on 1 January 2009. This decision offers notice prior to any eviction (no period specified), and for compensation (one to five million Iraqi Dinars). The decision further adds that no legal action should be taken against the persons who vacate within 60 days. In May 2009, the decision was reportedly suspended pursuant to Cabinet Order 157, but it was reactivated in 2010 and remains in force to date. Towards the end of 2010, increasing numbers of evictions were reported. Implementation of these decisions was reportedly inconsistent and in some cases families were reportedly evicted with little prior notice, often leading to secondary displacement. On 21 December 2010, the Parliamentary session No. 13 unanimously approved and called for the suspension of evictions and demolition of informal settlements pending the identification of solutions. However, the order was not implemented and evictions from state lands reportedly continued during 2011. UNHCR is aware of at least three settlements where eviction orders were executed in Baghdad during the year of 2011 and five orders were issued but not implemented yet; UNHCR Information, February 2012.

¹²⁴⁹ See "Civilian Casualties".

¹²⁵⁰ See UNHCR, *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, January 1992, para196, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3314.html>.

¹²⁵¹ The assessment of the availability of an IFA/IRA requires two main sets of analysis, namely its (i) relevance and its (ii) reasonableness. In cases where a well-founded fear of persecution has been established in some localized part of the country of origin, the determination of whether the proposed internal flight or relocation area is an appropriate alternative for the individual concerned requires an assessment over time, taking into account not only the circumstances that gave rise to the risk feared, and that prompted flight from the area of origin, but also whether the proposed area provides a safe and meaningful alternative in the future. The personal circumstances of the individual

applicant and the conditions in the area of relocation need to be considered; see UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, HCR/GIP/03/04, 23 July 2003, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f2791a44.html>.

¹²⁵² The large majority of IDPs from Central and Southern Iraq had reportedly arrived in the Kurdistan Region after 2006. By August 2011, there were 37,941 post-2006 IDP families (208,675 individuals) in the three Northern Governorates, including 9,704 families (53,342 individuals) in Erbil Governorate, 19,251 families (105,880 individuals) in Dahuk Governorate and 8,986 families (49,423 individuals) in Sulaymaniyah Governorate. In addition, the three Northern Governorates also host significant numbers of pre-2006 IDPs, most of whom have been reportedly displaced before 2003 as a result of the policies and violence of the former regime; information received from DDM and BMD, October 2011.

¹²⁵³ In late 2010 and early 2011, more than 1,300 Christian families had reportedly left Baghdad and Mosul, moving mainly to the Kurdistan Region; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 13, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq,%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹²⁵⁴ See "Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)".

¹²⁵⁵ In particular, there is "a continual threat of roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs);" US Department of State/Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Iraq 2011 Crime and Safety Report: Baghdad*, 21 April 2011, <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportPDF.aspx?cid=10884>. Between January 2011 and September 2011, UNAMI's Security and Information Analysis Unit (SIAU) recorded the following security incidents on the routes approaching the KRG checkpoints, mainly on the route from Kirkuk:

- 4 RPG attacks
- 9 small arms attacks
- 4 grenade attacks
- 3 mortar attacks
- 24 IEDs
- 4 car bombs.

¹²⁵⁶ US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html.

¹²⁵⁷ Depending on the security situation and the level of threats, entry procedures are reportedly more or less rigid. In 2011, according to UNAMI SSU, the security situation has reportedly been more tensed as a result of attempted terrorist attacks. On 1 June 2011, *Asayish* reportedly dismantled a sticky bomb in a civilian car at Erbil's main entrance on the Kirkuk – Erbil road; *Aswat al-Iraq, Sticky bomb dismantled in Arbil*, 1 June 2011, [http://en.aswataliraq.info/\(S\(1xiu4w55naggmw45ivivbn45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142906&l=1](http://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(1xiu4w55naggmw45ivivbn45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=142906&l=1). On 31 May 2011, Kurdish security forces reportedly made safe a sticky bomb attached to a car driving from Kirkuk towards Erbil; AKE, *Weekly Security Update for 2nd June 2011*, 2 June 2011, <http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/tag/arbil/>. On 1 November 2010, Kurdish security forces reportedly killed a would-be suicide bomber driving a lightweight truck laden with 250 kg of explosives as he attempted to enter Erbil through the Kirkuk-Erbil main way (Qushtapa Checkpoint). The Kurdish security authorities believe the bomber was a member of ISI; UNAMI Safety and Security Unit, 2 November 2010; *Aswat al-Iraq, Security forces kill suicide bomber in Arbil*, 1 November 2010, <http://en.aswataliraq.info/?p=138517>; Reuters, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Nov 1*, 1 November 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE6A01A4.htm>.

¹²⁵⁸ The information contained in this chapter is based on information received from UNAMI SSU and SIAU, field surveys and monitoring by UNHCR PACs in the Kurdistan Region and information obtained by UNHCR protection and field staff in the Governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul and Kirkuk.

¹²⁵⁹ Again, there is no uniform approach. For example, UNHCR became aware that IDP families can enter Sulaymaniyah Governorate on a tourist card without having a sponsor. However, if the family is not aware of this option, they may be asked to provide a sponsor. At the same time, single Arab men may be refused entry if they do not have a sponsor.

¹²⁶⁰ Work cards are given to daily labourers, who are usually known to the authorities due to their daily travel to the Kurdistan Region, or to those who can provide a letter of appointment by their employer in the Kurdistan Region. However, it is important to note that these cards are not automatically renewed and UNHCR is aware of several Arab labourers from Hawija, Kirkuk, who travelled to the Kurdistan Region for work but were not given an extension on their card (2010).

¹²⁶¹ In 2010, the KRG replaced the previous sponsor system, under which a person had to have a sponsor guaranteeing for his/her presence in the Kurdistan Region, by the new reference or acquaintance system. According to the KRG authorities, under the new system, a person seeking to enter and reside in the Kurdistan Region only needed to have a local contact. However, UNHCR observed that in reality the previous sponsor system remains in place.

¹²⁶² There is anecdotal evidence of sponsors harassing or abusing IDPs or asking for money in return.

¹²⁶³ In some places it suffices that the sponsor is a resident of the governorate to which the person wants to relocate. In Erbil city, however, the sponsor must reportedly be a public servant.

¹²⁶⁴ Kurds from the disputed areas or Kurds suspected to pose a threat to the Region's security.

¹²⁶⁵ Non-Kurds reportedly have their ID card withheld at the checkpoint. They are provided a letter to be used while in the Kurdistan Region and can reclaim their ID card once they leave the Region.

¹²⁶⁶ In March 2011, UNHCR received information indicating that church officials in Erbil have been allowed to act as sponsors on behalf of the Christian IDPs.

¹²⁶⁷ The information card contains the holder's personal data and expiry date. The card can be issued for a three-month, six-month, or a 12-month period. The information card reportedly provides the holder with freedom of movement within the Kurdistan Region. If that person wishes to relocate to another neighbourhood or Governorate, he/she must obtain a new information card from the local security station.

¹²⁶⁸ Again, procedures and requirements are not uniform and can vary even within a governorate. For example, it appears that persons seeking to stay in Raparin, Dukan and Bakarajo (Sulaymaniyah) are reportedly not required to have a sponsor. However, in New Halabja and Shorish in the same governorate a sponsor is mandatory. Furthermore, even if no sponsor is required, a local security office may still reject the stay, especially of single man on security grounds.

¹²⁶⁹ In some cases, a proof of rent is also required. However, in other cases it was observed that the information card was a prerequisite to rent a house or apartment.

¹²⁷⁰ There are unverified reports of IDP families forced to leave the Kurdistan Region in 2010 due to their inability to identify a sponsor.

¹²⁷¹ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 7, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf). See also "Background Information".

¹²⁷² IOM monitors noted that in areas with high numbers of Christian IDPs, e.g. Ainkawa (Erbil), rental prices for modest accommodation

have reportedly risen 200-300 percent as a result of the influx of Christians after the October 2010 church bombing in Baghdad; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 2, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf. See also Rebin Hasan, *Housing in Erbil "unaffordable" as foreign companies and Arab families flow into the city*, AKnews, 8 November 2011, <http://aknews.com/en/aknews/2/271482/>; Aiyob Mawloodi, *Rent prices increasing dramatically*, Kurdish Globe, No. 322, 24 September 2011, p. 4, <http://www.kurdishglobe.net/get-pdf-file/KurdishGlobe-2011-09-24.pdf?ID=326>; UNHCR, *UNHCR assists displaced children in Iraq's Kurdistan region*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4eae3e36.html>.

¹²⁷³ IOM, *Governorate Profile – Erbil*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>. See also Middle East Online, *Iraq Christian IDPs find refuge in Kurdish north*, 28 December 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43311>.

¹²⁷⁴ IOM noted that “‘rented house’ can be a misleading category which suggests comfort and financial security. In fact, rising rent prices together with poor quality accommodation mean that even those living in rented accommodation can feel insecure about long-term shelter for their families;” IOM, *Governorate Profile – Erbil*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>. Of the 894 Christian IDP families surveyed by IOM in December 2010, 57 percent reportedly lived in rented accommodations and are at risk of secondary displacement due to soaring rental prices. In Dahuk Governorate, a reported 97% of the Christian IDPs rated “shelter” as a top priority, largely due to difficulties in paying for the high cost of accommodation; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 4, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf.

¹²⁷⁵ Of the 894 Christian IDP families surveyed by IOM in December 2010, 31 percent reportedly lived with host families or relatives, often in over-crowded conditions; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 4, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf.

¹²⁷⁶ According to a 2011 UNHCR survey of public buildings and settlements illegally occupied by IDPs in the Kurdistan Region, there are 673 IDP families (4,044 individuals) living in public buildings in Dahuk, 96 families (563 individuals) in Erbil and 63 families (339 individuals) in Sulaymaniyah; UNHCR IDP complexes survey, July 2011. Those living with a host family or in a public building are in a precarious situation; should the hosts’ or the authorities’ goodwill end, they may be rendered homeless; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Erbil*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>.

¹²⁷⁷ In Dahuk Governorate, a reported 30% of the IDP families assessed by IOM live in collective town settlements in often improvised, weak housing structures; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Dahuk*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Dahuk.pdf>. In Erbil, 6,000 of the total 6,879 IOM-assessed IDP families (data from November 2010) reportedly live in rented accommodation whereas 360 families are living with hosts, 31 in public buildings, and 290 in “other” types of shelter which are usually improvised dwellings made from mud and scrap materials; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Erbil*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>. In Sulaymaniyah Governorate, the large majority (94%), are living in rented accommodation, with the remainder living with host families or in “other” accommodation; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Sulaymaniyah*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Sulaymaniyah.pdf>.

¹²⁷⁸ For example in the districts of Amedi and Zakho (Dahuk Governorate); IOM, *Governorate Profile – Dahuk*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Dahuk.pdf>.

¹²⁷⁹ Of the 894 Christian IDP families surveyed by IOM in December 2010, 7 percent have reportedly found refuge in the Church of Mar Yousif (Saint Joseph) in Sulaymaniyah. The church, although safe, does not offer a long-term solution and the IDPs slept on simple mats; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 4, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf.

¹²⁸⁰ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 7, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf). See also “Background Information”.

¹²⁸¹ Among 894 Christian IDP families surveyed by IOM in December 2010, 68 percent rated food as their top priority; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 4, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf.

¹²⁸² UNHCR, *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers*, April 2009, p. 56, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f569cf2.html>.

¹²⁸³ UNHCR information, January 2012.

¹²⁸⁴ IOM, *Governorate Profile – Dahuk*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Dahuk.pdf>.

¹²⁸⁵ Among 894 Christian IDP families surveyed by IOM in December 2010, 68 percent rated access to education as their top priority; IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 4, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Christian%20Displacement%20Update%2031%20January%202011.pdf. See also “Background Information”.

¹²⁸⁶ Brookings, *UN Expert Calling for Action on Behalf of IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, 3 October 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/~link.aspx?id=0F1713B038A84BA1B2340E2E0FF43515&z=z>.

¹²⁸⁷ IOM, *Governorate Profile – Erbil*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>. According to the US Department of State, “Access to education was a particular challenge for Arabic-speaking IDPs in the KRG;” US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 31, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>.

¹²⁸⁸ In Sulaymaniyah for example, Arabic-speaking families sometimes choose the costly option of reportedly sending their children to neighbouring Diyala Governorate for education; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Sulaymaniyah*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Sulaymaniyah.pdf>. See also UNHCR, *UNHCR assists displaced children in Iraq's Kurdistan region*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4eae3e36.html>.

¹²⁸⁹ Overcrowding reportedly affects most schools in the region. For example, at the Shlama Primary School in central Erbil, an Arabic school, there are 40 to 50 pupils per class and the school has to run in two shifts. Also the school infrastructure cannot accommodate such a high number of pupils; UNHCR, *UNHCR assists displaced children in Iraq's Kurdistan region*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4eae3e36.html>

- ¹²⁹⁰ As a result of the high number of students, those with special needs, e.g. due to conflict-trauma, are reportedly left behind; UNHCR, *UNHCR assists displaced children in Iraq's Kurdistan region*, 31 October 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/4eae3e36.html>.
- ¹²⁹¹ IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 2, report accessible at <http://reliefweb.int/node/382495>.
- ¹²⁹² IOM, *Displacement of Christians to the North of Iraq*, 31 January 2011, p. 2, report accessible at <http://reliefweb.int/node/382495>.
- ¹²⁹³ Brookings, *UN Expert Calling for Action on Behalf of IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, 3 October 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/~link.aspx? id=0F1713B038A84BA1B2340E2E0FF43515& z=z>.
- ¹²⁹⁴ See also "Background Information".
- ¹²⁹⁵ See also Serena Chaudhry, *FEATURE-Iraqi Christians find safety in north, but no jobs*, Reuters, 21 September 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/feature-iraqi-christians-find-safety-in-north-but-no-jobs/>.
- ¹²⁹⁶ The public sector reportedly remains the largest employer in the Kurdistan Region. The KDP and the PUK reportedly give preference in government employment to their respective members; Shwan Zulal, *Bloated Public Sector in Iraqi Kurdistan Needs to Be Reined in*, KurdNet, 24 June 2011, http://admin.iraquupdates.net/p_articles.php/article/94855; US Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 8 April 2011, p. 36, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160462.pdf>. According to Juliana Taimoorazy, president of the Iraqi Christian Relief organization, Christian IDPs in the Kurdistan Region are compelled to join the KDP "(...) to be able to live modestly. However, many refuse to do so and are experiencing poverty [and] lack of education"; Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Phillip Smyth, *Iraqi Kurdistan Without Blinders*, *The American Spectator*, 22 March 2012, <http://www.meforum.org/3195/iraqi-kurdistan-minorities>.
- ¹²⁹⁷ According to IDMC, over 70 percent of IDP families have no members employed; IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 8, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).
- ¹²⁹⁸ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 8, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).
- ¹²⁹⁹ Among IDPs in Erbil and Dahuk, more than 80 percent have reportedly rated employment as their top priority. In Sulaymaniyah, 42 percent reportedly rated employment as a priority; IOM, *Governorate Profile - Erbil*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Erbil.pdf>; IOM, *Governorate Profile - Dahuk*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Dahuk.pdf>; IOM, *Governorate Profile - Sulaymaniyah*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Sulaymaniyah.pdf>.
- ¹³⁰⁰ IOM, *Governorate Profile - Dahuk*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Dahuk.pdf>.
- ¹³⁰¹ Brookings, *UN Expert Calling for Action on Behalf of IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, 3 October 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/~link.aspx? id=0F1713B038A84BA1B2340E2E0FF43515& z=z>.
- ¹³⁰² IOM, *Displacement Of Christians To The North Of Iraq*, 31 January 2012, p. 1, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>. See also Jack Healy, *Iraq Christians now fleeing north havens*, *New York Times*, 11 March 2012, <http://www.sacbee.com/2012/03/11/4327745/iraq-christians-now-fleeing-north.html>.
- ¹³⁰³ For example, 63% of households surveyed in Sulaymaniyah Governorate in 2011 have reportedly said that the lack of medical staff or equipment was an obstacle to access primary health care centres; Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN), *Essential Services Factsheet*, December 2011, p. 3, <http://www.iauiraq.org/documents/1583/ServicesFactsheet-English.pdf>.
- ¹³⁰⁴ Rudaw, *Insufficient medication at major hospital in Iraq's Kurdistan capital, Erbil*, 4 February 2012, <http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/2/state5860.htm>.
- ¹³⁰⁵ Rudaw, *Kurdish Government to Monitor Drug Import*, 27 January 2012, <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurds/4360.html>; Fryad Mohammed, *Ministry closes 4,000 unlicensed pharmacies*, 20 January 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/285348/>; Qassim Khidhir, *Counterfeit pharmaceuticals a problem in Kurdistan*, *Kurdish Globe*, 30 July 2011, <http://www.kurdishglobe.net/display-article.html?id=DC68AE56C4F318A41DFA97EED5081E6F>.
- ¹³⁰⁶ UNHCR information, February 2012.
- ¹³⁰⁷ IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 13, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.
- ¹³⁰⁸ For example, it has been reported that Christian IDPs in Erbil Governorate can mainly be found in Erbil district, and mostly in Ainkawa, which has a predominantly Christian population and several churches; Middle East Online, *Iraq Christian IDPs find refuge in Kurdish north*, 28 December 2010, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43311>.
- ¹³⁰⁹ Brookings, *UN Expert Calling for Action on Behalf of IDPs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*, 3 October 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/~link.aspx? id=0F1713B038A84BA1B2340E2E0FF43515& z=z>.
- ¹³¹⁰ See "Actors of Persecution and Violence".
- ¹³¹¹ For example, recurrent attacks reported in Basrah, Kerbala or Kut demonstrate that armed Sunni groups such as ISI/AQI have the capability to plan and execute attacks even in predominantly Shi'ite areas; see also chapter "Actors of Violence".
- ¹³¹² For example, Christians that relocated to the outerlying areas of Ninewa ("Ninewa Plains") in the end of 2010 and early 2011 reportedly faced security threats, prompting many to further relocate or even return to their places of origin; IOM, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Christian%20Displacement%20Update.%2031%20January%202012.pdf>. The Ninewa Plains, *de facto* under control of the Kurdish security forces, are reportedly safer than, for example Mosul city, but have also seen mass casualty attacks and targeted attacks against members of minority groups. For example, reported incidents included:
- On 16 January 2012, a car bomb exploded in a residential complex housing IDPs of Shabak ethnicity, killing at least eight people and wounding four others, in Bartella district (Ninewa); Jamal al-Badrani, *Car bomb kills at least 9 in Iraq's Mosul*, Reuters, 16 January 2012, <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE80F0E520120116>.
 - On 14 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting Shi'ite pilgrims wounded five people, including two policemen, when it exploded near a main road leading to a Shi'ite shrine in the town of Bartella, east of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 14*, 14 January 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/checkbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-14/>; Aswat al-Iraq, *Three Shiite visitors, 2 policemen, injured in Ninewa explosive charge*, 14 January 2012, [http://en.aswatiraq.info/\(S\(i0zhgdzzwjnzfrzwbzzyg45\)\)/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146484&l=1](http://en.aswatiraq.info/(S(i0zhgdzzwjnzfrzwbzzyg45))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=146484&l=1).
 - On 2 May 2010, one person was killed and over one hundred students were injured when a convoy of school buses carrying Christian students was attacked after passing a security checkpoint on the outskirts of Mosul. The buses were transporting university students from the mainly Christian town of Al-Hamdaniyah to Mosul. According to an Iraqi security official, the buses were escorted by Iraqi soldiers because of past threats and attacks against Christians in the area. A teenage student died later of her wounds; see UNHCR,

Annex to the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009, pp. 4-6, 28 July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4c4feff72>.

- On 10 August 2009, two truck bombs exploded nearly simultaneously in the Shabak/Turkmen village of Khazna Tabtah in Al-Hamdaniyah District (Ninewa), killing at least 34 people and injuring 179 others. The blasts were so powerful that they completely destroyed at least 30 houses; see UNHCR, *Annex to the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009*, pp. 4-6, 28 July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4c4feff72>.
- On 7 August 2009, a suicide truck bomb detonated outside the main mosque in the Turkmen village of Shrekhan Sufla in Tilkeif District (Ninewa), killing up to 45 people and wounding 217 others during Friday prayers, including a significant number of women and children; see UNHCR, *Annex to the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers: Reports of Attacks and Security Incidents in Iraq since April 2009*, pp. 4-6, 28 July 2010, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=4c4feff72>.

¹³¹³ Among the refugee returnees monitored by UNHCR in Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basrah and Ninewa between August and December 2011, 15 percent had reportedly indicated that they had experienced security incidents affecting their family or their specific location of return in the six months preceding the interviews, including abuse/harassment (40%), targeted murder (13%), large explosions (10%), mines/UXO (9%), military operations (8%), kidnappings/disappearance (8%), and physical assaults (5%); UNHCR Iraq Returnee Monitoring, August – December 2011. Between January and November 2010, UNHCR Protection and Assistance Centre (PAC) monitors conducted 192 community level assessments, surveying a total of 50,000 families (295,992 persons), including 36,819 families (220,189 individuals) post-2006 IDPs, 12,210 families (70,422 individuals) IDP returnees and 971 families (5,381 individuals) refugee returnees. Virtually all returnees monitored reportedly cited the perceived improvements in security as central to their decision to return (96.9% of IDP returnee groups; 100% of refugee returnee groups); however, all groups of returnees reportedly confirmed that they continue to face security issues upon return. 69% of IDP returnees and 22.6% of refugee returnees reportedly said that incidents of general violence had affected them in the previous three month period. Furthermore, 12.8% of the IDP returnees and 11.7% of the refugee returnees claimed they had been targeted for religious reasons; 11.5% of the IDP returnees and 9.2% of the refugee returnees claimed they had been targeted for political reasons; UNHCR/PAC, *Community Monitoring Assessments January – November 2010*.

¹³¹⁴ Reported to UNHCR/PAC protection monitors, April – June 2010. See also “*Sunni Arabs in Majority Shi’ite Arab areas and Shi’ite Arabs in Majority Sunni Arab Areas*”.

¹³¹⁵ IOM observed occasional tensions between IDP and host communities because the latter had reportedly considered the IDPs to be increasing insecurity. Reportedly, this can at times result in targeting of IDPs by local security forces, especially in the wake of attacks or security breaches; IOM, *Salah al-Din – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 2, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Salah%20al-Din.pdf>.

¹³¹⁶ See chapter “*Availability of National Protection*”.

¹³¹⁷ See “*Background Information*” and “*Individuals with Ethnicity-based Claims*”. See also IOM, *Special Focus – Disputed Internal Boundaries*, November 2010, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1FE70227853DF594C12577FC004CEBC8-Full_Report.pdf.

¹³¹⁸ In Kirkuk, IDPs had reportedly been targets of harassment and detention, particularly during the run-up to the anticipated census exercise.

¹³¹⁹ See “*Women with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances*”.

¹³²⁰ See “*Children with Specific Profiles or in Specific Circumstances*”.

¹³²¹ See “*Victims or Persons at Risk of Trafficking or Forced Prostitution*”.

¹³²² See “*Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) Individuals*”.

¹³²³ According to the US Department of State, “[T]ravel throughout the country by road involves the significant potential for attacks.” It further assessed that “[V]ehicular travel in Iraq can be extremely dangerous. There have been attacks on civilian vehicles as well as US-FI and Iraqi military and security convoys on roads and highways throughout Iraq, both in and outside metropolitan areas. Attacks occur throughout the day, but travel at night is exceptionally dangerous (...);” US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html. According to FCO, “*Road travel within Iraq remains highly dangerous and there continue to be fatal roadside bombings and both random and premeditated attacks on military and civilian vehicles;*” FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³²⁴ For example, on 29 January 2012, a roadside bomb reportedly exploded near a minibus, killing one person and wounding nine others, in Baghdad’s Za’afaraniyah district; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 29*, 29 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-29/>. On 7 January 2012, a civilian was reportedly killed and three others were wounded, including a child, when a roadside bomb struck a minibus carrying passengers on a main road just north of Ba’quba (Diyala); Xinhua, *Three killed, 12 wounded in Iraq’s violence*, 7 January 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-01/07/c_131347952.htm. On 5 January 2012, a roadside bomb targeting a minibus carrying Shi’ite pilgrims reportedly killed one child and wounded five women when it exploded just southwest of Mosul; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, January 5*, 5 January 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-january-5>. On 26 November 2011, bombs on each side of the main road from Abu Ghraib to Fallujah reportedly killed seven people and injured at least seven more; AFP, *Eight killed in Iraq bombings*, 26 November 2011, <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/11/26/11/eight-killed-iraq-bombings>.

¹³²⁵ According to the US Department of State, attacks are “*random and unpredictable*” and are “*capable of destroying the average vehicle*”; US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html.

¹³²⁶ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Travel Report Iraq*, last updated 29 October 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/report_rapport-eng.asp?id=133000; FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³²⁷ For example, on 19 January 2012, armed men reportedly attacked a vehicle carrying three engineers working for a mobile communication company on the highway Baghdad-Kut, taking them to an unknown place; NINA, *3 Communication engineers kidnapped north Kut*, 19 January 2012, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FJLFIF. See also FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³²⁸ According to the US Department of State, “[C]arjacking by armed thieves is very common, even during daylight hours, and particularly on the highways from Jordan and Kuwait to Baghdad. Both foreigners (...) and Iraqi citizens are targets of kidnapping. Kidnappers often

demand money but have also carried out kidnappings for political/religious reasons. Many hostages have been killed;” US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html. See also Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Travel Report Iraq*, last updated 29 October 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/report_rapport-eng.asp?id=133000; FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³²⁹ According to the US Department of State, “[W]hile Baghdad has seen the majority of insurgent activity over the past year, significant incidents have also occurred in outlying cities, indicating a high risk to travelers on roadways;” US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html.

¹³³⁰ US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html. See also chapter “Shi’ite civilians, including pilgrims”.

¹³³¹ See “Former Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)” and “Sahwa Members, Traditional Tribal, Religious and Community leaders”.

¹³³² For example, on 12 September 2011, at a fake checkpoint, gunmen reportedly dressed in military uniforms forced their way onto a bus of Shi’ite pilgrims traveling from Kerbala to Syria and executed all 22 men on board; AP, *Gunmen in Iraq Take Over Bus Filled With Shi’ite Pilgrims and Kill 22 Men*, 12 September 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html>. “The wearing of an Iraqi police or army uniform is not a guarantee that the wearer is bona fide or operating in an official capacity. This warning is particularly important at ad hoc checkpoints, where murders, kidnappings, and robberies frequently occur;” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Travel Report Iraq*, last updated 29 October 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/report_rapport-eng.asp?id=133000. See also FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³³³ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 38, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).

¹³³⁴ For example, on 3 December 2011, a roadside bomb targeting a police patrol reportedly killed three people, including a father and his son, when it exploded near their vehicle in a farmland near the town of Iskandariya (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 3*, 3 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-3/>. See also “Government Officials and Employees” and “Members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)”.

¹³³⁵ For example, reported incidents included:

- On 4 February 2012, a bomb placed inside a plastic bag exploded in a bus, wounding a passenger in the Talibiya neighbourhood of northeastern Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Feb. 4*, 4 February 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-feb-4>.
- On 5 November 2011, a bomb attached to a minibus exploded in eastern Baghdad, killing a man and wounding seven other people; Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, November 5*, 5 November 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-november-5>.
- On 2 August 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a minibus wounded the driver in the town of Iskandariyah (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, August 7*, 7 August 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-august-7/>.
- On 13 July 2011, a roadside bomb exploded near a small bus and wounded five passengers on the southern outskirts of Baghdad; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 13*, 13 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-13/>.
- On 26 June 2011, a bomb left in a minibus killed a civilian and wounded three others when it exploded in Baghdad’s west-central Mansour District; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 21*, 21 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-21/>.
- On 23 June 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a minibus exploded and wounded the driver in southern Kirkuk; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, June 23*, 23 June 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-june-23/>.
- On 30 May 2011, a roadside bomb that exploded near a minibus killed one passenger and wounded four others in Baghdad’s northern Shaab District; Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, May 30*, 30 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-30/>.
- On 23 May 2011, a bomb attached to a taxi killed the driver and wounded the passenger in the Baghdad’s western District of Ghazaliyah; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, May 23*, 23 May 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-may-23/>.
- On 12 April 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a minibus killed the driver and wounded two passers-by in Baghdad’s western Yarmouk district; Reuters, *Security developments in Iraq, April 12*, 12 April 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-april-12/>.

¹³³⁶ For example, reported incidents included;

- On 18 December 2011, a sticky bomb attached to a car exploded when the driver entered a bus terminal, wounding him and two others in the town of Mussayab (Babel); Reuters Alertnet, *FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, December 18*, 18 December 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-december-18/>.
- On 8 September 2010, at least three people were killed and more than 20 others were wounded when a parked car bomb exploded near a bus station in the southern Bayaa neighbourhood of Baghdad. The same day, two bombs detonated near a bus station in eastern Baghdad, killing at least one person and wounding 12 others; BBC, *Second Iraq TV presenter shot, Baghdad bombs kill four*, 8 September 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11235930>.
- On 10 July 2011, a parked car bomb near a bus terminal wounded ten civilians when it exploded in Ba’quba (Diyala); Reuters Alertnet, *Security developments in Iraq, July 9*, 9 July 2011, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/factbox-security-developments-in-iraq-july-9/>.
- On 12 March 2010, a car bomb detonated inside a bus station in Kerbala, killing two people and injuring six others; Mohammed Al Dulaimi, *Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq - Friday 12 March 2010*, McClatchy Newspapers, 12 March 2010, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/12/90282/round-up-of-daily-violence-in.html>. On 21 February 2010.

¹³³⁷ “(...) curfews and vehicle bans can be enforced at short notice, particularly around religious holidays, pilgrimages and key political dates, such as elections”; FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³³⁸ On 11 December 2011, the Iraqi Transportation Ministry reportedly denied media rumours that there had been a rocket attack at Baghdad International Airport. Baghdad International was also the site of the large US military base, Camp Victory, which was handed over to Iraqi authorities in November 2011. Camp Victory had reportedly been a regular target for rocket attacks; Wissam al-Jaff, *Government denies attack at Baghdad International*, AKnews, 11 December 2011, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/277525/>.

¹³³⁹ US Department of State/Bureau of Consular Affairs, *Iraq Country Specific Information*, 23 December 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1144.html. See also Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Travel Report Iraq*, last updated 29 October 2011, accessed 18 March 2012, http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/report_rapport-eng.asp?id=133000; FCO, *Middle East and North Africa – Iraq*, updated 5 March 2012, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/middle-east-north-africa/iraq>.

¹³⁴⁰ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Travel Report Iraq*, last updated 29 October 2011, accessed 15 March 2012, http://www.voyage.gc.ca/countries_pays/report_rapport-eng.asp?id=133000.

¹³⁴¹ IOM also observed that as a result of sectarian tensions, Arab IDPs and returnees in Kurdish areas may often not receive the same services as Kurds, and vice versa; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 16, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>; IOM, *Special Focus – Disputed Internal Boundaries*, November 2010, p. 6, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1FE70227853DF594C12577FC004CEBC8-Full_Report.pdf.

¹³⁴² The housing card is a document provided to individuals who rent or own a place of residence at a particular address. The housing card is a prerequisite to obtain any other official document such as ID card, nationality certificate, PDS card, or passport. In order to obtain a housing card, the head of household is required to present an official housing deed or rental contract with his/her name on it. IDPs living in settlements and who therefore lack a legal title to their residences are unable to obtain a housing card. In the past, IDPs could obtain a “proof of residency letter” from the local council in their place of residence, which was often accepted in place of housing cards in applications for other documentation. However, this practice was stopped in January 2011 in line with instructions from the Ministry of Interior. As a result, many IDPs are no longer able to obtain or renew their civil ID cards or nationality certificates. This affects in particular children born in the place of displacement who are unable to obtain these critical documents; UNHCR Iraq, February 2012.

¹³⁴³ For example, 30.3 percent of IDP groups reported that members were missing PDS cards; 42.9 percent civil ID, 46.6 percent social welfare registration and 59.6 percent nationality certificates, according to information available to UNHCR in Iraq, December 2010.

¹³⁴⁴ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 7, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf). See also “Background Information”.

¹³⁴⁵ Nearly half (48%) of the IDPs surveyed by IOM mentioned shelter as a priority need; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 7, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁶ Among IOM-surveyed IDPs, 58 percent lived in rented accommodations; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁷ High rental costs are a problem for IDPs because it means that a large portion of their resources will be spent on paying rent each month, reducing what is left for food, health, or education. Having to pay rent is especially burdensome for those with no steady income; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>; IOM, *Babylon – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Babylon.pdf>; IOM, *Baghdad – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Baghdad.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁸ Among IDP families monitored by IOM, more than half (58%) live in rented homes, 19 percent live in homes described as “other”, which are generally temporary buildings comprised of mud, sticks, and oil canisters, with little or no plumbing or waste collection facilities, and almost 10 percent live in collective settlements. Another 10 percent live with host families or in tents near the host family and 2.6 percent were found to be living in public buildings; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

In Kirkuk Governorate, only 24 percent of the IDPs monitored by IOM live in rented housing while a large number of IDPs live in improvised housing, often illegally built on public land; IOM, *Kirkuk – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kirkuk.pdf>. In Salah Al-Din Governorate, almost 40 percent of the IDPs monitored by IOM said to be living in a collective town settlement, a public building, or „other“ - which normally means an improvised mud house; IOM, *Salah al-Din – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Salah%20al-Din.pdf>.

¹³⁴⁹ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 44, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).

¹³⁵⁰ UNHCR, *IDPs in settlements in Iraq*, April 2011, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_660.pdf.

¹³⁵¹ UN News Centre, *Iraq: UN official calls for better access to services for the internally displaced*, 11 March 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41511&Cr=Iraq&Cr1=>.

¹³⁵² UNHCR Monitoring in 2010 showed that over 80 percent of IDP groups monitored reported that members were suffering from water borne diseases such as dysentery or diarrhea. Also, 76.9 percent of IDP returnees and 22.6 percent of refugee returnees reportedly also suffered from water borne diseases; UNHCR in Iraq, December 2010. See also IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 9, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁵³ See “Conflict-Induced Displacements and Voluntary Returns”. UNHCR is aware of at least three settlements where eviction orders were executed in Baghdad during the year of 2011 and five orders were issued but not implemented yet; UNHCR Information, February 2012. See also IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁵⁴ See “Conflict-Induced Displacements and Voluntary Returns”.

¹³⁵⁵ In the Governorates of Al-Anbar, Babel, Baghdad, Diyala, Kerbala, Najef, Salah Al-Din and Wassit. These 45 settlements hosts some 10,083 families (57,670 individuals), mostly IDPs (5,913 families or 32,816 individuals), but also IDP and refugee returnees as well as persons from the local community; UNHCR Iraq, February 2012.

¹³⁵⁶ UNHCR is aware that a number of camps and settlements are located within the master plan of the main cities where public infrastructure projects could be implemented; UNHCR information, February 2012.

¹³⁵⁷ UNHCR is aware of some eight IDP camps, four of them in Baghdad, that have been established on private lands; UNHCR Iraq, February 2012.

¹³⁵⁸ According to latest reports by UNHCR's Implementing Partners, IDP families in Haidar Al-Karar settlement in Baghdad have reportedly received eviction warning within ten days and more than 20 houses were demolished in the settlement. Eighteen IDP families in Nuori Shafiq, also in Baghdad, have reportedly received a court order to either vacate the compound or pay rent, which however the majority cannot afford. Some 80 families have reportedly already been evicted from Al-Awassa settlement in Baghdad and moved to an adjacent area. There reportedly is a current threat of eviction also against vulnerable families in Al-Mansuriya quarter in Al-Alawi area in Baghdad; UNHCR Iraq, February 2012.

¹³⁵⁹ For example, IOM reported that houses in Al-Hessabat settlement in Baghdad's Hurriyah sub-district, which were built from mud and reeds, suffered severe damage, especially to the roofs, during storms in the area in 2010; IOM, Baghdad – Governorate Profile, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Baghdad.pdf>. See also for example, IOM, *Salah al-Din – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 7, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Salah%20al-Din.pdf>.

¹³⁶⁰ See "Background Information".

¹³⁶¹ Nearly half (47%) of the IDPs surveyed by IOM mentioned food as a priority need; reportedly, the rate is generally higher among the recently displaced compared to those displaced five or more years ago, who in the meantime have usually been able to secure access to food. Also, among IDPs monitored in the disputed areas, 64 percent have reportedly cited food as their main priority; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 7, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁶² Among returnees monitored by IOM, food was reportedly cited as the top priority need by 67 percent. IOM field assessments showed that 66 percent of returnee families had regular access to food rations, 30 percent received rations on a less regular basis and 3 percent did not have access; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, pp. 8, 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁶³ See "Background Information".

¹³⁶⁴ In late 2009, the monthly ration parcels reportedly consisted of rice, sugar, cooking oil, flour, milk for adults, tea, beans, children's milk, soap, detergents and tomato paste. In 2010, the Iraqi Government reduced the parcel to flour, rice, sugar, cooking oil and children's milk; IRIN, *Iraq: Government vows to improve food aid system*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91983/IRAQ-Government-vows-to-improve-food-aid-system>.

¹³⁶⁵ To obtain food rations, the family/individual is reportedly required to be registered at the branch supply centre in the place of residence. However, bureaucratic hurdles, including those related to documentation, have reportedly challenged their ability to do so. Persons seeking to transfer their PDS registration to another location are required to fill in a transfer request form at the new PDS centre. This request must be sent to the centre in the place of origin in order to cancel his/her registration there, and then be returned to the new PDS centre to add the person to the list. Depending on the area and the workload of the concerned PDS centre, this process can take several weeks or months. The procedure can be further delayed by up to six months by Ministry of Trade regulations that PDS transfers are not possible between November and April each year. Between May and October, applications for PDS transfer are only received during the first 10 days of each month. In the interim, IDPs have to rely on food supplies from local markets, or, if possible, retrieve their food rations from their previous place of residence, which may however not be possible due to insecurity or lack of finance to pay for transportation. Another obstacle encountered by IDPs is the requirement to produce a "housing card" (see above "Documentation") to the PDS centre in order to request the transfer. Unofficially, some PDS centres accepted a "residency letter" issued by the local council in the place of displacement; however, this practice was stopped in line with instructions from the MoI. IDPs living in illegal settlements are consequently denied access to the PDS in the place of displacement for lack of relevant documentation. IDPs may also face difficulties to add new-born children to their PDS registration, as this requires the child's civil ID card. However, often IDPs face difficulties to obtain civil ID cards for their children born in displacement. As a result, the family may not be able to increase the monthly food ration according to the number of family members. Widowed or divorced women may also face difficulties to obtain their separate PDS cards; UNHCR Iraq Information, February 2012. According to IOM, IDPs reported that it was too dangerous to return to their governorate of origin to transfer their PDS registration. Others have reportedly said that they did not transfer their registration because they thought that they would be able to return to their places of origin in the foreseeable future. IDPs in Kirkuk Governorate reported that they were not able to transfer their food registration; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁶⁶ In Diyala Governorate, for example, IOM reported that IDPs only receive one quarter of the items; IOM, *Diyala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Diyala.pdf>; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 10, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. See also IOM, *Governorate Profile – Qadissiyah*, November 2010, pp. 1, 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Qadissiya.pdf>. See also IRIN, *Iraq: Government vows to improve food aid system*, 21 February 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/91983/IRAQ-Government-vows-to-improve-food-aid-system>.

¹³⁶⁷ IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 14, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁶⁸ See "Displacements for Reason of Violence and Insecurity and Voluntary Returns".

¹³⁶⁹ See "Background Information".

¹³⁷⁰ See "Background Information".

¹³⁷¹ For example, in the Governorate of Babel, 57 percent of the IOM-assessed IDPs are reported to be under the age of 18. In Al-Anbar Governorate 64 percent are reportedly under the age of 18; see IOM, *Governorate Profiles*, November 2010, <http://www.iomiraq.net/govprofiles.html>.

¹³⁷² Among the communities assessed by UNHCR/PAC in Baghdad in 2010, it has been reported that the highest rate of non-attendance was found among IDPs with only 54 percent of IDP boys and 51 percent of IDPs girls attending school. The attendance rate was higher among IDP returnee children (72%) and refugee returnee children (76%); IRC PAC, *Protection Monitoring Assessments Summary Baghdad*, April – June 2010.

¹³⁷³ IRC PAC, *Protection Monitoring Assessments Summary Baghdad*, April – June 2010.

¹³⁷⁴ IOM, *Basrah – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Basrah.pdf>; IOM, *Diyala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Diyala.pdf>.

¹³⁷⁵ See for example, Mahmoud Talab, *110 dilapidated schools found in Diyala*, AKnews, 15 March 2012, <http://www.aknews.com/en/aknews/3/296012/>; IOM, *Anbar – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Anbar.pdf>; IOM, *Basrah – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Basrah.pdf>; IOM, *Diyala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Diyala.pdf>; IOM, *Kerbala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kerbala.pdf>; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Qadissiyah*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Qadissiya.pdf>.

¹³⁷⁶ For example, in Al-Manar Camp in Baghdad, which reportedly houses more than 3,500 persons, 50 percent of the children do not attend school; UN News Centre, *Iraq: UN official calls for better access to services for the internally displaced*, 11 March 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41511&Cr=Iraq&Cr1=>.

¹³⁷⁷ See “Background Information”.

¹³⁷⁸ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 46, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf).

¹³⁷⁹ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 46, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf); IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 8, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. For example, IDPs in Al-Chibayish District (Thi-Qar) must reportedly travel at least 20 km to the nearest health facility, making it difficult to access timely health care; IOM, *Thi Qar – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Thi%20Qar.pdf>. The problem is likely compounded by the lack of public transport between rural and urban centres. For cultural reasons, it has been reported that women are often unable to make such a journey alone; IOM, *Wassit - Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Wassit.pdf>.

¹³⁸⁰ Access to work was reportedly listed as the top priority for 75 percent of IDPs in 2011; IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 47, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf); IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 7, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁸¹ Iraqis reportedly originating from rural areas, with few marketable professional skills beyond agriculture and animal husbandry, may have more difficulties reintegrating elsewhere.

¹³⁸² See for example, IOM, *Kirkuk – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kirkuk.pdf>.

¹³⁸³ For example, IOM monitors in Diwaniyah reported that a majority of the IDP families surveyed were either unemployed or had insufficient income. Monitors observed that in Diwaniyah, more than half (55%) of IDP heads of household were reportedly unemployed, 30 percent worked as day-to-day construction workers, and only 15 percent had a regular employment, such as working as grocery store attendants or local government employees; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 7, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. In Kerbala, IOM monitors reported that many IDP children are often begging to help sustain their families; IOM, *Kerbala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kerbala.pdf>. In Kirkuk, the high number of minors and elderly people among the IDPs means that even where the head of household is employed, he/she will face difficulties to sustain the many dependants in the family. As a result, many children reportedly drop out of school in order to support their families; IOM, *Kirkuk – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kirkuk.pdf>. See also IOM, *Governorate Profile – Qadissiyah*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Qadissiya.pdf>; IOM, *Salah al-Din – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 4, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Salah%20al-Din.pdf>.

¹³⁸⁴ In IDP settlements, unemployment rates have reportedly been as high as 70 percent amongst men of working age; UNHCR Iraq, September 2010.

¹³⁸⁵ According to IOM, among the displaced, one in eight households are headed by a female, 71 percent of whom are able to work yet cannot find employment and thus cannot effectively provide for their families. Some districts/governorates see particularly high numbers of female-headed households. For example, in Baladruz district of Diyala, a reported 25 percent of the IDP households are headed by females. In Diwaniyah Governorate, 19 percent of IDP families are female-headed, rising to 40 percent in Afaq District, and in Kerbala Governorate, 16 percent of IDP families (20% in Al-Hindiya District) are headed by women; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 17, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>; IOM, *Female Headed Households*, Special Focus Report, November 2010, pp. 1, 2, http://www.iomiraq.net/library/IOM_displacement_monitoring_reports/special_focus_reports/2010/Female%20Headed%20Households.pdf; IOM, *Diyala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Diyala.pdf>.

¹³⁸⁶ IDMC/NRC, *IRAQ: Response still centred on return despite increasing IDP demands for local integration*, 10 October 2011, p. 47, [http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/\(httpInfoFiles\)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/\\$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/CCE717078C732F29C125792100523DC7/$file/Iraq-October-2011.pdf); IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 17, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>.

¹³⁸⁷ IOM, *Kerbala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kerbala.pdf>.

¹³⁸⁸ See “Female Heads of Household”.

¹³⁸⁹ IOM, *Basrah – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Basrah.pdf>; IOM, *Kerbala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 2, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kerbala.pdf>.

¹³⁹⁰ IOM assessments revealed that IDPs tend to move to areas where there is greater religious or ethnic homogeneity, especially if they are fleeing persecution related to their ethnic or religious background, or where those families have pre-existing tribal or family ties. In doing

so, these IDPs reportedly seek safety and stability among members with the same religion or ethnicity, further creating “pockets” of homogeneity and changing the social fabric of many of Iraq’s cities; IOM, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, p. 13, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/Five%20Years%20of%20post-Samarra%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq.%20Feb%202011%20EN.pdf>. For example, in Al-Anbar Governorate, a reported 94 percent of IDPs are Sunni Arabs just as the majority of the host population; IOM, *Anbar – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Anbar.pdf>. In Babel Governorate, for example, a reported 99 percent of IDPs are Shi’ite Arabs; IOM, *Babylon – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Babylon.pdf>. In Basrah Governorate, nearly all IDPs are reported to be Shi’ite Arabs; IOM, *Basrah – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Basrah.pdf>. In Kerbala, a reported 97 percent of IDPs are Shi’ite Arabs; IOM, *Kerbala – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 2, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kerbala.pdf>. IOM also observed an Iraq-wide trend of IDPs often staying close to their existing support networks provided by family and friends by relocating within the same governorate or nearby governorates; see for example, IOM, *Kirkuk – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Kirkuk.pdf>; IOM, *Governorate Profile – Qadissiyah*, November 2010, p. 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Qadissiya.pdf>; IOM, *Thi Qar – Governorate Profile*, November 2010, pp. 1, 3, <http://www.iomiraq.net/Documents/IOM%20Iraq%20-%20Governorate%20Profile%20-%20Thi%20Qar.pdf>.

¹³⁹¹ To date the government has reportedly not undertaken concrete steps to reverse the effects of sectarian cleansing; US Department of State, *July-December, 2010 International Religious Freedom Report*, 13 September 2011, p. 32, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171735.pdf>. See also “*Sunni Arabs in Majority Shi’ite Arab areas and Shi’ite Arabs in Majority Sunni Arab Areas*”.

¹³⁹² The number of persons displaced mainly as a result of sectarian violence as of February 2006 has reportedly reached 1.6 million in September 2008. As a result of a significant reduction in violence since then, the total figure dropped by 23% to 1.25 million by August 2011. The reductions have been uneven across the governorates and a few governorates, in particular in Ninewa, have seen an increase in IDP figures (in Ninewa, IDP figures increased by 76% from 106,000 to 178,000). Post-2006 IDPs can be found in all of Iraq’s 18 Governorates, with Baghdad, Ninewa and Diyala accounting for almost half of all IDPs (596,131 out of 1,258,934); UNHCR Iraq Operation, *Monthly Statistical Update on Return*, October 2011, p. 1, <http://www.iuiraq.org/documents/1565/Return%20Update%20IRAQ%20OCT%202011.pdf>.

¹³⁹³ Detailed guidance on the interpretation and application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention can be found in UNHCR, *Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f5857684.html>; and *Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, 4 September 2003, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f5857d24.html>.

¹³⁹⁴ Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention.

¹³⁹⁵ Since 1979, Iraq went through various periods of international armed conflict, notably:

- The Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988);
- The invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent Gulf War (1991); and
- The period from the US-led invasion in March 2003 until the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004.

¹³⁹⁶ Traditionally, “war crimes” were considered only in international armed conflicts. Breaches of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II did not give rise to criminal responsibility at the international level and, as a consequence, such breaches could not be considered “war crimes” until mid-1990s. Only in 1994, with the adoption of the Statute of the International Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR), were serious violations of Additional Protocol II considered within the jurisdiction of the Court as war crimes. In 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) decided that violations of international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts can be criminal under customary international law. After these developments, it has now become generally accepted that serious violations of international humanitarian law in a non-international armed conflict may give rise to individual criminal responsibility under international law, if the relevant conduct has been criminalized. Thus, it is now recognized that war crimes may also be committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts; see Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTR, <http://www.un.org/ict/statute.html>; *Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)*, IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 October 1995, para 134, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fd520.html>. Moreover, violations of AP II are explicitly contained as war crimes in Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, <http://www.un.org/ict/statute.html>. Therefore, for the purposes of an exclusion analysis, serious violations of international humanitarian law including violations of common Article 3 and AP II and customary international law applicable to internal armed conflicts, which were not criminalized before the mid-1990s, could not give rise to exclusion on the basis of Article 1F(a) as “war crimes”. Conduct in breach of these provisions could, however, come within the scope of Article 1F(b) as serious non-political crimes or Article 1F(a) as crimes against humanity. In the Iraq context, these considerations should be borne in mind when assessing crimes committed during the 1991 Shi’ite and Kurdish Uprisings. Acts committed during later periods of non-international armed conflict in Iraq may give rise to exclusion under Article 1F(a) as “war crimes”, provided they take place in the context of, and were associated with, the armed conflict. This could be the case, in particular, for crimes committed during the Kurdish Civil War (1995-1998) and the armed conflict between the ISF/MNF-I and armed insurgent groups following the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 June 2004, which has been qualified by the ICRC as a non-international armed conflict; ICRC, *Iraq post 28 June 2004: protecting persons deprived of freedom remains a priority*, 5 August 2004, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/63kkj8.htm>.

¹³⁹⁷ Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention. It is widely accepted that crimes against humanity were committed throughout the former regime (1979-2003), in situations of international and internal armed conflict as well as during government campaigns aiming at systematically suppressing political opponents or minority groups. Torture is known to have been used systematically and on a widespread scale; see, for example, consistent reporting by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq, <http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/FramePage/Iraq+En?OpenDocument>.

¹³⁹⁸ Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention. In the Iraq context, acts such as assassinations, abductions or torture committed by state security forces, armed opposition groups (pre-2003) or armed or criminal groups or militias (post-2003) are likely to reach the seriousness threshold required to fall under Article 1F(b). Similarly, egregious acts which involve the use of violence and the indiscriminate harm, or threat of harm, against civilians are also likely to constitute non-political crimes within the meaning of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention.

¹³⁹⁹ In addition, Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention refers to “acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. The purposes and principles of the UN are contained in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. Their broad and general terms give

little guidance as to the types of acts that would deprive a person of the benefits of refugee status under Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention. Given the vagueness of its terms, the lack of coherent State practice and the danger of being open to abuse, it is important that Article 1F(c) is interpreted restrictively and with caution, in light of the purposes and object of the Convention. Exclusion from refugee protection based on the criteria of Article 1F(c) should thus be reserved for situations where an act and the consequences thereof meet a very high threshold, that is, where an act is serious or egregious enough as to be capable of being contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This threshold should be defined in terms of the gravity of the act in question, the manner in which the act is organized, its international impact and long-term objectives, and the implications for international peace and security. Thus, in UNHCR's view, crimes which are capable of affecting the maintenance of international peace and security and peaceful relations between States, as well as serious and sustained violations of human rights, would fall within this clause. In the Iraq context, the UN Security Council considered Iraq's invasion in Kuwait in 1990 as a "breach of international peace and security." In addition, the violent suppression of the popular uprisings in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, which led to massive displacement to neighbouring countries, in particular Turkey and Iran, was condemned by the UNSC as a threat to international peace and security in the region. It should be noted, however, that references to UNSC resolutions in this context should not suggest an automatic application of Article 1F(c). As previously stated, the application of Article 1F requires an individual examination, on the basis of reliable and credible information, that "there are serious reasons for considering" that the individual concerned has incurred individual responsibility for acts which are contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN falling within the scope of Article 1F(c). Where the specific circumstances are such that a particular criminal conduct cannot be considered as contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, the application of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Convention would not be justified. Such offences may, however, come more appropriately within the scope of other sub-categories under Article 1F. In the Iraq context, particular attention should be exercised in relation to claims involving acts committed by applicants who held a position of State authority during the Iraq's invasion in Kuwait in 1990 and during the violent suppression of the popular uprisings in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991; see UNHCR, *Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, 4 September 2003, para. 107-111, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f5857d24.html>; UNSC, *Resolution 660 (1990)*, 2 August 1990, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f12240.html>; UNSC, *Resolution 688 (1991)*, 5 April 1991, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16b30.html>.

¹⁴⁰⁰ ICRC in its Annual Report for 2010 refers to Iraq as being in a situation of armed conflict: "Despite improvements in the security situation, Iraq was still wracked by armed conflict. Armed violence, including bombings, election-related incidents and attacks by armed groups, continued to kill, displace or otherwise affect people, disrupting the lives of many communities; minority groups were often singled out." And further "[A]ll parties concerned were called upon publicly to respect IHL, notably its provisions prohibiting attacks targeting civilians and indiscriminate attacks"; ICRC, *Annual Report 2010 - Iraq*, p. 427, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/current/icrc-annual-report-2010-iraq.pdf>. See also ICRC, *Overview of the ICRC's operations in 2012*, 8 December 2012, <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/appeals-2012-overview-2011-12-08.htm>.

¹⁴⁰¹ See for example, Jonathan C. Randal, *Iran-Iraq War, Crimes of War*, accessed 18 March 2012, <http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/547/>.

¹⁴⁰² See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1988 The Anfal Campaign*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html; Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1988 Halabja*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_halabja.html; HRW, *Genocide in Iraq - The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds*, July 1993, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/>; HRW, *Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words*, February 1994, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/iraq/>.

¹⁴⁰³ See for example, HRW, *Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq*, 3 August 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/412ee9044.html>.

¹⁴⁰⁴ See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1980 The Fayli Kurds*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_faylee.html.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1990 The Invasion of Kuwait*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_kuwait.html. See also the UN Security Council's resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, UNSC, *Resolution 660 (1990)*, 2 August 1990, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f12240.html>.

¹⁴⁰⁶ See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1980-1990 The Marsh Arabs*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_marsh.html; HRW, *The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs*, January 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/marsharabs1.htm>.

¹⁴⁰⁷ See for example, UNHCHR, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Iraq, *The Situation of Human Rights in Iraq*, E/CN.4/1999/37, 26 February 1999, para 20-23, <http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/5d0983c1727027ac8025673f0056c924>. See also Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1999 Al-Sadr Killings*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_alsadr.html.

¹⁴⁰⁸ See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1999 Suppression of the 1991 Uprising*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_uprising.html; HRW, *Endless Torment - The 1991 Uprising in Iraq And Its Aftermath*, June 1992, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm>. See also the UN Security Council resolution regarding the violent suppression of the Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings in Iraq following the Gulf War, UNSC, *Resolution 688 (1991)*, 5 April 1991, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16b30.html>.

¹⁴⁰⁹ See for example, Dave Johns, *The Crimes of Saddam Hussein - 1970-1999 Killing of Political and Religious Opponents*, Frontline World, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_opponents.html; HRW, *Iraq: The Death Penalty, Executions, and "Prison Cleansing"*, March 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iraq031103.htm>; UN Commission on Human Rights, *Report of the Special Rapporteur, Andreas Mavrommatis, on the situation of human rights in Iraq*, E/CN.4/2002/44, 15 March 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3caaffc42.html>; US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, *2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices - Iraq*, 4 March 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/nea/8257.htm>; various reports by Amnesty International, <http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq>; and HRW, <http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/Iraq>.

¹⁴¹⁰ For an overview on the Peshmerga and its role throughout the various conflicts, see Michael Garrett Lortz, *Willing to Face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces - The Peshmerga - From the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq*, Master of Arts Thesis in International Affairs, Florida State University, 14 November 2005, <http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11142005-144616/>.

¹⁴¹¹ Including the Islamic Movement in Kurdistan and its various breakaway groups such as Jund Al-Islam/Ansar Al-Islam.

¹⁴¹² See for example, HRW, *Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan*, 5 February 2003, <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/ansarb020503.htm>.

¹⁴¹³ See "Actors of Violence".

¹⁴¹⁴ UNHCR Executive Committee, No. 94 (LIII) - 2002, *Conclusion on the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum*, 8 October 2002, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3dafdd7c4.html>. For guidance on how to establish the genuineness and permanence of renunciation,

see UNHCR, *Operational Guidelines on Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum*, September 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/452b9bca2.html>.

¹⁴¹⁵ See “*Actors of Violence*”.