# OUR RIGHT TO KNOW

TRANSPARENT REPORTING UNDER AN ARMS TRADE TREATY

**AMNESTY**INTERNATIONAL





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### INTRODUCTION.

Public reporting is a key means by which the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will become more than a set of obligations and actually affect States' behaviour. Fully transparent reporting will build confidence amongst States, allowing States to demonstrate that they are implementing the treaty, and provide a basis for States and civil society to assess how the ATT is being applied in practice.

For the purposes of demonstrating compliance with the provisions of the ATT, transparency means that States must regularly provide accurate, comprehensive, timely and public information on exports, imports and other international transfers of conventional arms covered by the Treaty. States must also report on the implementation of the Treaty under their national laws, regulations and administrative procedures, including relevant enforcement actions and international cooperation and assistance activities.

This document focuses on why States should transparently report on their international arms trade and transfers. It also provides a brief overview of transparency initiatives to date, and outlines how a reporting mechanism could be incorporated into the Treaty.<sup>2</sup>

### REASONS FOR TRANSPARENCY

The majority of States, including most major arms exporters, already routinely report data on their country's international arms trade and transfers. Such reporting has changed from being an exception to a routine activity for many significant arms trading States. (see below). For many States, regular reporting on their international arms trade and transfers has become a normal part of the business of government and a necessity towards achieving shared security.

Nevertheless, there is still significant room for improvement and for harmonised reporting by all States under the ATT. Some States have not reported on their arms trade and other international arms transfers at all in recent years. A much greater number of States report partial information, leaving out some types of conventional arms, while some States fail to report on a regular basis. The ATT provides an opportunity to address this. An ATT can improve international levels of transparent reporting and provide a comprehensive framework for standardized national reporting. An enhanced system of reporting under the ATT will have the following benefits:

### Build confidence and security among States Parties to the ATT

States that ratify the ATT need to have assurances that other States Parties – sometimes their commercial or strategic competitors – will not ignore the obligations set out in the Treaty in order to gain an unfair commercial or strategic unfair advantage. A fundamental means of building confidence amongst States is to require each State Party to report fully on its exports, imports and other international transfers of conventional arms. Without such a transparent reporting mechanism, compliance by States Parties with the ATT and security cooperation based on the rule of law will be harmed through unnecessary mutual suspicion.

### Encourage democratic accountability by national legislatures:

The timely publication of a national report by States Parties to the ATT could stimulate understanding and discussion amongst elected representatives of national assemblies/parliaments, as well as the media and public, on arms imports, exports and other international transfers, and the implementation of national law. Frequently debates or committee sessions are scheduled on the publication of such a report, which provides a focus to ensure that a government is acting responsibly. The review of such reports can be accompanied by requests for more information or initiatives to improve national control systems.

### Public scrutiny of the application and implementation of the ATT:

National reporting is a basic foundation not only for democratic oversight but also for public scrutiny by media and civil society monitoring of how governments apply their obligations made under the ATT. This would apply not only to the regular import, export and other arms transfer licensing decisions, but also to the measures taken by government to implement all aspects of the Treaty. Journalists, NGOs and concerned citizens have a key role to play in checking that governments have lived up to their obligations in implementing and applying the Treaty. Without timely and comprehensive data on trade and transfers as well as on the legal and administrative and enforcement measures taken to implement the ATT, this role becomes much harder.

### Prevent diversion of arms into illicit markets:

All States should take active measures to prevent illicit trafficking. One of the main objectives of the ATT is to prevent the diversion of conventional arms into illicit markets. States cannot be achieved this without international cooperation and support for the rule of law by commercial actors and civil society in each country. The most prevalent source of illicit arms is diversion from licit stockpiles and from the authorised trade. It is therefore important that business associations, the wider public and other States have the best possible picture of the authorised trade, so that it can be analysed and diversion routes identified.

### Allow States to present the whole picture and improve understanding:

Increased transparency also helps to reduce unfair criticism of governments when they act lawfully to supply or acquire the legitimate means of defence and law enforcement. When questions arise concerning arms which have been exported or imported to an apparently problematic or dangerous destination, greater transparency in annual public reporting would allow government officials more

leeway to explain the full context to the public to show how government authorisations had been legitimate – for example if arms exports to a war zone were actually supplied to a peacekeeping force.

### Unfounded fears

Some States use a range of arguments to explain why they don't wish to fully and transparently report on their arms imports, exports and other international transfers. The first is the cost of refining collecting, collating and publishing the information. While this does involve some administrative expense, that cost is minimal and would by a tiny fraction of the existing costs of dealing with the consequences of irresponsible transfers of arms.

Customs authorities already record the movements of all commodities (including conventional arms) across borders, and where movements do not pass through customs authorities those transfers are checked and handled by other officials. Such data is collated and submitted annually by most States to the United Nations Statistics Division (see below) and several governments are known to use this information as the basis for their national reports. Government licensing authorities also have access to much information on international arms transfers. When they authorise an export or import of arms, it is normal for the license application to include details of the type and quantity of equipment; and firms or other parties also send information once authorised transfers have been completed. Governments should, as a fundamental means of complying with the ATT, monitor and record arms being moved in and out of their territory and jurisdiction. Reporting in a transparent manner would simply entail publishing this already available information in meaningful aggregate categories.

Two further objections are that full and transparent reporting will compromise national security or harm commercial interests. Both of these fears have been allayed by the experience of transparency over the past three decades. The leading arms producers and exporters (such as the USA, China, Russia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have all reported information annually on their exports and imports of major conventional weapons to the UN Register (see below), and an increasing number of States submit data on transfers of small arms and light weapons. Leading arms producers and exporters who have already for a number of years been reporting fully on their transfers do not appear to have suffered a commercial disadvantage. Similarly, these countries also have some of the largest military forces in the world – and disclosure of their transfers does not appear to have adversely affected their security. Moreover, most States also submit arms trade data to the UN Statistics Division (see below). Transparency does not require that technical specifications or detailed information on prices and contracts be disclosed.

### A HISTORY OF INCREASING TRANSPARENCY

Transparency in the international arms trade has steadily increased over the past 20 years. Almost all significant arms exporters report some information via one or more of the available reporting mechanisms. Nevertheless, reporting is patchy, inconsistent and states often withhold particular information. An ATT could help to complete the process of improving transparency in armaments by creating common reporting standards and procedures.

International norms governing transparency in the arms trade have a relatively short history. The first formal reporting mechanism was set up just after the end of the Cold War. In 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait, and it was widely recognised that the Iraqi armed forces had been built up through large imports of military equipment from several different countries. Following the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution which established the UN Register of Conventional Arms with the prevention of dangerous build-ups of major conventional arms as one of the key objectives. <sup>3</sup> All UN Member States have been encouraged to provide generic transfer data to the UN Register on a voluntary basis which is then collated and published by the UN each year. However, the Register only covers transfers of a few major conventional weapons with military offensive capability (such as military aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles and missiles) and does not cover all types of conventional arms.

The Register has developed since then into a key means by which States report to the UN on their imports and exports of arms, as well as to enable States to provide background information regarding their military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies. A total of 126 States submitted reports for 2001.<sup>4</sup> About half of all reports have clarified that the State in question did not import or export any of the types of arms covered by the Register. However, the level of reporting has dropped since 2001 and 72 States provided information for 2009. In 2003 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting States to provide additional information on their international transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and such information has been provided by States on a voluntary basis since then.<sup>5</sup>

Many governments also independently publish reports on their arms transfers. They are normally annual publications which detail exports though some are published more frequently, or have a wider range of information. The number of States publishing national reports grew from a handful in the mid-1990s to 22 in 2001. This number has continued to grow, and by 2011 35 States had published reports on their international arms transfers (though some have not done so recently, and others contain little useful information). About two thirds of national reports are published by EU Member States, but important arms exporters from other regions

also publish regular national reports – such as South Africa, Ukraine and the USA.

In 1998, the European Union (EU) agreed upon the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers that encouraged national reporting by EU Member States of their exports of conventional arms. Transparency among EU members was further enhanced through the development of EU annual reports that detail the arms exports of all EU members (currently 27 States). A short report was first published in 1999, and over the following years as reporting became mandatory it has grown into a more extensive document, with the latest report (covering 2010 exports) containing over 400 pages.

The third public reporting mechanism is the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (Comtrade).<sup>8</sup> Almost all States submit data on their trade in commodities – from potatoes to golf clubs – and some of this data covers arms exports and imports. Sometimes different types of equipment are aggregated (for example for military and civilian aircraft) in such a way that it becomes difficult or impossible to monitor certain types of arms transfers. However, in other cases, trade data on conventional arms is usefully disaggregated into generic categories (see for example the illustrative list in *Appendix Two* below). Thus, Comtrade can be used to a certain extent as a transparency mechanism, for example for international trade in: small arms, artillery, some light weapons, and associated parts and ammunition; and armoured vehicles.

Comtrade's main advantage is that States report both their imports and their exports, and a large number of States already report such data. In 2009 for example, 112 States reported on at least an import or export of small arms and light weapons or their parts and ammunition; and 67 States reported on transfers of armoured vehicles. States report on both exports and imports, so making it possible to 'mirror' data to build up a picture of the global arms trade. For example, one can examine import data reported by several States to assess another country's exports. Some States, though, report on relatively uncontroversial items such as pistols, but withhold information on equipment such as military style rifles and machineguns or light weapons like mortars.

An extensive analysis published in 2010 of reporting via these three different mechanisms by the 48 largest exporters of small arms and light weapons found that not only had transparency increased between 2001-8, but the number of States that reported no data at all had fallen from eight to two, and there had been improvements by some States that reported the least data. Public reporting of the arms trade has changed from being an exception to a routine activity for many States. A key task for the ATT must be to improve the quality and regularity of reporting.

In addition to public reporting, arms exporting States have also set up confidential State-to-State information exchanges. The most prominent examples concerning international transfers of conventional arms are those conducted by the 40 member Wassenaar Arrangement<sup>10</sup> which includes most of the world's significant arms producing and exporting States (the main exception being China); the information

exchange on the international transfer of small arms and light weapons within the 56 members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);<sup>11</sup> and the information exchange which occurs amongst the 27 Member States of the EU (in addition to the EU public reporting on arms exports). Thus, almost all the world's significant arms exporting States are already sharing information on their arms exports (and other transfers). They show no signs of having suffered any serious commercial or military disadvantage from doing so.

Most States have shown that they can and do report information on their international arms transfer and are willing to be transparent to a greater or lesser extent. It is important to ensure that they report regularly and comprehensively, that the gaps and grey areas in the data are gradually filled in with clarity.

### IMPLEMENTING TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

The **following elements** build on existing best practice and could be the basis of a reporting and transparency mechanism under the ATT.

### **Record Keeping:**

States have already committed themselves to regulate the trade in conventional arms and authorise exports and transit of small arms and light weapons, and to keep appropriate records. The ATT should require that all States keep records of the international arms transfers that the national authorities have authorised and that have been cleared by customs. These records would consist of all the information required to issue authorisations or customs clearance for the import, export, transit, trans-shipment and transfer of conventional arms into and out of their territory. Information on cases of arms brokering, transport and finance should also be kept from the issuance of licenses, permits or other authorisations. The records would contain information such as a description of the arms, quantity, value, final destination and end user, the importing, exporting and transit States involved, and names of other companies and individuals involved. This body of data should form the basis of reporting.

### **Information Sharing and Consultations:**

States have committed themselves to using and developing mechanisms for the exchange of information at the global, regional and sub-regional levels, including case-specific information on a range of possible matters relating to the arms trade. <sup>13</sup> Transparency within the ATT could also be facilitated and encouraged by provisions that support both bilateral and multilateral consultations amongst States Parties.

### Scope of Public Reporting:

Annual reports by States should cover all generic types of conventional arms and forms of international transfer defined under the ATT (see the annex to this briefing for a recommendation on the scope of the ATT). Forms of transfer should cover all import, export, transit, transhipment, temporary transfer and State-to-State transfer of conventional arms that have been authorised in terms of the Treaty. Annual reports should also include information on the authorisation of brokering, transport and financial services that facilitate international transfers of conventional arms.

### Elements in Public Reports:

Minimum data to include in annual national reports would be:

- Partner State (of import, export, transit, transhipment or transfer)
- **Types of equipment**, (generic reporting categories should be developed in the first five years after the ATT comes into force so the categories conform to the list in *Appendix One*);
- Year of transfer (of delivery and authorisation governments should aim to report on both authorisations and actual deliveries because what is eventually delivered can be very different to what was initially authorised. If reporting on both is not possible, one is acceptable);
- Size of transfer (include number of units, financial value, or both States are encouraged to report both the number of units transferred and the value of the transfer. If this is not possible then they can choose one (the number of units is preferred);
- Agency, company or other entity responsible (include commercial trade and services such as by producers, dealers and brokers, as well as transfers made by government departments such as the armed forces).

### **Developing the Framework for Transparency:**

States should report on their measures to implement the Treaty within 180 days of the Treaty entering force. Afterwards, within an agreed period, States should submit annual reports summarising their international arms transfers for the preceding year which should then be made publicly available on the UN web site. In addition, States should also submit to the UN copies of laws, regulations and guidelines, as well as other relevant information such as on the enforcement of the Treaty provisions and on international cooperation and assistance, which should also be publicly available.

To allow for the development of capacity within some States, in the first five years after the Treaty enters into force, States Parties could submit data that has already been reported to Comtrade, the UN register, and in national or regional reports. They would therefore not be required to duplicate existing transparency

mechanisms. Nevertheless, States could be encouraged to report additional information when doing so is practicable. For instance, they could report all information collected while authorising and monitoring arms transfers across their territories. In any case, States should report as much information as they are able and also make full use of the existing transparency mechanisms (such as regional reports, national reports and Comtrade).

After five years (possibly at every Review Conference), States Parties should review the quality and level of information they have provided in their annual public reports, and make proposals to improve standards of public reporting to achieve greater openness and transparency in the international trade and transfer of conventional arms. The UN Statistics Division and the Word Customs Organisation could be asked to contribute to a review of the reporting system on trade and transfers.

## APPENDIX ONE: ARMS TRADE TREATY — PROPOSED SCOPE OF EQUIPMENT

The Arms Trade Treaty will require each State Party to develop a comprehensive control list of conventional arms for national regulations on the import, export and international transfer of such arms. The control list should cover all types of weaponry, munitions, armaments and related material used for potentially lethal force in military and law enforcement operations, as well as any parts, components and accessories thereof, and machines, technologies and technical expertise for making, developing and maintaining those items. The generic descriptions listed below should be included as an annex to the Treaty and be regularly updated to guide each State Party in the establishment of its national control list. At a minimum, and not withstanding any existing more detailed control lists that are already mandatory elements for any State Party, the Treaty should apply to the generic descriptions of equipment listed in the annex, as follows:

- 1. Rifles, carbines, shot-guns, revolvers and pistols, machine guns, and other weapons, including bayonets, intended for use by an individual, and parts and accessories thereof.
- 2. Projectile weapons or directed energy weapons of all kinds, including guns, recoilless rifles, howitzers, heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, military flame-throwers, artillery systems, mortars, multiple launch rocket systems, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and launch platforms for all of these weapons, parts and accessories thereof.

- 3. Missiles and missile launchers of all kinds, parts and accessories thereof.
- **4.** Ammunition and ordnance of all kinds, including ammunition and munitions for use with any weapon, item or technology included in this list; other bombs, rockets, grenades, missiles, mines and torpedoes; and fuze-setting devices designed for any ammunition or ordnance included in this list.
- **5.** Military explosives, gases, propellants and demolition charges, "pyrotechnics", fuels and related substances, oxidizers and "precursors" designed for military or law enforcement purposes;
- **6.** Incendiary, smoke-producing, riot control and incapacitating agents and gases designed for military or law enforcement purposes, as well as other chemical and biological toxic agents.
- 7. Tanks, armoured combat vehicles and other ground vehicles, and parts and components thereof, designed or modified for military or law enforcement purposes.
- **8.** Military aircraft of all kinds, including combat aircraft, attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), transport, reconnaissance and surveillance and general utility aircraft, and parts and components thereof, designed or modified for military or law enforcement purposes.
- **9.** Ships and other vessels, surface or underwater of all kinds, special naval equipment, and parts and components thereof, designed or modified for military or law enforcement purposes.
- **10.** Armoured equipment, and parts and components thereof, designed or modified for military or law enforcement purposes.
- 11. Communications, sensing, imaging, optical, fire-control, battle management and countermeasure equipment, stealth technologies, and parts and components thereof, designed or modified for military or law enforcement purposes
- 12. Production equipment, specialised equipment for training, simulators and simulation equipment, components, spares, accessories, technology, and software designed or modified for the production, maintenance, training or use of any weapon, item or technology included in the above list.

### OTHER ARTICLES FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN MILITARY OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS:

13. States are encouraged to take appropriate measures to ensure that their national regulations require authorization for the import, export or international transfer of items not included in the categories above, but which are intended for the use of force in military or law enforcement operations in destinations or by end-users subject to a binding United Nations Security Council arms embargo, or any other relevant regional arms embargo either binding on a Participating State or to which a Participating State has consented to adhere.

# APPENDIX TWO: COUNTRIES REPORTING TO COMTRADE BY SELECTED CATEGORIES 2009

States and some self-governing territories report to the United Nations Commodity Trade Database. The main international classification systems for commodity trade are the "Harmonized System" (HS) developed by the World Customs Organization and the "Standard International Trade Classification" (SITC) developed by the UN Statistics Division. For illustrative purposes here, some of the categories under the Harmonized System that cover conventional arms are elaborated below but not all relevant HS categories are listed and nor are SITC categories relating to arms listed below. Authorities cannot submit a 'nil' report (that they exported or imported nothing) so absence from the lists below may well be due to the state not having imported or exported anything during 2009.

### Description: Small caliber ammunition Code: 930630

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Description: Munitions, including bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines and missiles Code: 930630

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Macao, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faeroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico,

Montenegro, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Korea (ROC), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

### Description: Tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles Code: 817000

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mayotte, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovakia, South Korea, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, United States of America, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

### Description: Military firearms including machineguns, assault rifles and combat shotguns Code: 930190

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Denmark, Djibouti, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, French Polynesia, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, Mayotte, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, South Korea, Sudan, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

### Description: Pistols and Revolvers Code: 930200

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Finland, French Polynesia, Germany, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macao, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Morocco Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Description: Sporting shotguns Code: 930320

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile,

China (PRC), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

### Description: Sporting rifles Code: 930330

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Argentina, Australia, Australia, Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China (PRC), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Macao, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Description: Large caliber guns, howitzers & mortars (none of which are self-propelled) Code: 930119

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Sudan, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Description: Light weapons including rocket launchers and grenade launchers Code: 930120

Reported either an import or an export during 2009: Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Guyana, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Korea, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America.

NOTE: The categories and lists above are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative

### **END NOTES**

- Amnesty International would like to thank Nicholas Marsh of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), for writing the first draft of this document and also thank Peter Dansseart of the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) and Clare da Silva, an independent legal consultant, for their contributions to the document. The technical issues of State reporting systems for international arms trade, transfers and services will be the subject of a more detailed report by Sergio Finardi to be published by TransArms, IPIS and Amnesty International.
- Discussion in this document covers imports, exports and other international transfers of conventional arms (such as transit where arms move through one states territory en route to another destination), and temporary export (for example for repair or exhibition). For stylistic reasons the term 'transfers' or 'international transfers' is sometimes used to cover all of these permutations.
- The UN Register of Conventional Arms can be accessed via the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs web site: http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/HTML/RegisterIndex.shtml
- <sup>4</sup> All statistics on reporting to the UN register are from Holtom, Paul, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau and Henning Webe. 2011. Reporting To The United Nations Register Of Conventional Arms. SIPRI Fact Sheet, May. Solna: SIPRI. Although a total of 126 States submitted reports for 2001, only 37 States have consistently reported for *every* year over the period 1992-2009.
- Information on reporting on small arms and light weapons is from Lazarevic, Jasna. 2010. Transparency Counts: Assessing State Reporting on Small Arms Transfers, 2001–08. Ocasional Paper No. 25. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Between 2003 and 2009, 28 States reported on a voluntary basis once or more to the Register on transfers of SALW.
- See Haug, Maria, Martin Langvandslien, Lora Lumpe and Nicholas Marsh. 2002. Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency. Occasional Paper No. 4. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
- Number of reports calculated from SIPRI's online archive: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national\_reports
- 8 For more information see: <a href="http://comtrade.un.org/">http://comtrade.un.org/</a>
- See Lazarevic, Jasna. 2010. Transparency Counts: Assessing State Reporting on Small Arms Transfers, 2001–08. Ocasional Paper No. 25. Geneva: Small Arms Survey
- For more information see: <a href="http://www.wassenaar.org/index.html">http://www.wassenaar.org/index.html</a>
- OSCE member states also share information on transfers of major Conventional Weapons using a format which is the same as the UN register. For more information see: <a href="http://www.osce.org/fsc/43190">http://www.osce.org/fsc/43190</a>
- See for example UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/51/45 F of 1997 where States agreed to "enact adequate national legislation and/or regulations and adopt administrative procedures in order to exercise effective control over armaments and the export and import of arms, inter alia, with the aim of preventing trafficking in illicit arms and bringing offenders to justice." See also United Nations. 2001.

Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. UN Document A/CONF.192/15. New York: United Nations, available from <a href="http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx">http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx</a>. Other regional and multilateral agreements also mention authorisation of arms transfers and record keeping.

 $^{13}$  See, for example, Programme of Action (Part III, paragraph 5), 1996 UN Guidelines, UN Firearms Protocol (Article 12)

