Assessment for Indigenous Highland Peoples in Bolivia

Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References

Risk Assessment

Protest is such a well-established part of Bolivian public life that mobilization around issues such as economic opportunities, government services, and land rights is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. It is also very likely that the highland indigenous of Bolivia will continue to increase their role in the central and local governments through conventional politics as well as by more confrontational tactics. Although highland leaders usually lead with the more confrontational strategies (such as illegally occupying private properties in 2003 in protest against their territories not being well defined legally or protected), both the highland and the lowland indigenous groups support each other in becoming a stronger political force in Bolivia. In 2002, indigenous parties won a quarter of the seats in the legislature. In that same election, opposition leader Evo Morales (leader of the violent demonstrations against the unpopular but successful eradication of coca crops) became the first indigenous person to reach the final round of a Bolivian presidential election, losing by just a point to former president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada from the centrist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement. After just fifteen months in office, however, indigenous groups led an uprising on October 17, 2003, forcing Lozada to resign from office for not making good on his promises to the indigenous with regard to gas issues. Vice President Carlos Mesa Gisbert then assumed the presidency and appointed a non-political cabinet. It is very likely that when conventional politics fail to bring about desired or promised changes, the highland indigenous will resort to more violent rebellion. The most contentious issue for the highlands indigenous is coca eradication. More often, the government has attempted to dominate the coca situation through direct force. Coca eradication is strongly supported by the US government (upon whose foreign aid Bolivia is heavily dependent); the government is unlikely to shift strategies in this area anytime soon. Thus, continued conflict around this issue is to be expected.

Analytic Summary

Highland Indians are the majority indigenous people in Bolivia. They are primarily Quechua-speaking (30 percent of the total population) and Aymara-speaking (25 percent) Indians of the altiplano and high valleys. Most Aymara live in the department of La Paz; the Quechua live in Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosi, Chuquisaca, and Tarija (GROUPCON = 3). Other highland groups include the Uru located in the Lake Poopo region in the department of Oruro; the Chipaya of Oruro; and the Callahuaya, an Aymaran subgroup from northern La Paz. Within the Quechua Indian group, local groups exist, including the Tarabucos, the Chayantas, the Laimes, the Ucumaris, the Calchas, the Chaquies, the Yuras Lipes, and the Tirinas. The division between Indian and non-Indian in Bolivia is quite significant – more than one-half of the population has indigenous heritage, though this is sometimes confused by the way ethnicity is practiced in Bolivia. More than skin color, social identity is tied to a way of life. Hence, adopting western dress and customs can change a person's social class. Indians of mixed blood or those who have adopted the way of life of the dominant class are called "cholos," a rough parallel to the "mestizo" identity of other Latin American societies. This group is upwardly mobile, yet still face discrimination by the dominant class. The lowest in social status are indios, also called campesinos (persons of the countryside) (CUSTOM = 1). This group is highly discriminated against because they are not assimilated into the dominant lifestyle and are the poorest class(ETHDIFXX = 8).

The distinction between Indian and non-Indian in Bolivian society is reinforced through language, education, and positions in public office and the military. Although Quechua and Aymara are officially recognized languages, they are rarely taught in the school systems. Public offices, such as the courts, jails, and government institutions have been reported to discriminate against indigenous people and force them to wait in long lines or to keep them in jail for longer time periods. Though all Bolivian males are obliged to serve military time, many indigenous males are offered Military Academy scholarships, provided they change their names and do not speak their indigenous language. The lower ranks of the police force also contain many Indians. This form of employment is perceived as a means of social mobility by many indigenous males. Indigenous women are often employed as domestic aids; there are occasional reports of abuse by their non-indigenous employers.

During the first half of the 20th century, there were scattered cases of uprisings against estate owners which held lands claimed by Indians as traditional communal land (in 1950 the hacendados owned over 92 percent of all land). Indians were forced to work the land, were not allowed to vote, and lacked many political rights. Their culture, language, and traditions were socially unaccepted by the European-descended social class. In 1953, the Agrarian Reform Laws were implemented by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which had come to power in a revolution the previous year. The goal of the MNR was to assimilate the Indians through the elimination of their autonomous culture and living patterns; the reforms focused on integrating lowland Indians with particular focus on decreasing their agricultural land. While Indians were given citizenship and the right to vote (which they were previously denied), they were still discriminated against and denied political rights that were given to non-Indian people.

In the 1960s, a primarily Aymaran indigenous movement began to develop in response to forced participation in state-founded political parties that claimed to represent indigenous interests. The movement identified with the former Aymara leader, Tupac Katari, who led the 1781 anti-colonial uprising. The CSUTCB (Unitary Union Confederation of Bolivian Workers and Peasants) eventually arose from this Katarista movement, aligning with other leftist movements. It separated itself from the state-based institutions for indigenous people in 1979. For the next years, the CSUTCB formed local and regional organizations to represent the demands of various highlands groups (GOJPA03 = 2). Under the 1985 MNR government, economic policies were implemented that dissolved much of the communal land upon which Indians lived and worked and ended many social programs that had supported indigenous people. Indigenous groups again began mobilizing to demand social and economic programs that met their needs. By the late-1980s, the CSUTCB had lost support due to its lack of representation across all highland indigenous groups (COHESX9 = 2), although it has regained much of its strength in recent years.

The 1980s also saw the emergence of violence in the Chapare (a transition zone between the departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz) due to its rising importance to illicit cocaine production. The majority of coca growers are highland Indians and mestizos, displaced by a lack of economic opportunity in the upland valleys. The issue is complicated by the importance of coca to traditional cultures, including religious practices, though most coca produced for these purposes is grown in the Chapare, in the department of La Paz. The US-sponsored eradication program has spurred sometimes violent resistance throughout the region. Occasionally, protests in the capital cities (primarily La Paz) will frame the conflict as one of national and cultural sovereignty. In 1999, the government accused the legislative representative from the Chapare of treason, though charges were later dropped. Violent farmer protests broke out the following year, with widespread roadblocks leading to food shortages in major cities. The government eventually agreed to end plans to construct three military bases in the Chapare (US-funded), but refused to back off of eradication efforts. Between 2001 and 2003, the government has continued to eradicate coca farms, use unrestrained force against protesting coca farmers, and arrest thousands (REP0201-03 = 1; REP1001-03 = 3; REP1901-03 = 1; REP2001-03 = 3; REP2101-03 = 3). As a result, there has been an increase in support for both conventional and militant organizations representing the highlands cocaleros (CONOR#02 = 1; MILOR#02 = 1).

The 2000 resurgence of ethnic violence between Laime and Oaqachacan communities in Oruro resulted in dozens of deaths and the destruction of scores of homes (INTRACON00 = 1). The violence only ended after military occupation and government promises of further economic development in the region. However, the biggest story of the year was the "water war" in the city of Cochabamba. In an effort to improve service and guarantee supplies, the national government had given the rights to develop a local water system to an Italian corporation, promising to privatize water rights and increase prices for many users. Cochabamba residents and area farmers reacted with dramatic street protests; the Banzer government reacted with a show of military force, in which scores were injured and one person was killed. The protests soon spread to other cities, with police officers in La Paz and Santa Cruz walking off their jobs as a show of solidarity. Soon after, the government declared a state of siege, seizing local Cochabamba radio stations. Only after Church-mediated negotiations and a government commitment to revoke the water contract did protests end (PROT00 = 4).

As mentioned above, in 2003, the indigenous led an uprising against the Lozada government over gas policy. The conflict started when congressional deputy Felipe Quispe, an Aymara leader, led road bloack protests near Lake Titicaca, which trapped about 800 tourists in the town of Sorata. Security forces attempted to rescue the tourists but were ambushed by demonstrators, resulting in injury and death of both civilians and soldiers. The conflict sparked the formation of a loose oppositional coalition of indigenous people, unionists, coca farmers, students, NGOs, and peasants, and more violent confrontations ensued as these groups blockaded access roads to La Paz. On October 17, Lozada and his cabinet resigned.

References

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Nexus News Service

Queiser Morales, Waltraud. Bolivia: Land of Struggle. Boulder. Westview Press. 1992.

Strobele-Gregor, Juliana. "From Indio to Mestizo... to Indio." Latin American Perspectives. Issue 81, 21 (2) Spring 1994: 106-123.

Wood, Bill and Harry Anthony Patrinos. "Urban Bolivia." In G. Psacharopoulos and H.A. Patrinos. Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America. Washington, D.C. The World Bank. 1994.

Agence France Presse. August 12, 2002, "Indigenous leader Evo Morales demands self-defence groups for coca growers". http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ Date accessed: 11/30/2004.

Toronto Star. March 16, 2003. "Coca Growers Fight Back". http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ Date accessed: 11/30/2004.

Agence France Presse, January 24, 2002, "Bolivian Congress Expels Influential Indigenous Lawmaker In Wake Of Violence," http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ Date accessed: 11/30/2004.

Agence France Presse, July 17, 2001, "Bolivian Unions Threaten To Expand Road Blockades," http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/ Date accessed: 11/30/2004.