The Court found in particular that Article 5 was applicable to the applicants’ case as their presence in
the transit zone had not been voluntary; they had been left to their own devices for the entire
period of their stay, which had lasted between five and 19 months depending on the applicant;
there had been no realistic prospect of them being able to leave the zone; and the authorities had
not adhered to the domestic legislation on the reception of asylum-seekers.
Given the absence of a legal basis for their being confined to the transit zone, a situation made
worse by them being impeded in accessing the asylum system, the Court concluded that there had
been a violation of the applicants’ rights protected by Article 5 § 1.
The conditions the applicants had lived in had also been appalling: they had had to sleep in the
transit zone, a busy and constantly lit area, with no access to washing or cooking facilities. There had
thus also been a breach of Article 3 as their treatment had been degrading.
The principal issues in the appeals concern the meaning and effect of Article 2(n) and Article 28 of Dublin III ("Article 2(n)" and "Article 28", respectively), which relate to the detention of an individual for the purpose of transfer to another Member State under that Regulation. Mr Hemmati and Mr Khalili also raise a distinct issue regarding whether Garnham J was right to hold that their detention was lawful by application of the usual principles of domestic law first adumbrated in Re Hardial Singh [1984] 1 WLR 704 and rehearsed in later authorities such as R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 888 and Lumba v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 ("the Hardial Singh principles").
This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision. The Grand Chamber affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Section delivered on 11 July 2006. UNHCR submitted an intervention in this case.