Nations in Transit - Kyrgyzstan (2004)

Capital: Bishkek
Population: 5,000,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $280
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 69
Religious Groups: Muslim (75 percent), Russian Orthodox (20 percent), other (5 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Kyrgyz (52 percent), Russian (18 percent), Uzbek (13 percent), Ukrainian (3 percent), other (14 percent)

Executive Summary

In a state address, President Askar Akayev declared that after adopting constitutional amendments through a national referendum on February 2,2003, the republic would "have all the required components [for democratic development]: state, democracy, and a development strategy." Opposition leaders and many ordinary citizens would hardly agree with this statement. During the last few years of independence, Kyrgyzstan has lost most of the democratic achievements that made the country one of the most liberal and open states in Central Asia in the early 1990s.

President Akayev, who defeated a powerful Communist Party leader in a hotly contested and deeply divisive presidential election in 1990, led the first post-Soviet government. He brought a group of young, inspired reformists into the government. He supported the establishment of a multiparty system and independent mass media. He also embraced the International Monetary Fund-designed program of radical economic reforms, speedy privatization, and trade liberalization and introduced a liberal Constitution and new sets of laws. All these achievements were especially remarkable when compared with those of the notoriously authoritarian regimes in neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These measures won Kyrgyzstan the title "Island of Democracy" in Central Asia.

Since the middle of the 1990s, however, the regime has increasingly turned to authoritarian actions to consolidate its power and quell political opponents and independent media. The Kyrgyz government was widely criticized in 1995 for failing to conduct fair presidential and parliamentary elections, and again in 2000 for conducting widespread vote manipulation, harassing independent journalists, and routinely banning the strongest political opponents from participation in parliamentary and presidential elections.

Moreover, the government mismanaged economic reforms, plunging the country into deep economic recession and the majority of the population into poverty, as major interest groups and political clans snatched up the fruits of the privatization process. According to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, which assesses life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income of countries, Kyrgyzstan slid from 31st place in 1991 to 102nd place in 2003, becoming one of the poorest countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In 2003, the Akayev regime focused its efforts on stabilizing the political environment, which had been greatly undermined by violent confrontations between the opposition and government forces. Kyrgyzstan entered 2003 on a wave of growing political discontent; the opposition demanded that the president accept early resignation and admit personal responsibility for killing unarmed opposition demonstrators in the southern town of Kerben in March 2002. Under public pressure, the government did resign in May 2002, but President Akayev survived by promising comprehensive political reforms through a constitutional referendum and pledging to resign in 2005.

Various opposition groups and parties formed the mass Movement for Resignation of President and for Reforms for People, uniting for the first time in criticism of Akayev's policies and widespread corruption among his cronies. However, Akayev's entourage managed to defuse public anger through several measures, including a hastily organized constitutional referendum that the president promised would improve government accountability.

The Times of Central Asia reported in June 2003 that President Akayev confirmed publicly that he would step down in 2005. He reconfirmed his pledge again after the Parliament adopted a law granting him lifetime immunity from any criminal prosecutions. This immediately raised concerns about possible succession scenarios.

The political opposition remains deeply divided and cannot agree on a political leader who would be acceptable to the majority of political groups and the public. The only possible widely recognized opposition candidate is general Felix Kulov, who has been in prison for three years on criminal charges he denies. In the absence of other candidates, rumors emerged in summer 2003 about the possible transfer of power to Mayram Akayeva, the wife of the incumbent president, or to one of his close associates.

Electoral Process. No elections were held in Kyrgyzstan in 2003. However, the national referendum on amendments to the Constitution revealed numerous problems in the country's election system. First, the government was able to control and manipulate the prereferendum debate and put forward its own agenda. Second, the government was able to choose a date for the national referendum that was suitable for the incumbent regime without consulting major opposition parties. Opposition groups and independent observers reported many cases of interference by government officials, direct and indirect pressure on voters, multiple cases of falsification of results, and numerous occasions when independent observers were not allowed to enter election centers. All these actions raised doubts that the election system in Kyrgyzstan is free and democratic. Kyrgyzstan's rating for electoral process remains unchanged at 6.00.

Civil Society. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Kyrgyzstan are very active and relatively well organized. In 2003, the NGO sector continued to grow, and it extended its work to new areas and issues in the republic. International assistance was crucial for this growth. The assistance included direct funding of various projects from international organizations and individual country affiliates of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), better training for NGO and community leaders, and increasing organizational capabilities. However, NGOs and think tanks did not play a significant role in the policy-making process owing to their institutional weaknesses and limited public support in the areas outside the capital city and because NGO leadership remained divided along regional and sometimes ethnic lines. Kyrgyzstan's rating for civil society remains unchanged at 4.50.

Independent Media. In 2003, the government continued its attacks on independent media and investigative journalists. In addition to closures of some opposition newspapers, there were reports of physical attacks on journalists and their families. However, the government softened its control over printed media by registering the Media Support Center Foundation. This step broke the monopoly of the state-controlled Uchkun publishing house. The Kyrgyzstani mass media also benefited from greater access to the Internet. Government institutions, opposition groups, and newspapers launched their own Web pages and worked toward establishing greater Internet access for the general pubic in most regions of the country. Kyrgyzstan's rating for mass media remains unchanged at 6.00.

Governance. For the most part, the governance system in Kyrgyzstan remained unchanged in 2003 and continued to be largely ineffective in implementing its own decisions, enforcing law and order, or fighting corruption. Government institutions also lack accountability and professionalism. This became especially evident in the law enforcement agencies' handling of the opposition meeting in Kerben in March 2002, in which police killed six unarmed demonstrators. Although the opposition succeeded in forcing the government to resign over the incident, the new government has hardly improved its institutional capabilities or conducted any substantial reforms. The Parliament has voiced criticism of the executive authorities, but it has been unable to initiate major government reforms. Kyrgyzstan's rating for governance remains unchanged at 6.00.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework. During the first decade since independence, Kyrgyzstan radically changed its constitutional, legislative, and judiciary systems. The Soviet-era Constitution was replaced with a new Constitution in 1993. This provided a foundation for developing checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches as well as guarantees for basic individual freedoms. The national referendums of 1996,1998,2000, and 2003 undermined the cohesiveness of the Constitution. In a recent development, the post of ombudsman was introduced, and government officials expressed their willingness to discuss further constitutional and legislative reforms. In reality, however, laws have not been vigorously implemented, and the legislature and judiciary have not always forcefully overseen the actions of law enforcement agencies. Executive authorities exercise significant influence over the judiciary and use legal instruments arbitrarily to silence opposition figures, such as Felix Kulov and Daniyar Usenov. The February 2003 constitutional referendum greatly undermined the ability of the legislature to check and balance executive powers. Kyrgyzstan's rating for constitutional, legislative, and judiciary framework remains unchanged at 5.50.

Corruption. Corruption became endemic in Kyrgyzstan in the 1990s despite all government promises to curb corrupt politicians and government officials. To develop a better business environment in 2001, the legislature introduced a law that significantly simplified the taxation system, and in 2003, the government established an agency to ensure "accountability of officials at all levels." In addition, state officials were required to declare their assets and holdings yet found ways to hide their ill-gotten gains in the vast patronage, clan, and extended family networks. Many individual citizens and businessmen complained that they were forced to pay bribes for basic services, and kickbacks were extorted at every level of government. Despite the public outcry, few government officials were prosecuted, and Kyrgyzstan was ranked among the most corrupt nations in the CIS. Kyrgyzstan's rating for corruption remains unchanged at 6.00.

Outlook for 2004. The political landscape in Kyrgyzstan will be shaped by turbulent regroupings, as both the ruling regime and the opposition prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2005. It is widely expected that incumbent president Askar Akayev will step down voluntarily after the expiration of his third term. However, the president and his entourage will be working hard on a succession strategy in order to transfer political power to a member of the president's inner circle. Meanwhile, the opposition parties will focus on overcoming deep political differences that have undermined their power in the past and will try to secure support from the major political clans and regional groups in the country. They will attempt to come up with a popular alternative candidate and suitable strategies to challenge the ruling elite, who are blamed for the rampant corruption, economic stagnation, and widespread poverty in Kyrgyzstan.

Electoral Process (Score: 6.00)

Kyrgyzstan was among the first countries in Central Asia to introduce a free competitive electoral system on the eve of independence. In fact, both the Parliament and the president, who led the republic to independence in 1991, were elected on a competitive basis despite strong opposition from the ruling Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan has held regular elections conducted by secret ballot. However, neither the opposition nor international observers have declared the elections free and fair. This is largely due to widespread allegations of abuse in the existing electoral system through ballot manipulation and vote buying, as well as intimidation of voters and the most vocal representatives of opposition parties and groups.

The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, the Law on Political Parties, and the Law on Elections provide a relatively liberal environment for registering and participating in elections, fair polling, and transparent tabulation of ballots. The Constitution, for example, stipulates that all citizens over 18 years of age – regardless of ethnic, racial, or religious background – are eligible to vote. All citizens over 25 years of age are eligible to run for the Parliament. All citizens between 35 and 65 years of age who have resided in the republic for at least 15 years prior to elections and "have the command of the state language" are eligible to run for president, according to the Constitution.

At the same time, the Constitution bans all "religious political parties," "organizations that propagate war or violence against the state or any ethnic group," and "membership in parties and public support of any political party by the military and officers of the interior, national security, justice, procurator's office, and courts." In addition, according to amendments to the Constitution adopted by the referendum in 2003, all citizens "with a criminal record" are banned from standing for election to the Parliament, unless their criminal convictions "have been expunged and canceled." This revision also provides enormous power to the chairman of the Central Election Committee (CEC), who is appointed by the president. Also in December 2003, Parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on Elections that prevents foreign media in Kyrgyzstan from publishing articles that appear to support particular political candidates or parties. The opposition claimed the legislation would restrict freedom of information, particularly affecting Moscow-based newspapers published in Kyrgyzstan.

The electoral system in Kyrgyzstan does not establish any significant direct barriers for registering political organizations, and the next parliamentary and presidential elections are expected to be held in 2005 as scheduled. The Constitution guarantees the freedom of political parties and multiparty elections. Citizens are free to establish and register new political organizations or participate in existing parties. Any registered political party, public organization, or meeting of voters (such as mahalyas, or local communities) may nominate candidates for elections. The government and government-appointed local administrations benefit from this regulation because they can control or influence the nomination of candidates in rural areas, where the majority of voters live, and in state-controlled enterprises. During the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000, government officials used this and other leverages to their advantage, frequently intimidating opposition groups and banning opposition leaders from participating for minor irregularities.

The national referendum on amendments to the Constitution, which was held on February 2,2003, revealed numerous problems in the country's election system. First, the government was able to control and manipulate the prereferendum debate and put forward its own agenda. The referendum was designed to achieve a political compromise between the government and the opposition and to make the former more accountable to the public. However, the referendum took constitutional changes in the opposite direction as President Akayev put forward his own amendments and ignored the opposition's proposals. His amendments further consolidated executive powers. Second, the government was able to choose a date for the national referendum that was suitable for the incumbent regime without consulting major opposition parties. Allegedly, the government directly and indirectly manipulated the voting process. According to reports on Eurasianet.org, the opposition groups and independent observers reported numerous cases of interference by government officials, direct and indirect pressure on voters, multiple cases of falsification of results, and many occasions when independent observers were not allowed to enter election centers.

Various political parties and organizations are highly active and visible in the political life of the republic. More than 44 of these were registered in the republic in 2003, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, many political organizations, especially opposition groups, experience significant difficulties in their everyday activities, including financial hardship. There are few donors to political parties in Kyrgyzstan, where almost half the population lives below the poverty line. According to independent research by Kyrgyz experts, between 4 and 10 percent of the population belong to or actively support registered political parties or organizations. Most groups have between 3,000 and 9,000 members on average, and few parties claim more than 20,000 members. Although people do not actively join political parties, high voter turnout during elections suggests that public engagement in political activities is relatively high.

Many parties are well represented in the political arena, as most were established in the early 1990s. These include the largest parties, such as the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (not to be confused with the smaller Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, which emerged after a split among the Communist Party leaders) and the National Revival Party. Several vocal and influential parties were established in the late 1990s and gained significant support from the public, including Moya Strana (My Country) and the Ar-Namys (Dignity) Party.

Yet most of the political parties have very limited or no experience in government. In the early 1990s, party activities were banned at all levels of state administration to limit their influence and prevent the resurgence of the Communist Party. The influence of political parties has been further curbed by the concentration of power in the hands of executive authorities. Political parties had practically no influence on government policy in the 1990s. The only notable exception emerged in 1999 with the establishment of the Ar-Namys Party, led by the experienced politician Felix Kulov. Kulov was vice president of Kyrgyzstan and also served as minister for the National Security Committee (successor of the KGB) and mayor of Bishkek. But Kulov moved to the opposition in the late 1990s. In 2002, the Ar-Namys broadened its base significantly by becoming one of the founding members of the mass political organization Movement for Resignation of President and for Reforms for People.

The most important challenges that political parties face are at the local level, especially outside of Bishkek. Political life at the shaar (town) and ail (village) levels is fully dominated by local government-appointed administrators, who are loyal to President Akayev. Most people are bound by clan and tribal ties and believe it is obligatory to show their loyalty to local leaders and communities. Kyrgyz political clans are traditionally divided into two major groups: the so-called northern clan organizes representatives of the Chuy, Isyk Kol, Naryn, and Talas oblasts (provinces), while the so-called southern clan represents the Batken, Jalal Abad, and Osh oblasts.

In the post-Soviet environment, these networks of political clans became the most powerful tool in the development of the republic. The inability of opposition parties to mobilize significant clan support for their political programs was their major weakness. In fact, their programs and demands were often vague and abstract. In contrast, President Akayev was able to cut numerous deals with the regional clans and gain their support in most critical situations in exchange for various concessions, including government positions, regional subsidies, and investment projects.

The situation changed, however, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as excessive power and wealth accumulated in the hands of President Akayev's family and his entourage (who are mostly representatives of the northern clan) at the expense of the southern clan. In the meantime, the Akayev administration was unable to address such issues as the falling standard of living, collapsing health care and welfare systems, widespread poverty, and high unemployment. These problems, along with the failure of the ruling "family" to share its fortune with the southern clan, led to widespread discontent in southern Kyrgyzstan that burst open in winter 2002 with the arrest of Parliament member Azimbek Beknazarov on charges of past professional misconduct.

Angry demonstrators took to the streets in Beknazarov's native Jalal Abad oblast, where he was elected to the Parliament. The government's attempt to clamp down on mass rallies and demonstrations by Beknazarov supporters backfired in March 2002, when confrontations between police and demonstrators turned violent in the village of Kerben. The overwhelmed police opened fire on unarmed demonstrators. Six people were killed and more than 60 civilians were injured, making this the bloodiest incident in the republic's postindependence history.

The killing triggered mass rallies, demonstrations, and public acts of civil disobedience, such as citizen roadblocks and flagrant disregard of the rules regarding registration of public gatherings. These actions continued throughout 2002, and there was a real fear that they might spiral the country into chaos. The opposition groups, in an attempt to overcome their differences and personal rivalries, united into the Movement for Resignation of President and for Reforms for People and held a national congress. Under strong pressure from the opposition and general public, the cabinet of ministers resigned and President Akayev introduced the Constitutional Council. He acknowledged the need for a debate on possible constitutional changes, including abolishing the office of the president altogether and introducing a parliamentary republic. Additionally, he promised to step down after his current term in office.

In this very tense political environment, the military and law enforcement agencies emerged as the most capable stabilizing force in the republic. Their visibility has been rising steadily since the militant incursions led by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Kyrgyzstan territory in 1999 and 2000. The military, police, and security forces monitored the situation carefully and refused to react to provocations, ensuring public security without taking political sides. This approach ultimately paid off, and by the beginning of 2003 tensions had decreased. The political situation stabilized and remained so for the rest of 2003. Thus, the military and law enforcement agencies have moved into mainstream politics and play an increasingly active role in the political life of the republic.

According to a survey by the Litsa newspaper in summer 2003, almost a quarter of the country's top 20 politicians have links to the National Security Committee, the army, and the police. These institutions are seen as the only political forces capable of stabilizing the country in an environment where opposition parties still struggle to establish themselves as a major political force. This development created a number of speculations that strongmen like Temirbek Akmataliyev, the ex-interior minister, or General Bolot Januzakov, chairman of the National Security Committee, or others might emerge as potential presidential successors in the next election.

In 2003, the political environment in Kyrgyzstan continued to be shaped by the results of the widely disputed 2000 elections to the bilateral 105-seat Parliament. The opposition and international monitoring organizations noted that the preelection campaign was free of violent confrontations, most candidates could conduct their campaigns openly, and women and ethnic minorities had no obstacles in casting their votes. Yet most observers claimed that the elections could hardly be called free and fair.

The opposition had three major complaints. First, the election rules that have been revised frequently through national referendums made it difficult for the opposition to prepare long-term strategies and mobilize supporters. Second, voters allegedly encountered intimidation and pressure from state officials, especially in remote areas of the country, and there were reported cases of vote buying. Third, the opposition had concerns about ballot manipulations and so-called family voting (when heads of families vote on behalf of all immediate relatives). Observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted several irregularities, including "de-registration of an opposition party list," "de-registration of leading opposition candidates after the first round," and "systematic voting irregularities committed against a leading opposition candidate."

Parliamentary elections were held on February 20,2000, with 230 candidates competing for 45 seats (out of 60) in the Legislative Assembly and 186 candidates competing for 45 seats in the Assembly of People's Representatives. The remaining, 15 seats in the Legislative Assembly were filled on the basis of proportional representation. The runoff for undecided seats (the law requires candidates to receive more than 50 percent of the vote) was held on March 15.

According to the official reports for both houses, independent candidates took 73 seats and the following parties the remaining 32 seats: the pro-Akayev Union of the Democratic Forces (12 seats); the opposition Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (6 seats); the pro-government My Country (4 seats); the pro-Akayev Democratic Women's Party of Kyrgyzstan (2 seats); the pro-Akayev Party of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan (2 seats); the opposition Poor and Unprotected People's Party (2 seats); the opposition Fatherland Socialist Party (2 seats); the pro-government Agrarian Labor Party (1 seat); and the opposition Progressive and Democratic Party (1 seat). Under accusations of vote manipulation and widespread criticism from international observers, the legitimacy of the newly elected Parliament was seriously undermined. In addition, the opposition parties were effectively excluded from this very important venue in political negotiations, which in turn led to their radicalization and to the wider use of mass rallies and acts of civil disobedience. The opposition's negative perception of the Akayev regime was reinforced during the presidential elections, which were held on October 29,2000. The OSCE chairperson, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, announced that "the elections did not reverse the negative trends identified during the parliamentary elections at the beginning of this year and can therefore not be qualified as being equal, free, and fair."

The CEC and the state bureaucracy created numerous registration obstacles for the most influential and popular opposition figures – Felix Kulov, leader of the Ar-Namys Party, and Daniyar Usenov, an opposition leader and member of Parliament. Both men could not meet the registration requirements: nominations by September 14, registration by September 24, collection of 100,000 signatures, a clean criminal record, and successful completion of a new Kyrgyz fluency test. Usenov's previous criminal conviction on minor irregularities (on charges he has denied) disqualified him from standing in the elections.

Kulov chose not to sit for the state language proficiency exam after witnessing the failures of several other candidates. He gave his support to Omurbek Tekebayev, chairman of the moderate opposition Fatherland Socialist Party. In the end, the CEC officially registered six candidates: President Askar Akayev; Omurbek Tekebayev; Almazbek Atambayev, an industrialist; Melis Eshimkanov, a journalist and one of the leaders of the National Revival Party; Tursunbay Bakir-Uulu, a leader of the Progressive and Democratic Party; and Tursunbek Akunov, a human rights activist.

On election day, President Akayev won in the first round with 74.4 percent of the votes. Akayev's main opponent, Tekebayev, received just 13.9 percent. The opposition candidates reported that their supporters had experienced intimidation at polling stations. There were also reports of vote manipulation, especially of student votes. Total turnout was 77.3 percent.

Civil Society (Score: 4.50)

The Akayev administration's approach to civil society groups is inconsistent. On the one hand, it supports nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations that provide social services, which have proved vital in ameliorating the effects of widespread poverty, unemployment, and other hardships during the country's post-Communist transition. On the other hand, government authorities have put increasing pressure on politically oriented groups that advocate human rights, support independent journalists and media, or expose corruption in government, especially during the constitutional referendum in February 2003.

Boosted by international assistance, political liberalization in the 1990s, and rising social activism, NGOs and nonprofit organizations have proliferated in the country. In a short period of time, numerous Western-style NGOs have emerged in the republic, along with the strengthening of ashars, indigenous forms of mutual assistance. Traditionally, the ashar is a community-based institution that provides aid to the disadvantaged (such as single mothers and orphans). It is independent of state control and typically led by community elders known as aqsakals. Kyrgyz experts estimate that more than 3,000 NGOs were established and registered in Kyrgyzstan by 2003; however, only 700 to 1,000 of them were thought to be active. Their ability to attract the most active members of the population – including youth, women, and local leaders in the capital and elsewhere – has contributed to the growth in volunteerism.

According to a survey conducted in November 2003 by Counterpart International, 302 NGOs (12 percent) were providing assistance to children and youth, 236 (9.6 percent) were working on women's issues, 212 (8.6 percent) provided services in education, and 146 (5.9 percent) were dealing with human rights issues. Among registered NGOs were 152 charities and foundations, yet most of them experienced difficulties in increasing philanthropy among the local population and relied excessively on support from the international community and overseas charities.

In general, ethnic groups have not experienced difficulties in establishing and registering organizations that promote cultural awareness and education. In fact, cultural centers were among the first organizations established in independent Kyrgyzstan and have become an important political force in the country. The authorities attempted to bring these centers and several large NGOs under the umbrella of the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan, which was designed to be the political regime's stabilizing anchor in dealing with interethnic relations. However, since 2000 the Kyrgyz government has actively persecuted members and supporters of the Uigur community, allegedly under strong pressure from Beijing, because some of the representatives of the community had links with the pro-independence movement in the Xinjiang autonomous province of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Political liberalization and a decrease in state control in many remote areas have diminished the sense of law and order but for the most part have not led to the appearance of terrorist organizations, private militias, or violent groups in the country. However, there have been some exceptions. In March 2003, a Kyrgyzstan Security Council representative announced that the country faces a security threat from militant groups along the southern border of the country; and in May, the National Security Committee linked explosions in the Osh oblast and in Bishkek to activities of the IMU.

This situation brought to mind the IMU incursions into the remote Batken raion (now oblast) from Tajikistan in summer 1999 and 2000. Their ultimate destination was Uzbekistan, as they aimed to challenge the authoritarian grip of President Karimov of Uzbekistan. The IMU attempted to gain a stronghold in Kyrgyzstan and to recruit young people by promoting the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in the region. According to official reports, the group did not receive any substantial support among the Kyrgyzstani population and was expelled from the Kyrgyz territory by joint efforts of the regular army and local police and security forces. However, there were subsequent reports that several young Kyrgyzstani citizens joined the IMU and followed the group to Afghanistan, where they fought alongside the Taliban militia against the U.S.-led coalition forces.

In addition, since the late 1990s the Kyrgyzstani government has persecuted members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a grassroots Islamic movement, accusing it of threatening stability and democracy in the country. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir – which aims to establish a caliphate, or Islamic theocratic state – denies such allegations. Its leaders claim that they advocate the peaceful replacement of existing secular regimes in Central Asia with law and order based on Islamic teaching and the Sharia, or Islamic divine law. In 2003, the Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies conducted several operations against Hizb-ut-Tahrir supporters in the Osh and Jalal Abad oblasts. These two provinces were thought to be strongholds of the organization, as the government claimed there were about 3,000 Hizb-ut-Tahrir supporters in the country. The government has been persistent in persecuting radical religious and militant organizations.

Although Kyrgyzstan has established one of the most liberal legal regimes in the region for public organizations and NGOs, the situation in practice is altogether different. The activities of civil society groups are regulated by the Constitution, the Law on Public Organizations, and the Law on Noncommercial Organizations. The Constitution and the Law on Public Organizations guarantee freedom of association. However, both documents unreservedly ban all political organizations that advocate violence or religious and ethnic hatred and do not allow any political activities by religious organizations.

The Ministry of Justice, which oversees group registration, has been known to delay registration of NGOs, independent media outlets, and political parties that are critical of the incumbent president and government. Many NGOs, especially those that deal with human rights, mass media, and corruption, also reported that government agencies often use legal barriers to prevent their registration and create difficulties with taxation and access to information. For example, in 2003 the Ministry of Justice thrice denied registration to the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, finally issuing a registration under international pressure.

Most civil society groups, such as the Forum of Women's NGOs, Interbilim, Internews, and the Children's Fund of Kyrgyzstan, have an impressive history of activism. This includes offering training for the disadvantaged and legal assistance and support to human rights activists and journalists. Yet these groups remain quite weak and are not sustainable in the long term. There are two fundamental problems. The first involves the inefficient organizational capacities of these groups. Many NGOs were established with international assistance and have been active in fund-raising overseas yet have failed to institutionalize their activities at home. They often have relied on charismatic personalities and networks of colleagues or extended families and have stopped their work once the financial resources were terminated or the leaders quit the organizations. The issue of managerial effectiveness and long-term planning still needs to be addressed.

The second problem is financial sustainability. Many civil society groups rely exclusively on overseas funding and are unable to raise money at home, where 55-70 percent of the population live below the poverty line and there are few opportunities to conduct legitimate business. Many small NGOs simply close or suspend their activities when their funds come run out. Yet by 2003, several large NGOs had introduced Western-style management systems, transparency, and financial auditing and planning and were able to raise resources regularly, mostly from international sources.

The political crisis in 2002 made the Kyrgyzstani government more receptive to policy advocacy by public policy research groups and NGOs. This trend continued in 2003, as political parties and NGOs tried to influence debates on the constitutional referendum, before and after. Regular seminars and conferences, often funded by international donors and managed by local NGOs, have become one of the more important channels of communication between government officials on the one hand and NGOs and various advocacy groups on the other.

Independent media also regularly provide opportunities to various NGOs to initiate public debates and discuss pressing issues. However, this access is limited primarily to the print media, as radio and TV are still controlled by the state and business groups with strong ties to the government. Several well-respected media outlets provide reliable information and commentaries on national issues and national government, though local issues at the oblast and raion levels receive less coverage.

The Law on Labor guarantees the right of workers to join a trade union, including opposition trade unions. In the early 1990s, the powerful Soviet-era Council of Trade Unions was reorganized into the Federation of Trade Unions of Kyrgyzstan. In the course of the economic transition, it lost most of its health care, recreational, and child care facilities, which were often privatized for pennies. Several activists established new independent trade unions, such as the Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, but they failed to attract mass support or to build channels of communication and influence with the government or legislature.

In the 1990s, the education sector in Kyrgyzstan emerged as one of the few areas independent of excessive state control or political influence. With the loss of external subsidies and sharp cuts in government expenditures, the entire sector was on the edge of collapse in the 1990s. In response, the government eased its control over school and university curriculums and allowed the establishment of private and semiprivate educational outlets. Many NGOs attracted international funds to reform the educational system or establish a new one. In 2003, Kyrgyzstani students could choose among 51 higher education institutions – 36 state-owned universities and 15 private universities, including the American University of Kyrgyzstan, the Slavonic University of Kyrgyzstan, and the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan.

At the same time, the quality of education has actually declined significantly in Kyrgyzstan owing to widespread bribery, unqualified or incompetent lecturers and administrators, limited resources, and poor infrastructure, especially at institutions outside major metropolitan areas. In August 2003, the Kyrgyz government required that all state and private universities be licensed by the Ministry for Education and Culture, raising serious concerns about the possible reestablishment of state control over higher education.

Independent Media (Score: 6.00)

In 2003, Kyrgyzstani independent media were again under government attack, despite international and public pressure on the Akayev administration. This contrasts sharply with the early 1990s, when the Kyrgyz media became the most vocal and outspoken independent media sector in Central Asia in the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration. However, the situation changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, as the Akayev regime became more repressive. This was often attributed to the regime's loss of credibility over the mismanagement of economic reforms and widespread political manipulations.

Increasingly, the government has worked to silence media that are critical of corruption, growing authoritarianism, and economic mismanagement. These measures include numerous civil suits filed by state officials, collection of damages through asset seizures, and refusal by the state printing monopoly to print materials that are controversial or critical of the government. The Media Support Center Foundation, which opened in November 2003, was designed to break the state printing monopoly by freeing opposition and independent newspapers and magazines from arbitrary pricing and other distribution reduction tactics by Uchkun, the state-controlled publishing monopoly. This project is sponsored by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, with additional support from the Open Society Institute and the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and is being implemented by the U.S.-based NGO Freedom House.

The Law on Mass Media (1992), the Law on Defense of Professional Activities of Journalists (1997), and the Law on Guarantees and Freedom of Access to Information (1997) provide guarantees for freedom of speech and the press. Several articles of the Law on Mass Media have been used by state officials to silence opposition journalists or to shut down media outlets altogether. Article 23 prohibits journalists from publishing state or commercial secrets or articles that offend any individual's honor or dignity, and Article 127 of the criminal code treats libel as a criminal offense. In 2003, more than a dozen libel suits were filed by government officials against journalists and independent media. Some had merit; most did not. For example, in June 2003 the independent newspaper Moya Stolitsa-Novosti closed, bankrupted by multiple court judgments. The owner later reregistered the paper under the name MSN.

Journalists in Kyrgyzstan often team up with NGOs to defend themselves against powerful state and nonstate actors. Journalists enjoy strong support from the public and opposition. However, in small towns and cities outside the capital, independent journalists have regularly been subjected to direct and indirect attacks from powerful local politicians and businessmen. In fall 2003, there was a controversy over the death of journalist Ernest Nazalov of Kyrgyz Rukhu in the Osh oblast. The official investigation concluded that he died in an accident, but several political groups and international organizations called for an independent investigation.

State and large privately controlled media employ self-censorship and reportedly have little editorial independence. This was particularly visible during the ownership change at Vechernii Bishkek, when the newspaper immediately stopped criticizing President Akayev and his government. (The paper continues to publish articles critical of the Parliament.) Opposition press, however, retained some of its editorial independence, although in 2003 there were reports that many investigative journalists experienced difficulties in fact gathering and getting access to state information.

In general, the public enjoys a diverse selection of print and electronic sources. Throughout the 1990s, independent newspapers presented a wide variety of political viewpoints. However, in the early 2000s the Kyrgyzstan media market was consolidated as several popular media outlets came under direct or indirect control of pro-government business groups. In 1999, the alleged takeover of the popular Vechernii Bishkek by a powerful businessman close to the Akayev family was especially notorious and provoked serious concerns about business practices in the media sector.

To increase accessibility, several opposition media outlets have launched Web sites. In addition, practically all opposition parties have established Web pages. To some degree, these steps have diversified the range of political viewpoints available to the public.

According to the Kyrgyz news agency Kabar, around 700 media outlets were registered in Kyrgyzstan in 2003; between 70 and 75 percent were privately owned. The state still controls several national and regional newspapers, including Slovo Kyrgyzstana and Kyrgyz Tuusu, and television stations, including KTP and KOORT. Private individuals and businesses own several popular newspapers and magazines such as Delo No and Litsa. There are also 14 independent television broadcasters and 11 independent radio stations, including Piramida Television and Radio, Independent Bishkek Television, Asman Television, and Almaz Radio, but most are controlled by private businesses with close links to the government. Since the financial crisis of 1998-1999, most of the mass media outlets have been left to market forces, as the state lacks sufficient financial resources to support them. Therefore, many newspapers, particularly those representing opposition voices, increasingly rely on Western donors, although some have attempted to attract private investors, advertising revenue, and contributions by wealthy individuals or political groups. In 2003, various political and business groups continued to invest in mass media, considering media control as crucial in the forthcoming struggle for President Akayev's successor. Since the state-controlled distribution agency SouzPechat collapsed in the 1990s, most of the printed media in Bishkek and its suburbs are distributed through newsstands and private individuals on the streets. Distribution of print media outside Bishkek is controlled by the state-owned Kyrgyz Pochtasy, which charges high fees for its services. In 2003, there were several high-profile disputes between Kyrgyz Pochtasy and publishers over newspaper distribution and profit sharing. In fact, according to an article published by the Internews agency, the distribution of printed media within the republic was a top problem for many publishers during the year.

Throughout 2003, Kyrgyzstani journalists continued to receive significant support from a network of local NGOs providing such services as training, free legal defense in libel cases, small grants, various media projects, and support for attending seminars and conferences at home and abroad. The Internews agency, for example, offered training facilities and materials for independent journalists and legal assistance for investigative journalists. Organizations like Freedom House sponsored workshops on legal issues such as how to avoid libel charges. Many Kyrgyzstani journalists are female, and NGOs like Women in Mass Media of Central Asia provide professional development for women working in the Kyrgyz mass media.

In 2003, public access to the Internet increased as the international community continued to provide significant support to NGOs and educational institutions. However, Internet access is still significantly limited by an undeveloped communications infrastructure in areas outside the capital and the country's low level of computer ownership. Several NGOs have opened Internet centers at colleges and schools in small towns with financial support from the Soros Foundation and the U.S. State Department. Internet cafes and computer centers at major colleges and universities have become popular sources of Internet access, offering competitive and flexible rates. Unlike the regimes in Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyzstan government has refrained from establishing controls or limits on Internet access. According to independent estimates by the Expert Consulting Agency, about 350,000 people accessed the Internet in 2003 (other sources place the number between 110,000 and 140,000). Most of the use is limited to Bishkek, where around 80 percent of Internet users reside.

In 2003, Reporters Without Borders significantly downgraded Kyrgyzstan's media freedom rating from 98th to 104th out of 166 countries. Freedom House, in its 2003 Survey of Press Freedom, classified Kyrgyzstan's press as "Not Free."

Governance (Score: 6.00)

The Kyrgyz government remained weak in 2003 owing to unfinished reforms and mismanagement of key political events the previous year. In the 1990s, government reforms were unbalanced, with several leaps forward followed by serious slowdowns. During the first years of independence, Akayev's administration conducted a series of radical reforms, including depoliticizing decision making, reshuffling personnel in ministries, and replacing Communist Party appointees with a younger generation of managers and politicians.

However, there has been slow progress in improving the accountability of government officials, fighting rampant corruption and incompetence, and increasing efficiency in policy implementation and administrative decentralization. The government has responded to mounting criticism from the opposition by interfering frequently in the political process, obstructing the work of the legislature and judiciary, and restricting mass media access to government information. These actions have further undermined effective governance and have led to greater instability.

There are numerous indications of this instability. First, Nikolai Tanayev, an ethnic Russian, was offered the post of prime minister in May 2002 as a compromise technocrat appointee with no apparent links to the Kyrgyzstani clan system. There were strong expectations that he would be replaced at any moment or that his cabinet would be disbanded if the struggle for political succession intensified. Second, the political opposition has continued to put pressure on the incumbent president to resign, although this has been defused to some degree through the regime's political maneuvering and some political compromises. Third, many government officials and state bureaucrats have remained unpopular and are perceived as corrupt. In addition, various government members have devoted considerable energy to succession-related bargaining and intrigue in preparation for the post-Akayev era, which should begin in 2005.

The Parliament retains its ability to balance the executive power but can hardly be considered an effective rule-making institution. In the past, the Parliament has confronted the president on issues including the introduction of Russian as the second language, private ownership of land, and agreements on border delimitations with China and Uzbekistan. In such cases, the Parliament was able to stir heated public debate and compel adjustments or delays in the government's proposals but accomplished little else. The Akayev administration responded by consolidating more power into its hands, and from 1994 to 2003, several constitutional changes strengthened the power of the president at the expense of the legislature.

In 1994, the Soviet-era 350-seat single-chamber legislature was replaced with a 105-seat two-chamber body. In 1996, a national constitutional referendum called by the president enhanced the power of the executive office at the expense of the Parliament. In June 1999, changes in the parliamentary election laws allowed 15 seats in the lower chamber to be reserved for representatives elected on party lists. The constitutional referendum of February 2003 seriously undermined the current Parliament, endorsing the replacement of the two-chamber legislature with – yet again – a single-chamber Parliament.

The effectiveness of the Parliament has also been seriously undermined by regional rivalries between northern and southern clans, reflected in policy conflicts. Representatives of the industrialized north generally support market-oriented reforms and economic liberalization, while representatives of the agricultural-based south often favor protectionist measures and lobby regularly for subsidies for failing enterprises. This conflict has intensified in anticipation of the 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections. Owing to fiscal restraints, the legislature has limited resources to fulfill its lawmaking and investigative responsibilities. Yet many parliamentarians remain highly critical of President Akayev's policies and have challenged the government on a number of issues.

Independent media still have legal rights to access various government documents and draft legislation. On paper, the Law on Guarantees and Freedom of Access to Information (1997) guarantees the media and public adequate access to all types of state documents, excluding state secrets. In practice, however, it has become a bureaucratic habit to limit access to information at all levels of government. For example, the final draft of the constitutional changes for the national referendum was not made public until a few weeks before the vote in February 2003. Also in 2003, the Bishkek branch of CIMERA, a nonprofit Swiss organization for journalists, documented numerous attempts to bar investigative journalists from accessing information, especially at the local level. Nevertheless, highly vocal independent media have regularly exposed the government's attempts to hide its actions from the public and legislature. For example, in the face of governmental denials, independent journalists published documents on land swap deals with Uzbekistan in 2000 and 2001.

The decentralization of power to regional and local governments continues, but with mixed results. The Law on Local Governance and Local State Administration was introduced on December 19,1991, and modified in 1992,1994, and 1998. According to law and the constitutional changes of 2003, the president has substantial power over regional and district governments. The president can "call elections to local keneshes [legislatures] and, in the cases provided for by law of the Kyrgyz Republic, dissolve them." He appoints akims, the heads of oblasts, and the Bishkek state administration on the recommendation of the prime minister and by consent of the corresponding local keneshes.

In December 2001, local populations elected akims of villages and town administrations for the first time since independence. Previously, the prime minister appointed them with the consent of the relevant local keneshes. However, according to the opposition, many local government officials abuse their powers. Encountering less scrutiny and pressure from international organizations or independent observers, these local officials manipulated the elections and since then have taken a hard stand against NGOs, independent journalists, and opposition parties.

Local authorities have limited fiscal autonomy to carry out social and economic development projects. They are also weak in their ability to impose fines and penalties, control the use of land and natural resources, implement environmental protections, and raise additional revenues. Local executives are authorized to overrule most decisions by local keneshes, though the keneshes have the right to call for a vote of no confidence in their respective administration heads. Local governments also have their say on such issues as funding non-Kyrgyz-language schools (Uzbek schools in the south; Russian, Uigur, and other schools in the north).

Local governments are severely constrained by small budgets and chronic difficulties in collecting taxes and raising local revenues. They therefore receive most of their revenue from the central budget, although during 2002 and 2003, the U.S. Agency for International Development and some other organizations provided significant support for local government reforms and training. In April 2003, the Parliament granted the city of Osh a special status to retain 40 percent of local tax revenues, up from 20 percent. This development opens the door for further fiscal reforms in other parts of the country.

About 17,000 civil service workers in Kyrgyzstan are regulated by the Law on Civil Service (1999), the Decree on Ethics of Civil Servants of the Kyrgyz Republic (2001), and other laws. The government plans further reforms in the National Strategy on Information and Communication Technologies for Development of the Kyrgyz Republic (2002). However, civil service workers, especially at the local level, still lack adequate training and expertise and have limited protection against politically motivated dismissals. Although salaries are twice those in the manufacturing and construction sectors, the average monthly pay for civil servants is around US$110.

During the last few years, the government has attempted to reform public services and attract talented individuals by raising salaries and introducing open, merit-based competition. The government regularly advertises most midlevel positions in the national newspapers. However, there were numerous accusations of nepotism and corruption in some appointments. Civil service is the only sector of the economy that provides steady employment and quick gains from corrupt practices. The general public and the opposition complain regularly that local civil servants are unable to handle their duties in a professional manner and extort bribes and "gifts" from ordinary citizens. In addition, the sector experiences some political interference, as civil servants are expected to be loyal to their superiors and refrain from publicly criticizing government policies.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (Score: 5.50)

The first post-Soviet Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, introduced in May 1993 and amended in 1996,1998, and 2003, clearly defines the powers and authority of each branch of government. In reality, however, there are few checks and balances among the country's legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Executive authorities have concentrated considerable political power in their hands and typically prevent the legislature and the judiciary from acting independently.

Despite limits on independence, the professionalism of Kyrgyz parliamentarians has steadily improved over the last decade, and the Parliament has become an operational rule-making body. Still, its effectiveness is plagued by a lack of funding, adequately trained staff, and appropriate levels of independence. Amid the growing authoritarianism of the executive authorities, parliamentarians can be a counterweight to government pressure and have mobilized wide public support in many disputed cases, including investigations into the land transfers to the People's Republic of China. According to this deal, which was negotiated to resolve border disputes with Beijing, Kyrgyzstan would transfer about 100,000 hectares to the PRC. The opposition viewed this agreement as an unfair treaty and a betrayal of national interests.

The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic was strongly influenced by Western constitutional thought. It provides a sound framework for human rights, including freedom of expression, religious freedom, and freedom of association. It also guarantees citizenship to all residents of the republic, regardless of their knowledge or command of the state language or length of residency. The Constitution also guarantees business and private property rights. The country was among the first in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to recognize private land ownership, which came into full effect in 2000. The Kyrgyz civil code guarantees equal protection of private property, the right to transfer or sell private properties, and freedom to conclude contracts with foreigners. In practice, though, these basic rights and civil liberties are all subject to abuse.

The Constitution was revised on a number of occasions through national referendums, including the most recent on February 2,2003. This referendum was called to overcome the political stalemate between the opposition and the Akayev administration following the March 2002 shooting in Kerben, in the southern district of Aksy. Several opposition parties with support from southern oblasts demanded the resignation of the government and the president and called for early elections. The meetings and demonstrations paralyzed much of the country to the verge of political chaos.

The Akayev administration was finally forced to make concessions. The government did resign in May 2002, but President Akayev suggested establishing a Constitutional Council, which would bring together representatives of the government and opposition in order to negotiate political changes and prepare legal ground for the next elections. The Constitutional Council did discuss amendments to the Constitution in fall 2002, but it was Akayev who appointed experts to finalize the proposed amendments in January 2003 and come up with a definitive list of changes. In February 2003, after three weeks' notice, the government held the referendum, which approved Akayev's proposed amendments and ignored most of the suggestions from the opposition.

This referendum alienated the opposition, especially since the Akayev administration failed to fulfill a key promise – to transfer significant powers from the president to the Parliament and to provide more independence to the judiciary. In fact, the referendum even further strengthened the power of the president. This step greatly undermined the legitimacy of the referendum and opened the Constitution to further revisions, a potential source of political discontent. The revised Constitution contains a two-term limit for the president but grants the office lifetime immunity from prosecution or criminal investigation.

Although the authorities claim there is independence and impartiality in the interpretation of the Constitution and that the Constitutional Court and Constitutional Council work independently, there is strong evidence to the contrary. One of the most publicized cases was in 2000, when the Constitutional Court decided that incumbent president Akayev could stand for reelection, despite the fact that the Constitution prohibits the president from serving more than two terms.

The Constitution implicitly prohibits any discrimination on the basis of origin, sex, race, nationality, language, creed, and political and religious convictions, but opposition activists complain regularly that in practice some government officials and individuals put themselves above the law. Despite regular mass media reports about corruption among government officials, few of them have ever been investigated or acted upon. Meanwhile, laws have been used arbitrarily against critics of the regime and opposition leaders. In 2003, for example, the government charged Galina Kaissarova, an independent human rights advocate, with libel and threatened to revoke her law license. In another case, a series of libel suits bankrupted the independent newspaper Moya Stolitsa-Novosti. On the positive side, women in Kyrgyzstan enjoy more freedom and equality before the law than women in many neighboring countries. There are several prominent female politicians, and a number of women have held positions at the ministerial level. The government's handling of minority issues has produced mixed responses. The law implicitly prohibits any discrimination against ethnic minorities, but there is no mechanism for legal enforcement. In the early 1990s, the republic faced interethnic tensions after a bloody confrontation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities in and around the cities of Osh and Uzgen.

Although the government has defended the rights of minorities and guaranteed their security, many non-Kyrgyz citizens have reported discrimination in hiring, promotion, education, and business activities. Between 1991 and 2002, more than 600,000 people left the country, mainly Russians, Germans, Ukrainians, and others, reported Slovo Kyrgyzstana, and the portion of the population comprising ethnic minorities declined from 47 percent to 33 percent. President Akayev attempted to deal with this issue through the Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan, an umbrella organization for ethnically based groups and NGOs. In 2000, the president introduced a decree declaring Russian an official language alongside the Turkic-based Kyrgyz. Kyrgyzstan is now the only country in the region that has adopted Russian as an official language. Between 2000 and 2003, a number of representatives of ethnic minorities were co-opted to serve in government posts.

During the last decade, the Kyrgyz government has attempted to reform the criminal code with active input from Western legal experts to bring the country's laws closer to international standards. In 1998, a new criminal code came into force, replacing the 1994 criminal procedures code. Under the law, every person is considered innocent until proven guilty, has the right to a fair trial, and is granted access to counsel. The procurator – under the Ministry of Justice – oversees criminal proceedings, authorizes all searches and detentions, and issues warrants.

In practice, though, the law is not vigorously implemented, police and security forces often detain or search suspected individuals without authorization, and defense counsels have difficulty accessing their clients. In 2003, lawyers complained that they had experienced delays in trying to meet with Felix Kulov, the former vice president and leading opposition figure who has been serving a seven-year prison term since 2001 on charges he vigorously denies. In January 2002, Azimbek Beknazarov, a vocal critic of the regime and parliamentarian, was arrested on dubious charges of professional misconduct. In February 2003, independent journalist Ulugbek Babakulov claimed that he was beaten by law enforcement officers, who also destroyed his equipment.

The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan guarantees an independent judiciary and fair and unbiased procedures for appointing judges. However, executive authorities can influence judges and procurators through various channels. Under the Constitution, the president has the authority to appoint or fire the procurator-general, procurators of oblasts, the military procurator, and judges of the local court. He does so, however, with the consent of the Assembly of People's Representatives.

There is widespread mistrust in judges, as the public often perceives their rulings to be unfair and politically motivated. In early 2002, the opposition parties complained that the judiciary acted under political influence in the case against Azimbek Beknazarov, charging him for minor professional misconduct after he became one of the most outspoken critics of the government. In 2003, many citizens and businessmen complained that judicial decisions were not always enforced, especially in disputes over property rights and business activities. Some entrepreneurs with close ties to the government were able to conduct their activities by influencing judicial decisions or ignoring the law.

Corruption (Score: 6.00)

The Kyrgyzstan government is increasingly viewed as corrupt by the domestic opposition and the general public. Rampant corruption has paralyzed the business environment and deters direct foreign investment, while President Akayev's regime struggles for political survival and support from powerful bureaucrats and politicians with extensive business interests. Corruption has penetrated all corners of the society and affects state institutions and businesses from top to bottom.

Corruption is a complex issue in Kyrgyzstan. It has cultural dimensions with blurry lines between traditional Oriental hospitality and gift giving and illegal extortions. Another dimension is patronage networking (with deep roots in Soviet bureaucratic traditions) that makes bribery a norm in exchange for appointments and promotions. In addition, mass privatization without clear legal boundaries in the early 1990s resulted in mass corruption in which high-ranking officials and influential politicians (including the opposition) snatched up the most lucrative properties and businesses.

Government officials have publicly condemned corruption and regularly promise to establish law and order. They also routinely discuss anticorruption measures with the representatives of international organizations and have agreed to introduce a wide range of anticorruption initiatives. In 1997 and 1998, the government launched major anticorruption campaigns and temporarily suspended the privatization program in order to streamline legal and administrative procedures against corruption.

In 1999, President Akayev initiated the Anticorruption Law, and the draft was discussed in the Parliament. In March 2003, Akayev stated that corruption might pose a major threat to the country's development, and in April 2003, the National Council for Conscientious Management was established to ensure "accountability of officials at all levels." In practice, however, none of the anticorruption initiatives have been implemented effectively. Moreover, a report published by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in April 2003 named Kyrgyzstan as one of the most corrupt countries among the members of the CIS.

Extensive bureaucratic regulation and registration requirements have been used by state bureaucrats to extort bribes or "discounts" from legitimate businesses. In a 2003 survey published by Moya Stolitsa-Novosti, 90 percent of respondents complained of excessive state regulation. Many members of the business community have admitted that they regularly put aside a significant portion of their profit to pay government officials for "help" to navigate unclear regulations, speed up registrations, circumvent various restrictions, or avoid the official tax code. According to recent World Bank research, the average businessman must endure oppressive delays in every undertaking: at least 9 procedures, which take a minimum of 26 days, to open a business; 44 procedures and at least 365 days to work with a contractor; and no less than 4 years to undergo bankruptcy procedures.

The law establishes limitations on the participation of government officials in private businesses. According to law, all citizens who stand for public elections are required to disclose their assets and business interests, including private property, business ownership, and stock holdings. The law also prohibits parliamentarians and government officials from using their public positions for private purposes. In November 2001, the legislative assembly adopted the draft Law on the Simplified Taxation System of Small Entrepreneurship Subjects, which was designed to provide greater protection for small businesses against arbitrary taxation. However, there is no mechanism to enforce the legal requirements, and government officials could easily use their patronage and patrimonial networks to hide business activities. A significant number of top policy makers directly or indirectly own or "patronize" profitable businesses and have close ties with the business community. Allegedly, members of the presidential family control or participate in numerous businesses. For example, the president's son-in-law, Adil Toigonbayev, has controlling interests in more than a dozen, including mass media, retail trades, entertainment, and aviation fuel, reports The Washington Post.

The government has a mixed record in enforcing anticorruption measures. In 1994, former prime minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev was accused of corruption and forced to resign. Between 1998 and 2000, several ministers were forced to resign and prosecuted on corruption charges. This included the prosecution in 1998 of powerful ministers Askar Sarygulov and Kemelbek Nanayev . However, the political opposition regularly accuses the government of prejudice. In 1999 and again in 2000, Felix Kulov, head of the opposition Ar-Namys Party, was brought to court over accusations of abuse of power and acquiring large sums of money from commercial deals. His supporters claimed that the trial could hardly be called fair, as his team of defense attorneys faced numerous difficulties. They insist that Kulov was charged for criticizing the regime and revealing corruption in the government. Despite public and international appeals for his release, he was still in prison in 2003.

Although the executive and legislative bodies operate under strict audit and other controls, the implementation of these rules is hardly effective. With Kyrgyzstan's tradition of extended family relations, vast patronage networks, and tribal and communal loyalties, it is easy to hide business interests, properties, and commercial activities. In addition, all investigative institutions face strong interference. The so-called telephone law is very strong, and powerful politicians rarely hesitate to interfere directly or indirectly if an investigation affects their interests.

Although self-censorship is a major limiting factor in investigative journalism, some independent media outlets and NGOs have made consistent attempts to expose corruption in the government ranks and to provide anticorruption public education. Yet whistle-blowers and investigative journalists have experienced direct physical violence or direct police interrogations. In rural areas, the picture is even worse. Some NGO activists and journalists report that government and law enforcement officials regularly obstruct their activities, conceal public or business information, or even threaten them physically.

In addition, government officials routinely use various legal means against independent journalists and NGO activists who report cases of corruption. Several government officials, including ministers, governors, parliamentarians, and prominent politicians, have brought journalists to court in order to "defend honor and dignity." In many cases, they've won significant financial damages. In the past, such cases blocked the publication of leading opposition newspapers, including the popular Res Publika, Asaba, and Moya Stolitsa-Novosti, and even led to their temporary or permanent closures.

Since the presidential elections in 2000 and the beginning of the political crisis in March 2002, the independent mass media, especially electronic newspapers and Web sites, have tried to provide greater coverage of corrupt practices in the country. In 2002 and 2003, for example, Moya Stolitsa-Novosti published a series of Internet articles on corruption among Akayev's inner cabinet and family members, particularly on deals allegedly made by the president's son-in-law. However, even widely publicized revelations and complaints rarely lead to investigations or crackdowns.

In 2003, Transparency International ranked Kyrgyzstan 118th out of 133 countries surveyed in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. Anecdotal evidence suggests that while corruption is rampant, people often tolerate it because of their high dependence on state bureaucracy for basic needs, their perception of the importance of political loyalties, and their general mistrust of the justice system. The opposition remains the major anticorruption force by mobilizing public support against corruption and providing education on the problem. It has organized anticorruption actions and exposed corrupt politicians and bureaucrats as part of its political campaign for the forthcoming presidential elections.

Author

Rafis Abazov is an adjunct lecturer at the Harriman Institute/School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. He is the author of the Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (2003) and coauthor of the forthcoming Population Change and Migration in Central Asia. He has written several pieces on transition and security issues in Central Asia and contributed to the Modern Encyclopedia of Russian, Soviet and Eurasian History.