What Future for Mozambique?

1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of January 1995 the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) came to an end. The general conclusion was that the operation had been an outstanding - and somewhat surprising - success.[1] Despite fears that the transitional process would collapse back into civil war, as had happened in Angola, general elections were held in an atmosphere of relative calm and tolerance, a new government was installed and the defeated opposition accepted the result with grace.

This generally positive evaluation of UNOMOZ is correct - although credit ought to be given to the people of Mozambique, who accustomed to being cast in the role of victims, over three days last October took their fate into their own hands. However, Mozambique is a country which has been at war almost continuously for 30 years. It inherited an almost uniquely dismal legacy of underdevelopment. Some six million out of a population of 14 million had been displaced in the war since 1977 and an estimated one million people are said to have died. Almost every Mozambican has undergone the trauma of loss of family and friends and many have witnessed horrendous atrocities. The countryside is littered with land-mines. Tens of thousands of men have had military experience and there are uncounted small arms cached throughout the country.

Social grievances have been exacerbated through the war years. The opposition has stimulated ethnic and regional grievances, while the government has ceded large tracts of land to its own functionaries or to multinational companies.

The potential sources of conflict are many. Indeed there are perhaps many more genuine grievances now than there were in the 1970s when Rhodesia and South Africa, Mozambique's white minority-ruled neighbours, began their campaign of destabilization. In such a context, what possibility is there of lasting peace?

2. HISTORY OF WAR AND DISPLACEMENT[2]

Many of Mozambique's recent troubles have their origins in the unique character of the country's colonial history over five centuries. Mozambique was colonised for longer than any other country, arguably with the least positive effect. Portugal's interest in Mozambique for most of the colonial period was as a staging post - the coastline is particularly rich in natural deep-water ports - and a source of slaves. From the late nineteenth century, the major colonial power in the region, Great Britain, regarded Mozambique in similar terms: as a transport corridor for the landlocked areas of the Witwatersrand, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and as a source of migrant labour.

It was Mozambique's misfortune to be colonised by one of the poorest of European powers. Portuguese settlers were mainly poor and semi-literate and effectively competed with the indigenous people for cultivable land, at the same time as acting as agents for slave traders. Even by the mid-twentieth century, when some penetration of the hinterland had begun, the level of human development was extremely low. In 1951 Mozambique formally became an overseas province of Portugal. Portugal imitated French colonial policy in attempting to develop an elite of educated Mozambicans, the assimilados, educated in Lisbon or Oporto. However, this elite was never more than minuscule. When Portugal left the country in 1975, Mozambique had fewer than 10 lawyers, a fact that is often overlooked when discussing problems relating to the rule of law in the country since independence.[3] Eighty-five per cent of Mozambicans were illiterate.

While the major colonial powers divested themselves of direct political control in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, the authoritarian Portuguese governments of Antonio Salazar and Marcello Caetano refused any concessions to the nationalist movements in Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé. In 1960 Portuguese troops massacred 600 peaceful protesters at Mueda in northern Mozambique. The following year a number of existing factions unified to form the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO - Mozambique Liberation Front). From 1964, with all avenues closed to peaceful protest, FRELIMO launched an increasingly successful guerrilla war against the colonial army.

In 1974 the Lisbon government was overthrown in a left-wing military coup d'etat, largely prompted by the military successes of the African nationalist movements and disillusionment and demoralization within the Portuguese army. One newspaper commented at the time: 'It was, in the last analysis, FRELIMO which brought down the Caetano government.'[4] As the only substantial political party, FRELIMO took control of a transitional government and then took power at independence in 1975. There had been political divisions within FRELIMO, prompted to some extent by the Portuguese secret police, but also caused by disagreements over the nature of the movement's political and social programme. The FRELIMO leadership had always been resolutely non-ethnic and nationalist - unlike some of those who split away from the movement in the late 1960s - and had developed close political links with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. However, despite these divisions, which were to be exploited in future years, the political outlook seemed positive.

The economic and social legacy, by contrast, was dismal. The Portuguese colonists had fled en masse at independence, taking with them whatever property they could and sabotaging much of what they left. The lack of trained Mozambican personnel posed immense practical and logistical problems and created an immediate dependence on outside assistance and training. Because of FRELIMO's political sympathies, much of this assistance came from the Soviet Union, although Mozambique remained non-aligned and open to Western assistance. In the early years after independence, the government's economic performance was deemed impressive. The period up until the early 1980s was one of significant economic growth, including development of unprecedented programmes for social welfare, notably in health and education.

This promising progress was reversed to a large extent by destabilization. There is no doubt that the new government was wildly optimistic in its development strategies and made many mistakes for which it was to pay dearly. Some of these flowed from the preferences of its ideological partners, such as a heavy investment in large state farms. Others were a result of its nationalist, anti-ethnic emphasis and opposition to traditionalism and 'obscurantism' - the two terms tended to be used interchangeably.[5] Thus FRELIMO failed to understand the disastrous impact of its programme of grouping the rural population into collective villages. In the late 1970s and early 1980s some 1.8 million people were moved into more than 1,200 communal villages. These were initially welcomed - peasants appreciated the new schools and health centres - but rapidly rejected when it became apparent that rural people would have to give up their homes, often on ancestral lands, and move to new settlements.[6]

Although these were serious mistakes which FRELIMO's enemies were able to exploit, they were not the cause of Mozambique's massive social breakdown. Almost immediately after independence the country's white minority-ruled neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa, embarked on a campaign of military destabilization. The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO - Mozambique National Resistance) was established by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in 1976-77, initially with the aim of gathering intelligence on the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), which had bases in Mozambique.[7] The movement's secretary-general was Orlando Cristina, a former Portuguese secret police agent, and its military leader was Andre Matsangaissa, a former FRELIMO platoon commander. However, by the end of 1979 RENAMO was in crisis, with Matsangaissa killed in action and Zimbabwe on the verge of independence. In the event, the CIO handed control of RENAMO to South African military intelligence.[8]

The early 1980s saw a major escalation of RENAMO's activities from rear bases in South Africa and Malawi. The destabilization caused by the war combined with severe drought to create famine. It was during this period that RENAMO acquired its reputation for characteristic brutality - apparently random killings and mutilation of both the living and the dead. By 1984 the Mozambican Government had reached an accord with the South African Government at Nkomati. Subsequent analysts generally agree that while Mozambique abided by the terms of the Nkomati agreement - requiring it to cease support for the African National Congress of South Africa - South Africa continued covert support of RENAMO.[9] However, in the months leading up to Nkomati, South African military intelligence had helped RENAMO to stockpile supplies within the country and infiltrate troops, so that it was ironically at its strongest point just when the Mozambican Government thought that it had a breathing space. A similar chain of events took place in 1986, when Mozambique and its new allies, notably Zimbabwe, put pressure on Malawi to withdraw support for RENAMO, prompting a massive influx of RENAMO fighters into Zambezia province in the biggest offensive of the entire war.

From the early 1980s Zimbabwe was drawn deeper into the war, initially to guard its transport corridor through central Mozambique to the port of Beira. Soon the Zimbabwean army became the spearhead of the counter-insurgency campaign, twice capturing the RENAMO headquarters in Gorongosa - only to see it lost again by demoralised and ineffectual government troops.

Unlike Angola, where pro-South African rebels received military support from the West, few governments outside the region supported RENAMO (Portugal, by the late 1980s, may have been the exception). The British Government, for example, provided officer training for the Mozambican army. The publication in 1988 of a report commissioned by the United States Department of State drew international attention to the atrocities perpetrated by RENAMO, alleging that the rebels had killed some 100,000 civilians.[10] Although this report underplayed the extent of government atrocities and has been criticised by some scholars for a faulty analysis of RENAMO's organization and tactics, it did not exaggerate the brutality.[11] However, Western support for the Mozambican Government seemed to be dependent upon the implementation of economic and political reforms. By 1990, Mozambique had reversed nearly all its post-independence policies, joining the Bretton Woods financial institutions and implementing a structural adjustment programme, opening up to foreign (notably South African) investment, and adopting a liberal multi-party constitution.[12] By this time, however, RENAMO controlled large tracts of territory, especially in the centre of the country. It became increasingly evident that if there was to be peace, RENAMO would need inducements. In the event, the peace process proved relatively easy. The RENAMO leadership was bought off with large sums of cash.

In October 1992, after two years of talks mediated by the Roman Catholic Church, the government and RENAMO signed a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome. An important factor pushing both sides to the negotiating table was the severe drought of the early 1990s, which created an unsustainable burden both on the civilian population - many of whom fled the country - and on government as well as RENAMO political administrations. However, the unwritten element of the GPA was a pledge by the Italian Government to RENAMO of US$ 15 million.[13]

By the time the peace agreement was signed, Mozambique was the poorest country in the world, being the most dependent on overseas aid, which made up 80 per cent of its foreign exchange flows. In 1988 aid was equivalent to 70 per cent of its gross domestic product.[14] The most effective military force in the country was the Zimbabwean army, while private companies employed mercenaries to perform basic security functions. With the encouragement of donor governments, many of the welfare and development aspects of government had been devolved to foreign non-governmental organizations.[15]

3. THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS[16]

The shadow of Angola's Jonas Savimbi loomed large over the transitional process in Mozambique. A similar transition in Angola broke down just as the peace process in Mozambique was beginning, when Jonas Savimbi, leader of the opposition in Angola, rejected the results of elections and relaunched his civil war. The fear that RENAMO and its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, might do the same was ever-present.[17]

The transition took place under the supervision of a massive United Nations operation (UNOMOZ), which effectively took over many aspects of administering the country. The process ran considerably behind its original schedule. Elections which were originally planned for October 1993 eventually took place a year later. At one stage it appeared that the transitional process might become protracted indefinitely. However, the UN Secretary-General insisted that elections should go ahead in October 1994, even though the planned disarmament of the belligerents and integration into the new national army was not completed - thus running the danger of repeating precisely what happened in Angola.

The encampment and disarmament of troops, which only began more than a year after the peace agreement had been signed, was bedevilled with problems. It appeared that RENAMO was only sending troops to the assembly areas from regions that were not crucial to its election strategy. Later, criticism focused on the government side which was encamping its soldiers at a proportionally slower rate than RENAMO. There was a fear that on both sides commanders were withholding elite troops in case the conflict resumed. The troops themselves became increasingly restive. In the months leading up to the elections, former combatants from both sides blocked major roads and took hostages to draw attention to their dissatisfaction with the pace of demobilization.

However, the major threat to the peace process came from the problem of the so-called dual administration. At the time of the GPA, RENAMO controlled substantial areas of the country - 25 per cent of the land area according to some estimates.[18] Although the agreement clearly stated that the country would be under a single administration with freedom of movement allowed throughout, RENAMO was reluctant to allow the population which it controlled to move out of the area and government agencies to move in. Thus, RENAMO continued to require a guía da marcha (travel permit) for movement in and out of its areas, while it strictly controlled food distribution by non-governmental agencies on the grounds that it suspected them of close contacts with the government. These problems were supposedly resolved in a meeting between President Chissano and RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama in September 1993. Henceforth each provincial governor was to be shadowed by three permanent RENAMO advisers.[19] In practice, however, restrictions on freedom of movement continued. The failure to complete the process of encampment and disarmament meant that RENAMO still had the armed personnel to enforce its control. Some observers concluded that RENAMO's restrictions meant that the elections could not be considered truly fair. Although FRELIMO established an office at RENAMO's war-time headquarters of Maringué, in practice parties were not allowed to campaign in RENAMO territory. The population was, in a literal sense, a captive electorate.[20]

The elections themselves seemed poised on the verge of last-minute disaster when Afonso Dhlakama announced that RENAMO was boycotting them on the very eve of polling. Dhlakama came under intense international pressure and then reversed his position after a statement by the Electoral Commission that it would investigate RENAMO allegations of irregularities. In fact, observers noted that the RENAMO boycott did not seem to make any difference to attendance at the polling stations, although there was concern that it may have increased the RENAMO vote among people who feared that it might return to the bush and re-launch its war.[21]

The verdict of the United Nations, recorded in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council in December 1994, was that 'although some irregularities were recorded, most were of an administrative nature, and no event or series of events occurred that could have had an adverse effect on the overall outcome'. The Association of European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA) 'found the electoral process as a whole sufficiently free and fair for the outcome to be a valid expression of the electorate's choice. Polling is assessed as having been free and fair, but in the pre-election phases a number of breaches of the rules have occurred, leading to a certain qualification of the overall assessment'.[22]

Nearly 90 per cent of the registered electorate of over six million voted. The result of the presidential election was a substantial victory for President Chissano with 43.3 per cent of the vote, ahead of Afonso Dhlakama with 33.7 per cent. The other 10 candidates had no significant support. The parliamentary result was much closer: FRELIMO won 44.3 per cent, giving it 129 seats in the 250-member assembly and RENAMO won 37.8 per cent (112 seats). A small coalition, the União Democrática (UD - Democratic Union), won nine seats, with just over 5 per cent of the total vote.[23]

The explanation of the gap between the presidential and party vote is partly an obvious one: President Chissano is considerably more popular than the party he leads. However, it is also clear that many people engaged in tactical voting, largely under the direction of the Roman Catholic church, by voting for President Chissano and RENAMO. The aim was to guarantee that RENAMO came out of the election with a sufficiently strong position not to return to the bush, while ensuring that the FRELIMO leader would form the government.[24]

4. DISPLACEMENT, REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION

The scale of displacement of the people of Mozambique has been extraordinary and almost impossible to grasp in its complexity. Not only have the numbers involved been huge: 1.7 million refugees, as well as some four and a half million internally displaced.[25] Also, people were displaced many times over. Between 1964 and 1992 Mozambique was at peace for only about three years in the mid-1970s. Throughout that period, all parties to the conflict were active in forcibly moving sections of the population, in addition to the millions who simply fled the direct effects of war, drought and famine.

An important tactic of the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign was the creation of aldeamentos or 'protected villages', where people were forced to live to remove them from the influence of the nationalist guerrillas. One effect was to make it increasingly difficult for peasants to cultivate land and feed themselves.[26] The communal village policy of the late 1970s was another massive exercise in population removal, this time for purposes of social engineering. This failed in part because it was so reminiscent of the Portuguese aldeamento strategy. By the early 1980s, communal villages which had initially formed part of the government's socialist development strategy became used as a counter-insurgency tool. Equally unpopular was 'Operation Production', which began in 1983 and involved the removal of unemployed rural migrants from the cities and their forced employment on state farms.[27] The Zimbabwean army implemented a strategy of creating a 'free fire zone' some 40 kilometres wide on the Mozambican side of the border. Those who lived there were forcibly removed, many into refugee camps in Zimbabwe. A survey in 1989 found that 61 per cent of a sample of about 1800 refugees in Zimbabwean camps had been rounded up rather than arriving in the camps voluntarily.[28] In the later stages of the war the Mozambican army resettled civilians 'recuperated' from RENAMO-held areas - often by force - in poorly supplied accommodation centres where they began to starve.[29]

For its part, RENAMO increased the population under its control from the early 1980s by the systematic and forced movement of people, combined with the enlistment of chiefs who would often lead their people into RENAMO-held territory. Forced recruitment was a major problem, with young men given compulsory military training and young women used as sexual servants.[30]

The statistics of displacement are unreliable. For example, the official estimate of 137,000 refugees in Zimbabwe before the repatriation programme began does not take into account at least 100,000 unregistered refugees living outside the official camps.[31] The figures for refugees in South Africa were notoriously unreliable, since until 1993 the country was not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or any other relevant international treaties and did not give any status to Mozambican refugees. Even a head count of Mozambicans within the country would not have been reliable, since South Africa, like Zimbabwe, is a traditional magnet for Mozambican migrant labour.[32]

In 1988, UNHCR had signed a Tripartite Agreement with the governments of Mozambique and Malawi, where the largest number of refugees resided. This was followed by a series of repatriation plans between 1989 and 1992 leading to the signing of the GPA in October 1992 which were criticised by donor countries and others.[33]

One of the points criticised was that the repatriation plans included an expensive and logistically complex scheme to transport some quarter of a million refugees and their belongings in convoys of buses and trucks over a period of 36 weeks from 72 'pre-assembly points' in Malawi through designated exit points, to transit centres in Mozambique. It was hoped that returnees would stay in these tented transit centres for two weeks or less, going on to their own villages or to other accommodation centres further inland.[34] The plans appeared not to take into account the fact that Mozambique did not have the infrastructure to make this practicable.[35]

Critics from non-governmental organisations also questioned UNHCR's emphasis on ensuring that returnees cut their links with Malawi (so that they could not draw double food rations) rather than concentrating on helping the refugees' own strategies for assuring a smooth transition. Further, the plans had no mechanism for disseminating information about conditions in Mozambique which would have enabled refugees to make informed decisions.[36] The plans were equally questioned for lack of a developmental focus or provision of the foundations for long-term reintegration. Importantly, they did not take into account that, in addition to returning refugees, a larger number of displaced persons still within Mozambique would also have to be resettled.[37]

Meanwhile, spontaneous repatriation had begun already before the GPA was signed. Already by 1990 it was estimated that over 200,000 Mozambican refugees had repatriated from around the region - only 4,500 of them in organised programmes.[38] The peace agreement saw a rapid increase in spontaneous return especially from Malawi, where refugee settlements were nearest to the border. UNHCR responded rapidly to the changed situation, adopting a new plan which took account of the fact that most repatriation movements would be spontaneous. The element of the programme which was closest to the original plan was in Zimbabwe, where refugees were accommodated in large, well-organised camps with restricted freedom of movement.[39] For the most part, however, organised repatriation was only available for 'vulnerable groups' - single female-headed households, children and the elderly. There was, however, a vigorous debate about whether the 'vulnerables' should be 'mainstreamed'. It was argued that in order not to be put at a disadvantage, the vulnerable groups should be transported home at the same time as those repatriating spontaneously, and not left to the end as envisaged in UNHCR's plans. UNHCR and the Malawian Government were also criticised for stopping the food rations of those who had partially repatriated to Mozambique, at a time when the long-term future of the peace agreement was far from clear and many returnees continued to draw their rations from the camps as a form of insurance policy.[40]

By March 1995 more than 1.6 million refugees - almost all of the original official estimate - had returned home. UNHCR was expected to repatriate a further 100,000 by June 1995.[41]

5. OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

5.1. Politics

The post-election government remains, like its predecessor, exclusively composed of FRELIMO members. Constitutionally and politically there is no reason why this should not be so, since the government is appointed by the President, who has a majority of votes, while FRELIMO has an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. However, President Chissano was under considerable pressure both before and after the elections to form a government of national unity including RENAMO and other opposition politicians. The issue of the government of national unity was a major cause of a deterioration in relations between the governments of Mozambique and the United States throughout 1994.[42] However, FRELIMO and its supporters argued that not only was it under no legal obligation to form a government of national unity, but that politically the situation was quite unlike neighbouring South Africa, where agreement to create such a government was part of the transitional settlement.[43]

Despite suggestions that RENAMO members might be nominated as provincial governors in the central provinces where the party had substantial support, these posts also went to FRELIMO nominees.[44]

In the event, RENAMO has accepted fairly readily that it does not have a role in the current government. It has boycotted all sessions of the national assembly because of a dispute over voting procedures, although Afonso Dhlakama has indicated that the RENAMO deputies will take their seats in March 1995.[45] This reflects in part the political immaturity of RENAMO, which does not have any party origins nor indeed any real ideological framework, having been established as a surrogate of a foreign power. But it also flows from Mozambique's lack of democratic history. The country has never had a multi-party political system so that there is no precedent to draw upon for how a parliamentary opposition should function. Unlike countries colonised by Great Britain or France, where there was democracy in the metropolis if not in the colony, Mozambique's political traditions derived from Portugal, which at the time was an authoritarian state dominated by the armed forces.

The fear before the elections, even if Afonso Dhlakama did not follow the pattern of Jonas Savimbi and reject the result outright, was that RENAMO would embark on an extensive period of armed negotiation. Its ready acceptance of the result has been a welcome surprise, reflecting the widespread popular desire for peace, including among the RENAMO rank-and- file. The integration of RENAMO is also reflected in the fact that its leader now receives government financial support as the 'honoured leader of the opposition'.[46] The refusal of many RENAMO activists to follow Afonso Dhlakama's boycott call on the eve of the elections indicates that there are serious divergences between the party leadership and the rank-and-file which a continued period in opposition seems likely to exacerbate.

However, the 'dual administration' issue remains unresolved. Just as it did in the run-up to the elections, RENAMO continues to control significant tracts of territory to which it does not give the government access. If it has the continued military capacity to resist attempts to unify the administrative structures and give the government control over all the territory, this could lead to disagreement between the protagonists.[47]

The new government has undertaken a massive change in personnel, with young technocrats brought in to replace the older generation. Only 15 out of 48 members of the previous government have been nominated again. Only three of the party old guard are still there: President Chissano himself, the hardline Interior Minister Manuel Antonio, and Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi, formerly Foreign Minister and a close personal friend of the president. Some of the most interesting political debates are likely to take place within FRELIMO. President Chissano has to maneuver between a Marxist party establishment and a younger, technocratic generation whose hand has been strengthened by the strong opposition vote.[48]

5.2. The Ethnic Factor

Mozambique is a country of enormous ethnic and social diversity - which is scarcely surprising considering its size. Although the Zambezi River provides an obvious dividing line, with predominantly matrilineal systems to the north and patrilineal ones to the south, ethnicity has not been a major factor in the country's politics until recently. Even grievances over forced villagization, when people were removed from ancestral lands, reflected the fact that the intellectual leadership of FRELIMO, many of them former assimilados, rejected all traditional social structures, not those of a particular group.[49]

However, RENAMO has consciously exploited ethnic grievances in ways which came out openly in the election campaign. It was a frequent refrain that FRELIMO and the government were dominated by southerners, mainly Shangaans, and therefore favoured the southern part of the country. It is true that large development projects - many of dubious practical value - were situated in the south, but this was largely because of the more favourable terrain. In any event, FRELIMO has always enjoyed strong support in the far north. The nationalist campaign began in Cabo Delgado in 1960 and for all the 1960s FRELIMO military activities were concentrated in the north. It was only in 1971 that the guerrillas began to infiltrate into the north-centre in Tete Province.[50]

Much of the leadership of RENAMO is Ndau, reflecting the movement's Rhodesian origins. The Ndau are a Shona-speaking group of Nguni origin who straddle the border with Zimbabwe. The Rhodesian CIO recruited Shona-speakers into RENAMO, not only because they could be more easily found within Rhodesia, but also because their main purpose was to gather intelligence on the Shona-speaking Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas.[51] RENAMO's popular base of support has remained within the Shona-speaking centre of the country, although it has also grown in Nampula, Tete and Zambezia where the movement held large blocks of territory from the mid-1980s. In the south, where some of RENAMO's worst atrocities were perpetrated, it has little support.[52]

The election results underline this pattern. In the south and far north, FRELIMO won overwhelming majorities. In the centre - Sofala and Manica - RENAMO won a similar majority, although these provinces have a much smaller population. In Nampula, Zambezia and Tete, RENAMO was the largest party by a proportion of about three to two.[53]

It is likely that RENAMO strategy will continue to focus on stimulating a sense of ethnic grievance in the centre. However, even the central provinces are far from uniform. RENAMO's aggressive Ndau ethnicism has promoted a reaction from the Sena-speaking population, which could be a future source of conflict.[54]

Another potential source of trouble could be the secessionist ambitions of the 'Rombezia' movement.[55] This grouping has its origins in the 1960s in an attempt by a section of the Portuguese settler population to sow division in the nationalist movement by promoting a group that favoured a separate independence for the area between the Zambezi and Rovuma rivers - hence 'Rombezia'. This settler faction encouraged President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi in his belief that the northern part of Mozambique was historically Malawian territory. The Malawian Government became an enthusiastic supporter of the Rombezia African National Union.[56] After Mozambican independence this group resurfaced under the name Africa Livre (Free Africa), a Malawi-based anti-FRELIMO group which by the early 1980s became integrated into RENAMO.[57] The name 'Rombezia' was scarcely heard again until 1994, when the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation baffled its listeners by denying that the Malawian Government had any connection with the movement.[58] The 'Rombezia' movement apparently re-emerged at the same time as several hundred members of the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers fled the country after clashes with the army in December 1993. The president of Rombezia, Elidio Chapala, was reported to have an office in Malawi.[59]

A related group consists of the followers of Gimo M'Phiri. Gimo M'Phiri was the leader of Africa Livre and later a senior commander of RENAMO. However, he split away in 1986 to form the União Nacional Moçambicana (UNAMO - Mozambique National Union), with the apparent encouragement of FRELIMO. One reason for his split appears to have been opposition to Ndau dominance within RENAMO.[60] He was in turn edged out of UNAMO, a registered party which contested the elections, and formed another party, the União Democrática Mocambicana (UDEMO, Mozambique Democratic Union, not to be confused with the similarly named coalition which came third in the election). Gimo M'Phiri claims to command several hundred armed men in the Namuli and Gurue mountains in Zambezia.[61]

Whether either the Rombezia movement or Gimo M'Phiri presents a real armed threat is difficult to ascertain. Aside from the changes in political circumstances within Mozambique, the defeat of President Banda in the Malawian elections of May 1994 removes an important source of support for any secessionist group. The new Malawian Government shows no sign of sharing President Banda's eccentric and selective reading of the history of the Maravi Empire to justify his territorial ambitions. However, a federalist solution, which would give the opposition control of a number of key provinces, is undoubtedly a potential rallying cry. It is likely that Rombezia, Gimo M'Phiri and other similar factions will reunite with RENAMO to challenge the existing centralised system.

One scenario could be that pro-Rombezia groups might link up with members of the Malawi Young Pioneers alleged still to be in Mozambique. In a meeting with his Malawian counterpart, Bakili Muluzi, in March 1995 President Chissano urged Malawi to do more to encourage an alleged 2,730 Young Pioneers to establish.[62] Accurate information about the Young Pioneers is hard to come by. RENAMO has denied any connection with the Young Pioneers and Malawian army officers admit privately that their public estimates of the numbers who fled in December 1993 were exaggerated.[63]

Another potentially dangerous development, the implications of which are not yet clear, is the emergence of new armed bands along the Zimbabwean border. Press reports in early 1995 spoke of a rebel group called Chimwenje, which had been setting up bases in the border districts of Sussundenga and Mossurize. Chimwenje, which was said to have long-standing links with RENAMO, was described as the armed wing of the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement. Earlier reports in 1993 had linked the group with another Zimbabwean opposition group, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga (ZANU-Ndonga), led by Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole.[64] The latter explanation seems more likely, since Reverend Sithole is known to have signed a pact with RENAMO in 1986.[65] Also the party has its main base of support among the Zimbabwean Ndau. There have long been fears in Zimbabwe that an Ndau- based group could re-infiltrate across the border from Mozambique.[66]

5.3. The Land Question

The question of access to land is an explosive one, although it has hardly been recognised as such. One reason for this is its potential for coinciding with perceived ethnic grievances.

Under the 1990 constitution, like its post-independence predecessor, land belongs to the state and may not be sold or leased. However, titles for the use of land can be granted for up to 50 years and can be inherited.[67] The problem is that in a situation where there have been multiple layers of displacement and occupancy over 30 years, there may be many claimants for any given piece of land. Neither the government nor the United Nations appear to have acknowledged the seriousness of this problem.[68]

Many observers appear to think that Section IV(e) of Protocol III to the General Peace Agreement applies to land. It states that:

Mozambican refugees and displaced persons shall be guaranteed restitution of property owned by them which is still in existence and the right to take legal action to secure the return of such property from individuals in possession of it.[69]

A number of former Portuguese colonists are using this provision to try to recover land which was expropriated at independence. However, since there is no private property in land it would seem that this provision can only apply to moveable goods.[70]

However, Article 5(4) of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Mozambique and UNHCR states:

The Government shall ensure that returnees have access to land for settlement and use, in accordance with Mozambique laws.[71]

Some refugees will not have had land before they fled and it is unclear how the government is to guarantee land to them, or indeed to any other returnees.

The government's policy has been for 'traditional authorities' to mediate in disputes over land ownership. However, 'traditional authority' is itself a fluid and disputed category. The 'traditional' chiefs during Portuguese rule were the regulos, essentially tax collectors, who may or may not have corresponded to bloodline chiefs. Some of these regulos were maintained by FRELIMO as officials in the local administration, others were not. When RENAMO took control of areas they would reinstall regulos or bloodline chiefs loyal to them, known as mambos.[72]

For example, in Erati District in Nampula, local chiefs won elections in 1977, leading the FRELIMO District Administrator to annul the results. In the reorganized elections the villagers nominated village idiots to stand instead. When RENAMO arrived in the district in 1984 they installed the bloodline chiefs. In this instance, these did not correspond to the regulos.[73] This precise model is not necessarily typical. However, there will have been similar local variations from district to district throughout the country. Simply invoking 'traditional authorities' may be no more than a restatement of the problem, not a solution.

The greatest concern arises from the widespread allocation of land to outside interests, such as multinational companies, or to senior FRELIMO officials. The National Peasant Union, as well as foreign non-governmental organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, have documented instances where officials have prevented peasants from registering their title to land in order for large landowners to gain control.[74] One case that has given rise to particular public concern is the concession of a large tract of land to the Heaven on Earth Development Company, headed by the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, leader of the Transcendental Meditation cult (President Chissano is an adherent).[75] However, this is only the most bizarre of a number of similar arrangements. Shortly after the elections, the government was reported to be in negotiation with General Constand Viljoen of the right-wing South Africa Freedom Front to grant 40-year leases to Afrikaner farmers in return for training local farmers.[76]

The British multinational company Lonrho has been one of the most important land concessionaires, taking over former state farms (condemned as impractical by many critics of the government's socialist policies) and establishing plantations. In other cases Portuguese companies which were active before independence have been invited back to establish plantations or manage peasant cash cropping.[77]

The National Peasant Union, as well as land tenure experts in the Ministry of Agriculture, have recommended changes in the law and widespread registration of titles before any land is granted to outsiders. The government appears to be ignoring this advice.[78]

One reason the land question is so explosive is that it is linked to the causes of the conflict. It was peasants' reaction to forced villagization which made many inclined to support RENAMO. Especially among the Shona-speakers of central Mozambique, land is an essential part of a belief system involving ancestor-worship. RENAMO made use of Shona spirit mediums to mobilise support, just as the liberation movement in Zimbabwe had done (although the latter is usually regarded as being at the opposite end of the political spectrum). Although the Shona-speakers are a small minority in Mozambique, RENAMO has proved skilful in the past at an eclectic mobilization of traditional religious beliefs.[79] It could prove dangerous for the government to ignore the desire of people to return to their ancestral lands.

5.4. The Aftermath of War

The physical and psychological scars of the war will last for a generation at least and will ensure that, for the foreseeable future, Mozambique will be unable to return to 'normality'.

The social infrastructure has been devastated. Since 1983, 1,100 rural health units have been destroyed. The cost of the defence budget has led to a reduction in the share of health in the recurrent budget from 10.7 per cent in 1981 to 6.9 per cent in 1992. About 4000 rural primary schools - 68 per cent of the total - were destroyed from 1983 onwards.[80]

The psychological wounds are the most difficult to identify and address. Survivors of the war, in addition to the trauma of forced removal, have almost invariably witnessed horrific killings or mutilations of family or friends. Women have been the victims of widespread rape and sexual abuse. This has not only been because of the 'normal' behaviour of soldiers in war- time, but also as part of a strategy on RENAMO's part to imbue its fighters with ritual male power and privileges.[81]

Many children have been forcibly recruited, especially by RENAMO, and others, whether recruits or not, have been traumatised by their experiences. Honwana-Welch cites one provincial welfare officer:

I have seen many traumatised children but nothing like this. These children have lost sensibility; they just stare. Because many of these children are residing in RENAMO controlled camps, very far from the place where they were kidnapped, and because they were then very small, they cannot remember their family names or the name of their place of origin. Many had to be given new names. The task of tracing their families is a daunting one. Many families died in attacks and massacres.[82]

The issue of tracing and family reunification has so far been bound up with RENAMO's denial of freedom of movement. In Milange district in Zambezia, for example, a local RENAMO commander offered to return more than 150 children to their families - but only in exchange for an equal number of adults from government zones.[83]

Save the Children Federation (SCF) was involved in tracing unaccompanied children. In fact there were few unaccompanied children among the refugees, because of the use of fostering and the extended family. Often families would foster children simply in order to obtain their ration cards. In RENAMO-controlled areas, however, there appeared to be larger numbers of unaccompanied children. SCF were allowed to document the children - in Maputo, Gaza and Nampula, for example - but not to take them away.[84]

RENAMO denied that it had recruited child soldiers, but people who have been held by RENAMO said that they had seen very young soldiers. In 1988, SCF had under its care a boy of seven who had been submitted to military training. In some camps, 45 per cent of the population were children. A UNICEF report of May 1994 alleged that RENAMO still held 2,300 child soldiers - a claim which was treated with scepticism by some observers. In July 1994, however, UNOMOZ released similar figures based on information supplied by RENAMO itself.[85]

Gita Honwana-Welch stresses the need to involve traditional authorities in addressing the psychological aftermath of the war when she asserts that: '[m]ore than the material aid, the populations being resettled need to rebuild their mental strength and moral cohesion and to reassert their cultural identity and spirituality.'[86] However, she warns against an unbridled return to traditionalism, since chiefs have been known to restrict their people's rights and behave in a despotic fashion: 'The formal reinstallation of traditional structures of power may lead to protest and confrontation due to ancient rivalry.'[87]

A major threat to future security - and one which cannot be dealt with by local communities unassisted - is the extensive and unmapped use of land mines.[88] Some land mines date from the independence war of the 1960s and 1970s, although most were planted by RENAMO or government forces between about 1977 and 1992. In a few instances mines were planted by other parties. For example, Tanzanian troops deployed in Zambezia Province admit to having carried out defensive mining, while the British company Lonrho has an unfenced minefield around a citrus plantation in Maputo Province.

In December 1992 the United Nations estimated that there were two million landmines in the country. However, this was simply an average of estimates current at the time and had no scientific basis. Human Rights Watch and, apparently, the United Nations mines experts themselves now believe that this was an over-estimate. In many areas a greater danger is posed by unexploded ordnance of other types, such as rocket-propelled grenades. There are, however, an estimated 8,000 amputees in Mozambique from land mine accidents and there is no doubt that mines pose a considerable danger to returnees. In mid-1994 Medecins sans Frontières estimated that more than 10,000 people had been victims of mine explosions since the GPA. Peasants had begun to detonate mines as they tilled the soil. The worst affected areas were said to be Manica and Sofala provinces. Most injuries have been caused by anti- personnel mines, although there are also anti-vehicle mines on some roads.[89]

Laying of land mines clearly varied by province and district. Generally speaking, there are more mines in the south than the north of the country. Angonia District in Tete, for example, where the first large wave of refugees returned from Malawi, is virtually free of land mines. The far northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado are also largely unaffected. There was also some difference in the pattern of minelaying by RENAMO and the government. The latter often laid mines to defend towns, villages and other military positions. RENAMO used mines defensively as well, but they were also an important part of its strategy to disrupt economic targets, thus spreading them randomly in fields and access paths to stop peasants from producing food. The government also used this tactic to some extent in the central provinces. Neither side kept any record of the mines they planted.

Planned clearance operations inevitably focus on roads. The United Nations mine clearing plan that supposes three stages. The first stage was to clear 2,000 kilometres of roads identified as a priority for access for distribution of humanitarian supplies. The second was to identify and clear routes for the return of refugees. The third entails setting up a school to train Mozambicans who will then complete the mine clearance. In practice, because of various objections from both the government and RENAMO, this programme did not start until more than a year after the cease-fire. What little mine clearance took place earlier was carried out by private companies hired by non-governmental organizations. Even by October 1994, Norwegian People's Aid and Halo Trust had cleared over 1.2 million square metres, uncovering some 500 mines, while the United Nations and the United States Agency for International Development had swept 1,500 kilometres of road - less than the original priority target - uncovering 22 mines.[90]

5.5. Demobilization and Banditry

The greatest threat to Mozambique's future peace appears to be the still enormous quantities of arms in the country, with disaffected ex-combatants ready and able to use them. It now seems improbable that the worst fears of some commentators will be realised, with the war resuming as happened in Angola. However, as indicated above, there are splinter and secessionist factions who could find ready recruits among ex-combatants. The most likely outcome is that many former fighters from both RENAMO and the government army will find their way into armed banditry.

At the time of the peace accord there were an estimated 105,000 soldiers: 24,646 with RENAMO and 80,818 on the government side. The accord envisaged the creation of a national army of 30,000 and the demobilization of the remainder. The process of demobilization has been fraught with problems, with the cantonment and disarmament of troops seriously behind schedule. By 9 December 1994 the strength of the new army was only 11,579.[91]

However, the problem is not, as might be expected, that there are too many candidates for admission to the new army. This was the case in Zimbabwe, for example, in 1980 and led to the creation of an army much beyond the country's defence needs. In Mozambique, however, few ex-combatants wish to join the new army. This led to a series of violent incidents in mid- 1994, in which encamped combatants blocked major roads and took hostages in order to press their demand for accelerated demobilization.[92]

The present situation is exacerbated by the fact that Mozambique has only received 28 per cent of the money pledged by donors to pay demobilised soldiers. Under the demobilization plan, former combatants are to receive a total of two years' pay, one quarter provided by the government and the remainder by outside donors. The external contribution amounts to US$ 31.9 million of which only US$ 27.6 million has been pledged and only US$ 8.9 million received. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has appealed to donors to provide the needed contributions quickly.[93]

The urgency of this is underlined by the large numbers of weapons which remain unaccounted for. In September 1994 RENAMO halted verification of its arms caches by the Cease-Fire Commission (in violation of the peace accord). The result was that when the UNOMOZ mandate expired, 116 of 287 declared RENAMO bases and arms dumps had not been visited. Most were in the RENAMO heartland in Manica and Sofala Provinces. The Cease-Fire Commission also found 141 undeclared arms caches on both sides.[94]

6. CONCLUSION

Mozambique is one of the countries that could very well descend into serious social conflict. It is the poorest country in the world, with massive social inequalities, land conflicts and growing ethnic division, and it is awash with arms - and dispossessed men who know how to use them.

In his final report on Mozambique to the Security Council, the United Nations Secretary- General identified a number of potentially dangerous issues which UNOMOZ had failed to resolve:

•           the existence of arms caches in the country;

•           the incomplete integration of territorial administration;

•           the continued presence of mines throughout the country;

•           inadequate training and equipping of the new national army and police.[95]

The only reason for supposing that Mozambique is not on the verge of breakdown is that the conflict has taken place already. Some of the factors which make Mozambique seem such an unstable place today were in existence 20 years ago, but many of them are a result, rather than a cause, of the war of destabilization.

The basis for optimism today is simply that Mozambicans do not want a return to war. To some extent they have faith in the new political system, but no more so than they had in the new, post-independence system in 1975. Their reluctance to engage in new conflict is almost entirely negative: they have been through it and have seen its implications.

Of course, it is true in most conflicts that ordinary civilians would vote for peace if they could. In Mozambique, however, an entire society has become so traumatised that even the fighters want peace. The reluctance of so many ex-combatants to join the new national army is unusual and significant. At the higher echelons, the appetite for peace is a result of venality.[96] RENAMO's leaders have benefited from a massive pay-off, funded by the international community through the UN Trust Fund for RENAMO, and are looking for further ways of ensuring a state subsidy.[97] On the government side, the idealistic generation of post- independence Marxists has given way to a layer sometimes described as technocrats, certainly more inclined to corruption and bribery.

Contrary to what is often argued, RENAMO was a centralised and relatively disciplined army. It worst atrocities flowed from a deliberate strategy rather than from soldiers out of control.[98] Thus when the leadership called for a cease-fire in 1992 the rank-and-file complied. This has been the major difference between Mozambique and, say, Liberia where there is little discipline and the armed leaderships have a vested financial interest in continued conflict. However, two years of ill-managed demobilization has broken down that discipline, so that it is not easy to predict how the ex-combatants might behave. The fracturing of RENAMO and the re-emergence of regionally-based groups such as 'Rombezia' is a particular cause for concern.

There is a general expectation that peace will mean economic development. However, the likely growth areas are plantation agriculture and tourism, which will entail land seizures, very low wages and increased social tensions. The authority and jurisdiction of the Mozambican state - weak at the best of times - has been reduced almost to nothing. Paradoxically, the transition process, with political control passing to the international community, has symbolically underlined the state's lack of power. The emasculation of the Mozambican state was the main strategic aim of South African destabilization and it is clear that this has succeeded. There can be no attempt to repeat the important social advances of the 1970s in health care, education and the involvement of women in national life.

It now seems likely that Mozambique will enjoy some sort of peace, even if there are localised disturbances from secessionist groups. One important change lies at the regional level. Southern Africa is no longer dominated by white-minority ruled states built upon an system of apartheid. With the exception of Angola (and the much less significant case of Swaziland) the region is entirely composed of multi-racial, multi-party democracies with a common interest in political stability. The crisis in Lesotho in 1994 has shown that a regional system of collective security is beginning to emerge, underwritten by South Africa. The visit of President Nelson Mandela and Defence Minister Joe Modise to Mozambique in the run-up to the elections can be taken as a sign of South Africa's concern that the peace agreement in Mozambique should hold.[99]

Perhaps observers were mistaken in drawing too close a parallel with Angola, which shares a common colonial past but does not really belong historically within the Southern African region. Mozambique, by contrast, shares a future with the rest of the region. It is a future which involves cheap labour, growing social inequalities, violent crime and the menace of the narcotics trade, all of which could be destabilizing factors in the long run. But in the short term, at least, Mozambique is at peace.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of UNHCR.

[1] Inter Press Service, 'Mozambique-Politics: Beyond UNOMOZ', 31 January 1995

[2] The following section is drawn principally from Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique, (New York, 1992); William Finnegan, A Complicated War: the Harrowing of Mozambique, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Christian Geffray, La cause des armes au Mozambique: anthropologie d'une guerre civile, (Paris: Karthala, 1990); Margaret Hall, 'The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): a Study in the Destruction of an African Country', Africa, 1990, 39- 68; Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: the Revolution Under Fire, (London: Zed, 1990); Allen Isaacman, A Luta Continua: Creating a New Society in Mozambique, (New York: SUNY, 1978); Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, (London: James Currey, 1991).

[3] Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, p. 54; Albie Sachs and Gita Honwana-Welch, Liberating the Law: Creating Popular Justice in Mozambique, (London: Zed, 1990), passim

[4] The Guardian [London], cited in Hanlon, Mozambique: the Revolution Under Fire, p. 43

[5] Gita Honwana-Welch, Mozambique: Feasibility Study, (London: International Alert, 1994)

[6] Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, pp. 66-7

[7] Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, (London: John Murray, 1987), pp. 262-3, 301- 2. Margaret Hall, 'The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)' states that in the early years the group was always known as the MNR (Mozambique National Resistance), or occasionally the Portuguese abbreviation RNM. The name RENAMO, adopted to sound 'more Mozambican', was first used as late as 1983. It is used here throughout for clarity.

[8] Flower, Serving Secretly

[9] For example, Phyllis Johnson and David Martin 'Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid', in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), Frontline Southern Africa (London: Ryan, 1989), especially pp. 25-55

[10] Robert Gersony, Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experiences in Mozambique, (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1988)

[11] Geffray, La cause des armes; Finnegan, A Complicated War; Vines, RENAMO

[12] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p. 13

[13] Alex Vines, No Democracy Without Money: the Road to Peace in Mozambique (1982-1992), (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1994)

[14] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p. 13; Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Who calls the shots?, (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 6

[15] Hanlon, Mozambique: Who calls the shots?

[16] This section is largely drawn from AWEPA (European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa), Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, Maputo, June 1993-February 1995, and Richard Carver, Safe Return - Protection and Repatriation of Refugees: the Example of Mozambique, (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, September 1994)

[17] See, for example, SouthScan, 'Fears that Mozambique Election will Follow Angola Example', 16 September 1994

[18] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, October 1994

[19] Richard Carver, Going Home: the Repatriation of Mozambican Refugees', (York: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, October 1993)

[20] ARTICLE 19, Mozambique: Freedom of Expression and the Elections, (London, October 1994)

[21] Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre, Final Report by the SARDC Observer Team, (Harare, 1995)

[22] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[23] Ibid.

[24] Author's interviews with election observers, November 1994; Inter Press Service, 'Mozambique-Elections: Why Millions Voted for RENAMO', 23 November 1994; Africa Report [New York], 'Mozambique: a Better Future', January-February 1995

[25] United States Committee for Refugees, No Place Like Home: Mozambican Refugees Begin Africa's Largest Repatriation, (Washington, December 1993)

[26] Carver, Safe Return

[27] Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, pp. 66-84

[28] Author's interviews with displaced Mozambicans, Mutandhawe, Zimbabwe, April 1989

[29] Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, p. 78

[30] Africa Watch, Conspicuous Destruction, pp. 73-4

[31] United States Committee for Refugees, No Place Like Home, p. 16

[32] Diana Cammack, 'Mozambican Refugees in South Africa', 1990 (mimeo); author's interviews with returning refugees, Ressano Garcia, Mozambique, July 1993

[33] K.B. Wilson, Assisting Repatriation: Recent Lessons from Self-Repatriation in Mozambique, (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, January 1993); Carver, Safe Return

[34] UNHCR, 'Operations Plan: Malawi-Mozambique Repatriation Operation', January 1991 (final draft)

[35] Wilson, Assisting Repatriation

[36] Carver, Safe Return

[37] Wilson, Assisting Repatriation

[38] Stella Makanya, Mozambican Refugees: Preparing for Repatriation, (Harare: CIES, 1992)

[39] Author's interviews with returning refugees, Honde, Mozambique, August 1993

[40] Carver, Safe Return; Save the Children Federation (US), 'The Documentation, Tracing and Reunification Program for Mozambican Refugee Children in Malawi', 25 October 1993; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Africa Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention, (New York: 1995), pp. 117-118.

[41] West Africa [London], 'Refugees Return', 20 February 1995; UNHCR, 'Repatriation and Reintegration of Mozambican Refugees: Progress Report', March 1995

[42] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[43] Inter Press Service, 'Mozambique-Politics: National Unity Key to Peace?', 11 November 1994

[44] Africa Confidential [London], 'Chissano's Choice', 20 January 1995

[45] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[46] Africa Confidential, 'Chissano's Choice'

[47] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[48] Africa Confidential, 'Chissano's Choice'

[49] Africa South of the Sahara, (London: Europa, 1994); Malyn Newitt, Women, Drought and Banditry: Linked Themes in the History of Mozambique, (York: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, November 1993)

[50] ARTICLE 19, Mozambique; David Hedges, 'Notes on Malawi-Mozambique Relations, 1961-1987', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 15 (4), October 1989

[51] Africa Watch, Zimbabwe: A Break with the Past?, (New York, 1989), pp. 77-84

[52] Vines, RENAMO, passim

[53] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[54] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p. 30

[55] SouthScan, 'Government Admits Battle Continues with "Rombezia"', 19 August 1994

[56] Hedges, 'Notes', p. 631

[57] Vines, RENAMO, pp. 54-5

[58] ARTICLE 19 Weekly Monitoring Report, week beginning 2 April 1994, quoting Malawi Broadcasting Corporation News, 7 April 1994

[59] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, July 1994

[60] Vines, RENAMO, p. 70

[61] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p.30

[62] SouthScan, 'Chissano seeks to get rid of Malawi's Young Pioneers', 10 March 1995

[63] Author's interviews, Lilongwe, August 1994

[64] SouthScan, 'Guerrilla Groups "expanding bases"', 24 February 1995; Africa South and East [Harare], 'Dicing with Democracy', June 1993

[65] Vines, RENAMO, pp. 62-3

[66] Africa Watch, Zimbabwe, pp. 81-2

[67] M. Hall and T. Young, 'Recent Constitutional Developments in Mozambique', Journal of African Law, Vol. 35, 1 and 2, 1991, p. 110; Sachs and Honwana-Welch, Liberating the Law, Chapter 1

[68] Carver, Safe Return

[69] General Peace Agreement of Mozambique - Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique, (Amsterdam: African- European Institute, 1992), p. 20

[70] Carver, Safe Return

[71] UNHCR, Mozambique: Repatriation and Reintegration of Mozambican Refugees, (Geneva, May 1993)

[72] Carver, Safe Return; Hall, 'The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)'

[73] Geffray, La cause des armes

[74] Carver, Safe Return

[75] SouthScan, 'Maharishi's Land Deal under the Spotlight', 27 May 1994 and 'Frelimo Walks out after Questions on Missing 12,000 Troops', 10 June 1994; Maharishi Vedic University [Netherlands], 'Mozambique President Chissano Applies Maharishi's Transcendental Meditation Programme to Bring Political Peace and Harmony to Mozambique', July 1993 (press release)

[76] SouthScan, 'Viljoen and Chissano Agree on White Farmers' Deal', 24 February 1995

[77] Hanlon, Who Calls the Shots?, pp. 247-8

[78] SouthScan, 'Maharishi's Land Deal under the Spotlight', 27 May 1994

[79] Hall, pp. 47-9; Vines, RENAMO, p. 64; David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe, (London: James Currey, 1985)

[80] AWEPA, Mozambique General Elections 1994: Manual for International Observers, (Maputo, 1994), p. 23

[81] K.B. Wilson, Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique, (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1992)

[82] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p. 21

[83] Carver, Safe Return

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, p. 21

[87] Ibid. p. 22

[88] The following section is drawn from: Human Rights Watch/Africa, Landmines in Mozambique, (New York, 1994); Carver, Going Home; Honwana-Welch, Mozambique, pp. 24-5

[89] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 June 1994, quoting Radio Mozambique [Maputo], 'More than 10,000 mine victims recorded since peace accord', 15 June 1994

[90] AWEPA Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[91] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[92] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, August 1994

[93] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[94] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[95] AWEPA, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, February 1995

[96] Vines, No Democracy without Money

[97] SouthScan, 'Renamo Seeks Part of State Finances as UN Money Ends', 24 February 1995

[98] Vines, RENAMO; Hall, 'The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)'

[99] SouthScan, 'Extensive Pact Agreed with Mandela ahead of October Election', 29 July 1994; 'SA Logistics Support Likely if Task Force Needed for Disorder', 28 October 1994