Iraq: Sectarian Tensions Will Outlast Mosul Offensive

As efforts to recapture the Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State (IS) militants move into their third month, Iraqi security forces in the capital are struggling to prevent attacks in and around Baghdad, a reminder of the sectarian tensions that will persist even after the Mosul offensive is concluded.

In what is now a fairly routine announcement, the Iraqi defense ministry said on December 1 that security forces had arrested four men linked to IS's so-called Wilayat Baghdad. Reportedly the group was planning attacks on security forces and civilian targets. Such attacks are a near daily occurrence. Indeed, in the days following the arrests, the capital was hit by another series of blasts, including attacks using "sticky" bombs attached to the underside of civilian busses, which left at least 2 people dead and 13 more wounded (Iraqi News, December 7).

Wilayat Baghdad, which operates as a kind of provincial arm of IS, has been behind scores of bombings over the last few years. In March 2015, Iraqi intelligence rounded up more than 30 alleged members of the group reportedly responsible for 52 attacks in areas around the capital (al-Arabiya, March 15, 2015). Two months later, Iraqi military intelligence claimed to have killed the group's leader, a man they named Abu Walid (Iraqi News, May 12, 2015; Tasnim, May 13, 2015). Those successes, however, brought only the most temporary of reprieves. Wilayat Baghdad has remained active, continuing to release propaganda videos online and staging attacks around the capital. It is unlikely the eventual capture of Mosul, whenever that happens, will put an end to this.

Part of the problem is that the Sunni areas surrounding Baghdad, the so-called "Baghdad belt," are still a fertile area for recruitment by insurgents. The situation there was made worse in the build-up to the Mosul offensive because Shia militias were turned loose on areas north and east of the capital nominally to maintain security, but indiscriminate violence and looting exacerbated sectarian tensions.

In February, a plan to build a concrete security barrier around Baghdad, which had been first mooted several years earlier, was resurrected in the hope of preventing infiltration from insurgents (al-Arabiya, February 3). Such a plan is fraught with problems. It alienates communities outside the capital and does little to prevent sleeper cells already present in Baghdad. Further, for many the move is simply a plot for a Shia land grab (al-Jazeera, February 10).

IS likes to use the persistent attacks on Baghdad to demonstrate that, even as it loses ground, it retains the ability to strike across the country. But the attacks are also indicative of Iraq's sectarian tensions, an issue that will not be brought under control with the eventual re-capture of Mosul.