Pakistan: Whether the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) has committed any human rights violations

Human Rights Violations by Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)

While speaking with reporters in August 2002, the central vice president of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) referred to Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and other "cronies" of former dictator General Ziaul Haq as "oppressors who had usurped human rights" (The Pakistan Newswire 17 Aug. 2002). He added that "JI activists had been accompanying secret agencies while conducting midnight raids at the homes of workers of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] and other democratic forces ..." (ibid.). However, information corroborating the PML vice president's statement and reports of instances of human rights violations committed by JI could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. Instead, only references to JI's organization of anti-US rallies (Dawn 9 Oct. 2001a; ibid. 9 Oct. 2001b; ibid. 9 Oct. 2001c; ibid. 22 Oct. 2001; Daily News 24 Oct. 2001; The Independent 6 Nov. 2001), various demonstrations (The Pakistan Newswire 19 Oct. 2001; ibid. 19 Feb. 2002; Al-Majallah 12-18 Jan. 2003; The News 30 Apr. 2003) and protests (ibid. 25 Mar. 2002; Country Reports 200231 Mar. 2003, Sec. 2b; The Nation 19 Sept. 2001; Dawn 1 Mar. 2002), a three-day assembly calling for the restoration of democracy (The Daily Star 9 Nov. 2000) and humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees (Pakistan Observer 22 Feb. 2001) could be found. According to the JI chief, Hussain Ahmed,

... our area of interest is limited to sponsoring charitable and humanitarian activity in Pakistan alone. We have repeatedly said that we are engaged in peaceful and charity work through which we seek only to help people, the homeland, and religion (Al-Majallah 4-10 Aug. 2002).

The Ideology of the Jamaat-i-Islami

JI's aim is to establish "a government based on Islamic law, with strict segregation of the sexes" (The Boston Globe 9 Nov. 2001). While speaking to a group of JI workers, acting chief of JI, Munawar Hassan, stated that

... his organization was trying to make the government realize the fact that [Pakistan] was formed in the name of Islam and secularism will not be allowed here. ...

... He said his party believed in struggling within the limits of the Constitution and law, but its adherence to the Constitution and law should not be misconstrued as its weakness.

...He said his party was struggling to establish a noble government (Nawa-i-Waqt 27 Feb. 2002).

According to the party's founder, Abdul A'ala Maududi, the "first priority" for Pakistan was "an Islamic constitution and laws to establish the Kingdom of God" (ICG 20 Mar. 2003, 7). To establish the kingdom of God and enforce the Islamic system of life, Maududi believed it "essential to attain power to shape the state's ideology, society and politics according to Islamic principles and so save it from Western, liberal and secular ideologies" (ibid.). The International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that

In many ways the JI is the main architect of official Islam in Pakistan. ... Maududi, is the best-known South Asian Islamic scholar, whose influence is visible in revivalist movements across the Muslim world. The party has wide international contacts, with chapters in Bangladesh and India, and ties to the Ikhwanul Muslimeen, the Islamic Brotherhood of Egypt (ibid.).

JI was designed along "communist party lines" demanding that its members have a "'firm ideological commitment, high character and total dedication'" (ibid., 9). Because of this, it has become "the most organised and dynamic political party in Pakistan" (ibid.), and the "most powerful religious lobby" in Pakistan in respect of its "organisational capability, media skills, political experience and influence within state institutions and in society" (ibid., 6). (For additional information on the JI, including its role, ties with the military, structure and methodology, please see the excerpted attachment from Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military by the International Crisis Group.)

JI is "a leader of the six-party fundamentalist coalition Muttahida Mujlis-e-Amal (MMA), which dominates the federal opposition and rules the two western border provinces, North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan" (AFP 27 June 2003). According to the ICG, the MMA programme "runs counter to President Musharraf's pledges of reform" (20 Mar. 2003, i). Among its objectives are a desire to end "co-education, a first step towards the total segregation of women in public life, and the addition of mere Islamic texts to school and college curricula" (ICG 20 Mar. 2003, ii). JI Secretary General, Syed Munawar Hassan, has said that the MMA "believes in peace and tranquility on national affairs"; however, "'provocative acts by the government'" such as sending Pakistani troops to Iraq to help United States forces "were forcing people and political force[s] to adopt the way of protest and agitation" (PPI 3 July 2003).

JI is also a "key member" of the All Parties Harriyat Conference (APHC) (Dawn 1 July 2002), an "umbrella organization of parties fighting for freedom in Kashmir" (ibid. 1 Aug. 2000) that decided to boycott the polls in Jammu and Kashmir for the 2002 elections conducted by the Indian Election Commission (ibid. 1 July 2002). However, Ghulam Mohammed Bhat, a JI chief, explaining that his group "would not urge people to boycott the upcoming state polls," said that "'Jamaat doesn't believe in unlawful activity. Ours is a democratic setup'" (ibid.).

According to the Boston Globe, JI "wants to win an Islamic state through elections, not violence" (9 Nov. 2001).

Frédéric Grare, the Director of Centre de Sciences Humaines (CSH), a New Delhi-based research centre studying issues of development in India and South Asia (Grare 2001, 2), argues in his book Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami, that despite "an ideology with totalitarian consequences," the JI's defence of democracy in the face of the military regime of General Musharraf is "the means of its political survival" (ibid., 124). Grare also suggests that in the "confrontation with authoritarian regimes," the struggle for democracy creates a "deadlock" that motivates some Islamist parties, including the JI's student branch, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulabah, to resort to violence, which the JI has attempted to curtail (ibid.). At the same time, however, Grare suggests that the group's dependence on democracy for whatever influence it enjoys also leads to a self-restricted use of violence (ibid.).

While condemning the killing of 17 Christians during Sunday prayers in October 2001, JI leader Hussain Ahmad declared that "no Muslim could resort to such an action, adding that those who indulged in violence were playing 'the game of the enemy'" (IPS 31 Oct. 2001).

In March 2002, JI and 19 other religious organizations formed "a joint front to eliminate extremism and terrorism, establish peace, and promote unity among Muslims" (Khabrain 29 Mar. 2002).

In June 2003, the JI "hosted a grand reception to welcome an Indian parliamentary delegation ... in a move which 'shocked' Islamic militants" (AFP 25 June 2003). Agence France Presse (AFP) reported that the JI was "apparently shedding its hardline policy towards India [and] said ... it supported peace initiatives between the rival nuclear neighbours" (ibid.).

The JI outlines a number of conditions that must be fulfilled by persons wishing to become its members on its Website (JI n.d.a). The eighth condition provides the following:

(8) The Jamaat-i-Islami is devoted to peaceful and upright means of struggle and a strict adherence to this principle marks its whole history. ... It devoutly disdains violence and bloodshed (ibid.).

In laying out its vision for Pakistan on its Website, JI declares that it is "committed to the sincere and effective pursuit of [various] guiding principles of state policy" (ibid. n.d.b). One of these is that "[p]olitical power must be exercised within the laid down framework; that is, it must be exercised "on behalf of the community through the process of mutual consultation" (ibid.).

However, JI outlines its "defence policy" as follows:

a. Develop Pakistan defence potentials to the maximum, using all appropriate modes including nuclear option.

b. Strive for the earliest achievement of self-sufficiency in defence production.

c. Establish the closest possible co-operation with the Muslim world in every field of defence activity.

d. Consider aggression against any Muslim country as aggression against the entire Muslim world.

e. Strive to get back every inch of land that belongs to us (ibid.).

For additional or more detailed information on the JI, including its objectives, goals, approach, vision, commitment, strategy for change, constitution, leadership, organization and founding leaders, please refer to its Website at .

Jamaat-i-Islami's Links to Terrorism

According to Dawn, the JI is "regarded as the political arm of the Hizbul Mujahideen militant group" (1 July 2002). However, JI leader Hussain Ahmed denies that the mujahideen is its military wing (SAAG 29 May 2003). For additional information on the relationship between JI and the Hizbul Mujahideen, please refer to PAK41668.E of 24 July 2003.

Although JI claims to be "strongly against sectarianism, subversion, and terrorism, and appreciate[s] every effort for the elimination of terrorism" (Khabrain 15 Apr. 2000), JI "also support[ed] the Taliban regime and insists that Jews planned the attack on the World Trade Center" (The Boston Globe 9 Nov. 2001).

In an August 2002 interview, Hussain Ahmed stated the following in reference to JI links with terrorist groups in Kashmir:

"... [T]hose with whom we have contacts are leaders and people who are far from practicing terrorism against anyone. ... I do not know terrorists, killers, or criminals. Those who contact me are sensible brothers and respectable leaders" (Al-Majallah 4-10 Aug. 2002).

During a large demonstration in early 2003 organized by the JI to protest US threats against Iraq, some JI leaders allegedly "threatened to declare jihad against the United States if it attacked Iraq" (Al-Majallah 12-18 Jan. 2003). Speaking about these threats in an interview, Hussain Ahmad clarified his group's position, saying that

"I did not make such a threat. The Shaykh who said that during the recent demonstration meant jihad as a comprehensive political term through which we [JI] seek to make the changes we desire. It does not mean carrying weapons against the United States. We do not have the capability to do that. We did not have the capability during the US war against Afghanistan" (ibid.).

To date, four of the 22 most wanted members of Al-Qaeda have been arrested while in the homes of JI activists (Dawn 4 Mar. 2003). Despite this, Pakistan's federal information minister, Sheikh Rashid Ahmad, declared that the JI is "'not a terrorist outfit,'" but rather "a responsible politico-religious party" (ibid.). In addition, a high ranking official of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) stated that the JI "was not suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda," while adding that individuals belonging to the JI may be involved with the group "on their own" (ibid. 13 Mar. 2003).

United States intelligence officers, however, are not convinced that JI leaders and members are not helping Al-Qaeda members from Afghanistan and so are making "detailed enquiries" into possible links with Al-Qaeda (SAAG 29 May 2003). For more detailed information in this regard, please refer to the attached article by the South Asia Analysis Group.

In September 2001, ITAR-TASS reported that, "[i]n the opinion of Russian secret services, the Islamic fundamentalist organization ... Jamaat-i-Islamie ... in view of its financial and organizational potentials, may be behind terrorist acts in the USA" (12 Sept. 2001). The report added that, according to the Russian Federal Security Service,

... the masterminding and sponsoring [of] a chain of explosions of residential houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk two years ago [in 1999] had been traced to that radical group [JI] with the headquarters in Afghanistan and branches in the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Some 230 people were ... killed by the explosions (ibid.).

In February 2003, Russia's Supreme Court "blacklisted 15 radical Islamic organizations operating in Russia and abroad," including the Jamaat-i-Islami (Pakistan) (ITAR-TASS 14 Feb. 2003).

Human Rights Violations Against Jamaat-i-Islami

In September 2000, the chief of JI Bahawalnagar, Muhmmad Ismail, was shot and killed by unidentified armed men while returning to his hometown after attending a meeting of the JI advisory council in Lahore (The News 6 Sept. 2000).

According to an advocate who has examined anti-terrorism laws in Pakistan, 90 per cent of those booked under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) were political workers, including 2,000 JI workers (Dawn 24 Aug. 2001) who had "launched a violent demonstration in 1999 when Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited the eastern ... city of Lahore by bus" (AFP 25 June 2003; see also Dawn 24 Aug. 2001). According to Dawn, the definition of terrorism in the amended ATA is "all encompassing; under [it] all kinds of offences are triable before anti-terrorism courts" (ibid.). In addition, the previously struck down provision by the Supreme Court, under which confession before a police official could be used as evidence, has been brought back (ibid.). For the text of the amended definition of terrorism, please see the excerpted attachment taken from the Dawn article entitled "Terrorists, Police May Exploit Amended Law."

In October 2001, several persons, including a district JI chief, were injured "when police used tear gas and baton charged activists of several parties who wanted to take out a procession ... against the US attack on Afghanistan" (Dawn9 Oct. 2001a). As the protestors arrived at the venue, "police rushed to the site and asked the protestors to disperse peacefully saying that taking out a procession would not be allowed" (ibid.). JI leaders, however, "insisted on taking out a 'peaceful protest'," but an argument ensued and the police resorted to tear gas and baton charge (ibid.).

Elsewhere that same day, JI organized a "tribal rally ... to protest the US strikes against Afghanistan," but the police opened fire, leaving three persons with bullet injuries (ibid. 9 Oct. 2001c). According to rally organizers, "protesters were peaceful and the security forces resorted to firing" (ibid.).

In late October 2001, police arrested over 70 JI leaders and workers in the province of Sindh over a 36-hour period as "a preventive measure against the planned Jamaat rally" scheduled for 23 October 2001 to protest against the use of the Jacobabad airport by the United States air force (Dawn 22 Oct. 2001). According to JI, over 1,000 workers and leaders were arrested in the Sukkur division of Sindh alone (ibid.). In addition, Hussain Ahmed, who was to lead the rally, was banned from entry into Sindh (ibid.). Corroborating information was published in an article by the Daily News (24 Oct. 2001).

In November 2001, police detained JI chief, Hussain Ahmad "at the height of pro-Taliban protests ... against Musharraf's support for the US-led war on terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan" (Dawn 1 Mar. 2002). In January 2002, Ahmed's detention was further extended for a period of 30 days "on account of his involvement in activities prejudicial to good order and public safety" (The News 5 Jan. 2002). According to the acting chief of JI, Ahmed was arrested "not under any case, but on the basis of personal vengeance" (Nawa-i-Waqt 27 Feb. 2002).

In March 2002, the Pakistan government asked the Sindh, Punjab and Azad Kashmir governments to ban the publication of 22 magazines (Dawn 7 Mar. 2002). The publications are managed by several groups, including JI (ibid.).

In April 2002, the Pakistan government "prevented a protest and arrested several party leaders [of the JI] in Lahore, even though the JI officials claimed they received prior permission for the protest" (Country Reports 2002 31 Mar. 2003, Sec. 2b).

Speaking with a reporter in August 2002, Hussain Ahmed stated that the police "arrest us, release us, and then arrest us again. I am not alone in this; all the leaders of the religious parties are being treated in this way. But we have been used to this kind of treatment throughout the past few years" (Al-Majallah 4-10 Aug. 2002).

In September 2002, 14 central and provincial leaders of the MMA were arrested for violating a ban on political gatherings at railway stations (AFP 7 Sept. 2002). One of these leaders was Hussain Ahmed (ibid.).

In January 2003, the home of JI's women leader, Sabiha Shahid, was raided and her family members detained (The Pakistan Newswire 11 Jan. 2003). The arrest of the female members of her family, "who were not even allowed to wear veils," was termed a "violation of basic human rights" (ibid.). Following a raid on the house of JI leader Shahid Ali Khan on 9 January 2003, which resulted in the arrest of three foreigners alleged to be Al-Qaeda members, "police [have] prepared a comprehensive plan to crack down on JI to arrest the top leaders and activists in Karachi" (Pakistan Observer 11 Jan. 2003). In addition,

All police stations have been alerted for raids to be conducted at the residences of JI leaders and activists in case protest and rallies are organized.

... the Sindh government has received instructions from Islamabad to handle the JI agitation with [an] iron hand and as such police have been put on red alert (ibid.).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References

Agence France Presse (AFP). 27 June 2003. "AFP: Islamic Parties Rage at Possible Deployment of Pakistani Troops in Iraq." (Dialog)

_____. 25 June 2003. "AFP: Pakistani Islamic Fundamentalist Party Supports Peace with India." (Dialog)

_____. 7 September 2002. "Pakistan Police Arrest Islamic Party Chiefs to Thwart Rally." (NEXIS)

Al-Majallah [London, in Arabic]. 12-18 January 2003. Mahmud Khalil. "Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami Leader on Ties with Musharraf, Al-Qa'ida." (FBIS-NES-2003-0117 21 Jan. 2003/Dialog)

_____. 4-10 August 2002. Abdallah Ahmad. "Pakistani JI Leader on Terrorism Accusations, Kashmir, Relations with Government." (FBIS-NES-2002-0808 12 Aug. 2002/Dialog)

The Boston Globe. 9 November 2001. Anne Barnard. "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign Islamist Movement: Religious Party Hopes to Shut Down Pakistan." (NEXIS)

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2002. 31 March 2003. United States Department of State. Washington, DC. [Accessed 11 July 2003]

Daily News [Colombo]. 24 October 2001. "Massive Security in Airbase Town as Pakistan Braces for Anti-US Demo." (NEXIS)

The Daily Star [Dakha]. 9 November 2000. Vol. 3, No. 430. "Pak Religious Parties Warned Against Holding Rallies." (NEXIS)

Dawn [Karachi]. 13 March 2003. M. Ziauddin. "JI Not Suspected of Having Links with Al Qaeda: ISI." (NEXIS)

_____. 4 March 2003. "JI Not a Terrorist Outfit: Rashid." (NEXIS)

_____. 1 July 2002. Jawed Naqvi. "US Pressures APHC to Contest Polls." [Accessed 15 July 2003]

_____. 7 March 2002. Mohammed Riaz. "22 Magazines to Be Banned." (NEXIS)

_____. 1 March 2002. "Plan Afoot to Set Free Some Held Militants." (NEXIS)

_____. 22 October 2001. "Many JUI, JI Leaders, Workers Arrested." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. 9 October 2001a. "Anti-US Rally Baton-Charged." [Accessed 15 July 2003]

_____. 9 October 2001b. "JI Takes Out Procession." [Accessed 23 June 2003]

_____. 9 October 2001c. "Three Injured at JI Rally." [Accessed 23 June 2003]

_____. 24 August 2001. Rafaqat Ali. "Terrorists, Police May Exploit Amended Law." (NEXIS)

_____. 1 August 2000. "Making the Most of This Opening." [Accessed 16 July 2003]

Grare, Frédéric. 2001. Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islami. New Delhi: Manohar - Centre de Sciences Humaines.

The Independent [London]. 6 November 2001. Peter Popham. "Campaign Against Terrorism: Pakistan - Hardline Cleric Put Under House Arrest by Musharraf." (NEXIS)

International Crisis Group (ICG). 20 March 2003. Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military. IGC Asia Report, No. 49. [Accessed 23 July 2003]

Inter Press Service (IPS). 31 October 2001. Nadeem Iqbal. "Pakistan: Christian Killings May Widen Sectarian Violence." (NEXIS)

ITAR-TASS [Moscow]. 14 February 2003. "Russia to Submit List of Islamic Terrorist Organizations to UNSC." (FBIS-SOV-2003-0214 19 Feb. 2003/Dialog)

_____. 12 September 2001. "Russian Secret Services Link Jamiat-e Eslami to US Attacks." (FBIS-SOV-2001-0912 13 Sept. 2001/Dialog)

Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI). n.d.a. "Objectives, Goals and Approach" [Accessed 11 July 2003]

_____. n.d.b. "Vision and Commitment." [Accessed 11 July 2003]

Khabrain [Islamabad, in Urdu]. 29 March 2002. "Pakistan Daily: Religious Anti-Terror Group Formed, Some Leaders Express Doubt." (FBIS-NES-2002-0402 4 Apr. 2002/Dialog)

_____. 15 April 2000. "Leaders Criticize Interior Minister Over Terrorism Remarks." (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 17 Apr. 2000/NEXIS)

The Nation [Lahore]. 19 September 2001. "Pakistan Asks Provinces to Start Talks to Pacify Religious, Jihadi Groups." (FBIS-NES-2001-0919 20 Sept. 2001/Dialog)

Nawa-i-Waqt [Rawalpindi, in Urdu]. 27 February 2002. "Pakistan: Jamaat-i-Islami Leaders Vow to Continue Struggle Against Secularism." (FBIS-NES-2002-0303 6 Mar. 2002/Dialog)

The News [Islamabad]. 30 April 2003. "Pakistan: Jamaat-i-Islami Stages Protest Against Visit of 'Arms Inspectors'." (FBIS-NES-2003-0430 1 May 2003/Dialog)

_____. 25 March 2002. "Pakistan: Jamaat-i-Islami Vows to Continue Jihad in Kashmir." (FBIS-NES-2002-0325 26 Mar. 2002/Dialog)

_____. 5 January 2002. "Pakistan: Jamaat-i-Islami Chief's Detention Extended for Another 30 Days." (FBIS-NES-2002-0105 7 Jan. 2002/Dialog)

_____. 6 September 2000. "Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami Leader Shot Dead." (FBIS-NES-2000-0906 7 Sept. 2000/Dialog)

The Pakistan Newswire. 11 January 2003. "JI Women MNAs Criticize Arrest of JI Leader's Family." (NEXIS)

_____. 17 August 2002. "Politics: PML-Q Leader Stays Away from Gen. Zia Anniversary Function." (NEXIS)

_____. 19 February 2002. "Politics: JI Women Activists Demo." (NEXIS)

_____. 19 October 2001. "JI Announce Movement to Topple Musharraf Govt." (NEXIS)

Pakistan Observer [Islamabad]. 11 January 2003. "Pakistan Authorities Brace for Imminent Clash with Jamaat-i-Islami Over FBI Raids." (Dialog)

_____. 22 February 2001. "Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan Urges Muslim States to Recognize Taleban Government." (FBIS-NES-2001-0222 23 Feb. 2001/Dialog)

Pakistan Press International (PPI). 3 July 2003. "JI Opposes Sending Pakistani Troops to Iraq." (Dialog)

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). 29 May 2003. No. 699. B. Raman. "Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al Qaeda." Attachment

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). 29 May 2003. No. 699. B. Raman. "Jamaat-e-Islami, Hizbul Mujahideen and Al Qaeda." Additional Sources Consulted

IRB Databases

Internet sites, including:

BBC

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000

Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organizations, Violent Political Groups, and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements. 2002. 2nd ed. Edited by Sean D. Hill. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice.

Federation of American Scientists

Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2002

Political Parties of the World. 2002. 5th ed. Edited by Alan J. Day. London: John Harper Publishing.

United Kingdom Immigration and Nationality Directorate

Search engine:

Google

Electronic Attachments

Dawn [Karachi]. 24 August 2001. Rafaqat Ali. "Terrorists, Police May Exploit Amended Law." (NEXIS)

...

The amended terrorism law defines terrorism in these words: "An action shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1) if it involves the doing of anything that causes death, grievous damage to property, or is likely to cause death or endangers a person's life; kidnapping for ransom, hostage-taking or hijacking, incites hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal disturbance, involves stoning, brick-batting or any other form, mischief to spread panic, firing on religious congregations, mosques, imbargahs, churches, temples and all other places of worship, or random firing to spread panic, or involves any forcible takeover of mosques or other places of worship; creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful trade and daily business and disrupts civic life, burning of vehicles or any other serious form of arson, involves extortion of money (bhatta) or property; is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt a communication system or public utility service; involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties; or involves serious violence against a member of the police force, armed forces, civil armed forces or a public servant."

International Crisis Group (ICG). 20 March 2003. Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military. IGC Asia Report, No. 49. pp. 7-9. [Accessed 23 July 2003]

C. JIHAD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE

During the first six years of Pakistan's existence, two critical issues defined the JI's role and the character of the state: jihad, or holy war, and the Ahmadis, a Sunni minority community.

...

... Ahmadi[s], a community against which the JI launched a campaign in 1953 that transformed into bloody riots. Martial law was declared for the first time in parts of the country, including Lahore. Maududi justified state-sanctioned discrimination against non-Muslim minorities to a commission of inquiry.

Islamic movements, including the JI, had demanded that the Ahmadis be declared apostates and treated as ‘dhimmis', non-Muslims. ...

As a result of religious party pressure, this perception of minorities has become constitutionally enshrined. In 1974 the constitution was amended to define Muslims in a manner that excluded Ahmadis. They are now legally considered non-Muslim. That constitutional amendment set the scene for the brutal sectarian violence of the 1980s and 1990s.

...

... the JI also joined hands with the military on issues of national security and national identity, including its anti-Indian policies.

D. TIES WITH THE MILITARY

In 1965, when Pakistan again went to war with India on Kashmir, the JI declared a jihad and ran a public campaign to complement the army's effort.

... JI front organisations participated in the civil war in East Pakistan, which culminated in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Its student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), was transformed from a "peaceful dawa organisation into a militant force, willing to meet violence with violence". ...

Ties established with the military in East Pakistan served the JI well in the 1970s. It was a key component of the Pakistan National Alliance, whose agitation gave General Zia-ul-Haq the pretext to overthrow the elected government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and impose martial law in 1977. The JI became Zia-ul-Haq's surrogate political party domestically and its closest partner in the U.S. sponsored jihad in Afghanistan.

...

The JI was, in fact, the face of the Afghan jihad in Pakistan. It ran a decade-long campaign to collect zakat, donations and other material support for the Afghan jihad. Never a madrasa-based party, it set up a network of religious schools to support the war. Although the JI was then based mainly in the Punjab and Karachi, 41 of the 107 madrasas it established during the 1980s were in areas adjoining the Afghan border.

Faithful to Maududi's precepts, the JI only supports militancy for "legitimate" causes - those sanctioned by the state. Following the Afghan episode, its next jihad was in Indian-occupied Kashmir, where JI-affiliated front organisations like the Al-Badar and Hizbul Mujahideen were among the pioneers of the insurgency.

The party's student wing (IJT) has a long record of physical intimidation and violence at educational institutions. This can be partly attributed to its younger cadre's involvement with Afghan mujahidin groups. Weapons and violence were introduced at Pakistani colleges during the 1980s, especially at the Punjab University and the University of Karachi. The suppression of socialist and secular student parties was supported by a military regime that was doing the same in the national political arena.

...

... JI agitation, at the military's urging, heralded the fall of both PPP and Muslim League governments during the failed democratic transition of the 1990s.

E. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY

...

association: rukniat (full membership); karkun, associate members serving as workers and candidates for full membership; and muttafiqin, those who agree with its ideology and politics.

...

... Full membership is only possible after passing tests of knowledge, morality and character. It is not unusual for candidates to remain under observation and trial for months, if not years. Deviation from party standards warrants cancellation of membership or demotion.