PERSPECTIVE SERIES

CHINESE STATE BIRTH PLANNING IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND

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PRODUCED BY:
SUSAN GREENHALGH, Ph.D.
PROFESSOR OF ANTHROPOLOGY,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

EDWIN A. WINCKLER, Ph.D.
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE OF THE
EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Perspective series reports are one means by which information on human rights conditions in a country and/or conditions affecting given groups or individuals deemed "at risk" within a given country is presented to Asylum and Immigration Officers. These reports are descriptions of conditions in countries based on information provided by the sources referred to above. They are prepared by expert consultants and/or the staff of the Resource Information Center, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice. This paper was researched and written by Susan Greenhalgh, Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of California at Irvine and Edwin A. Winckler, Research Associate of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Edwin Winckler translated the Fujian Birth Planning Regulations in Appendix Three from Chinese to English.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAIN THEMES

Birth limits. Throughout the 1990s, the Chinese government continued to sharply limit the number of children a couple was allowed to bear. These restrictions are likely to remain in force for at least the next decade and a half. Most urbanites are allowed to have only one child, while about two-thirds of ruralites qualify for two because of special occupational or family circumstances. Third children are "resolutely prohibited" for all but some ethnic minorities. The government adheres rigorously to these limits, fearing that the public would take advantage of any liberalization to press for more children. During the early 1990s, the government demanded stricter enforcement from all localities, but especially from populous provinces with high rates of "multiple" (third or higher-order) children. By the late 1990s, policy makers believed that reported fertility was about as low as it could go. Program leaders do not intend to try to push birth rates any lower, except in a few less developed areas where fertility has fallen only moderately. In most places, including major cities, a couple in which both spouses are single children is now allowed to have two children. As the number of such couples increases early in the 21st century, some automatic de facto liberalization of birth limits will occur, providing the program with a "soft landing"— at least in the urban areas. In the countryside, where the majority of the population lives, the gap between state demands and popular preferences persists. In the more developed rural areas, the number of children couples want has fallen since the 1980s, though it remains slightly above program limits. In the poorer parts of rural China, family size ideals remain well above state limits. No soft landing can be expected here.

Enforcement strategies. Throughout the 1990s, the birth-limitation policy remained mandatory on all citizens. It is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The policy is a "basic state policy" and a national constitutional obligation about which all provincial legislatures have passed detailed regulations. Evidently, much of the public largely accepts the legitimacy and even necessity of state limitation of births, deeming it a patriotic duty, like the payment of income taxes. It is expected that by 2002 a new national law will spell out both the obligation to obey the policy and protection from arbitrary implementation of it. The policy is a matter of civil law that is enforced mostly through government propaganda-and-education (a broad term with a distinctive meaning in the Chinese context) and community social pressure. These preferred means are backed up mostly with economic fines that are meant to be steep but not crippling. In the 1990s, however, fines rose sharply, causing considerable economic hardship for many required to pay them. Administrative means such as dismissal from jobs and termination of party membership can be used as well. Citizen non-compliance with birth limits is not a matter of criminal law punishable by prison. In China, non-compliance is not considered to express dissident political opinion. In the course of the 1990s, the program increasingly emphasized "lawful administration" by grass-roots cadres, forbidding "forceful methods" of physical violence to persons or property. Cadre violation of such strictures is a criminal offense, and some local cadres guilty of coercion or corruption have been punished, a few of them severely. Yet scattered evidence suggests that in some places where couples insist on having more children than allowed, cadres continue to use heavyhanded, even abusive, measures, and some are not punished. There is no way to know how widespread such practices are.

Implementation methods. During the 1990s, and especially after 1993, program leaders sought to increase the program's reliance on the routine work of public education and service delivery. At the same time, they strived to reduce the dependence on crash campaigns, which produce clumsy implementation, high-pressure tactics and poor-quality medical procedures. Program administrators also gave more emphasis to preventing unwanted and unauthorized pregnancies before they occur, in order to minimize the number of abortions, which remain mandatory for all unauthorized pregnancies. About 40% of married women between the ages of 15 and 49 use intra-uterine devices (IUDs). One member of about half of couples that had their permitted children has been sterilized. At least a quarter of women have experienced contraceptive failure (or deliberate removal of contraceptive device), unauthorized pregnancy and mandatory abortion. In the late 1990s, nearly half the provinces revised their regulations; reportedly all removed the requirement that one member of a couple with two or more children undergo sterilization. The program will continue macro-planning of population targets, but evidently in some places it is beginning to reduce the micro-management of subnational governments and private couples. Or perhaps local governments and individuals are simply seizing control from the center. Since the mid-1990s, the program has been giving new and much needed emphasis to improving the quality of reproductive health care. Despite these promising developments, strict control of population growth remains the program's central goal. A rebound in population growth may well threaten these liberalizing trends.

Local resistance and human costs. Because the state's reproductive rules have permitted fewer children than couples (especially rural couples) wanted, the program has always met covert resistance from individual families and even cadres. Resistance has been much fiercer in the countryside than in the cities and much stronger at times of intense enforcement than weak. In the 1990s, local resistance to state birth planning moved to a new, more overt and collective level, in which collectivities such as local legislatures and media organizations worked to document and oppose the program's harshest provisions, most abusive practices, and most inhumane consequences. At the same time, the human costs of the program— especially for women and infant girls— remained high. The greatest costs to individuals were undoubtedly the harm to women's reproductive health, the survival risks faced by infant girls, and the fate of children who had the great misfortune to come into the world "unplanned." Legally non-persons, these children are denied the right to a wide range of state benefits essential to membership in the social collectivity.

The rest of this Executive Summary provides **a *precis* of this Report**. The Preface notes the purposes and sources of the Report. The Table of Contents gives an overview of the detailed contents of each chapter. The body of the Report contains four sections, each with two chapters. The introductory section summarizes some basic facts about Chinese state birth planning policy and enforcement, describes the politics of resistance to birth planning, and documents some of the costs to individuals and to society of China's top-down approach to population control. The second section of the Report describes national policy and program performance in the 1990s. The third section describes how the program is organized and how it varies along several dimensions. The fourth and final section of the Report surveys variation across provinces in the 1990s before sketching the history and geography of birth planning in Fujian, the province that has produced a disproportionate share of the asylum applicants claiming persecution under the one-child policy. Four appendixes present the important policy Decision of March 2000, define

Chinese terms, translate Fujian regulations, and provide Fujian data.

I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter One provides an **overview of program policy and enforcement**. The program is mandatory state birth planning, not voluntary family planning. The main program rules have been mandatory contraception after a first child and mandatory sterilization after a second, but there have been both deliberate and inadvertent exceptions and the rules are beginning to be softened. In principle, the main means of enforcement have been, first, propaganda-and-education (a technique that can involve considerable coercion), second, economic incentives and penalties, and only as a last resort, more drastic "administrative means." 1990s innovations sought to strengthen institutions to make enforcement more reliable and more lawful, increase the resources devoted to professional salaries and mass incentives, and improve information by intensifying monitoring and computerizing client data. These innovations were all aimed at strengthening the program, improving compliance, and increasing state control over reproduction.

Chapter Two outlines the **politics of resistance to the birth planning policy and the human costs** of state birth planning. Rapid economic growth, coming on top of decades of state propaganda, has measurably reduced the number of children that most Chinese couples want. Although people often desire more children than program rules allow, most people accept the legitimacy and necessity of birth limitation. Because the rules have been out of line with deeply felt reproductive desires, however, the program has always faced covert individual resistance, especially in the countryside, both from couples targeted for surgery and from local cadres charged with enforcement. During the 1990s, the program also became the subject of overt collective politics of resistance. As foreign journalists have graphically documented, the human costs of state-directed birth planning have been steep. In this deeply patriarchal culture, women and infant girls have borne the great bulk of these costs. Women have borne the burden of contraception, at great risk to their reproductive and emotional health. In a culture in which son preference remains strong, girl infants have faced particular risks, the first of which is sex-selective abortion. If carried to term, the girl child faces the risk of concealment, abandonment and, in certain times and places, infanticide. The result is a growing imbalance in the sex ratio at birth. In the 1990s, state attention to reproductive health may have begun to alleviate the problems faced by women, but the sex ratio at birth remained distorted and may have even worsened.

II. NATIONAL POLICY AND PERFORMANCE

Chapter Three delineates **continuity and change in Chinese birth policy in the 1990s**. The main continuities were in "strictly limiting" second children to couples fitting specific circumstances, "resolutely forbidding" "multiple" (or third and higher-order) children, delaying the timing of childbearing by requiring spacing between births, and combining routine administration with crash campaigns. One set of changes was *administrative rationalization.* From 1989 to 1993, the government strongly re-enforced existing policy. From 1993, it emphasized shifting from emergency to routine work, and from 1995 on it stressed linking birth planning to related programs such as poverty reduction. Another set of changes was *incipient*

liberalization. From around 1995, the program drew increasingly on international influences. From around 1998, it stressed improving the quality of care and began slowly reducing its micro-management of individual behavior.

Chapter Four reports **national population change and program performance in the 1990s**, according to the program's own measures and data. Unfortunately, extensive underreporting of births makes interpretation of these data somewhat difficult. The evidence available suggests that the program helped limit China's population to just under 1.3 billion in the year 2000, perhaps 300 million less than the total otherwise would have been. The average number of children per woman fell from about six in 1970 to around two in the 1990s. Contributing to this goal, by the late 1990s, reportedly more than half of marriages were "late" and more than 90% of married women aged 15-49 practiced contraception. However, only about a fifth signed contracts agreeing to have only one child. During the 1990s, according to program statistics, the proportion of annual births that were "within plan" rose from about 80% to over 90%, and the proportion of births that were "multiple" (third and higher-order) children fell from 19% to 5%. These program statistics may well exaggerate the extent of change, but the trends of change they indicate are probably in the right direction. Despite these statistics showing rising contraceptive use and falling fertility at the end of the 1990s, only somewhat more than a third of Chinese women of childbearing age had only one child. Slightly under a third had two, a quarter had many, and 6% had none.

III. ORGANIZATION AND VARIATION

Chapter Five outlines the program's **administrative organization, public involvement, and legislative basis**. Backed by China's senior political leaders, program agencies include Birth Planning Commissions or committees at every level of government. Numerous other agencies, such as the Ministry of Public Health, also have responsibilities for birth planning. Public involvement in enforcement is extensive. Throughout the program's history, public involvement has included the work of basic-level administrative organizations and the "mass organizations," in particular, the Women's Federation. The 1990s saw growing public supervision of the program, known as "oversight from below," through the actions of legislative committees, investigative reporting by the media, and other means. Birth policy has evolved from administrative dicta toward legislative legitimacy. Recent revisions of provincial regulations have somewhat liberalized them. An anticipated forthcoming national law will spell out not only the duty of citizens to comply but also the protection of citizens from abuse. Interaction of the program with foreign organizations has been growing, a trend that has contributed significantly to the beginning of some liberalization of the program. Appended to this chapter are charts of the organization of the program at the national, subnational, and local levels.

Chapter Six defines some **dimensions along which the program varies**. Across provinces, birth limits were implemented earlier and more strictly in Han Chinese areas (which include about 91% of the population) than in minority nationality areas. In some areas, historically strong regionalism may have softened policy and implementation, as perhaps along the Southeast Coast. Within provinces, birth limits were imposed earlier and more strictly in urban than in rural areas. Relatedly, birth limits have been more strictly enforced in state work units than in collective ones and least strictly enforced in individual private work units and

among migrants. The policy was applied earlier and more strictly on government employees than on ordinary citizens. Women have borne most of the contraceptive burden and run most of the medical risks involved in a program that has long emphasized reaching urgent demographic targets regardless of the cost.

IV. PROVINCIAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Chapter Seven canvasses **provincial population change and program performance in the 1990s**. The center delegates most implementation to provinces and localities, using program indicators to monitor provincial performance. Over the last thirty years, the program has gradually reduced the differences between provinces in basic demography, program inputs, and program outcomes. In particular, at the beginning of the 1990s, the center demanded stricter implementation from the nine largest agricultural provinces and from any province with a high "multiple" child rate. By 1995, the center had brought nearly all provinces into compliance, at least according to program data. The exceptions are mostly provinces that contain a high proportion of minority nationality population. Within provinces, differences in implementation capacity involve an interplay of formal administrative hierarchy and core-periphery geographic structure.

Chapter Eight focuses on the coastal province of **Fujian**, home to a large proportion of asylum applicants. The province has remained somewhat distinct from most of the rest of agricultural China because of mountain barriers, maritime orientation, cultural distinctiveness and post-1949 "battle-front" status. Until about 1990, Fujian's birth program implementation was distinctly lax, relying too much on crash campaigns and too little on routine work. During the 1990s, the program received higher priority and more funds, as a result of which implementation became both more strict and more lawful. Within Fujian, program implementation is solid in most of the advanced coastal plain, but not all of it. Enforcement remains weak in poor mountainous rural areas and among urban migrants. Fuzhou City has generally strong implementation, but its coastal counties are notoriously unruly and resistant to the demands of municipal and provincial birth planners.

APPENDIXES

Two of four appendixes treat national terms and policies, while two provide Fujian local regulations and data.

The first Appendix contains a **Glossary** that defines special terms used by the Chinese program and by this Report. Selective in coverage and detailed in content, the Glossary amounts to a summary of key policy emphases in Chinese birth planning during the 1990s.

The second Appendix provides a translation of the complete text of a major **March 2000 "Decision"** by the party Central Committee and government State Council on overall birth policy for the 2000-2010 period and beyond. This weighty "Decision" is the authoritative summary of official Chinese thinking about birth policy at the turn of the millennium.

The third Appendix translates the 1991 **Fujian Birth Planning Regulations**. In effect

throughout the 1990s, the regulations convey the rules actually applied to Fujian residents during the last ten years. Though dry, these regulations are well worth reading, for they illustrate the incredibly systematic and detailed nature of provincial legislation on birth planning. The regulations also provide concrete illustration of many of the larger points made in this Report.

The fourth Appendix presents a set of tables providing quantitative **data about Fujian**. The first part, on Fujian as a whole, includes indicators of the province's demographic history and occupational structure. The second part records Fujian's major cities and prefectures. The third part provides basic data on Fujian's 77 counties. Read carefully and comparatively, these data provide clues to the likely harshness of birth planning enforcement in each of the counties of the province from which perhaps the majority of asylum applicants originate.

PREFACE: PURPOSES, SOURCES AND USAGES

PURPOSES

China's state birth planning program evolved significantly during the 1990s and promises to change even further in the first decade of the 21st century. Relative to the significance of the program and the magnitude of these changes, Western journalism and scholarship have provided little coverage of them. Few sustained descriptions exist of the program's baseline policies, organization and methods. Few systematic analyses exist of how the program has changed in the 1990s and how policy and enforcement have varied from place to place. Few accounts exist that place China's unusual approach to population control in the larger context of the country's rapidly changing politics, economy, and culture. In the absence of concrete recent information, foreign perceptions of the program remain dominated by images of the highly coercive program of the early 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the early 1990s. The little foreign discussion of the program that does occur tends to remain a worthy but general discourse about the role of coercion in the program, abstracted from the program's evolving rules, procedures, and context.

This Report tries to help fill these gaps. It outlines the program's main reproductive regulations, enforcement methods, administrative organization and legislative basis. The Report sketches changes in national policy and program performance during the 1990s and anticipates developments early in the 21st century. It indicates differences in program outcomes across provinces and the special pressure on some "laggard" provinces to improve. The analysis remains largely qualitative, but contains enough quantification to suggest the scale of the processes and the magnitude of the changes involved.

The Report does not claim any direct relationship between this general background and particular INS asylum cases. No analysis of general processes can specify the circumstances of a particular applicant. The Report simply describes some major changes that have occurred in the Chinese program and defines some major dimensions along which individual asylum cases are likely to vary. An understanding of these changes and dimensions should help INS officers inquire knowledgeably into particular cases.

SOURCES

This Report both deepens and updates previous coverage. It incorporates the findings of the few main English-language materials on the Chinese birth program in the 1990s. These include academic publications such as a 1990s field report on urban program implementation,[1] a recent fine rural field report,[2] and other recent analyses.[3] Most other Western academic analyses,

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[1] Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994).

[2] Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 202-230.

[3] Greenhalgh, Susan. "The evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi, 1979-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 122, June 1990), p. 191-229; Greenhalgh, Susan. "Population studies in China: Privileged past, anxious future," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (No. 24, July 1990), p. 357-384; Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994) p. 3-30; Greenhalgh, Susan. "The

however, are quite out of date and not well adapted to INS needs. English-language materials also include some translations of primary sources by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS, American, now available on the World News Connection) and Survey of World Broadcasts (SWB, British, now available on the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe). These services are admirable, but their coverage is necessarily unsystematic and infrequent.

Given these limitations of the English-language sources, this Report heavily exploits recent materials published in China in Chinese, mostly for the internal use of Chinese program officials. Although government publications, these materials are not propaganda, but rather the program's record of its own development. These *Chinese publications provide information that is several orders of magnitude more comprehensive, more specific and more up-to-date than any English-language sources* available. Read with an understanding of the larger political context and politicized vocabulary of contemporary China, these materials are immensely valuable, yet they too have limitations. Given the program's own schedule for compilation and publication, at any given time the most recent Chinese materials available treat events from about two years before. In addition, it takes six months to a year for American research libraries to obtain them. Thus for a report written in 1999 and revised in 2000, the most recent Chinese coverage available runs only through the end of 1998. This is particularly regrettable given the accelerating pace of change in the program today.

For information on the past few years, the authors of this Report conducted a series of in-depth interviews with high-level Chinese birth planning officials visiting the United States in 1998 and 1999. Again, although these people are officials, their responses to questions appeared to be mostly quite candid and complete. Indeed, most of these officials seem quite eager to explain recent changes, which evidently most of them enthusiastically favor. In any case, they constitute some of the latest and most authoritative information. For a broader view of the program, the Report's authors have drawn on numerous discussions with Chinese demographers and influential members of the State Birth Planning Commission conducted over many years. The most recent interviews were conducted in Beijing in late 1999.

For the broader context in which the program has developed over the last thirty years, we have drawn widely on the scholarly literature on China's history, geography, culture, and politics. Field research in Shaanxi Province in 1988 and 1993, as well as field visits to several localities around the country in 1993 have informed our understanding of many of the issues treated here. To illuminate the costs of the program to individuals, we have used media accounts of especially traumatic or troubling experiences some Chinese have had under the one-child policy. For the broader demographic context in which the program operates, we have relied on the academic

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peasantization of the one-child policy in Shaanxi," in *Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era.* Edited by Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 219-250; Greenhalgh, Susan, Chuzhu Zhu and Li Nan. "Restraining population growth in three Chinese villages," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1994) p. 365-395; Greenhalgh, Susan and Li Jiali. "Engendering reproductive policy and practice in peasant China," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 1995), p. 601-641; Winckler, Edwin A. "Re-enforcing state birth planning," in *Transition from Communism in China.* Edited by Edwin A. Winckler (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1999), p. 181-203; Winckler, Edwin A. "Chinese state birth planning: Continuity and change in the 1990s" (Unpublished manuscript, no date); Winckler, Edwin A. "Chinese state birth planning: Provincial performance in the 1990s" (Unpublished manuscript, no date).

literature on China's population. Unfortunately, we were able to use only a small part of the large and excellent literature on the demography of China, much of it by Chinese scholars.

USAGES

This Report adopts certain terms that highlight its focus and findings:

Birth planning. The central concept behind the Chinese program is "birth planning" or "planned birth" (*jihua shengyu*). The term implies a contrast between socialism and capitalism. Under socialism, PRC leaders decided, human reproduction should be scientifically planned by the state, because under capitalism unplanned human reproduction is chaotic and inefficient. Thus the Chinese concept of "birth planning" refers to planning by the Chinese party-state, not to planning by Chinese families.

Birth policy. Both the Chinese program and this Report distinguish between broad population processes and issues ("population policy") and a narrow focus on human reproduction ("birth policy"). Since both the Chinese program and this Report deal primarily with reproduction and fertility, this Report speaks mainly of "birth policy." Throughout this Report, we use "policy" to refer to the officially specified content of the program, including how goals and methods are formulated and how they are affected as policy is implemented.

Birth program. In this Report, we use this term to refer to the whole effort by the Chinese state to affect reproduction, but particularly to the organizational embodiment of that effort in the birth planning administrative "system." It includes whatever concrete measures have actually been taken to implement policy. For succinctness, we often refer simply to "the program," which always means birth planning.

For additional explanation of terminology, see the Glossary in Appendix One at the end of the Report.

I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION: CHINESE POLICY AND PROGRAM ENFORCEMENT

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: CORE FEATURES

B. PROGRAM RULES: STRINGENT BY ANY STANDARD

(a) Marriage and first child
(b) First child and contraception
(c) Second child and sterilization

C. THREE KINDS OF COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS: FROM SOFT SELL TO HARD PRESSURE

(a) Propaganda-and-education, routine and campaign style
(b) Economic incentives and penalties
(c) Administrative means: Administrative punishments and criminal sanctions

D. 1990s INNOVATIONS: STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT

(a) Strengthening institutions to strengthen enforcement
(b) Increasing incentives to improve compliance
(c) Improving information to enhance control

E. CONCLUSION

China's population policy and birth planning program are complex governmental initiatives that defy easy summary. Reflecting Chinese communist political discourse and political realities that still, despite 20 years of "reform and opening up," remain opaque to most outsiders, the policy and program present their goals in cryptic axioms ("the two transformations," "the three priorities") that only add to the confusion. In this Introduction to the Report, we try to extract the main elements of the policy and program in order to make those initiatives more comprehensible. The chapter's Introduction presents key features of China's approach to birth planning. Here we address some of the central themes that emerged from questions posed by INS officers to this Report. In the first section we lay out the rules that China's birth planning program has enforced on successive stages of a woman's reproductive career. In the next section we describe the three main means through which program enforcers have attempted to achieve compliance with these requirements. The third and final section summarizes important 1990s innovations in enforcement methods.

In this chapter, we refer frequently to two documents that well state official policy and that should be of particular use to INS officers. One is a **2 March 2000 "Decision"** by top government and party leaders, a comprehensive overview that summarizes official thinking at the end of the 1990s and sets the course of the birth-planning program for the early 21st century.[4] The Decision calls for "strengthening" population and birth planning work in order to "stabilize" the relatively low birthrate that China has already achieved. The other document is the 1991 **Fujian birth planning regulations**, which were in force in Fujian throughout the 1990s.[5] Since the general concepts and provisions in the Fujian regulations are typical of those in other provinces as well, the regulations provide an excellent concrete example of general points made in this Report. At the same time, these regulations show the rules in force in Fujian, a province of particular interest to INS officers.[6]

A. INTRODUCTION: CORE FEATURES

Before going into the details of policy rules and program enforcement, it is useful to sketch in "the big picture."

Approach: Birth planning by government, not family planning by individuals. For most of its history, the Chinese program has been not "family planning" in the Western sense of individual couples controlling their own fertility, but state birth planning by the government for national economic and social purposes. The idea has been that "scientific socialism" should plan not only economic production but also social reproduction, in order to bring them into harmony both with each other and with China's environmental capacity. As of 2000, strict family limitation remained mandatory. The March 2000 Decision remains heavily "top-down," continuing to emphasize the integration of "state guidance" with people's "voluntary participation" (these terms are explained below). Despite the persistence of stringent state norms on number of children that remain below societal preferences in many places, the program has begun to evolve toward some individual choice in timing of births and method of contraception (but not whether to contracept). Program leaders have also shown growing concern for the quality of reproductive health care in addition to the quantitative control of population growth.

Enforcement: Increasingly compulsory but decreasingly violent. The Chinese party-state believes that in the long run economic development will limit childbearing and that in the meantime the government's main means of securing compliance with birth rules should be propaganda-and-education (also a technical term, explained below). Nevertheless, birth limits are legally mandatory for all Chinese citizens, and the government believes they must be enforced on all couples, not only to avoid what it considers a national demographic disaster, but also to maintain the credibility and fairness of the program. As in most nations, most compliance with demanding state policies such as tax payment or military service is "voluntary" in a range of senses: some people contribute with patriotic enthusiasm, others reluctantly accept compliance as a legitimate

[4] See the summary at the end of Chapter Three and the full text in Appendix Two.
[5] For a translation of this document, see Appendix Three.
[6] As of 1999, Fujian was revising its regulations but the legislative process had not yet been completed.

obligation, still others comply only because they know they have no choice. Yet others do not comply, but rather resist state demands at risk of punishment that ranges from mild to severe. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese birth program has been adapting its enforcement methods to a "socialist market economy," relying less on crash campaigns that sometimes involved some physical violence and more on economic incentives and penalties.

Institutionalization: Organized not disorganized. By the 1990s, Chinese state birth planning had become highly institutionalized, both in its formal legal basis and administrative organization, and in the informal norms and practices that adapt general policies to specific circumstances. Among Chinese communist programs, state birth planning began relatively late (not 1950s but 1970s). Nevertheless, by the 1990s, the program had succeeded in constructing both an administrative system capable of implementing the program and a new social norm of one or two children accepted as legitimate by most citizens. Moreover, program administrators have devoted increasing attention to trying to ensure that program cadres adhere to program rules. Successful implementation depends on clients perceiving program requirements as fair and program services as beneficial.

Implementation: More differentiated than inconsistent. Many reports on China's birth policy remark that it is applied "unevenly" across localities and couples, as though such variation is undesirable. Certainly there is some unintended variation due to local incapacity, incompetence or corruption. Yet much of the variation is deliberate. Since the mid-1980s, *national policymakers have striven for a consistent set of principles that produce different outcomes under different circumstances,* in order to be both as effective and as fair as possible. Under the aegis of the national "one-child" slogan, policymakers have deliberately developed different policies for different localities, depending on their level of socioeconomic development, geographical location, ethnic composition and other factors. Moreover, local regulations allow for differences in family circumstance, such as residence (rural versus urban), occupation (labor intensivity), and gender composition (sons deemed necessary for labor, retirement care, or family continuation).

Limits: A one-child ideal, not a one-child policy. In the late 1970s, China adopted the one-child ideal as a temporary expedient for limiting the reproduction of one generation of Chinese (until about 2000). In the early 1980s, China did actually attempt to implement such a policy, but soon discovered that was not feasible, because many rural families went to extreme lengths to have two children and a son. Since then the "one-child" standard has remained in place as an actual policy only for urban areas. In rural areas, the de facto policy has been a roughly "1.68 child policy," or a "one-child policy with two-child exceptions," the most important of which is for couples with one girl. In the 1990s, China did not have a one-child policy in the sense of actually limiting most couples to one child. Moreover, by the 1990s, program leaders had no intention of ever trying to persuade most Chinese to have only one child, at least in the rural areas. Even in urban areas, the program allows couples in which both spouses are single children to have two children of their own. In effect, at the turn of the millennium, the 1980-2000 "emergency" is largely ending.[7]

[7] However, the results of the 2000 census may create another "crisis," and a "fourth peak" is projected to appear in 2009-2014, perhaps inciting a new "emergency."

Human costs: Particularly steep for women, baby girls and "unplanned" children. Most of the burden of birth planning has fallen on adult women: they practice most contraception (principally IUDs or sterilization), they endure contraceptive failure and "remedial procedures" (mandatory abortion of any out-of-plan pregnancies), and they suffer any adverse medical side-effects and complications (e.g., from inappropriate IUDs or botched operations). Because they are the ones targeted for "persuasion" and "mobilization," the emotional costs are steep as well. In addition, because most rural couples want a son, birth limits have fallen heavily on baby girls, who may be aborted before birth, concealed, abandoned, adopted-out, or even allowed to die. Finally, birth regulations have created a category of "unplanned" children who, because they are illegal, cannot be registered as ordinary citizens for education, health and other crucial benefits.

B. PROGRAM RULES: STRINGENT BY ANY STANDARD

In this section we describe the classical program requirements surrounding the successive possible stages of a Chinese woman's now truncated reproductive career— marriage and first child, contraception after her first child, and sterilization after her second child. The section mostly describes the urban situation, but notes rural differences. Since 1983, the national guideline has been "after first child, IUD; after second child, sterilization." That guideline has been extensively implemented and contraception has been provided free of charge. Although only half of the 1980s provincial regulations incorporated that formulation, specifying contraceptive method by birth order,[8] the guideline was heavily stressed during short-term birth planning campaigns (on which, more below). The level and pattern of implementation have varied across provinces by their level of socioeconomic development. Reportedly, in the 1990s when revising their regulations, many provinces dropped the sterilization requirement.[9]

This section contains a great deal of empirical data. On first reading, some readers may wish to skip the data paragraphs. For later use, however, these numbers should prove helpful by conveying an idea of the likelihood that applicants from different kinds of places have been at risk for particular types of medical procedures.[10]

(a) Marriage and first child

Until recently, all couples wishing to have their first child were required to adhere to the following procedures. The woman must apply to her *work unit* for a certificate confirming she has reached the age of late marriage (24 in most of China). If a woman gets pregnant before age 24 she is "persuaded" to abort. The woman takes this certificate to her *residence committee*, which issues documents granting her permission to become pregnant. There are three copies, one kept by the residence committee, one filed with the work unit, and one kept by the woman

[8] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 23-42.
[9] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997) [in Chinese].
[10] For an example of provincial rules on fertility and contraception, see Chapters Two and Three of the regulations in Appendix Three.

herself. When the woman becomes pregnant, she needs that certificate to access free government prenatal health care; otherwise she must purchase those services herself at market prices. Recently in some areas, the program has begun experimenting with waiving these procedures and allowing newly married couples to have their first child whenever they choose, without it being formally registered as "within-the-plan."[11] [12]

(b) First child and contraception

After having her first child, within three to six months a woman is required to have an intra-uterine device (IUD) inserted. Many women will get an IUD and a One-Child Certificate on their own initiative because they know it is expected. If not, a birth planning worker will come to visit, inquire about how the woman's first child is doing, and remind her about the IUD. After IUD insertion, the woman's contraceptive practice is monitored by both her work unit and her residential unit. The small proportion of women in whom an IUD causes bleeding or other unacceptable side effects are allowed to use birth control pills instead. The IUD a woman receives should last most of the rest of her fertile life. If not, she can be sterilized by undergoing a tubal ligation (or her husband can undergo a vasectomy). Some areas offer financial incentives and paid rest periods for such early sterilization operations.[13] In the late 1980s, 70% of couples with one child practiced some form of contraception (96% of them "responding to the government's call," suggesting a certain ambivalence). Among these, 79% used IUDs and only 1.7% used sterilization (including 0.4% male sterilization). The level and type of contraceptive use among couples with one child was virtually identical across provinces at different levels of development.[14]

If contraception fails, women are expected to abort their unauthorized or "out-of-plan" pregnancy. Government-mandated abortion has played an important role in Chinese birth planning from the outset.[15] Detailed case studies suggest that a great number of second pregnancies, because they do not meet government requirements, end in abortion.[16] The literature on China provides a graphic description of a 1985 campaign in Xiamen, Fujian, requiring some

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[11] Polansky, Jonathan. Vice President and Creative Director, Public Media Center, San Francisco, California. June 1999. Personal interview by the authors.

[12] On this stage, see Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 114-117. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy*. (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)]. For the relevant procedures in one illustrative province, see Article Ten of the regulations in Appendix Three.

[13] On this stage, see Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 117-123. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)]. On these tensions in Fujian, see Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 181.

[14] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 36, based on 1988 State Birth Planning Commission survey.

[15] Guo, Shenyang. "Determinants of fertility decline in Shanghai: Development or policy?" in *China: The Many Facets of Demographic Change.* Edited by Alice Goldstein et al (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).

[16] Tu, Ping and Herbert L. Smith. "Determinants of induced abortion and their policy implications in four counties in north China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 25, No. 5, September/October 1995), p. 278-286.

village women to abort out-of-plan pregnancies.[17] During the 1980s and early 1990s, China averaged around eleven million abortions a year, but during the mid- to late 1990s the numbers declined substantially. They hit a temporary peak at the beginning of the 1990s at the height of the re-enforcement of policy (14 million in 1991), but the number was halved by 1995 (to 7.5 million) and remained in the 6.6 to 8.8 million range through 1998. By the late 1990s, a basic objective of the Chinese program was to prevent unwanted and unauthorized pregnancies before they occur in order to avoid having to abort them afterward. Program spokespersons maintain that the main reason abortions are necessary is to correct accidental contraceptive failure. Of course, a significant portion of these "failures," especially in the rural areas, reflect deliberate resistance to the birth policy by couples who want additional children.[18] Sheer technical failure, however, is quite frequent. In the 1990s, program managers attempted to reduce the failure rate by improving the quality of contraceptive devices (switching from round steel to copper-T IUDs) and by improving the quality of reproductive health care (for example, making sure that IUDs are properly inserted). A major constraint on such efforts is that local governments must pay most of the costs. Under-funded local programs may continue to purchase the much cheaper steel IUDs and may remain unable to adequately train and motivate service providers.

Clearly, it remains the intent of program officials that all out-of-plan pregnancies be terminated. Evidently, the actual proportion that is terminated through abortion varies by type of locality: high for urban couples (around 90% in the 1980s) but lower for rural couples (only 55%). Rural couples were more likely to be required to terminate pregnancies when the contraceptive method that failed was user-controlled rather than provider-controlled.[19] However, counter-intuitively, the more children a woman already had, the more likely that a contraceptive "failure" would result in a live birth, confirming that many such "failures" were probably deliberate.[20]

According to program ideals, a woman with an out-of-plan pregnancy should abort on her own initiative. Failing that, she would be "persuaded" to undergo an abortion (*shuofu*, a colloquial Chinese term). At worst, she would have to be "mobilized" (*dongyuan*, a technical-ideological term) by increasing the social pressure on her from birth planning workers and community leaders. When asked why they had contraceptive operations that obviously they personally would have preferred not to have undergone, most people reply that they "answered the state's call."[21] If a woman insists on carrying an out-of-plan pregnancy to term, the punishment is a substantial out-of-plan birth fine for the parents, revocation of any one-child

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[17] Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 175-185.
[18] Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30.
[19] Thus, 82% of pregnancies from failure of the pill and condom were terminated, while only 51% of pregnancies following IUD failures and 34% following sterilization failures were ended.
[20] Wang, Duolao, Ian Diamond and Sian L. Curtis. "Contraceptive failure and its subsequent effects in China: A two-stage event history analysis," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1998), p. 45-64.
[21] Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 114-117. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)]; Wang, Duolao, Ian Diamond and Sian L. Curtis. "Contraceptive failure and its subsequent effects in China: A two-stage event history analysis," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1998), p. 52.

benefits for the parents, and denial of access for the child to many ordinary government benefits (e.g., registering for school). These are steep costs to pay for having that extra child.

The question frequently arises whether Chinese couples who have an unauthorized child while residing abroad are likely to face penalties upon returning to China. The evidence available suggests that, in many if not most cases, the answer is no. The relevant regulations do not call for penalties. Interviews with officials from Fujian and Guangdong produced the following account. If the woman became pregnant before leaving the country, the couple must pay the out-of-plan birth fine. However, if the woman became pregnant while abroad for ordinary reasons, the couple is not fined. Because the government wants to encourage students studying abroad to return to China, generally speaking there is no fine or other punishment for extra births that occur while they are abroad. Both Fujian and Guangdong have many Chinese citizens going in and out of the country on ordinary business, particularly from Guangdong to Hong Kong and back. Officials said that trying to control the behavior of such travelers is neither feasible nor necessary. Permission to travel abroad requires some clear purpose, and it is relatively easy to identify someone trying to go abroad simply in order to have a child. Overseas Chinese (a term explained in Chapter Six under Regionalism) have particularly broad latitude. They can send their one child out of China to permanent residence abroad and bear another child to replace it. Officials said that work units do not have much interest in trying to control the behavior of their members while they are abroad.[22]

(c) Second child and sterilization

Until recently, once a couple had a second child (for whatever reason), in principle, sterilization became mandatory for one member of the couple. In many parts of the country, that policy was widely enforced.[23] Birth planning officials follow the same process of persuading or mobilizing couples for sterilization as they do for abortion, but people are much more averse to sterilization than to abortion. In the past, particularly in rural areas, birth planning workers have preferred sterilization as a means of contraception because the operation is effective, permanent, and not reliant on the vigilance and cooperation of the woman herself. However, especially in the countryside, sterilization is highly unpopular, because people fear practical harm to their health and symbolic diminution of their bodily powers. Accordingly, in practice, if a couple clearly seemed likely to adhere to the birth planning regulations, the couple might be able to avoid sterilization. However, repeated deliberate attempts to have a third child, or success at having a third child, almost certainly demanded sterilization. In the late 1990s, many provinces revised their birth planning regulations, and reportedly all of those provinces dropped mandatory sterilization of couples with two children, requiring only that they practice "safe and effective" contraception.[24] [25]

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[22] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April and June 1999. See Fujian regulations, Article Eight.
[23] E.g. Tu, Ping. "IUD discontinuation patterns and correlates in four counties in north China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 26, No. 3, May-June 1995), p. 169-179.
[24] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 121-122 [in Chinese].
[25] On resistance leading to punishment, see Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30.

From 1971 through 1998, the program performed about 146 million sterilizations (female and male), averaging about five million a year. In the early 1990s (1990-1994), the program averaged about 6 million sterilizations a year, a higher average that reflects the 1990-1991 policy re-enforcement. In the late 1990s (1995-98), the program averaged just under 3 million sterilizations a year, a lower level that may begin to reflect provinces dropping the sterilization requirement from their regulations. From 1971 through 1998, women accounted for about three-quarters of all sterilizations, with the proportion rising almost continuously from 59% in the early 1970s to 84% in the late 1990s. Sterilization is unpopular, but male sterilization appears to be more unpopular with males than female sterilization is with women. Or, in this male-centered culture, the balance of decision making power favors husbands over wives, making women the major targets of sterilization operations. During the 1970s and 1980s, the program nearly always performed at least a million male sterilizations a year, but during the 1990s, the number dropped sharply, reaching a low of 330,000 vasectomies in 1998. Male sterilization appears particularly unpopular in more developed provinces, with few men having vasectomies there regardless of the number of children they had .[26] Sterilization rates were also quite low in minority provinces, suggesting some reticence about imposing such a draconian measure on non-Han populations. In typical Han (that is, non-minority) agricultural provinces, the sterilization rate (male and female combined) was about 60% of all couples. Among these, Fujian and Zhejiang had the two highest rates, but only by a few percentage points (63.2% and 62.3%).[27] [28]

In the late 1980s, 80% of couples with two children practiced contraception (91% of them professing to "answer the government's call"). Of these, 66% were sterilized (including 13% male sterilization). The level of contraception varied somewhat with level of socioeconomic development, with the most developed provinces recording levels just over 80% and the least developed provinces showing levels around 70%. The type of contraception varied more sharply. In provinces at a middle level of development (typical agricultural provinces), a remarkable 76% of couples with two children had one member sterilized (including 14% male sterilization). In highly developed provinces (the more urbanized and industrialized), only 48% of couples with two children had one member sterilized (including virtually no male sterilizations, only 0.4%). In the least developed provinces (many of them national minority areas), only 36% of two-child couples were sterilized (including more males than females— 20% versus 16%). [29]

For couples with three or more children, the proportion using contraception was 77%, with "only" 81% saying that they were "answering the government's call." For couples with multiple children, rates of contraceptive use were highest in provinces at the middle level of development (82%), intermediate in the most developed provinces (77%), and lowest in the least developed provinces (66%). Among contracepting couples, the proportion of sterilizations rose

[26] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 33.
[27] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), based on 1988 SBPC survey.
[28] On resistance in Fujian to sterilization in general and male vasectomy in particular, see Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 181. Some sterilizations occur in China for eugenic purposes on couples with "genetic problems." Since these are likely to be of little relevance to the INS, we do not elaborate on them here.
[29] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 36.

only modestly as the number of children rose from two to many (from 66% to 71%, 20% of them vasectomies). The sharpest increase in sterilization occurred in the most developed provinces (from 48% to 62%). Sterilizations in provinces at a middle level of development increased from 76% to 83%, while in the least developed provinces sterilization levels rose only from 36% to 38% as the number of children rose from two to three or more. Among couples with multiple children, in the most developed provinces there were no male sterilizations at all. In provinces at a middle level of development, the proportion of male sterilizations nearly doubled as the number of children rose from two to many (up from 14% to 25%) while in the least developed provinces it was halved (down from 20% to 11%).[30]

C. THREE KINDS OF COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS: FROM SOFT SELL TO HARD PRESSURE

Achieving compliance with state birth planning in China, like achieving compliance with any policy anywhere, involves three basic types of power: **Persuasion** through propaganda and education, **inducement** through material benefits and penalties, and **coercion** through legal enforcement or physical force.[31] Following classical Chinese communist doctrine, post-Mao national political and program leaders have continued to prefer persuasion. In addition, with their new emphasis on individual incentives, post-Mao national leaders have become increasingly willing to supplement persuasion with material benefits. Trying to avoid violent political struggle, post-Mao national leaders have become increasingly reluctant to use coercion, though at certain times it has been quietly condoned and in certain places local cadres have sometimes used it as a last resort. In this section we introduce the program's classical formulation of these three kinds of incentives during the 1970s and 1980s and note the beginnings of innovations in them during the 1990s. The following section and Chapter Two continue the discussion of those innovations.[32]

(a) Propaganda-and-education, routine and campaign style

A key concept in Chinese communist implementation is "voluntarism" (*ziyuan*), which means *trying to persuade people to do voluntarily what they will be required to do in any case*. The state achieves voluntarism in the long run through propaganda-and-education (*xuanchuan jiaoyu*), and in the short run through persuasion and "mobilization." Officially the birth program is based on "state guidance combined with the voluntarism of the masses." Although the term

[30] Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 36.
[31] Etzioni, Amitai. *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).
[32] See also the discussions of different kinds of program compliance in Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 114-117. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)]; Winckler, Edwin A. "Re-enforcing state birth planning," in *Transition from Communism in China*. Edited by Edwin A. Winckler (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1999), p. 181-203; Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 202-230.

sounds innocuous, propaganda-and-education can involve a great deal of social, political, and emotional pressure, at least when it escalates from persuasion to mobilization. There is no doubt that some people regard having been "mobilized" as a traumatic experience, particularly if they resisted for a long time. Official Chinese guidelines prohibit "excessive" pressure such as angrily berating the client or abjectly humiliating the client in public.[33]

China's national political and program leaders regard propaganda-and-education as particularly fundamental to birth planning because they recognize that permanently changing the reproductive beliefs and behavior of hundreds of millions of people is a long-term task requiring deep cultural change. In their view, permanent program success requires change from traditional to modern culture, including generally higher levels of education and "cultural quality" within the entire population, particularly in rural areas. Because such cultural change was expected to take many decades, over the past thirty years China's political leaders have pushed fertility decline faster than would have occurred on a truly voluntary basis. At the same time, both political and program leaders have remained aware that, to the extent that program enforcement was based on coercion, program compliance remained "unstable." It was this concern with the stability of compliance that led program leaders to conclude that a main lesson of the past twenty years is that propaganda-and-education must remain fundamental. For this reason, it remains the first of the program's "three priorities" (discussed in Chapter Three).[34]

There are two types of propaganda-and-education: routine and campaign.

Routine propaganda-and-education is what the program translates into English as "information, education and communication" or "IEC." Chinese schools provide instruction on birth policy from primary school classes through college courses. The media propagate birth planning through all imaginable means: posters and pamphlets, newspapers and magazines, radio and television, and theater and film. Before marriage, couples must take a short course on birth planning requirements. Through thirty years of effort, program propagandists have achieved saturation coverage of the entire population. As one Shaanxi peasant remarked over ten years ago, in China every school child knows what the policy is, what its rationale is, what the limit is, and what happens to you if you exceed that limit.[35]

In the late 1990s, the content of routine propaganda-and-education work began to shift from a nation-centered approach emphasizing national needs to limit population, toward a client-centered approach stressing individual health and choice. While sophisticated images of environmental destruction and human crowds continue to be produced, propaganda makers have begun to devote more attention to providing program clients with the information they need for informed contraceptive choice and improved reproductive health.[36]

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[33] On voluntarism, see Lieberthal, Kenneth. *Governing China: From Revolution through Reform* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), p. 63-70.

[34] This is also an important emphasis in provincial regulations, as illustrated by Article Two of the regulations in Appendix Three.

[35] Interview by the authors in rural China, March 1988.

[36] Gu, Baochang. "Toward a quality of care approach: Reorientation of the family planning program in China" (Unpublished manuscript, New York: The Population Council, 1998); Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.

Campaigns are temporary efforts— often one to three months in duration— to mobilize the populace for a particular policy purpose. They rely mostly on persuasion, but often have an undertone of some coercion. In birth planning, many of these campaigns have proceeded from propaganda to enforcement— the campaign first raises people's awareness, then demands that selected targets comply with program requirements, such as needed abortions or overdue sterilizations. Such combined propaganda-and-enforcement campaigns, often called "shock months" (*tuji yue*), involved dispatching propaganda teams and mobile medical teams from higher levels to a succession of villages for a short period of time. In large part, the reason for resorting to them has been to compensate for inadequate routine program resources and capacity, or inadequate routine program implementation and enforcement. Low capacity and poor work are serious problems at the community level in poorer rural areas.[37]

In birth planning, the campaign goal is to achieve certain, clearly specified levels of contraceptive use and births. At the community level, these goals are usually formulated as a certain number of birth control operations to be performed: so many IUD insertions, so many abortions of out-of-plan pregnancies, so many sterilizations of couples who already have two or more children. These surgical targets are then attached to particular individuals: someone is designated as the obligatory recipient of these contraceptive services and subjected to social and political pressure to agree to undergo the necessary operation. The anthropologist Huang has provided a graphic description of this process of allocating quotas in a suburban Fujian village in 1985.[38] The short time involved allowed little time for social pressure, besides which few villagers agreed with the one-child goal being imposed. Despite these suggestions of heavy-handed techniques, fieldworker Huang calls the campaign "not as brutal as earlier ones described to me by the villagers."

In order to meet quotas, campaigns include mechanisms for increasing the social pressure on recalcitrant individuals. A birth planning worker will first counsel a client, often first in the community birth planning clinic. If that does not produce the intended effect, the birth planning worker will start visiting the client's home to persuade her (and her husband and in-laws) to comply (*shuofu*). If that does not work, the birth planning worker will begin bringing along other community citizens and leaders, at first to persuade her but increasingly to "mobilize" her into compliance (*dongyuan*). More and more people appear more and more frequently, to achieve escalating levels of mobilization. Participants remind the client of her moral and legal obligations to comply. They remind the client of the benefits of compliance (such as favorable treatment of single children) and the penalties for non-compliance (usually fines, but also removal of previously authorized benefits for an existing single child). They remind the client of harmful effects on other community members, including unfairness to others who have complied and harm that the client can bring on the community (by, for example, increasing the pressure on land or other community resources, or impairing a good record of birth policy compliance that may be associated with material rewards). These social and political pressures can become tremendous, leaving the client little choice but to give in and comply.

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[37] For some data on "high tides" of sterilization in rural Fujian in the late 1970s and early 1980, see Kaufman, Joan et al. "Family planning policy and practice in China: A study of four rural counties," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 4, December 1989), p. 721-724.

[38] See Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 175-185.

The **campaign context** of birth control surgery undoubtedly inflicts both emotional and physical trauma on many of the women targeted. In addition to the intense social pressures to comply, in rural areas the resulting medical operations are performed by a mobile medical team, often in a rushed manner, using poor facilities. Poor quality medical procedures are most likely in this context; in fact, provincial regulations specifically and consistently warn against this, indicating the seriousness of the problem. Especially in earlier years, when campaigns worked through terror and fear, the emotional trauma to women was incalculable. Physical harm due to medical complications was also more likely than when medical procedures were conducted under more routine circumstances. The top priority was achieving numerical targets; the reproductive health of women was a very secondary concern. Health and safety were considered, but not if concern for them jeopardized attainment of the larger goal. Such abuses were worse in the past than in the present, and were worse in rural areas than in urban areas. They may well continue in some rural areas, but they are loudly deplored by program leaders.

In the 1990s, a main program objective was to make "crash" enforcement campaigns unnecessary by building adequate routine administrative capacity and requiring adequate routine implementation work. "Crash" campaigns were still conspicuous in the early 1990s, particularly in the most populous agricultural provinces that the program targeted at that time. One reason campaigns have persisted is that, by neglecting routine work and enforcing birth planning only when ordered by superiors to do so during a campaign, village-level cadres can make it clear to their community that it is the superiors, not they, who are to blame for the policy.[39] In 1995, program leaders declared crash campaigns impermissible and established targets for phasing them out by the end of the century. The target was to eliminate them in 16 provinces by the end of 1998, 21 provinces by the end of 1999, and all 31 provinces by the end of 2000. Unfortunately, outsiders have no way to independently assess the success of this effort. Presumably, it has greatly reduced crash campaigns in most provinces, but presumably also crash campaigns persist in some areas, particularly less developed localities without the facilities for routine work.[40]

(b) Economic incentives and penalties

Propaganda-and-education alone is not enough to convince everyone to comply. The next level of escalation is economic incentives and penalties.

Positive economic incentives. In order to promote the one-child goal, around 1980, the central government mandated that couples who restrict themselves to one child should receive a wide range of material benefits, including preferential treatment for the single child and rewards to the parents. In order to obtain these benefits, after having their first child, a couple was supposed to sign a One-Child Certificate promising not to have any more children. For example,

[39] Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999).

[40] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999; Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), describes 1993 birth planning campaigns in north China village, evidently in Hebei.

in two rural Fujian counties studied in the late 1980s, the main benefits to one-child pledgers were extra allocations of farm land and a health subsidy for the only child.[41] However, according to the 1991 provincial regulations, staff and workers in urban state units can get as much as six months paid leave for signing a one-child agreement.[42] If the couple violates this contract, the benefits are rescinded and the couple must pay back any they have already received.[43]

Obviously, offering positive incentives from within the birth program is a desirable way to achieve program compliance. In practice, however, this method has posed problems. First, only about a fifth of couples sign such certificates, limiting the effectiveness of this incentive.[44] Perhaps as a result, in the 1990s, Fujian began issuing certificates entitling couples to benefits simply for practicing contraception. Second, most such incentives are funded from local and even community resources. As a result, they are least available where they are most needed: in rural areas, particularly in poor rural areas. Third, as China prospered in the 1980s and 1990s, the value of the incentives the program could offer declined relative to general income levels. In the 1990s, the program re-emphasized the desirability of shifting from "administrative means" toward economic incentives ("incentivization"), but through a new strategy of linking birth planning to other forms of economic and social development outside birth planning itself ("collateralization").

Negative economic incentives. From the late 1970s, the program has also prescribed penalties for non-compliance. In the 1990s, as the salience of positive economic incentives decreased, the importance of negative economic sanctions increased. This was particularly so because fines were drastically increased between the 1980s and the 1990s.[45] Of course the effectiveness of penalties is relative to their environment. Some people with high incomes (for example, urban entrepreneurs, rural families with high remittances from relatives overseas) simply pay the fees from their own resources. Other couples mobilize the resources of their extended families to pay the fine. Still others try to negotiate lower fines with local enforcers, a tactic that is more successful at some times than others. Aside from the nominal size of economic penalties, a key difference between periods and places is whether the prescribed penalties are actually enforced, particularly on community cadres.[46] The rationale for imposing fees for "excess" (or unplanned) children has been not only to enforce compliance, but also to help offset the extra costs that excess children impose on society, and to help pay for the birth planning program itself. The amount of revenue generated has been quite large, and some counties have diverted the funds to non-program purposes, a malpractice that party-state and program leaders combated vigorously during the 1990s.

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[41] 60 yuan a year, or about 10% of local per capita income; Kaufman, Joan et al. "Family planning policy and practice in China: A study of four rural counties," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 4, December 1989), p. 714.
[42] Article Thirty, Appendix Three.
[43] Last sentence of Article Thirty-two, Appendix Three.
[44] See Chapter Four.
[45] E.g. Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-Child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 113. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)].
[46] Kaufman, Joan et al. "Family planning policy and practice in China: A study of four rural counties," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 4, December 1989), p. 719-721.

The main penalty imposed on ordinary citizens for violating program regulations is a "fee" for out-of-plan births. Ideally, such sanctions are intended to be sufficiently severe to deter people from having the much-wanted child, but not so severe as to impoverish them. People who face "real economic difficulty" in paying the fine are often allowed to spread payment over several years. Cadres demanding too high a fine from poor couples are supposed to be punished themselves.[47] In the 1980s, the typical fee for the first unauthorized birth was a substantial fraction of annual income. Some places calculated on the basis of the couple's actual previous year's income, while others used a typical local income to compute the fine. For example, in rural Fujian in the late 1980s the fee was 200-400 yuan for the first unplanned birth (50-90% of annual per capita income). In the early 1990s, fees were raised sharply to a startling two or three times annual income. For example, in Fujian a couple could be fined 60-100% of their previous year's income simply for violating spacing rules, and those who had an extra child could be fined two to three times their previous year's income.[48] For a second out-of-plan child, these fines were doubled, and in the unlikely event of still more children, the fines were increased again. In addition to penalties for non-complying couples, there might also be penalties for birth planning workers and work-unit colleagues, such as loss of personal bonuses or collective awards for exemplary performance. Increasingly steep, such penalties create great hardship for many of those required to pay.[49]

Although these charges are clearly "fines," it is worth noting that the Chinese terminology distinguishes at least three gradations of economic punishment. The first, which evidently is entirely "economic" is "levying a fee" for out-of-plan births.[50] The second gradation, probably considered an "administrative means," is imposing additional "restrictions and punishments" for violating program rules on either the timing or the number of children.[51] In addition, program violators who had received benefits under a One-Child Certificate must return all incentive payments and preferential leave pay.[52] The third, probably also an "administrative means," is "imposing a fine" on officials guilty of maladministering the program.[53] Here we note the economic content of the more "administrative" of these penalties.

"Restrictions" are more stringent on urban functionaries.[54]. The restrictions include that program violators should not receive collective bonuses, promotion from temporary to regular worker, promotions in position or rank, or assessment as advanced workers. They should not receive any salary during maternity leave or enjoy labor insurance, and should take care of their own childbirth expenses. Those who have extra children out-of-plan must also be demoted by one salary grade. Even rural villagers are subject to economic "restrictions."[55] They should not be given employment in township or town (*xiang* or *zhen*) enterprises, should not be recruited as cadres, and should not be transferred from agricultural to non-agricultural registration status.

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[47] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.
[48] See the 1991 regulations in Appendix Three, Article Thirty-six.
[49] For such collective penalties, see Article Forty-one of the regulations in Appendix Three.
[50] Z*hengshou... fei*, see Article Thirty-six, Appendix Three.
[51] X*ianzhi he chufa*, see Article Thirty-seven, Appendix Three.
[52] Article Thirty-eight, Appendix Three.
[53] *Geiyu fakuan*, Article Forty-two, Appendix Three.
[54] The "staff and workers" [*zhigong*] of "administrative, enterprise, and professional organizations" [*jiguan, qiye, shiye danwei*], Article Thirty-seven, Section One.
[55] Section Three of Article Thirty-seven, Appendix Three.

Those who have one or more "extra" children may also suffer confiscation of any share of cultivable land (or forest land or irrigation water or orchards) that they may have been issued. Moreover, rural villagers are subject to these restrictions for the same length of time as urban functionaries— from one to three years simply for violating timing rules, and seven years for having an extra child.

The economic content of punishment for maladministration includes the confiscation of any illegal income. In addition, fines range from 50 to 500 yuan for falsifying birth planning statistics, to 500 to 1000 yuan for illegally placing a child for adoption, to 1000 to 5000 yuan for showing favoritism or committing irregularities, faking medical procedures, illegally removing contraceptive devices, illegally determining the sex of a fetus, and forging and selling certificates concerning birth planning.[56]

(c) Administrative means: Administrative punishments and criminal sanctions

More severe forms of enforcement include "administrative means" employed by bureaucratic organizations with which citizens are involved, and criminal sanctions applied by the justice system. Some of these administrative means, and most of these criminal sanctions, approach what some Westerners would regard as coercion. Program leaders prefer not to punish **ordinary citizens** severely, but consider such punishment legitimate when applied according to regulations to recalcitrant cases. One of the few circumstances under which an ordinary citizen would be subject to criminal penalties in connection with a birth planning violation is if he or she attacked a birth planning worker in a violent manner that would be criminal under any circumstances. Lawmakers have made it a crime to harm or kill women and baby girls— practices that, of course, are officially deplored by the birth program but that sometimes occur as people react to the stiff policies the program enforces. Under the 1991 Law Protecting Women's Rights and Interests and the 1994 Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care, it is a crime to drown, forsake, cruelly injure or kill baby girls and to discriminate against women who give birth to baby girls or bear no children. Provincial regulations often have similar provisions, yet the means of enforcing those criminal provisions are rarely specified, and actual enforcement is generally lax.[57] Some evidence suggests that people are sometimes temporarily "detained" at birth planning clinics for "education." In June 1998, a video of such a "birth planning jail" was shown on American television and to the House Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, within the House Committee on International Relations. According to interviews, such detention should not last for more than a day, but evidently can last a week or two. Localities have a revenue incentive for collecting fines, and for that reason try to make them enforceable.[58] Under the 1989 Administrative Procedures Law, citizens have access to legal redress for mistreatment. Such redress, however, is often difficult to obtain.

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[56] Article Forty-two, Appendix Three.

[57] See the work of legal specialist Li, Xiaorong. "License to coerce: Violence against women, state responsibility, and legal failures in China's family-planning program," *Yale Journal of Law and Feminism* (Vol. 8, No. 119, Summer 1996), p. 145-191; Human Rights in China (HRIC). *Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women* (New York: HRIC, 1995).

[58] As the SBPC's investigation of Fujian and Jiangsu noted, State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: 1998, China Population Publishing House), p. 130 [in Chinese].

"Administrative means" probably include some of the stronger economic "restrictions and punishments" listed above. However, "administrative means" includes "other administrative punishments" that the regulations do not specify but leave up to the violator's unit or the department in charge to decide. The punishment is to be reported for review to the department in charge of birth planning at the same level.[59] These more severe punishments are most likely to apply not to ordinary citizens, but to **government or party personnel** who violate birth regulations governing their own personal lives by having more children than allowed. In principle, such officials are punished more severely than ordinary citizens because employment by the state is regarded as a privilege and requires exemplary behavior. These punishments range from entering demerits in the offender's government or party career file to loss of government job or party membership. In practice, local officials often ignore the regulations and then protect each other from such punishments by neglecting to report the violations to their superiors. Trying to stamp out these local deviations, during the 1990s, program administrators made increasing efforts to punish officials who set a bad example for the public by having unpermitted children.

Many articles specifying appropriate punishment add that if what the program violator has done legally constitutes a crime, the case should be referred to the relevant legal authorities for possible prosecution. Penalties could then include prison and even execution. These most severe punishments are most likely to apply to **birth planning and medical personnel** who violate birth planning regulations governing their conduct in their official relations with the public, usually by accepting bribes in exchange for favorable treatment, but sometimes for using coercion against a resistant client. Such severe punishment of deviant program personnel is intended to prevent abuse of the public. For example, any violent cadre behavior against persons or property would be a crime. For program personnel to grant exceptions or falsify documents for program clients in return for profit would also be a crime. For program personnel to falsify statistics in order to meet program targets or impress superiors would be a crime as well. A weakness of these safeguards has been that, although violations were declared crimes, exact punishments were usually not specified and where they were specified, they were usually not enforced.[60] Despite these weaknesses, during the 1990s, program administrators devoted increasing efforts to trying to identify and punish any mistreatment of the public by program personnel.[61]

The program has a special term for forms of pressure that it regards as illegitimate: "coercion and commandism" (*qiangpo mingling*). These are a serious deviation from correct cadre workstyle, which is to rely on persuasion.[62] In practice, the term usually means the use of **physical coercion against persons or, more commonly, property**. In the birth program, cases of such forceful methods were well documented by the regime itself for the early 1980s. Their use was specifically forbidden in 1984. Despite this prohibition, program leaders sometimes put local officials under great pressure to reach birth planning targets. Such was the case in the early

[59] See the regulations in Appendix Three, Article Thirty-Seven, Section One.
[60] Li, Lianjiang and Kevin J. O'Brien. "Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China," *Modern China* (Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1996), p. 28-61.
[61] For the administrative penalties specified by one province, again see Appendix Three, Chapter Seven, particularly Articles Thirty-Seven, Forty-two and Forty-three.
[62] As explained in such classic cadre manuals as Liu Shaoqi's *How to Be a Good Communist.*

1990s. Faced with recalcitrant cases, grass-roots administrators sometimes feel that they have no alternative to using intense pressure, if not actual physical force. Violation against personal property also occurred because cadres understood it as substituting for a fine from couples who were unwilling to pay the fine or who fled the community. Objectionable though the practice is, community cadres felt that, in order to demonstrate that they had "done something" to punish violators, they had to take property such as a television set or other consumer durables, or perhaps even damage the offender's house. Many such cases have been reported in the Chinese press, especially during the major campaigns of the past.

Physical force directed against both persons and property appears to have greatly declined since 1984. Since about 1993, birth planning leaders have been increasingly insistent that community cadres not use forceful methods. By the mid-1990s, coercion against persons was a clear violation of central policy. It was (and is) least likely in cities and somewhat likely primarily in less developed rural areas. Coercion against property has probably continued longer than force against persons, but by the mid-1990s it too was a clear violation of central policy and should have been on the decline. Especially since the mid-1990s, program leaders have devoted increasing attention to enforcing "lawful administration" on cadres themselves and to protecting the "legitimate rights and interests" of citizens. It is difficult to assess the extent to which these rhetorical goals have been achieved in practice. While some— perhaps even major— gains certainly have been made, the use of forceful tactics might well persist in some areas.

D. 1990s INNOVATIONS: STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT

During the 1990s, at the same time program leaders were trying to reduce the reliance on crash campaigns and forceful methods, they were also trying to strengthen the effectiveness of routine methods of enforcement. In 1991, the party central committee and government cabinet instructed stricter enforcement of existing regulations. In the early 1990s, enforcement was in fact intensified, mobilizing both the party-state and the populace behind the policy. From the beginning of the 1990s, the most important methods of strengthening enforcement included strengthening institutions, increasing incentives and improving information.[63]

(a) Strengthening institutions to strengthen enforcement

A primary method of increasing enforcement has been to strengthen institutions for achieving the compliance of both cadres and masses.

Cadres. In the early 1990s, the national political leadership greatly strengthened the "responsibility systems" (*zirenzhi*) for birth planning that had been introduced in the 1980s. These were often called "target management responsibility systems," a term emphasizing their focus on the achievement of numerical population control targets. Officials who did well at birth

[63] On these three components of program organization in the 1990s, see Winckler, Edwin A. "Re-enforcing state birth planning," in *Transition from Communism in China*. Edited by Edwin A. Winckler (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1999), p. 181-203.

planning received immediate bonuses and improved their prospects for eventual promotion, the latter probably being the more important incentive. Officials who did poorly at birth planning were denied bonuses and promotions. The central government drastically increased the weight of birth planning in evaluating the performance of local officials, so much so that poor performance in birth planning alone was sufficient to wipe out good performance in all other areas (a "one-vote veto" or *yipiao foujue*). In a major escalation of pressure, the center extended these penalties from local program leaders to local political leaders, and from community and county political leaders upward to prefectural and provincial political leaders, including not only government leaders but also party leaders. At every level, the topmost political leader (*diyi bashou*, or the "number-one man") was charged with taking personal responsibility for the performance of the birth planning program within his jurisdiction. These new responsibility systems placed intense pressure on officials at all levels to achieve mass compliance with program regulations— or, if they could not achieve that, to report that they had done so.

With regard to cadre efforts to gain mass compliance, during the 1990s, a main emphasis of the program was on basic-level construction of administrative organization and service networks. As noted above, the main reason for earlier heavy reliance on crash campaigns had been that the program itself did not have enough administrative capacity, and had to supplement that capacity by periodically mobilizing local and community resources. The only way to shift from crash campaigns to routine work was to build stronger local organizations.

The masses. During the 1980s and 1990s, the program's main enforcement innovation involving the population at large was the building of an entirely new mass organization, the Chinese Birth Planning Association (BPA, *jihua shengyu xiehui*). Its primary function is to conduct propaganda to mobilize the masses to comply with birth policy and to enforce the policy on each other. In addition, members and affiliates of the Birth Planning Association themselves act as implementers (for example, getting women to report for their periodic checkups) and monitors (for example, monitoring whether a woman is practicing contraception or pregnant). By the end of the 1990s the BPA had 1.1 million local membership branches with 83 million volunteers— a branch in each of China's roughly 800,000 villages, with an average of ten volunteers in each village. Moreover, these volunteers are typically people of high local political and social status, increasing the social and political pressure on ordinary people to comply.

(b) Increasing incentives to improve compliance

Building basic-level organizations that can deliver better service requires resources. During the 1980s, resource shortage greatly hampered program enforcement. During the 1990s, the center lobbied provincial governments to raise the investment by themselves and their localities to at least two yuan per capita and, where possible, more. As a result, program funds have doubled, providing more funds for capital construction, new administrative personnel, better services and more incentives to clients. Moreover, the program has diversified the types of rewards it offers. A favorite device has been insurance schemes, for example old-age insurance for couples with two daughters who agree to undergo sterilization. There have also been schemes to insure clients against other kinds of risks, such as from the program's own medical operations. In addition to increasing within-program benefits, as noted above, the program has increased

positive incentives by linking birth planning to economic and social development programs such as poverty alleviation. Though undoubtedly constructive, in the sense of encouraging compliance, these measures are not entirely benevolent, since receipt of benefits is contingent on adherence to program requirements.

(c) Improving information to enhance control

The program has also improved the information at its disposal, both by better monitoring of individual clients, and by better use of information within the program itself.

At the client level, program officials have taken several steps. First, they have instituted mandatory gynecological exams— at least annual, usually semi-annual, and sometimes even quarterly. During these examinations, medical personnel check for reproductive health problems, monitor contraceptive use, and detect unauthorized pregnancies sooner than might otherwise have occurred. Second, in many places program managers have computerized their data on each client, enabling them to know when each client should receive what kinds of services. The core data from the birth program itself concern women and their reproductive histories, including the dates of their monthly reproductive cycles. Third, program leaders have used the community Birth Planning Association and networks of "central households" as their eyes and ears to provide comprehensive monitoring of client behavior.

Program leaders have also taken several steps at the administrative level. First, faced with a rising tide of misreporting, they have devoted much effort to combating fraudulent upward reporting and enforcing regulations requiring statistical accuracy. Second, they have gradually constructed a computer information system linking all levels of the program's administration. By the end of the 1990s, a provincial-level administrator could directly access the records of each of the prefectures and counties within the province, and even some rural townships and urban districts, to inspect their work and check their data.[64] Third, program officials have attempted to link their own core data on client reproductive needs to data from other agencies such as those in charge of public health and household registration. The purpose is to keep track of clients and their "needs," particularly mobile clients in urban areas.

E. CONCLUSION

In this introductory chapter we have provided an extensive overview of the rules and enforcement mechanisms making up China's "one-child" policy and birth control program. Because the policy violated deep-seated reproductive preferences and enforcement was sometimes accompanied by terrible abuse of its "targets," it provoked strong reaction from Chinese society. Indeed, since the one-child policy was introduced, the program has met fierce resistance, at first by the ordinary people targeted for control, and later by cadres as well. Before delving into the details of program organization and operation in the 1990s, we pause to consider these micro-political and human dimensions of China's birth planning program. In the next

[64] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.

chapter, we take a close look at popular resistance to the one-child policy before documenting some of the grave human costs of the program. It is these matters that brought China's birth control program to the attention of Americans and their government in the first place.

Chapter 2: LOCAL RESISTANCE AND HUMAN COSTS

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO CONTEXTUALIZE THE MEDIA STORIES

B. POPULAR REPRODUCTIVE DESIRES: LOW BUT STILL ABOVE STATE DEMANDS

(a) Rural fertility aspirations: Two is best, a son is essential
(b) Urban fertility aspirations: One is enough
(c) The paradox of compliance despite unfulfilled desires

C. THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE: FROM COVERT TO OVERT, INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE

(a) Covert individual resistance by ordinary citizens
(b) Covert individual resistance by cadres
(c) Overt collective politics

D. THE HUMAN COSTS OF STATE BIRTH PLANNING

(a) Women's physical and emotional well-being
(b) The treatment and survival of infant girls
(c) The fate of "unplanned" children

E. CONCLUSION

Americans have long been appalled by the human rights abuses in the Chinese birth control program that have been documented by the American media. Indeed, it is this concern that prompted the legislation permitting Chinese claiming persecution under the one-child policy to apply for political asylum in the US. While this concern is well warranted, the media have given us mostly individual stories of cadre mistreatment of citizens, without providing the larger— and today rapidly changing— political context in which that abuse occurs. In this chapter, we attempt to fill in that missing piece of the story with a broader exposition of the changing politics of resistance to the birth program and the human costs the program has imposed, not just on individuals, but on whole categories of people.

Resistance to birth planning is rooted in fertility desires that remain above the state's restrictive demands. We begin, then, by exploring the population's views of ideal family size and sex composition. We turn then to the politics of resistance, documenting both covert individual resistance to program regulations and overt collective discussion and public supervision of program implementation. The emergence of these new forms of collective resistance is a major

new development of the 1990s. Finally, we track some of the most extensive and serious human costs of China's approach to population control, measured in such terms as harm to women's health and threats to the survival of female fetuses and infants.

A. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO CONTEXTUALIZE THE MEDIA STORIES

Most Americans know the Chinese birth control program through exposure to accounts in the media. Since the early 1980s, a long stream of media stories has documented the coercive measures used by the Chinese state to enforce its highly restrictive policies on the population. While these stories provide rare and valuable glimpses into the nature of official abuse, often derived from accounts in the Chinese press, many have featured cameo incidents— one village, one couple— that convey the emotionally wrenching effects of official abuse on individuals. What is missing— and what the media cannot be expected to provide in any case— is the larger political and cultural context in which that abuse occurs. Supplying this broader context is the task of the China scholar. In a sense, this whole Report is devoted to illuminating the political context and the cultural and political contradictions that underlie the Chinese program. In this chapter, however, we focus specifically on the cultural sources and political dynamics of resistance to the birth policy. We also tally up some of the social costs of Chinese birth planning that do not emerge from the media accounts. Indeed, we would argue that some of the major human costs of the program have received little attention in this country, in the media or elsewhere. These questions of resistance and human cost are important not only to our understanding of the program, but also to the work of evaluating asylum cases. We will suggest that the applicants for asylum to this country may not include in their numbers some of those who have suffered the most under the one-child policy.

B. POPULAR REPRODUCTIVE DESIRES: LOW BUT STILL ABOVE STATE DEMANDS

Under communism, China has developed two quite distinct societies, rural and urban, with different institutional setups, economies, cultures— and ideas about family size. Here we examine the reproductive preferences of rural couples and city couples separately before unraveling the paradox of widespread acceptance of the program despite fertility desires that exceed state demands.

(a) Rural fertility aspirations: Two is best, a son is essential

A peasant society centered on the family, rural China has long been noted for its pronatalism. Chinese communism has changed that. Available evidence suggests that by the 1970s, when state birth planning was extended to every corner of the country, rural couples in many places wanted only three children.[65] By the late 1990s, the gap between the number of

[65] Parish, William L. and Martin King Whyte. *Village and Family in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

children rural couples wanted and the number the government allowed had narrowed considerably. Nevertheless, a gap remained. According to a Fujian village cadre, what his community found hardest to accept was the initial limitation to three children in the early 1970s. The second hardest was the limitation to two children in the late 1970s. By implication, the third hardest was the goal of only one child in the early 1980s.[66]

The evidence for decline in fertility aspirations is not merely anecdotal. To the contrary, it is based on a great many careful surveys by Chinese researchers,[67] as well as field research by Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Western scholars.[68] A huge social science literature documents a widespread preference in rural China for two children. Yet those same studies also show that villagers are at least as concerned about the gender of their children as their number. Despite decades of birth planning propaganda instructing that "girls are the same as boys," this desire for sons has lessened very little over the years. The strength of son preference is not surprising, given its deep sociocultural roots and the lack of strong state support for gender equality (except at the rhetorical level). In this deeply patriarchal culture, rural couples continue to have strong desires for at least one son. Given a gender division of labor in which females are restricted from performing certain kinds of work, sons are considered essential members of the family labor force. In this patrilocal society in which daughters ideally join their husbands' families at marriage, sons are considered crucial sources of social and economic support for their parents in old age. In this patrilineal society in which the family name is carried through the male line, sons are deemed necessary to ensure the continuation of the family line.

Gender bias is nearly universal in China, but the strength of traditional preference for males does differ somewhat across localities and is changing somewhat over time. Areas with strong traditions of organizing male relatives into lineage organizations tend to have particularly strong preference for male children: Fujian and Guangdong are the classic examples.[69] Areas with strong traditions of private entrepreneurship also have a particularly strong preference for male children, to inherit and continue the family business. Evidently, this is a factor that complicates birth planning in Zhejiang's Wenzhou region.[70]

Village research in the northwestern province of Shaanxi revealed fertility preferences that by the late 1980s were already very low and by the early to mid-1990s had fallen even further. In 1988, villagers in several modestly prosperous peri-urban communities believed that their long-term well-being hinged crucially on their raising two children, at least one of whom was a son. More than two was acceptable, but two was best. The very best was one son and one daughter. By 1993, these ideas about the ideal family had changed in subtle but important ways. While one boy and one girl were still considered the perfect, or "complete" family, the rapidly escalating costs of raising children had convinced villagers that two reproductive outcomes—three children and two sons— had to be avoided. Although sons continued to be preferred, in

[66] Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 178-179.
[67] Some summarized in Whyte, Martin King and S. Z. Gu. "Popular response to China's fertility transition," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1987), p. 569-571.
[68] E.g. Croll, Elisabeth. *From Heaven to Earth: Images and Experiences of Development in China* (London: Routledge, 1994).
[69] Freedman, Maurice. *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (London: Athlone Press, 1958).
[70] Interviews with Zhejiang birth planning officials by the authors, April 1999.

both periods villagers expressed a distinct desire for a daughter to provide emotional support in old age, among other things. This growing emphasis on daughters was taking place in a social context in which sons were increasingly seen as unreliable and unwilling to fulfill their filial obligations. Although daughters could not take the place of sons, daughters were seen as valuable family members who provided certain social and emotional benefits that sons could not. Couples who ended up with two daughters were adapting to their situation by planning to marry a son-in-law into the family (traditionally a culturally disparaged arrangement) so that one of their daughters and her husband could support them in old age.[71]

Official program statements forthrightly acknowledge that a gap remains between state prescriptions and public preferences, saying that birth planning work requires both firm enforcement to prevent a resurgence of fertility and tactful handling to avoid public resentment. The evidence suggests that by the late 1990s, most rural residents still wanted at least two children, including a boy and a girl, whereas official policy demanded that couples with one son stop having children, and that couples with one daughter stop after one more, even if it is not a boy. In the more prosperous rural areas, this gap may well close a bit more as time goes by. Although child-rearing is less expensive in the villages than in the cities, the costs of raising rural children have risen as well, in some places astronomically. The indirect or "opportunity costs" of women's time lost to labor have convinced many that three children are not affordable. Meantime, the direct costs of providing a dowry for a new bride and supplying housing for a new couple have dissuaded many ruralites from wanting more than one son. In the increasingly media- and commercial-saturated culture of rural China, rising expectations about what it takes to raise a "modern" "quality" child can be expected to raise these costs of child-rearing even further in the future, promoting reduced family size desires.[72]

(b) Urban fertility aspirations: One is enough

In the cities, couples appear to be generally satisfied with one child. Although many would prefer two children, the high costs of urban life— transportation, schooling, health care, and the like— make that difficult. Growing connections with the world outside have brought a flood of media images of "modern" children equipped to enter the global economy. The nurturing of such children requires big investments— in rich foods, the best schooling, expensive health care, martial arts lessons, piano lesson, and much, much more— making two children too expensive to consider.[73] In the cities, son preference is weaker than it is in the countryside.

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[71] Esp. Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30; Greenhalgh, Susan, Chuzhu Zhu and Li Nan. "Restraining population growth in three Chinese villages," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1994), p. 365-395.

[72] Gu, Baochang, Xie Zhenming and Karen Hardee. *The Effect of Family Planning on Women's Lives: The Case of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: China Population Information and Research Center and Durham, NC: Family Health International, March 1998), 155 p.; Greenhalgh, Susan, Chuzhu Zhu and Li Nan. "Restraining population growth in three Chinese villages," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 20, No. 2, June 1994), p. 365-395; on family size and gender preferences in rural Fujian, see Hardee-Cleaveland, Karen. *Desired Family Size and Sex Preference in Rural China: Evidence from Fujian Province* (Ithaca, New York: Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1988).

[73] *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*. Edited by James L. Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997); Davis, Deborah S. and Julia S. Sensenbrenner. "Commercializing childhood: Parental

Indeed, growing numbers of urbanites seem to prefer daughters. Son preference is weaker in the cities in part because family economies based on wage labor do not require male manpower. And in the cities, as in the countryside, girls are seen as providing more social and emotional support to aging parents.[74]

The institutions of city life also make it much more difficult for urban couples to resist the one-child policy. In the cities, birth planning is supervised by both the "work unit" and the residential unit. The official "grandmas" in the residential street committees keep close watch on all that occurs in their domains— including unauthorized pregnancies. Work-unit cadres may be even more vigilant. Birth planning officials in state bureaucracies and enterprises have many sanctions with which to induce couples to comply: steep fines, denial of educational or health care benefits to the child, and, the ultimate threat, the loss of a job.[75] In today's economy, in which unemployment is a big and growing problem, loss of a secure livelihood and all the perks that come with it is a big price to pay for that extra child. For all these reasons, urban couples seem more willing to stop at one child. Indeed, some couples are opting to remain childless.[76]

(c) The paradox of compliance despite unfulfilled desires

Paradoxically, given the remaining gap between state demands and popular desires, the evidence indicates that most of the public largely accepts the birth planning program as legitimate and even necessary. In a 1992 urban survey, 85% of women said that the individual must submit voluntarily to national policy and 83% agreed that national leaders had no option but to control population growth. Forty-six percent disagreed that the number of children should be left to the choice of the individual (42% agreed and 12% did not answer). Nearly all women said that in practice the number of children they had (mostly only one) had been dictated by national policy rather than personal preference. Some indicated that that was appropriate, others merely that it was unavoidable.[77] Rural field research in the late 1980s and early 1990s (in Shaanxi) left the impression that villagers accepted the state's right to dictate the reproductive rules. They were upset only when the application of those rules to their own families left them bereft of a treasured son. Interviews with intellectuals and state officials over many years suggest that

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purchases for Shanghai's only child," in *The Consumer Revolution in Urban China*. Edited by Deborah S. Davis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 54-79; *Feeding China's Little Emperors: Food, Children, and Social Change*. Edited by Jun Jing (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000).

[74] An early report on this trend was Wolf, Margery. *Revolution Postponed* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1985).

[75] For more, see the section on urban-rural differences in Chapter Six.

[76] Handwerker, Lisa. "The consequences of modernity for childless women in China: Medicalization and resistance," in *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*. Edited by Margaret Lock and Patricia A. Kaufert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 178-205. For more on urban child preferences see, e.g. *China's One-Child Family Policy*. Edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin and Penny Kane (London: Macmillan, 1985); Gates, Hill. "Cultural support for birth limitation among urban capital-owning women," in *Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era*. Edited by Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 251-276.

[77] Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-child Family Policy.* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 86-95. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)].

couples conceded the state's right to regulate their fertility, but rejected the abuse with which state cadres sometimes enforced the rules. Recent interviews with knowledgeable observers in Beijing confirm the view that, in their heart of hearts, most people— urbanites included— would prefer two children. Yet that preference is only a nebulous wish, not a realistic expectation and certainly not a public demand. Despite these secret wishes, urban residents largely accept the policy because they can see the effects of the country's huge population in their daily lives, they accept state authority, and they see no choice in any case.[78]

The apparent contradiction between the public desire for more children than the state permits and the general public acceptance of state birth planning needs to be understood in the context of the complicated politics of reproductive control in China. That politics is shaped by a political culture, rooted in Chinese history and Marxian theory, in which collective needs outweigh individual needs and the state's right to control society is theoretically unbounded. Those cultural presumptions, reinforced by 30 years of state birth planning practice, have led to a situation in which many people would prefer more children but nevertheless accept the need for and legitimacy of government regulation of population growth.[79] As Chinese put it, perhaps only somewhat ironically, in limiting their fertility they have "answered the call of the nation." An American analogy might be that Americans would prefer to have lower tax rates, but nonetheless accept the legitimacy of government taxation and grumblingly pay their taxes.

C. THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE: FROM COVERT TO OVERT, INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE

Given the gap between popular fertility wishes and state fertility demands, birth planning is understandably unpopular with the public. Many if not most people comply, but some actively resist. Historically, resistance was largely individual and covert. Not only couples targeted for surgery, but also cadres charged with enforcing a disliked policy engaged in stratagems to oppose the demands of the center. As the reforms introduced in the late 1970s have deepened, bringing with them massive changes in Chinese society, individual resistance to the policy has become almost epidemic, at least in some places. *New York Times* correspondent Elisabeth Rosenthal, writing about Guangdong, Hainan, and Ningxia, reports on couples who, with three to five or even more children, actively flout the one-child rule.[80] In a major new development, in the mid-1990s, opposition to the birth policy became more collective and overt. This section details these changing patterns of resistance, documenting both the individual stratagems, which are relatively well known in this country, and the more collective resistances of the 1990s, which are little known.

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[78] Interview by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.

[79] Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: The Perspective of Urban Chinese Women on the One-child Family Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Copenhagen, 1994), p. 79-98. [Published as *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-child Family Policy* (Surrey, England: Curzon Press, 1997). (Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Monographs, 74)].

[80] Rosenthal, Elizabeth. "Rural flouting of one-child policy undercuts China's census," *The New York Times* (14 April 2000), p. A10.

(a) Covert individual resistance by ordinary citizens

Citizens targeted for reproductive control have tried to evade the program in proportion to their desires and their opportunities to do so. Both have been much greater in the countryside than in the cities.

Rural opposition. Since the early 1980s, the rural environment has provided ample opportunity for resistance. After the dismantling of communes and the diversification of rural employment, rural cadres enjoyed less leverage over farmers. Members of the rural communities themselves, rural cadres are more sympathetic to peasant desires for two children and sons, and often collude with peasants to conceal violations from higher levels. The rural population is relatively dispersed and, during the post-Mao period, increasingly mobile. These institutional changes have enabled rural people to operate more and more in accordance with the old axiom: "The sky is high and the emperor is far away." In other words, to the extent possible, they have tried to pursue their own interests.

These far-ranging changes in rural society, coupled with the continued preference for two children and a son, have led to forms of resistance to the birth policy that have been as numerous as they have been imaginative. Stratagems for avoiding contraceptive requirements include illicit removal of IUDs and bribing medical workers to obtain false sterilization certificates, an action that is sometimes accompanied by fake "surgery" that leaves superficial wounds to simulate sterilization.[81] To bear out-of-plan children, women give birth at home and temporarily move to other localities, often to stay with relatives in a nearby city where the requisite health care services can be bought on the market. Groups known as birth planning "guerrillas" move from place to place, escaping the net of control. Some have even formed new communities along provincial borders where government control is weak if not nonexistent. To rear out-of-plan children, women bear the child in secret and then "loan" it to relatives elsewhere until the child is so old that cadres have no choice but to accept it back into its original village. Few of these unplanned children are registered at birth, though some may acquire household registration later. Today, with local cadres relying heavily on fines for enforcement, fleeing one's home appears to be less necessary. Couples wanting more children simply pay the fine, or, if they are too poor, ignore it.[82]

Local processes of resistance have also included informal struggles over and negotiations of the birth-planning rules. These processes have occurred both in relations between the lowest

[81] Sills, E. Scott et al. "Gynaecology, forced sterilisation, and asylum in the USA," *The Lancet* (Vol. 351, No. 9117, 6 June 1998), p. 1729-1730.

[82] Rosenthal, Elizabeth. "Rural flouting of one-child policy undercuts China's census," *The New York Times* (14 April 2000), p. A10; In the academic literature, such micro-political tactics are documented in Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30; and Greenhalgh, Susan and Li Jiali. "Engendering reproductive policy and practice in peasant China," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 1995), p. 601-641; see also Croll, Elisabeth. *From Heaven to Earth: Images and Experiences of Development in China* (London: Routledge, 1994); Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. "Resistance to the one-child family," *Modern China* (Vol. 10, No. 3, July 1984), p. 345-374; Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 202-230.

level administrators and program clients and in relations between higher and lower administrators. Given the emphasis in INS cases on harsh and arbitrary treatment of individuals, it is worth emphasizing that in most localities, maintaining the fairness and reasonableness of the program in its application to concrete cases has been a primary program concern, though that concern may well have been overridden at times of pressure from above to reach targets.

Urban defiance. In urban areas, program rules are more stringent than in rural areas, approaching the one-child ideal in practice. Nevertheless, compliance is also higher than in the countryside. Aside from the fact that urbanites want fewer children, the main reason is that in urban state work units, it is difficult for people to resist birth planning, because the state has more means of control.[83] Even in the cities, however, the state has little control over individuals in the "private economy" and even less among the "floating population" of rural-to-urban migrants. Among these groups, especially the migrant population, childbearing is often early, repeated, and unplanned.

(b) Covert individual resistance by cadres

While resistance by citizens targeted for control is better known outside of China, party and government cadres, both administrators and implementers, have also actively defied the one-child policy. The reasons are abundantly clear. Birth planning has long been considered the single most difficult policy (*diyi nan*) that local officials are required to enforce. The difficulty stems not only from the difficulty of enforcement, but also from the close personal ties between birth workers and "clients," especially in the villages. During the high-pressure campaigns of the past, local enforcers were expected to "make" (sometimes force) their neighbors and relatives undergo dreaded surgery, an emotionally wrenching experience for cadre as well as target.[84] Many rural birth planning workers have been subject to verbal and physical abuse from villagers who take out their ire about the policy on its enforcers. Over the decades, the Chinese press has documented numerous cases of enraged villagers blinding and even murdering birth planning cadres who, they felt, had done them wrong.

Faced with such a difficult assignment, many local officials have obstructed or delayed policy implementation by dragging their feet and "looking the other way." Another common tactic has been to report false statistics, which are then transmitted up the administrative system, leaving the center in the dark about what the real facts are.[85] Another mode of resistance has taken the form of negotiation and collusion with local people to work out informal "local policies" that fit the needs of the local people, even if they deviate from the formal policy of the state.[86] In a sense, many administrators and enforcers effectively resist their birth planning duties by trying to transfer to other work, a move that creates both high personnel turnover and high administrative costs for the program.

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[83] For the details, see Chapter Six.
[84] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, March 2000.
[85] The extent of this problem is considered in the introduction to Chapter Four.
[86] For an account of this process, see Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30.

Especially since the early 1990s, top-level program administrators have been increasingly concerned about these violations of program regulations by birth planning cadres themselves. The heightened emphasis of the 1990s was part of a broader campaign launched by national political leaders in the mid-1990s to avoid public outrage in a wide range of policy areas by restoring discipline over party members and preventing corruption by government officials. In birth planning, perhaps the largest number of cases concern pecuniary corruption: administrators accepting bribes for lenient treatment and medical workers taking gifts or money for faked medical procedures. The center has tried to bring cadres into line, but, with power shifting down the administrative hierarchy, the results have been mixed.

(c) Overt collective politics

During the 1990s, and especially after 1993, the birth program became the subject of increasingly open discussion. By and large, these newly public commentaries constituted not fundamental opposition to the policy— which would have been politically dangerous, given its status as a "basic state policy"— but constructive criticism of it.

State capacity. One should not underestimate the capacity of the Chinese state to shape the behavior of ordinary citizens. Evidently, the Chinese state has begun to establish new social norms favoring fewer children. In any case, even in most rural areas the Chinese state has largely succeeded in enforcing its policies, including unpopular ones like birth planning.[87] On the other hand, neither should one overestimate the capacity of the Chinese state. The formerly "totalitarian" Chinese party-state is no longer the leviathan it once was. The regime's own studies of implementation of one 1990s reform (village self-government) show that in 65% of villages implementation was lackadaisical, while in another 20% it was semi-paralyzed, paralyzed or non-existent.[88] Though enforcement of the birth policy probably was much better than that, its implementation is still far from perfect.[89] Moreover, the emphasis in one province during the early 1990s on bringing village political self-management "up to standard" exactly paralleled efforts at the same time to bring village self-management of birth planning up to standard.[90] A major reason for limiting births has been to increase rural per capita incomes in order to retain rural political support. Yet the effort has proved contradictory, producing at least as much resistance to as support for the regime.

State political calculations. Having reduced rural fertility to what the state deems the lowest levels possible in most areas, in a trade-off between rural appreciation of further per capita gains and rural resentment at continued stringent birth limits, national political leaders are

[87] O'Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li. "Selective policy implementation in rural China," *Comparative Politics* (Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1999), p. 167-186.
[88] O'Brien, Kevin. "Implementing political reform in China's villages," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (No. 32, July 1994), p. 51.
[89] *Collection of Evaluation Reports on the First Batch of Quality of Care Experimental Counties and Districts (1995-1998) under the State Birth Planning Commission (Guojia jihua shengyu weiyuanhui, Diyipi youzhi fuwu shidian xianqu (1995-1998) pinggu baogao ji).* Edited by Erli Zhang, Xie Zhenming and Gu Baochang (Beijing: China Population Press, 1999) [in Chinese].
[90] For more, see Chapter Eight, section One.

likely to give greater weight to avoiding more resentment than to achieving more appreciation. In practice, much if not most of the population appears basically satisfied with, or at least resigned to, their reproductive outcomes under the program. The main exceptions are rural couples with two daughters who still urgently want a son.

Incipient democratization. In a marked departure from earlier decades, during the 1990s, response to the birth policy increasingly took somewhat more overt and even collective forms. This included more open policy debate at the national and provincial levels, growing supervision of local programs through local legislatures, and increasingly open discussion within rural communities about the conduct of birth planning as an issue in village elections. Fieldwork on provincial legislatures suggests that they are eager and able to play the role of ombudsman in relation to provincial government administration, and documentary evidence shows that they have done that for birth planning in at least some provinces.[91] Fieldwork on village self-government in Fujian finds that, outside selected demonstration sites, it was difficult for villages to combine implementation of state policies with achievement of public participation.[92] If state targets were achieved, participation was only token (these were dubbed authoritarian villages); participation was real but state targets were evaded (run-away villages); or neither state targets nor participation was achieved (paralyzed villages). Implementation and evasion of birth planning probably follow parallel patterns.

A recent incident provides a cameo of this process of incipient democratization. In August 2000, local birth planning officials in Caidian, Hubei, sought to destroy the fourth baby of a rural couple just before it was born by requiring medical workers to inject the mother with a saline solution. Yet the baby survived. Incensed, the local officials were waiting for the couple when they returned home. In the argument that followed, the officials snatched the baby and proceeded to drown it in a paddy field. Although villagers were afraid to speak out, fearing retribution, word of the incident spread through the internet. The public outcry in the nearby city of Wuhan prompted national media attention, forcing the Hubei government to promise that it would punish the offending cadres.[93] The abuse was old, but the response was new. When the Chinese people themselves begin to speak out about abuses in the birth program, forcing an official response, there is reason to hope that real change might be on the way.

At the level of national elites, urban intellectuals have begun to openly voice their concerns about the one-child policy. In the past few decades, the state's steady and insistent support for the birth planning policy has created a political climate discouraging open challenge to the policy. In the 1980s, some brave individuals openly questioned the harsh one-child limit. They pointed out problems in practice and noted worrying social and demographic consequences of the one-child limitation, all fully legitimate topics for discussion by policy intellectuals. Yet few challenged either the state's overall assessment of the seriousness of the population problem and its solution to it, or the official claim that birth planning was good for women. In the 1990s, introspection by program leaders, combined with growing contacts with foreign organizations in

[91] MacFarquhar, Roderick. "Provincial People's Congresses," *China Quarterly* (No. 155, September 1998), p. 656-667; see Chapter Eight on Fujian.
[92] O'Brien, Kevin. "Implementing political reform in China's villages," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (No. 32, July 1994), p. 50-58.
[93] McElroy, Damien. "China fears crime wave of one-child generation," *Daily Telegraph* (London: 7 May 2000).

the wake of the Cairo and Beijing conferences, opened up some political space for intellectuals to speak their mind.[94] Interviews with some leading reproductive health scholar-activists in late 1999 suggest the quiet beginnings of a critique— not of the legitimacy of state birth planning, but of its effects on particular social groups. These newly vocal intellectuals have sought not to dismantle the policy, but rather to improve it so that the costs do not fall so heavily on women and infant girls.[95] Although this hardly constitutes open expression of dissident views, in the Chinese political context the emergence of these voices indicates the beginnings of a more open policy discussion that might pave the way for real liberalization of the policy when the time is right.

D. THE HUMAN COSTS OF STATE BIRTH PLANNING

From a macro-societal and -economic perspective, China's one-child policy has brought many benefits. These benefits, publicized often by the government, have included rising per capita incomes, reduced strain on infrastructure and the environment, a "higher quality" labor force, and many more. At the micro-level of the individual, the social benefits of the policy have also been impressive— at least for some. China's single children have been the most pampered generation in China's history, showered with McDonald's hamburgers, exotic toys, and fancy computers.[96] For urban women, who enjoy attractive job opportunities and reasonably good health care in urban medical facilities, the one-child policy may well have brought about a "great liberation," as Mao used to say.

Yet the costs of the policy— to society and to individuals— have been very steep. The costs to society as a whole have included the accelerated aging of the population in a society that lacks a working social security system. The question of who will care for China's burgeoning elderly population is a huge and unresolved problem in China today.[97] Another price China has paid for drastic population control is a growing imbalance in the sex ratio, which has created a catastrophic shortage of marriageable women.[98] The result is a growing army of unhappy bachelors and a proliferation of smuggling rings engaged in kidnapping and selling women and girls to poor men. A third problem that surely was unanticipated by policy makers who envisioned a "low quantity, high quality population" is a rising tide of juvenile delinquency and juvenile crime committed by a spoiled generation of single-child "princes and princesses." Intense parental pressure on only children has led to student suicides and breakdowns and even family murders in which single children, pressed beyond their limits, have killed their parents

[94] On these changes, see Chapter Three, section on internationalization.
[95] Interviews by the authors in Beijing, November 1999; Greenhalgh, Susan. "Fresh winds in Beijing: Chinese feminists speak out on the one-child policy and women's lives," Forthcoming in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 2001).
[96] *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*. Edited by James L. Watson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997); *Feeding China's Little Emperors: Food, Children, and Social Change*. Edited by Jun Jing. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000).
[97] Du, Peng and Tu Ping. "Population ageing and old age security," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 77-90.
[98] Tuljapurkar, Shripad, Li Nan, and Marcus W. Feldman. "High sex ratios in China's future," *Science* (No. 267, 10 February 1995), p. 874-876.

during arguments over such things as poor test results.[99] These problems, which threaten social order and stability, have become a focus of intense concern within the government and public alike.

What has received the least attention are the human costs borne by specific categories of individuals, individuals who are rarely seen in INS offices. What ties these categories of people together is their gender: they are largely female. Hoping to give visibility to these groups, in this section we focus on some of the most extensive and serious human costs of the one-child policy. We examine the costs to women of reproductive age, to infant girls, and to children who come into the world "unplanned."

(a) Women's physical and emotional well-being

In the early 1980s, the Chinese media documented numerous cases of rural women who gave birth to daughters, and were then beaten and divorced by their husbands. While these incidents may still occur on occasion, the mid-1980s introduction of the policy allowing couples with one daughter to have another child probably eased that problem. More serious and pervasive has been the damage caused to women's, especially rural women's, reproductive health. Although these health problems have not been fully documented— that is part of the problem— the evidence available suggests that they are worrisome.[100]

Because they are the biological reproducers and the designated "sacrificers for the nation," women, especially rural women, have been the targets of state reproductive control.[101] As documented in Chapter Six, they have borne the burden of contraception and, despite the program's pleas to men to do their part, women's contraceptive burden has grown with time. With policy specifying which type of contraception must be used when, contraceptive choice has been extremely limited, especially in the rural areas. The great bulk of contraceptive use involves a surgical procedure, leaving women vulnerable to the risks and complications of surgery. These are far from negligible in a country where contraceptive counseling is poor and virtually nonexistent during target-focused campaigns.[102] Although levels of abortion have declined since their early 1990s peak, abortion continues to be mandatory for all unauthorized, or "out-of-plan" pregnancies. Repeated abortions and IUD insertions worsen the risks of infection and perforation.[103] A micro-study of a peri-urban village in Shaanxi gives us a sense of the size of

[99] McElroy, Damien. "China fears crime wave of one-child generation," *Daily Telegraph* (London: 7 May 1998); Rennie, David. "'Spare the child' plea by Chinese leader," *Daily Telegraph* (London: 6 March 2000).
[100] For more evidence, see Human Rights in China (HRIC). *Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women* (New York: HRIC, 1995).
[101] For more on the larger cultural context that encourages such gender bias, see Chapter Six.
[102] Kaufman, Joan et al. "The quality of family planning services in rural China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 23, No. 2, March/April 1992), p. 73-84; Li, Bohua. "Report on reproductive health survey," *China Population Today* (Vol. 16, No. 3, June 1999), p. 2-9; *Collection of Evaluation Reports on the First Batch of Quality of Care Experimental Counties and Districts (1995-1998) Under the State Birth Planning Commission (Guojia Jihua Shengyu Weiyuanhui, Diyipi Youzhi Fuwu Shidian Xianqu (1995-1998) Pinggu Baogao Ji)*. Edited by Erli Zhang, Xie Zhenming, and Gu Baochang (Beijing: China Population Press, 1999), p. 15-16 [in Chinese].
[103] Kaufman, Joan. "The cost of IUD failure in China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 24, No. 3, May/June 1993), p. 194-196 [Commentary].

these risks in one community. Of all women married between 1971 and 1981, roughly one in eight (13.2%) had undergone multiple IUD insertions by 1988. By the late 1980s, just over one in five (21.7%) had had one or more abortions, while one in ten (9.4%) had undergone the trauma of a second or third trimester abortion. Those at greatest risk for abortion and IUD reinsertion were those who resisted the policy the most; they were labeled troublemakers and targeted for surgery.[104]

The quality of the operations women have undergone has depended on the context in which they were performed. **Routine** procedures tend to be performed by experienced medical practitioners working in clinics and hospitals with good medical conditions.[105] Operations conducted during **crash campaigns** have rarely met these standards. There can be no doubt that during the high-pressure campaigns of the past, women were subject to coercive birth control surgery conducted in a rushed way by outside medical teams working in often poor facilities. In the words of some Chinese observers today, women's bodies were treated like mere objects of state control, to be used in the achievement of state targets.[106] The consequences for women's health have not been carefully studied, but individual testimonies, interviews with some candid Chinese birth planning officials, and provincial regulations demanding quality surgery indicate that they have been serious at best.

An issue of particular concern is the late term of many abortions performed in China. While first trimester abortions appear to be relatively safe, later abortions pose elevated health risks even where medical facilities are excellent, a situation that, as we have just seen, does not always obtain in China. In the past, late-term abortion was a common if not preferred mode of eliminating unauthorized pregnancies that were discovered late. A routine way of reaching annual population control targets was to carry out a fall campaign to eliminate all illegitimate pregnancies— regardless of the month of the pregnancy. Although in the 1990s, program leaders sought to reduce, and no doubt succeeded in reducing, the incidence of late-term abortions performed by program personnel, the rising tide of abortions of female fetuses presents a worrying problem. The sex of a fetus can only be detected in the fourth or fifth month of pregnancy, meaning that abortions for this purpose can only be carried out in the second or even third trimester. Because of the sensitivity of the issue of late-term abortion, a sensitivity that is heightened by the illegal nature of sex-selective abortion, the extent of this problem is not known.

Beyond these short-term costs are the long-term consequences for women's reproductive and general health of inappropriate, botched or repeated birth-control procedures. The case of Li Qiuliang, brought to the attention of Americans in a 1993 *New York Times* article, underscores the likely seriousness of these problems.[107] Twenty-three year-old Li had her first pregnancy aborted at seven months because she was supposed to give birth in 1992 rather than 1993.

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[104] Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30.
[105] E.g. Lin, Luo et al. "Induced abortion among unmarried women in Sichuan Province, China," *Contraception* (Vol. 51, No. 1, January 1995), p. 59-63.
[106] Interviews by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.
[107] Kristof, Nicholas D. "China's crackdown on births: A stunning, and harsh, success," *New York Times* (25 April 1993), p. 1, 12.

According to a confidential Chinese government report on the incident, despite the frailty of her health and over the protests of the attending doctor, she was required to undergo an induced abortion. During the procedure she bled severely, fell unconscious, and almost died. The operation left her crippled, the report indicated, without specifying the nature of the injuries.

While little is known about the incidence of long-term reproductive health problems, they certainly include upper reproductive tract infections (RTI) and even infertility. Studies by specialists in women's health indicate that infections of the reproductive tract are a serious problem in the rural parts of the country. In some places studied, 58% of the women suffered from inflammation of the cervix, which is just one of several common types of RTI.[108] Because health care services are provided differentially to those who comply with the policy, women who violate the policy by carrying unauthorized pregnancies to term suffer greater risk of maternal mortality. In one study conducted in 1989-1991, mortality levels among women with unauthorized pregnancies were an astonishing four times those of women with legitimate pregnancies.[109]

In addition to the physiological burdens of undergoing these operations, fear of surgical procedures, especially sterilization, is common, adding a psychological burden as well.[110] Meantime, the health needs of those who are not targets of control— unmarried women, older women and infertile women— have been largely ignored.[111] Although reproductive health issues began to get programmatic attention in the late 1990s,[112] the dominant attitude, according to reproductive health activists, remained that women's health was "unimportant."[113] Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, they contended, the health of women was considered less worthy of concern than the health of single children, and both were treated as trivial matters relative to the achievement of population control targets. Fortunately, official attitudes have begun to change.

The psychological problems faced by rural women targets of the birth planning program have remained hidden from view, yet the research of Chinese scholars suggests these burdens are enormous.[114] For even as they have been targeted by cadres for "persuasion" and "mobilization," they have been blamed by their husbands and in-laws for having a child of the wrong sex. The combination of gender bias with ignorance of reproductive biology has resulted in the scapegoating of young women, who are blamed for their failure to produce a son and made to feel they have made a terrible mistake. While daughters are accepted and even increasingly welcomed in the cities, village women whose first two children are girls have suffered

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[108] Kaufman, Joan et al. "A study of field-based methods for diagnosing reproductive tract infections in rural Yunnan Province, China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 30, No. 2, June 1999), p. 112-119.
[109] Ni, Hanyu, and Annette MacKay Rossignol. "Maternal deaths among women with pregnancies outside of family planning in Sichuan, China," *Epidemiology* (Vol. 5, No. 5, September 1994), p. 490-494.
[110] Zhu, Chuzhu et al. *The Dual Effects of the Family Planning Program on Chinese Women* (Xi'an, China: Xi'an Jiaotong University Press, 1997) [in English and Chinese].
[111] Handwerker, Lisa. "The consequences of modernity for childless women in China: Medicalization and resistance." In *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*. Edited by Margaret Lock and Patricia A. Kaufert. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 178-205.
[112] See Chapter Three, section three.
[113] Interview by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.
[114] Zhu, Chuzhu et al. *The Dual Effects of the Family Planning Program on Chinese Women* (Xi'an, China: Xi'an Jiaotong University Press, 1997) [in English and Chinese].

psychological trauma and social isolation. The work of Chinese field researchers has shown that, as their status in their family suffers, young mothers often become deeply depressed. Violating the birth policy, they become pregnant a third time, often moving secretly from place to place to escape detection. The pregnancy is marked by intense anxiety, which turns to despair if the child is another girl.[115] The product of a stringent birth policy enforced in a male-centered society, these sorts of psychological costs are simply immeasurable.

(b) The treatment and survival of infant girls

If the consequences of the one-child policy have been deleterious for women, they have been worse for infant girls. Again, the problem is largely rural. While baby boys are treasured, baby girls, especially those of second or higher birth order, are at high risk not only for abortion, but also for concealment, abandonment, and even quiet infanticide. Statistics indicate that the sex ratio at birth (SRB)— the number of boys born per 100 girls born— has worsened markedly since the one-child policy was introduced. While the biologically normal ratio is about 105-106, the Chinese ratio rose from 107 to 114 in the 1980s and reached 121 in 1994 before falling to 116.5 in 1995.[116]

The distortion in the SRB is a nationwide phenomenon, but there are large differences between regions. The 1990 census showed that 24 of China's (then) 30 provincial-level units had high sex ratios at birth, while only 6 reported relatively normal sex ratios. In 1995, nine provincial-level units reported SRBs of 99-109, twelve showed sex ratios of 110-119, eight produced SRBs of 120-129, and one revealed an astonishing sex ratio at birth: 132.[117] The provinces with the worst SRBs in 1995 were, from worst to less worse: Hubei, Henan, Hainan, Guangxi, Fujian, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Beijing, the national capital. Sex ratios at birth by province in 1990 and 1995 are shown in Table 2.1 at the end of the chapter.

The rising sex ratio at birth reflects pressure to have small families in a culture that strongly prefers sons. This dynamic becomes clear when we examine the sex ratio at birth by birth order. While it is only slightly above normal for first children, is it extraordinarily high for second and higher-order children. By the 1990s, these high sex ratios among higher-order births had become the norm. Official program statistics for 1997 indicate that the sex ratio for first children was a biologically normal 105 males to 100 females, 138 for second children and 142

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[115] Zhu, Chuzhu et al. *The Dual Effects of the Family Planning Program on Chinese Women* (Xi'an, China: Xi'an Jiaotong University Press, 1997) [in English and Chinese].

[116] Li, Yongping and Peng Xizhe. "Age and sex structures," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 64-76; for earlier years and sub-regional break-downs, see Yuan, Jianhua and G. William Skinner. "Shaping the gender configuration of offspring sets: The spatial patterning of reproductive strategizing in contemporary China" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, 11 March 2000); for more on discrimination against infant girls, see Human Rights in China (HRIC). *Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women* (New York: HRIC, 1995).

[117] Li, Yongping and Peng Xizhe. "Age and sex structures," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 64-76.

for third and higher children.[118] Essentially, higher-order daughters are not either not surviving—or not being counted.

What has happened to these "missing girls" is a focus of intense debate among population specialists. Three hypotheses have been defended. The first focuses on underreporting and adoption. In this hypothesis, **the births occur and the girls are still alive but they do not appear in the data**. Some of these girls are alive but their births are not reported because parents do not want their violation of the birth policy known. Other baby girls are abandoned, a fate that, for the fortunate, leads to institutionalization in state orphanages and adoption (and for the unfortunate, death).[119] Indeed, in parts of rural China a whole culture of adoption has developed in which ordinary people are taking unrelated children and girls into their homes, despite birth planning regulations that specify steep fines for doing so.[120] In a recent case, a poor slum-dwelling couple in Beijing had picked five infant girls out of the garbage and raised them as their own. Because birth planning was lax in their neighborhood, officials did not bother them. What the girls had in common was their slight disfigurement (cleft palates, hare lips), imperfections the birth parents probably considered too great a deformity for them to deal with or too expensive to fix.[121] A tiny number of these abandoned children find their way to state orphanages whence they are adopted into families abroad. In the 1990s, roughly 18,000 Chinese infants, the vast majority of them girls, were adopted into American families.[122]

A second hypothesis argues that **the missing girls died** due to infanticide, abandonment, or neglect.[123] As the Chinese media have sometimes acknowledged, especially in the early 1980s, some girls have been subject to outright infanticide. The extent of infanticide is impossible to measure because births followed immediately by death are often not registered. Although they lack hard evidence, perhaps on the basis of their visits to the countryside Chinese demographers believe that outright infanticide has greatly declined.[124] Yet death can also occur through abandonment, neglect and mistreatment. The "excess mortality" (i.e., mortality above biologically normal levels) of young girls is astonishingly high. In parts of rural Shaanxi in the mid-1990s, Chinese field researchers found death rates among young girls that were over 25% higher than expected— and they were rising.[125] Some of the best figures for the country as a

[118] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 440 [in Chinese].
[119] Johnson, Kay. "The politics of the revival of infant abandonment in China, with special reference to Hunan," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 22, No. 1, March 1996), p. 77-98; Johnson, Kay, Banghan Huang and Liyao Wang. "Infant abandonment and adoption in China," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 24, No. 3, September 1998), p. 469-510.
[120] Johnson, Kay, Banghan Huang and Liyao Wang. "Infant abandonment and adoption in China," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 24, No. 3, September 1998), p. 469-510.
[121] McElroy, Damien and Olga Craig. "Victims of China's one-child policy find hope," *Daily Telegraph* (London: 30 July 2000).
[122] Riley, Nancy E. "American adoptions of Chinese girls: The sociopolitical matrices of individual decisions," *Women's Studies International Forum* (Vol. 20, No. 1, January-February 1997), p. 87-102; Evans, Karen. *The Lost Daughters of China: Abandoned Girls, Their Journey to America, and the Search for a Missing Past* (New York: Putnam, 2000).
[123] Coale, Ansley J. "Excess female mortality and the balance of the sexes in the population: An estimate of the number of missing females," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1991), p. 517-523.
[124] Interviews by the authors over numerous years.
[125] Li, Shuzhuo and Zhu Chuzhu. "Gender differences in child survival in rural China: A county study" (Unpublished

whole suggest that in 1995, 9.6% of infant girls were missing. Of these, 15% were absent due to female mortality in excess of the normal level.[126] In addition to the factors noted above, discrimination against baby girls in the distribution of medical care is also an important cause of the high levels of female mortality in the youngest age groups.[127]

A third explanation, the one preferred by many Chinese demographers, attributes much of the missing-girls problem to the growing use of **abortion to eliminate unwanted infant girls before they are born**. Sex determination is done by the ultrasound-B machines that are routinely used in IUD check-ups. Introduced on a significant scale in the mid-1980s, these machines are now widely available throughout the Chinese countryside (and, of course, in the cities as well). For growing numbers of Chinese couples, sex-selective abortion provides a good, "modern" alternative to the crude and morally fraught practice of infanticide.

Strictly speaking, the culpability for this discrimination against girls does not lie with the birth planning program alone. Program leaders routinely deplore it and blame it on remnants of "feudal" tradition in the villages. Nonetheless, the program itself has inadvertently institutionalized gender discrimination by writing gender-specific provisions into the birth planning regulations, in particular the provision that rural couples whose first child is a girl can try again for a boy.[128]

In the early 1990s, program leaders declared the use of ultrasound-B machines for sex determination illegal. Many provinces issued regulations forbidding it. In addition to strengthening regulation of these devices, government policy makers have tried to arrest the trend with measures to improve women's status, ensure old-age security and eliminate traditional practices such as lineage worship. Chinese demographers cite a March 1994 directive titled Proposals and Suggestions for Preventing the Rise of Sex Ratio at Birth as evidence of the seriousness of Chinese leaders' concern.[129] Yet neither official prohibitions nor measures to improve women's status appear to have had much effect. By all accounts the problem persists and may even be worsening. To address this problem, the government will need to introduce much stronger measures and demonstrate much stronger commitment by, for example, having top leaders vigorously condemn the practice in public statements.[130]

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manuscript, Xi'an Jiaotong University, 1999).

[126] Lavely, William. "Unintended consequences of China's birth planning policy" (Paper presented at the conference on Unintended Social Consequences of Chinese Economic Reform, Harvard University, May 24, 1997).

[127] Zhu, Chuzhu et al. *The Dual Effects of the Family Planning Program on Chinese Women* (Xi'an, China: Xi'an Jiaotong University Press, 1997), p. 167-187 [in English and Chinese]; Li, Shuzhuo and Zhu Chuzhu. "Gender differences in child survival in rural China: A county study" (Unpublished manuscript, Xi'an Jiaotong University, 1999).

[128] This policy innovation is described in the introduction to the next chapter.

[129] Li, Yongping and Peng Xizhe. "Age and sex structures," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 74.

[130] For 1990s discussions of these issues, see Hull, Terrence H. "Recent trends in sex ratios at birth in China," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 16, No. 1, March 1990), p. 63-83; Johansson, Sten and Ola Nygren. "The missing girls of China: A new demographic account," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1991), p. 35-51; Hom, Sharon K. "Female infanticide in China: The human rights specter and thoughts toward (an)other vision," *Columbia Human Rights Law Review* (Vol. 23, 1991-92), p. 249-314; Gao, Lin. "The sex ratio at birth of the Chinese population," *Population Research* (*Renkou Yanjiu*) (No. 1, January 1993), p. 1-6 [in Chinese];

(c) The fate of "unplanned" children

A final but still largely hidden problem is the plight of "unplanned children"— children who result from unauthorized pregnancies carried to term in violation of program rules. By classifying all pregnancies and births as "planned" or "unplanned," the birth planning program has effectively created a whole new class of children who are illegitimate. Sometimes known as "black children" or the "black population" (*hei haizi*, *hei renkou*), these "unplanned persons" are legally and socially nonpersons. Ineligible for household registration, they have no right to state-provided schooling, higher education, health care, and a host of other state services and benefits. They are excluded from many types of jobs and not permitted to purchase property.[131] Certainly, some unplanned children manage to obtain these services on the market— although at higher cost and lower quality than if they had been provided by official sources.[132] But we have no idea how many are getting services in other ways. Stories in the Chinese media reveal the troubles these "outlaws by birth" can encounter— and also create. With little formal education and low status in society, growing numbers live on the streets, turning to petty crime to survive.[133] The first cohort of such children is now reaching young adulthood and encountering serious problems, from getting jobs to getting married.[134]

Because "unplanned children" is not a bureaucratic category for data collection, we have little idea how many unplanned children there are, though their numbers are certainly large. But we do have some sense of who they are. Given the strong son preference in rural China, the vast majority are probably girls. The evidence available suggests that most of the unplanned children are farm children who still live in the rural areas or have migrated, alone or with their families, to the cities. In a reversal of the usual situation, the urban children may fare more poorly than the rural. In the countryside, the household register is a less central mediator of state services than in the past; in addition, registration for the unplanned child may be negotiated with sympathetic

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Tu, Ping. "An exploration of the sex ratio at birth in China," *Population Research* (*Renkou Yanjiu*) (No. 1, January 1993), p. 6-13; Zeng, Yi et al. "Causes and implications of the recent increase in the reported sex ratio at birth in China," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 19, No. 2, June 1993), p. 283-302; Coale, Ansley J. and Judith Banister. "Five decades of missing females in China," *Demography* (Vol. 31, No. 3, August 1994), p. 459-479; Gu, Baochang and Krishna Roy. "Sex ratio at birth in China, with reference to other areas in East Asia: What we know," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 10, No. 3, September 1995), p. 17-42. Greenhalgh, Susan and Li Jiali. "Engendering reproductive policy and practice in peasant China," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 1995), p. 601-641; Human Rights in China (HRIC). *Caught Between Tradition and the State: Violations of the Human Rights of Chinese Women* (New York: HRIC, 1995).

[131] Fan, Xiangguo and Huang Yuan. "China's 'black population'," *New Observer* (*Xin Guancha*) (No. 4, 1989), p. 28-32 [in Chinese]; Chan, Kam Wing and Li Zhang. "The *hukou* system and rural-urban migration in China: Processes and changes," *China Quarterly* (No. 160, December 1999), p. 818-855.

[132] Eckholm, Erik. "For China's rural migrants, an education wall," *New York Times* (23 December 1999), p. 1, 8.

[133] Ni, Ching-ching. "Two families— but no place to call home," *Los Angeles Times* (29 March 2000), p. A1, 10.

[134] For more on the operation and significance of the household registration system, which is the institutional root of all these problems, see Cheng, Tiejun and Mark Selden. "The origins and social consequences of China's *hukou* system," *China Quarterly* (No. 139, September 1994), p. 644-668; Mallee, Hein. "China's household registration system under reform," *Development and Change* (Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1995), p. 1-29; Chan, Kam Wing and Li Zhang. "The *hukou* system and rural-urban migration in China: Processes and changes," *China Quarterly* (No. 160, December 1999), p. 818-855.

local officials. Reports from China suggest that some are "legalized"— or entered in the register— after payment of a fine, while in other cases cadres prefer to keep unplanned children out of the register to make their localities' planned birth rates look higher than they really are.[135] In the cities, however, registration continues to provide access to the full range of state services and welfare benefits. The result is that unregistered persons, in particular, rural members of the "floating population," enjoy much less than full citizenship rights.[136]

This is an extremely sensitive issue that Chinese program leaders do not like to publicize. Following state priorities, Chinese demographers have largely ignored the matter as well. As the November 2000 census approaches, census-takers concerned about getting an accurate population count are now facing up to the size of the problem. Meanwhile, innocent children and young people are being punished by being deprived of essential social support.

E. CONCLUSION

For most of its history, China's population planning program has been driven by targets and numbers. Yet, as one reform-minded Chinese sociologist quietly argued ten years ago, "behind the numbers there are tens of thousands of families."[137] For many years that voice was not heard: those real life-and-blood families received virtually no attention from policy makers. In this chapter, we have adopted the micro-perspective of those families, looking at how they have resisted the policy and the human pain they have endured as a result of the state's preoccupation with population numbers. Little known to the outside world, from the mid-1990s, the center has begun to reconsider that exclusive focus. In the next chapter, we examine continuities and changes in that important decade to see how far government attempts to "bring the people back in" have succeeded— and can succeed in the future.

[135] Fan, Xiangguo and Huang Yuan. "China's 'black population'," *New Observer* (*Xin Guancha*) (No. 4, 1989), p. 28-32 [in Chinese]; Wang, Xizhan. "Analysis of a survey of 100 rural 'unplanned birth households'," *Population and Economy* (*Renkou Yu Jingji*) (No. 4, 1989), p. 36-37.
[136] Solinger, Dorothy J. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Eckholm, Erik. "For China's rural migrants, an education wall," *New York Times* (23 December 1999), p. 1, 8.
[137] Interview by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.

TABLE 2.1 SEX RATIOS AT BIRTH, 1990 AND 1995

PLACE	1990 SRB	1995 SRB
Guizhou	101.77	100.35
Tibet	103.05	98.91
Xinjiang	103.70	101.26
Shanghai	104.35	105.34
Qinghai	104.62	106.58
Beijing	106.21	122.54
Yunnan	106.84	109.53
*IMAR	107.37	111.36
Heilongjiang	107.44	109.70
Jilin	108.11	109.84
Hubei	109.49	131.63
Shanxi	109.66	111.83
Ningxia	110.04	106.77
Liaoning	110.10	111.61
Gansu	110.29	110.13
Anhui	110.48	118.14
Fujian	110.49	124.42
Hunan	110.49	116.96
Jiangxi	110.56	119.81
Tianjin	110.65	110.56
Shaanxi	111.12	124.26
CHINA	**111.42**	**116.57**
Sichuan	111.53	110.01
Guangdong	111.76	123.30
Hebei	112.32	115.20
Jiangsu	114.50	123.88
Hainan	115.60	125.87
Shandong	115.97	118.94
Henan	116.64	127.44
Guangxi	117.73	124.57
Zhejiang	117.82	115.35

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Source: Li, Yongping and Peng Xizhe. “Age and sex structures,” in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 71. 1990 figures calculated from the 10% sample tabulation of the 1990 population census, 1995 from the national 1% population sample survey.

II. NATIONAL POLICY AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Chapter 3: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE 1990s

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: BIRTH PLANNING IN THE 1960S AND 1970S

B. CONTINUITIES IN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

(a) Number of children
(b) Timing of childbearing
(c) Mixed implementation

C. EARLY 1990S ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALIZATION: DEEPENING THE STATIST APPROACH

(a) 1989-1993: Strong Re-enforcement
(b) From 1993: Routinization
(c) From 1995: Collateralization and Incentivization

D. LATE 1990S SPROUTS OF LIBERALIZATION: "MAKING PEOPLE THE CORE"

(a) From 1995: Internationalization
(b) From 1998: Toward quality of care
(c) From 1998: Liberalization of planning

E. CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS

The 1990s brought major changes to China's birth policy and program— changes that remain little known outside the country. In this chapter, we track the evolution of the policy during the 1990s, mapping out both continuities with the past and new developments. The chapter's Introduction briefly recalls the program's origins and historical development, particularly the overall rhythm of intense enforcement, relaxation and intense re-enforcement that marked the early 1980s, mid-1980s and early 1990s, respectively. In the first section we identify some specific features of policy and implementation that emerged in the 1980s and remained in place during the 1990s. The second section describes 1990s changes that are "conservative" and "rationalizing" in the sense that they were intended to maintain, even strengthen, the program by further institutionalizing and elaborating it. In the third section we report changes that are both "progressive" in the sense that they tend to shift the program from serving the state to serving individual clients, and "liberalizing" in the sense that they began to reduce state micro-

management of individual behavior. The Conclusion notes how, at the turn of the millennium, program leaders say birth planning is likely to evolve in the future.[138]

A. INTRODUCTION: BIRTH PLANNING IN THE 1960s AND 1970s

When the PRC was founded in 1949, its new communist leaders had not yet conceived the idea of using state power to limit births. They shared the orthodox Marxist and Soviet "pronatalism," believing that the more farmers, workers and soldiers a country had, the better. Those leaders who favored contraception wanted to enable individual women to control their fertility, which would "liberate" them from the "feudal bonds" of family and housework, enabling them to contribute their energies to the collective task of national construction. Initial attempts to provide contraceptive services to urban women were disrupted by shifts from moderate to radical tendencies in medical and economic policy. During the radical shifts of the Great Leap Forward, Mao reversed his support for antinatalism, and efforts to control births were largely abandoned.[139]

During the 1950s and 1960s, however, China's leaders gradually shifted their stance from pronatal to antinatal. They shifted too from radical prohibition or disruption of mass contraception to moderate implementation of it. As China's leaders began the task of economic construction, they discovered they had more people than optimal for economic development. They decided that social reproduction should be planned along with economic production (the "two kinds of production").[140] Preliminary implementation of these ideas in urban areas during the early 1960s was interrupted again in the late 1960s by the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution. Around 1970, China turned from the Cultural Revolution back toward economic construction. During the 1970s, China revived and institutionalized the idea of state birth planning, extending the planning of births from cities to countryside. Under the "later-longer-fewer" policy in effect from 1971 to 1979 (calling for later marriage, longer spacing, and fewer children), some combination of increasingly intense birth policy implementation and falling popular fertility aspirations reduced the average number of children per woman from six to three. The inauguration of strong birth planning around 1971 marked a critically important turning point in China's birth planning project. It marked the beginning of a strong and insistent effort, supported by the top political leadership, to reduce fertility throughout the country. Most of the fertility decline that has occurred in China over the past 50 years took place during this decade.[141]

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[138] This chapter draws heavily on Winckler, Edwin A. "Chinese state birth planning: Continuity and change in the 1990s" (Unpublished manuscript).

[139] On early policy and program history, see references under Aird and Tien as well as Fraser, Stewart. *China: Population, Education, and People* (Melbourne: School of Education, La Trobe University,1987); and *China: The Many Facets of Demographic Change*. Edited by Alice Goldstein and Feng Wang (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). On its intellectual history, see White, Tyrene. "The origins of China's birth planning policy," in *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State*. Edited by Christina K. Gilmartin et al (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 250-278.

[140] White, Tyrene. "Two kinds of production: The evolution of China's family planning policy in the 1980s," in *The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning*. Edited by Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh. Supplement to *Population Development Review* (Vol. 20, 1994), p. 137-158.

[141] On the 1970s, see Chen, Pi Chao and Adrienne Kols. "Population and birth planning in the People's Republic of China," *Population Reports* (January-February 1982, Series J, No. 25), p. J577-J618; Tien, H. Yuan. "Wan, xi, shao:

In the late 1970s, the new post-Mao leadership was both emboldened by this success and alarmed at oncoming waves of additional population expansion. In 1979, and in an unusual Open Letter issued in September 1980, top leaders announced an ambitious new policy goal of limiting the present generation of Chinese couples to only one child. The purpose was not only to protect the country from over-population and to level-down future demographic peaks, but also to consolidate support for communist rule by promising higher per capita living standards. In the early 1980s, China tried to implement this restrictive policy by launching a series of forceful nationwide campaigns, the most ferocious of which was the mass sterilization campaign of 1983.

Not surprisingly, the campaign produced mass backlash, especially in the rural areas. Resistance came not only from farm families, especially those threatened with the inability to have a son, but also from basic-level cadres who had to enforce the policy. In early 1984, the government liberalized the policy by "opening a small hole to close a big hole." The "small hole" was designed to allow more ruralites, especially those with only a daughter, to have second children. The "large hole" it sought to stanch was the rush for third children. Policy makers relaxed implementation as well, forbidding community cadres to use coercion and urging them to develop close relations with the masses. Yet this move produced other problems. In the mid-1980s, especially during 1984-1986, cadres and public "over-responded," allowing policy to slip toward a de facto two-child norm and allowing implementation to become lax.[142]

With fertility rising alarmingly in 1986 and 1987, and a new "baby boom" on the horizon, in 1988 and 1989, top policy makers struggled to evolve an effective strategy to keep fertility under control without undermining political stability by overly antagonizing the population. Declaring the approach of the mid-1980s exhausted, they decided to *stabilize the policy* in the more "lenient" guise (allowing most rural couples with a girl to have another child). The tradeoff for greater flexibility on policy was an insistence on greatly *strengthening the policy's enforcement*, an overall strategy known in this Report as *re-enforcing policy*. This re-enforcement was the heart of the reforms of the early 1990s, and this is where our story of that decade will begin. First, however, we review some continuities in policy rules and

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How China meets its population problem," *International Family Planning Perspectives* (Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1980), p. 65-73.

[142] On the 1980s, see Banister, Judith. "Population policy and trends in China, 1978-83," *China Quarterly* (No. 100, December 1984), p. 717-741; Hardee-Cleaveland, Karen and Judith Banister. "Fertility policy and implementation in China, 1986-1988," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1988), p. 245-286; Hardee-Cleaveland, Karen and Judith Banister. "Family planning in China: Recent trends" (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Research, U.S. Bureau of the Census, CIR staff papers, No. 40, 1988); Greenhalgh, Susan. "Shifts in China's population policy, 1984-1986: Views from the central, provincial and local levels," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1986), p. 491-515; Greenhalgh, Susan. "The evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi, 1979-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 122, June 1990), p. 191-229; Greenhalgh, Susan. "Controlling births and bodies in village China," *American Ethnologist* (Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1994), p. 3-30; White, Tyrene. "Birth planning between plan and market: The impact of reform on China's one-child policy," in *China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence*. Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Vol. I, 1991), p. 252-269; White, Tyrene. "Two kinds of production: The evolution of China's family planning policy in the 1980s," in *The New Politics of Population: Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning*. Edited by Jason L. Finkle and C. Alison McIntosh. Supplement to *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 20, 1994), p. 137-158.

implementation strategy.

B. CONTINUITIES IN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

In this section we note some concrete continuities in policy— both goals and dilemmas. We deal here with number of children and timing of childbearing; the rules on contraception were set out in Chapter One. We also provide a qualitative introduction to key indicators of program performance. Quantitative data on these indicators can be found in Chapter Four.

(a) Number of children

Since around 1980, birth policy on number of children has consistently been to "encourage" one child, "strictly limit" the number of second births, and "resolutely prohibit" third births. In both China and the West, Chinese birth policy has often been referred to as the "one-child policy," a term that well captures the spirit of strict limitation. Nevertheless, in practice, for most of the 1980s the crux of the policy problem was to work out rules on second children, while in the 1990s, the central policy problem was to eliminate "multiple" births: no third or higher-order children.

Throughout the 1980s, policy makers devoted great effort to devising a set of conditions under which a (theoretically) limited number of couples would be allowed to have second children "in a planned way" (that is, after going through official channels and waiting four years). Decisions at the center were shaped by the extensive informal negotiations over the issue that occurred at the local level. Informally from 1984 and formally from 1988, the policy that evolved allowed rural couples whose first child was a girl to have another. In addition to this "only-daughter" (*dunuhu*) condition, there were other, fairly narrowly defined circumstances under which couples could have second children.[143] The upshot was a set of provincial regulations that on average allowed about 1.68 children across the country as a whole, with the vast majority of second children in rural areas. With the emphasis on adapting policy to local conditions, in the 1980s there evolved four types of policy, each applied to different parts of the country.[144]

1. One-child with very few exceptions for second children: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, part of Sichuan, all residents of urban areas across China.

2. Two children if the first is a girl: Rural areas of 18 provinces.

3. Two children with spacing: Rural areas of Guangdong, Hainan, Yunnan and parts of

[143] Greenhalgh, Susan. "Shifts in China's population policy, 1984-1986: Views from the central, provincial and local levels," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 12, No. 3, September 1986), p. 491-515; Greenhalgh, Susan. "The evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi, 1979-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 122, June 1990), p. 191-229

[144] Zeng, Yi. "Is the Chinese family planning program 'tightening up'?" *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1989), p. 333-337; Xie, Zhenming. "Population policy and the family-planning programme." In *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times*. Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 54-55.

Hebei and Hunan.

4. Two or three children: Applied to ethnic minorities in the minority autonomous regions of Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, as well as some small autonomous prefectures in other provinces.

This was the policy that was "stabilized" and "re-enforced" in the early 1990s.

As of mid-2000, according to State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC) minister Zhang Weiqing, three types of policies were in effect:[145]

1. One-child with very few exceptions for second children: All urban areas, as well as rural areas of Beijing, Jiangsu, other developed provinces.

2. Two children if the first is a girl: Rural areas of Henan, Anhui and 17 other provinces and autonomous regions.

3. Two children with spacing: Rural areas of Yunnan, Qinghai, and three other provinces and autonomous regions.

In early 2000, SBPC vice minister Zhang Yuqin made public "new rules," introduced in the summer of 1999, under which couples made up of two only children are allowed to have two children themselves. Such a policy has actually been on the books for a long time, but, as China's "onlies" reach marriage age, it apparently has received enhanced attention.[146]

From 1979, third births have been outlawed, a rule enforced with strong, even harsh, measures. With the issue of the policy on second births resolved by the late 1980s, in the early 1990s, the dominant policy emphasis shifted to enforcing the rules on second births and ensuring the elimination of virtually all third and higher-order births.

(b) Timing of childbearing

Since the inauguration of the one-child policy, foreign observers have usually emphasized the quantitative goals of Chinese population policy: national macro-targets and the resulting number of children per couple allowed. This is understandable, since Chinese policy itself has emphasized quantitative targets for number of children. Yet the policy has had other components as well. In the 1980s, the official overall slogan was "late marriage, late birth, few births, and quality births" (*wanhun, wanyu, shaosheng, yousheng*). "Quality births" received some attention from the birth planning establishment, but much less than quantity, so we do not pursue it in this Report.

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[145] "Chinese publication says PRC intends to keep birthrate low," *Xinhua* (Beijing: CPP20000411000112, 11 April 2000), as reported on FBIS.

[146] "China relaxes one-child policy: Official," *Agence France Presse*. NPG Population-News Listserve (31 January 2000) URL: www.npg.org; "PRC one-child policy remains unchanged," *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong: FTS19990622000397, 22 June 1999), p. A19, as translated for FBIS.

As during the "later-longer-fewer" period in the 1970s, the "late marriage" and "late childbearing" components in the 1980s and 1990s were intended to slow population growth by postponing the arrival of children. "Late marriage" generally meant that a woman's first marriage had to be postponed until she reached age 23 or higher. "Late childbearing" referred to having one's first child at age 24 or later. The third timing element was spacing between births. While at some times, such as the mid-1980s, spacing received little emphasis, at other times, including the 1990s, the program remained fairly strict about enforcing spacing between births. In most places, couples have been required to wait four years before having a second birth.

(c) Mixed implementation

Mixed implementation combines routine work and crash campaigns, with continued reluctant but heavy reliance on campaigns. Campaigns have been a major implementation method in all communist systems, but particularly in Maoist China. The post-Mao regime repudiated divisive political campaigns involving violent struggle, but has continued to use mild "propaganda campaigns" to implement some policies, particularly social and cultural ones. Since the late 1970s, officials of the birth program have been trying to shift the program's reliance from crash campaigns to routine professional work. Yet that shift has required increased funding for program administrative capacity and more complete cooperation from the public. Both have been only slowly forthcoming. Campaigns place heavy pressure on both community implementers and community clients, producing poor implementation— both human rights violations and low-quality medical procedures. As noted in Chapter One, during the mid- and late 1990s, replacing crash campaigns with routine work remained a priority objective, suggesting the difficulty of making that transition. During the late 1990s, however, the program may finally have succeeded in largely eliminating them.[147]

C. EARLY 1990s ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALIZATION: DEEPENING THE STATIST APPROACH

Starting in the late 1980s, program administrators have introduced three kinds of changes intended to strengthen the program through administrative "rationalization." These include re-enforcement of existing policies, routinization of implementation work, and "collateralization" that links the birth program to other programs in order to strengthen all of them. These initiatives are consistent with a statist-bureaucratic-planning approach, though they also address the problems and opportunities posed to the program by the "socialist market" economy in which it must operate. None of these modifications, in itself, tends to reduce the program's statist character or to undermine the program's administrative capacity. In fact, part of the analysis of China's leaders is that the market is not yet strong enough to induce low fertility, so that the state

[147] For more on campaigns, see Chapter One on Enforcement. On mixed implementation, see White, Tyrene. "Post-revolutionary mobilization in China: The one-child policy reconsidered," *World Politics* (Vol. 43, No. 1, October 1990), p. 53-76; Winckler, Edwin A. "Re-enforcing state birth planning." In *Transition from Communism in China*. Edited by Edwin A Winckler (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner, 1999), p. 181-203.

must continue to exercise "macro-control."[148] This conclusion about the weakness of the market forms a cornerstone of official policy thinking, placing limits on the extent of policy or program liberalization that can occur in the short to medium run.

(a) 1989-1993: Strong Re-enforcement

The first reform was directed at society: an intensified re-enforcement of the policies and implementation that had been relaxed during the mid and, to a lesser extent, late 1980s. This re-enforcement was intended to last at least through the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), which coincided with a "third peak" in the number of newly-marrying couples and hence also births. The re-enforcement included both policy and implementation. As regards policy, the leadership decided neither to tighten nor to loosen existing formal policy, but rather simply to insist that the existing policy (described just above) be enforced. In practice, however, re-enforcing formal policy meant a tightening from the de facto informal two-child standard that the mid to late 1980s had approached. The re-enforcement particularly targeted the birth of unauthorized "multiple" children (third and higher), especially in China's nine most populous agricultural provinces. Couples with unauthorized second children were also targets of control.[149]

As regards strengthening implementation, unlike the 1980s, when national leaders tended to proceed bottom-up from basic level cadres, in the 1990s, national leaders proceeded from the top down, focusing on political leaders. In the 1980s, attempts to force community cadres to implement birth policy had been undermined by the fact that their superiors at the county, prefectural and provincial levels had become increasingly preoccupied with promoting economic development and neglected to give birth planning high priority. Accordingly, as noted in the Report's Introduction, national leaders decided to make the top party and government leaders at every level personally responsible for successful program enforcement, and to give heavy weight to the achievement of birth targets in leaders' evaluations for bonuses and promotions.

The result was intensified pressure on political and program leaders at all levels to enforce program policy, or at least to report that they were doing so. On the one hand, in the early 1990s, most provinces launched major new "crash campaigns" to abort all out-of-plan pregnancies and to sterilize one member of all couples that were over their one- or two-child limit. With great pressure on cadres at every level to achieve targets, in many places the campaigns involved precisely the kinds of abuses and shoddy surgical procedures that program leaders officially decried.[150] The campaigns undoubtedly produced some real decline in fertility. However, program administrators knew that such administratively-induced fertility decline was "unstable"— if enforcement pressure were relaxed, fertility would rebound. At the same time, in the early 1990s, the program suffered a rising tide of upward misreporting, as lower-level

[148] "Family planning under market economy," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing: FTS19971014000667, 14 October 1997), as translated for FBIS.

[149] The formal announcement of this intensified "re-enforcement" was the 12 May 1991 joint decision of the Party Central Committee and State Cabinet on "Strengthening birth planning work and strictly controlling population growth." This document is available in English in the China FBIS for 20 June 1991 and in Chinese in the 1992 birth planning *Yearbook*.

[150] Interview with Chinese official by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.

administrators felt forced to report on paper the results they could not achieve on the ground. This misreporting demonstrated continued resistance to harsh enforcement not only within the public, but now also among lower-level administrators. Moreover, the program also suffered a rising tide of misdirection and misappropriation of funds. At the beginning of the 1990s, program rules had greatly raised the fines for out-of-plan births, the major penalty available to program managers for non-compliance. The main purpose was to reduce births, not to raise revenues, but in fact program officials needed added revenues to pay for intensified enforcement. Moreover, in some localities the county governments that managed these funds began using them for purposes other than birth planning. As a result, in some localities, community cadres readily permitted couples to have out-of-plan children— or allegedly even encouraged them to do so— so that local government could collect the resulting out-of-plan birth fines.

A policy legacy of this re-enforcement was the first of three main policy slogans that was to guide birth policy during the 1990s: the "three unchangeables" (*sange bubian*). The first is no change in the present birth planning policy (in a nutshell, one child for all except rural couples with one daughter). The second is no change in the population control targets already specified. The third is no change in the practice of top party and government leaders personally taking full responsibility for reaching program goals. This slogan was put forth by "conservative-statist" then-Premier Li Peng at the March 1992 Second National Forum on Birth Planning Work. The slogan embodied the view of the official May 1991 re-enforcement "Decision": current policies must be implemented without wavering.[151] The "three unchangeables," far from being a "mere slogan," represented a major policy line articulated by top political leaders.

(b) From 1993: Routinization

A second thrust of administrative rationalization was routinization directed at the program itself. When this emphasis surfaced in 1993, its immediate purpose undoubtedly was to curb some of the implementation excesses of the 1991 strong re-enforcement. At the March 1993 annual central forum on birth planning work, the new national leader Jiang Zemin instructed program cadres not only to "grasp" their work "tightly" but also to grasp it "well," emphasizing that birth planning was a delicate matter that intimately affected the vital interests of a billion-plus people. Thus was introduced the 1990s slogan "grasp tightly, grasp well" (*zhuajin, zhuahao*).[152] The long-term goal of the emphasis on routinization was to continue institutionalizing the program, in particular by shifting from crash campaigns to routine work. By the mid-1990s, routinization also extended to combating some of the abuses that emerged within the program, particularly misreporting of facts and misappropriation of funds. Here the long-term goal was not only to institutionalize the program but also to insulate it and the rest of the regime from public backlash over rising government corruption and party indiscipline.

The objective of routinization-through-institutionalization is well expressed by the second of the three main policy slogans of the 1990s: the "three priorities" or "three mainstays" (*san wei*

[151] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 599 [in Chinese].
[152] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 601 [in Chinese].

zhu) of propaganda and education, contraception, and routine work. This slogan, which had emerged around 1980 from local experience in Shandong, was propagated nationally throughout the 1980s. The slogan states what should be the three "mainstays" of implementation work. The first is to stress propaganda and education over administrative or economic enforcement. The second is that pre-pregnancy contraception is more important than post-pregnancy birth control (abortion). The third is that routine work is more important than crash campaigns. Although only the third "mainstay" mentions the idea of routinization, all three are intended to avoid the necessity for coercive emergency campaigns to abort pregnancies that good routine contraceptive work should have prevented. On 16 September 1993, the State Council convened a national "three priorities" meeting to re-emphasize the slogan, which remained central for the rest of the 1990s. The long life-span of this saying suggests the difficulty program leaders have had turning slogans into reality. The 1997 *Yearbook* claims that the "three priorities" really have been implemented nationwide and really have raised the level of birth planning work, showing that birth planning has "internal controls." While these claims may well be true or largely true, there is no way to independently assess them. According to program documents, the "three priorities" were fundamental to program work during the 1996-2000 Five-Year Plan and remain fundamental to work early in the 21st century.[153]

(c) From 1995: Collateralization and Incentivization

The third rationalizing reform was directed sideways from the birth program to other, collateral government programs. The first general idea was to overcome the previous separation between the "two kinds of production," economic and social, and even to link birth planning to cultural and eventually also to political construction. The idea was that the birth program should look beyond a narrow focus on demographic variables and link up with other development processes— what this Report will refer to as "collateralization." Implementing birth policy and achieving population objectives were too complex and difficult for the birth planning system to achieve on its own. Instead, they should be pursued by inter-governmental coordination of the birth planning system with such departments as health, agriculture, science, and commerce.[154]

The other general idea was to supplement the birth program's educational propaganda and administrative coercion with economic incentives— what this Report will refer to as "incentivization." The program's formulation is interesting: "shifting from an implementation mechanism that relies mostly on social constraint to one that combines social constraint and interest guidance." In other words, program leaders sought to move away from constraint alone to a combination of constraint and material incentive. The hope was that linking social reproduction to economic production would make stand-alone negative birth limitation ("constraint") less unpalatable to the general population by connecting it to the delivery of what citizens would regard as more positive services, particularly poverty alleviation programs. Local birth planning administrators were instructed to design local policies that would help families

[153] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1995) [in Chinese]; "Interview with Family Planning Minister," *Liaowang* (Beijing: FTS19990202001654, 11 January 1999), p. 16-17, as translated for FBIS.

[154] See the joint circular issued by ten departments in October 1995, in State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1996), p. 91 [in Chinese].

with fewer children get rich faster, and to "give preferential treatment in terms of project selection, capital, technology, material, social welfare and remunerations to rural households that practice family planning, offering them more material incentives." Community birth planning workers were instructed to "place a particular stress on the need to help the masses of peasants resolve difficulties with their production, daily life and childbirth."[155]

These two general ideas— collateralization and incentivization— were dubbed "the two transformations" (*liangge zhuanbian*). Collateralization was summarized in the third of the three main slogans to guide the program in the 1990s, the "three links" or "three integrations" (*san jiehe*). The first link was developing the agricultural village economy. The second was helping farmers achieve a modestly comfortable standard of living. The third was to construct "civilized and happy" families. According to the *Yearbook*, the "three integrations" drew on both domestic and overseas experience. Domestically, the benefits of such linkages had become evident in Jilin and Jiangsu at the beginning of the 1990s, because of the rapid development of a socialist market economy in those areas. Party secretary-general Jiang Zemin and government premier Li Peng both completely endorsed the three-links goal, considering it a "major reform and new development" in Chinese birth planning. SBPC director Peng Peiyun frequently called it the "hoped for road" for rural birth planning.[156] The State Council organized a national "three links" experience exchange meeting in Chengdu from 22-26 October 1995. Again, the "two transformations" and "three links" were fundamental to program work during the 1996-2000 Five-Year Plan, and at the turn of the millennium remained major directions for the program early in the 21st century.[157]

D. SPROUTS OF LIBERALIZATION: "MAKING PEOPLE THE CORE"

There was little in the program's 1995 work plan for the 1996-2000 Five-Year Plan period that one could call liberalizing change, except perhaps for an emphasis on "lawful administration" to protect client rights and some mention of strengthening international exchange. Even the program's prospectus for its work in the first half of the 21st century contained no mention of reducing program micro-management of individual behavior as a formal policy objective.[158] By the late 1990s, however, the program had begun to undergo some liberalizing changes, and they appear likely to continue. Here we describe three types of liberalizing change: internationalization, quality of care, and liberalization of planning. These changes are well summarized by another of the program's current slogans: "making people the core" (*yiren weizhu*).

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[155] All quotes are from "Family planning minister notes progress and methodology," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (London: 5 January 1996) as reported on NEXIS.

[156] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 599 [in Chinese].

[157] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1995) [in Chinese]; "Interview with Family Planning Minister," *Liaowang* (Beijing: FTS19990202001654, 11 January 1999), p. 16-17, as translated for FBIS.

[158] "Interview with Family Planning Minister," *Liaowang* (Beijing: FTS19990202001654, 11 January 1999), p. 16-17, as translated for FBIS.

(a) From 1995: Internationalization

The SBPC has long had relations with international and foreign agencies. Though "internationalization" may be an exaggeration, in the late 1990s these relations have become more numerous and influential. Despite their rejection of hostile political criticism from foreigners, program officials have always been remarkably receptive to constructive professional advice from foreigners (especially advice that furthered its own goals). Historically, that responsiveness has been evident primarily in technical domains such as contraceptive development and demographic techniques of data collection and analysis. During the course of the 1990s, though, program leaders became increasingly interested in international experience in broader social and policy matters, such as program goals and implementation methods.

A major stimulus was the September 1994 decennial international conference on population and development in Cairo. The ICPD shifted the focus of the international population community from national "population control" to women's reproductive health, rights, and choice. China also participated in the World Summit on Social Development held in Copenhagen in March 1995. Another critical stimulus was the Fourth International Women's Conference and associated NGO forum that was held in Beijing and nearby Huairou in September 1995. The women's meetings introduced into Chinese intellectual circles new understandings of gender as a power relationship, rather than simply male-female equality. They also impressed on program leaders international feminists' critiques of the Chinese program. In part because these new ideas dovetailed with ideas developing domestically, many Chinese intellectuals and program leaders embraced these new objectives and began considering how to shift Chinese birth policy in these directions. In late 1995, at the beginning of the Ninth Five-Year Plan period, the SBPC officially called for reorientations of the program from exclusive concern with demographic targets toward joint attention to population goals and client-centered approaches, and from a narrow focus on contraception toward a broader concern with women's reproductive health.[159] Another international event held in China (also Beijing) was the October 1997 meeting of the quadrennial General Congress of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP), the influential international association of professional population specialists. The meeting brought to Beijing a large contingent of foreign demographers, simultaneously acquainting Chinese scholars with international scholarship, some of it embodying the ideas of Cairo, and multiplying the links between Chinese and foreign population specialists. Signaling its growing connections with the world, the SBPC established its own website, with information on both the domestic program and its international exchanges (www.sfpc.gov.cn).

The growing linkages and new ideas of the 1990s have paved the way for foreign organizations to contribute not only to enhancing the technical bases for birth planning, but also to nurturing the beginnings of a fundamental liberalization of the program's goals and methods. Since the early 1980s, the United Nations Population Fund has been involved in China for three cycles of programs. The recently begun fourth cycle focuses on reproductive health in 32

[159] Gu, Baochang. "Toward a quality of care approach: Reorientation of the family planning program in China" (New York: Unpublished manuscript, The Population Council, 1998); Gu, Baochang. "Reorienting China's family planning program: An experiment on quality of care since 1995," Paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (Los Angeles: March 2000).

counties and cities in 22 provinces. The Rockefeller Foundation has been involved in projects on informed choice and emergency contraception. The Ford Foundation has emphasized reproductive health, including involvement by women's NGOs, improving the "quality of care" by the birth planning system, and a large project on health care reform in Yunnan province. To promote and manage this work, Ford has had a program officer in reproductive health resident in China since 1991. The Population Council has helped to promote "quality of care" within the Chinese program. In addition to these multilateral examples, China has conducted bilateral exchanges with many countries, both developed and developing. For example, the Japanese Organization for International Cooperation in Family Planning (JOICFP) has cooperated on projects in birth planning, maternal health care and prevention of parasitic diseases in 27 provinces over 15 years.

(b) From 1998: Toward quality of care

The programmatic response to these new ideas and connections was fairly rapid. As early as 1995, program leaders began sponsoring a first round of local experiments in these new policy directions (1995-1998). These experiments were soon supported by a variety of external agencies (in particular, the Ford Foundation, with technical assistance from the Population Council; the United Nations Population Fund supported a related initiative). One key threshold was allowing experiments in abolishing mandatory local quota limits on annual births. At the beginning of 1995, the SBPC designated six advanced localities to serve as pilot projects (five rural and one urban); at the beginning of 1998, it added five more (four urban and one rural). In these experimental areas, the additional incentives for compliance derived from improved "quality of care," including not only more and better material services, but also more careful counseling on the risks and benefits of alternative methods of contraception and freer choice of contraceptive methods. Chinese program administrators— and even more so their national political superiors— had always feared that such experiments giving clients greater choice would lead to a rebound of fertility in the experimental localities.[160] By placing the experiments only in localities where fertility and fertility aspirations were already low, and by putting careful controls in place, program administrators thought they could avoid the rebound problem.

Data gathered by those involved with the experiments suggest that they not only did not lead to a rise in fertility, but also resulted in fewer contraception failures, fewer abortions, and more normal sex ratios at birth. Moreover, local program administrators found the reformed approach much more acceptable to the public and therefore much easier to implement. Given the success of these preliminary local experiments, in early 1998, the SBPC reiterated its intention, after a second round of pilot projects was completed by the year 2000, gradually to extend the client-centered and quality-focused approach to the whole country by 2010. The achievement of macro-demographic targets would remain important, but it would be accompanied by greater attention to clients' needs and quality health care. The strategy would be to "fade in" the new approaches before "fading out" the old ones, and to allow localities to experiment with their own

[160] Kaufman, Joan et al. "The quality of family planning services in rural China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 23, No. 2, March/April 1992), p. 73-84; Gu, Baochang. "Toward a quality of care approach: Reorientation of the family planning program in China" (New York: Unpublished manuscript, The Population Council, 1998).

combinations of innovations. Soon the national administrators of the local experiments were inundated with more requests than they could manage from localities wanting to participate. National leaders authorized provinces to conduct their own experiments and local leaders forged ahead on their own. The number of counties involved rose from 100 in 1997 to 200 at the beginning of 1998 and to 300 by the end of 1998. By the end of 1999, some 660 localities in China were trying one kind of experiment or another in "quality care."[161] By the end of 1999, the SBPC felt confident enough about the experiments to hold an international symposium to showcase their results.[162]

These experimental practices have set a new direction for the future development of the program that is unlikely to be reversed. Without any doubt, there is a great deal of room for improvement in the quality of the services that the Chinese birth planning system has provided. The Chinese claim to be making improvements is both credible and welcome.[163] Yet some observers have reservations about the experiments. One worry centers on how far the experiments can be extended from the "advanced" third of localities, particularly in the eastern third of the country, where most of the experiments are located. Probably it will become progressively more difficult to extend such experiments to the middle third of "ordinary" counties, let alone to the bottom third of "backward" counties. This is particularly so because the experiments are not subsidized from above; instead, each locality pays for its own experiments. A second concern stems from the difficulty of knowing exactly what the experiments conducted so far have entailed. Localities have been allowed to decide for themselves what new methods to try, an approach that is both appropriate given China's diversity and unavoidable given local self-funding. The third and most basic reservation is that so far none of these experiments has altered either the mandatory nature or the top-down managerial implementation of the program. Unlike the concept of "quality of care" advocated at Cairo, the Chinese experiments do not allow couples to choose whether to contracept or whether to abort an out-of-plan pregnancy.[164] True voluntarism in reproductive practice seems to be a long way away.

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[161] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors in Beijing, June, November 1999; *Collection of Evaluation Reports on the First Batch of Quality of Care Experimental Counties and Districts (1995-1998) Under the State Birth Planning Commission (Guojia jihua shengyu weiyuanhui, Diyipi youzhi fuwu shidian xianqu (1995-1998) pinggu baogao ji.* Edited by Erli Zhang, Xie Zhenming and Gu Baochang (Beijing: China Population Press, 1999) [in Chinese]; Gu, Baochang. "Reorienting China's family planning program: An experiment on quality of care since 1995," Paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (Los Angeles: 21-24 March 2000); Simmons, Ruth, Baochang Gu and Sheila Ward. "Initiating reform in the Chinese family planning program," Paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (Los Angeles: March 2000).

[162] Population Council 2000. *Report of the International Symposium on Quality of Care in China* (New York: The Population Council). [The symposium was held on 17-19 November 1999, in Beijing. Both the symposium and the report were sponsored by the State Family Planning Commission of China, the Ford Foundation, the Population Council, the University of Michigan, and the International Council on Management of Population Programmes].

[163] Kaufman, Joan et al. "The quality of family planning services in rural China," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 23, No. 2, March/April 1992), p. 73-84; Li, Bohua. "Report on reproductive health survey," *China Population Today* (Vol. 16, No. 3, June 1999), p. 2-9.

[164] Chu, Chunhong. "Quality reorientation of the family planning program in China: Some conceptual issues" (Unpublished manuscript, Center for Population and Development, Harvard University); Chu, Chunhong. "Study on the quality of family planning program in China," Paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (Los Angeles: March 2000).

(c) From 1998: Liberalization of planning

At the end of the 1990s, the program began undergoing significant transformation not only from the "bottom up" in the delivery of services, but also from the "top down" in the nature of planning. A central meeting reaffirmed that national-level "population planning" would continue.[165] Yet "population planning" appears to mean little more than the creation of macro-economic population projections, with little attempt to impose mandatory limits on the number of births within particular communities. The intention of national program leaders is that population targets should no longer be passed down below the county level. Yet those same leaders also acknowledge that it is impossible for them to know how many localities have carried out their wishes.[166] Some local leaders defiantly retain the targets, knowing their usefulness in the past and perhaps fearing punishment for failure to meet population goals in the future.

In contrast to the early 1990s, when the center attempted to "micro-manage" subnational programs through the use of elaborate indicators of program performance, reportedly in the late 1990s, the center largely turned over to the provinces the formulation of program indicators.[167] Yet this downward transfer of authority may have unintended effects. Since few provinces have the technical capacity to formulate and administer such program indicators, local programs are likely to go largely unmonitored. This is all the more likely because many of the functions that the program now wishes to emphasize, such as reproductive health and quality of care, are much more difficult to measure than the relatively clear-cut demographic outcomes.

Program administrators have introduced still other changes that they have billed as merely technical but that in fact constitute significant liberalizations. For example, in at least one major city, the program will no longer require newly married couples who want to have their first child to apply for permission under an annual quota. They can simply go ahead and have their permitted one child whenever they wish.[168]

E. CONCLUSION: FUTURE PROSPECTS

At the beginning of 1999, the new minister of the State Birth Planning Commission, Zhang Weiqing, outlined the program's long-range plans. By 2000, he stated, the program should keep population under 1.3 billion (which it did), reduce birth defects, and deliver "elementary" (*chuji*) reproductive health care. In implementation, the program should "basically achieve" the "three priorities" and gradually effect the "two transformations" (collateralization and incentivization). By 2010, the program should hold population under 1.4 billion, raise the overall quality of the population, and deliver "basic" (*jibende*) reproductive health services. The program should also strive to solve problems created by population aging as well as the problem of high sex ratios at birth in some places. In method, the program should have established a mechanism

[165] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1998.
[166] Interview with Chinese official by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.
[167] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April, June 1999
[168] Polansky, Jonathan. Vice President and Creative Director, Public Media Center, San Francisco, California. June 1999. Personal interview by the authors.

for population regulation that affects the "two transformations." By 2020, the program should bring population growth under better control, further raise population quality, deliver "first rate" (*youzhi*) reproductive health care, and "perfect" its implementation mechanism. Around 2050, population should peak, with all-round high quality and a rational structure. By then the public should practice contraception voluntarily and have a high awareness of health issues. China should achieve a benign circular relationship between population and development, environment and resources.[169] Though they may sound dry and sloganistic, these goals are important, for they will form the basis for population policy and program work in the coming years.

Zhang packaged these policies under a new slogan: "one guarantee, three reforms and two foundations." The *one guarantee* is continuation of the "three priorities" of educational propaganda, advance contraception and routine work, which Zhang stressed would remain the starting point of all program work. The *three reforms* emphasized a shift from "administrative methods" toward economic incentives. The first of the three reforms is management according to law. The second is integration of educational propaganda with scientific management and comprehensive services, in order to achieve an implementation mechanism "combining social constraints and interest guidance." The third reform— of social security— aims to reduce people's need for children to support them in old age. The *two foundations* continue routinization-through-institutionalization: building basic-level administrative organizations and service networks, and building a contingent of birth planning cadres. Though containing little that is new, Zhang's long slogan sends the important signal that the Commission will continue the directions of change inaugurated in the late 1990s into the present century.

Official remarks also indicate the looming existence of a more concrete mid-term problem: anticipation of a fourth "birth peak" between 2009 and 2014. Births are projected to rise to over twenty million a year, even if fertility is held to the replacement level of roughly two children per couple. In addition, program administrators expect rising numbers of unemployed, elderly and migrant citizens to make birth planning more difficult. An additional challenge is encouraging late childbearing and long spacing between children, the main ways through which the government can combat the effects of existing "population momentum."[170] Despite the linear trend of incipient liberalization, could these challenges portend another cyclical tightening of enforcement? Perhaps. In calling attention to the "fourth birth peak" problem, SBPC vice-minister Yang Kuifu concluded: "Therefore, controlling population growth will be at the top of the agenda for a long period of time to come." On the other hand, so far the proposed remedy is a new campaign of propaganda-and-education to promote "new concepts of marriage and fertility." The new concepts include not only the slogan "later marriage and later births, healthier births and better nurturing," but also the notions that girls are as good as boys and that men also bear responsibility for birth planning. Evidently, the program intends to address the material basis needed to realize these concepts: experiments in six villages in Henan include social security

[169] "Interview with Family Planning Minister," *Liaowang* (Beijing: FTS19990202001654, 11 January 1999), p. 16-17, as translated for FBIS; See also Banister, Judith. "Population, public health and the environment in China," *China Quarterly* (No. 156, December 1998), p. 1008-1010.

[170] Chu, Chunhong. "Quality reorientation of the family planning program in China: Some conceptual issues" (Unpublished manuscript, Center for Population and Development, Harvard University); Chu, Chunhong. "Study on the quality of family planning program in China," Paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America (Los Angeles: March 2000).

programs related to old-age pensions, education, employment and health care. SBPC minister Zhang Weiqing declared the effort "a long-term struggle between old and new concepts."[171] Given the rapid change in the program and in the larger environment in which it exists, what remains unclear is what kind of "struggle" might be possible by the end of this decade.

Less official remarks provide additional insight into how the program may handle some of the key issues it faces in the foreseeable future and what evolutionary path the program is likely to take. Given China's already low fertility (probably around two or slightly below replacement), recently some Chinese demographers have argued that the program can now afford to shift to a "two-child" policy.[172] Some provincial birth planning administrators too remark that, given the already low fertility in their provinces, and the fact that actual demographic outcomes are usually better than plan targets, by early in the 21st century the program will no longer exist in its current mandatory-restrictionist form.[173]

Despite such unofficial hints that the winds may be changing, national program officials have declined to renounce the "one-child" goal and other restrictions, presumably fearing as always that the population would over-react to any relaxation, causing fertility to rebound.[174] Nevertheless, at least some national program officials anticipate a natural evolution that will produce a more controlled relaxation. For example, even under present policy, couples in which both husband and wife are "only children" are allowed to have two children. As the proportion of such couples increases, the former one-child goal will itself produce a de facto two-child policy. These officials refer to this process as an eventual "soft landing" for the program. That label is significant, because it echoes the dramatic success of Zhu Rongji in the early 1990s at engineering a controlled "soft landing" down from high inflation in the Chinese economy, the accomplishment that won him his present premiership. Whether this formulation was designed by him or simply designed to appeal to him, it reflects the likely future direction of the program, at least in the cities. In the villages and the poorer parts of the country, a "soft landing" will be much harder to engineer.

On 12 March 2000, the top political leadership— the party central committee and government cabinet— issued a "Decision" stating Chinese birth policy for the foreseeable future. The title states the main themes: "...strengthening population and birth planning work" for the purpose of "stabilizing a low birth rate." Because this Decision summarizes official thinking at the turn of the millennium, it is worth summarizing some main points and suggesting some main implications for INS concerns. The "Decision" falls into five parts containing a total of nineteen sections.[175]

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[171] "PRC anticipates yet another baby boom," *Xinhua* (Beijing: FTS19981103000758, 3 November 1998), as reported on FBIS.
[172] "PRC one-child policy remains unchanged," *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong: FTS19990622000397, 22 June 1999), p. A19, as translated for FBIS; Interview by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.
[173] Interviews on Fujian by the authors, April 1999.
[174] "PRC One-Child Policy Remains Unchanged," *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong: FTS19990622000397, 22 June 1999), p. A19, as translated for FBIS.
[175] "Text of CPCCC, State Council Decision on Family Planning," *Xinhua* (Beijing: CPP200000507000012, 7 May 2000), as translated for FBIS. For the full text, see Appendix Two.

Part One states basic premises. During the 21st century China's population will peak at around 1.6 billion and then begin to decline. A large population remains China's most basic national condition, with a fundamental impact on development. A "sharp contradiction" will continue between population on the one hand and economy, society, resources and environment on the other, continuing to make birth planning difficult. In other words, for the foreseeable future, limiting population growth will remain a policy priority and that will continue to require state intervention. Only in the very long run will economic, social and cultural modernization make political regulation unnecessary.

Part Two states general goals and principles for the decade 2000 to 2010. These include limiting birth rates and total population size (within 1.4 billion), improving the quality and structure of population (including normal sex ratios at birth), and upgrading birth planning services and management. Achieving these goals requires policy that is comprehensive, stable and discriminating (emphasizing rural areas, particularly in the western and central regions). In other words, state intervention will continue to be aimed at limiting population quantity, but will also pursue qualitative goals, including reduction in gender discrimination and improvement in the quality of care.

Part Three notes requirements for improving state regulation of population. Effective regulation requires coordinating many agencies, such as general planning (to coordinate population with economy and society), public security (for population registration), and birth planning (to standardize regulations). Regulation requires strengthening laws and enforcing compliance. Regulation requires increasing guidance through material interests, such as linking birth planning to other programs, giving preferential treatment to complying couples, and developing social security programs. Population control must be particularly strict in developing the relatively "backward" western region. In other words, state intervention must continue to shift from direct dictation of individual reproductive behavior toward more indirect methods, but not at the expense of strict enforcement where required.

Part Four discusses how to adjust population regulation to economic marketization. Political leaders must coordinate the relevant agencies. Community development and migrant management must include birth planning, with cities taking primary responsibility for birth planning among migrants. Through various kinds of media, cultural departments should propagate a new socialist reproductive culture. Birth planning departments and health departments should cooperate to provide good contraceptive services and reproductive health care. Scientific and technological progress should be promoted, among other ways, through market mechanisms. International cooperation should increase. In other words, marketization and globalization do not replace state administration but instead require appropriate bureaucratic responses.

Part Five stresses leadership by party and government over population and birth planning work. Political leaders at all levels must participate. In their own private reproductive behavior, all party and government cadres must set an example or be punished. The system for emphasizing birth planning in evaluating the performance of political leaders must be perfected. Birth planning personnel must be improved. Governments at all levels must provide their share of funding for birth planning. By 2005, total funding should exceed 10 yuan per capita. In other

words, political leadership remains pivotal to program performance and party-state personnel face particularly stringent demands.

The March 2000 decision well illustrates the comprehensive way in which the program leadership has come to analyze its problems and present its plans. The appearance of thoroughness notwithstanding, the program's perspective downplays or ignores some critical problems. Many of these are longstanding problems; some of the most critical were reviewed in Chapter Two. Because of their importance, they bear reiterating, for despite their long history, these problems remain either unaddressed or insufficiently addressed even today. Three sets of problems persist. A first set of difficulties appears largely technical but nonetheless has substantial social impacts. For example, the SBPC's quantitative data undoubtedly overstate the demographic benefits and its qualitative data certainly understate the social costs of the program. In particular, the program has only recently begun to openly acknowledge the costs imposed on women by the poor quality of many of the procedures that have been performed.[176] A second set of problems has been recognized and partly addressed by political and program leaders, but not fully analyzed and solved. One such problem is the highly distorted sex ratio at birth, which represents a trauma not only to the "missing" girls and their families but also to the growing numbers of bachelors who will not be able to find brides. The excess of males over females may precipitate serious political problems that the regime is not prepared to handle. Another problem is the growing imbalance in the age structure— more old people than young— resulting in difficulties providing support for the elderly. Yet a third set of problems appears to have been ignored by political and program leaders. One such problem is the creation of a "black population" (*hei renkou*) of out-of-plan children not entitled to the benefits that Chinese socialism was intended to guarantee its citizens.[177] Another neglected problem includes the less tangible costs to Chinese families, whose cultural values, religious rituals, and social structure, long centered on the ideal of a house full of children, have been irrevocably altered.

In this chapter we have reviewed the myriad changes— and continuities— in policy and implementation strategy in the 1990s. Now we turn to the numbers to see what effects these monumental efforts had on the outcomes China's population planners worked so hard to achieve.

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[176] Li, Lianjiang and Kevin J. O'Brien. "Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China," *Modern China* (Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1996), p. 28-61; Greenhalgh, Susan. "Fresh winds in Beijing: Chinese feminists speak out on the one-child policy and women's lives," Forthcoming in *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 2001).

[177] Greenhalgh, Susan. "Planned birth, unplanned persons: 'Population' in the making of Chinese modernity" (Unpublished manuscript, June 2000); Greenhalgh, Susan. "Making up China's 'black population'," Forthcoming in *Qualitative Demography: Categories and Contexts in Population Studies*. Edited by Simon Szreter, Arunachalam Dharmalingam and Hania Sholkamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Chapter 4: NATIONAL POPULATION CHANGE AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINING QUALITY OF CHINESE POPULATION STATISTICS

B. BASIC DEMOGRAPHY: BIG CHANGES WITH COMPLEX CAUSES

(a) Population size and growth rate
(b) Total fertility rate (TFR)
(c) Socioeconomic development, program effort, and fertility change

C. PROGRAM INPUTS

(a) Timing
(b) Contraception
(c) Commitment

D. PROGRAM OUTCOMES

(a) Planned birth rate
(b) Multiple child rate
(c) Birth-order distribution

E. CONCLUSION

In a target-focused population program such as China's, numbers take on special importance. In this chapter we provide a numerical overview of national program performance and population change during the 1990s. Our aims are several. First and most simply, we hope to convey a more concrete sense of how the birth planning program works and how it measures its success. We also wish to show how China's leaders have understood the country's population problem and why they came to take such an alarmist view of it. Third and finally, we want to introduce some of the measures the birth program uses to evaluate its performance. Some of these measures conform to international practice, but others are distinctively Chinese.

We begin by tracking the worrying deterioration in the quality of Chinese population statistics, a problem traceable to programmatic innovations of the early 1990s. Our first section on *basic demography* records some of the main figures on population size, population growth, and fertility that persuaded China's leaders that a strict birth policy was necessary. While these figures can also be used to evaluate the ultimate success of the program in achieving its larger demographic goals, because changes in population growth and fertility are influenced by socioeconomic development as well as program effort, here we view them through the eyes of political and program leaders assessing the size of the task ahead.

In the second section, we define and report some of the program's own indicators of *program performance*—age at marriage and first childbearing, use of contraception, and

commitment to have only one child. The third section views some of the most important *demographic outcomes* from the program's point of view— the "planned birth rate," the "multiple-child rate," and the distribution of children by birth order. When we talk about "good" and "improved" performance on such measures as in-plan births and multiple children, it should be clear that we are not implying a value judgment but rather describing performance that meets government goals.

During the 1970s and 1980s, program goals emphasized the sorts of quantitative demographic measures that will be discussed below. Consequently basic-level implementers stressed fertility limitation at the expense of other possible goals— avoidance of coercion, promotion of reproductive health, quality of care, and so forth. These qualitative goals became more important during the 1990s. Although it is possible to define program indicators for them too, in practice those goals are more likely to be advanced by negative public reaction of the sort we will discuss in Chapter Five, not by program officials monitoring their own work.

A. INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINING QUALITY OF CHINESE POPULATION STATISTICS

Since 1982, when China carried out a major fertility survey of very high quality, data on China's population have been considered quite good for a developing country. However, data from and about China's birth planning program have been deemed not so good because the program reports on itself. The strong re-enforcement of policy in the early 1990s— particularly the practice of making subnational political leaders accountable for birth planning performance in their localities— increased the pressure for misreporting. By all accounts, the quality of program data declined greatly during the 1990s, more severely in "backward" than in "advanced" areas. One scathing article went so far as to declare that intentional distortion had "turned the last few years of population and family planning statistics tables into something not worth referring to."[178] Even the State Birth Planning Commission has taken to citing State Statistical Bureau (SSB) statistics when it wants to sound convincing! These data problems were in fact one of the major developments in the program during the 1990s. Moreover they are related to coercion: subnational administrators legally bound to achieve targets resort to faking results because they either cannot or do not want to force them. Not surprisingly, these data problems have been a serious concern to Chinese demographers, who lack the resources to mount independent nationwide surveys on their own. Given the problematic nature of the data, it is worth commenting further on their reliability and the consistency with which the program has reported them.

Data **reliability** has been a serious and growing problem. The program has two main internal sources of information: self-reporting by lower-level implementers (particularly annual) and sample surveys conducted by higher-level administrators (particularly quinquennial, e.g., in 1992 and 1997). (Here "higher" versus "lower" may mean either national versus provincial or provincial versus local.) Most annual national figures result from self-reporting up the program's

[178] "Population, family planning stats viewed," *Population and Economy (Renkou Yu Jingji)* (Beijing: FTS19980918000289, 18 September 1998), as translated for FBIS.

own chain of command. In the early days of the program, a main source of inaccuracy was the underdevelopment of the program's statistical system.[179] More recently, the most serious source of distortion has been deliberate misreporting, particularly since around 1990 when the center tightened enforcement.[180]

To combat the problems with ordinary reporting, higher-level administrators have attempted to use sample surveys to obtain more accurate data. Originally these survey figures were somewhat more accurate, but when superiors started using the survey figures to evaluate subordinates' performance, subordinates soon devised measures to subvert the surveys. In the 1990s, SBPC surveys produced some implausibly low fertility rates, perhaps partly from sampling errors, but partly also from deliberate distortion by individual respondents and even cadre surveyors. Chinese demographers estimate that in the 1990s fertility was routinely underreported by an astonishing 20 to 30%.[181] Spot checks by the SSB reportedly indicate understatement of births by as much as 40% in some villages.[182] In the early part of the decade, these low rates made the program "good" to national leaders, but "bad" to international observers, who suspected that the extremely low fertility resulted from widespread coercion.[183]

The **inconsistency** of reporting also suggests serious data problems. How the SBPC has reported on itself may be as informative as what it has reported; in any case, these patterns of reporting raise intriguing questions. Since the program's annual *Yearbook* was first issued in 1986, there have been only a few indicators for which the program has published the same data in the same format for many years in a row (e.g., contraceptive use and contraceptive operations). The *Yearbook* often has omitted key program indicators for years at a time (e.g., age of marriage and proportion of births "within plan"). That inconsistency accounts for the spottiness of the coverage in this chapter. It also requires that we use great caution when comparing numbers, particularly over time. Changes in published rates may reflect methodological or political changes— in the definitions of the indicators, in the nature of the sample from which they were measured, or in the extent of underreporting— rather than real change in the underlying demographic phenomena. In this chapter we deal with these problems not only by exercising caution in our interpretations of the SBPC data, but also by supplementing the SBPC numbers with data from the State Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of Public Health wherever possible.

B. BASIC DEMOGRAPHY: BIG CHANGES WITH COMPLEX CAUSES

We begin with some data on China's basic demography. On the one hand, these data provide an important measure of the past success of the program in achieving its ultimate goal—

[179] Banister, Judith. *China's Changing Population* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 12-49, 227-243.
[180] "Population, family planning stats viewed," *Population and Economy (Renkou Yu Jingji)* (Beijing: FTS19980918000289, 18 September 1998), as translated for FBIS.
[181] Interviews by the authors in Beijing, July 1993 and November 1999; Zeng, Yi. "Is fertility in China in 1991-92 far below replacement level?" *Population Studies* (Vol. 50, No. 1, March 1996), p. 27-34.
[182] Rosenthal, Elizabeth. "Rural flouting of one-child policy undercuts China's census," *New York Times* (14 April 2000), p. A10.
[183] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors in Beijing, July 1993; Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, June 1999; "Population, family planning stats viewed," *Population and Economy (Renkou Yu Jingji)* (Beijing: FTS19980918000289, 18 September 1998), as translated for FBIS.

reducing the growth rate of the Chinese population. Yet because changes in population size and growth rate also reflect socioeconomic change, here we emphasize the influence of these aggregate figures on national political and program leaders' perception of China's population problem and on their justification of further program efforts. In the first two parts of this section we review a number of important measures: population size, the absolute size of the annual increase in population, crude birth and death rates, natural population increase rates, and the total fertility rate.[184] At the end of this section we discuss the joint effects of socioeconomic development and program effort on these macro-demographic figures and the difficulties of disentangling them.

(a) Population size and growth rate

Population size. When the nationwide birth-planning program was launched around 1970, the PRC's population was about 830 million. When the one-child goal was announced in the late 1970s, the total was approaching 1 billion, and the leadership's goal was to keep it beneath 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Around 1985, the leadership loosened the goal to "about 1.2 billion" (which meant in practice 1.25 billion). Around the time the birth policy was re-enforced in 1990-1991, the leadership revised the goal to "keeping the population under 1.3 billion" in the year 2000. Evidently, the program achieved that target, even allowing for some undercounting.[185] At the end of the decade, program spokespersons claimed to have averted 300 million births.

China's population size has appeared still more threatening to the country's leaders when viewed in per capita terms. For example, as program propagandists still like to insist, at the end of 1997, China had 22% of the world's population living on only 7% of the world's arable land, resulting in a land/person ratio only a quarter the world's average (0.078 hectares). Per capita water availability was also only a quarter the world average. More than a quarter of China's more than 2000 counties fell below the poverty line. And so on.[186] Such numbers are cited endlessly, justifying the necessity of a stringent policy and strong program.

The large size of China's population has appeared even more ominous when viewed in terms of absolute annual increases— always equivalent to the population of a modest-sized country. The size of these annual increases depends mostly on the size of the current cohort of couples of reproductive age (as well as the number of people dying), and this varies greatly from decade to decade. The net annual increase was 22 million in 1970, 12 million in 1980, 31 million in 1990, down to around 10 million in 2000, but projected to be up to around 20 million again around 2010. Clearly, such large numbers strain not only natural resources but also school enrollments, employment opportunities and administrative capacity. Chinese planners calculate that each year a quarter of the increase in national income goes to support the additional population. Each year about 20 million people reach working age, and there are already 100 million surplus laborers in the countryside.[187] As China's leaders continually stress, the macro-

[184] The TFR is the number of children an average woman would bear if fertility levels by age remained stable.
[185] "China confident of meeting population control goal," *Xinhua* (Beijing: 24 June 1999), as reported on NEXIS.
[186] State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). *Population and Family Planning in China* (Beijing: SBPC, 1998) [SBPC briefing packet, undated but evidently issued in 1998].
[187] State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). *Population and Family Planning in China* (Beijing: SBPC, 1998)

level economic, social, and ecological problems brought about by rapid growth of a billion-plus population are legion.

Population growth rate. National political and program leaders have been greatly alarmed by the "peaks" in cohort size around 1970, 1990, and, prospectively, again around 2010. They were particularly concerned by the generational relationship between those peaks, and determined to smooth them out in order to spare both planners and public such demographic "booms and busts." From the planner's perspective, such smoothing is expected to have highly beneficial social consequences, not only creating a "steady state" in the relationship between demand and supply in infrastructure such as schools and housing, but also equalizing the degree of competition within successive cohorts for education and employment. Of course, from the family's and individual's perspective, the transition to this macro-demographic "steady state" would cause severe micro-social distortions in family continuity, parent-child relations, and parental retirement, verging on the destruction of the long highly effective (if inegalitarian) traditional Chinese family system.[188] Consistent with Marxian theory and Chinese culture, China's policy makers deemed such micro-concerns unimportant relative to the needs of the nation as a whole.

A basic measure of population growth is the rate of natural population increase, conventionally expressed as so many per thousand. Assuming zero net international migration, the population growth rate is calculated by subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate (also expressed as so many per thousand). Between the 1950s and 1960s, as death rates fell but birth rates remained high, natural increase rates rose from the high teens to the high twenties (except briefly during the Great Leap Forward). In the 1970s and 1980s, as the decline in death rates slowed and the decline in birth rates began, natural increase rates began to fall precipitously (from the high twenties to the low teens). In the 1990s, as the death rate declined only slightly and birth rates declined somewhat, the natural increase rate continued to fall (from over 14 to about 10). The leadership's goal for the year 2000— to reduce the natural increase rate to below 10— was achieved at the end of the 1990s.[189]

Crude birth rates and natural growth rates have been main measures by which the program has reported on population change. They are not particularly good measures of program effectiveness, however, because they are strongly affected by the current age structure of the population.

(b) Total Fertility Rate (TFR)

A measure that is independent of population age structure and better reflects variables that the birth program can hope to affect is the Total Fertility Rate, the total number of children

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[SBPC briefing packet, undated but evidently issued in 1998].

[188] Bongaarts, John and Susan Greenhalgh. "An alternative to the one-child policy in China," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1985), p. 585-617.

[189] State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics. *China Statistical Yearbook* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998 [data ending with 1997]); see also, Banister, Judith. *China's Changing Population* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 228, 352.

that the average woman bears during her reproductive career. The TFR provides an apt indicator of program performance, particularly given China's overriding emphasis during the 1980s and 1990s on limiting the number of children. In 1970, TFRs started at just under six, and by 1990 had fallen to around two, a remarkable decline for such a large population at such a low level of development. Most of that decline occurred during the 1970s (when the TFR fell from almost six to just under three). During the 1980s, the TFR declined to near two, most of the decline occurring in the first half of the decade.[190]

How much further TFRs fell during the 1990s is a matter of considerable debate. Official statistics suggest that the TFR fell from 2.0-2.1 in 1990, to 1.9 in 1991, to 1.7 in 1992.[191] Many Chinese demographers believe that the official numbers were subject to serious underreporting. Since the extent of misreporting is difficult to estimate with any precision, the whole subject of the TFR since 1990 has provoked controversy and speculation. Zeng Yi, one of China's leading demographers, has estimated that, after correction for underreporting, fertility dropped from 2.4 in 1990 to 2.2 in 1991 and 2.1 in 1992.[192] Whatever the precise numbers, all observers agree that the TFR fell sharply in the early 1990s. Today it is probably somewhere around two (according to most Chinese experts, various interviews). Chinese officials usually describe it in the cautious language of: "at or below replacement." In terms of understanding policy and program change, what may be most significant is that, at the turn of the millennium, program leaders believed that fertility was already as low as it was likely to go, except in some "backward" rural areas. Consequently, except in those areas, further lowering of fertility was no longer a policy goal. The central policy goal now is to maintain or "stabilize" the low levels of fertility already achieved. This is a big and significant policy change.[193]

In the 1990s, China's TFR provided a good case study in the international "politics of numbers."[194] The SBPC's 1992 survey found a national TFR of about 1.7, a sharp and sudden

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[190] Tu, Ping. "Trends and regional differentials in fertility," in *The Changing Population of China (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times)*. Edited by Xizhe Peng and Zhigang Guo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 22-33.

[191] *1992 National Fertility and Family Planning Survey, China: Selected Research Papers in English*. Edited by Zhenghua Jiang (Atlanta, Georgia: State Birth Planning Commission and World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1997) [Center in Perinatal Care and Health Services Research in Maternal and Child Health] [also published in Chinese by China Population Publishing House]; Tu, Ping. "Trends and regional differentials in fertility," in *The Changing Population of China (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times)*. Edited by Xizhe Peng and Zhigang Guo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 22-33.

[192] Zeng, Yi. "Is fertility in China in 1991-92 far below replacement level?" *Population Studies* (Vol. 50, No. 1, March 1996), p. 27-34.

[193] For more precise TFRs and some of the controversy, see Feeney, Griffith. "Fertility in China: Past, present, prospects," in *The Future Population of the World: What Can We Assume Today?* Edited by Wolfgang Lutz (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1994); Feeney, Griffith et al. "Recent fertility dynamics in China: Results from the 1978 one percent population survey," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 2, June 1990), p. 297-322; Feeney, Griffith and Wang Feng. "Parity progression and birth intervals in China: The influence of policy in hastening fertility decline," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1993), p. 61-101; Feeney, Griffith and Jianhua Yuan. "Below replacement fertility in China? A close look at recent evidence," *Population Studies* (Vol. 48, No. 3, November 1994), p. 381-394; Zeng, Yi. "Is fertility in China in 1991-92 far below replacement level?" *Population Studies* (Vol. 51, No. 1, March 1996), p. 27-34.

[194] *The Politics of Numbers*. Edited by William Alonso and Paul Starr (New York: Russell Sage, 1987).

drop from the 1989 figure of 2.3 found only two years earlier by the 1990 census.[195] This finding caused an international uproar. Critics of China's birth program reasoned that if China's fertility had really dropped that far that fast, it could only have been because of coercion applied by local cadres in response to the center's 1991 demand to greatly tighten enforcement.[196] The United Nations Population Fund dispatched a mission to China to evaluate the survey. The mission, of which the authors of this Report were members, concluded that the low fertility finding was probably an artifact of inadequate sampling procedures.

Since then, the program has been exceedingly cautious about releasing TFRs. For much of the early 1990s, the *Yearbook* simply repeated the 1990 census figure, which was considered relatively reliable. The 1995 *Yearbook* published an SBPC analysis of age-specific cumulative fertility (*leiji shengyulu*) by birth order, occupation, and education, evidently based on careful "adjusting" of the problematic 1992 SBPC survey.[197] This analysis showed a 1992 national fertility rate of 2.10, composed of a non-agricultural rate of 1.30 and an agricultural rate of 2.36 (cumulative to age 35, by which time most Chinese women have completed their childbearing).[198]

Evidently, the 1997 SBPC survey found "very low" TFRs.[199] A preliminary report of the survey's findings gives exact figures for many measures, but of TFR says only that it "declined sharply" in 1991-1992, has since declined at a "steady rate," and as of 1997 was "below replacement." Nevertheless, at the end of the 1990s, cautious program leaders continued to refer to the TFR as "two." A more recent and refined analysis, using both the 1992 and 1997 SBPC sample surveys, concludes that there was a significant downward shift in TFRs around 1991, possibly reflecting a permanent downward shift in the fertility expectations of the mass public.[200] According to this analysis, through 1996 the TFR remained at about 1.7, which is quite low but about the level required by policy. Consistency between the 1992 and 1997 data support these conclusions, but the study's author concedes that both surveys probably reflect significant under-reporting.[201] The 1997 survey should have been published in September 1999. The 2000 census should further illuminate these issues.

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[195] Zeng, Yi. "Is fertility in China in 1991-92 far below replacement level?" *Population Studies* (Vol. 50, No. 1, March 1996), p. 27-34.

[196] Kristof, Nicholas D. "China's crackdown on births: A stunning, and harsh, success," *New York Times* (25 April 1993), p. 1, 12.

[197] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1995), p. 449-466 [in Chinese].

[198] For other analyses of the 1992 survey and TFR, see *1992 National Fertility and Family Planning Survey, China: Selected Research Papers in English*. Edited by Zhenghua Jiang (Atlanta, Georgia: State Birth Planning Commission and World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1997) [Center in Perinatal Care and Health Services Research in Maternal and Child Health] [also published in Chinese by China Population Publishing House].

[199] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, June 1999.

[200] Guo, Zhigang. "Fertility and parity progression in the 1990s in China" (Unpublished paper for the annual meeting of the Population Association of America, Los Angeles: 21-24 March 2000), using "tempo adjusted" TFRs.

[201] Interview by the authors, March 2000.

(c) Socioeconomic development, program effort, and fertility change

The dramatic declines in population growth rates and fertility reported in this chapter are due not only to the massive effort on the part of program leaders and cadres, but also to the rapid socioeconomic development that has characterized most of the post-1979 period. During the 1980s, there was a big debate in the Western literature over the relative influence of these two sets of factors in China's fertility decline. Some analysts emphasized socioeconomic development, seeing it as the main motor driving the decline of fertility over time and the main engine producing variations in birth rates across space.[202] Other scholars emphasized state capacity, seeing it as significantly accelerating fertility decline over time and markedly leveling differences in fertility across localities.[203]

Today most observers believe that the strong birth control program has interacted with socioeconomic development and associated transformations in Chinese society and institutions to produce China's fertility change.[204] This conclusion is supported by microstudies of fertility dynamics and by the widespread pattern in which more developed localities tend to perform better on demographic and program measures, while less developed ones perform worse. What is not clear, however, is what accounts for the differences between the two types of localities. Clearly, some of those difference are due to differences in development and program effort, while some are due to the complex interactions between the two sets of factors. If the central government were able to provide equal resources to all localities— equal funding, equally trained administrators, equal political backing— the effect of state capacity would be stronger. Yet resource limitations have constrained it from doing so. Because local programs depend on local resources, the actual capacity of local programs varies significantly with the level of development in the locality. More developed localities enjoy a "virtuous circle" of high government revenues, high program capacity, low fertility aspirations, and low fertility. Less developed localities suffer a "vicious circle" of low government revenues, low program capacity, high fertility aspirations, and high fertility.[205]

If these dynamics are difficult to sort out theoretically, they are even more difficult to untangle statistically. The interrelations are particularly complex because, in addition to the factors described just above, after program managers realized that socioeconomic development

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[202] E.g. Whyte, Martin King and William L. Parish. *Urban Life in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[203] Wolf, Arthur. "The preeminent role of government intervention in China's family revolution," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1986), p. 101-116.

[204] E.g. Poston, Dudley L., Jr. and Baochang Gu. "Socioeconomic differentials and fertility in the subregions of China: Further evidence," *Demography* (Vol. 24, No. 4, 1987), p. 531-552; Feeney, Griffith and Wang Feng. "Parity progression and birth intervals in China: The influence of policy in hastening fertility decline," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 19, No. 1, March 1993), p. 61-101; Guo, Shenyang. "Determinants of fertility decline in Shanghai: Development or policy?" In *China: The Many Facets of Demographic Change*. Edited by Alice Goldstein and Wang Feng (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996); Tu, Ping. "Trends and regional differentials in fertility," in *The Changing Population of China (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times)*. Edited by Xizhe Peng and Zhigang Guo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 22-33.

[205] See, for example, Skinner, G. William. "Differential development in Lingnan," In *The Economic Transformation of South China*. Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994), p. 44-45.

was also a major force behind fertility decline, they developed new program enforcement measures that sought to piggyback on those economic dynamics by enhancing their effects. Prime examples are the measures we described in Chapter Three under the term "incentivization." As a result, today the two factors are so inextricably intertwined that there seems no way to analytically separate them or measure their relative influence. While program officials may like to claim responsibility for the great bulk of the fertility decline, it is important for outside observers to keep in mind that the major transformations that have occurred in China's economy, society, and even culture over the last two decades of reform have made crucial if unmeasurable contributions to the demographic outcomes reported here.

C. PROGRAM INPUTS

In this section we report some measures of the performance of the birth-planning program itself. The program's "inputs" into the final demographic outcome include the proportions of couples that comply with such program requirements as postponing marriage and childbearing, practicing contraception, and agreeing to have only one child. By calling them "inputs" we stress their role in influencing the major concern of the program— fertility. Readers should remember that each is also an important program goal in its own right.

(a) Timing

Timing was heavily emphasized in the 1970s "later, longer, fewer" birth policy. It has been somewhat de-emphasized since the announcement of the one-child goal in the late 1970s. In the late 1990s, as "fewer" lost some of its importance, "later" appears to have regained some importance. There are three components of timing: late marriage, late first childbirth, and spacing between first and second child. The program has been fairly systematic about reporting indicators of "late marriage." It only occasionally produces figures on "late birth." It seldom publishes data on spacing.

Late marriage has remained a program requirement and has surfaced periodically as an indicator in reporting. The "program input" measure of late marriage is the proportion of all first female marriages that classify as "late" (usually defined as age 23 or higher). A related measure is the proportion of first marriages that are "early" (that is, before the legal age of 20). A more common demographic measure of late marriage is the average (mean) age of women at first marriage.

Average age at first marriage. In the 1950s and 1960s, women's average age at first marriage rose rather slowly, from about 19 to about 20. In the 1970s it rose steeply from 20 to 23, presumably in large part because of the emphasis on late marriage in the "later, longer, fewer" policy. In the 1980s, revision of the Marriage Law took some of the pressure off marriage age, and it declined to 22. The 1991 *Yearbook* reported a 1990 figure of 22.12. The *Yearbook* then stopped systematic reporting on "late marriage" for a few years. In the 1990s, evidently average

age at first marriage resumed its rise: 22.23 in 1991, 22.73 in 1994 and 23.39 in 1997.[206] To what extent that was because of renewed policy enforcement and to what extent because of socioeconomic modernization remains unclear— it was probably mostly the latter.[207]

"Early" and "late" marriage rates. As regards program compliance, in 1989 55.4% of women achieved the "late marriage" ideal (of age 23 or higher). In that same year, 41.7% were neither unacceptably early nor ideally late, and only 2.9% of marriages were "early" (that is, under the legal marriage age for women of 20). Urban-rural breakdowns for 1989 show the expected linear fall-off: 75% of urban women met the late marriage ideal, 57.4% in towns and only 49.5% in villages. Conversely, urban women had an only 0.7% rate of early marriage, towns had only 2.4% and even villages reported only 3.6%.[208] *Yearbook* reporting on marriage age categories resumed for 1995, 1996 and 1997. By 1996, the proportion of ideal "late" marriages had risen to 59.4%, "ordinary" marriages (those that were neither early nor late) had fallen to 40%, while "early" marriages had fallen to under 1%.[209]

Age at first childbearing. Policy makers have set a target for age at first childbearing— 24 or higher— that is about a year later than the marriage-age target. The program does occasionally report relevant data. The average age at which women bore their first child was 23.28 in 1991, 23.39 in 1994, and 24.48 in 1997.[210]

(b) Contraception

The **contraceptive prevalence rate** (CPR) shows the proportion of couples who are practicing some form of contraception (among couples who are legally required to practice contraception because they are of childbearing age). The CPR is usually stated in terms of women, but includes male practice (such as vasectomy) as well. Program tables usually also show the number and/or proportion of persons using different kinds of contraception. Program leaders have been most interested in tracking the proportion of contraceptive use accounted for by long-term, "effective" methods such as IUDs and sterilizations.

The national CPR recorded by the State Birth Planning Commission had already reached an extraordinary 80% by 1979, the earliest year reported by the first 1986 *Yearbook*. During the 1980s, it fluctuated mostly in the range of 80% to 90%, but reached 92% in 1983, a year of particularly vigorous enforcement. In the late 1980s, the rate trended upward from 86% to 88%, and in the early 1990s it inched up from 89% to 91%. In the late 1990s, it may have stabilized at

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[206] State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). "Report on SBPC 1997 national population and reproductive health sample survey results," *Population and Birth Planning* (No. 5, May 1998), p. 4-5; "Population issue 'headache' for PRC," *Beijing Review* (Beijing: FTS19990622000210, 22 June 1999), as reported on FBIS.
[207] Banister, Judith. *China's Changing Population* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), p. 153-160.
[208] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1990), p. 382-385 [in Chinese].
[209] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 503 [in Chinese].
[210] "Population issue 'headache' for PRC," *Beijing Review* (Beijing: FTS19990622000210, 22 June 1999), as reported on FBIS.

around 91%. Evidently, rates have been only slightly lower in rural than in urban areas, at least according to intra-program reporting from rural localities.

These figures should be viewed with some caution, however. Chinese demographers, who draw more heavily on the results of large-scale surveys, tend to put the CPRs at about 10 to 15% lower than the official SBPC statistics. Population specialists at the China Population Information and Research Center maintain that the CPR was no more than 60% in the 1970s, around 70% in the 1980s (69.5% in 1982, 71.2% in 1988), and then rose to 83.4% in the early 1990s.[211] One problem with the Chinese contraception data generally, a problem that may contribute to these differences in estimates, concerns the definition of the denominator. In most countries the denominator for calculating the CPR includes all married or cohabiting women aged 15-49. Though nominally following that definition, in fact the Chinese program often omits women whom the program does not require to practice contraception, such as late-married women who have not yet had their first child, women who are pregnant, and women who have passed menopause. This procedure reduces the denominator, boosting the contraceptive prevalence rate. Whatever the exact prevalence rate, there can be no doubt that it is extremely high and that contraceptive use in China is higher than the average levels of both developed and developing countries.[212]

(c) Commitment

The One-Child Certificate rate shows the proportion of couples who, after having their first child, sign what is in effect a contract promising not to have a second child. In exchange they receive "one-child" benefits for that child and themselves. During the 1990s, the nationwide certificate rate rose slightly from 18% (in 1989) to 22% (in 1996).[213] The urban-rural breakdown for 1989 shows 48.9% of couples in cities signing one-child certificates, but only 18.1% in towns and 10.5% in villages.[214]

Compared to the high rates for a truly mandatory practice like contraception, the relatively modest program performance on the One-Child Certificate rate underlines that in most areas, particularly rural localities, having one child remains only a state ideal, not a popular aspiration. The sole exception may be the major cities.[215] Insofar as having only one child is a mandatory state requirement, it is a requirement that permits many exceptions, and evidently most couples of reproductive age, at least in the rural areas, hope to become exceptions.

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[211] Xie, Zhenming. "Population policy and the family-planning programme," In *The Changing Population of China (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times)*. Edited by Xizhe Peng and Zhigang Guo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 57.

[212] On Chinese contraceptive use in relation to other East Asian countries, see Yang, Quanhe. "Provincial patterns of contraceptive use in China," *Asia-Pacific Population Journal* (Vol. 9, No. 4, December 1994), p. 23-42.

[213] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1990), p. 386 [in Chinese]; State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 568 [in Chinese].

[214] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1990), p. 387-389 [in Chinese].

[215] For more on fertility aspirations, see Chapter Two.

D. PROGRAM OUTCOMES

The program uses several measures that reflect its distinctive concerns: the planned birth rate, the multiple child rate and, more broadly, the distribution of births by birth order.

(a) Planned birth rate

The planned birth rate is the proportion of births that are "within-plan." Data from 1997 suggest that virtually all first births are within-plan, about four-fifths of second births are within-plan, and about a third of multiple births are within-plan. (Many of these are probably births to minority couples, who are allowed more children.) Though the program defines the planned birth rate as an official program indicator, it has published this rate only intermittently and not at all for much of the 1990s. This is surprising because there could hardly be a more fundamental indicator of the performance of a planned birth program than the proportion of births that are "within plan." In a context in which underreporting of births is rife, and the births most likely to be unreported are illegitimate (that is, unplanned) births, it could well be that changing degrees of skepticism about the planned birth data within the Commission itself help to explain the appearance and disappearance of the rate from its yearbooks. Whether that is true or not, the planned birth rate is not a perfect indicator of program performance. It can reflect the fact that most births are within-plan first births, but it cannot indicate whether the couples responsible for those first births will go on to have second or more children.

The earliest published national "planned birth" rates were for the early 1980s and trended upward from two-thirds to three-quarters of all births.[216] By the late 1980s, national rates had exceeded four-fifths (peaking at 85% in 1988). However in 1990, the rate declined to only 81%.[217] Data disappeared until the 1998 *Yearbook*, which showed a sharp rise to over 90% (91% in 1996 and 93% in 1997). The 1989 rural-urban breakdown showed a relatively modest fall-off from cities through towns to villages (94%, 86% and 82%).[218]

Conversely, at the beginning of the 1980s, the out-of-plan birth rate was still over 30% of all births. In absolute numbers, there were around seven million out-of-plan births per year, about seven for each of China's roughly one million villages. That still left a great deal of room for improvement. By the end of the 1990s, the out-of-plan birth rate was well under 10%. Out-of-plan births numbered under a million per year, or slightly less than one for each of China's million villages. By the end of the 1990s, then, there was little room for improvement. Most of the reduction in unplanned births had occurred in multiple births (third or higher) and there were few of those left. This, at least, is the story told by the official statistics. There is reason for us to be skeptical.

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[216] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1986) [in Chinese].
[217] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1991), p. 487, 490 [in Chinese].
[218] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1990), p. 375-377 [in Chinese].

(b) Multiple child rate

The multiple child rate is the proportion of all births in a given year that are third or higher-order children. Between 1970 and the late 1990s, the published multiple child rate fell from more than 50% to less than 5%, arguably the program's single greatest accomplishment. The multiple child rate is a particularly apt indicator for program performance in the 1980s and, even more so, the 1990s because, although the program has strongly "recommended" one child and strongly discouraged two, what it was most strict about has been "resolutely prohibiting" third or higher-order children.

When the program was launched in 1970, the multiple child rate was 57%, and it was still 52% in 1975. However by 1980, it had fallen to 30%, and by 1985 to 19%, where it remained in 1990. In the early 1990s, eliminating multiple births, particularly in populous agricultural provinces, was a major priority of national political and program leaders, and they cut the rate from 19% in 1990 to 7.4% in 1995 (even according to SSB figures). Since then the rate has continued to creep down— in 1997 to only 5%.[219] According to SBPC, in 1997 the rate was an even more astonishing 2%, a third of that within-plan.[220] Some urban areas, like Shanghai, claim virtually no multiple children.[221]

(c) Birth-order distribution

The multiple child rate is part of a more elaborate array of data that the program also uses: the proportion of children born each year that are first children, second children, and third-or-higher order children.[222] In China in 1997, about 71% of annual births were first children, about 24% were second children, and about 5% were "multiple" children (according to SSB; the SBPC's figures are 74%, 24% and 2%). In such an array, as the proportion of multiple children goes down, the importance of second children goes up, at least until the number of second children themselves is drastically reduced. Accordingly, in China, from 1970 to 1997, the proportion of second children first rose (from 19% in 1970 to around 30% in 1985 and 1990) and then declined (to about a quarter in the late 1990s). About four-fifths of those are within-plan, as noted above.[223]

In using such birth-order distributions to assess the program's intentions and success, one must distinguish between the annual figures given above and cumulative figures that better

[219] Even according to State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics. *China Population Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese].
[220] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 438.
[221] For 1970-1997 national figures, see State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics. *China Population Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese].
[222] Demographers refer to first, second, third, and so on as the "parity" of the birth in question.
[223] State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics. *China Population Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese]; State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese].

reflect the eventual course of each woman's reproductive career.[224] A 1995 SSB survey on cumulative population structure found that only somewhat more than a third of Chinese women of childbearing age had only one child. Slightly under a third had two, a quarter had many, while 6% had none (the actual numbers are 36.1%, 32.5% 25.7% and 5.7%). SBPC quoted these SSB findings to refute foreign claims that China had a "one-child policy"![225]

E. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have reviewed some of the huge amounts of data the program keeps on itself. We have stressed the large and growing data problems that make it impossible to know the extent to which the data reflect demographic reality. The gap between the official data and reports from foreign journalists encountering families in some places with five and six children makes the situation even more confounding. With luck, the 2000 census will clarify some of these issues. Meantime, there is every reason to believe that the trends we have observed here are in the right direction and that compliance with program requirements is considerable, even if the size of those trends and the extent of compliance are not as large as official sources claim. Having now reviewed program rules, implementation, and results, in the next two chapters we turn to organizational matters, exploring first program organization and legislation (Chapter Five) before turning to dimensions of variation (Chapter Six).

[224] Of course, cumulative figures include many women who completed their childbearing before the program began trying to achieve a one-child goal.

[225] "State official rejects US testimonies on birth control policy," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (London: 18 June 1998), as reported on NEXIS.

III. ORGANIZATION AND VARIATION

Chapter 5: PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

B. PROGRAM ORGANIZATION: BUREAUCRATIC "SYSTEMS" AND COMPLEX TIES

(a) The program "system"
(b) Other "systems"
(c) Bureaucratic strengths and weaknesses of the SBPC

C. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENFORCEMENT: FROM "OVERSIGHT FROM ABOVE" TO "OVERSIGHT FROM BELOW"

(a) Basic-level administration
(b) Mass organizations
(c) Public supervision

D. PROGRAM LEGISLATION: "SOCIALIST LEGALIZATION" IN PRACTICE

(a) National laws
(b) Provincial regulation
(c) Local regulations

E. CONCLUSION

China's birth program is deeply embedded in the political culture and political institutions of communist China. In this chapter, we outline the organization of the program, illuminating the shaping role of that larger political context. We focus on the 1990s, with some sideways glances back to earlier decades. We begin by laying out some basic institutional processes underlying the program's organization. In the first section we describe the administrative agencies involved, covering those inside and outside the birth planning "system." A second section documents the public's extensive involvement in policy implementation, which ranges from administration to supervision. In the third section, we detail the legal basis of the program in national statutes and provincial and local regulations. Organizational charts located at the chapter's end provide concise overviews of the organization of birth planning at the national, subnational, and local levels.

A. INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

Three key institutional processes inform the program's organization: the personal basis of political authority, the state-planning model of socioeconomic development, and the ideological

foundation of practical action. Each of these processes has left a deep imprint on the structure and operation of the birth planning program. These imprints, however, remain poorly understood outside of China.

Personal-political basis. Historically, the political basis for the program was the personal support of senior revolutionaries such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, as well as of some "conservative" successors to the senior generation who continued to favor more rather than less state management of society. During the course of the 1990s, however, the influence of conservative successors faded somewhat. Today's third-generation "reformers," faced with more pressing economic and political challenges, may wish to avoid expending their limited political capital on birth planning. Evidently, these reformers prefer non-confrontational administration of the existing program and a gradual phase-out of stringent controls as successive localities approach nearly zero population growth. Subnational political and program leaders too have demonstrated keen interest in liberalizing the program, both to avoid politically costly confrontation with the people and to concentrate their own energies on economic development. Some local program leaders fear that if liberalization leads to fertility rebound, they will be held responsible. Nevertheless, the overall pattern seems to be that the lower the administrative level and the more direct the contact between political leaders and local populace, the more political and program leaders prefer liberalizing reform.

State planning model. Following socialist doctrine, from the founding of the PRC, China has relied on unified state planning to manage socialist construction and socioeconomic development. Since the inauguration of economic reforms in the late 1970s, the "socialist market" has gradually taken over many functions that used to be performed by the state plan. Until the late 1990s, state birth planning remained more robust than state economic planning and it remained a conspicuous exception to the liberalization of the sociocultural domain. At the same time, however, the birth planning program had to adjust to the emergence of a "socialist market economy." At the end of the 1990s, national political and program leaders insisted that there was "no change in policy" and that population planning would continue "for a long time." In practice, however, the nature of the program is being transformed. Even program leaders say that, having largely achieved its objective, strict birth planning will not be needed at all within ten years.[226] Such birth planning as continues will be increasingly macro, not micro, and indicative, not mandatory. Planning will still indicate such macro-targets as holding the total population under 1.4 billion in 2010 and 1.6 billion in 2050. However, reportedly these targets will no longer be translated into mandatory micro-quotas for individual communities. Allegedly, since 1995, in some areas, population plans and targets have stopped at the county level, rather than being handed down to the township level as before.[227] Yet program administrators have no idea how many counties have implemented that change.[228]

Ideological foundations. As noted in Chapter Three, the original ideological foundation for state birth planning was the notion of "the two kinds of production," economic and social, a concept borrowed from the 19th century Marxian theorist Frederick Engels. While this has

[226] Interview by the authors, April 1999.
[227] Interview with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999.
[228] Interview by the authors in Beijing, November 1999.

remained the ideological touchstone, population ideology has continued to develop. During the 1990s, the main ideological development centered on party leader Jiang Zemin's gradually wrapping himself in a mantle of "Deng Xiaoping theory." This theory, along with Jiang's own instructions, provided the ideological basis for birth policy during the 1990s. SBPC director Peng Peiyun published an authoritative exposition in *People's Daily* in April 1997.[229] According to her, Deng's main contributions were to identify population limitation as strategic to China's overall economic and social development and to stress "per capita concepts" (such as per capita income). Jiang's latest instructions were that birth planning workers should take the initiative, be pragmatic, work with perseverance and "have everything in place— responsibility, input and measures" (i.e., accountability, resources and enforcement). Mme. Peng observed that, since there had been no ready-made domestic or foreign solution to China's population problem available, China had had to forge its own path to comprehensive population management, a path proudly known as "birth planning with Chinese characteristics."[230]

B. PROGRAM ORGANIZATION: BUREAUCRATIC "SYSTEMS" AND COMPLEX TIES

By the end of the 1990s, Chinese state birth planning had grown to include a large complex of bureaucracies— agencies within the State Birth Planning Commission and the administrative "system" (*xitong*) it heads, agencies belonging to other "systems," and several channels for public involvement. In Chinese administrative parlance, a "system" is a set of closely related bureaucracies, usually reporting to some common political superior.[231]

(a) The program "system"

The program "system" includes a core bureaucracy with several major internal divisions, as well as affiliated organizations for both elite research and mass education.

Birth planning commissions (BPCs). The national State Birth Planning Commission formulates, coordinates and oversees birth policy. The SBPC contains seven major departments, dealing with policy and legislation, planning and statistics, propaganda and education, science and technology and so on. There are Birth Planning Commissions at the provincial, prefectural and county levels, and Birth Planning Committees below that. They too have internal divisions and external affiliates, though the number of divisions and affiliates declines at lower levels of the administrative hierarchy.

Elite research organizations. Since the 1980s, the SBPC has sponsored several elite organizations in the performance of such critical tasks as policy research, population projection

[229] "Family planning minister quotes Deng's views on population control," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (London: 2 May1997), as reported on NEXIS.
[230] "Family planning minister quotes Deng's views on population control," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (London: 2 May1997), as reported on NEXIS.
[231] For a provincial example of the legal prescriptions on "population planning and management," see Chapter Five of the regulation in Appendix Three.

and planning, and project management. These organizations have proliferated over time; here we can just describe a few of the better known ones. The China Population Association organizes national and international conferences, participates in population censuses, and compiles and publishes academic books and periodicals. The China Population Information and Research Center (CPIRC) acts as a bridge linking government agencies and academic institutions. It conducts applied research on population and birth planning to assist the government with policy formulation. Publishing three journals, a yearbook, two data sheets, and multimedia works, CPIRC is also an active disseminator of information. The birth planning system has its own China Population Press that publishes both elite research and mass educational materials. More recently, the China Population Welfare Foundation, using funds from China and abroad, has funded projects for helping mothers out of poverty.[232]

Mass educational organizations. Since the 1980s, the program has had numerous external affiliates engaged in advancing birth planning. Some specialized organizations with self-explanatory names are the China Association for Healthier Births and Better Childbearing, The China Association for Research on Healthier Births, the Birth Planning Institute of the China Medical Association, and The China Population Culture Promotion Society.

(b) Other "systems"

Like any government program, birth planning requires coordination with other agencies. Not only is population a complex problem with many links to other areas, but also during the 1990s, "collateralization" and other processes increased the number and intensity of such bureaucratic collaborations. Longstanding ties with "mass organizations" such as the Women's Federation are discussed below in the section on Public Involvement (Section C, b).

Old ties. At the implementation level, the main collaborative agency has long been the Ministry of Public Health, which has had varying degrees of responsibility for performing birth planning operations. The SBPC has complicated relations with the MOPH. The birth planning system originally emerged from the health establishment, but now the Birth Planning Commission strives to achieve greater independence from the Public Health Ministry by building its own "stand-alone" medical capacity. At the policy and planning level, the SBPC has had a long and close relationship with the State Planning Commission, with which it coordinates its long-run population planning. A third central-level organization with which the SBPC has had cooperative if complicated relations is the State Statistical Bureau. The SSB has been in charge of conducting China's population censuses, whose results have often shown fertility levels to be higher than the SBPC had reported. Since the SSB's bureaucratic mandate is to produce accurate numbers, while the SBPC's mandate is to demonstrate fulfillment of population targets, the two agencies have sometimes engaged in a delicate politics of numbers, a politics with serious implications for birth policy and practice. At present the SBPC is trying to achieve statistical independence by building its own "stand-alone" statistical capacity. Finally, in the area of

[232] On the organization of Chinese demographic research, see Greenhalgh, Susan. *Population Research in China: An Introduction and Guide to Institutions.* Center for Policy Studies Working Papers 137 (New York: The Population Council, 1988); Greenhalgh, Susan. "Population studies in China: Privileged past, anxious future," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (No. 24, July 1990), p. 357-384.

contraceptive development and distribution, the SBPC has longstanding relationships with the pharmaceutical bureaucracy and the science-and-technology establishment.

New ties. During the 1990s, the SBPC developed growing ties to a new group of central-level agencies. The "three links," particularly the link to rural poverty alleviation, have involved the SBPC with economic ministries. The attempt to guarantee "lawful administration" has involved it with the party system for inspecting party discipline, the government system for supervising administrative propriety, and the public security system for policing both government and public. The effort to deepen the program's legislative foundations has involved the Commission with representative bodies, which, as we will see below, also have begun overseeing the program on behalf of the public.

(c) Bureaucratic strengths and weaknesses of the SBPC

The SBPC has both strengths and weaknesses in its relations with other government agencies. On the one hand, the SBPC outranks an ordinary ministry, so that in principle it can direct any work related to birth planning in all central ministries and all subnational provinces (the two are of equal rank in the Chinese administrative system). Moreover, the SBPC supervises a "basic national policy" of relatively high and permanent priority, a policy that has commanded considerable budgetary and personnel resources, even during periodic government downsizing. On the other hand, the SBPC is only a staff organization that does not exercise line command over either central ministries or subnational provinces. Moreover, the SBPC is a consumer, not a producer of economic revenue, a role that significantly reduces its clout within the Chinese party-state. These same strengths and weaknesses apply to lower-level BPCs in their relations with other government agencies at those levels.

C. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENFORCEMENT: FROM "OVERSIGHT FROM ABOVE" TO "OVERSIGHT FROM BELOW"

The public has been involved in the birth planning program not only as "targets" of intervention, but also as informal and even formal implementers of state policy. Many people in many walks of life have played some role in carrying out the birth policy. An informed guesstimate might put the proportion of the population so involved at 75%— or even higher. For most of the program's history this role has involved mostly **oversight and mobilization from above**. The key actors have been employees and "activists" under the authority of basic-level administration and the mass organizations, in particular the Women's Federation, whose members have been responsible for carrying out birth planning work at the grass-roots level. Ordinary citizens have also been expected to promote the policy by such means as attending mass meetings and political study groups focusing on birth planning and monitoring their neighbors for possible violation of the rules. At least theoretically, the public has also had an indirect influence on the birth policy through the operation of the "mass line" (*qunzhong luxian*). Under the mass line, a fundamental party doctrine, local leaders should canvass the views of the masses and then convey them up the administrative system to the top, where policy is revised in accordance with the masses' needs.

While these top-directed forms of participation continue to be important, the 1990s also saw the beginnings of more effective **public feedback from below**. This feedback has been both individual and collective in nature. In the new political and legal environment of the 1990s, in which legal bodies possess real oversight powers and individual citizens have actually enforceable rights, not only have new feedback mechanisms emerged, but also old mass mechanisms have taken on qualitatively new significance. Reflecting the growing importance and acceptance of such feedback, at the end of the 1990s, top leaders signaled that "the degree of the masses' participation in the work of family (i.e., birth) planning should be considered an important condition for judging the level of this work."[233]

(a) Basic-level administration

Birth planning committees exist even at the lowest levels of the administrative hierarchy— municipality, urban district, and neighborhood (in the countryside, county, rural township or town, and village). Under the authority of these committees are individual birth planning workers of two kinds. One type includes full-time state employees who administer the program and implement technical functions. The other includes part-time volunteer activists and part-time local cadres who promote the program and help monitor women for pregnancy. In the countryside, the most important local cadres are the "women's heads," discussed just below. Basic-level birth planning workers are virtually all women, so that most administrator-client interactions are women-on-women.

(b) Mass organizations

Particularly at the basic levels, government line administration is supplemented by party "mass organizations." In the early years of the PRC, the party established mass organizations to promote its goals and policies among specific population groups, such as women, workers, students, and youth. While the Women's Federation has had the most important role in birth planning, virtually all the mass organizations have been called upon at times to enforce the birth policy. In the early 1980s, the party created a new mass organization, the Birth Planning Association (BPA), to promote birth planning among the population at large. Of all these mass organizations, only the Birth Planning Association belongs to the birth planning system.

By far and away the most important mass organization involved in birth planning is the Women's Federation (*fulian*). In the villages, where the great majority of the population still lives, the women in charge of women's affairs, known as "women's heads," have had the duty of enforcing the policy throughout their villages, which means imposing birth restrictions on their neighbors and even relatives. Given the unpopularity of the policy and the drastic measures sometimes ordered from above, enforcing the policy has been an onerous and unpleasant task at best. While grass-roots Women's Federation cadres have been responsible for the day-to-day

[233] Politburo member Wang Zhongyu on the Birth Planning Association (BPA), "Jiang Chunyun Elected Family Planning Head," *Xinhua* (Beijing: FTS19990109000774, 9 January 1999), as translated for FBIS.

work of birth planning, during birth planning campaigns all the major mass organizations—including those for workers, youth, and students— have been enjoined to contribute to the effort to mobilize the population to achieve population-control targets.

The Birth Planning Association performs key program functions of propagandizing and monitoring. It also helps link birth planning to collateral programs such as poverty alleviation and cultural construction. During the 1990s, the BPA also linked basic-level administration to public supervision and to the additional collateral program of community democratization. China calls such mass organizations "nongovernmental organizations" (NGOs), but clearly they are sponsored and directed by the communist Chinese party-state, and rely largely on government funding.[234]

(c) Public supervision

During the post-Mao period, China's leaders became increasingly concerned to avoid abuses of power by the huge bureaucracies connecting them to the Chinese people. During the 1980s, the party and government launched numerous campaigns to rectify thinking and impose discipline, particularly on government functionaries. By itself, however, such top-down "oversight from above" proved inadequate. Consequently, during the 1990s, China's leaders began relying more on bottom-up "oversight from below." One form of oversight from below is the formal registering of complaints by the public with the offending authorities. Members of the public have long been allowed to write letters to, or even visit, the birth planning authorities to state their complaints and seek redress. This practice continued in the 1990s. The decade also brought the emergence of new forms of bottom-up oversight, however. Some of the most important of these new means of public comment have been review by legislative committees and investigative reporting by the media. In the 1990s, China began allowing more village self-government, opening a new forum for popular oversight from below. Interviews with provincial officials suggest that these forms of public supervision brought significant pressure to bear on the program to avoid clumsy implementation of the policy. Such pressures have been increasingly felt in Fujian, as documented in Chapter Eight.

D. PROGRAM LEGISLATION: "SOCIALIST LEGALITY" IN PRACTICE

The post-Mao leadership has striven earnestly to reconstruct regime legitimacy on a foundation of "socialist legality." Like other policies, birth planning policy has moved beyond ad hoc administrative regulation to become institutionalized in a growing network of laws. By the 1990s, state regulation of family reproduction had been written into all levels of Chinese law, from the national constitution through national laws and provincial regulations to county and township regulations and rules. There appear to be few written rules at the village level. This trend toward legalization has contradictory implications. On the one hand, legalization has gradually given the program an institutionalized foundation and set of routine procedures that are quietly more coercive than the crash campaigns and occasional violence of the past. On the other

[234] One should note that, technically, the party itself is an NGO.

hand, legalization of population policy has gradually placed legal constraints on administrators' behavior and provided legal guarantees for client rights. Although few have tried to sue the birth planning establishment, and those who have not always succeeded,[235] by the mid-1990s, administrators' adherence to lawful procedures had become a major national goal of the birth planning establishment.[236]

(a) National laws

Through the late 1990s, the national legal basis for the program was diffused across a number of statutes. At the turn of the millennium, however, a long-postponed national law on birth planning was being drafted and was apparently on its way to promulgation.

A "basic national policy." China's commitment to state birth planning was first written into basic national law in 1978, when the early post-Mao leadership formally shifted the nation's policy emphasis from revolution to modernization. The 1978 government Constitution stated that "the state advocates and encourages birth planning" (Article 5). The 1982 government Constitution was stronger. Article 25 stated that "The state promotes birth planning so that population growth may fit the plans for economic and social development." According to Article 49: "Both husband and wife have the duty to practice birth planning." In late 1982, birth planning as designated a "basic national policy" (*jiben guoce*), a designation that has been emphasized repeatedly since then.

No national law— yet. Despite the efforts of post-Mao leaders to ground major national policies in national laws, and despite the importance of birth policy, as of 2000, no national law yet covers that area. National political and program leaders periodically attempted to pass such a law, but, given the political controversies and ethical dilemmas surrounding the law, they failed to achieve the needed consensus. By the end of the 1990s, several developments made such a law increasingly imperative: on the one hand, there was the need to strengthen the legal authority of the program as it shifts toward "lawful" implementation. On the other hand there was the need to articulate consistent national principles to deal with a population that is increasingly mobile on a national scale.[237] Accordingly, at the end of the 1990s, program leaders drafted a national Population and Birth Planning Law, in consultation with the national political leadership, other ministries, the national legislature and subnational governments. The draft law has been submitted to the National People's Congress, which is expected to pass it within its current term of office (that is, by 2002). Evidently, the new law will spell out the responsibilities of the birth planning system, other agencies and the public. It will also include guarantees of the rights of ordinary citizens vis a vis the birth planning program. Passing this law should be facilitated by the fact that no fewer than three vice-chairmen of the National People's Congress have strong connections to the birth planning program: former SBPC minister Peng Peiyun, former SBPC vice-minister Jiang Zhenghua, and the new head of the Birth Planning Association, Politburo

[235] Rosenthal, Elizabeth. "A day in court and sometimes justice, for Chinese," *New York Times* (27 April 1998).
[236] Most provincial regulations clearly state couples' legal obligation to practice birth planning. For an example, see Chapter One of the regulations in Appendix Three.
[237] "Problems in enforcing family planning laws," *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research)* (Beijing: FTS19990527001989, 27 May 1999), as translated for FBIS.

member Jiang Chunyun.

Other national laws. Pending the passing of a birth planning law, other national laws have stipulated the necessity for birth planning or contained provisions relevant to it. These include the 1980 Marriage Law, the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law, the 1992 Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, the 1994 Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care, and the 1998 Adoption Law.[238] (On the late 1990s revision of the Adoption Law see FBIS 98-303 30 Oct 98 and for the revised text see FBIS 98-3315 11 Nov 98).

(b) Provincial regulations

In the absence of a national law, the major public statement of birth policy has been provided by provincial birth planning regulations.[239]

From administrative to legislative. Provincial regulations have long histories. The first such regulations, which appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were purely administrative. Many provinces revised these administrative rules several times, giving them such labels as "provisional" and "temporary".[240] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, birth planning regulations were passed, often in revised form, by provincial legislatures, giving them the force of law. Since that time, a number of provincial legislatures have again revised their birth planning legislation.[241]

Scope and detail. The core of the provincial regulations has long been the reproductive rules and their enforcement. In highly detailed form, they specify the rules guiding such things as the type and timing of contraception, the conditions under which a second child is permitted, the amount of time couples are required to wait before having that second child, the benefits for complying with the policy, and the fines for violating the rules. Over time, however, in line with national policy, provincial regulations have increasingly addressed other issues. Newer concerns include the requirements for "lawful administration," the punishments for maladministration, and guarantees of protection for clients against program abuse.

1990s revisions. During the 1990s, a majority of provinces revised their birth planning regulations; in some cases provinces adopted entirely new laws. A 1996 SBPC study of revisions in thirteen provinces noted the following main changes: (1) guaranteeing government implementation; (2) protecting human rights; (3) propagating new work methods; (4) serving privatized state enterprises; (5) guaranteeing investment; (6) improving compensation for birth

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[238] On the late 1990s revision of the Adoption Law, see "NPC discusses adoption, family planning," *Xinhua* (Beijing: FTS19981030000631, 30 October 1998), as translated for FBIS; and for the revised text, see "Revised PRC adoption law," *Xinhua* (Beijing: FTS19981111000217, 5 November 1998), as translated for FBIS.

[239] China's thirty-one "provinces" now include twenty-two ordinary provinces, four major municipalities and five autonomous regions for minority nationalities. The city of Chongqing was only recently elevated to provincial status.

[240] For a history of such developments in Shaanxi, see Greenhalgh, Susan. "The evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi, 1979-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 122, June 1990), p. 191-229.

[241] Feng, Guoping and Linna Hao. "A summary of the birth planning regulations for 28 regions in China," *Renkou Yanjiu (Population Research)* (No. 4, 1992), p. 28-33 [in Chinese].

planning workers; (7) protecting citizen's legal rights; (8) rewarding citizen compliance; (9) coordinating with relevant new national laws— some provincial regulations were adjusted to remove conflicts; (10) promoting lawful administration.[242] These modifications illustrate the new, contradictory impulses of the 1990s that were outlined in Chapter Three: strengthening of the administrative apparatus, coupled with growing legal support for protection of individuals from official abuse.

As an example of a 1990s provincial revision, Appendix Three provides a translation of the 1991 version of the Fujian birth planning regulations. As in other provinces, Fujian's regulations were originally formulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s as administrative decrees. Also as elsewhere, in the late 1980s the regulations were reformulated and passed by the provincial legislature to give them more legal force. In Fujian, the first legislative version was passed in April 1988 and implemented in July 1988. The 1991 legislative revision was passed in June and again implemented in July.[243] Documents and interviews suggest that the provincial legislature did not revise the regulations again during the 1990s, though it did supplement them with special administrative rules covering such problematic issues as birth planning among the migrant population.[244]

As of 1999, the Fujian legislature was processing a revision that included the addition of four more conditions under which a second child will be permitted. Evidently, these conditions are rather narrow, mostly addressing unusual family situations where continuing the family line is a problem. For example, one condition would allow a couple, both of whom are divorced and remarried, to have a child even though they both had one child by the previous marriage. Another would allow a male to have a third child in order to be able to transfer a child to brothers who are without heirs (under the present regulations only a second child would be allowed for that purpose).[245]

(c) Local regulations

Subprovincial levels— prefectures, counties and townships— have their own birth planning regulations. A study of such regulations in Shaanxi suggests that local regulations do not so much specify general policy as describe how the provincial regulations are to be adapted to local circumstances within the locality. The further down the administrative level, the more concrete and specific the rules are.[246]

Especially in the countryside, where the rules are more permissive, people are keenly interested in the birth planning regulations of all levels of government. Provincial officials

[242] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 121-122.
[243] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.
[244] The 1991 regulations list twelve conditions under which a second child is allowed, while provincial administrators who were interviewed spoke of thirteen.
[245] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.
[246] Greenhalgh, Susan. "The evolution of the one-child policy in Shaanxi, 1979-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 122, June 1990), p. 191-229.

interviewed in the mid-1990s said that citizens eagerly await the publication of new provincial regulations in the newspapers, checking eagerly to see if they fit the conditions for second children.[247] Township birth planning officials often post the current regulations on the inside walls of the birth planning clinic and on bulletin boards outside the township office complex, where they are easily accessible to all.

We conclude this section on program legislation with a brief note on program paperwork. Alleged program documents often feature as crucial evidence in asylum cases. Program administrators interviewed in 1998 and 1999 insisted that the documents accompanying most applications for asylum to the United States are fake. Often these false papers are obtained by the parents of the applicants, who get them through organizations of Overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*). Some of the administrators noted that the program itself issues few official documents, primarily the one-child certificate, which goes to only a fraction of all couples. Others recommended that foreign officials receiving such materials check the way the documents are stamped. One tip-off to fake documents, he said, is that the program does not use iron stamps (*tie zhang*). Iron-stamped certificates are most likely fakes.[248]

E. CONCLUSION

The Chinese have long been known for their bureaucratic accomplishments. In this chapter we have seen some of the manifestations of those organizational skills in the domain of birth planning. The Chinese program is administered by a huge birth planning hierarchy that has growing connections with other administrative systems. Public involvement, often "managed" by government agencies, is extensive. And the policy is being increasingly legalized, even if the gap between written law and enforcement remains vast. In this chapter, we have described these organizational patterns for the country as a whole. Yet China is a complex and internally variegated place. In the next chapter, we turn to variation in program rules and enforcement. We will see that longstanding cultural, social, economic, and locational differences have left their stamp on birth planning practice, creating an internally differentiated program that varies from province to province, village to village, and even person to person.

[247] Interview by the authors, July 1993.

[248] Interviews by the authors, April 1999. On PRC seizure of allegedly fake documents from Changle and Lianjiang, see "Customs seizes letters requesting political asylum," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (London: 28 September 1998), as reported on NEXIS. The documents included religious certificates, notices demanding payment of out-of-plan birth fines, and arrest warrants.

Figure 5.1
ORGANIZATION OF PRC BIRTH PLANNING:
NATIONAL LEVELS

The State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC) is an organ of the government cabinet for managing the birth planning system and coordinating relevant work of other agencies. The SBPC falls under the dual supervision of the government cabinet and party politburo, receiving additional oversight from the national legislature. The clout of the SBPC depends heavily on the seniority of the national political leaders assigned to supervise it. A June 1998 cabinet regulation grants the SBPC 120 staff, including one chairman, four vice-chairmen and 22 section leaders.



Mass organizations for education and mobilization

Birth Planning Association
Population Association
Assn. for... population culture
Population Welfare Foundation
Assn. for... better childbearing
Assn. for research on healthier births
Birth planning Institute
of the China Medical Association

Elite organizations for scientific and policy research

National Research Institute for Birth Planning
Population Information and Research Center
Contraceptives Supply Center of the SBPC
China Population News
China Publishing House
China Family Planning IEC Center
Tai'an Population School of the SBPC
Nanjing College for Population Program Management

The birth planning "system" includes agencies for administration, service-delivery, research and education, some of them formally subordinate to the SBPC and others simply associated with it. Birth planning has always involved other "systems" such as the Ministry of Public Health, and during the 1990s increasingly also involved other agencies such as those for combating rural poverty.
Source: Expanded from State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). *Population and Family Planning in China* (Beijing: SBPC, 1998) [SBPC briefing packet, undated but evidently issued in 1998].

Figure 5.2
ORGANIZATION OF PRC BIRTH PLANNING:
SUBNATIONAL LEVELS

The most authoritative vertical channel between geographic levels is that operating through the communist party and enforced through control over the careers of local party and government officials (in PRC terms, a "leadership relationship," indicated by solid lines). Birth planning commissions at higher geographic levels do not directly command the activities of lower ones, but rather only set policy guidelines and operational standards for them (in PRC terms, a "professional relationship," noted by dashed lines). At each geographic level, birth planning commissions report directly to the government and party organizations at that level and rely on them for most of their funding and political support. In dealing with lower-level commissions, higher-level commissions must employ mostly education, persuasion and bargaining.



Beneath the national level, the most important level is the province (indicated by bolding). From the 1970s, birth planning work has relied on increasingly detailed regulations at each geographic level. In the 1980s and 1990s, the most important regulations have been those passed and revised by the provincial legislatures. During the 1990s, representative bodies and mass associations began to exercise some oversight over birth planning work, particularly the provincial legislature. MCH means maternal and child health. Source: Expanded from State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). *Population and Family Planning in China* (Beijing: SBPC, 1998) [SBPC briefing packet, undated but evidently issued in 1998].

Figure 5.3
ORGANIZATION OF PRC BIRTH PLANNING:
LOCAL LEVELS

At the local levels, administrative organs become less elaborate and the important question becomes the capacity of local service organs to perform necessary medical procedures. Historically most birth planning operations were performed by hospitals and clinics run by the Ministry of Public Health, particularly at the county level. During the 1980s and 1990s, the birth planning system increased its own independent medical capacity. As of 1998, about 90% of counties had permanent specialized birth planning "service stations" (*zhan*) and about 80% of townships had birth planning service clinics (*suo*). Only half of villages had birth planning offices (*shi*), making it difficult to improve the quality of reproductive health care.



Locally, the most import level for administering birth work is the county, while the most important levels for delivering birth planning services are the township and village. (Some localities group small numbers of households into an additional quasi-administrative level.) During the 1990s, in order to increase public consent to demanding policies, the national party-state somewhat increased public political participation through electing village government leaders and reviewing village administrative performance. This created channels for exposing maladministration and redressing grievances. Reportedly this has moderated corruption and coercion in relations between birth planners and the public. MCH is shorthand for "maternal and child health." Source: Expanded from State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC). *Population and Family Planning in China* (Beijing: SBPC, 1998) [SBPC briefing packet, undated but evidently issued in 1998].

Chapter 6: DIMENSIONS OF VARIATION

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: ADAPTATION THROUGH EXPERIMENT

B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVINCES: OLD CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS LEAVE THEIR IMPRINT

(a) Ethnicity
(b) Regionalism
(c) Southern coastal provinces

C. URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES: THE "TWO SOCIETIES" RESURFACE

(a) Administrative system
(b) Work unit
(c) Residence status

D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUPLES AND INDIVIDUALS: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES LEAVE THEIR MARK

(a) Variation between couples: Political
(b) Variation between couples: Economic and social
(c) Individual variation: The difference gender makes

E. CONCLUSION

In a country as large and internally diverse as China, it is not surprising that the birth planning policy and its enforcement have varied tremendously from place to place. In this chapter, we present nine dimensions of such variation, ranging from differences between whole provinces to differences between cities and countryside to differences between couples and individuals. Mapping out these variations by scale (from large to small) enables us to give a systematic overview of dimensions of variation and provides one possible logical order in which INS officers might want to ask questions of asylum applicants.

A. INTRODUCTION: ADAPTATION THROUGH EXPERIMENT

One of the main lessons the Chinese communists have learned in their efforts to transform Chinese society since 1949 is that the country's size and diversity make it impossible to impose uniform policies on every locality. In the wake of such policy disasters as the Great Leap Forward, the center concluded that it cannot "cut with one knife" (*yi dao qie*). The central

government has been most successful when it has restricted itself to promulgating tentative general principles and objectives, allowed provinces and localities to implement variations on a trial basis, and then only gradually summarized and codified those experiences into a revised statement of general national principles and objectives. Such experimental adaptation is precisely how Chinese birth policy has evolved, from its initiation through the 1990s.

One result of basing central policy guidelines on local experiments is that local variations have been built into overall policy and programmatic practice. Both local field studies and community-level analyses of large data sets indicate that no single one-child policy exists in practice. Instead, there are many policies, whose rules and implementation vary from community to community.[249] Here we attempt a systematic examination of some of the sources of that variation. What we will see is that the birth program did not create the differences but rather incorporated the inequalities already built into Chinese society, reinforcing them in the process.

B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROVINCES: OLD CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS LEAVE THEIR IMPRINT

We begin with differences that affect provinces as wholes. These center primarily on ethnic and regional differences with long histories in Chinese culture.

(a) Ethnicity

The distinction between "Han Chinese" and "minority nationalities" is the biggest distinction between provinces in formal birth policy. In order to protect national unity and national defense, the Chinese government has taken great trouble to avoid antagonizing the minority nationalities (of which there are more than 55). Moreover, because they constitute only 9% of China's population (as of 1995), the minority nationalities represent only a small part of China's population "problem."[250] Consequently, central policy makers applied birth policy earlier and more strictly to Han Chinese areas and later and less strictly to minority nationality areas. When the birth planning program did begin to formalize rules for minorities, it allowed them to have three to four children, not just one to two. As a result, minority populations have grown faster than the Han population. Between the 1982 and 1990 censuses, the minority population grew by 35.2%, three times the national average of 12.5%.[251] It was perhaps only in the late 1990s (during the 1996-2000 Five-Year Plan) that the central government seriously began to try

[249] Kaufman, Joan et al. "Family planning policy and practice in China: A study of four rural counties," *Population and Development Review* (Vol. 15, No. 4, December 1989), p. 707-729; Short, Susan E. and Zhai Fengying. "Looking locally at China's one-child policy," *Studies in Family Planning* (Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1998), p. 373-387.

[250] For the statistics, see Du, Peng. "The ethnic minority population in China," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.* Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

[251] Du, Peng. "The ethnic minority population in China," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.* Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

to get minority nationalities gradually to move toward the stricter rules enforced on the Han.[252]

The provinces with the largest proportions of minority populations are, in descending order, Tibet, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Ningxia.[253] All of these are minority "autonomous regions," except Yunnan, which contains many subprovincial autonomous prefectures and counties.[254] Some "non-minority" provinces have significant proportions of minorities (in descending order, Hainan, Liaoning, Jilin, Gansu and Hunan). Indeed, Hainan's 17% minority population may be one reason for its poor program performance. In terms of the absolute size of the minority population, the leading provinces are Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xinjiang. Some "non-minority" provinces too have fairly large absolute numbers of minorities (e.g., Liaoning, Hunan and Sichuan). Fujian, which will interest us later, has a very low proportion of minorities— only about 1.5%. Most are aboriginal She, who number about 350,000. About half of the She live in relatively mountainous and backward "East" Fujian (Ningde prefecture), particularly in Fu'an City and Xiapu and Fuding counties (toward the border with Zhejiang). Fujian also is home to about 100,000 Hui (Chinese Muslims), particularly in Jinjiang Prefecture around Quanzhou (in Jinjiang City and Hui'an county).

Ethnicity is among the dimensions that are probably least relevant to INS immigration cases: most asylum applicants come from coastal areas dominated by Han Chinese. Nevertheless, members of minorities from less developed areas may turn up among the domestic migrants who have moved to the coastal cities which serve as the launching pad for international migration. Such individuals are less likely to have overseas networks to facilitate emigration. Indeed, they may be among the main victims of rackets aimed at smuggling illegal immigrants into the United States and other countries. Whatever the case, these individuals' minority status would affect their treatment by the birth program in China. A typical set of provincial regulations allows most minorities to have two children and to qualify for a third child under some of the same conditions that allow Han couples to have two.[255]

(b) Regionalism

Subethnicity. The majority Han Chinese population exhibits some differences among regions according to the date and extent of incorporation of an area into the dominant northern Han Chinese culture. The central government downplays such historical-cultural distinctions among the Han, which are known as "subethnic" differences. Such distinctions do not appear formally in post-1949 Chinese policy, birth policy included. Nevertheless, they have continued to affect the center-provincial politics of population policy. Broadly speaking, the later and less completely a locality was incorporated into Han China, the more culturally and socially distinctive it remains, the greater the resistance to national birth policies, and the greater the

[252] On late 1990s birth policy for minorities, see Sharma, Yojana. "Birth control policy stepped up for minorities," *Inter Press Service* (Hong Kong: 18 November 1997), as reported on NEXIS.
[253] 1990 census data, Tu, Ping. "Trends and regional differentials in fertility," in *The Changing Population of China (Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times)*. Edited by Xizhe Peng and Zhigang Guo (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 28.
[254] The other provincial-level autonomous region is Inner Mongolia, which is only 19% minority, primarily Mongol.
[255] See Appendix Three, Article Nine.

latitude the central government tends to allow the locality.

Two sub-ethnic categories of Han Chinese are of special interest, because they are treated, or can be expected to be treated, differently by the birth policy.

Overseas Chinese. Localities from which many Overseas Chinese originated have strong social connections abroad— and produce many asylum applicants. Historically, most emigrants came from Guangdong and Fujian and went to Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, emigration increased from Zhejiang, another southern coastal province. Historically, most Chinese migration to the United States was from Guangdong; in the 1990s, migrants from Fujian dominated. Historically, international ties between Overseas Chinese and Chinese still on the mainland were persistent but informal, constituted out of familial relationships. In the 1990s, associations of Overseas Chinese became increasingly formalized and globalized, with associations from Fujian localities among the most prominent. Historically, Overseas Chinese remitted money to their families and made some charitable donations to their communities. In the 1990s, Overseas Chinese businessmen were supranational sponsors not only of joint business ventures in their home towns but also of local infrastructure construction and even state enterprise restructuring (most famously in Quanzhou). Overseas Chinese home localities (*qiaoxiang*) are eager to play their "Overseas Chinese card" (*qiaopai*). The local chapters in a 1995 survey of Fuzhou Municipality listed Overseas Chinese connections as a resource for externally-oriented economic development (FZM 1995).[256]

Such localities (*qiaoxiang*)— or at least the Overseas Chinese residing in them— enjoy a special status in birth planning. First and most formally, birth planning regulations make special provision for Overseas Chinese who have returned to China to reside permanently. For example, in Fujian, an Overseas Chinese couple who has only one child and has sent it abroad for permanent residence is allowed to have an additional child.[257] Second, in practice, while residing or traveling abroad, Overseas Chinese are largely exempt from domestic birth planning rules, and can return to China with a pregnancy or a child born abroad without being penalized.[258] Third, still less formally, because governments at all levels wish to maximize investment from Overseas Chinese still residing abroad, some of these localities may go easy in enforcing birth planning on the relatives of Overseas Chinese living in China.

The fourth and probably biggest impact of the Overseas Chinese on birth planning is through remittances, which enable the fortunate recipients of such resources to pay out-of-plan birth fees relatively easily. Most families with relatives abroad receive streams of income from them, giving those families incomes substantially higher than average. Moreover, they can draw on overseas relatives for help in paying for a large investment such as an extra child. Higher incomes and large houses better enable such families to pursue traditional male-centered ideals of large coresident families and inter-generational continuity. Already in the late 1970s,

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[256] The Chinese for Overseas Chinese is *huaqiao* or *haiwai huaren*. For leads to the recent literature, see Liu, Gong. "Old linkages, new networks: The globalization of Overseas Chinese voluntary associations and its implications," *China Quarterly* (No. 155, September 1998), p. 582-609. On Fuzhou, see Pura, Raphael. "A breed apart: Stamina and success mark Fuzhou Chinese diaspora," *Asian Wall Street Journal* (8 June 1994).
[257] See Fujian regulations, Article Eight.
[258] According to interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April and June 1999.

communities with many such families could support black markets for scarce items.[259]

Hakka. The geographic concentration and cultural distinctiveness of the Hakka (*kejia ren*) are as great as those of many minority nationalities. Yet this group is not classified as an official minority. The Hakka migrated from north to south China about a thousand years ago and have since inhabited the less desirable upland areas, particularly at the intersection of northern Guangdong, southeastern Jiangxi and southwestern Fujian (western Longyan prefecture). A well-known cultural center is Meizhou in Guangdong. From these upland areas, they also migrated down into the piedmont closer to lowland Han urban markets for their products of cash crops, timber, and minerals. In Fujian, such areas include several near-coastal counties.[260]

One might think that the Hakka would constitute a distinct category for birth program administration. Certain factors should make Hakka less susceptible to state birth planning than other Han couples: they inhabit peripheral areas, they have specialized in labor-intensive activities, and they have had relatively high population growth rates in the past. Yet program officials from the southeast coast deny that the Hakka cause them problems.[261] This may be because of other factors that make this group more amenable to state birth planning: male lineage organization is weaker, women's status is higher, and mainland Hakka have practiced alternative marriage forms that allow families without sons to continue their lines.[262] In short, it is difficult to say whether the Hakka have a distinctive birth planning profile. Although this must remain an unsettled issue for now, the group's cultural distinctiveness (except among those who have assimilated) suggests that the question should remain open to further inquiry.

(c) Southern coastal provinces

The three provinces along the southern coast from which most INS asylum applicants originate contain small minority populations and few minority areas. Fujian's population is only 1.44% minority, Guangdong's 0.68%, and Zhejiang's 0.54%. Yet **regionalism** is particularly salient is these provinces. On this dimension, Zhejiang was incorporated earliest of the three, and has been most closely integrated with the rest of China. Most of Zhejiang has an exemplary birth program; the major exception is its later-incorporated southern area around Wenzhou. Fujian was incorporated second earliest but has been partially shielded from full integration with the rest of China by mountains. Until around 1990, Fujian's birth planning was among the worst in the country outside minority-nationality provinces. Guangdong was incorporated latest and remains most distinctive. Although the quality of administration of Guangdong's birth program is quite good in the province's more developed areas, Guangdong was long one of the few provinces

[259] For a field report of these effects of remittances on southern Fujian, see Yu, Elena S. H. "Overseas remittances in south-eastern China," *China Quarterly* (No. 78, June 1979), p. 339-350.
[260] Such as Yongtai county within the borders of Fuzhou city; for more, see Chapter Eight. For leads to literature on Hakka, see *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad*. Edited by Nicole Constable (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996).
[261] Interviews by the authors, April and June 1999.
[262] On Hakka geography and history, Leong, Sow-Then. *Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History: Hakkas, Pengmin and Their Neighbors* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), including the Introduction by G. William Skinner, p. 1-18.

outside minority areas with a rural two-child policy, as a result of which its population grew quite rapidly.[263]

C. RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES: THE "TWO SOCIETIES" RESURFACE

Differences between city and countryside are a fundamental dimension of Chinese society, communist development— and birth planning. Over the decades, each innovation in the birth program has gradually spread from urban to rural areas. In more urban-industrial areas, the policy has been carried out earlier, the rules have been more restrictive, implementation has been more professional and more exacting, and compliance has been more complete and (probably) more voluntary. Rural-urban differences can affect birth planning across whole provinces: the largest provincial-level cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin) are the most "advanced" in the country, along with the highly urbanized Northeastern provinces.

Rural-urban differences in program performance and demographic outcome are more conspicuous within provinces, however. In the mid-1980s, a Fujian village cadre in a rural suburb of Xiamen (Lin village) summed up the difference between urban and rural areas as follows:

> City people can easily adopt the one-child-per-family policy for practical reasons. First of all, city people generally don't have enough living space. For instance, the average living space for residents in Xiamen City is about two meters per person. It is already very crowded. Besides, all city residents work in government offices or enterprises. By the time they retire, the elderly can live on their retirement pensions, which amount to 70 to 80 percent of their regular wage. They don't have to rely on their children to support them in old age.
>
> The situation in the countryside is completely different. Our living space is not restricted. The average housing space in our village now is about twenty square meters per person. Most city families don't even have that much space for the entire family. In addition, we peasants live on our labor. We have no retirement pension to draw on when we grow old. Who is going to support me if not one of my sons? We peasants are not prejudiced against girls or women. But, the fact is that girls are generally married out to another family when they grow up. You need to have at least one son to stay on with the family.[264]

A large social scientific literature, whose conclusions are reviewed in Chapter Two, supports the cadre's conclusions.[265]

Data on most aspects of Chinese birth planning show pronounced rural-urban differences. Chinese data provide at least three ways to capture rural-urban contrasts— by jurisdiction, by

[263] For data on provincial performance, see Chapter Seven.
[264] Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 180.
[265] For more, see that chapter's section on Popular Reproductive Preferences.

registration and by employment. Usually Chinese data classify whole populations as rural or urban simply according to whether they live under the **jurisdiction** of a county or city, not according to their actual lifestyle. An alternative that the program sometimes uses is "agricultural" versus "non-agricultural," a classification that refers not to the nature of economic activity but to the type of household **registration**. This measure is based on information about individuals, but it largely reflects their situation at birth, not their current residence or occupation. To distinguish actual differences in livelihood and lifestyle, for some purposes the best indicator is current **employment**, which we use in Chapter Seven. These alternative dimensions for assessing "rural" versus "urban" complicate both the administration and the analysis of China's birth program.[266]

(a) Administrative systems

In both rural and urban areas, birth planning reaches individuals largely through existing structures of local administration. As noted in Chapter Five, the nature of those structures differs between rural and urban areas.

In **rural** areas, administration is mostly territorial, through county, township or village (what the Chinese call *kuai* or horizontal "pieces"). Particularly at the village level, fewer functional administrative systems have their own specialized representatives, and community cadres often perform several different roles. Rural birth program administration relies heavily on territorial officials, part-time cadres, and collective community mobilization. Particularly in rural areas, below the provincial level there remain significant differences in the administrative capabilities of different localities and communities. These differences result from both the environment in which birth planning is promoted— in particular, the availability of local and community financial resources— and the organization of the program— principally, the commitment of local and community political leaders.[267] On many matters, villages vary significantly in the quality of their leadership and their degree of compliance with central policies.[268] The Civil Affairs Ministry, which administers village "self-government," estimates that only 15-20% of villages "meet standards" for general administrative tasks, and that a large proportion of villages are simply "out of control." A late 1990s field study of birth planning in rural North China documents that, for purposes of birth planning, some villages were also largely out of control, except during implementation campaigns directly supervised by superiors.[269] During the 1990s, the birth planning program engaged in a persistent campaign to increase the

[266] Aptly noted in Thayer, Harry E. T. *China: Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum Applications* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Asylum Affairs, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 1995). For a thorough description of the confusion and an attempt at clarification, see Zhang, L. and Simon X. B. Zhao. "Re-examining China's 'urban' concept and the level of urbanization," *China Quarterly* (No. 154, June 1998), p. 330-381.
[267] The Chinese call these two dimensions "objective" and "subjective" factors.
[268] O'Brien, Kevin. "Implementing political reform in China's villages," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* (No. 32, July 1994), p. 33-60; O'Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li. "Selective policy implementation in rural China," *Comparative Politics* (Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1999), p. 167-186.
[269] Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 202-230.

proportion of villages that "met standards" for program administration. Improvement has been steady but in some places levels remain modest.

In **urban** areas, some administration is territorial, effected through district offices and street committees. Yet much administration is functional, conducted through specialized branches of national ministerial hierarchies (what the Chinese call *tiao* or vertical "branches"). The administration of urban birth planning benefits from a greater number of specialized personnel. In addition, urban program administration relies more than does rural administration on other specialized hierarchies for services and information. Among the most important are the health and household registration systems. In the course of the 1990s, with the decline of urban work units and the rise of migrant populations, urban birth planning administrators worked to strengthen coordination between these different functional systems in order to keep track of clients and deliver services to them. A major means of enhancing coordination has been computerized information systems that pool records on each client, so that people who register for residence or apply for health care automatically come to the attention of birth planning administrators. Obviously such integration has both "policing" and "servicing" functions. Here, as in other aspects of the program, the two are inextricably intertwined. In the 1990s, the slogan for urban birth planning work became "take the territorial-residential unit as fundamental (*kuai*), but achieve an integration of functional and territorial systems (*tiao* and *kuai*)."

Urban residents are subject to two systems of control, one based on their place of residence, the other based on their place of work, or work unit. Both play important roles in administering the birth program. Control by place of residence is managed by urban street committees staffed by "busybodies," often retired women, who keep close track of women's menstrual cycles, contraceptives, and pregnancies.[270] The role of urban work units is more complex.

(b) Work units

The impact of birth planning on an individual depends also on the type of work unit in which she or he is employed. "Work unit" (*danwei*) has long been a crucial shaper of people's lives in communist China. From the late 1950s through the late 1970s, all citizens were highly dependent on their work units not only for employment, but also for housing and a wide range of other social services. Workers had to go to their work units for permission to get married and have children. The work unit's ability to deny a family access to crucial resources if it violates birth policy constitutes a very powerful means of policy enforcement. This was true not only for urban areas and their state work units, but also for rural collectives such as the commune (now township) and brigade (now village). The remarkable success of the later-longer-fewer policy in the 1970s was largely due to the collective structure of rural life, which gave near-absolute powers to local cadres, leaving ordinary villagers little choice but to comply.[271]

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[270] A colorful account is WuDunn, Sheryl. "Changsha journal: In China's cities, the busybodies are organized," *New York Times* (13 March 1991).

[271] On the Chinese work unit system, see *Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. Edited by Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth J. Perry (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). On 1990s changes in state factories, see Lee, Ching Kwan. "From organized dependence to disorganized despotism: Changing labour

Since 1978, the decline of state provision and control of employment and services, and the rise of markets providing them, have reduced the importance of the work unit. In the rural areas, the dismantling of the collectives in the late 1970s and early 1980s undermined enforcement structures, making implementation much more difficult in the 1980s and 1990s.[272] Nevertheless, the work unit remains important, even in the rural areas. For example, whether one's locality has prosperous collective industry or not largely determines the level and quality of reproductive health services provided in the rural areas. Though their powers have shrunk, village cadres have retained important sources of leverage over ordinary villagers, resources that they can mobilize to collect fines and control births.[273] In the cities, hundreds of millions of Chinese still depend heavily on their work units for access to education and publicly funded medical care, access to employment and job change, and permission to marry or move or travel abroad. These dependencies make the birth policy relatively easy to enforce.

The most important distinction between work units has been the nature of their ownership, which has defined three types of units: state, collective and individual.

State (*guoyou*) work units are part of the state system of personnel classification and material supply. They offer the highest pay, greatest benefits and most secure jobs. However, they also achieve the strictest enforcement of state birth planning. They regard exemplary behavior as a necessary credential for holding such a favorable, state-sector job. The advantages of state employment for the employee give the state work unit much enforcement leverage over its members. What this boils down to is that employees of state work units are likely to have experienced relatively strict enforcement of state birth policy.[274]

Collective (*jiti*) work units can be either urban or rural, prosperous or poor. Depending on local circumstances, they may range from vigorous implementers of state birth policy to passive resistors. An important example is the collectively-owned factory, the most prominent of which is the township enterprises that have emerged in great numbers in the post-Mao period. Where prosperous, such work units (or the township to which they pay taxes) can provide high levels of health services and contraceptive enforcement. Collective enterprise is particularly strong in the lower Yangtze region, where it provides the economic basis for the model program performance in the suburbs of Shanghai, adjacent counties within Jiangsu province, and similar counties in northern Zhejiang.[275]

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regimes in Chinese factories," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 44-71.

[272] White, Tyrene. "Implementing the 'one-child-per-couple' population program in rural China: National goals and local politics," in *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*. Edited by David M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 284-317; White, Tyrene. "Birth planning between plan and market: The impact of reform on China's one-child policy," in *China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence*. Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 1, 1991), p. 252-269; Greenhalgh, Susan. "The peasantization of the one-child policy in Shaanxi," in *Chinese Families in the Post-Mao Era*. Edited by Deborah Davis and Stevan Harrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 219-250.

[273] E.g. Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 176-177.

[274] For a graphic illustration of such stringent enforcement, see Rofel, Lisa. *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 244-256.

[275] Personal field inspection, July 1993.

Individual or private work units (*getihu*) are much more lax in enforcing birth planning. Family enterprises provide social services only to family members. Again, however, where individual work units are prosperous, the taxes they pay to the township can enable the township to provide quality services. In Guangdong's Pearl River Delta, such private prosperity has created the economic base for community services comparable to those provided in the Yangtze River Delta. By contrast, in the Wenzhou area of southern Zhejiang, such private prosperity has created a highly individualistic environment in which state birth planning has been difficult to implement. Zhejiang provincial birth planning officials attribute this difficulty largely to the particular individualism and competitiveness of the "Wenzhou model" of economic entrepreneurship.[276]

This "individual work unit" category also includes the "floating population" (*liudong renkou*) of theoretically short-term migrants to China's cities who remain registered in their rural places of origin. Today roughly 100 million Chinese belong to the floating population, two-thirds of them male and the great majority in the prime reproductive ages of 20 to 35.[277] The state has had great difficulty extending its network of control and services to these migrants. Attempting to do so was a main focus of urban birth planning work in the 1990s. The central government and some individual provinces have issued meticulous regulations about how birth planning for migrants is to be administered, but these regulations have remained difficult to enforce. Migrants are likely to have experienced relatively lax enforcement of state birth policy.[278]

(c) Residence status

As noted above, rural-urban differences are also important at the individual level. Within China, the difference between being a temporary migrant to the city and being an officially registered urban resident is comparable in importance to the distinctions for international migrants between being a legal or an illegal alien, or between holding or not holding a "green card" in the United States. In communist China, the category "rural"/"urban" is not a question merely of the location of population within urban versus rural administrative areas, but also of the personal status of each individual. One has to ask what the individual's status is, as recorded in his or her household register. The major status is "agricultural household" (*nongye hukou*) versus "non-agricultural household" (*fei nongye hukou*). Administrative units called "cities" include both non-agricultural and agricultural populations. These latter often include large counties whose residents are actually engaged in agriculture. Moreover, people born in rural villages officially remain ruralites even after they migrate to live temporarily in cities and take up non-agricultural work. To become urbanites officially, they must achieve the difficult goals of obtaining a permanent urban job and completing government procedures for transferring their

[276] Interview by the authors, April 1996.
[277] Solinger, Dorothy J. *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Sun, Changmin. "The floating population and internal migration in China," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.* Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
[278] For the detailed administrative arrangements in one fairly typical province, see Chapter Four of the regulations in Appendix Three.

household registration from countryside to city. In practice the distinction between "rural" and "urban" is not merely a question of formal classification by residence and occupation. Already in the past, and increasingly in the present, much of the officially "rural" and "agricultural" population works off-farm, either locally in small-scale enterprises (usually collective) or at a distance in major cities (usually self-employed). Nearly half of Fujian's "agricultural" population may work off-farm.[279]

Many foreign observers have noted the complexity of rural versus urban residential status in China. Evidently, some foreign observers regard the system's "lack of transparency" as a sign of administrative confusion and even corruption, particularly relative to the application of birth policy to particular individuals. Some program administrators may well have achieved some personal advantage by manipulating these complexities. Nevertheless, from a Chinese point of view the complexity is an unavoidable result of the post-1949 evolution of communist rural-urban policy. Assessing each person's status individually for the application of birth policy is basically an effort to be fair by doing justice to the complexity of each person's residential and employment history.

D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUPLES AND INDIVIDUALS: SOCIAL INEQUALITIES LEAVE THEIR MARK

The impact of the birth policy also varies systematically between couples and even between individuals within families. Here we review some of the most important sources of such variation, including the political, economic, and social status of couples within their communities and the gender of individuals. Again we will see that the birth program did not so much create the differences as incorporate— and, in the process, reinforce— the inequalities already built into Chinese society.

(a) Variation between couples: Political

Birth policy is supposed to be applied more strictly to individuals of higher political and administrative status. Here the broadest distinction is between cadres and masses. Cadres (*ganbu*) are official functionaries who work for the party or state, who therefore have exceptional influence and connections, but whose conduct is expected to be exemplary. The "masses" (*qunzhong*) are ordinary people who are unlikely to have powerful connections but who are not ordinarily expected to set an example. In birth planning, cadres have greater opportunities and temptations to use personal influence to violate birth planning regulations. However, the expectations for compliance are much higher for cadres than for masses, and the penalties for non-compliance are much more severe.

Expectations are particularly high and penalties particularly severe for birth planning cadres themselves. They are obliged not only to conform to birth policy for individuals in their

[279] Rozelle, Scott et al. "Leaving China's farms: Survey results of new paths and remaining hurdles to rural migration," *China Quarterly* (No. 158, June 1999), p. 372, notes to table.

private lives, but also to conform to policies for implementing birth policy in their public roles. Particularly in the mid-1990s, most campaigns to identify "violations of birth planning laws" targeted not ordinary citizens who had too many children, but birth planning cadres or other health officials who had implemented birth policy arbitrarily or corruptly. These campaigns have implications for asylum applicants: during the 1990s, due to repeated "rectification" of birth planning cadres, program administration appears to have become increasingly regular and lawful. For individual citizens, this meant significant punishments for non-compliance, mostly fines, but also significant (if not yet complete) protection against administrative malfeasance including physical coercion or property destruction.

(b) Variation between couples: Economic and social

Birth policy is supposed to be applied uniformly across economic class. Nevertheless, informally, economic distinctions between families can be significant. Richer couples are more able to pay fines and to bribe local officials to bend the rules in their favor. Examples are said to include rich entrepreneurs in Guangdong province and in the Wenzhou area of Zhejiang province. Obviously, allowing people to have as many children as they want simply because they can afford to pay the fines tends to defeat the purpose of birth policy, not only by allowing excess children but also by undermining public perception that the program is fair. However, out-of-plan birth fines can also support the policy. Localities are supposed to use the revenues to fund the birth program and to subsidize positive incentives for the compliance of less prosperous families. In the best case, the number of privileged rich who get away with violating the rules would be few and the number of poor beneficiaries who enjoy better services would be many.[280] Richer families are also more able to pay the costs of emigration to the United States, and are therefore more likely to turn up as INS applicants.

Birth planning regulations certainly draw no distinction between different social categories within a community (except for the leniency toward minority nationalities discussed above). Nevertheless, there is some evidence, not of discrimination by the program, but of differential compliance by families, depending on their social position within the community. Research on the rural politics of policy compliance generally indicates that families that are central to the community are more likely to comply and to lead others in adhering to regulations. Such families are likely to be those with long residence in the community (often for generations). They are likely to be those that have many close social connections, including membership in a prominent or dominant local surname group, if any. They are likely to have high social status within the community, and to have participated in the political leadership of the community. Conversely, families that are marginal to the community are more likely than others to resist the policy. Sometimes this marginality results from objective factors such as brief residence, few relatives or low income. Sometimes it results from subjective factors such as personal unpopularity or a general truculence toward community political leaders.[281]

[280] Bribes are less socially constructive.

[281] Li, Lianjian and Kevin J. O'Brien. "Villagers and popular resistance in contemporary China," *Modern China* (Vol. 22, No. 1, January 1996), p. 28-61.

(c) Individual variation: The difference gender makes

At the individual level, differences along lines of gender loom large. In this male-centered culture, the burden of birth planning falls on wives rather than husbands, while the rules on second childbearing incorporate and thereby reinforce the culture's preference for sons over daughters.

Women bear the burden. Within couples, there is a systematic difference in birth planning: for reasons that are as cultural and political as they are biological, the burden of contraception falls heavily on women. As in other countries, so in China there remains the widespread but still largely unexamined assumption that contraception is the woman's responsibility. It is therefore women who are targeted for persuasion and mobilization, women who endure birth control operations, and women who put their bodies at risk. The statistics are striking. Of the three-quarters of a billion operations performed from 1971 to 1998, 95.1% were performed on women. Moreover, that proportion has **increased** every half decade, rising from 92% in the early 1970s to 97% in the late 1990s.[282] Given the uncertain quality of these surgical procedures in many times and places, and the risks always involved in undergoing such intrusive measures, this feminization of birth control surgery would seem to render questionable official claims that the program protects women's health.

Abortion is almost always a traumatic experience, emotionally if not physically. It is one that, of course, only women go through. Abortion has always accounted for a significant fraction of the birth control surgeries conducted in China. In the twenty-eight years between 1971 and 1998, that fraction ranged from 17% to 43% of all operations, averaging 31.6% (see Table 6.1). The greatest numbers of abortions (between 12.5 and 14.4 million a year) were performed during the major campaign years 1982-1983 and 1990-1991 (as well as 1988). Since 1991, the number of abortions has fallen below 10 million a year, suggesting some amelioration in the most recent decade. In the period 1995 to 1998, 6.6 to 8.8 million abortions were performed a year, less than at any time since 1982.

The figures on sterilization show extensive gender bias. Of the 146 million sterilizations performed in China from 1971 through 1998, 73.8% were performed on women (see Table 6.2). This, despite the fact that vasectomy is a less complicated and risky procedure than tubal ligation. Here too the trend is toward feminization of surgery. Interestingly, fully 41% of all the vasectomies so far performed (from 1971 through 1998) were conducted during the 1970s, when the later-longer-fewer policy was still in effect. In the late 1990s (1995-1998), only 2.1% of all operations (and 15.9% of sterilizations) were performed on males (again, see Table 6.2). Women's proportion of the total number of sterilizations has increased in most half decades (59%, 64%, 78%, 75%, 80%, 84%). During the 1990s, there was some slight amelioration in the type of operation performed on women: IUD insertions rose from 35% of the total procedures in the early 1990s (1990-1994), to 39% in the late 1990s (1995-1998). Between the early and late 1990s, abortions inched down from 37% to 36% of the total number of birth control procedures.

[282] The figures are 92% in the early 1970s, 93% in the late 1970s, 95% in the early 1980s, 96.0% in the late 1980s, 96.1% in the early 1990s, and 98% in the late 1990s.

This overall feminization of birth control surgery reflects larger shifts in gender roles and responsibilities between the Maoist and post-Maoist periods. The birth program originated during the Maoist period (1949-1976), when there was greater emphasis, both rhetorical and to a certain extent also substantive, on gender equality. During the 1970s, birth planning propaganda was actively pro-woman, linking birth planning with women's liberation and stressing men's responsibility for contraception. Birth policy sought to alter social and economic institutions such as marriage, employment, and wage structures in ways that would raise women's status in the family and in society. The pro-woman thrust of the birth program changed dramatically in the late 1970s, when women were called upon to bear only one child, sacrificing their individual needs and wishes "for the Chinese nation" and "for generations to come."

In the 1980s and 1990s, the great changes that swept over Chinese society presented daunting challenges to women. Although the economic and political reforms introduced in these decades had contradictory effects on women's lives, it is the losses— of job security, formal political position, and much more— that have received the most attention.[283] Internal debates about the apparent deterioration in women's status prompted government action to arrest the trend.[284] The government's Program for the Development of Chinese Women (1995-2000) and many o9ther measures seem to have fostered greater awareness of the growing discrimination against women and introduced some countermeasures to improve women's status. Meantime, however, China's growing incorporation into the global economy has nourished the development of a new consumer culture that commodifies the bodies, sexuality, and identities of women. The dominant image has been the "virtuous wife and good mother" who has left the public sphere of production and politics to men, taking up her rightful place in the private sphere of childcare and domesticity.[285] This new cultural celebration of motherhood is likely to have encouraged the notion that women bear sole responsibility for reproduction, contraception, and child-rearing.

Given this marked gender bias in contraceptive burden, it is more than ironic that so many of the asylum applicants claiming persecution under the one-child policy are male. While the burden of birth planning falls very heavily on men too— high fines, economic destitution, possible loss of their wives' labor power, the inability to have a wanted child— women, whose bodies may also be damaged, would seem to suffer a greater cost.[286] Yet fewer women make it to this country to press their case.

Daughters endure discrimination. The policies on second children also embed the cultural preference for sons by allowing rural couples with "only" a daughter to have another

[283] Riley, Nancy E. "Gender equality in China: Two steps forward, one step back," in *China Briefing: The Contradictions of Change*. Edited by William A. Joseph (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 79-108; *Spaces of Their Own*. Edited by Mayfair Mei-hui Yang (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[284] Tan, Lin and Peng Xizhe. "China's female population," in *The Changing Population of China: Family, Sexuality and Social Relations in Past Times.* Edited by Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
[285] Honig, Emily and Gail Hershatter. *Personal Voices: Chinese Women in the 1980s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Notar, Beth. "Of labor and liberation: Images of women in current Chinese television advertising," *Visual Anthropology Review* (Vol. 10, No. 2, Fall 1994), p. 29-44; Hooper, Beverley. "'Flower vase and housewife': Women and consumerism in post-Mao China," in *Gender and Power in Affluent Asia*. Edited by Krishna Sen and Maila Stevens (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 167-193.
[286] For more on these costs, see Chapter Two.

child.[287] In the 1980s, when these rules were being worked out, population policy makers were caught in a terrible bind: intense efforts to promote the one-child rule countrywide had produced a fierce backlash in which some couples with only a daughter resorted to killing the girl in order to be allowed another try for a son. Faced with this kind of resistance, and with its harmful effects on party-mass relations in the countryside, policy makers felt they had no choice but to modify the policy to allow couples with one daughter to have another child. This rule was designed to save the lives of baby girls, to improve policy enforcement— and to improve foreign opinion of the birth program. Whatever the reasons, the effect was to reinforce the longstanding cultural bias against daughters. The rule now has the force of law, for the daughter-only provision has been written into the birth planning legislation of the majority of China's provinces. Those hurt most by the one-child policy may well be the female infants who, having been aborted, abandoned, sometimes lovingly adopted, but sometimes also killed, have little chance to leave China to better their lives.

E. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have traced the remarkable variation in the Chinese program and its roots in inequalities that are, in some cases at least, as old as China itself. In this and the preceding chapters, we have observed the program from the viewpoint of the political center. In the next section, we drop down the administrative hierarchy to see how things look at the provincial level. We begin in the following chapter with an examination of provincial program performance. This chapter forms a companion to Chapter Four, which detailed many of the same measures at the national level.

[287] For more on these preferences, see Chapter Two.

TABLE 6.1 ABORTIONS, 1971-1998

	ABORTIONS	TOTAL OPERATIONS	% ABORTIONS
1971	3,910,110	13,051,123	30.0%
1972	4,813,542	18,690,446	25.8%
1973	5,110,405	25,075,557	20.4%
1974	4,984,564	22,638,229	22.0%
1975	5,084,260	29,462.861	17.3%
1976	4,742,946	22,385,435	21.2%
1977	5,229,569	25,539,086	20.5%
1978	5,391,204	21,720,096	24.8%
1979	7,856,587	30,581,114	25.7%
1980	9,527,644	28,628,437	33.3%
1981	8,696,945	22,760,305	38.2%
1982	12,419,663	33,702,389	36.9%
1983	14,371,843	58,205,572	24.7%
1984	8,890,140	31,734,864	28.0%
1985	10,931,565	25,646,972	42.7%
1986	11,578,713	28,475,506	40.7%
1987	10,489,412	34,597,082	30.3%
1988	12,675,839	31,820,664	39.8%
1989	10,379,426	29,031,912	35.8%
1990	13,493,926	34,982,328	38.6%
1991	14,086,313	38,135,578	36.9%
1992	10,416,287	28,017,605	37.2%
1993	9,496,119	25,114,685	37.8%
1994	9,467,064	27,967,575	33.9%
1995	7,476,482	22,236,012	33.6%
1996	8,834,195	22,953,599	38.5%
1997	6,589,869	20,418,688	32.3%
1998	7,384,290	19,458,072	37.9%

Source: 1971-83, Editorial Committee. *China Health Yearbook 1999 (Zhongguo Weisheng Nianjian)* (Beijing: Renmin Weisheng Chubanshe) [in Chinese]; 1982-98, *China Health Yearbook 1984 (Zhongguo Weisheng Nianjian).*

TABLE 6.2 STERILIZATIONS, 1971-1998
(By gender)

	FEMALE STERILI-ZATIONS	MALE STERILI-ZATIONS	TOTAL STERILI-ZATIONS	TOTAL OPERA-TIONS	% STERILI-ZATIONS	FEMALE/ MALE RATIO
1971	1,744,644	1,223,480	2,968,124	13,051,123	22.7%	1.43
1972	2,087,160	1,715,822	3,802,982	18,690,446	20.3%	1.22
1973	2,955,617	1,933,210	4,888,827	25,075,557	19.5%	1.53
1974	2,275,741	1,445,251	3,720,992	22,638,229	16.4%	1.57
1975	3,280,042	2,652,653	5,932,695	29,462.861	20.1%	1.24
1976	2,707,849	1,495,540	4,203,389	22,385,435	18.8%	1.81
1977	2,776,448	2,616,876	5,393,324	25,539,086	21.1%	1.06
1978	2,511,413	767,542	3,278,955	21,720,096	15.1%	3.27
1979	5,289,518	1,673,947	6,963,465	30,581,114	22.8%	3.16
1980	3,842,006	1,363,508	5,205,514	28,628,437	18.2%	2.82
1981	1,555,971	649,476	2,205,447	22,760,305	9.7%	2.40
1982	3,925,927	1,230,967	5,156,894	33,702,389	15.3%	3.19
1983	16,398,378	4,359,261	20,757,639	58,205,572	35.7%	3.76
1984	5,417,163	1,293,286	6,710,449	31,734,864	21.1%	4.19
1985	2,283,971	575,564	2,859,535	25,646,972	11.1%	3.97
1986	2,914,900	1,030,827	3,945,727	28,475,506	13.9%	2.83
1987	4,407,755	1,752,598	6,160,052	34,597,082	17.8%	2.51
1988	3,590,469	1,062,161	4,652,630	31,820,664	14.6%	3.38
1989	4,221,717	1,509,294	5,731,011	29,031,912	19.7%	2.80
1990	5,314,722	1,466,442	6,781,164	34,982,328	19.4%	3.62
1991	6,753,338	2,382,670	9,136,008	38,135,578	24.0%	2.83
1992	4,500,029	858,675	5,358,704	28,017,605	19.1%	5.24
1993	3,580,344	641,705	4,222,049	25,114,685	16.8%	5.58
1994	3,726,861	671,890	4,398,751	27,967,575	15.7%	5.55
1995	2,315,472	464,387	2,779,859	22,236,012	12.5%	4.99
1996	2,736,415	546,425	3,282,840	22,953,599	14.3%	5.01
1997	2,340,303	436,656	2,776,959	20,418,688	13.6%	5.36
1998	1,993,126	329,080	2,322,206	19,458,072	11.9%	6.06

Source: 1971-1981, Editorial Committee. *China Health Yearbook 1984 (Zhongguo Weisheng Nianjian)* (Beijing: Renmin Weisheng Chubanshe) [in Chinese]; 1982-1998, *China Health yearbook 1999*.

IV. PROVINCIAL PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Chapter 7: PROVINCIAL POPULATION CHANGE AND PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: "LEVEL-BY-LEVEL" ADMINISTRATION THAT KEEPS TOP AND BOTTOM APART

B. SUBNATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: CENTRAL GOAL-SETTING, PROVINCIAL IMPLEMENTATION

(a) Provincial role
(b) Local resources
(c) Funding and control

C. THE EARLY 1990s: THREE CATEGORIES OF PROVINCES

(a) National evaluation of provincial performance
(b) Provincial program performance in 1990
(c) Change in provincial performance, 1990-1995

D. THE LATE 1990s: REMARKABLE CLAIMED RESULTS

(a) Basic demography
(b) Program inputs
(c) Program outcomes

E. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we sketch the subnational structure of birth planning administration in the 1990s. After noting the decentralized nature of the birth program, we elaborate on the decentralization of implementation and of funding. In a second section we treat the early 1990s, tracing the responses of the provinces to the big push by the center to re-enforce birth limits. In the third section we provide data on population change and program outcomes as of the late 1990s. Implicit throughout is the interaction between the decentralized organization of program administration and the diverse levels of socioeconomic development across China's provinces and localities.[288] As in Chapter Four, when we talk about "good performance" on birth planning, we are not implying a value judgment, but instead referring to performance that accords with government goals.

[288] This chapter draws heavily on Winckler, Edwin A. "Chinese state birth planning: Provincial performance in the 1990s" (Unpublished manuscript, no date).

In examining provincial birth planning patterns, our concern is less demographic than political: we are interested in mining the numbers for political insights into how and how heavily the policy rules have been enforced in different places. For INS officers, the purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, the discussion of decentralization helps to explain why birth policy and implementation vary from place to place. In particular, the program is mostly locally funded. For this reason, its capacity for administration that is both strict and "lawful" varies greatly across localities. Second, the discussion of early 1990s "re-enforcement" helps identify which provinces were under particular pressure to force their localities to comply with national policy during that period. Such pressure does strengthen local enforcement, often through crash campaigns that can include coercion. Third, the data on provincial performance in the late 1990s show which provinces remained "out of line" and help situate particular asylum cases within the subnational development of the program. For that purpose, the chapter notes any distinctive characteristics of the southern coastal provinces in general and Fujian in particular. The same processes that produce variation across provinces also produce variation within provinces, so this chapter also provides us with a heuristic for thinking about the local context of individual cases.

A. INTRODUCTION: "LEVEL-BY-LEVEL" ADMINISTRATION THAT KEEPS TOP AND BOTTOM APART

The most fundamental feature of subnational program administration is the "level-by-level" hierarchy that gives national political and program leaders only indirect access to local program leaders and community program implementers. The performance of any level is a composite of the performances of the diverse levels below it. Each level of territorial government assumes some program responsibilities and funds some proportion of the total cost. Usually each level directly supervises only the level immediately below it. Moreover, as in the implementation of most Chinese social and cultural policies, that supervision is largely advisory. Higher-level birth planning commissions can formulate policies but they can only "recommend" those policies to lower-level governments and their birth planning commissions.[289] Higher-level birth planning commissions do not exercise any line command over lower-level provincial birth planning commissions (known as a "leadership" relationship), much less over the leaders of lower-level territorial governments. Lower-level birth planning commissions report only to the territorial governments at their own level. The main command leverage between levels is not within the administration of birth planning itself, but within the management of the political careers of subnational leaders, which ultimately are supervised by the party and from the political center.

B. SUBNATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION: CENTRAL GOAL-SETTING, PROVINCIAL IMPLEMENTATION

[289] In Chinese communist lexicon, this is called a "professional" relationship; see Lieberthal, Kenneth and Michel Oksenberg. *Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

In the implementation of social policy in general and birth policy in particular, the center has established general guidelines, while provinces and subprovincial localities have had responsibility for implementing them. Here we look into the economic realities that made such a division of labor necessary.

(a) Provincial role

In a large country like China, provinces have always been strategic units for the formulation and implementation of policy. This was true under imperial (until 1911), republican (1911-1949), and communist (1949 to present) administrations. During the communist period, the overall trend has been away from the Soviet-style centralization that was adopted in the 1950s toward increasing decentralization of all but national defense. Even many key economic functions have gradually devolved from the center to the provinces.

Despite socialist aspirations for broad social policies and despite revolutionary aspirations for deep cultural change, much decentralization has always prevailed in social and cultural affairs. The center usually has set the main directions of change and often has vigorously promoted change through propaganda-and-education. Nevertheless, the center has never considered itself able to subsidize extensive social services in the vast poor countryside. And seldom has it maintained much optimism about the rapidity with which it could transform traditional rural customs.

Thus, in state birth planning, as in other social policies, the center has formulated the goals and mandated their implementation, but it has delegated that implementation largely to the provinces. As the center intends, the provinces have re-specified national birth policies to fit their circumstances. Provincial birth planning regulations, eventually passed by provincial legislatures, so far have provided the most authoritative concrete statement of birth planning policies.[290] Provinces have also assumed significant responsibility for funding.

(b) Local resources

Most Chinese provinces are large and diverse units with huge populations and limited resources. Consequently, provinces in turn have left much of the work of implementation up to prefectures and, below them, counties. The counties in turn have had to rely heavily on townships and villages to provide economic resources and secure social cooperation.

This pattern of reliance on localities has meant that the material achievement of national social and cultural goals has depended largely on local resources. As a result, basically each locality has enjoyed only the level of social services that its own local economy could support, with some exceptions for old revolutionary bases, model localities, experimental areas and very poor areas, all of which have received outside support. Decentralization of social and cultural policies became even more pronounced during the 1990s, as the central government suffered large budget deficits and strived to segregate central and subnational revenue sources. Nevertheless, at the end of the

[290] For more on these provincial regulations, see Chapter Five.

1990s, the SBPC decided to devote 60% of central program resources to the central and western regions of the country, in hopes of building solid grass-roots birth planning networks in poor areas there.[291] The level of support suggests the extent of the problem in those areas.

(c) Funding and control

As just suggested, a key variable is funding. During the 1990s, the center lobbied each province to raise total per capita expenditure on birth planning— with much success. Provinces in turn have lobbied each of their localities to do the same. At the beginning of the 1990s, typical provincial spending (by all levels within the province) started below two yuan per capita (only about twenty American cents!). The national goal for the mid-1990s was at least two yuan per capita. Although the province itself makes a significant contribution, typically the county bears the largest part of the financial burden (in Fujian about 60%). Per capita funding is a main determinant of the effectiveness of birth planning within a given locality. For example, the high local revenues of Fujian's industrial port city of Xiamen have permitted high per capita expenditures on birth planning, creating one of Fujian's best institutionalized and most effective programs.[292]

It would be too much to say that "he who pays the piper calls the tune," implying that because provinces largely fund their own programs, the center has lost control. Quite the contrary. The national political leadership has been willing to invest the political resources necessary to force subnational party and state leaders to implement national birth policies. To an extent that is remarkable given the decentralization of funding, the central party-state has succeeded in calling the tune. Nevertheless, the fact that the subnational pipers at various levels have been significantly self-supporting has certainly given them some influence over how the tune would be played.[293] (see Huang 1996.)

C. THE EARLY 1990s: THREE CATEGORIES OF PROVINCES

The early 1990s marked an important turning point in the evolution of the birth program. Here we see how national political and program leaders viewed provincial program performance and what kind of subnational situation they faced around 1990. We see too the dramatic improvements the center achieved in the performance of many populous agricultural provinces during the years that followed.

In the 1990s, national political and program leaders divided provinces and their localities into three categories— "advanced," "middling" and "backward." This classification highlighted differences in provincial performance and created competition between provinces to improve their national standing. Such classification also underlined the need to devise different strategies for

[291] Zhang, Weiguo. "Implementation of state family planning programmes in a northern Chinese village," *China Quarterly* (No. 157, March 1999), p. 202-230.
[292] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999.
[293] On continued state political clout despite economic decentralization, see Huang, Yasheng. *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

improving provincial programs within each of the three categories. The main emphasis was on helping "backward" provinces, which in turn meant focusing on backward localities within each province. Usually such places were quite poor, so the problem was how to do much with little, something for which the most advanced places did not provide an apt model. National program leaders encouraged "advanced" provinces to maintain their exemplary performance in limiting births while improving the quality and scope of services. As regards "middling" provinces, the center recommended that the better ones study the experience of the advanced and reminded the worse ones of the danger of sliding down into the backward category. The center urged that each province replicate this "three-category" approach within its own jurisdiction.[294]

(a) National evaluation of provincial performance

In practice, when allocating administrative effort under the three-category schema, the center considered at least three main factors: the population of the locality, the province's birth planning performance, and the prospects for improvement.

The first dimension was the size of each province's contribution to the national population problem. This was basically a function of sheer population size, but it also included the rate of natural population growth. Taken together, size and growth rate determined how many new births each province added to China's population each year. It was because of size that in the 1970s the center had targeted Sichuan, China's most populous province and still a largely agricultural area with relatively high birth rates. As of 1990, because Sichuan had already made significant progress, attention expanded to include the other nine most populous agricultural provinces, which still had relatively high birth rates.[295]

A second dimension was provincial birth planning performance. To national leaders, arguably the single most salient dimension was the multiple child rate (MCR). As noted throughout this Report, during the 1990s what the enforcers of the so-called "one-child" policy were most determined to achieve in practice was not limiting couples to one child but preventing them from having more than two. A high MCR was clear evidence that a province was not doing its job (the exception was minority provinces where third children were allowed). A crude version of the MCR was simply the percentage of women with three or more children. A more precise measure was the proportion of births in recent years that were third or higher-order children. A still more refined index was the proportion of births that were not only third-or-higher order but also "out-of-plan."

The third dimension concerned the performance of provinces relative to their level of socioeconomic development. More developed provinces had less excuse than less developed provinces for having high multiple child rates and poor performance on other program indicators. In practice, the main obstacle to persuading couples to limit their births has been the still labor-intensive demands of Chinese agriculture and the accompanying culture that has emphasized the need for several children, particularly males, as agricultural workers. Given Chinese data categories,

[294] The Fujian chapter will illustrate this process.
[295] Early 1990s accounts spoke of the nine big provinces, while some retrospective late 1990s accounts spoke of the dozen largest.

the most direct single indicator of that rural livelihood and lifestyle is the proportion of provincial population that remained in agricultural employment (in 1990 a national average of 72%, according to the census of that year).

(b) Provincial performance in 1990

Table 7.1 displays the provinces in 1990 along the three dimensions just defined. (The tables discussed in this chapter are located at the end of this chapter.) The table lists the provinces in descending order of multiple child rate, highlights the nine most populous agricultural provinces (in bold type), and shows the proportion of agricultural employment in each province. Taken together, these dimensions define several categories of provinces that remained significant for most aspects of birth planning throughout the 1990s. For that reason, it is worth briefly noting which provinces fall into which category.

The "advanced" group (shown in the top third of Table 7.1) includes the most urbanized and industrialized provinces, plus Sichuan. All had 1990 MCRs of 11% or less. The three municipalities of Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin all had rates under 6% and, of course, the lowest agricultural employment (12-30%). Shanghai had the lowest of both rates— remarkably, the city had almost no multiple children! It is worth pondering the magnitude of the administrative achievement of insuring that in a city of more than ten million people, almost no couples have more than two children (assuming that these figures reflect reality, which in Shanghai they largely should). Next highest in multiple-child performance came the most developed of the true provinces. In the Northeast, Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin had agricultural employments between about 50% and 60%; in the East, Zhejiang and Jiangsu were just over 60%. Jiangsu was one of the nine populous provinces. Finally and remarkably, this advanced group included Sichuan, China's most populous province, which the center had targeted for fertility reduction in the 1970s. Reducing the MCR to below 10% was a remarkable achievement for a large province with 83% of its population still employed in agriculture. Reportedly, much coercion was required to achieve that high figure. Among our three southern coastal provinces (introduced in Chapter Six), Zhejiang fell in this advanced group. An MCR under 5% was an amazing figure for a province with 62% of its population employed in agriculture. Evidently, Zhejiang already had an exceptionally effective birth program, which was reflected by the late 1990s in its pioneering a "new birth planning" with better quality services and more voluntary compliance.

The "middling" group includes five of the nine most populous agricultural provinces (in order of size, Henan, Shandong, Hebei, Hunan and Anhui). Their 1990 MCRs ranged from 17% to 23% (near the national average of 19%), while their agricultural employment averaged 80.3% (well above the national average of 72%). Together with Hebei, they account for most of the population of North and Central China. Within that group, Hebei and Shandong had the best program performance (MCRs of 17%). This accords with Hebei's early start in birth planning in the 1960s and 1970s and with Shandong's role in the 1980s and 1990s of providing models for how to do "good birth planning" in areas that are still agricultural. In contrast, Henan, the second most populous province in China, had among the worst performances in this group (an MCR of 23%). For that reason, Henan was a particular target in the early 1990s. Among the three southern coastal provinces, Fujian fell within this middling cluster. Its MCR was rather high (21%) relative to an

agricultural employment rate that was rather low (67%), implying a somewhat lax program. Fujian's neighbor, Jiangxi, falls at the bottom of this group, with an MCR of 24%. Its agricultural employment was 77%.

Finally, the "backward" category consists mostly of provinces with significant numbers of minority nationalities— seven of nine fit this description.[296] This "backward" group includes two of the nine most populous provinces: Guangxi, which is a minority province and Guangdong, which is not. All of these backward provinces have 1990 MCRs of 25% or more. Since the main explanation for a high MCR is the presence of minority nationalities, within this category there is little correlation between MCR and agricultural employment. Among the minority provinces, Xinjiang's exceptionally high MCR (44%) was particularly excessive for its relatively modest agricultural employment (64%, a figure that includes Xinjiang's animal husbandry), suggesting a particularly lenient birth policy. Among our three southern coastal provinces, Guangdong not only fell in this backward category, it also stuck out because its high MCR (29%) was far out of line with its low agricultural employment (61%).

(c) Change in provincial performance, 1990-1995

The extent of the reduction in multiple child rate that each province recorded between 1990 and 1995 provides some indication of the amount of administrative pressure that each province exerted on its localities during that period. Table 7.2 ranks the provinces by the size of the decline in the MCR (according to the State Statistical Bureau, not the birth program, which reports still lower rates). As one would expect, the provinces that achieved the greatest reductions came mostly from those with the highest 1990 rates. Interestingly, the largest reduction— 19%— was by Henan, the prime target of national political and program leaders during this period. It is remarkable that Shandong could achieve such a large reduction (15%): aside from still being a largely agricultural province, it started in 1990 below the national average MCR. Conversely, most of the minority provinces (Gansu, Guangxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Hainan, Tibet) did worse than their high 1990 MCRs would have predicted. Among the three southern coastal provinces, Zhejiang was so advanced in 1990 (its MCR was 5%) that it had little room for improvement. Nevertheless, it managed to reduce its MCR still further (to a mere 2%). Fujian did perhaps slightly better than its baseline MCR would imply (judging from a scatterplot of these same data).

During the early 1990s, the national leadership's main objective was to force provinces to improve their birth program performance even if they were not very developed socioeconomically. If these data reflect reality, or even a partial reality, to a significant extent the national leadership appears to have succeeded, because there is little relationship between the extent of reduction in MCR and the proportion of agricultural employment in 1990 (again, judging from a scatterplot). Indeed, it was the "typical agricultural provinces" with still high agricultural employment that achieved virtually all of the large reductions in multiple children (ranging from 10-20%). They must have made an extraordinary administrative effort to overcome their low levels of development, presumably at the urgent insistence of the central government. For example, Henan did particularly well by program standards, achieving a nearly 20% reduction despite an agricultural population

[296] The other two minority provinces fall toward the bottom of the "middling" group.

over 80% of the total. In fact, it is known that during this period the national political leadership became particularly concerned about Henan's poor birth performance and insisted that the province improve its compliance. Despite the lack of relationship between the reduction in MCR and the absolute level of agricultural employment in 1990, one should not forget that during the early 1990s the reduction in MCR was accompanied by significant socioeconomic development, including a notable decrease of employment in agriculture. The big changes in this and other birth planning rates were due in part to rapid socioeconomic development.

D. THE LATE 1990s: REMARKABLE CLAIMED RESULTS

Here we rank China's provinces along the dimensions of birth program performance introduced for the nation as a whole in Chapters Three and Four. To match Chinese assessments of performance during five-year plans, where available we have used mostly information for 1990 or 1995. Where data are available, some dimensions also show 1996 and 1997. For single-year rankings, provinces are listed from "worst" performance to "best" performance— the order in which they would attract central pressure for stricter enforcement.

(a) Basic demography

To show the baseline from which the national leadership formulated its program strategy for the 1990s, Table 7.3 shows 1990 **population sizes and crude birth rates** (the latter given as number per thousand). The bolding on the table calls attention to three categories likely to be targeted for central-level attention. Populous provinces with high birth rates provided the most obvious targets (Henan, Guangdong, Anhui and Hubei). Middle-sized provinces with still-high birth rates provided secondary targets (Jiangxi, Fujian and Shanxi). Third, several small provinces showed particularly high birth rates, but because of their small absolute contribution to annual national growth, program leaders may not have considered them worthy special effort.[297] By the late 1990s, of course, the relative population size of provinces had not changed much. Yet there was one significant change: Guangdong passed Jiangsu into fourth place, something that helped persuade Guangdong to rescind its two-child policy. Also, Henan threatened to pass Sichuan to become China's most populous province.[298]

During the 1990s, provinces were under pressure to lower their **natural population increase rates**, with a year-2000 target of increase rates under 10 per thousand. Table 7.4 lists China's provinces in order of 1995 natural population increase rate. One thing noteworthy about these data is the high rates for mostly Han provinces like Hainan, Guangdong, and Jiangxi— rates that are similar to those for provinces with many minority nationalities. In 1995, Fujian's increase rate was already below 10 per thousand, the national target for the year 2000.

Table 7.5 shows 1995 **Total fertility rates** (the total number of children that the average woman bears during her reproductive career). These figures are about what one would expect from

[297] Such provinces include Xinjiang, Hainan, and Ningxia.
[298] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, June 1999.

the provinces' levels of socioeconomic development. Exceptions include Guangdong, which does much worse than its high development would predict, and Shandong, which does much better than its low development would predict. Many national and provincial Chinese birth planning administrators know quite accurately the TFR implied by the birth planning regulations of many provinces, which they regard as a strong determinant of actual provincial TFRs. These figures are from the SBPC's own report to the State Council of progress during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995), presumably based on the 1990 census and a 1995 survey. Many observers would say the figures are low, but these are the numbers with which the program works.

(b) Program inputs

Program inputs are important predictors of program outcomes. Here we review several key inputs: late marriage rates, contraceptive prevalence rates, and One-Child Certificate acceptance rates. Although fertility has been the program's main concern, high rates of late marriage, contraceptive use, and certificate acceptance have been important goals of the program in their own right.

Table 7.6 orders the provinces by their 1995 **late marriage rates** (i.e., the proportion of first female marriages that take place at age 23 or over). Here it is not surprising that Jiangxi does poorly, but Sichuan, Heilongjiang and Jilin, with their strong programs, also do poorly. At the other extreme, as usual, it is impressive that agricultural Shandong does so well, but it is unclear why Xinjiang does too, unless it has generous marriage age rules. The table also shows rates for early marriages (i.e., first marriages of women taking place before age 20), which are illegal. Here Ningxia and Qinghai do poorly even for minority provinces, and, as usual, Hainan does poorly for a largely Han province.

Table 7.7 presents the **contraceptive prevalence rates** for all provinces in 1995. Overall the claimed performance is remarkably high. The national average is 90% and three-quarters of the provinces achieve rates of 90% or above. Most of the laggards are poor minority regions; the exception, as usual, is Guangdong.[299]

Across provinces, during the 1990s, **One-Child Certificate rates** ranged from as high as 70% (Shanghai) to below 10%, with about half the provinces falling between 10% and 30%. Table 7.8 orders the provinces by their 1995 rates. These data suggest that provincial policy strongly affects popular certificate acceptance. As one would expect, rates in the three major cities are significantly higher than elsewhere. High certificate acceptance rates in the major cities reflect not just urbanites' willingness to have only one child, but also urban policy's requiring that. In the middle range of provinces, localities with acceptance rates of about 25% and higher are those with strong programs. Most of the lowest rates fall in provinces with large minority nationality populations, which have lenient birth policies. In addition, Guangdong had a low rate, in good part because for most of the 1990s it too had a two-child policy. Jiangxi's low rate— on this as on

[299] Since Jilin has a strong program, the low rate reported for Jilin in 1995 is anomalous and may have been a misprint. The rate reported for Jilin in 1996 is more plausible, and since these rates and rankings vary little from year to year, the table ranks Jilin according to the 1996 figure.

many other measures— suggests an unusually weak program.

(c) Program outcomes

Table 7.9 orders the provinces inversely by their **planned birth rates** in 1997, the first year for which they were published since 1990. At the top of the table, as usual Guangdong and Hainan have surprisingly low rates.[300] At the bottom of the table, minority nationality provinces have high in-plan rates because they have generous rules. It is not surprising that industrialized-urbanized Liaoning does so well, but for agricultural Shandong such a high in-plan rate suggests especially strong enforcement of birth policy.

Table 7.10 orders the provinces by their **multiple child rates** in 1995 (again, according to the State Statistical Bureau). The national average was only 7%, and if one omitted the minority provinces it would be even lower. If these figures reflect or even partly reflect reality, there was a striking drop in multiple childbearing in all those populous agricultural provinces in the low single digits.[301] Again, Guangdong and Hainan were high for mostly Han provinces. On the basis of this table, one would expect that in the late 1990s the center would have increased its pressure on Guangdong and Hainan. In fact, in the late 1990s, Guangdong did change its "two-child" policy to a "1.68 child" policy (a number similar to that used by other Han agricultural provinces). Guangdong birth planning officials insist that this occurred on local initiative, not as a result of central pressure.[302] Perhaps what they meant was that the new governor had just been transferred from Henan, where heavy-handed birth planning had achieved "results."

Finally, Table 7.11 shows the distribution of **births by parity** in 1997. Since the proportion of births that are first children is largely a function of the proportion that are a second child, let us focus on second children. As we have come to expect, Guangdong and Hainan are very high for mostly Han provinces; moreover, a high proportion of those second children are out-of-plan (not shown on table). Conversely, as usual, provinces from the Northeast and East are low.

E. CONCLUSION

China's provinces are as big as many nation-states— and deserve as much attention. In this chapter we have tracked some of the remarkable variation between provincial-level units on many measures of population change and program performance. Although data problems mean that we will never know the real level of all these rates, the data from the State Statistical Bureau suggest the likelihood that the reported trends are in the right direction, even if the absolute levels may not be a high as the State Birth Planning Commission claims. While some of the variation we have observed is due to differential pressure from the center, some of it is due to variation in socioeconomic development. As China's coastal provinces are increasingly incorporated into the global economy while inland provinces lag, that variation can only grow. In the next chapter, we

[300] In 1990, Fujian and Jiangxi had done worst of all the provinces, but by 1997 had greatly improved.
[301] The SBPC reports even lower figures, as reflected in the 1996 and 1997 rates shown.
[302] Interviews by the authors, June 1999.

take an in-depth look at one coastal province that is of special interest to our readers. Fujian is home to many asylum applicants— and an alluring place in its own right.

TABLE 7.1 MULTIPLE CHILD RATE, 1990
Showing populous provinces and agricultural employment

MCR	PLACE	1990 AG EMP
0.66	01 Shanghai	12.4
4.02	02 Liaoning	48.9
4.05	03 Beijing	19.5
4.99	04 Zhejiang	62.2
5.61	05 Tianjin	29.8
9.42	06 Heilongjiang	53.1
9.89	07 **Sichuan**	83.0
10.13	08 Jilin	57.5
10.95	09 **Jiangsu**	64.0
14.59	10 IMAR*	65.2
16.88	11 **Shandong**	79.3
16.94	12 **Hebei**	78.2
19.15	13 **Anhui**	81.3
19.32	CHINA	72.3
19.35	14 **Hubei**	71.6
19.50	15 **Hunan**	80.9
21.36	16 Fujian	66.7
21.89	17 Shanxi	67.1
22.59	18 **Henan**	82.2
22.84	19 Gansu	81.4
23.67	20 Yunnan	84.4
24.39	21 Jiangxi	77.3
25.74	22 Shaanxi	76.2
26.37	23 Guangxi	83.0
27.75	24 Qinghai	68.7
28.93	25 Ningxia	68.9
29.12	26 **Guangdong**	60.8
33.11	27 Hainan	76.8
33.65	28 Guizhou	84.8
44.35	29 Xinjiang	64.4
53.80	30 Tibet	75.9

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Note: Bolding of provinces shows nine most populous.
Source: Multiple child rate from State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics, comp. *China Population Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese]. Agricultural employment calculated from the State Council, Population Census Office and State Statistical Bureau, Population Statistics Department comps. *10 Percent Sampling Tabulation on the 1990 Population Census of the People's Republic of China (Computer Tabulation)* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, July 1991), Table 1-12, p. 26 [in Chinese]. For much lower SBPC figures on multiple children, see State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1991), Table 1-2-4, p. 489 [in Chinese].

TABLE 7.2 REDUCTION IN MULTIPLE CHILD RATE, 1990-1995

MCR DROP	PLACE	MCR 1990	MCR 1995
22.20	01 Xinjiang	44.35	22.15
18.64	02 Henan	22.59	3.95
17.49	03 Shaanxi	25.74	8.25
16.98	04 Guizhou	33.65	16.67
15.76	05 Anhui	19.15	3.39
15.32	06 Jiangxi	24.39	9.07
15.19	07 Shandong	16.88	1.69
14.70	08 Fujian	21.36	6.66
14.57	09 Hunan	19.50	4.93
14.17	10 Hebei	16.94	2.77
13.97	11 Guangdong	29.12	15.15
13.03	12 Yunnan	23.67	10.64
11.95	13 Guangxi	26.37	14.42
11.94	14 Hubei	19.35	7.41
11.89	CHINA	19.32	7.43
11.39	15 Shanxi	21.89	10.50
10.46	16 IMAR*	14.59	4.13
10.23	17 Qinghai	27.75	17.52
9.83	18 Gansu	22.84	13.01
9.18	19 Jiangsu	10.95	1.77
9.01	20 Ningxia	28.93	19.92
7.15	21 Heilongjiang	9.42	2.27
7.08	22 Hainan	33.11	26.03
7.00	23 Jilin	10.13	3.13
5.52	24 Sichuan	9.89	4.37
3.80	25 Tibet	53.80	50.00
3.45	26 Tianjin	5.61	2.16
2.97	27 Beijing	4.05	1.05
2.97	28 Zhejiang	4.99	2.02
2.65	29 Liaoning	4.02	1.37
0.04	30 Shanghai	0.66	0.62

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Sources: Multiple child rate from State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics, comp. *China Population Statistics Yearbook* (Beijing: 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese]. 1990 agricultural employment from 1% sample of 1990 census, 1995 from State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population and Employment Statistics; and Ministry of Labor, Department of Overall Planning, comp. *China Labor Statistical Yearbook* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1996).

TABLE 7.3 POPULATION SIZE, 1990

POPULATION	PROVINCE	% OF NATIONAL POPULATION	BIRTH RATE
1,131,911,093	CHINA		16.89
108,165,975	01 Sichuan	9.6%	14.53
86,016,742	02 **Henan**	7.6%	**20.82**
84,700,815	03 Shandong	7.5%	14.60
67,502,534	04 Jiangsu	6.0%	16.13
62,588,667	05 **Guangdong**	5.5%	**19.56**
61,169,422	06 Hebei	5.4%	15.09
61,060,713	07 Hunan	5.4%	17.91
56,555,839	08 **Anhui**	5.0%	**19.41**
54,271,044	09 **Hubei**	4.8%	**19.71**
42,400,814	10 Guangxi	3.7%	12.15
42,348,345	11 Zhejiang	3.7%	12.85
39,271,993	12 Liaoning	3.5%	14.31
38,106,401	13 Jiangxi	3.4%	**21.92**
36,963,940	14 Yunnan	3.3%	17.31
34,906,876	15 Heilongjiang	3.1%	13.82
32,804,084	16 Shaanxi	2.9%	17.66
32,400,798	17 Guizhou	2.9%	16.51
30,372,791	18 Fujian	2.7%	**20.16**
28,548,461	19 Shanxi	2.5%	**21.45**
24,833,280	20 Jilin	2.2%	15.53
22,469,295	21 Gansu	2.0%	17.88
21,707,900	22 IMAR*	1.9%	17.48
14,963,580	23 Xinjiang	1.3%	**18.74**
13,199,862	24 Shanghai	1.2%	9.96
10,322,131	25 Beijing	0.9%	12.42
8,662,535	26 Tianjin	0.8%	12.51
6,570,843	27 Hainan	0.6%	**20.74**
4,642,625	28 Ningxia	0.4%	**19.56**
4,382,788	29 Qinghai	0.4%	16.80

*****IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Note: Bolding of both provinces and birth rates indicates populous provinces with high birth rates. Bolding of birth rates alone shows middle-sized and small provinces with high birth rates.

Source: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1991), Table 1-2-1, p. 486 [in Chinese]. Omits Tibet.

TABLE 7.4 NATURAL POPULATION INCREASE RATE, 1995
(Showing crude birth and death rates)

NATURAL INCREASE RATE	PROVINCE	CRUDE BIRTH RATE	CRUDE DEATH RATE
16.10	30 Tibet	24.90	8.80
15.12	29 Qinghai	22.01	6.89
14.51	**28 Hainan**	20.12	5.61
14.26	27 Guizhou	21.86	7.60
14.16	26 Gansu	20.65	6.49
13.79	25 Ningxia	19.28	5.49
12.72	24 Yunnan	20.75	8.03
12.40	**23 Guangdong**	18.10	5.70
12.45	22 Xinjiang	18.90	6.45
11.66	**21 Jiangxi**	18.94	7.28
11.01	20 Guangxi	17.54	6.53
10.55	**CHINA**	**17.12**	**6.57**
10.53	19 IMAR	17.23	6.70
10.48	18 Shanxi	16.60	6.12
9.87	17 Sichuan	17.08	7.21
9.66	16 Anhui	16.07	6.41
9.36	15 Shaanxi	15.93	6.57
9.30	14 Fujian	15.20	5.90
9.27	13 Hubei	16.18	6.91
8.13	12 Henan	14.41	6.28
7.90	11 Heilongjiang	13.23	5.33
7.61	10 Hebei	13.93	6.32
6.81	09 Jilin	12.90	6.09
6.02	08 Liaoning	12.17	6.15
5.91	07 Zhejiang	12.66	6.75
5.87	06 Hunan	13.02	7.15
5.76	05 Jiangsu	12.32	6.56
4.00	04 Tianjin	10.23	6.23
3.35	03 Shandong	9.82	6.47
2.80	02 Beijing	7.92	5.12
-1.30	01 Shanghai	5.75	7.05

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Note: Figures are year-end and given in number per thousand. Aside from the national average, bolding indicates Han provinces with levels of natural population increase similar to those of minority provinces.

Source: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1996), p. 478 [in Chinese].

TABLE 7.5 TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 1995
(Showing 1990 and 1990-1995 reduction)

1995	PROVINCE	1990	REDUCTION
3.43	30 Tibet	3.81	0.38
2.64	29 Hainan	3.03	0.39
2.62	28 Guizhou	3.03	0.41
2.41	27 Qinghai	2.59	0.18
2.39	26 Yunnan	2.67	0.28
2.35	25 Xinjiang	3.13	0.78
2.24	24 Guangxi	2.71	0.47
2.21	23 **Guangdong**	2.48	0.27
2.16	22 Gansu	2.30	0.14
2.11	21 Jiangxi	2.62	0.51
2.08	20 Ningxia	2.60	0.52
2.02	19 Shanxi	2.44	0.42
1.94	18 IMAR*	2.13	0.19
1.92	17 Shaanxi	2.67	0.75
1.91	16 **Hubei**	2.46	0.55
1.78	CHINA	2.31	0.53
1.78	15 **Hebei**	2.48	0.70
1.75	14 Fujian	2.49	0.74
1.74	13 **Sichuan**	2.00	0.26
1.71	12 **Anhui**	2.49	0.78
1.66	11 **Henan**	2.90	1.24
1.50	10 Zhejiang	1.59	0.09
1.49	09 Liaoning	1.70	0.21
1.49	08 **Jiangsu**	2.01	0.52
1.47	07 **Hunan**	2.43	0.96
1.46	06 Heilongjiang	1.91	0.45
1.46	05 Jilin	1.87	0.41
1.41	04 Tianjin	1.61	0.20
1.14	03 **Shandong**	2.11	0.97
1.11	02 Beijing	1.44	0.33
1.05	01 Shanghai	1.42	0.37

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Note: Bolding of provinces shows nine most populous.
Source: State Birth Planning Commission. “Report to party center and government cabinet on subnational results of birth planning during the Eighth Five-Year Plan (draft, 17 January 1997).” in *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 97-99 [in Chinese]. Omits Tibet.

TABLE 7.6 LATE MARRIAGE RATE, 1995

LATE MARRIAGE RATE	PROVINCE	EARLY MARRIAGE RATE
29.57	29 Jiangxi	0.65
34.36	28 Sichuan	0.51
41.71	27 Hunan	0.73
42.89	26 Yunnan	5.56
45.50	25 Ningxia	9.24
47.08	24 Gansu	3.38
48.88	23 Heilongjiang	1.58
49.09	22 Jilin	0.53
49.32	21 Hubei	0.97
49.73	20 Fujian	1.19
51.76	19 Hebei	0.06
52.46	18 Guizhou	3.23
53.67	17 Qinghai	9.88
57.28	16 Shaanxi	0.76
58.85	**CHINA**	**0.94**
61.52	15 Guangxi	0.37
61.55	14 Liaoning	0.05
62.43	13 Shanghai	0.05
62.76	12 Tianjin	0.09
64.45	11 Shanxi	1.44
66.94	10 Hainan	4.43
67.00	09 Henan	0.16
67.70	08 Anhui	0.27
70.59	07 Jiangsu	0.33
71.59	06 Guangdong	1.56
72.45	05 IMAR*	0.56
73.72	04 Zhejiang	0.40
82.44	03 Xinjiang	0.48
84.51	02 Beijing	0.03
99.05	01 Shandong	0.00

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Note: Late marriage is women 23 and above; early marriage is women 19 and below.

Source: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1996),p. 466 [in Chinese]. Omits Tibet.

TABLE 7.7 CONTRACEPTIVE PREVALENCE RATE, 1995
(Showing 1996)

1995 CPR	PROVINCE	1996 CPR
84.79	29 Hainan	83.36
80.77	28 Xinjiang	82.06
84.08	27 Yunnan	84.70
84.99	26 Qinghai	85.28
85.44	25 Guangdong	86.79
88.22	24 Gansu	88.16
90.08	23 Beijing	90.10
73.21	22 Jilin	90.81
90.09	21 Guangxi	91.37
90.12	20 Henan	91.05
90.25	19 Shanxi	90.07
90.26	18 Ningxia	91.48
90.27	17 Anhui	90.83
90.40	**CHINA**	**91.14**
90.73	16 Shaanxi	92.31
91.23	15 Sichuan	91.52
91.25	14 Fujian	91.88
91.41	13 Liaoning	91.56
91.66	12 Tianjin	91.64
91.89	11 IMAR*	92.09
92.12	10 Hebei	92.39
92.22	09 Shandong	91.56
92.24	08 Zhejiang	92.41
92.45	07 Shanghai	92.15
92.58	06 Guizhou	90.70
92.85	05 Hubei	93.09
92.94	04 Jiangxi	94.50
93.12	03 Heilongjiang	93.54
93.57	02 Hunan	92.55
93.60	01 Jiangsu	93.56

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

Note: Chinese data define CPR as the proportion of married women between 15 and 49 who contracept (or whose spouse does). However, Chinese data sometimes omit women not required to practice contraception (e.g., late-married childless, pregnant or post-menopausal women). Decreasing the denominator works to inflate the CPR.

Sources: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1996), Table 1-5, p. 470 [in Chinese]; and *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (1997), Table 1-7, p. 508. Omits Tibet.

TABLE 7.8 ONE-CHILD CERTIFICATE RATE, 1995
(Showing 1996 and 1997)

1995	PROVINCE	1996	1997
6.48	29 Guangxi	6.35	6.72
6.81	28 Guizhou	6.18	5.94
7.63	27 Hainan	7.49	6.40
8.32	26 Yunnan	8.44	8.58
9.19	25 Guangdong	9.45	9.42
9.60	24 Jiangxi	9.78	10.77
9.97	23 Gansu	13.02	10.18
10.20	22 Henan	13.54	15.08
10.82	21 Anhui	10.87	11.58
11.08	20 Hunan	11.22	11.84
11.38	19 Hebei	11.88	12.66
11.78	18 Shaanxi	14.87	12.16
12.15	17 Qinghai	12.29	12.40
12.58	16 Ningxia	12.72	12.50
13.28	15 Fujian	18.19	20.00
13.43	14 Xinjiang	13.60	13.74
13.82	13 Shanxi	13.18	13.57
14.39	12 IMAR*	14.02	14.47
17.22	11 Hubei	17.47	17.51
20.72	CHINA	21.67	21.96
23.43	10 Zhejiang	23.0	22.56
25.07	09 Jilin	33.47	35.22
26.25	08 Shandong	27.42	28.48
30.42	07 Heilongjiang	31.31	32.30
33.33	06 Sichuan	35.33	36.58
42.68	05 Liaoning	43.88	44.69
45.23	04 Jiangsu	44.45	43.84
50.60	03 Tianjin	49.23	47.93
60.53	02 Beijing	62.05	61.71
69.99	01 Shanghai	66.55	59.00

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Sources: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1996), p. 522-523 [in Chinese]; *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (1997), p. 568-569; *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (1998), p. 512-513. Omits Tibet.

TABLE 7.9 PLANNED BIRTH RATE, 1997
(Showing 1990)

1997	PROVINCE	1990
69.32	31 Hainan	69.68
77.94	30 Guangdong	77.71
81.20	29 Ningxia	75.05
85.00	28 Gansu	85.20
85.58	27 Guizhou	78.57
86.18	26 Qinghai	78.40
88.97	25 Shanxi	79.95
90.04	24 Guangxi	82.94
91.01	23 Yunnan	80.76
92.97	**CHINA**	**81.17**
93.05	22 Fujian	61.61
93.18	21 Jiangxi	60.00
93.74	20 Chongqing	n.a.
93.77	19 Sichuan	90.67
94.14	18 Jilin	90.78
94.26	17 Shaanxi	81.15
94.36	16 Hubei	75.31
95.10	15 Jiangsu	84.80
95.22	14 Shanghai	99.51
95.99	13 Anhui	76.13
96.69	12 Hebei	89.52
96.95	11 Heilongjiang	89.17
97.08	10 Hunan	68.15
97.77	09 Beijing	96.42
97.77	08 Zhejiang	96.97
97.85	07 Henan	79.41
98.08	06 Xinjiang	81.67
98.15	05 IMAR*	80.60
98.27	04 Tianjin	95.73
98.70	03 Tibet	n.a.
98.96	02 Shandong	87.59
99.70	01 Liaoning	96.19

*****IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Notes: Minority autonomous regions have high in-plan rates because they have generous plans.
Sources: State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 439 [in Chinese]; and *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (1991), calculated from p. 487 and p. 490. The 1991 *Yearbook* was the last to give planned birth rates until the 1998 *Yearbook*. Chongqing was newly elevated to status of provincial-level city.

TABLE 7.10 MULTIPLE CHILD RATE, 1995
(Showing 1996 and 1997)

1995	PROVINCE	1996	1997
50.00	30 Tibet	38.26	30.74
26.03	29 Hainan	19.51	15.46
22.15	28 Xinjiang	16.17	16.11
19.92	27 Ningxia	11.60	10.20
17.52	26 Qinghai	8.40	8.55
16.67	25 Guizhou	5.62	4.46
15.15	24 Guangdong	9.27	6.43
14.42	23 Guangxi	2.38	2.09
13.01	22 Gansu	4.44	1.66
10.64	21 Yunnan	3.86	2.70
10.50	20 Shanxi	1.61	1.35
9.07	19 Jiangxi	0.32	0.13
8.25	18 Shaanxi	1.30	0.54
7.43	**CHINA**	**2.75**	**2.11**
7.41	17 Hubei	2.71	1.48
6.66	16 Fujian	1.70	1.42
4.93	15 Hunan	0.56	0.35
4.37	14 Sichuan	2.50	2.28
4.13	13 IMAR*	1.48	1.17
3.95	12 Henan	0.19	0.22
3.39	11 Anhui	0.32	0.22
3.13	10 Jilin	0.14	0.43
2.77	09 Hebei	0.85	1.03
2.27	08 Heilongjiang	0.53	0.39
2.16	07 Tianjin	0.07	0.04
2.02	06 Zhejiang	0.78	0.47
1.77	05 Jiangsu	0.33	0.34
1.69	04 Shandong	0.23	0.19
1.37	03 Liaoning	0.93	0.25
1.05	02 Beijing	0.10	0.12
0.62	01 Shanghai	0.22	0.30

*****IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
Note: State Statistical Bureau (SSB) multiple child rates (1995) are significantly higher than State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC) rates (1996 and 1997). A consistent late 1990s series is not available: SSB gave only 1995 and SBPC did not give 1995. **Source:** 1995 rate from State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998) [in Chinese]. 1996 and 1997 rates from *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (1998), Table 1-4, p. 438.

TABLE 7.11 BIRTHS BY PARITY, 1997

	FIRST CHILD	SECOND CHILD	MULTIPLE CHILDREN
CHINA	**74.32%**	**23.57%**	**2.11%**
Beijing	91.78	8.10	0.12
Tianjin	85.66	14.31	0.04
Hebei	72.65	26.32	1.03
Shanxi	69.93	28.72	1.35
IMAR*	79.18	19.65	1.17
Liaoning	80.97	18.78	0.25
Jilin	88.87	10.70	0.43
Heilongjiang	90.10	9.51	0.39
Shanghai	92.77	6.93	0.30
Jiangsu	90.72	8.94	0.34
Zhejiang	76.14	23.39	0.47
Anhui	75.46	24.32	0.22
Fujian	75.04	23.54	1.42
Jiangxi	79.50	20.37	0.13
Shandong	75.68	24.12	0.19
Henan	81.57	18.20	0.22
Hubei	77.32	21.20	1.48
Hunan	79.80	19.86	0.35
Guangdong	57.99	35.58	6.43
Guangxi	68.19	29.72	2.09
Hainan	54.58	29.96	15.46
Sichuan	81.17	16.55	2.28
Guizhou	61.71	33.83	4.46
Yunnan	59.46	37.84	2.70
Tibet	36.67	32.59	30.74
Chongqing	80.07	18.69	1.24
Shaanxi	71.06	28.40	0.54
Gansu	67.25	31.10	1.66
Qinghai	60.70	30.75	8.55
Ningxia	60.46	29.34	10.20
Xinjiang	56.80	27.08	16.11

*IMAR is Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

Note: Expressed as percentage of all births. **Source:** State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), Table 1-4, p. 438 [in Chinese].

Chapter 8: FUJIAN

OUTLINE

A. INTRODUCTION: MAOIST CLOSURE, POST-MAO "OPENING UP"

B. PROVINCIAL PROGRAM: A TYPICAL PROGRAM WITH ATYPICAL RESULTS

(a) 1960s-1980s
(b) Early 1990s
(c) Late 1990s

C. SUBPROVINCIAL VARIATION: BIRTH PLANNING IN SOCIOECONOMIC AND SOCIOSPATIAL CONTEXT

(a) Prefectures across space
(b) Prefectures over time
(c) Counties across space

D. SUB-URBAN VARIATION IN THE FUZHOU AREA: COLORFUL COUNTIES, CADRE HEADACHES

(a) Peri-urban counties
(b) Interior counties
(c) Coastal counties

E. CONCLUSION

As home to a great many asylum applicants, the coastal province of Fujian merits special attention in this Report. Fujian is also a fascinating area. Its cultural distinctiveness, frontier character, and remarkable openness to the outside world make it a colorful place to visit, if only in these pages. In this chapter we provide both a broad overview and an in-depth look at many dimensions of Fujian's birth planning program, placing them in the larger context of the province's history, geography, and culture. Fujian is of interest both in itself, and as a detailed case study of the history and workings of birth planning in a reasonably typical province. INS officers can apply the processes noted and issues raised to other provinces, particularly other southern coastal provinces that, like Fujian, produce many applicants.

For simplicity, in earlier chapters we discussed subnational variation in Chinese birth planning in terms of provinces. Provinces are "artificial" administrative jurisdictions defined by political convention. However, Chinese provinces cover large areas that contain much diversity and it is necessary to have some way to understand that diversity. A helpful way to do so is to attend to "natural" urban-physiographic regions defined by such material factors as physical

geography, transportation networks, economic development and central-place hierarchies.[303] (Skinner 1977) Subnational variation in program performance involves an interplay between "artificial" jurisdictions and "natural" regions. *Both hierarchy and region have a strong practical impact on how birth planning works in any particular locality.*

Regional structure is important because the policy performance of any administrative jurisdiction is strongly affected by where it falls within the core-periphery structure of the regional landscape. The regional "core" is usually a fertile, well-watered plain with good transportation and large cities. Birth programs in the core have all the advantages of higher government revenues, "better quality" (that is, more capable) program cadres, a "higher quality" (more cooperative) populace and a "virtuous circle" connecting lower fertility and higher prosperity. The regional "periphery" is usually mountainous, underdeveloped and poor. Birth programs in the periphery have all the disadvantages of lower revenues, "poorer quality" cadres and populace and a "vicious circle" connecting poverty and fertility. Of course, the distinction between core and periphery is actually not a dichotomy, but a continuum. In this chapter we locate Fujian in its regional setting and suggest some of the effects of regional structure on sub-provincial program administration.

We begin with some background on the historical geography and postwar development of this intriguing corner of the country. In the first section, we move on to review the history of birth planning in post-1949 Fujian, treating the province as a whole. In the following section, we identify some major geographic distinctions within Fujian that affect birth planning performance, both across prefectures and within them. In the third section, we take a close look at variation across counties under the administration of the provincial capital Fuzhou Municipality, an area from which many INS applicants originate.[304]

Our main sources on birth planning are official Chinese accounts, both written and oral. The most detailed Chinese publication on the earlier periods is the chapter on birth planning in the 1990 Fujian volume of the authoritative series on *China population*, based in part on the 1982 census.[305] This Report updates that account using the Fujian entry in the annual national *Birth planning yearbook* (BPYB), supplemented by the section on birth planning in the annual *Fujian yearbook* (FJYB). In addition, the Report contains much detail on recent developments and specific localities obtained from interviews conducted with Fujian birth planning officials in 1998 and 1999. In contextualizing those developments in birth planning, we draw on a substantial historical and social scientific literature on the area.

Before beginning, a word on our sources. Like official reports everywhere, the official reports on birth planning in Fujian seek to paint a positive picture of program progress. Despite this bias, they note "difficulties" as well as achievements, giving us a sense, if not an overly detailed account, of where the problems lie. Moreover, the long listings of program initiatives

[303] *The City in Late Imperial China*. Edited by G. William Skinner (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1977).
[304] Appendix Three provides a translation of the 1991 Fujian program regulations. Appendix Four presents data on the province's socioeconomic development and program performance.
[305] *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence)*. Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990) [in Chinese] [chapter on birth planning, p. 329-354].

contain important information on what steps were taken and give us a sense of the program's priorities. Although the information on program achievements must be interpreted with great caution, the trends reported are probably in the right direction, even if the size of the achievement seems too great. Read with a critical eye, the official reports are very valuable sources of information.

A. INTRODUCTION: MAOIST CLOSURE, POST-MAO "OPENING UP"

Fujian constitutes most of the region known as Southeast China. Historically, the population was concentrated in a narrow strip of relatively flat land running north-south along the coast. For reasons explained below, the communists focused instead on developing the main valleys in the mountainous interior. The coastal strip is intersected at its mid-point by Fujian's largest river, the Min, which flows eastward down from the province's mountainous hinterland into the East China Sea. Historically, Fujian was incorporated into Han China relatively early, at least militarily and administratively. Nevertheless, the province long remained shielded from full economic and cultural incorporation into the rest of China by wide bands of mountains. Fujian's narrow coastal plain recurrently became overpopulated and the coast's maritime orientation encouraged excess population to migrate abroad— mostly to Taiwan and Southeast Asia, but eventually also to the United States. Fujian was long among the less developed of China's provinces— historically because of its poor connections to the rest of China, during most of the communist period because it was a military front line facing Taiwan.[306]

Some sociocultural differences within Fujian derive partly from the history of the province's relationship with the rest of China. Northern Fujian was incorporated into China economically and socioculturally during the Song dynasty (from around 1000 AD). Northern Fujian includes the Fuzhou area centered on the mouth of the Min river. Southern Fujian was more fully incorporated only during the Yuan dynasty (around 1200 AD). Southern Fujian includes the coastal port cities south of the Min River (*Minnan*, including historic Quanzhou and Zhangzhou as well as modern Xiamen). The distinction between northern and southern Fujian remains significant, for example in *Fulao* versus *Minnan* dialects and identities and in some difference in the intensity of son preference (reportedly stronger in the south).[307] [308]

Most Chinese provinces have ample reason to want to control their population growth, but Fujian has particularly strong versions of those reasons. Only 10% of Fujian's land is arable and the province has the second highest ratio of population to arable land among Chinese provinces (neighboring Zhejiang is highest, according to official figures). Much of the arable land lies along the coast; not surprisingly, the population is concentrated in that area. It was these

[306] For a recent elementary introduction to post-Mao Fujian, see *Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan*. Edited by Brian Hook (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996); for specialized studies, see all references under Lyons.
[307] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, November 1998.
[308] On Fujian's early history, see Schafer, Edward H. *The Empire of Min* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles Tuttle, 1954); Clark, Hugh R. *Community, Trade and Networks: Southern Fujian Province from the Third to the Thirteenth Century* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991); on later imperial history see *Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the 19th and 18th Centuries*. Edited by Edward B. Vermeer (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1990).

locally high densities that drove coastal Fujianese abroad throughout much of Chinese history, and it was these high densities that continued to create "vicious circles" of high poverty and high population growth during the communist period. By 1983, Fujian's per capita arable land was only half the national average (0.74 *mu*). In a few coastal counties with particularly dense populations, per capita arable land was little more than half that (for example in Changle county in Fuzhou Municipality, where at the beginning of the 1990s it was 0.41 *mu*). Fujian's burgeoning population also consumed much of its increase in economic output and placed great pressure on education and employment.[309]

Unfortunately, until the late 1970s, many of Fujian's development problems were actually aggravated by Maoist development strategy. In agriculture Maoist strategy overemphasized grain at the expense of the more profitable specialty crops for which Fujian was well suited. In industry, Maoism emphasized capital-intensive heavy industry at the expense of the labor-intensive light industry appropriate for this overpopulated province. Maoist development de-emphasized commerce, particularly foreign trade, activities in which Fujian had specialized historically. Maoist strategy deprived Fujian of investment and located what little investment it provided not along the high-return coast but in the low-return interior. During the Maoist period, the province's per capita grain output and per capita income fell below the national average.[310]

China's 1978 policy of "reform and opening up" brought dramatic changes. Economic "reform" allowed Fujian to return to exploiting its economic comparative advantage. In July 1979, the center granted the province greater economic autonomy for overseas interactions. Economic "opening" thus brought an influx of foreign investment, much from Taiwan, to export-oriented industries along the coast. The results were dramatic increases in industrial employment, per capita income, urbanization rate, and international exposure. During the post-Mao period Fujian per capita income rose above the national average— 2200 versus 2000 yuan. By 1990, 42% of the labor force worked outside of agriculture. This was true not only in major cities, but also to some extent in those rural areas within commuting distance of urban product and labor markets. Even largely agricultural counties did well. In 1995, 33 of Fujian's 77 counties had net per capita agricultural incomes over the relatively prosperous level of 2000 yuan.[311] No Fujian counties had agricultural incomes under 1200.[312] [313]

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[309] *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence)*. Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990), p. 329-334 [in Chinese]. The density theme is pursued below.

[310] For postwar demographic background, see *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence)*. Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990) [in Chinese] [chapter on birth planning, p. 329-354]. On Maoist development strategy in Fujian, see Lyons, Thomas P. *China's War on Poverty: A Case Study of Fujian Province, 1895-1990* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992); Lyons, Thomas P. *Poverty and Growth in a South China County: Anxi, Fujian, 1949-1992* (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994); and Weng, Junyi. "Economic growth in Fujian province: A growth center analysis, 1950-51," in *The Economic Transformation of South China.* Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994).

[311] These 33 included Changle and Lianjiang.

[312] Fujian's low number of poor counties was similar to Guangdong's 4 of 123 counties, but better than Zhejiang's 10 of 82, and much better than Jiangxi's 28 of 96.

[313] For net agricultural income by counties in Fujian, see Table A15 in Appendix Four. For high income counties, see Ministry of Agriculture. *China Agricultural Yearbook* (Beijing: China Agricultural Publishing House, 1995), p. 445-

One should not exaggerate the extent of Fujian's economic modernization, however. Despite its special role in China's "reform and opening," the province remained close to the national average on many measures of development. In 1990, in rural areas only 22% of the labor force worked outside of agriculture, much below neighboring coastal provinces with more developed off-farm alternatives (Zhejiang 34%, Guangdong 32%). Nominal urbanization rates skyrocketed from a fifth to four-fifths between the 1980s and 1990s, but that was mostly because administrative reorganization placed still largely agricultural populations under the jurisdiction of newly named municipalities.[314] In 1990, Fujian still had only about two-thirds the per capita income of Guangdong and its level of development was still comparable only to 1960s Taiwan. Moreover, non-agricultural employment fell off sharply as one moved from rural counties in the central coastal zone between Fuzhou and Xiamen (a half to a third), along other transport corridors (about a fifth), to less accessible coastal areas (under a fifth) to the remote mountainous periphery (often 15% or lower).[315]

The provincial capital of Fuzhou illustrates these promises and limitations of globalization. Starting from 1979, Fuzhou's external economic involvement increased by an order of magnitude every five years for the first fifteen years— in terms of both millions of US$ of investment and numbers of companies— from tens to hundreds to thousands. Fuzhou's external involvement also expanded in space: at first the involvement of foreigners was limited to the port of Mawei, then extended to the inner counties and finally to all counties within the municipality.[316] On the other hand, Fuzhou's global integration encountered obstacles and limits. First, within Fujian, Fuzhou moved less rapidly than Xiamen to the south. In part, this was because Xiamen has a better port and was declared a Special Economic Zone earlier. However, it was also because as provincial capital, Fuzhou itself was still somewhat ideologically conservative.[317] Second, understanding the need to build infrastructure and achieving the financial capacity to do so have occurred only gradually. Third, Fuzhou's external commercial development continues to suffer from external military-political constraints. The Taiwan Straits remain a frontline for any potential renewal of military conflict with Taiwan. Taiwan has still not

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446 [in Chinese]. On lower income counties, see Ministry of Agriculture. *China Agricultural Yearbook* (Beijing: China Agricultural Publishing House, 1996), p. 440-441, 449-450 [in Chinese] and Lyons, Thomas P. "Grain in Fujian: Intra-provincial patterns of production and trade, 1952-1988," *China Quarterly* (No. 129, March 1992), p.184-215. On Fujian's post-Mao development see *The Economic Transformation of South China.* Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994); and *Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan*. Edited by Brian Hook (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996). On the resulting political economy see Wank, David. *Commodifying Communism: Business, Trust and Politics in a Chinese City* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[314] In 1990, only 17% of Fujian's population had "non-agricultural" household registrations, and only 21% of the population resided within the truly urban districts of urban jurisdictions. However, if one includes peri-urban areas that are in fact quite urbanized, the proportion of the population whose lifestyle is "urban" might have been about two-fifths.

[315] The above statistics and analysis are from the 1990 census, as well as Parish, William L. "Rural industrialization in Fujian and Taiwan," in *The Economic Transformation of South China*. Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994).

[316] "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995) [in Chinese].

[317] Chu, David K. Y. and Xunzhong Zheng. "Fuzhou: Capital of a frontier province," in *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts of Modernization*. Edited by Yue-man Yeung and Xu-wei Hu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 204.

allowed direct transportation between Taiwan and the mainland, including Fuzhou. There are many Taiwan investors in the Fuzhou area, but not as many as there would be with more direct links.

Fujian's accelerated post-Mao development has posed some special problems for birth planning. Two problematic categories of people are rich entrepreneurs who are undeterred by birth fines and migrant "masses" who are hard to locate and persuade to comply. Nevertheless, overall development has facilitated birth planning. The province began to shift from the rural-agricultural lifeways that impede birth planning to the urban-industrial outlooks that facilitate it. In itself, socioeconomic change might not automatically have reduced fertility in Fujian during the late 1980s and early 1990s; yet it provided the material underpinnings that enabled intensified program intervention to be effective and should have significantly reduced the amount of coercion required to gain compliance. These material underpinnings included not only rising personal incomes and changed family mobility strategies, but also higher government revenues that permitted program funding that was above the national average.

Fujian birth program administrators are quite clear about the connection between Fujian's rapid economic development and the rapid improvement in its birth program performance. Asked to explain the remarkable twenty percentage-point drop in Fujian's multiple-child birthrate between 1990 and 1998, program officials listed the following factors: (1) correct national policy, (2) rapid economic development, (3) good propaganda-and-education work, and (4) rising costs and falling demand: The cost of raising a child has risen, and what people now desire in children is not quantity but quality, so that 95% of people now think that two is a good number. As discussed below, program officials' mental map of which localities within the province have good or bad program performance is significantly (though not entirely) a map of greater or lesser development.

The strong external involvement in Fujian's economic development has posed distinctive problems and opportunities for birth planning in the province. Fujian has received much foreign investment, much of it from Taiwan, some in joint ventures with PRC partners (state, collective and individual), and some in companies that are wholly foreign-owned. Evidently, the employees of these companies are considered "staff and workers" and, according to the Fujian regulations, should be subject to rather stringent birth planning. The Fujian Birth Planning Commission drew up special rules for birth planning in joint ventures and has tried to promote enforcement in foreign-owned subsidiaries. Research for this report uncovered no hard evidence about the result. On the one hand, since these companies are not state-owned and in many cases do not have politically active party committees, probably they are not eager to devote much company time or resources to birth planning. On the other hand, employees of joint ventures and foreign firms are likely on their own initiative to have adopted modern urban economic mobility strategies that benefit from fewer children of higher "quality." Moreover, they are likely to be enthusiastically adopting the modern lifestyles portrayed in movies and on television. These images of modern life are created not only by Chinese propagandists (including birth planning propagandists), but also by advertisers from Hong Kong, Taiwan and abroad. In this these employees of joint venture and foreign firms are increasingly joined by the rest of coastal urban Fujian and by neighboring rural Fujian as well (to say nothing of the rest of China).

B. PROVINCIAL PROGRAM: A TYPICAL PROGRAM WITH ATYPICAL RESULTS

In this section we review the development of Fujian's birth planning program from the 1960s through the 1980s before considering the early and late 1990s in more detail. We will show how a relatively typical program produced quite atypical results. The level of detail we provide may well strain the reader's patience. Yet we believe that the details merit all the attention we give them. On a pragmatic level, they can help asylum officers assess the credibility of claims by Fujian applicants by telling them what was going on in the birth planning system at the time the applicant maintains s/he was persecuted. On a more political level, these mind-boggling "facts" provide fascinating insight into the extent of bureaucratization of state birth planning and the extraordinary amount of bureaucratic attention devoted to this matter. Finally, a close attention to programmatic detail is necessary for an understanding of the contradictory currents of program change today. In the Chinese birth program one might say that "the devil is in the details." By this we mean that it is only by studying the year-by-year modifications program leaders introduced to cope with problems in previous practice that one can understand why and how the program is becoming simultaneously more repressive and more "progressive" today (in the senses explained in Chapters Three).

For the 1960s through the 1980s, the main theme is the gradually rising priority and capacity of the program, as reflected in details of its administrative leadership and organization. For the 1990s the main theme is the growing effort that Fujian made to strengthen program capacity, not only to deliver reproductive services and to obtain public compliance, but also to guarantee "lawful administration" and to protect citizen rights, through both top-down leadership oversight and bottom-up "democratic supervision." For the 1990s, we do not attempt to summarize all the material available, but instead focus on two developments. One is the emergence of new policy emphases and overall assessments of program accomplishments. The other is critical evaluation of the program and efforts to rid it of corruption and coercion.[318]

As in all provinces, so in Fujian the provincial birth program has basically followed national instructions. Despite attention to central directives, however, until around 1990, Fujian's performance remained somewhat laggard. The overall post-1949 population growth rate was significantly higher than the national average (e.g., for 1949-1982, a 115% increase for Fujian versus an 84% rise for China as a whole). The first two "birth peaks" in the 1950s and 1960s were more prolonged and the onset of sustained fertility decline in the 1970s was later by several years. Particularly before 1970, much of the cause of this lag may have been "natural" features of Fujian's population structure inherited from the pre-49 period. However, between 1970 and 1990, probably a significant part of the cause was relatively lax implementation of birth planning. Conversely, if Fujian's second birth peak lasted well into the 1970s, its third birth peak should have lasted well into the 1990s. Therefore, lagging demographic structure should be part of the cause of Fujian's still lagging birth planning performance around 1990. Conversely, Fujian's finally passing its "third birth peak" should help explain improvement by the late 1990s.[319]

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[318] For some basic data on Fujian as a whole over time, again see Tables A1-A6 in Appendix Four.

[319] For Fujian's demographic history, see *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence).* Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990) [in Chinese]

Program laxity may have occurred for several reasons. A first is small size: Fujian is not one of China's most populous provinces. Since it does not contribute much to China's total population increase, it was apparently not a priority target of the national leadership (like Sichuan and Henan, for example). A second reason is regionalism: historically, Fujian's people have often tended to resist central government authority. Even during the communist period, relations between outside and local communist leaders have sometimes been delicate, perhaps making the center reluctant to crack down on provincial leaders. A third reason is Fujian's frontier character: the center may have been unwilling to destabilize a province on China's maritime borders that was both a defense theater facing Taiwan and a locus of overseas Chinese involvement. Earlier, Fujian's front line military status meant particularly strong military influence there and birth planning was not a military priority. Later, after the center made Fujian a portal for economic "opening" to the outside world, civilian provincial leaders became preoccupied with externally-oriented economic development, probably at some detriment to birth planning.

(a) 1960s-1980s

As elsewhere in China, in Fujian the **first wave** of birth planning occurred from 1963 to 1965, mostly in urban areas. The party provided leadership, but government staffing remained spare and implementation was mostly delegated to the provincial Health Department and Women's Federation. Fujian targeted mainly its six major cities, and by 1965, the program claimed to have helped reduce their fertility from above that of rural areas to below. In addition, three largely rural prefectures around the three major cities set up experimental points in their cities and counties, though without much impact on actual population growth. In policy, preliminary regulations recommended late marriage (25 for urban males, 24 for urban females). The policy slogan for number of children was the moderate one of "two is right, three are too many, don't have four." Birth planning medical procedures were not only free but also rewarded with paid vacation time and material benefits. In implementation, a 1965 provincial birth planning work conference transmitted the moderate national slogan of "promote actively, maintain voluntarism, guarantee quality, advance steadily."[320]

Again as elsewhere in China, so in Fujian the **second wave** of birth planning occurred during the 1970s. As in other provinces, the policy was stabilized, organization strengthened, and spatial scope expanded. The main policy was the moderate national one of "later, longer, fewer" (later marriage, longer intervals between children and fewer total children). Organizationally, birth planning was incorporated into the provincial economic and social plan, along with demands that industrial and agricultural agencies take birth planning into account in their economic planning. In Fujian, however, these demands were ignored for many years. Spatially, this wave of birth planning began extending the program from urban to rural areas. Yet it was only in the 1980s that rural Fujian seriously focused on birth planning. For much of the 1970s,

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[chapter on birth planning, p. 329-354].

[320] On cities, see Table A10, on the turnabout in urban versus rural fertility see Table A3, both in Appendix Four.

the main implementation model for rural work methods stressed crash campaigns over routine work.[321]

Program work resumed in 1971 with a July provincial directive transmitting the center's renewed interest in birth planning and a December work conference exchanging rural work experience. In 1972, Fujian established a party Leadership Small Group (LSG) for birth planning, with its government Birth Planning Office in the Health Department. Work intensified in 1973 as March provincial "Implementation rules" relayed the national "later, longer, fewer" policy. From 1974 to 1977, the limit in Fujian was three children.[322] Already in 1974, the province was requesting that local political leaders personally take charge of the birth program "several times a year." Nevertheless, in 1977, Fujian's natural increase rate was still 8% above the national average, high relative to all of the rest of country except minority nationality areas. Provincial program histories blame several factors. "Leftism" remaining from the Cultural Revolution caused program "reversals" in some localities. Leadership thinking was not "sufficiently unified" and leadership follow-through was not strong enough. Crash campaigns and routine work were not "well integrated."[323] From 1977, Fujian reduced the number of children allowed to two.[324] (Huang 1989, p. 179)

The **third wave** of birth planning fell mostly in the early 1980s, after the late 1970s declaration of the one-child goal. Again, Fujian followed national policy directives, achieving both much organizational construction and some demographic results. But Fujian remained a poor performer relative to most other provinces. In 1990, Fujian was a shocking next-to-last out of twenty-nine provinces in the percentage of its births that occurred "within plan." That proportion was only 62% compared to a national average of 81%.

Organizationally, in 1978, the government Birth Planning Office was promoted from a staff office within the Health Department to an administrative agency directly under the provincial government. In 1983, this office was further elevated to a commission (the Fujian Birth Planning Commission, hereafter FBPC). The Commission had different branches promoting the development of different functions (e.g., propaganda, statistics, technology). As regards policy, in May 1979, Fujian shifted from "later, longer, fewer" to a one-child goal with at most two children, but actively promoted the one-child rule only in cities. In 1982, policy tightened for the whole province to only one child under most circumstances, with only four rather narrowly defined exceptions (mostly "special circumstances" such as a first child too "defective" to provide family labor power, or unusual marriage arrangements). In September 1984, in Fujian as throughout China, policy loosened somewhat, adding more circumstances justifying a second child, mostly among occupational groups facing "real difficulties" (miners, fishermen and farmers in sparsely populated areas).[325]

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[321] These remarkably candid assessments are from *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence)*. Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990) [in Chinese] [chapter on birth planning, p. 329-354].

[322] Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 178.

[323] *China Population: Fujian Volume (Zhongguo Renkou: Fujian Fence)*. Edited by Zhude Fu and Jiayuan Chen (Beijing: Financial & Economic Publishing House, 1990) [in Chinese] [chapter on birth planning, p. 329-354].

[324] Huang, Shuming. *The Spiral Road* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 179.

[325] The May 1985 birth planning campaign described in Huang 1989 (referenced above) evidently was the first

In the area of implementation, the center's September 1980 "open letter" emphasized propaganda and education. Accordingly, Fujian formed new organs to conduct both elite policy research and mass policy propaganda. The former included a provincial Population Research Association and its publication *Fujian population*. The latter included a provincial propaganda center, local propaganda guidance stations and a mass newspaper *Population and family*. From 1983, Fujian ran "propaganda months" (that is, birth planning campaigns) around major holidays such as Chinese New Year. However, in line with China's post-Mao pragmatism, the provincial program also employed economic incentives to secure compliance. Late-marrying couples were offered longer marriage vacations and were paid salary during that leave, while couples accepting a one-child certificate received government subsidies of a monthly one-child health insurance fee. Conversely, there were definite economic penalties for violating birth policy, though those penalties varied according to local conditions.

In the area of basic-level construction, Fujian pushed institutionalization and rationalization to overcome its over-reliance on crash campaigns. The province developed a "three-level work network" (county-township-village), established a birth planning responsibility system (mostly for local and community leaders), and established regulations governing program administration. Already in August 1983, a work meeting promoted Shandong's "three priorities" and Fujian's own local experience.[326] A January 1985 conference promoted additional Fujian local experience.

(b) Early 1990s

The **fourth wave** of birth planning fell largely in the 1990s. During this period, according to official reports, Fujian's birth planning establishment made substantial organizational effort, particularly at basic-level construction, and finally achieved increasing compliance with national norms. During the 1990s, the provincial program progressed from largely top-down administration to the beginning of bottom-up feedback. At the beginning of the 1990s, Fujian started by emphasizing the responsibility of top provincial and prefectural leaders for achieving targets. In the mid-1990s, provincial program leaders conducted extensive top-down rectification of middle and lower level cadres. These rectifications concerned party discipline inspection, government fund management and program "lawful administration." By the late 1990s, Fujian introduced a new emphasis on bottom-up "democratic supervision." At the elite level were reviews of the program by the standing committee of the provincial People's Congress and by non-communist parties in the provincial Political Consultative Conference. At the mass level was an increasing supervisory role for the community Birth Planning Association and for incipient village democracy.

In the early 1990s, Fujian was not one of the "nine big provinces" that, according to some formulations, national political leaders targeted for stricter program enforcement. Nevertheless, the province came under increasing pressure to conform. Fujian still had a relatively small

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application of the one-child goal to this Xiamen suburb— surprisingly late.

[326] The "three priorities" are described in the section on administrative rationalization in Chapter Three.

population (30,372,791 in 1990, only 2.7% of national population, 18th among provinces). However, as of 1990, the province's poor birth planning meant that it was producing a disproportionate share of China's annual population increase, particularly "out-of-plan" births. In 1990, the number of new births in the province was 607,044, or 3.2% of national new births, 12th among provinces. The net increase in its population was 1,430,033, or 4.7% of national, 8th among provinces (though evidently much of it from in-migration not births). Nonetheless, the number of excess births was 233,061, or 6.5% of national excess births, 7th among 29 provinces.[327] Accordingly, Fujian was among the top dozen provinces targeted by the national leadership in the early 1990s and among the half-dozen of those that did well.[328]

In 1990, an early sign of the rising priority of birth planning was the reestablishment of a party Leadership Small Group (LSG). In 1991, the LSG transmitted the center's decision to strongly re-enforce existing policy. In 1992, the provincial leadership displayed real activism: the party secretary and governor wrote an "open letter" to basic-level cadres defining seven things that they "certainly must" do (perhaps a national guideline, see below on 1997). The "seven certainlies" were that leading cadres should (1) take responsibility for achieving program goals, (2) ensure "lawful administration", and (3) themselves set personal examples. The program should: (4) use propaganda to make mass compliance automatic, (5) prevent pregnancies before they occur, (6) mobilize help from other organizations, and (7) proceed realistically. According to program records, about half of villages were able to comply. The "open letter" also defined three things that villages must not allow: "no early marriage, no out-of-plan births and no late-term abortions."[329] Overall, the FBPC claimed that despite 1992's new national emphasis on economic growth, the program had still turned in a good performance— for example, a (quite unbelievable) multiple child rate of 2.4%.

According to official reports, in 1993, the FBPC promulgated ten standards for assessing leader responsibility. The provincial party and government conducted a large-scale survey review of birth planning in Fujian, producing a mixed assessment. Some local political leaders were assuming responsibility for implementing the birth program, but some still "did not understand the seriousness of the problem." Misreporting continued. Basic-level organization was beginning to receive the organization, personnel, and funding it required. Construction of the program's "stand-alone" service network was proceeding at the county, township and village levels. That network was beginning to perform some contraceptive functions such as IUD inspections and insertions, but its personnel still needed further "consolidation" and training. Half of villages had been able to achieve self-management, but a fifth still depended heavily on higher levels. In addition to this survey, the provincial political leadership also launched a large-scale inspection of party discipline, including management of funds from out-of-plan birth fees. In 1992, the FBPC and provincial Finance Department had jointly drafted a "method" for their management. In 1993, a "notice" implementing those methods was issued by the FBPC and relevant provincial

[327] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: 1991, China Population Publishing House), p. 486-487 [in Chinese].
[328] According to Fujian reports, and Fujian government and Fujian Yearbook editorial committee. *Fujian Yearbook (Fujian Nianjian)* (Fuzhou, China: People's Press, 1997), p. 278 [in Chinese].
[329] Fujian government and Fujian Yearbook editorial committee. *Fujian Yearbook (Fujian Nianjian)* (Fuzhou, China: People's Press, 1994), p. 256 [in Chinese].

departments (Finance, Inspection and Auditing), which together sampled the compliance of eighteen counties.

In 1994, national SBPC minister Peng Peiyun visited Fujian, transmitting the demand of national party chairman Jiang Zemin that the national birth planning system "get real" in its statistical reporting and policy implementation. The provincial Leadership Small Group was "adjusted" and one of its first new decisions was to include surveys of program work in the provincial budget. The expanded LSG included eighteen departments. Peng advised that the FBPC divide its localities into categories (advanced, middling and backward) and guide each category differently. So in 1994, the FBPC designated eighteen counties as "backward" and placed them under direct provincial supervision (*danlie guanli*). In addition to reorganizing its LSG at the top, Fujian also "consolidated" its Birth Planning Association (BPA) at the bottom.

During the 1991-1995 Eighth Five-Year Plan, Fujian reportedly met its five-year-plan population size target for the first time. Even though the cohorts of newly-marrieds were bigger than in the late 1980s, the number of (reported) births was lower. The birthrate was down by nine per thousand (to fifteen), one of the biggest declines in the nation. In 1995, the natural increase rate was 9.30 per 1,000, the first time it had achieved the national year-2000 target of under 10. Allegedly, the TFR was down from 2.57 in 1990 to 1.73 in 1995, figures we regard as dubious. Among program inputs, the contraception rate was up 29 percentage points (to 88%). In 1990, the program's own service network had handled only 18% of contraceptive medical procedures, but by 1995 was able to handle 53%. Per capita program expenditures had about doubled, from a provincial average of about two yuan in 1990 to 4.2 yuan in 1995, with all prefectures achieving at least two yuan.[330] In program outcomes, the planned birth rate was up 42 percentage points to 78%. Births of multiple children were down from 21% in 1990 to only 3.5% in 1995. The one-child rate was up by 20 percentage points, to 65%. Parity structure conformed to Fujian regulations.[331] These figures are what the FBPC reported; unfortunately, there is no way to independently confirm their accuracy.

(c) Late 1990s

In 1995, as it approached the 1996-2000 Ninth Five-Year Plan, the FBPC unleashed numerous initiatives. Most broadly, it announced the ambitious goal of raising Fujian birth planning into the national category of "advanced" provincial programs. The FBPC also pursued a goal of reaching a "modestly comfortable" per capita standard of living level three years earlier than the national target of 2000. More concretely, the FBPC issued new measures on management-by-objectives and on really applying rewards and punishments to enforce leader responsibility. Per capita expenditures reportedly rose to nearly five yuan.[332] At the middle levels, the FBPC continued guiding localities by categories, challenging Fujian's more advanced

[330] This was well above the 1995 national average of 2.65 yuan.
[331] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: 1996, China Population Publishing House), p. 307-308 [in Chinese]; Fujian government and Fujian Yearbook editorial committee. *Fujian Yearbook (Fujian Nianjian)* (Fuzhou, China: People's Press, 1996), p. 280 [in Chinese].
[332] Fujian government and Fujian Yearbook editorial committee. *Fujian Yearbook (Fujian Nianjian)* (Fuzhou, China: People's Press, 1996), p. 280 [in Chinese].

localities to bring themselves up to national standards. Half of the eighteen "backward" counties graduated from direct provincial supervision. The FBPC also carried out numerous inspections and conducted a 2% sample survey intended to review progress under the 1991-1995 five-year plan and to facilitate planning for the next one. Program service centers had been established in all counties and were now coming up to standard. At the bottom, program service stations were now functioning in 97% of townships and 70% of administrative villages. In rural areas, the FBPC introduced a new emphasis on bringing villages "up to standard" and stressed developing a "three links" policy "with Fujian characteristics." These included thirteen indicators for advanced units and a checklist of ten measures for achieving "up-to-standard" villages. The BPA expanded its mandate from organizing the masses for "self education, self management and self service" to include also "democratic participation and democratic supervision."

In 1996, the FBPC issued a notice on lawful administration, issued regulations on controlling migrants, and emphasized quality births and a quality population. One striking innovation was the passage by the provincial legislature of China's first local law banning the identification of the sex of unborn children.[333] Another striking innovation was an evaluation of provincial birth planning by the standing committee of the provincial legislature (in August and November). The evaluation found that the provincial program leadership was good and had taken many good measures to implement basic national policies, including the encouragement of lawful administration. Despite this, the FBPC had been unable to correct the "simple" (code word for crude and heavyhanded) and even illegal work methods employed in some localities. Misreporting of statistics and misappropriation of out-of-plan birth funds remained problems. In some localities, management of migrants remained weak. Fujian's democratic parties conducted additional investigations and evaluations (in August and October). Meanwhile, The FBPC targeted ten counties that were weak in three rates (planned birth rate, multiple child rate and standard village rate). Seventy-two percent of villages "met or basically met" standards (53% "met" and 19% "basically"). The planned birth rate was up to 86%, the first-child rate was 70% and the multiple child rate was down to 3.3%.

In 1997, the FBPC declared the preliminary achievement of some old "struggle targets" (standard vocabulary in China). For example, per capita income had begun to achieve the "modestly comfortable" level that was planned (Fujian had risen to seventh nationally). Meanwhile, both top and bottom levels of the administrative hierarchy embraced some new "fighting objectives," such as the "two transformations" of collateralization and incentivization (described above in Chapter Three). For example, the program issued certificates to couples practicing birth planning that entitled them to benefits. Toward the middle levels, the provincial leadership continued its strong emphasis on inspections and surveys. Also, after a national conference on urban birth planning, the FBPC convened a follow-on conference in Fujian.[334] Perhaps not coincidentally, in 1997, the FBPC targeted the seventeen counties on the corridor between Fuzhou and Xiamen (which should be relatively urbanized). In 1997, Fujian also emphasized training, including both political-ideological training for all birth planning workers and professional training sessions run by prefecture and counties. At the bottom or local level,

[333] "Fujian bans illegal sex identification of unborn babies," *Xinhua* (Beijing: FTS19960606000131, 6 June 1996), as reported on FBIS.

[334] According to program statistics, in Fujian's urban areas, the TFR was below 1.5, the late marriage rate was 95%, the one-child certificate rate was over 98% and the first-child rate was over 70%. These seem implausibly "good."

the BPA made progress in extending its reach through "central households" affiliated with it (a new direction nationwide).

In the area of "lawful administration," in June-July 1997, the national SBPC investigated Fujian (along with Jiangsu) to check on their combating the "seven impermissibles" and their protection of the "lawful rights and interests of the masses." Evidently, the SBPC had instructed all provinces to conduct a "cleanup" of all local regulatory procedures to make sure that they did not contain any unduly coercive provisions. The investigation found that in general the sampled localities in both provinces had done a good job, that maladministration had been much reduced and that the masses were mostly satisfied with program cadre behavior.[335] Nevertheless, in Fujian and Jiangsu as a whole, achievements were uneven and violations still occurred. In some localities, some required procedures had not been implemented. In particular, many villages had not implemented the required incentive measures (probably on punishing errant cadres). In "quite a few" localities, regulatory documents still contained some over-strong provisions, particularly on collecting fees and fines.[336] Aside from this national survey, within Fujian itself the FBPC issued two notices on lawful implementation, to reduce abuse of power and increase democratic supervision. This responded to the 1996 evaluation by the provincial legislature. Moreover, the FBPC convened an all-province meeting at which provincial legislative leaders themselves instructed the program how to improve.

In 1998, according to the FBPC, the province continued its effort to excel at the institutionalization and reform of birth planning. The "three priorities" were to be implemented everywhere, and the "three links" were to be strongly promoted. The provincial leadership remained actively involved. Fujian chided eleven counties that had not yet reached three *yuan* per capita in birth planning expenditures and identified eight backward counties for intensive supervision (including Yongtai near Fuzhou). Fujian reformed the mechanism for year-end evaluation of birth planning performance, separating the evaluation of party and government leaders from the evaluation of birth planning officials so that political leaders could not foist responsibility onto program leaders. The province made statistical accuracy an important component of such evaluations and conducted surveys to cross-check population statistics. Numerous communities in ten localities pursued experiments in quality care. According to program records, all townships had ultrasound machines, 83% of townships had computers, and localities were beginning to link their computers into networks. Zhangzhou Municipality cracked down on use of ultrasound for prenatal sex selection. The birth planning service network performed 83.5% of all birth planning medical procedures and in more than half of localities had begun offering some reproductive health care. Work continued on bringing village work up to standard and on improving village meetings for discussing birth planning. Fujian continued a campaign to promote a "modern reproductive culture" and combined propaganda with delivery of services, particularly to needy households and poor women. The province surveyed its three million migrants, finding that 28% were married women of childbearing age and that migrants accounted for roughly 80% of the out-of-plan children born in the province.[337]

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[335] In Fujian, the SBPC checked Shishi, Jinjiang, Putian and Minhou counties.

[336] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 130 [in Chinese].

[337] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1999), p. 322-326 [in Chinese]

C. SUBPROVINCIAL VARIATION: BIRTH PLANNING IN SOCIOECONOMIC AND SOCIOSPATIAL CONTEXT

This section treats differences in socioeconomic development and program performance across space and over time. We begin with subprovincial regions and prefectures, then turn to local counties. The evaluations of program performance in various places are based on interviews with Fujian program officials, providing a rare glimpse at how program administrators view their tasks. From their point of view, "good" performance is both strict and lawful, while "bad" performance is lax but erratic and sometimes coercive. The main quantitative measure of program performance to which program officials referred was the multiple child rate.[338]

(a) Prefectures across space

Socioeconomic differences within Fujian derive largely from the fact that Fujian's small coastal plain is surrounded by mountains to the northeast, west, and southwest. As in most regions of China, historically the plains were the advanced "core" and the mountains the backward "periphery." However, from the 1950s through the 1970s, Fujian departed from this pattern because the coastal plains were designated the "first front" of a war zone. Consequently, China's leaders did not build the infrastructure that one might have expected on Fujian's coast, such as a railroad from Zhejiang through Fujian to Guangdong. Instead, they built railroads back in the mountains to the west, to create a "second front" less vulnerable to naval and aerial bombardment. The result was that Fujian's coastal cities received less development than normal, while its new interior (in particular, Nanping and Sanming prefectures) received more. Since around 1980, economic "reform and opening" have shifted the focus back to the coast.

The simplest way to think about spatial differences in birth planning within Fujian at the end of the 1990s is in terms of informal multi-prefectural administrative subregions named in terms of cardinal directions. This is the "first cut" used by Fujian provincial birth planning officials themselves. Maps of the main administrative divisions of the province can be found in Figures 8.1 (in English) and 8.2 (in Chinese). In these directional terms, the entire coastal plain containing all the major coastal cities (Fuzhou, Putian, Xiamen, Quanzhou and Zhangzhou) is the "South". Taken as a whole, this area is relatively advanced in both socioeconomic development and program performance, with low reported overall excess child rates (i.e., unplanned child rates). Yet program performance within this zone is uneven. In particular, performance seems poor (relative to other areas) around Quanzhou: the prefecture as a whole reports a 5% excess child rate and several counties are problematic (particularly interior Anxi, but also Nan'an and coastal Hui'an and Jinjiang, interviews April 1999). Historically, Quanzhou has suffered from limited arable land and poor soils, resulting in high population density, high outmigration and a strong Overseas Chinese connection. Thus, part of the problem for birth planning may be sheer

[338] For some basic data on Fujian, see Appendix Four: on regions and prefectures, Tables A10 through A12; on counties, Tables A13 through A15.

poverty.[339] Part of the problem, however, may be remittances from Overseas Chinese that enable some people to pay out-of-plan birth fees (perhaps in coastal Hui'an and Jinjiang, for example).

The relatively developed interior valley is the "North" (including Nanping and Sanming). This area demonstrates surprisingly strong economic development and program performance, but it too varies. Nanping is the more industrialized. Fujian program officials say Nanping's birth planning performance is quite good because the many factories draw people out of their villages.[340] Sanming remains more agricultural, with seven of the province's 33 counties enjoying high agricultural income. According to program officials, Sanming is not so good because it is still largely agricultural and people remain in their home villages.[341]

The real "problem areas" in Fujian are the province's northeastern and southwestern peripheries. The "East" is the mountainous frontier with Zhejiang to the northeast. Before 1949, it was a revolutionary base area and war zone; a few counties have high concentrations of She aborigines. In the 1990s, the East remained quite underdeveloped and poor and was a main target for provincial poverty alleviation programs.[342] East Fujian has multiple child rates still around 10%, though some localities turn in good performances if their cadres are good. The "West" is the mountainous frontier with Guangdong to the southwest. It was an even more important revolutionary base area (many central leaders came from there). In 1982, the West had among the highest fertility in the province; at the end of the 1990s, it still had excess child rates around 5%.[343]

(b) Prefectures over time

Discussing subprovincial differences over time requires using the Chinese names of Fujian's dozen major cities and prefectures. Narration is complicated by the fact that administrative units have changed significantly. Roughly speaking, during the Maoist period, major cities were more likely to be subordinate to mostly rural prefectures, while during the Dengist period, cities have been given increasing independence from rural counties and even dominance over them. In birth planning, diffusion from urban to rural involved major cities running experiments in rural counties with which they were administratively associated. Fuzhou City was associated with Minhou prefecture, Quanzhou city with Jinjiang prefecture and Zhangzhou city with Longxi prefecture.[344] During the post-1949 period, the localities from which the Fujian birth planning program drew its models may have shifted somewhat, beginning first in these three major areas, then shifting away from them, and finally shifting back toward them.

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[339] Exemplified by interior Anxi, one of the poorest counties in Fujian, see Lyons, Thomas P. *Poverty and Growth in a South China County: Anxi, Fujian, 1949-1992* (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994).
[340] Here the excess child rate may be under 2%.
[341] Here the excess child rate is over 4%.
[342] See Lyons, Thomas P. *China's War on Poverty: A Case Study of Fujian Province, 1895-1990* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992).
[343] All characterizations and statistics from interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999, but see also Tables A10 through A12 in Appendix Four.
[344] Xiamen, squeezed between Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, was not associated with a large prefecture.

FIGURE 8.1 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF FUJIAN (IN ENGLISH)

Source: Lyons, Thomas P. *Economic Geography of Fujian: A Sourcebook* (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University: Vol. 1, 1995).

FIGURE 8.2 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF FUJIAN (IN CHINESE)

In the early 1960s, the six major cities that birth planning targeted were the four coastal commercial cities of Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Xiamen and the new interior industrial cities of Nanping and Sanming. The three main prefectures targeted for rural experimental points were Minhou surrounding Fuzhou, Jinjiang surrounding Quanzhou and Longxi surrounding Zhangzhou. At the beginning of the 1970s, the December 1971 work conference relaunching the program was held in Longhai, the county just downstream from Zhangzhou City in Longxi prefecture. However, during the 1970s, the main model for the approved implementation strategy (emphasizing crash campaigns) was a newcomer, the greatly enlarged coastal Putian prefecture, which replaced Minhou prefecture as the jurisdiction surrounding Fuzhou City on the west and south. A new and more "radical" approach to birth planning may have emerged from a prefecture that had not previously been a keypoint for "moderate" birth planning experiments. Conversely, in the 1980s, as the emphasis began to shift from crash campaigns toward routine administration, provincial attention shifted back to the original keypoint prefectures. The August 1983 provincial meeting promoting Shandong's "three priorities" was held in Longhai and also promoted Longhai's own experience. The January 1985 follow-on conference was held in Minhou county and promoted the experience both of Minhou and of several counties in Nanping prefecture (in the interior developed area).

(c) Counties across space

In Appendix Four, Tables A13 and A14 provide some basic data about all of Fujian's counties in 1982 and 1990, both grouped into the same 1990s prefectural boundaries. INS officers can use those tables to help situate applicants from any county. The tables also permit comparison of counties that produce many applicants with counties that do not, particularly counties that are otherwise quite similar. Exploring such variation and making such comparisons requires introducing some additional dynamics.

Birth planning and illegal emigration. For INS purposes, perhaps the simplest point of entry into these county data is sheer *population density*— persons per area (density). Even better is persons per area of arable land (arable density) and better yet is agricultural population per arable area (agricultural density). This is one way of addressing a main question implicit in INS concerns: is there any relationship between strong and weak birth program implementation and higher or lower levels of illegal international migration? This Report does not have the data to definitively answer that question, but it can hazard some observations. First, if there is any connection, it is probably <u>not</u> between severity of enforcement and likelihood of illegal emigration. Birth planning is well enough (i.e., strictly enough) enforced in all counties to provide ample reason for emigration on the part of anyone determined to violate birth regulations. Second, if there <u>is</u> any relationship it may be not with enforcement that is strict but with enforcement that is routinely lax but periodically intensified through campaigns. Violating birth regulations and violating migration laws are both illegal behaviors that evidently flourish in certain independent-entrepreneurial places (like Changle county near Fuzhou City, described in more detail below).

Third, if there is some connection between weak or poor birth planning work and high illegal emigration, it is likely to be an indirect and underlying relationship that operates through socioeconomic development, particularly as measured by population density. According to estimates from U.S. satellite data, it is our three southern coastal provinces that have the lowest per capita availability of farmland (less than 0.05 hectares per capita[345]). In Fujian, many of the coastal counties that have very high agricultural population densities also have both historical traditions of out-migration and continuing problems of birth program performance (e.g., Changle county under Fuzhou City). However, in exploring possible relationships between high population density, high historical emigration, poor program performance, and high illegal migration, it is important to note some key distinctions.

First, high density alone is not enough to drive most people abroad, because individuals need access to networks created by a local history of out-migration. Thus, in Fujian, it is certain coastal counties combining high density and maritime orientation that historically have produced the most legal emigration to Southeast Asia and that today produce the most illegal migration to the United States.[346]

Second, however, a strong history of legal emigration to Southeast Asia does not necessarily predict contemporary illegal migration to the United States. Instead, it may provide an alternative to it— in the form of remittances and investment at home. Thus, Quanzhou prefecture, the area with the most Overseas Chinese connections, evidently produces relatively few illegal migrants to the United States. Quanzhou has the highest level of per capita remittances among Fujian prefectures and enjoys employment opportunities generated by overseas capital, not only in Quanzhou but also in nearby Xiamen. Several of the counties in Fuzhou Municipality have substantial Overseas Chinese connections, remittances, and investment, but not as high as Quanzhou. Some of these (e.g., Changle) produce large numbers of illegal migrants to the United States and some (e.g., Fuqing) do not.

Third, it is not so much poverty as ambition that drives individuals abroad: most migrants are young people whose families have some resources to invest in such a venture. Thus, in order to be a likely generator of illegal migration, a county should have a population that is quite dense but not abjectly poor. Moreover, illegal migration would be propelled by the "blocked mobility" of a county as a whole— something that slows or prevents domestic economic development that people want and expect, and that therefore drives them to pursue foreign alternatives. Some of the counties in Fuzhou Municipality may meet these criteria, as discussed below.[347]

Birth planning and sociospatial development. Going beyond simple density requires a more complex model of *sociospatial development* than the commonsense distinctions between subprovincial regions and prefectures outlined above. Overall, the environment for birth planning varies along at least two sociospatial dimensions: the level of the highest central place within an area and the level of a given locality within that local urban system. Many characteristics relevant

[345] Smil, Vaclav. "China's agricultural land," *China Quarterly* (No. 158, June 1999), p. 422.
[346] Studies of rural-to-urban migration within China find that previous out-migration and the resulting networks are the strongest predictor of which localities produce migrants; see Rozelle, Scott et al. "Leaving China's farms: Survey results of new paths and remaining hurdles to rural migration," *China Quarterly* (No. 158, June 1999), p. 367-393.
[347] The best example may be Changle.

to birth planning tend to vary along these two dimensions— for example, per capita income, infant mortality and women's education.[348] Thus, the urban districts within a region's leading city are likely to perform best, while a far outpost of a prefectural capital in the periphery of a region is likely to perform worst. In between, a near suburb of a major city is likely to do well, while even the capital of a peripheral prefecture may not do well. Efforts to advance backward areas cannot fully overcome their disadvantages. Instead, the mechanisms through which the improvement efforts themselves diffuse tend to reproduce the historical inequalities.[349] This is the kind of model of sociospatial structure and process that underlies the backwardness of the "East" and "West" in Fujian, in both socioeconomic development and birth planning.

In Fujian some *peri-urban* counties— adjacent to and partially surrounding major cities— have eventually achieved high rates of birth planning. An example is Minhou county just upstream from Fuzhou City (discussed below). Nevertheless, in Fujian the counties performing worst on birth planning measures are not necessarily the most remote ones; some counties relatively near major cities have done poorly. Part of the explanation may be that in Fujian the coast as a whole is so little modernized, despite containing most of Fujian's major cities. *Interior* counties stretch into the hilly piedmont and therefore often have both poor agriculture and little off-farm employment. The examples in Fuzhou Municipality are Yongtai and Luoyuan counties, both of which have had problems in their birth program (also discussed below). In *coastal* counties the soil is often sandy or salty and the main occupations are often fishing or sailing, both relatively unprofitable, high-risk, and male-oriented. The main example within Fuzhou Municipality is the island county of Pingtan, but the coastal margins of Lianjiang, Changle, and Fuqing counties are similar. Of these, at least Pingtan and Changle have had problems in birth planning (again discussed below).

D. SUB-URBAN VARIATION IN THE FUZHOU AREA: COLORFUL COUNTIES, CADRE HEADACHES

We now turn to the Fuzhou area, home to large numbers of INS asylum applicants. We begin by charting some of Fuzhou's long urban history and by tracing the tortuous administrative development of the area during the communist period. In the rest of the section, we sort the counties in the Fuzhou area into peri-urban, interior, and coastal zones and then use some of the counties nearest Fuzhou City to explore possible relationships between socioeconomic development, birth program performance, and overseas emigration. For maps of the administrative divisions of Fuzhou, see Figures 8.3 (in English) and 8.4 (in Chinese). Where helpful, the section draws on information about other city-regions within Fujian.

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[348] Lavely, William et al. "The rise in female education in China: National and regional patterns," *China Quarterly* (No. 121, March 1990), p. 61-93; Skinner, G. William. "Differential development in Lingnan," in *The Economic Transformation of South China.* Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994), p. 17-54.

[349] Skinner, G. William. "Differential development in Lingnan," in *The Economic Transformation of South China.* Edited by Thomas P. Lyons and Victor Nee (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994), p. 17-54.

In this section, we present much detail on Fuzhou geography. Our aims here are to help INS officers identify the jurisdictions from which asylum applicants originate and to provide key information about those localities. As noted in a 1995 U.S. State Department report, asylum applicants identify their places of origin in terms of diverse levels of administration, pronounced in a variety of ways.[350] Confusion is compounded by the fact that during the communist period, administrative arrangements in the Fuzhou area have changed nineteen times! One result is some minor confusion about place names even in authoritative U.S. government reports. For example, during the communist period, the Fuzhou area has never had a Tingjiang county (it is a town that is now under the Mawei district of Fuzhou City) and Fuzhou City does not have a Lang Qi district.[351] [352]

In this Report, we cannot of course characterize all the townships and villages from which applicants might have come. We do, however, mention all 1990s administrative jurisdictions at the level of districts within Fuzhou City and counties within Fuzhou Municipality. Thus, for the communist period, the section distinguishes between **Fuzhou City** (four urban districts plus a suburban district) and **Fuzhou Municipality** (Fuzhou City plus eight county-level units, a prefectural-level municipality). For simplicity, we refer to all county-level units as "counties," even though in 1996, some of them were promoted to county-level municipalities (Changle and Fuqing). The section does not much discuss the localities most distant from Fuzhou— populous and prosperous Fuqing in the south and relatively backward Minqing and Luoyuan in the west and north. That would have lengthened the analysis without adding necessary comparisons. In any case, U.S. government reports do not mention them as significant sources of asylum applicants (even though Fuqing has a large Overseas Chinese connection and much foreign investment).

A brief history of Fuzhou City. The overall shape of the Fuzhou area's post-1949 story is as follows. Historically, Fuzhou City had been the seat of a prefecture that included surrounding counties. However, for most of the period from 1956 through 1967, Fuzhou City was shorn of all its counties, and from 1968 through 1982, it was deprived of all of them except Minhou. Thus, from 1956 through 1982, evidently each locality in the area developed— or rather, failed to develop— largely on its own. It was only in 1983 that a greatly enlarged new Fuzhou Municipality assumed supervision not only of Fuzhou City (including a large surrounding "suburban" district) but also of eight large "sub-urban" counties. In the 1980s and 1990s, the economic development of Fuzhou City gradually accelerated and a more integrated city-region probably began to emerge. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, development did not exhaust the space available within Fuzhou City itself and only began to spill over into the surrounding counties, particularly Changle.

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[350] Thayer, Harry E. T. *China: Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum Applications* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Asylum Affairs; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; U.S. Department of State,1995), p. 14-15.

[351] Both were mentioned in the otherwise superb Thayer report (referenced above) on p. 14, 35, 36 and 39.

[352] For tables summarizing postwar jurisdictional changes affecting Fuzhou, see Editorial Committee of the Fuzhou Yearbook. *Fuzhou Yearbook (Fuzhou Nianjian)* (Fuzhou: Vol. 10, 1997), p. 30-37 [in Chinese] [originally called the *Fuzhou Economic Yearbook (Fuzhou Jingji Nianjian)*].

FIGURE 8.3 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF FUZHOU MUNICIPALITY (IN ENGLISH)



Source: Thomas P. Lyons, Dept. of Economics, Cornell University, produced August 2001.
All feature locations are those of 1990, except coast highway, 1999. All original sources at scales of 1:1,000,000 or better. Most linework taken from Lyons, Thomas P. *Economic Geography of Fujian: A Sourcebook* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program: 1995, 1997). Sources described therein.
Location of coast highway approximate. Map shows sections completed as of 6/99. From a Fujian map dated 10/99. Place names are those of 6/99.

FIGURE 8.4 ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS OF FUZHOU MUNICIPALITY (IN CHINESE)



Source: Thomas P. Lyons, Dept. of Economics, Cornell University, produced August 2001.
All feature locations are those of 1990, except coast highway, 1999. All original sources at scales of 1:1,000,000 or better. Most linework taken from Lyons, Thomas P. *Economic Geography of Fujian: A Sourcebook* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program: 1995, 1997). Sources described therein.
Location of coast highway approximate. Map shows sections completed as of 6/99. From a Fujian map dated 10/99. Place names are those of 6/99.

Fuzhou City is located somewhat upstream from the mouth of the Min River, which connects half of Fujian's hinterland to its coast and provides one main port for access from Fujian to overseas. From the beginning, the city's development was affected by military considerations. The somewhat upstream location was intended to give the city the advantages of access to the coast while protecting it against attack from the sea. Also from the beginning, Fuzhou had a maritime orientation. Probably it was founded from the sea before the development of an agricultural hinterland. Historically, Fuzhou served as an entrepot for many different kinds of trade, coordinated by different elites, few of them from Fuzhou itself. Trade reached into the Fujian hinterland and further overland to central China, across the straits to Taiwan and through the island kingdom of Liujiu to Japan, and south to Guangdong and Southeast Asia. Along with the rest of Fujian, Fuzhou's fortunes fluctuated according to the degree to which, for military strategic reasons, the central government allowed external maritime connections to be either open or shut. When Westerners forcibly reopened China in the mid-19th century, Fuzhou was one of the first five "treaty ports" accessible to foreigners. Fuzhou became an important center for the tea trade and ship-building. By the early 20th century, Fuzhou was moving toward cooperation between Chinese and foreign elites, for example, to combat the silting in the Min River that kept forcing Fuzhou's port area to move downstream. During Japan's occupation of Taiwan (1895-1945), Fuzhou had some special relations with Japan.[353]

Under communism during the Maoist period (1949-76), several factors combined to hobble the further development of Fuzhou City. One was external: a continuation of the historical cycle of opening and shutting for strategic reasons. Fuzhou was on the front line of a war zone and the Nationalists continued to occupy the island of Mazu at the mouth of the Min River. This meant not only that the communists declined to invest in Fuzhou, but also that foreign embargo deprived Fuzhou of the foreign trade on which it might otherwise have thrived. The other factor inhibiting Fuzhou's development was internal: a Maoist prejudice against cities and a resulting penchant for putting major urban centers under the jurisdiction of largely rural areas. In the Fuzhou area, from 1949 through 1982, the result may have been to deprive Fuzhou of its natural hinterland and to inhibit the development of a city-region. This may help explain the independent mentality within some of the counties involved.[354]

During the early communist decades, Fuzhou City was reorganized several times. In some years, Fuzhou was cut back to administering only the urban districts and immediate suburbs within Fuzhou City proper. In other years, Fuzhou constituted a mini-municipality including only Fuzhou City and Minhou county. At still other times, the surrounding counties were joined into one prefecture surrounding Fuzhou, with the prefectural seat at Minhou. Most peculiarly, from

[353] On the early history of Fuzhou, see Schafer, Edward H. *The Empire of Min* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles Tuttle, 1954); Cartier, Carolyn Lee. *Mercantile Cities on the South China Coast: Ningbo, Fuzhou and Xiamen, 1840-1930* (Berkeley: Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Geography, University of California, 1991); and the excellent brief summary in Chu, David K. Y. and Xunhong Zheng. "Fuzhou: Capital of a frontier province," in *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts of Modernization*. Edited by Yue-man Yeung and Xu-wei Hu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992).

[354] On the postwar Fuzhou history, see Chu, David K. Y. and Xunhong Zheng. "Fuzhou: Capital of a frontier province," in *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts of Modernization*. Edited by Yue-man Yeung and Xu-wei Hu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992).

1968 through 1982, the counties surrounding Fuzhou City were reallocated to two relatively backward prefectures to Fuzhou's south and north (Putian and Ningde). To the south of Fuzhou City, the counties under the administration of largely agricultural Putian prefecture were coastal Fuqing, Pingtan and Changle, interior Yongtai and periurban Minhou (though in 1973, Minhou was returned to a reconstituted Fuzhou mini-municipality).[355] To the north of Fuzhou City, the counties under quite backward Ningde prefecture were coastal Lianjiang and largely interior Luoyuan. Although we cannot clearly connect these historical administrative changes to contemporary birth planning performance, our suspicion is that the changes did have an important impact, both on the development of the region and its parts and on local attitudes toward higher-level authority. These factors both have significant bearing on birth planning.

The urban districts of Fuzhou City. Turning now from the city as a whole to its constituent parts, we briefly sketch the main parts of Fuzhou City, which are mapped in English in Figures 8.5 and 8.6 and in Chinese in Figure 8.7. The city's relatively small urbanized areas all fall along its southern boundary, which is formed by a U-shaped curve of the Min River (see Figure 8.5). Fuzhou City's main urban area consists of three contiguous and entirely built-up districts along the upper left side of the U (Gulou, Taijiang and Cangshan, in the mid-1990s totaling about 45 square kilometers and about 847,000 people). About 18 kilometers to the southeast, at the bottom of the U, is another small built-up area, Fuzhou's downstream "outer" port of Mawei, within its own larger district (76 square kilometers). After subtracting these four urban districts, what is left of Fuzhou City is largely non-urbanized countryside, what used to be called the Suburban district, but in the late 1990s, was renamed the Jin'an district (926 square kilometers and 510,000 people, named after the small river separating it from the rest of Fuzhou City). Evidently, birth planning work is good in all districts.[356] [357]

Within the main urban area, the northernmost district is *Gulou*, the original site of the walled imperial city (see Figure 8.6). It oriented to the segment of the Min river immediately to the west, which later silted up. Gulou remains Fuzhou City's administrative and cultural center, with some new hotels. In 1982 it had 12 square kilometers and 260,000 people; by the mid-1990s it had 22 square kilometers and 420,000 people. South of Gulou, the *Taijiang* district is Fuzhou's classic commercial center and its "inner" port on the north bank of the Min River (particularly for passengers). Taijiang is now both commercial (tea and other local specialties and handicrafts) and light-industrial (mostly food processing). In the mid-1990s, it occupied about 14 square kilometers and held about 297,000 people. Still further south, occupying only a small part of large Nantai island in the middle of the Min River, the *Cangshan* district was the center for Fuzhou's somewhat limited foreign community in the late 19th and early 20th century. Cangshan

[355] Pingtan, Changle and Yongtai have all been poor birth planning performers.
[356] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999, though this may not apply to all of the suburban Jin'an district.
[357] On Fuzhou's 1990s urban geography, see Chu, David K. Y. and Xunhong Zheng. "Fuzhou: Capital of a frontier province," in *China's Coastal Cities: Catalysts of Modernization*. Edited by Yue-man Yeung and Xu-wei Hu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992); and Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995) [in Chinese].

FIGURE 8.5 THE ENVIRONS OF FUZHOU (IN ENGLISH)



The Environs of Fuzhou

FIGURE 8.6 THE EVOLUTION OF FUZHOU CITY (IN ENGLISH)



The Evolution of Fuzhou City

FIGURE 8.7 THE OUTSKIRTS OF FUZHOU CITY (IN CHINESE)



has retained some handicrafts and woodworking, but has become a center for education and research and is again a locus for Westerners and Overseas Chinese. In the mid-1990s, it occupied 9 square kilometers and was home to 130,000 people.[358]

The outer port of *Mawei* became the site of Fuzhou City's first post-Mao industrial zones for attracting investment from overseas and manufacturing for export. The original zone at Mawei was for light industry. An extension further up along the right side of the U was designated for future heavy industry (downstream along the north bank of the Min River, from Tingjiang to Guantou). Parts of the suburban areas immediately surrounding Fuzhou's urbanized areas were added to and subtracted from the city many times between 1949 and 1983. Since then Fuzhou City's suburban district has reached out to the east to include a large island at the mouth of the Min River and extended northward into the hills. Like most areas in China, during the post-Mao period it has suffered from "urbanization inflation"— the promotion of formerly rural jurisdictions into urban ones. In 1996, suburban Jin'an contained three urban wards (*jiedao*), four small towns (*zhen*), and four rural townships (*xiang*).[359]

In the late 1980s, Fuzhou Municipality formally distinguished between inner areas that made a strong contribution to its economic development and outer areas that did not.[360] By the early 1990s, Fujian and Fuzhou had declared the entire delta of the Min River a "golden triangle" for internationalizing economic development. The development zone included all of Fuzhou City's five districts, plus part of Minhou county and all of Lianjiang, Changle, Pingtan and Fuqing counties.[361] These developments had important implications for birth planning.

Birth planning in Fuzhou Municipality. The evidence available suggests that the mid-1990s were a time of significant provincial pressure for improvement in birth planning. For example, in 1996, Fuzhou Municipality claimed a late marriage rate of 53%, a one-child certificate rate of 26% (11% over target), and a planned birth rate of 92.3% ("a conspicuous increase over last year"). Moreover, the municipality reported that all thirteen of its constituent jurisdictions had passed provincial review as having met their targets. Nevertheless, municipal political and program leaders had identified thirteen townships and towns as requiring "direct supervision" (*danlie guanli*). The 1997 *Fuzhou Yearbook* entry on birth planning twice mentioned Pingtan, Changle and Yongtai as "relatively backward."

One of the municipality's distinctive strategies for improving program performance was to send down huge waves of government personnel (more than ten thousand) to the basic levels (nearly eight thousand village neighborhoods) for on-the-spot investigation of various aspects of birth planning work. More formal municipal inspection teams also spot-checked over one hundred villages without warning. The municipality also used "one vote veto" and other

[358] Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995) [in Chinese].
[359] Editorial Committee of the Fuzhou Yearbook. *Fuzhou Yearbook (Fuzhou Nianjian)* (Fuzhou: Vol. 11, 1998), p. 36 [in Chinese] [originally called the *Fuzhou Economic Yearbook (Fuzhou Jingji Nianjian)*].
[360] Listing Changle and Lianjiang as "outer," as noted in "Fuzhou establishes inner and outer townships," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (3 August 1988), as reported on NEXIS.
[361] Edmonds, Richard Louis. "Geography and natural resources," in *Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan*. Edited by Brian Hook (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 63-94.

administrative punishments to promote "lawful administration." Thus, it continued the "five cleanups," uncovering 291 cases of violation of program rules by party members, functionaries and basic-level cadres. As a result, the party disciplined 85 persons and the government disciplined 221; 60 units were denied advanced status and 35 persons were denied promotions.[362] Evidently, Fujian has carried out central orders to get tough on cadres who do their work poorly.

(a) Peri-urban counties

Of the peri-urban counties in the Fuzhou area, Minhou is among the most interesting. Here we take a look at some of the sources of its birth planning success.

The model Minhou. Minhou county is an example of a "peri-urban" county that eventually did well at birth planning. Minhou has several locational advantages. It is immediately adjacent to Fuzhou City and partially surrounds it. Its county seat is the closest to Fuzhou City among the counties within Fuzhou Municipality (24 kilometers). It also has the best transport connections to Fuzhou City, including river, road, and rail. Fuzhou municipal leaders may have found it convenient to use Minhou as an experimental point, and county leaders had relatively convenient access to municipal leaders. Minhou's people probably had more interaction with Fuzhou City than did residents of more distant counties. The extent of industrialization by 1978 was probably limited. Since 1978, Minhou has industrialized somewhat, but evidently only about half as fast as Changle (described below under Coastal counties). At the end of 1993, Minhou occupied 2136 square kilometers and was home to 590,000 people. It claimed connections with 70,000 Overseas Chinese and 4000 people on Taiwan and was dubbed one of Fujian's famous homelands for Overseas Chinese. As a result, the numbers and amounts of foreign investment were comparable to Changle's (a hundred-odd firms and several hundred million U.S. dollars at the end of 1993).

Minhou's proximity to Fuzhou City did not in itself produce high birth planning levels. In 1977, Minhou had one of the worst program performances in the province. By 1984, it was one of the most improved. By the 1990s, it was one of the best, a model for careful basic-level work. Between 1977 and 1993, Minhou had reportedly reduced its natural population growth rate from 23% to 6%, and had three times been declared a nationally "advanced county." In 1993, it claimed a birth planning rate of 91%, and at the end of the 1990s claimed a multiple child rate under 2%. In a major 1995 survey of Fuzhou Municipality, the chapter on Minhou is the only one that mentions birth planning, describing its achievements and methods at some length. The current Fujian provincial director of birth planning served in Minhou as director of the county organization department (1983-1988) and county executive (1988-1992). He had risen from the grassroots elsewhere, partly on the basis of having himself provided an early model of male sterilization.[363]

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[362] Editorial Committee of the Fuzhou Yearbook. *Fuzhou Yearbook (Fuzhou Nianjian)* (Fuzhou: Vol. 10, 1997), p. 211-212 [in Chinese] [originally called the *Fuzhou Economic Yearbook (Fuzhou Jingji Nianjian)*].

[363] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999; Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 201-206 [in Chinese].

According to its own reports, Minhou's successful program methods included the following. First, as regards propaganda-and-education, in each of the 318 administrative villages in its 15 townships and towns, Minhou established a Population Education School, which had instructed 80% of the public. Second, Minhou created a four-level service network, starting from county-level stations for providing services and managing migrant population and including thorough staffing down to the village level. Third, Minhou "institutionalized scientific management," with an emphasis on "transparency and responsibility."[364] Fourth, service work was entering a new era emphasizing quality. This included the "three qualities," "ten kinds of services," incentives such as insurance schemes and reproductive health services for women who practiced birth planning (covering the woman from the time of her marriage and her children up to age seven).[365]

(b) Interior counties

Fuzhou Municipality has jurisdiction over three counties that are not adjacent to it and that are located toward the interior. Yongtai is in the south beyond Minhou, Luoyuan is in the north beyond Lianjiang, and Minqing is in the west beyond Minhou. These counties have lower levels of development. Yongtai and Luoyuan also have poor birth program performance.

Poor performing Yongtai and Luoyuan. Historically, Yongtai was a destination of Hakka migration from the periphery to a location near core markets (for more on the Hakka, see Chapter Six). It remains quite poor. In the late 1990s, as much as a third of the population had gone out to look for work. Local leaders found it difficult to control these individuals while they were gone. The result is an excess (or unplanned) child rate around 6%. Luoyuan did not come up in interviews, but in the late 1990s, Fuzhou Municipality listed it as a target of direct supervision for the purpose of overcoming its poor program performance.[366]

"Backward" Anxi. The dynamics of a backward "interior" county are exemplified by Anxi county under Quanzhou City. It has had the worst program performance of any county in all of Fujian, with a 15% multiple child rate and chronic misreporting, among other problems. In the late 1990s, investigation by the province revealed that between 1990 and 1998, some 50,000 children were not registered. Several characteristics help explain Anxi's bad performance. It is both poor (long the poorest county in Fujian) and large (making it difficult to manage). Second, it has a long tradition of popular desire for both male and female children, and has been among the worst areas for trafficking in women. Third, for years Anxi did not "grasp" birth planning work— not in the 1970s, not in the 1980s, nor even in the early 1990s, but only in the late 1990s.

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[364] These mean that cadres, public, and couples should all know the birth policies and which couples were targets. Both cadres and masses should fulfill their responsibilities, with both program monitoring from above and mass supervision from below.

[365] Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 206 [in Chinese].

[366] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999. On Yongtai, see Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 217-220 [in Chinese]. On Luoyuan, see Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 225-228 [in Chinese].

Therefore, as the birth planning materials put it, it did not "lay a good foundation." The province notified the county that it had not done its propaganda-and-education work well.[367]

(c) Coastal counties

Fuzhou Municipality includes four counties located along the coast. Lianjiang occupies the coast just north of the mouth of the Min River, Changle occupies the coast just to the south of it. South of Changle are Fuqing, basically a peninsula extending out to sea, and Pingtan, an island just off Fuqing. These coastal counties have long histories of both legal and illegal foreign trade and both legal and illegal emigration abroad. Lianjiang and Changle produce many INS applicants. Changle and Pingtan have had poor birth program performance, and for that reason merit special attention.

Poor and populous Pingtan. The island county of Pingtan specializes in fishing. It is fairly poor but not extremely so. Pingtan has 310 square kilometers, 344,400 people, not even 0.3 *mu* of cultivated land per capita, but a net agricultural income of 1065 yuan per capita. Of special interest, Pingtan is the locality in China that is closest to Taiwan. (Pingtan is 128 kilometers from Fuzhou City but only 68 kilometers from Hsinchu City on Taiwan.) During the Maoist period, despite bans, Pingtan fishermen continued to have contact with Taiwan fishermen. Pingtan hopes to benefit from eventual direct communication and trade with Taiwan. In the meantime, evidently superior levels of government have tried to figure out how to help Pingtan develop. They have designated Pingtan a scenic area, a coastal open area, an experimental point for comprehensive sea island development and an experimental zone for open comprehensive reform. In 1992, the province and city held a meeting there and declared 32 preferential policies. Beginning in 1989, some of its 70,000 fishermen were hired as fisherman abroad. As regards birth planning, fishermen have a strong desire for sons to continue the family occupation. Fujian policy does allow fishermen with a first girl to try again for a boy. However, they are supposed to stop after the second child— which they do not. The overall multiple child rate is about 10% but in some villages ranges above 25%. Another program problem on Pingtan is that the cadres there are poorly off economically and "deficient" administratively.[368]

Rebellious Changle. Changle county, from which many INS applicants have originated, is not only a good example of a coastal county with poor birth planning; it also provides a colorful case of the changing relationship between localism and globalization. For these reasons we give it special attention.[369]

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[367] Interviews with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999. For a whole book on Anxi and its economic backwardness, see Lyons, Thomas P. *Poverty and Growth in a South China County: Anxi, Fujian, 1949-1992* (Ithaca, New York: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1994).

[368] Interview with Chinese officials by the authors, April 1999. See also, Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 228-234 [in Chinese].

[369] On Changle, see Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 217-220 [in Chinese]; *Looking Toward the Three Links Between the Two Coasts, Accelerate Economic Development: Fujian Changle Economic Development Strategy (1991-2010).* Edited by Jingwen Li (Beijing: Economic Management Press, 1993).

Historically, the county was most famous for its maritime orientation, fishing industry, and sailors (though it also had good rice agriculture). The most notable event in the county's history was its role in the early Ming naval expeditions to Southeast Asia, the most famous maritime exploration of overseas connections in Chinese history (around 1400, under Zheng He). Modern Changle has been notorious for smuggling and piracy and for the accompanying independence and aggressiveness of its residents, ranging into recalcitrance, belligerence and even outright lawlessness. In addition, Changle is famous for out-migration, which may be partially explained by its high population density. In 1937, its density was 351 persons per square kilometer, only fifth in Fujian among nearly 70 large rural counties. By 1982, Changle's density had increased to 843, only third among the more than sixty counties that did not contain one of Fujian's four major historic cities.

During the 1990s, the area was described as having a "culture of emigration"—practically everyone, it was said, aspired to migrate abroad, preferably to the United States, illegally if necessary.[370] In the 1993 *Golden Venture* incident, many of those shipwrecked on the Long Island shore were Changle residents. Unfavorable international publicity shocked Fujian authorities into a temporary crackdown. Since then, the province has again targeted Changle as a problem area, along with Lianjiang and other notorious localities along the Fujian coast.[371]

Paradoxically, given the Changle asylum applicants' claimed fear of birth planning enforcement, Changle has been an area of particularly lax enforcement.[372] This remained true even in the late 1990s.[373] In 1997, after the program "strengthened management," Changle Municipality claimed a birth planning rate of 88.5% and a crude birth rate of only 8.6 per 1,000.[374] The county seat at Wuhang claimed a remarkably high birth planning rate of 97.4%.[375]

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[370] E.g. Hood, Marlowe. "High price of a passport to misery," *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong: 13 June 1993), p. 2, as reported on NEXIS; and "It is the dream of every young male in Changle County…," *South China Morning Post* (Beijing: 30 January 1994), p. 12, as reported on NEXIS; also, Faison, Seth and Jane H. Lii. "Brutal end to an immigrant's voyage of hope," *New York Times* (3 October 1995), p. A1, as reported on NEXIS.

[371] On Changle lawlessness, see "Central discipline commission on Fujian corruption case," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (22 March 1984), as reported on NEXIS. On illegal emigration from Changle, see "Deportees from Japan arrested in Fujian," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (7 June 1990), as reported on NEXIS; "Chinese deportee sentenced to year's house labour," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (22 February 1992), as reported on NEXIS; "Fujian illegal emigrants to Mexico return to face fines and investigation," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (27 July 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Officials do not discriminate against returned illegal emigrants," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (30 August 1993), as reported on NEXIS. On crackdowns, see "Fuzhou City crackdown on illegal emigration," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (11 June 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Fujian official outlines campaign against illegal emigration and 'snakeheads'," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (31 July 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Fuzhou city jails illegal emigration ring leaders," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (18 August 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Fuzhou official comments on illegal emigration; 146 arrested in east coast area," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (15 November 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Fujian police say capturing 'snakeheads' will remain an 'arduous' task," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (22 December 1993), as reported on NEXIS; "Fujian brings illegal emigration under control," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (18 February 1994), as reported on NEXIS; "Fujian authorities combat 'hazards of illegal migrants'," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (8 August 1996), as reported on NEXIS; and "Fujian CPPCC member discusses crackdown on illegal emigration," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* (8 March 1997), as reported on NEXIS.

[372] As noted in Thayer, Harry E. T. *China: Country Conditions and Comments on Asylum Applications* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Asylum Affairs; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; U.S. Department of State, 1995).

[373] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.

[374] Editorial Committee of the Fuzhou Yearbook. *Fuzhou Yearbook (Fuzhou Nianjian)* (Fuzhou: Vol. 11, 1998), p.

The overall excess child rate was about 6%, but in some villages ranged over 20%— reportedly, some people have as many as six children! The main problem in Changle, according to officials interviewed, is that son preference remains strong and people are highly competitive— if one family has three children the next family wants four. Fujian officials explained Changle's poor record this way: Not only is the county maritime, but it is also highly commercialized and its people are prone to fighting: families want males both for business expansion and for physical protection. Another main problem in Changle, according to program superiors, is that its cadres do not follow the rules for leaders: reportedly, they think the same as the local people and do not "take the lead" in birth planning (*dai tou*). The province has sent in some outside administrators, but basically feels constrained to work mostly through local personnel. The province does not have enough personnel to staff the locality entirely from outside. Besides, they have discovered, only local personnel can deal with the local population.[376] Of course, poor program performance does not necessarily mean leniency. On the contrary, it is poorly institutionalized programs that are prone to abuses when they do try to enforce policy.

Yet by the turn of the millennium, Changle was no longer a coastal backwater but an increasingly industrialized suburb ever more integrated with Fuzhou City. Between 1978 and 1990, agriculture declined from 57% to 35% of total economic output, manufacturing increased from 23% to 44%, while services increased from 20% to 21%.[377] Changle had such a rapid industrial growth rate that between 1978 and 1993 it rose from 31st to 9th among Fujian's counties in total value of agricultural and industrial output, and by 1993, industry accounted for 83% of that output. Aside from one large electrical generating plant owned by Fuzhou Municipality, Changle's growing number of factories were mostly small-scale light-industry factories under village and individual ownership (up from 29% of industry in 1978 to 67% in 1993). These are not the township-level collective enterprises characteristic of southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang (which are thought to promote birth planning), but the more individualistic enterprises characteristic of southern Jiangsu (including Wenzhou) and the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong (including Taishan). By 1993, Changle had some six thousand such enterprises at the village level or below, employing half the rural labor force and producing 125 times their 1978 output. They were so successful that China's most famous sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, came to inspect. Changle's foreign social and economic connections were also strong. The county claimed several hundred thousand descendants among Overseas Chinese and on Taiwan. By 1993, it had 60 companies involving foreign capital worth 164 million U.S. dollars, with another sixty-odd agreements not yet implemented.[378]

So far, Fuzhou Municipality has used Changle mostly as a location for infrastructure, probably mostly serving Fuzhou City. During the 1980s and 1990s, Changle received successive

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170 [in Chinese] [originally called the *Fuzhou Economic Yearbook (Fuzhou Jingji Nianjian)*].

[375] Editorial Committee of the Fuzhou Yearbook. *Fuzhou Yearbook (Fuzhou Nianjian)* (Fuzhou: Vol. 11, 1998), p. 196 [in Chinese] [originally called the *Fuzhou Economic Yearbook (Fuzhou Jingji Nianjian)*].

[376] Interview with Chinese official by the authors, April 1999.

[377] *Looking Toward the Three Links Between the Two Coasts, Accelerate Economic Development: Fujian Changle Economic Development Strategy (1991-2010).* Edited by Jingwen Li (Beijing: Economic Management Press, 1993), p. 78.

[378] Editorial Committee of the Fujian volume. "Fuzhou municipality," *China Urban Encyclopedia* (Beijing: China Urban Press, 1995), p. 221-222 [in Chinese].

stages of a large electricity generation plant that soon accounted for about half of Changle's heavy industry. In the long run, Changle may become the site for a deep-water outer port (at Songxia). Meanwhile, Changle is in the process of becoming Fuzhou's portal to the outside world, as the site of Fuzhou's new international airport (at Zhangze). The new airport is intended not only to replace Fuzhou's old one but also to make Fuzhou a strategic gateway to Taiwan. Construction of the airport has involved much collateral construction in Changle such as wharves for delivering jet fuel and a projected expressway to Fuzhou City. The new Changle airport provides a piquant metaphor for the external orientation and foreign involvement that have produced so many Changle asylum applicants. In the future, they may be less likely to be the illegal cargo of a *Golden Venture* than passengers on a 747.

E. CONCLUSION

In this, our final chapter, we have sketched out some of the complicated, even contradictory connections between Fujian's global involvement— a process that includes not only in-bound investment, but also out-bound emigration and asylum claim-making— and birth planning practices in the province. While "Fujian," a mere province, may appear undifferentiated to the outsider, we have shown how much internal differentiation there really is, and how careful attention to local historical, socioeconomic, sociospatial, and sociocultural differences can make sense of variations in birth planning within the province. Of course, Fujian is not China, but the patterns and dynamics we have illuminated in that province are similar to those that operate throughout the country.

APPENDIX ONE: GLOSSARY

INTRODUCTION

This Glossary is designed to serve several functions. First, it defines key terms and concepts, mostly terms used by the Chinese birth program but also some distinctive to this Report. Second, by including major policy slogans, the Glossary in effect lists many of the main policies in the Chinese program during the 1990s. Third, the Glossary conveys some idea of how the Chinese program has packaged these matters for dissemination within the birth planning "system."

<#>

33321 A 1995 formula including all the program's then main slogans: The three unchangeables, the three basics, the three links, the two transformations and the one purpose (explained separately below).[379]

<A>

Activists (*jiji fenzi*) Within communities, volunteers who do propaganda, monitoring, and service work for the birth planning program. According to birth planning regulations, all Chinese citizens are supposed to help implement the program; few, however, achieve the status of activists.

Administrative means A last resort, after persuasion and economic sanctions have failed. Include loss of party membership, being denied promotion, temporary demotion in salary grade, and sometimes even firing. See Chapter 1, Section C (c).

Administrative Procedure Law Passed in 1989 as part of Dengist attempt to rebuild socialist legality, and in particular to give citizens a legal basis for resisting bureaucratic abuses. A main legal basis for citizen ability to seek redress from any abuses committed by the birth program.

Adoption Law One of the laws that requires coordination with birth planning. When first passed on 29 December 1991, it was quite restrictive, in order to discourage a "market" for children. A revised version was passed on 4 November 1998, making adoption easier, partly in order to help place unwanted girls in homes. In terms of legal philosophy, there may have been some shift between the two versions, from an orthodox emphasis on the "unity of rights and obligations" toward a reformist emphasis on "lawful rights and interests" of citizens.[380]

Agricultural versus non-agricultural An important distinction, and a frequent category in

[379] On most of the formula, see "Family planning under market economy," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing: FTS19971014000667, 14 October 1997), as translated for FBIS.

[380] For the 1991 version, see FBIS 91-251 (31 December) 18-20. For the revised version, see FBIS 98-315 (11 Nov), available on World News Connection.

Chinese population statistics. Unfortunately, it is usually based on slow-changing household registration (*hukou*) data, not on the actual current occupations of individuals.

<B>

Birth order distribution The number or proportion of births that are first children, second children, and third or higher-order children. An obvious indicator of program success or failure. Demographers call these numerical slots the "parity" of the births.

Birth peak At the micro level, refers to age at which most women give birth to most children, in 1990s China 24-26. At the macro level, refers to generational "booms" in births, about every 20-25 years, as in the early 1990s.

Birth planning In China, planning of births not by the family but by the state, in order to coordinate economic production and social reproduction.

Birth Planning Association (*Jihua Shengyu Xiehui*) Started in 1980, and growing steadily since, the "mass organization" charged with mobilizing popular participation in implementing state birth planning. See Chapter 5, Section C (b).

Birth policy The rules governing reproduction, primarily age of marriage, timing of births, and number of children, but also including timing and type of contraception.

Birth program In this Report, the administrative "system" in China that implements state birth planning. Headed by the State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC).

<C>

Cadres (*ganbu*) The usual English term for party and state functionaries, particularly at the "basic level" (within communities, dealing directly with the mass public).

Campaign (*yundong*) A method of implementation, much used in birth planning, that deploys upper level resources to lower levels for short periods of time, to educate and mobilize people to undergo contraceptive operations. The opposite of routine work. Also called "shock months" (*tuji yue*), "propaganda months" (*xuanchuan yue*), or "high tides" (*gao chao*).

Children In the 1990s, an emerging theme in Chinese social legislation was protection of children's "rights and interests." The main legal embodiment was the 1991 PRC Law on the Protection of Minors. In April 1996, partly in response to international criticism of injury to children indirectly resulting from the birth program, the State Council issued a white paper on the status of China's children.[381]

Coercion In Chinese, the nearest equivalent of the pejorative sense is "forceful methods"

[381] Keith, Ronald C. "Legislating women's and children's rights and interests in the PRC," *China Quarterly* (No. 149, March 1997), p. 29-55.

(*qiangzhi de banfa*), which means using physical violence against persons or property. In a less pejorative sense, the whole Chinese program is coercive in that it is legally mandated and enforced.

Collateralization In this Report, the process in the 1990s through which the birth planning program formed links to other kinds of programs— mostly economic, but also cultural and even political. One of the "two transformations" that was still a slogan at the end of the 1990s. See the "three links" and Chapter 3, Section C (c).

Collective *(jiti)* A Chinese classification of ownership that is neither state nor private. The typical form of ownership of cooperative enterprises in rural areas, which are an important foundation for economic growth, government revenues, and the ability of rural local governments to fund and enforce birth planning.

Community (*shequ*) In this report, as in Chinese program usage, the township and village level, where people interact face-to-face and therefore have a sense of community.

Contraceptive operations or procedures The "technical" side of the program, in the 1990s it included primarily IUD insertions and removals and sterilizations (mostly female, but also male), plus small numbers of contraceptive implants.

Contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) A significant measure of program input to demographic outcomes, the proportion of women who practice contraception (including sterilized husbands). In China, the reported rates are remarkably high, around 90%. However, in most countries, CPR is computed by dividing the number of women (or their partners) who are practicing contraception by the number of married women of reproductive age (MWRA). Nominally, the Chinese definition is similar, using married women aged 15-49. In practice, Chinese figures often omit women who are not legally required to practice contraception (such as late-married women who do not yet have a child, pregnant women, and women after menopause). This artificially inflates the Chinese rates. A variant of this indicator of interest to the Chinese program is the proportion of women using long-term provider-controlled contraception (IUDs or sterilizations) as opposed to pills or condoms that are client-controlled.

Core In this report, the most developed center of a large geographic region.

County In China, the lowest level of the state that is fully state funded and extensively staffed for a wide range of functions. For birth planning, usually the lowest level that has a hospital and a fairly advanced birth planning clinic. China has about 2800 counties.

<D>

"Decision" (12 May 1991) The decision by the party Central Committee and government State Council at the beginning of the 1990s to stabilize and then strongly "re-enforce" birth policy, particularly by holding local political leaders responsible for successful implementation. With the 1980 "Open letter," one of the two or three most important birth policy documents ever issued. Issued as Central Document Number Nine.

"Decision" (2 March 2000) The decision by the party Central Committee and government State Council at the beginning of the 2000s to further strengthen birth planning work in order to stabilize the relatively low fertility rate already achieved. Sets program goals for 2010 and beyond.

Deng Xiaoping (1904-1996) From Sichuan, a major early communist leader who headed the party secretariat from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, was purged during the Cultural Revolution, but reemerged to succeed Mao Zedong as China's paramount leader. The architect of China's post-Mao modernization strategy, which he decided should include intensified birth planning.

<E>

Economic methods (*jingji fangfa*) After persuasion, the second implementation method for birth planning, consisting of both economic incentives (subsidies to one-child couples and only children) and economic penalties (steep fines for out-of-plan children). See Chapter 1, Section C (b).

Eugenics Law See Maternal and Infant Health Law.

Excess (*chaosheng*) **child** Child born in excess of the authorized quota. Same as unplanned or out-of-plan child.

<F>

<G>

Grasp tightly, grasp well (*zhuajin, zhuahao*) An instruction to birth planning workers to reach targets ("grasp tightly") while avoiding coercion ("grasp well"). Emphasized at different times during the development of the program since 1970. In the 1990s, a directive from Jiang Zemin at the March 1993 central party and state council birth planning work forum. Responded to defects in program workstyle, particularly coercion. Jiang pointed out that birth planning affects the vital interests of a billion people and must be done firmly but carefully. Tempers Li Peng's "three unchangeables" with a greater concern for citizen rights.

<H>

Household registration (*hukou*) Historically, the main bureaucratic means of recording population in China, and an even more fundamental institution in communist China. Essentially, it assigned a person to the type of place (rural or urban) and the particular place in which he or she was born. For birth planning, determines the rules to which a person is subject, and the community that will supervise their implementation.

<I>

Incentivization In this Report, the program effort in the 1990s to supplement active persuasion and implicit threats with significant economic reasons for compliance, partly by simply passing out benefits, and partly by linking the program to other government programs, particularly poverty alleviation in rural areas. One of the "two transformations," still a slogan at the end of the 1990s. See Chapter 3, Section C (c).

Individual (enterprise or sector) (*geti*) In communist China, one of the three types of ownership. Originally small, this sector has grown rapidly in the post-Mao period, and includes both many prosperous entrepreneurs and many poor urban migrants, both hard for the birth program to control.

<J>

Jiang Zemin (1926-) From Jiangsu, in the 1980s, the mayor and party secretary of Shanghai. Promoted to Beijing in 1989, where he became general secretary of the Communist party, chairman of the party Military Affairs commission, and president of the PRC. Succeeded Deng Xiaoping as the "core leader" of China. Evidently, strongly supports state birth planning, but has intervened to demand that the program respect citizen rights (1993) and be realistic in its methods and reporting.

<K>

<L>

Late marriage, late birth, few births, quality births (*wanhun, wanyu, shaosheng, yousheng*) The slogan of the "one-child policy" promulgated in the early 1980s, and still a major program theme.

Late birth rate (*wansheng lu*) The proportion of births by women age 24 and older. Equal in practice to any woman who conforms to the "late marriage" ideal of not marrying until she is 23.

Late marriage rate (*wanhun lu*) The proportion of marriages that conform to the recommended ages of marriage— 23 for women and 25 for men. Technically, it is calculated separately for men and women, but usually it is just given for women.

Later, longer, fewer (*wan, xi, shao*) Later marriage, longer spacing between children, and fewer children. The program slogan from 1973 until 1979, emphasizing timing of reproductive events as well as number of children.

Law In the 1980s, China attempted to restore a socialist legal system. In the 1990s, China attempted to reform this system. Particularly in social policy, China supplemented older formulations of intertwined class-based "rights and obligations" of all citizens with a new emphasis on the "lawful rights and interests" of particular categories of citizens. This reform effort combined Chinese domestic experience with a new 1990s responsiveness to evolving international conventions. See the entries on Administrative procedure, Adoption, Children,

Marriage, Maternal and infant health, Population and family planning, and Women.[382]

Li Peng (1928-) An adopted son of Zhou Enlai, Moscow educated. He was premier from 1988 until 1998 when he took over leadership of the National People's Congress. A "conservative" statist who has strongly favored state birth planning in the 1990s. Articulated the "three unchangeables" in 1993.

Li Tieying A "third generation" successor associated with Zhou Enlai, was the politburo member overseeing birth planning in the early 1990s.

Liberalization In this Report, refers to preliminary signs at the end of the 1990s that the program may be shifting away from trying to micro-manage the reproductive behavior of individual couples— and the administrative behavior of provinces and localities— in favor of more general and indirect controls.

Local In this Report, refers basically to the county level, though sometimes also to prefectures (the level between county and province).

<M>

Mao Zedong (1893-1976) From Hunan, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. He led the party from 1935 until his death in 1976, and was paramount leader of the PRC from 1949 to 1976. He originally opposed limiting China's population, but later endorsed it. Although he authored the birth planning approach to controlling China's population growth, he did not consider birth planning a high priority. Indeed, many of the radical economic and political policies distinctively associated with Mao (for example, the Cultural Revolution) brought birth planning to a halt.

Marriage Law In the absence of a national law for birth planning, aside from the Constitution the main national law stating that birth planning is mandatory. Has several provisions that affect birth planning, such as age of marriage. Originally passed in 1951. Revised in 1980, when it technically raised the legal marriage age, but in practice lowered it, somewhat reducing the birth program's ability to use timing to postpone childbearing. Under the current Marriage Law, the minimum legal age for women is 20, for men, 22.

Maternal and child health law Improving maternal and child health (MCH) was an objective of Chinese communist public health administrators from the founding of the regime. In the late 1980s, the birth program also began trying to prevent the birth of children with hereditary deficiencies. Both of these enter into the Chinese version of the concept of "eugenics," which in Chinese translates as "quality birth" (*yousheng*). In October 1994, the PRC passed a Law on Maternal and Infant Care. This measure was originally labeled a "eugenics" law, but its passage was postponed and it was renamed after it aroused international concern. During the 1990s, the effort to prevent birth defects has been supplemented with an increasing return to the original

[382] See also, Keith, Ronald C. "Legislating women's and children's rights and interests in the PRC," *China Quarterly* (No. 149, March 1997), p. 29-55.

public health MCH objectives.

Mobilize, mobilization (*dongyuan*) An implementation method for persuading reluctant citizens to fulfill their birth planning obligations. Mostly a matter of mobilizing community leaders and neighbors to persuade a woman to terminate an out-of-plan pregnancy or to have a legally required sterilization (because she has already born her quota of children).

Multiple-child rate (*duotai lü*) The proportion of births that are third children or higher, a category that the program has targeted since around 1980, and particularly since around 1990.

<N>

Natural rate of population increase The growth rate of the population, calculated by subtracting the crude death rate from the crude birth rate. Usually expressed as a certain number per thousand. A frequently used but misleading indicator of program performance— it does not reflect program performance well because it is heavily influenced by the age structure of the population.

<O>

One-child certificate rate (*dusheng zinü zheng*) The proportion of couples who, after having their first child, sign a document saying they will not have any more, in order to get benefits both for themselves and for their child. If they change their minds and have a second child (legally or illegally) they must pay back the benefits.

One-child policy (*yihai zhengce*) An interim measure introduced in 1979 to combat population growth from 1980 to 2000 during a period that otherwise could bring a major baby boom. The party-state tried to enforce it in the early 1980s but found it infeasible, and retreated to a de facto "one and two-thirds" child policy instead— that is, one child for urbanites, but two children for one-half to two-thirds of rural residents.

One guarantee, three reforms, and two foundations A new slogan propounded by the new chairman of the State Birth Planning Commission, Zhang Weiqing, in February 1999. It reiterates some classical features of the program (the one guarantee), while also indicating that the program is changing (the three reforms).

"Open letter" (*gongkai xin*) A letter published in the authoritative *People's Daily* on 25 September 1980, from the central committees of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Youth League to their members, indicating that the party was launching a major drive aimed at keeping the total population within 1.2 billion in 2000 by asking all couples to limit themselves to one child.

<P>

Parity progression ratio A highly precise way to state the structure of reproduction, basically the proportion of women that progress from having one child (parity one) to having two children

(parity two) to having three children, et cetera.

Party and government top leaders personally grasp and bear general responsibility (*dangzheng yibashou qinzi zhua, fu zongze*) A key plank of the May 1991 "Decision," making subnational political leaders (not just program leaders) responsible for program success in their jurisdictions and making their performance central to their careers. One of the "three unchangeables" that remains in effect.

Peng Peiyun The chairman of China's State Birth Planning Commission (SBPC) from 1988 to 1998. On the one hand, she was associated with some tightening up and re-enforcement of policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the other hand she vigorously promoted rationalizing reforms, particularly a shift toward more economic incentives through the "three links." She became a member of the State Council (China's government cabinet), and on leaving the SBPC became a vice-chairperson of the National People's Congress. She also now heads the All-China Women's Federation.

Per capita concept The notion, attributed by SBPC director Peng Peiyun to Deng Xiaoping, that China's post-Mao development requires not just all-out attention to increasing production, but also attention to slowing population growth, in order to "reduce the denominator" in per capita calculations and actual living standards.

Periphery In this Report, the less developed margins of spatially differentiation regions. Typically the most difficult areas for birth planning because of low incomes, high dependence of families on labor power, low government revenues, and poor "quality" cadres.

Peri-urban In this Report, an area (usually a county) adjacent to and partially surrounding a major city. In Fujian, around Fuzhou City, Minhou county (and former Minhou prefecture).

Persuade, persuasion (*shuofu*) The mild beginning stage of trying to persuade a woman to comply with birth planning regulations; if unsuccessful, followed by mobilization.

Planned versus unplanned (*jihua nei* versus *jihua wai)* In-plan versus out-of-plan, particularly a pregnancy or birth. A central distinction in birth planning, since classically all pregnancies and births must be authorized in advance from the annual quotas available under macro population targets. Unplanned births are also known as "excess" births.

Planned birth rate The proportion of births that are "in-plan," a major measure of demographic outcomes from the program's point of view.

Population and birth planning law A national law giving birth policy legislative legitimacy, something the program has lacked because, despite periodic attempts, policymakers and legislators could not reach consensus on its major provisions. As of late 1999, again actively being drafted, and scheduled for passage before 2002.

Prefecture (historically *fu*, under the communists *diqiu*) In China, a level of government between the province and county— as though in the United States there were a level of

government between state governments and counties.

Propaganda-and-education (*xuanchuan jiaoyu*) In the view of Chinese political and program leaders, the preferred method for implementing birth policy even in the short run, and in the long run the only way to bring mass fertility aspirations into line with program ideals. See Chapter 1, Section C (a).

<Q>

Quality China has been interested in "eugenics" at least since the 1920s, and the communist regime has long favored improving the "quality" of the population in terms of health and education. In the birth program in the late 1980s, "quality" meant mostly trying to avoid births of children with hereditary diseases or birth defects. By the 1990s, "quality" increasingly meant a combination of good maternal and child health and what westerners would call more investment in "human capital," particularly education.

Quality of care (*youzhi fuwu*) In the mid-to-late 1990s, an increasing preoccupation of the Chinese birth program, particularly under the influence of the shift in international population policy thinking achieved at the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo. In China, the term means essentially a shift from a nation-centered approach that emphasizes aggregate "population control" to a client-centered approach that emphasizes delivery of better health care services, including adequate counseling.

Quantity In China until the 1990s, the main preoccupation of population policy and birth policy. Reflected in numerical targets that tended to dominate implementation, sometimes resulting in coercion. From the mid-1990s, concerns with quality issues (quality of care, of service, and so on) have joined, but not displaced, quantity concerns.

<R>

Rate See Contraception, Late birth, Late marriage, Natural population increase, One-Child Certificate, Multiple birth, Parity progression, and Planned birth.

Rationalization In this Report, a series of reforms during the 1990s intended to strengthen and routinize the program, starting with the "re-enforcement" of policy at the beginning of the 1990s, and continuing with "routinization," "incentivization," and "collateralization."

Reproductive health (*shengzhi jiankang*) In the 1990s program, an increasing buzzword within the Chinese birth program, largely equivalent to classic "maternal and child health" (MCH), though with a new emphasis on women's rights.

Residents' committee (*jumin weiyuanhui*) In urban areas, a quasi-governmental, quasi-private committee that monitors public and private behavior within an urban neighborhood, including compliance with birth planning regulations. It is the territorial component of the combined territorial and functional (work unit) controls over urban residents. The rural equivalent is the villagers' committee.

Routinization In the Chinese birth program in the 1980s and 1990s, the process of "organization building" through increased funds, training, and personnel, combined with the process of achieving administrative-supervisory control over grass-roots implementors' behavior ("lawful administration"). The opposite of the short-term "campaign." See the "three priorities," and Chapter 3, Section C (b).

Rural versus urban A fundamental cleavage for most of the communist period, and a basic distinction in birth planning. Basically, urbanites are limited to one child while half to two-thirds of rural couples can have two. Classification of individuals depends on where they were originally entered in the household registration system (see "agricultural" versus "non-agricultural"). Unfortunately, in Chinese, data classification of whole populations as rural or urban depends simply on the kind of administrative jurisdiction under which they fall (city or county), without regard to how much of the population actually lives in urbanized areas or experiences an urban lifestyle.

<S>

Sex ratio The ratio of males to females. In the Chinese program, the main issue concerns sex ratio at birth. In most human populations, the sex ratio at birth is about 105-106, because male infants have higher mortality rate than female infants. The interaction between program birth limits and societal gender preferences produces much higher ratios for second and third children, and even for first births during periods of stringent enforcement. For example, in 1997, the overall sex ratio at birth was 113, but for first children it was 105, for second children 138, and for third and higher children 142.[383]

Song Ping (1917-) From Shandong, a "conservative" economic planner who headed the State Planning Commission from 1983-1987. Evidently, a strong supporter of state birth planning, he headed the China Birth Planning Association from 1990-1998.

State (*guoyou*) In the Chinese communist classification of ownership, the most favorable category, classically covering most urban work units. Access to state revenues guaranteed good and secure salaries and generous benefits—- in exchange for which state employees were expected to comply with the birth program, among other things.

Sterilization, "involuntary" An American (as opposed to an official Chinese program) category. The term does, however, capture the fact that after having more children than the program allows, sterilization is mandatory, and also that most Chinese would prefer not to undergo the procedure.

Subcore In a spatially differentiated region, an area outside the developed core that is nevertheless quite developed, a sort of secondary economic center. In Fujian, communist efforts to shift development from the militarily vulnerable coast to the mountainous interior made the

[383] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1998), p. 440, Table 1-6 [in Chinese].

latter a subcore.

Sub-urban In this Report, counties that are under the administration of a city. For example, in Fujian, Minhou and Changle counties are sub-urban.

Sustainable development Originally a western "population-resources-environment" concept, China has adopted the term and the concept as a basic justification for strict control of the country's population.

<T>

Three links (*san jie he*) Refers to linking birth planning, first to developing the agricultural village economy, second to helping farmers achieve a modestly comfortable standard of living, and third to constructing civilized and happy families. This innovation appeared in Jilin and Jiangsu at the beginning of the 1990s "because of the development of a socialist market economy." It sums up certain aspects of both Chinese mass experience and overseas advanced experience. Party leader Jiang Zemin and government leader Li Peng both completely endorsed it and called it a "major reform and new development" in Chinese birth planning. The State Birth Planning Commission director called it rural birth planning's "hoped for road." From 22-26 October 1995, the State Council organized a national "three links experience exchange meeting" in Chengdu.[384]

Three priorities (*san wei zhu*) An important instruction to all birth planning cadres to take propaganda-and-education, contraception, and routine work as the three "mainstays" in their work. This slogan arose in the 1980s from the experience of Songcheng and Wendeng counties in Shandong. The full slogan was to stress propaganda-and-education over administrative or economic incentives, pre-pregnancy contraception over post-pregnancy birth control, and routine work over crash campaigns. In 1983, the State Birth Planning Commission held a national meeting in Songcheng and propagated the "three priorities" nationwide. On 16 September 1993, the State Council convened a national meeting to further propagate the "three priorities." Program reports claim that during the 1990s, they really have been implemented, raising the level of birth planning work nationwide. According to the program, the "three basics" shows that birth planning has its own "endogenous controls." They are a basic work direction that, according to program leaders, must be followed in advancing birth planning.[385]

Timing The temporal component of birth policy, emphasized most strongly during the 1970s, of delaying births through later marriage and longer spacing between children. When implemented well, delayed timing can achieve fertility-reducing effects as great as those of drastic limits on the number of children.

Total Fertility Rate The total number of children that the average woman would have over her reproductive life-span if age-specific fertility rates for a given year held steady over her life. An

[384] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 599 [in Chinese].
[385] State Birth Planning Commission. *China Birth Planning Yearbook* (Beijing: China Population Publishing House, 1997), p. 599 [in Chinese].

apt measure of program performance, though even in China much of the reduction has come from declining fertility aspirations, not from program enforcement of child limits.

Two kinds of production (*liangzhong shengchang*) Economic production and social reproduction. In the late 1950s, the Chinese communists formed the ambition of subjecting these to integrated planning. This remains the basic idea behind the program. In the 1990s, cadres have been instructed to do both at the same time (*yiqi zhua*), and to use increase in one (economy) to promote decline in the other (population).

Two transitions (*liange zhuanbian*) According to the State Birth Planning Commission, following the deepening of reform and the opening and preliminary establishment of a socialist market economy, birth planning work must alter its work philosophy and work methods. First, it has to shift from just doing birth planning work to linking to the socioeconomic plan and using more comprehensive measures to solve the population problem. Second, it has to shift from taking social constraints as fundamental to the preliminary establishment of a combination of interest guidance and social constraint, melding propaganda-and-education, comprehensive service and scientific management into a unified mechanism.

Three unchangeables (*sange bu bian*) Pursuant to the 1991 "Decision," Premier Li Peng put forth this principle at the 1992 Second National Birth Planning Work Conference. First, the present planned birth policy won't change. Second, already-specified population control targets won't change. Third, the practice of top party and government leaders personally taking full responsibility won't change.

<U>

<V>

Voluntarism (*ziyuan*) The Chinese communist implementation doctrine, according to which, in the long run the most efficient way to achieve compliance is to persuade people that they want to do what they have to do in any case.

<W>

Women, Rights and Interests of In the 1990s, a focus of Chinese social policy has been developing programs for the protection and advancement of women, particularly under the circumstances of China's new "socialist market economy," which has led to the deterioration of women's status in many domains. On 3 April 1992, China passed a Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, unifying and strengthening provisions scattered in related legislation.[386]

"Work outline" (*gongzuo gangyao*) (1995-2000) The guiding document for birth planning work during the 1996-2000 Ninth Five-Year Plan. Approved by the State Council on 14 January

[386] Keith, Ronald C. "Legislating women's and children's rights and interests in the PRC," *China Quarterly* (No. 149, March 1997), p. 29-55.

1995, as Document Number Three of 1995.

Work unit (*danwei*) Under Chinese communism, a fundamental unit of social structure, individual life, and birth planning. The three types of ownership are state, collective, and private (see those entries). In cities, the work unit is the "functional" arm of control over individuals, including for birth planning, along with the "territorial" residents' committee (see that entry).

<X>

<Y>

Yuan Chinese dollar, equivalent to about 12 cents in American currency.

<Z>

Zhang Weiqing At the end of the 1990s, the successor to Peng Peiyun as the chairman of the State Birth Planning Commission. He was transferred in from having been governor of Shanxi where he had little connection with birth planning. He then spent several years as a quiet understudy to Peng. Since her elevation to higher posts, he has become somewhat more articulate, for example propounding the "one guarantee, three reforms, and two foundations" slogan described in the text and Glossary.

Zhou Enlai (1989-1976) From Jiangsu, one of the main communist leaders, served as Premier. One of the main early proponents of state birth planning.

Zhu Rongji (1928-) From Hunan, Zhu worked in the State Planning Commission and State Economic Commission and served as Shanghai's mayor from 1988-1992. He became vice premier in the early 1990s, and premier in 1998. A technocrat, but a liberal one who is liberalizing China's economic management and may be pushing the birth program in the same direction.

APPENDIX TWO: MARCH 2000 "DECISION" [387]

DECISION OF THE CPC CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE STATE COUNCIL ON STRENGTHENING POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING WORK AND STABILIZING A LOW BIRTHRATE

The population issue is a long-standing and important issue facing the initial stage of socialism. It is a crucial factor restraining the economic and social development of our country. Controlling the size of population and improving the quality of population are important strategic policies for realizing the magnificent goal of socialist modernization and sustainable development in our country. In the 50 years since the founding of New China, especially since the beginning of reform and opening up, China has, with the hard work of the whole party and all the people of the country, made great achievements in population and family planning work that have attracted worldwide attention. Although its economy is not yet developed, China has effectively put the excessively rapid growth of the population under control, enabled the birthrate to decrease to a level below the replacement level, brought about a historical change in population reproduction from a high birthrate, a low death rate, and fast growth, to a low birthrate, low death rate, and a slow growth. China has successfully explored a way with Chinese characteristics to comprehensively deal with the population issue, effectively promoted the growth in comprehensive national strength, the progress of the society, and improvement in the people's livelihood, and made a positive contribution to stabilizing the world's population.

Family planning is a basic national policy we must adhere to for a long time to come. After bringing about a change in the type of population reproduction, the main task of population and family planning work is to shift to lowering the birthrate and improving the quality of the population. The whole party and the whole society must proceed from the overall situation of the socialist modernization in our country, and the long-term interests of the existence and development of the Chinese nation, and continue to do a good job in population and family planning. Consequently, a decision has been made as follows:

I. To Stabilize a Low Birthrate Is an Important and Arduous Task for Some Time to Come

1. With the arrival of the 21st century, the population and family planning cause of our country will enter a new and important development period. With the prerequisite of stabilizing a low birthrate in the coming several decades, the population in our country will gradually move from a low growth rate to zero growth. After reaching a peak (nearly 1.6 billion), the total population will begin to decrease slowly and the quality of the population will constantly improve, thus creating a favorable population environment for the basic realization of modernization and sustainable development.

[387] "Text of CPCC, State Council Decision on Family Planning," *Xinhua* (Beijing: CPP200000507000012), as translated for FBIS.

2. An excessively large population remains the most important problem in our country. In the coming decade and more, the population of our country will continue to grow in a sustained manner. It is estimated the annual net growth will exceed 10 million. It is difficult to bring about a fundamental change in the low quality of the population within a short time. Employment pressures will further increase. The problem of an aging population will become more conspicuous. The contradiction between the population on the one hand, and the economy, society, resources and environment on the other, remains sharp.

The demand on the work to stabilize a low birthrate is even higher and the task more arduous. At present, the level of productivity is quite low in our country, the development between different regions is uneven, the social security system is not sound. The influence of traditional birth concepts will remain for a long time to come, and it is still quite difficult to implement family planning. Deviations made in implementing policies, errors in work, or the undesirable impact of the external environment may lead to an increase in birthrates. In the process of the gradual establishment of the socialist market economy structure, population and family planning work will face many new situations and new problems such as the management structure, the work methods, and the service quality, and the quality of the cadres cannot completely meet the development of the situation [*sic*]. It is a pressing task to change the functions of the government and accelerate the pace of reform and renovation.

3. The coming 10 years will be a crucial period for stabilizing a low birthrate. It should be pointed out that at present, a considerable number of comrades still do not understand very well that a large population is the most basic and most important national condition in the initial stage of socialism in our country, do not understand very well that the population issue is crucial to the sustainable development strategy, and do not understand very well the long-term nature, the difficulty and complexity of population and family planning work under the condition of practicing socialist market economy. It is a pressing task to earnestly change concepts, solve these problems of understanding, overcome blind optimism, and guard against relaxation in our will to work.

4. The essence of the population issue is the issue of development. Whether or not the population problem is solved has a direct bearing on the improvement in the people's livelihood, the improvement in the quality of all the people, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Leading cadres at all levels must understand and solve the population problem on the high plane of the overall situation and strategy and in the spirit of being held highly responsible to the party, the country, the people's interests, and future generations. They must keep their heads cool, adhere to a scientific attitude, and unremittingly and properly grasp population and family planning work year after year to ensure the realization of the goal of population and family planning work.

II. The Goal and Principles for Population and Family Planning Work in the Coming 10 Years

5. The goal of population and family planning work in the coming 10 years is to limit the total population of the country (excluding the people in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao Special Administrative Region, and Taiwan Province) to within 1.4 billion

and to limit the average annual birthrate to 15 [text garbled; probably “per 1000”]; to make a marked improvement in the quality of population; to normalize the ratio between babies of the two sexes; to enable the childbearing group to enjoy basic reproduction health service, and to extensively promote contraceptive measures so that people can make the proper choice; to initially form new concepts on marriage and childbirth and a new childbirth culture; and to gradually establish a family planning guarantee system and work mechanism for effective control and management with sound policies and regulations.

6. To realize the above goal, it is imperative to adhere to the following principles:

It is necessary to make comprehensive policy decisions on population and development. It is necessary to speed up economic and social development, attach great importance to science, technology and education, strive to improve the people’s livelihood and the quality of citizens, include population and family planning work in the overall planning for economic and social development, formulate and improve various sets of policies, and promote the coordinated development between the population on the one hand, and the economy, society, resources and the environment, on the other.

It is necessary to stabilize existing childbirth policies. The state encourages late marriage and late childbirth and advocates one child per couple, and rational arrangements according to laws and regulations for giving birth to a second child. It is also necessary to carry out family planning among minority ethnic groups. Specific policies and regulations are to be formulated by various provinces, regions and municipalities.

It is necessary to deal with the population issue in a comprehensive manner. It is necessary to mobilize the whole society, put the work under government leadership and the guidance of relevant departments, enable various sectors to cooperate with each other, set up a working mechanism for the people’s participation, and ensure strong points will supplement each other, resources are shared, and each unit undertakes its own responsibility. It is necessary to take legal, educational, economic and administrative measures to deal with the population issue in a comprehensive manner.

It is necessary to integrate state guidance with the people’s voluntary participation. It is necessary for the state to formulate policies, provide necessary guarantee measures, and give consideration to both state interests and individual interests, long-term interests and immediate interests, and overall interests and partial interests. It is necessary to integrate administrative management with mass work, take the promotion of a fundamental change in the people’s childbirth concept as the standing point, organize and guide the people to enthusiastically take part in population and family planning work, increase the people’s consciousness in carrying out family planning, and establish closer ties between the party and the people and between the cadres and the people.

It is necessary to integrate overall promotion of the work with separate guidance for different categories of work. While properly grasping the national family planning work, it is necessary to continue to put the focus of the work on the rural areas, especially the rural areas in the central and western regions. It is necessary to give play to the role of demonstration in cities

and the eastern region. It is necessary to further implement the “three dominant factors” principle of taking publicity and education, contraceptive measures, and regular work as dominant factors, and promote the balanced development of population and family planning work in different localities.

It is necessary to regard comprehensive development as the center. It is necessary to respect the people’s position of being masters of family planning work and safeguard the people’s legitimate rights and interests. It is necessary to organically integrate family planning work with economic development, the work to help the people become rich through labor, and the building of civilized and happy families. It is necessary to depend on science and technological progress and to provide quality services.

III. Improve the Readjustment and Regulation System of Population and Family Planning Work and Relevant Social and Economic Policies

7. Establishing a sound readjustment and regulation system and a good policy environment is an important guarantee to population and family planning work. In formulating regulations and reform measures for land, enterprises, medical service, social security, residential registration, labor, education, finance, and taxation, governments and relevant departments should take all factors into consideration and coordinate various factors to promote population and family planning work.

It is necessary to improve and perfect family planning management and give full play to the readjustment and regulation role of population planning. Planning departments must do a good job in making plans for the coordinated development of the population, the economy and the society. Public security departments must earnestly strengthen birth registration and seriously carry out work related to the citizens’ identity cards. Family planning departments must scientifically standardize their working regulations. Such departments at the township and village levels should carry out management according to existing polices, simplify procedures, make public the procedures and policies of their office work, and consciously put themselves under the people’s supervision.

8. It is necessary to strengthen the building of the legal system for population and family planning work, speed up national legislation on population and family planning, and gradually establish and perfect the legal system for population and family planning. It is necessary to strengthen the publicity of family planning laws and regulations and increase the sense of law in cadres and the people. It is necessary to raise the level of administration according to law, strictly enforce laws in a civilized manner, give full play to mass supervision and public opinion supervision, earnestly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the people, and enable population and family planning to comprehensively embark on the road of management according to law.

9. It is necessary to establish and perfect the family planning mechanism for guidance by means of interests. Governments and agriculture-related departments at all levels should adopt measures such as granting small loans, giving priority in the construction of projects, providing support by means of science and technology, and formulating preferential policies to help peasant

households that practice family planning increase their economic income, overcome actual difficulties and raise their social and economic position. Government and poverty-relief and development departments at all levels should give priority to helping, selectively, and in a planned way, poor households that practice family planning, and increasing their capacity to help themselves through production developmental strength. The policy that “no increase in land with the increase in people and no reduction in land with the decrease in people” will continue to be implemented in rural areas. In the current stage, fees for society to bring up children should be collected from families that have violated family planning policies and this is a kind of necessary economic restraint on them. The rate of such fees should be fixed in a unified manner by various provinces, regions and municipalities. The fees for society to bring up children collected should be handed over to financial departments.

Governments at all levels and grass-roots organizations should set up an encouragement mechanism to implement the policies of rewarding and giving preferential treatment to families that practice family planning. It is necessary to reward single-child families with a certain amount of money. When parents of urban single-child families retire, various localities can provide them with necessary subsidies according to actual circumstances. In the distribution of collective economic income, enjoying collective welfare, the distribution of land for building houses, the contracting of land, training, employment, medical service, housing, providing nursery and kindergarten services, and school enrollment, appropriate consideration should be given to families that practice family planning, especially families with only one girl.

It is necessary to energetically develop social security undertakings to dispel the people’s worry about practicing family planning. Labor protection and other relevant departments should proceed from reality, take various preferential measures, and establish a social security system conducive to family planning. In urban areas, it is necessary to establish and develop old-age insurance, basic medical insurance, childbirth insurance, social welfare, and other social security services. In rural areas, it is necessary to adhere to the principle of government support and the peasants’ voluntary participation and gradually establish, according to actual circumstances, the old-age protection system for single-child families that practice family planning and for families with two girls. It is necessary to ensure the labor rights and economic interests of childbearing women. Civil affairs departments should formulate social assistance policies beneficial to families that practice family planning and provide livelihood subsidies for poor households that practice family planning.

10. It is necessary to include the population issue in the general program for developing the western region. In implementing the strategy for developing the western region, it is imperative to persistently grasp both economic development and population control so that the economy will grow, the population will decrease, and the people’s quality will improve. In view of the fact that in the western region, the childbirth rate is relatively high, the percentage of the poor population is also high, and the level of urbanization is quite low, it is necessary to formulate relevant policies and measures to strengthen basic family planning work at the grass-roots level to exercise strict control over population growth. The state will adopt the system of financial transfer payments, implement the strategy of tackling difficult problems in poverty-relief work, and strive to develop educational, science, technology, cultural, medical and health care, and family planning undertakings. It will also implement measures for the eastern region to support

the western region, the urban areas to support the rural areas, and the advanced to help the less advanced. It will also strengthen training for cadres, emphasize guidance for work, improve service facilities, and improve service quality.

IV. Establish a Management Mechanism for Population and Family Planning Work That Is in Keeping With the Socialist Market Economic Structure

11. Population and family planning work is a social system project that depends heavily on policies and involves the vital interests of the people. Party committees and governments at all levels should coordinate with relevant departments to mobilize all the forces of society to comprehensively improve such work. The discipline inspection, supervision, organization, propaganda, planning, education, science, technology, ethnic, public security, civil affairs, judicial, financial, taxation, personnel, labor protection, construction, land resources, agricultural, cultural, health, broadcasting, television, statistical, industrial and commercial departments must continue to make clear their responsibility and tasks in population and family planning work and formulate specific measures. Family planning departments must give full play to their functional role and assist party committees and governments to organize, coordinate, supervise and promote the implementation of population and family planning policies in various other departments. Trade unions, the Communist Youth League, women's federations, family planning associations, and other mass organizations at all levels, being important forces that assist party committees and governments in mobilizing the broad masses of people to participate in family planning work, should enthusiastically give play to their role and do a better job in organizing the people to carry out self-education, self-management and self-service.

12. It is necessary to energetically create conditions to include population and family planning in the grass-roots community management and service system. In rural areas, it is necessary to regard family planning as an important part of the building of rural grass-roots organizations, and of the building of "comparatively well-off villages," "civilized villages," and "five-good civilized families," conduct activities to enable villages to meet the requirements of family planning, energetically promote the autonomy of villagers, make affairs related to family planning public, and carry out democratic management and supervision. In urban areas, it is necessary to continue to promote local management, strengthen the functions of managing family planning of neighborhood offices and resident committees, and energetically promote the building of communities and provide community services.

It is necessary to strengthen the comprehensive management of the migrant population. It is necessary for places where the migrants go to undertake main responsibility in management in accordance with the "Procedures for the Management of Family Planning Work of the Migrant Population" and on the basis of joint responsibility undertaken by places where the migrants go and where the migrants come from. The public security, industrial, commercial, taxation, labor protection, health, real estate management, and other relevant departments must earnestly perform their duties, and must, centering round issuing certificates, renting houses, employment, and other links, form an effective management and service network in places where migrants reside, and strive to provide services in various aspects for the migrant population.

It is necessary to continue to implement the responsibility system for legal representatives

in family planning work. Enterprises and establishments under various kinds of ownership, and various kinds of social organizations must undertake the responsibility of managing family planning, guarantee necessary working personnel and funds, and implement measures as well as rewards and preferential policies for family planning according to relevant laws and regulations.

13. Propaganda, education, science, technology, and cultural departments should closely coordinate with each other, make use of various kinds of media, adopt different forms, and make great efforts to publicize the benefits of family planning to the public and the basic knowledge of population and family planning work so that a good atmosphere conducive to family planning will be formed in the whole society. It is necessary to conduct activities to “bring new practices in marriage and childbirth to thousands and thousands of families,” send culture, science, technology, and health services to the rural areas, make great efforts to publicize and spread scientific knowledge on contraceptive and birth control measures, sound child rearing, and health care for reproduction, guide the people to establish scientific, civilized and progressive concepts on marriage and childbirth, such as late marriage and childbirth, less childbirth and better child rearing, and no difference between a baby girl and a baby boy, and strive to develop a new type of socialist childbirth culture. Party schools, schools for administrative cadres, and schools of the Community Youth League should attach importance to education on population and family planning. Schools for secondary and tertiary education should hold forums or offer courses on population, puberty and sexual health care.

14. It is necessary to provide quality services with technical service as the dominant factor. Family planning departments are departments for the comprehensive management of population and family planning technical services. Family planning and health departments should closely coordinate with each other according to their respective duties, and should jointly provide good technical service for family planning and health care for reproduction centering around childbirth, birth control, and sterility. Grass-roots family planning technical service personnel should go deep into thousands upon thousands of households to give guidance for people in their childbearing years to choose safe, effective and appropriate contraceptive methods with long-term effective contraceptive measures as the major ones. Governments at various levels should strengthen the management of family planning technical service institutions and medical and health service networks at the county (city), township (town) and village levels, make full use of existing medical resources, improve service conditions, improve service standards, and increase service capacity.

15. It is necessary to depend on science and technological progress to develop the family planning cause. It is necessary to speed up scientific research and technical renovation in the field of population and family planning. It is necessary to develop and spread the use of new technology and products for contraception, birth control, sound childbirth, child rearing and reproductive heath care, and develop the reproductive health industry. It is necessary to strengthen the management of the market for family planning medicine, equipment and tools and standardize market behavior.

16. It is necessary to strengthen international cooperation and exchanges in the field of population and family planning. It is necessary to constantly expand the scope of cooperation, actively take part in multilateral and bilateral activities in the international field of population and

family planning, learn from and use for reference the useful experiences and scientific methods of the international community, strengthen propaganda abroad, establish a good image of our country in population and family planning work, and strive to win the extensive understanding and support of the international community.

V. Earnestly Strengthen the Leadership of the Party and the Government Over Population and Family Planning Work

17. The strong leadership of the party and the government is the fundamental guarantee to doing a good job in population and family planning work. Party committees and governments at all levels must put properly carrying out population and family planning work in the most important position of the sustainable development strategy, and persistently arrange their top leaders to grasp and undertake general responsibility in the work. It is necessary to seriously study new situations, coordinate and formulate work plans that conform with local reality, organize people from various quarters to properly implement such plans, and make sure responsibility is clearly defined and measures are taken, and necessary input has been made. It is necessary to give play to the role of part-time members of the State Family Planning Commission, organizations under the commission, and the population and family planning leading groups of various provinces, regions and municipalities.

The central authorities will hold a population work forum once a year, include population and family planning work in the scope of central inspection and supervision on important affairs, and carry out irregularly scheduled special investigations and inspections on key points of such work in various provinces, regions and municipalities. Party committees and governments of various provinces, regions and municipalities must make a special report to the central authorities on their respective population and family planning work each year.

Party and government cadres and cadres of family planning departments must improve their own quality, strengthen their sense of law and the legal system, earnestly improve their work style, establish close ties with the people, show concern for the people's livelihood, help the people overcome difficulties, and seriously and meticulously do in-depth ideological work. They must take the lead in implementing state family planning policies and must not abuse power to have unplanned childbirth. All cadres who have unplanned childbirth will be given administrative and disciplinary punishment and cannot take up leading posts; and party members who have unplanned childbirth will be given punishment according to party discipline.

18. It is necessary to persistently implement and improve the targeted management responsibility system for population and family planning, separately appraise the responsibility of party and government leading cadres and family planning departments, and implement the "veto with one vote" system [system that regards family planning work as one of the most important points for appraisal]. Organization, discipline inspection and supervision departments must regard how leading cadres implement the responsible system for family planning as an important part of the appraisal for administrative achievements, promotion, rewards, and punishment. Appraisals in this respect must be carried out each year during their terms of office and when they are relieved of their posts. Those who have neglected their duties should be investigated for their responsibility. In making appraisals on population and family planning work, it is necessary

to give prominence to key points, pay attention to actual results, use simple and feasible procedures, and lead the attention and work focus at the grass-roots level to quality service for the people and work efficiency.

19. Party committees, governments, and organization and personnel departments at all levels must, in accordance with the requirements of having good ideology and a good work style, being familiar with professional and management work, and being good at mass work, strengthen the building of family planning work personnel, especially those who work at the township (neighborhood) and village (residents committee) levels, ensure there are sufficient personnel, clearly define their tasks and remuneration, show concern for family planning cadres politically, show concern for their livelihood, create better conditions for their work, and ensure the stability of family planning work institutions. It is necessary to strengthen education and training for family planning personnel, improve their political and professional quality and their professional ethics, and increase their sense of the legal system, the people, and service. It is necessary to reform the cadre and personnel system and select outstanding personnel to substantiate the contingent of family planning workers.

20. Population and family planning work is a public welfare cause that produces remarkable social benefits, and the input in population and family planning work is basic input for the country’s economic and social development. It is necessary to include funds for family planning in the financial budgets of governments at various levels and such funds should earnestly be guaranteed. It is necessary to gradually increase the overall input of funds in population and family planning work, and the growth in funds for family planning work should be faster than that of financial revenue. By the end of 2005, the annual per capita fund put into family planning undertakings by financial departments at various levels should exceed 10 yuan. In the central and western regions, areas inhabited by people of the minority ethnic groups, and areas affected by natural disasters, where there is financial difficulty, priority should be given to funds for family planning. In the process of reforming tax collection in rural areas, it is necessary to earnestly ensure the necessary input of funds for grass-roots family planning undertakings. After fees for the society to bring up children and funds under townships’ overall planning have been included in financial budgets, financial departments should increase funds for family planning. It is necessary to establish a structure for raising funds through various channels, and encourage donations by the people, society, and the international community. The state supports the establishment of public funds for population and family planning. Auditing departments should strengthen supervision and inspection, and solemnly deal with problems in the collection, management and use of funds for the society to bring up children.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force should formulate regulations on their family planning work using the spirit of this decision for reference.

Party committees and governments at various levels should, in light of local reality, creatively do a good job in family planning work. They should, under the leadership of the party Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin as its core, hold high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, seize opportunities, meet challenges, pluck up their spirit, really firmly grasp work in this respect, work in a down-to-earth manner, comprehensively push the population and family cause of our country to a new stage, and make greater contributions to realizing the magnificent

goal of socialist modernization.

APPENDIX THREE: FUJIAN BIRTH PLANNING REGULATIONS

Passed 29 April 1988, revised 28 June 1991

[Translator's note: Parentheses contain the *pinyin* romanization of potentially ambiguous Chinese terms. Most brackets contain English words added by the translator to explain cryptic Chinese terms. A few brackets contain explanations of Chinese usage or Chinese terms.]

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article One. These regulations are formulated in order to control population quantity, raise population quality, cause population development to correspond to economic and social development. They are based on the Constitution of the PRC, the Marriage Law and other relevant state regulations, in view of the actual conditions in this province.

Article Two. Implementing birth planning is a basic national policy of our country. We should resolutely maintain propaganda-and-education and encouragement (*guli)* as the mainstay, supplemented by necessary economic and administrative measures.

Article Three. Both husband and wife have the obligation to practice birth planning. There is legal guarantee of the lawful rights and interests of citizens practicing birth planning.

Article Four. All levels of government should strengthen their leadership of birth planning work, and should take responsibility for organizing the implementation of these regulations.

CHAPTER TWO: FERTILITY

Article Five. Late marriage is advocated and late childbearing is to be implemented. Late marriage means that the male is at least 25 and the female at least 23. Late childbearing means having the first child by a married women 24 and above, or through getting pregnant after a late marriage.

It is forbidden to marry or procreate without reaching the legal marriage age.

It is forbidden to have out-of-plan births.

It is forbidden to adopt-in or adopt-out a child illegally.

Article Six. A rural couple who has given birth to one child and has real difficulties can have one more child if they request to give birth again and meet one of following conditions:

(1) Both husband and wife are only children, and the couple has only one child.

(2) The couple has only one child, and it suffers from a non-hereditary disease such that even after treatment the child cannot grow up to exercise normal labor power.

(3) The couple suffered from infertility, legally adopted a child, and the woman later became pregnant.

(4) Either husband or wife is the only child of a revolutionary martyr, and the couple has only one child.

(5) Either husband or wife was incapacitated in the public service, the handicap is classified as Grade Two, Level A or above, and the couple has only one child.

(6) Either or both spouses are remarried, and before remarrying the total number of their

children did not exceed one.

(7) The couple are from Taiwan, Hong Kong or Macau and returned to the mainland for permanent residence within the past six years, and they have only one child.

(8) One spouse is a second generation only child, and the couple has only one child.

(9) The couple has only one child, and none of the husband's brothers have a child, and all of them have lost their reproductive capacity.

(10) The woman has no brothers, the husband came to live with the wife's family after marriage to take care of the wife's parents, and the couple has only one child. If the woman's family has several daughters, this provision can apply to only one of them.

(11) The husband and wife live in a township with less than fifty persons per square kilometer, and the per capital arable land is two *mu* or above, or the forest land is thirty *mu* or above, and the couple has only one child. [A *mu* equals 0.0667 hectares or 0.165 acres, roughly the bare minimum for sustaining one person.]

(12) Miners who worked in the pit for more than five consecutive years and are still working there, and have only one child. Also couples with one child who live in a village where out-of-plan births are controlled and both are farmers or fishermen.

Adopted-in, adopted-out and abandoned children count, aside from any exceptions specified in laws or regulations.

Article Seven. If either or both the husband and wife are employees of an administrative, enterprise or professional unit, [or?] are urban residents, a couple with only one child who have special circumstances and request to have another child, should use the provisions for pit miners in Article Six, Sections One through Seven, and Section Twelve.

Article Eight. Returning Overseas Chinese, aside from using Articles Six and Seven, can have another child if they request to give birth again and meet the following provisions:

(1) When entering the country to reside, the woman was already pregnant.

(2) Both spouses have not been back to China for six years yet, and they have only one child.

(3) Their children reside abroad permanently, and in China they have no child.

Article Nine. Minority nationality couples (except Zhuang) in which both are farmers— or are functionaries in an administrative, enterprise or professional unit in a minority township or village, or are urban residents— can have two planned births, and can have another child if they request to procreate again and meet one of the following situations:

(1) Both husband and wife are only children.

(2) Of the two children, one has a non-hereditary defect and despite treatment can't grow to exercise normal labor power.

(3) One or both of the couple are remarried, and before remarrying the total number of children did not exceed two.

Couples in which one spouse is Han and the other is minority nationality (except Zhuang) shall be considered minority, and use the birth limits in the above regulations, if they live in a minority township or village, and the Han member has taken up residence in the minority, and their children are minority nationality according to the relevant regulations.

Article Ten. For those who qualify to have a first child, arrangements should be made by their

unit or village (residents') committee reporting to the department in charge of birth planning in the township (town) government or neighborhood office. Those who meet Articles Six to Nine of these regulations, and who wish to bear a second or third child, should apply to the township (town) government or neighborhood office, which should investigate and report for permission to the county (city or district) department in charge of birth planning. Spacing must be four or more years. Those who have already received arrangement or permission to give birth should be issued a planned birth certificate.

The non-hereditary disability referred to in Article Six, Section Two and in Article Nine, Section Two must be confirmed by a specialist hospital at the city (prefecture) level or above. The infertility and loss of reproductive capacity referred to in Article 6, Sections 3 and 9 must be confirmed by a specialist hospital at the county (city or district) level or above.

Article Eleven. Eugenics is advocated, and a premarital health examination system is to be carried out. To strengthen health during childbearing and infancy, relevant units should open a premarital outpatient clinic and eugenics information outpatient clinic. Infertile women should be offered medical services.

Article Twelve. All couples that a hospital at the county level or above has certified as having a hereditary disease are forbidden to give birth. One member of the couple must be sterilized, and any pregnancy must be terminated.

It is forbidden for any unit or person to determine the sex of a foetus for a pregnant woman, except as otherwise provided by state regulations.

CHAPTER THREE: CONTRACEPTION

Article Thirteen. All fertile couples must practice some form of effective contraception according to the demands of birth planning.

Those who become pregnant out-of-plan should take the initiative in reporting the pregnancy to their village (residents') committee and unit, or take timely remedial measures.

Those who become pregnant out-of-plan should be enjoined— by the unit or township government, neighborhood office or village (residents') committee— to take timely remedial measures.

Article Fourteen. Those who undergo contraceptive operations, after certification by a medical unit, should receive leave time according to the relevant rules. If one member of a couple who accepts sterilization needs the care of the other, the other's unit can grant five to seven days of leave.

During the leave for performing contraceptive operations, or during the period of any illness resulting from a contraceptive operation, or during the period of performing any operation reversing the sterilization (*wenhe shouxu*), the salary for a functionary in an administrative, enterprise or professional unit shall be paid, and the leave should not influence promotion. Those who in accordance with these regulations get sterilized after giving birth, can receive an appropriate subsidy from their unit.

Based on actual circumstances, rural villagers or urban residents can be given appropriate subsidy from the township (town) government, village committee or neighborhood office.

Article Fifteen. Those who at a hospital at the county level or above have been confirmed to have a complication caused by a contraceptive operation should receive free treatment. Those who cannot pursue normal labor even after treatment should receive care or assistance from their unit or local government according to regulation.

Article Sixteen. Those who, after accepting sterilization, because a child died or became disabled, meet the stipulations of these regulations and request to give birth again, can have a free operation reversing the sterilization, after certification by their unit, township (town) government or neighborhood office and approval of the county (city or district) department in charge of birth planning.

Article Seventeen. Agencies at various levels in charge of overseeing medical insurance and birth planning should do a good of job of technical guidance of birth planning and accept the assignment of performing procedures. In order to guarantee the safety of operations, contraceptive technical personnel must undergo training, and those who pass examinations should be given a certificate by health administration departments.

The work of birth planning scientific research should be stepped up and new birth control techniques should be promoted that are safe effective and simple.

Birth planning departments and other relevant departments should do a good job of planning, management and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices.

CHAPTER FOUR: MIGRANT POPULATIONS

Article Eighteen. Responsibility for birth planning by the migrant population should be jointly shared by the migrant's place of household registration and place of temporary residence.

Responsibility for managing birth planning for the migrant population should, according to specified responsibilities and jurisdictions, be fulfilled by birth planning management departments at various levels, and by departments of public security, industrial and commercial administrative management, urban and rural construction, labor and personnel, civil affairs, health, transportation, food, and township enterprise management.

Article Nineteen. As regards personnel who are going out (*wai chu*) to pursue economic or other activities, the departments managing birth planning at the township government and neighborhood office should conduct birth planning education, issue marriage and contraception certificates, register them and issue a booklet. They should establish liaison with the birth planning management department of the place of temporary residence of the personnel, in order to strengthen management.

Article Twenty. When personnel from outside arrive at their place of temporary residence, they should undergo inspection of their marriage-and-childbearing and birth planning certificates by the department in charge of birth planning in the township (town) government or neighborhood office. Only after that can the relevant units permit their registration as a temporarily resident household, [and allow them] to rent housing or a vending spot (*tan dian*), contract for construction projects, obtain permits to run businesses, or be hired as temporary workers, contract workers, or seasonal workers. The recruiting unit and contracting unit should assign

personnel responsible for ordinary birth planning work, and the department in charge of birth planning in the place of temporary residence should conduct periodic examinations.

As regards the management of birth planning for workers who have crossed between localities either inside from outside the province, aside from using the above provisions, the construction unit should register the marriage-and-childbearing situation and contraceptive measures of women of childbearing age (including members of the household of the incoming worker for more than one month) and issue a booklet. [The construction unit should] report to the department in charge of urban-rural construction at the work site for their review, and at the same time report to the department in charge of birth planning in the township government or neighborhood office for the record.

Article Twenty-one. Among women of childbearing age who go out to pursue economic or other activities for a long period of time, those who request to bear a child must hold a contraceptive certificate and planned birth certificate from their place of household registration and can give birth only after passing the inspection and approval of the birth planning department of the county (city or district) of their place of temporary residence.

Article Twenty-two. As regards outgoing personnel who are not practicing contraceptive measures, the relevant departments of the place of registration and temporary residence should mobilize and educate them to perform contraceptive measures on the spot. For those who have employment, the employing unit should pay the contraception expenses. Those without an employing unit should first pay the cost themselves, and apply for reimbursement when they return to their place of registration.

CHAPTER FIVE: POPULATION PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Article Twenty-three. Based on population indicators sent down from above, the various levels of government should specify population plans and implement a term responsibility system for population objectives [assessing performance during terms of office or periods of time]. The birth planning and population planning situation should be an important content in evaluating the political accomplishment of the various levels of government.

Basic level units can draw up birth planning contracts with couples of childbearing age.

Article Twenty-four. Each unit should implement a responsibility system for birth planning work, managing that unit's birth planning work and following the leadership of the local government.

Village (residents') committee and other basic level organizations should keep abreast of (*zhang wo)* the situation of women of childbearing age as regards marriage, childbearing and practice of contraceptive measures, and do a good job of scientific management.

Each unit and village (residents') committee should, according to birth regulations, implement population plans [from aggregate targets] all the way to individuals, and should promulgate [the regulations and plans], and should accept mass supervision.

All citizens have the obligation to assist in doing a good job of birth planning work.

Article Twenty-five. In accordance with the provision of these regulations, in birth planning

management work each relevant department should perform its duties, each should bear its responsibilities, and departments in charge of managing birth planning at various levels should be responsible for supervision and inspection.

Article Twenty-six. Propaganda-and-education and counseling services should be conducted on scientific knowledge about birth planning and eugenics by departments of propaganda, news, publishing, health, birth planning, education, civil affairs, science and culture, and by each level of labor union, Chinese Communist Youth League, Women's Federation and other mass organizations. Middle schools and upper-year primary schools should integrate population theory or population knowledge education into their curricula.

Article Twenty-seven. Statistics about birth planning and population should be timely and accurate. Relevant organizations and personnel should not conceal, falsify or alter them, or engage in other forgery behavior.

Those who give birth or get married away from home (*yidi de*) should, according to relevant regulations, immediately report this to their household registration [department] or temporary residence household registration [department].

Article Twenty-eight. [The following] should be beneficial to birth planning. Allocation of land, forest, mudflat, enterprise contracts (*qiye de chengbao*), collective profits (*shouyi*), housing land and housing; management of household registration and foodgrains; regulations concerning admission to school, gaining employment, issuing of business licenses, and social welfare.

Article Twenty-nine. The various levels of birth planning committee are competent administrative departments of the government at the same level. At the county level and above, departments responsible for birth planning should establish birth planning service stations. Townships (towns) and neighborhoods should establish birth planning offices, and assign birth planning management personnel and specialized cadres. Villagers' (residents') committees should provide birth planning officers. Villagers' (residents') small groups should provide birth planning propagandists.

Each administrative, enterprise or professional unit should provide full-time or part-time birth planning workers.

It is encouraged to establish mass organizations concerning birth planning, in order to strengthen propaganda-and-education and self-management and self-supervision by the masses themselves.

CHAPTER SIX: PRIVILEGES AND REWARDS

Article Thirty. The workers of administrative, enterprise and professional units who marry late (both worker and spouse) have their marriage leave extended to fifteen days. Those who give birth late and sign a one-child certificate can have their maternity leave extended to 135-180 days, according to the specific rules of their unit. When husband and wife are both workers, the unit can give the husband seven days of leave for taking care of his wife. Salaries should be paid during marriage leave and maternity leave and these [leaves] should not affect promotions.

Article Thirty-one. A couple of child-bearing age in which the wife is aged 49 years or under

with only one child can be issued a one child certificate by the township (town) government or neighborhood office, after application by the person and after inspection and confirmation by the local unit.

Article Thirty-two. Case rewards should be issued to the parents of all children under fourteen whose parents have a one-child certificate.

(1) The reward for workers in administrative, enterprise or professional units is four to five yuan per month, paid until the child is fourteen, or a one time payment not exceeding 400 yuan, with half paid by the unit of each member of the couple. If one member of the couple is [only] an urban resident or villager [i.e., not employed], the entire amount should be paid by the worker's unit.

(2) Rewards to urban residents should be stipulated by the county (city or district) government.

(3) Rural villages can give case rewards, and can also use other methods of encouragement such as special assistance in developing production, priority in entering township (town)- or village-run enterprises, priority in obtaining housing land, and appropriate reduction in obligatory work (*yiwu gong*). Details should be stipulated by the township (town) government.

For couples who already have one-child certificates, if one dies the reward should be given by the unit of the other. After divorces, the payment should be issued by the unit of the former spouse with custody of the child.

After enjoying treatment as a one-child couple, if the couple meets [the requirements of] these regulations, and petitions to give birth again, from the date of approval their one-child certificate should be retracted, and already issued case rewards should be returned.

Article Thirty-three. All things being equal, an only child can receive preferential treatment in being admitted to nursery school, kindergarten and [primary] school, and in recruiting for employment, accessing medical care, and allocating housing.

Each locality should create favorable conditions for arranging various kinds of social insurance for only children and their parents, and for couples that have had two girls and have been sterilized. Each locality can establish special population funds to use in birth planning affairs.

As regards rural couples who have lost their labor power, those localities that have implemented pension systems can appropriately increase the pension. In order to achieve elder care, localities that have not implemented pension systems should gradually open elder care homes and [implement] other such social welfare measures.

Article Thirty-four. In rural couples in which the wife has no brothers and the husband came to reside with the wife's family and is supporting the wife's parents as a member of the wife's family, the husband has the same rights and obligations as other villagers and in accordance with law enjoys the same right of inheritance, which is protected by law.

If the male is a [state] functionary and establishes residence in a family with only one daughter, the woman's parents are entitled to workers' insurance benefits as direct relatives of the male.

Article Thirty-five. Any department, unit or individual who achieves outstanding accomplishments in birth planning should be rewarded by various levels of government. Those

who are picked as local, prefectural or provincial advanced workers three times in a row should receive the same treatment as model workers at that level.

CHAPTER SEVEN: LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY

Article Thirty-six. An out-of-plan birth fine should be levied on couples who give birth out-of-plan.

(1) If a couple has a first child early or violates spacing laws, a fine should be levied according to 60% to 100% of their combined total income the previous year.

(2) For those who violate birth planning regulations by bearing one extra child, the fine should be two-to-three times their combined total income for the previous year.

(3) Those who violate birth planning regulations by having two extra children should be assessed four-to-six times their combined total income for the previous year. For three or more excess children, the weight of the assessment should be increased.

Those who adopt children illegally should be dealt with in accordance with the rules for out-of-plan births.

Out-of-plan birth fees can be levied in a lump sum.

The amount of the out-of-plan birth fees stipulated by city or county (district) should accord with Section One [of this article].

Article Thirty-seven. Couples who give birth out-of-plan should receive restrictions and penalties.

(1) Personnel of administrative, enterprise and professional units who violate birth planning regulations by having their first child early or violating spacing rules [should be punished] from the day of processing for one-to-three years. Those who give birth to extra children out-of-plan [should be punished] from the date of processing for seven years. They should not receive collective bonuses, promotion from temporary to regular worker, promotions in position or rank, or assessment as advanced workers. They should not receive any salary during maternity leave, they should not enjoy labor insurance, and they must themselves pay the expenses of childbirth. For those who have extra children out-of-plan, both the husband and wife must also be demoted by one salary grade starting from the date of pregnancy and they should be given other administrative discipline and punishment. The above mentioned administrative punishment should be decided by the local unit or responsible agency and reported for the record to the department in charge of birth planning at the same level.

(2) From the month of birth to the age of ten years, the excess out-of-plan children of urban residents can receive grain and oil only according to negotiated [i.e. market?] prices.

(3) Villagers who violate birth planning should not be given employment in township (town) enterprises, should not be recruited as cadres, and should not be transferred from agricultural to non-agricultural population, for a time period according to Section One. Those who have one or more extra children also can have confiscated a share of private-use land (or private-use hill or beach or orchard).

Article Thirty-eight. Those who give birth out-of-plan after already having had a one-child certificate, aside from [being subject to] Articles Thirty-six and Thirty-seven, also should return cash rewards and preferential leave pay.

Article Thirty-nine. The levying of out-of-plan birth fees should be decided by the birth planning department of the township (town) people's government or neighborhood office, based on the provisions of these regulations. After the case is reported for the record to the government (or police agency) at the same level and to the department in charge of birth planning at the next higher level, the person should be notified in writing.

The levying of out-of-plan birth fees on the migrant population, aside from following the provisions of previous articles, can also be decided directly by the responsible agency at the county (city, district) level.

Out-of-plan birth fees that are levied should be used exclusively for birth planning expenditures, and must not be diverted to other uses.

Article Forty. At the same time as levying out-of-plan birth fees and restricting or penalizing, the township (town) government or the neighborhood office should take measures urging person to perform effective contraceptive measures or remedial measures for out-of-plan pregnancy.

Article Forty-one. Cities (prefectures), counties (cities or districts), townships (towns) and neighborhoods that do not conscientiously implement the provisions in these regulations, and units that have out-of-plan births, in that year cannot be evaluated as spiritually civilized or [be given] other honors. In those localities in which the birth situation is serious, leadership responsibility should be traced and administrative punishment or economic penalties given.

In areas of temporary residence in which migrants give birth out-of-plan, the county (city or district) government and neighborhood office should fine the responsible person in the recruiting unit or the construction contractor who has not done a good job of birth planning and should fine private employers and those who lease or lend housing and therefore know about the situation but took no action.

Article Forty-two. For anyone who obstructs or disrupts birth planning work, or who displays one of the behaviors listed below, departments responsible for birth planning at the county (city or district) level or above should fine the persons directly responsible and should give the person's unit administrative discipline and punishment. In cases serious enough to constitute a crime, civil law agencies should, according to the law, trace criminal responsibility.

(1) Those who show favoritism or commit irregularities (*wubi*) or perform fake medical procedures, should have their illegal income confiscated and be fined 1000 to 5000 yuan.

(2) Those who illegally remove contraceptive devices for other people should have their illegal income confiscated and be fined 1000-5000 yuan.

(3) Those who illegally conduct examination of the sex of a fetus should have their illegal income confiscated and be fined 1000 to 5000 yuan.

(4) Those who forge and sell certificates concerning birth planning should have their illegal income confiscated and be fined 1000 to 5000 yuan.

(5) Those who forge or alter birth planning statistics should be fined 50 yuan to 500 yuan.

(6) Those who illegally adopt-out a child should have their illegal income confiscated, and be fined 500 to 1000 yuan.

Article Forty-three. Those who do not practice effective contraception measures or do not adopt remedial measures if pregnant out-of-plan should be given education. Those who after education still do not fulfill [their obligations] should be given economic punishment by the township

(town) government and neighborhood office according to the rules. Anyone who obstructs birth planning work, or slanders birth planning workers, medical personnel or activists, or who deliberately damages property for revenge, should be promptly punished by the security agencies in accordance with the "Regulations for punishment in managing security of the PRC." In cases that constitute a crime, the civil law agencies should trace criminal responsibility.

Article Forty-four. Those who drown or abandon girl infants, mistreat mothers who have girls, interfere with women performing contraceptive measures or remedial measures for out-of-plan pregnancy, should be handled according to the "Fujian province rules for protecting the legal rights of women and children" and related statutes and regulations.

Article Forty-five. A party who does not accept decision about out-of-plan birth fees and other fines levied on them should first petition the next higher department in charge of birth planning. If the party does not accept the review decision, the party can bring suit in the people's court. The time periods for requesting review, for deciding a review, and for bringing suit should be according to the "Administrative review regulations" specified by the State Council. If the party does not petition for review in time or does not bring suit within the required period, and [payment of the fee] is still unfulfilled (*yu bu luxing de*), the unit that levied the confiscation or decided the fine can petition the court to enforce it.

CHAPTER EIGHT: APPENDIX

Article Forty-six. Each city or county (district) government should, on the basis of these regulations and in accordance with the actual situation, specify concrete methods and report them to the next higher level of government for review.

Article Forty-seven. The power to apply and interpret these regulations belongs to the provincial birth planning commission.

Article Forty-eight. These regulations will be implemented from 1 July 1991.

From the date when these regulations are implemented, the "Fujian province people's government rules for minority nationality birth planning" approved by the eighth meeting of the Standing Committee of the sixth provincial People's Congress on 14 July 1984 will be inoperative. When any provincial rules are not in accordance with these regulations, these regulations should be taken as correct. Decisions on cases of persons who violated birth planning that were decided before these regulations came into effect will stand and will not be reconsidered. Cases that have not yet been processed because of concealment (*yinman*) or evasion (*duo bi*) should be handled according to these regulations.

APPENDIX FOUR: FUJIAN DATA

PROVINCE

TABLE A1. FUJIAN POPULATION: BASIC DATA, 1952-1996 (Population total and density, sex ratio, household number and average size)

TABLE A2. FUJIAN POPULATION: NATURAL INCREASE RATE, 1952-1996 (Showing crude birth and death rates, number per thousand)

TABLE A3. FUJIAN POPULATION: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 1950-1982 (Average children per woman, showing urban and rural)

TABLE A4. FUJIAN POPULATION: SELECTED CATEGORIES, 1953-1995 (% of population, selected years)

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TABLE A8. FUJIAN EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND INDUSTRY, 1985-1996

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TABLE A13. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1982 (Agricultural registration and per capita industrial and agricultural output, illiteracy and infant mortality, population density and sex ratio)

TABLE A14. FUJIAN COUNTIES: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 1981 (Showing average marriage age for men and women)

TABLE A15. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1995 (Population in millions, % agricultural, net agricultural income, government revenue in billion yuan)

TABLE A1. FUJIAN POPULATION: BASIC DATA, 1952-1996
(Population total and density, sex ratio, household number and average size)

	TOTAL POP	POP DENSITY	SEX RATIO	HOUSE-HOLDS	HOUSE-HOLD SIZE
1952	12.5920	104	104.7	----	----
1953	13.0252	107	108.3	3.1980	4.07
1954	13.3851	110	106.7	3.2190	4.16
1955	13.6662	113	106.8	3.2292	4.23
1956	14.0044	116	107.0	3.2804	4.27
1957	14.5251	120	107.5	3.3834	4.29
1958	14.9338	123	107.2	3.2907	4.54
1959	15.4305	127	107.1	3.3343	4.63
1960	15.7262	130	109.2	3.3607	4.68
1961	15.9781	132	107.4	3.4854	4.58
1962	16.3965	135	107.2	3.5293	4.65
1963	16.7837	138	107.2	3.5512	4.73
1964	17.0349	141	107.6	3.6179	4.71
1965	17.5976	145	107.3	3.6530	4.82
1966	18.1368	150	107.3	3.7056	4.89
1967	18.6081	153	106.9	3.7506	4.96
1968	19.1764	158	106.6	3.8350	5.00
1969	19.7449	163	107.1	3.9418	5.01
1970	20.2875	167	107.0	4.0512	5.01
1971	20.8969	172	107.1	4.1357	5.05
1972	21.5068	177	106.6	4.1747	5.15
1973	22.1041	182	106.7	4.2569	5.19
1974	22.5792	186	106.6	4.3964	5.14
1975	23.1027	191	106.8	4.5031	5.13
1976	23.6191	195	106.8	4.6755	5.05
1977	24.1119	199	106.8	4.7757	5.05
1978	24.5277	202	107.2	4.8447	5.06
1979	24.8793	205	106.5	4.9314	5.05
1980	25.1778	208	106.4	4.9970	5.04
1981	25.5690	211	106.5	5.1960	4.92
1982	26.0402	215	106.4	5.3328	4.88
1983	26.3980	218	106.6	5.4564	4.84
1984	26.7683	221	106.7	5.5755	4.80

TABLE A1. FUJIAN POPULATION: BASIC DATA, 1952-1996
(**Continued**)

	TOTAL POP	POP DENSITY	SEX RATIO	HOUSE-HOLDS	HOUSE-HOLD SIZE
1985	27.1310	224	106.8	5.7221	4.74
1986	27.4930	227	107.0	5.8950	4.66
1987	28.0052	231	106.9	6.1118	4.58
1988	28.4525	235	106.9	6.3480	4.48
1989	28.8905	238	107.0	6.5284	4.43
1990	29.9982	247	106.4	6.7967	4.41
1991	30.3909	251	106.6	6.9345	4.38
1992	30.6685	253	106.6	7.0746	4.34
1993	30.9917	256	106.7	7.1840	4.31
1994	31.2687	258	106.7	7.3357	4.26
1995	31.6463	261	106.8	7.5019	4.22
1996	32.1061	265	106.9	7.6944	4.17
1997					

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)* (Fuzhou: 1997), Table 2-1, p. 39 [in Chinese]. Based on Public Security figures.

TABLE A2. FUJIAN POPULATION: NATURAL INCREASE RATE, 1952-1996
(Showing crude birth and death rates, number per thousand)

YEAR	CRUDE BIRTH RATE	CRUDE DEATH RATE	NATURAL INCREASE RATE
1952	37.92	13.32	24.60
1953	36.67	12.55	24.12
1954	38.72	10.88	27.84
1955	36.88	10.37	26.51
1956	34.60	10.20	24.40
1957	37.56	9.80	27.76
1958	35.12	9.43	25.69
1959	30.09	12.46	17.63
1960	25.37	20.70	4.67
1961	22.98	15.99	6.99
1962	41.14	11.65	29.49
1963	45.80	9.34	36.46
1964	38.59	8.68	29.91
1965	41.19	7.92	33.27
1966	37.06	7.67	29.39
1967	34.99	7.38	27.61
1968	37.22	7.39	29.83
1969	35.68	6.99	28.69
1970	34.23	6.98	27.25
1971	34.83	6.94	27.89
1972	33.88	6.88	27.00
1973	33.17	6.78	26.39
1974	29.58	6.71	22.87
1975	29.19	6.58	22.61
1976	29.16	6.57	22.59
1977	27.57	6.56	21.01
1978	25.35	6.31	19.04
1979	22.91	6.28	16.63
1980	18.68	6.27	12.41
1981	23.40	6.25	17.15
1982	27.91	6.35	21.56
1983	24.53	6.31	18.22
1984	25.68	6.25	19.43

TABLE A2. FUJIAN POPULATION: NATURAL RATES, 1952-1996
(**Continued**)

YEAR	CRUDE BIRTH RATE	CRUDE DEATH RATE	NATURAL INCREASE RATE
1985	23.88	6.18	17.70
1986	24.02	5.85	18.17
1987	24.91	5.79	19.12
1988	24.34	5.81	18.53
1989	24.67	6.10	18.57
1990	24.44	6.71	17.73
1991	20.03	6.26	13.77
1992	18.18	6.02	12.16
1993	16.72	5.62	11.10
1994	16.24	5.95	10.29
1995	15.20	5.90	9.30
1996	13.22	5.94	7.28
1997			

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)* (Fuzhou: 1997), Table 2-4, p. 42 [in Chinese].

TABLE A3. FUJIAN POPULATION: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE, 1950-1982
(Average children per woman, showing urban and rural)

	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL
1950	5.268	6.126	5.144
1951	5.039	5.797	4.933
1952	6.518	5.528	6.661
1953	5.944	6.692	5.836
1954	5.984	6.502	5.911
1955	6.226	6.162	6.235
1956	5.635	6.648	5.491
1957	6.728	6.880	6.706
1958	5.888	6.013	5.870
1959	5.524	6.226	5.427
1960	5.041	6.070	4.900
1961	2.896	3.409	**2.827**
1962	6.581	**6.275**	6.623
1963	8.054	**5.792**	**8.363**
1964	6.571	**4.224**	6.880
1965	6.455	**4.073**	6.788
1966	6.964	**2.074**	7.609
1967	5.510	**2.068**	5.953
1968	6.854	3.351	7.305
1969	6.264	2.977	6.687
1970	6.092	1.921	6.632
1971	6.245	2.605	**6.723**
1972	5.439	1.545	**5.926**
1973	5.304	2.451	**5.668**
1974	4.549	1.226	**4.962**
1975	4.216	1.891	**4.511**
1976	4.472	2.042	**4.783**
1977	4.028	1.034	**4.419**
1978	3.503	0.995	**3.844**
1979	2.838	1.062	**3.091**
1980	2.048	0.973	2.210
1981	2.788	1.006	3.040
1982	2.636	1.269	2.830

Note: Bolding indicates periods of initial rapid fertility decline. Until 1962, urban fertility was higher than rural.
Source: Coale, Ansley J. and Chen Sheng Li. *Basic Data on Fertility in the Provinces of China, 1940-82* (Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, Paper No. 104, January 1987), p. 102-107; age-specific rates, calculated from 1982 census.

TABLE A4. FUJIAN POPULATION: SPECIAL CATEGORIES, 1953-1995
(% of population, selected years)

	1953	1964	1982	1990	1990	1995
Under 1 (0)	----	----	----	----	2.30	1.30
Preschool (3-6)	10.23	10.58	9.63	8.60	13.30	11.20
Primary (7-12)	11.66	16.41	15.63	11.61	11.60	13.40
Junior (13-15)	----	----	----	----	6.30	5.50
Youth (0-14)	35.78	42.30	36.50	31.30	----	----
Labor	54.60	48.72	52.72	57.21	56.90	57.40
Male (16-59)	28.56	26.50	28.46	30.60	30.30	29.80
Female (16-54)	26.04	22.22	24.26	26.61	26.60	27.60
Draft-age males (16-25)	9.91	7.97	10.23	11.30	----	----
Voting-age adults (18-)	58.31	52.40	56.24	62.18	----	----
Fertile women (15-49)	24.84	21.15	23.49	25.92	25.90	26.70
Elderly	4.70	4.42	5.68	6.41	----	----
Male (65-)	1.11	1.11	1.75	2.11	----	----
Male (60-)	----	----	----	----	3.70	4.50
Female (60-)	3.59	3.31	3.93	4.30		
Female (55-)	----	----	----	----	5.90	6.70

Sources: 1953-1990, Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1991 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1991)* (Fuzhou: 1991), p. 46 [in Chinese]. 1990 & 1995, *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1996)*, p. 52, Table 2-6.

TABLE A5. FUJIAN MARRIAGE: AGE AND STATUS, 1990s

AVERAGE MARRIAGE AGE, 1990s

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
21.45	21.61	22.12	22.44	22.57	22.50	23.78

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)* (Fuzhou: 1997), Table 2-14, p. 48 [in Chinese].

MARRIAGE STATUS OF WOMEN BY AGE, 1995
(% of women 15 and above)

	NEVER MARRIED	HAVE SPOUSE	DIVORCED	WIDOWED
TOTAL	18.5	71.6	0.3	9.6
15-19	98.5	1.5	----	----
20	82.7	17.1	0.1	0.1
21	62.2	37.8	----	----
22	45.9	53.8	0.1	0.2
23	29.1	70.7	0.1	0.1
24	17.4	82.2	0.1	0.3
25	11.1	88.4	0.3	0.2
26	6.6	92.9	0.3	0.2
27	3.9	95.5	0.2	0.4
28	2.1	97.4	0.3	0.2
29	1.6	97.7	0.2	0.5
30	1.4	97.9	0.3	0.4
31	1.1	97.9	0.4	0.6
32	0.8	98.2	0.4	0.6
33	0.5	98.2	0.3	1.0
34	1.0	97.6	0.5	0.9
35	0.4	98.4	0.4	0.8
36	0.2	97.9	0.5	1.4
37	0.3	98.3	0.3	1.1
38	0.3	98.2	0.3	1.2
39	0.3	97.6	0.3	1.8
40-44	0.2	96.7	0.4	2.7
45-49	0.2	93.8	0.5	5.5
50-54	0.1	89.2	0.3	10.4
55-59	0.1	81.6	0.4	17.9
60-64	0.1	70.8	0.4	28.7
65-	0.3	37.8	0.3	61.1

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1996)* (Fuzhou: 1996), p. 56 [in Chinese]. Based on 1995 1% sample survey.

TABLE A6. FUJIAN MINORITIES, 1953-1990
(Total persons, census years)

	1953	1964	1982	1990
TOTAL	12,845,252	16,757,223	25,872,917	30,048,224
HAN	12,728,762	16,606,788	25,621,412	29,584,393
MINORITY	116,490	150,435	251,505	463,831
She	96,375	128,706	210,893	346,451
Hui	5,094	9,323	31,188	92,124
Chuang	2	256	1,942	7,937
Manchu	749	1,183	1,915	5,273
Miao	14,090	7,070	2,771	3,924
Mongol	23	88	162	2,385
Tujia	----	7	37	1067
Foreigners	135	3,298	997	684
Buyi	----	79	139	596
Aborigines	1	84	421	522

Note: Listed in order of 1990 population. Among 26 groups, includes only the 10 with population over 500 in 1990. "Aborigines" are "*gaoshan.*" "Foreigners" is "foreigners entering Chinese registration."
Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1991 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1991)* (Fuzhou: 1991), p. 47 [in Chinese]. 1990 based on fourth census.

TABLE A7. FUJIAN VARIATION: RURAL VERSUS URBAN, 1950-1990
(% of total, selected years)

	AG	RURAL	NON AG	URBAN	CITY	TOWN
1950	86.14		13.86			
1952	88.52		11.48			
1957	85.13	83.68	14.87	16.32	8.09	8.23
1962	82.50	78.44	17.50	21.56	12.06	9.50
1965	83.67	79.73	16.33	20.27	11.84	8.43
1970	85.93	80.80	14.07	19.20	11.05	8.15
1975	86.27	80.99	13.73	19.01	11.14	7.87
1980	85.44	80.22	14.56	19.78	11.24	8.54
1985	83.52	57.16	16.48	42.84	15.84	27.00
1990	83.32	43.39	16.68	56.61	21.06	35.55
1995	81.34	16.10	18.66	83.90	----	----
1990	83.32	43.40	16.68	56.60		
1991	83.21	40.70	16.79	59.30		
1992	82.86	22.90	17.14	77.10		
1993	81.91	18.70	18.09	81.30		
1994	81.45	17.40	18.55	82.60		
1995	81.34	16.10	18.66	83.90		
1996	80.84	15.50	19.16	84.50		

Note: AG/NONAG and RURAL/URBAN are % of total population. URBAN includes CITY and TOWN, which are available separately for 1950-1990 but not after 1990.
Sources: 1950-1990 series from, Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1991 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1991)* (Fuzhou: 1991), p. 42 [in Chinese]. 1990-1996 series from, *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)*, p. 40 (rural/urban percentages), and p. 41 (ag/nonag population). Based on Public Security annual statistical reports. [See also, *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1994 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1994)*, p. 33, for annual urban-rural according to jurisdiction, and p. 34 for annual agricultural versus non-agricultural, according to Public Security.]

TABLE A8. FUJIAN EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR AND INDUSTRY, 1985-1996
(Selected years, in % and millions)

EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR, 1985-1996

PER CENT

	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Primary	61.5	58.4	57.7	56.2	53.5	51.2	50.3	49.4
Secondary	19.4	20.5	20.9	21.9	23.2	23.9	23.7	24.1
Tertiary	19.0	21.1	21.3	21.8	23.3	24.9	26.1	26.5

MILLIONS

	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Primary	7.0910	7.869	8.295	8.378	8.195	7.950	7.881	7.880
Secondary	2.2380	2.771	3.008	3.269	3.553	3.719	3.710	3.835
Tertiary	2.1920	2.843	3.061	3.249	3.566	3.867	4.083	4.228
TOTAL	11.5211	3.483	14.364	14.896	15.314	15.536	15.674	15.943

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)* (Fuzhou: 1997), Table 2-18, p. 50 [in Chinese]. Year-end figures.

EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRY, 1995
(% of total employed population, by type and sex)

TOTAL	CATEGORY	MEN	WOMEN	M/W RATIO
61.4	Agriculture, forestry, fishing	34.0	27.4	1.2
14.8	Manufacturing	8.4	6.4	1.3
7.5	Commerce	4.1	3.4	1.2
3.6	Construction	3.2	0.4	8.0
3.4	Communications	3.1	0.3	10.3
2.7	Education & culture	1.4	1.3	1.1
1.8	State, party & mass organizations	1.4	0.4	3.5
1.7	Social services	1.1	0.6	1.8
1.0	Excavation (*caijue*)	0.9	0.1	9.0
0.8	Health, sport & welfare	0.5	0.3	1.7
0.4	Utilities	0.3	0.1	3.0
0.4	Finance & insurance	0.2	0.2	1.0
0.2	Other	0.1	0.1	1.0
0.2	Science research & technical services	0.1	0.1	1.0
0.1	Real estate	0.1	---	---

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1996)* (Fuzhou: 1996), Table 2-8, p. 53 [in Chinese]. From 1995 1% sample survey.

TABLE A9. FUJIAN EMPLOYMENT BY UNIT TYPE, 1952-1995
(Selected years, in millions)

	TOTAL	RURAL LABOR	STATE UNIT	URBAN COLLECT	URBAN INDIV	% STAFF & WORKERS
1952	5.395	5.057	0.190	0.023	0.125	3.95%
1957	6.037	5.188	0.514	0.302	0.033	13.52%
1962	5.865	4.667	0.773	0.376	0.049	19.59%
1965	6.387	5.018	0.838	0.491	0.040	20.81%
1970	7.640	6.376	0.934	0.331	----	16.55%
1975	8.551	6.900	1.114	0.496	0.041	18.83%
1980	9.630	7.291	1.675	0.637	0.028	24.00%
1985	11.521	8.642	1.914	0.809	0.138	23.79%
1990	13.484	10.122	2.146	0.781	0.253	23.05%
1995	15.674	11.485	2.171	0.603	0.663	21.95%

Note: Staff & workers includes state units (shown), urban collective (shown) and "other economic units" (not shown).
Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1996 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1996)* (Fuzhou: 1996), p. 58 [in Chinese].

FUJIAN STAFF AND WORKERS BY TYPE, 1990s
(% and number)

PER CENT

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Enterprise	74.43	74.09	74.14	75.32	74.84	73.47	72.70
Professional	18.04	18.27	18.39	17.08	17.47	18.72	19.50
Administrative	7.53	7.63	7.47	7.60	7.69	7.82	7.80

MILLIONS

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Enterprise	2.314	2.388	2.512	2.597	2.639	2.528	2.554
Professional	0.561	0.589	0.623	0.589	0.616	0.644	0.685
Administrative	0.234	0.246	0.253	0.262	0.271	0.269	0.274
TOTAL	3.109	3.223	3.388	3.448	3.526	3.441	3.513

Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau. *Fujian Statistical Yearbook 1997 (Fujian Tongji Nianjian 1997)* (Fuzhou: 1997), Table 2-26, p. 54 [in Chinese].

TABLE A10. FUJIAN CITIES: POPULATION, 1957-1990
(Selected years, non-agricultural and total, in millions)

	1957	1965	1970	1975	1980	1984	1990	
Fuzhou	-	.59	.52	.57	.66	.75	**889,920**	Non-ag
	.62	.87	.82	.97	1.08	.16	1,402,584	Total
Xiamen	.24	.22	.25	.29	.33	-	**390,947**	Non-ag
	.20	.40	.40	.45	.49	.53	662,270	Total
Nanping	-	.11	.12	.13	.14	.15	**187,546**	Non-ag
	.06	.27	.32	.37	.39	.42	466,995	Total
Zhangzhou	-	.12	.10	.11	.14	.16	**178,448**	Non-ag
	.10	.21	.22	.25	.28	.30	346,707	Total
Quanzhou	-	.11	.11	.12	.13	.15	**178,395**	Non-ag
	.12	.22	.32	.36	.40	.43	493,442	Total
Sanming	-	.06	.09	-	-	.14	**159,232**	Non-ag
		.10	.14	-	-	.21	266,855	Total
Longyan	-	-	-	-	-	.10	**134,027**	Non-ag
	-	-	-	-	-	.37	438,162	Total
Yongan	-	-	-	-		.10	**109,287**	Non-ag
	-	-	-	-	-	.37	318,791	Total
Putian	-	-	-	.11	.13	.06	**85,434**	Non-ag
	-	-	-	.17	.19	.26	311,336	Total
Shaowu	-	-	-	-	-	.07	**86,037**	Non-ag
	-	-	-	-	-	.26	298,694	Total

Note: Listed in order of 1990 non-agricultural population. Additional cities in 1990 (showing prefecture and non-agricultural/total population in 1990) were Fuan (in Ningde, 78,443/525,580), Shishi (in Quanzhou, 63,728/ 273,047), Ningde (in Ningde 60,231/364,324), and Wuyi (in Nanping, 38,425/206,620). Additional cities created in the early 1990s (showing prefecture and non-agricultural population in 1992) include Jinjiang (in Quanzhou, 95.5), Fuqing (in Ningde, 92.0), Jianou (in Nanping 79.1), and Zhangping (in Longyan 41.5).
Sources: 1957-1984 from, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Population Research Center. *Almanac of China's population, 1985* (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1986), p. 839-840 [contains retrospective data] [in Chinese]. 1990 from, Fujian Population Census Office. *1990 Population Census of Fujian Province: Computer Tabulation* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, Vol. 1, 1990), p. 246-249. Additional early 1990s cities from, *Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan*. Edited by Brian Hook (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 86.

TABLE A11. FUJIAN PREFECTURES: POPULATION
(Successive censuses)

	1953	1964	1982	1990
FUJIAN	12,845,252	16,757,223	25,872,917	30,048,275
		SOUTH		
Total	8,176,538	10,794,154	16,317,517	19,017,416
Fuzhou	2,419,524	3,147,711	4,657,496	5,340,927
Putian	1,134,119	1,499,091	2,253,921	2,625,358
Quanzhou	2,437,305	3,144,051	4,816,551	5,734,441
Xiamen	458,389	668,470	965,985	1,175,551
Zhangzhou	1,727,201	2,334,831	3,623,564	4,141,139
		NORTH		
Total	2,125,037	2,883,441	4,752,730	5,487,989
Nanping	1,169,492	1,617,985	2,585,415	2,928,046
Sanming	955,545	1,265,456	2,167,315	2,559,943
		EAST		
Ningde	1,369,973	1,698,092	2,545,608	2,860,217
		WEST		
Longyan	1,173,704	1,381,536	2,257,062	2,682,653

Note: Reordered and regrouped by provincial subregion.
Source: Fujian Population Census Office. *1990 Population Census of Fujian Province: Computer Tabulation* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990), Table 1-1.

TABLE A12. FUJIAN PREFECTURES: BY POPULATION, 1988
(Showing % of provincial total, number and size of households, % nonagricultural, and sex ratio)

TOTAL POPULA-TION	% OF TOTAL	LOCALITY	TOTAL HOUSE-HOLDS	HOUSE-HOLD SIZE	% NON AGRICUL-TURAL	SEX RATIO
28,452,494	100	Fujian	6,347,986	4.48	16.75%	106.90
5,432,601	19.1	Quanzhou Muni	1,120, 296	4.85	10.90%	102.65
5,142,090	18.1	Fuzhou Muni	1,258,086	**4.09**	23.26%	109.26
3,982,063	14.0	Zhangzhou Muni	895,491	4.45	14.51%	104.51
2,742,869	9.6	Ningde Pref	664,596	4.13	12.81%	**118.62**
2,735,962	9.6	Jianyang Pref	612,334	4.47	22.55%	111.27
2,520,704	8.9	Putian Muni	532,539	4.73	**7.27%**	**97.14**
2,510,771	8.8	Longyan Pref	512,594	**4.90**	13.86%	106.19
2,308,600	8.1	Sanming Muni	494,199	4.67	21.10%	110.95
1,076,834	3.8	Xiamen Muni	257,851	4.18	**38.42%**	104.44

Note: Bolding indicates high and low values. “Pref” means prefecture (*diqu*), a jurisdiction including several counties. “Muni” means municipality (*shi*), essentially a prefecture with a larger central city, but still including a predominantly agricultural population.
Source: Fujian Statistics Bureau and Fujian Public Security Bureau comps. *Compilation of Statistical Materials on Fujian’s Population 1949-1988 (Fujian Sheng Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1988)* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 74-75 [in Chinese].

TABLE A13. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1982
(Agricultural registration and per capita industrial and agricultural output, illiteracy and infant mortality, population density and sex ratio)

PLACE	% AG	GVIAO* PER CAP	% ILLIT	INFANT MORT	POP DEN	SEX RATIO
FUJIAN	69.8	580	37.2	na	213	105.9
			SOUTH			
FUZHOU CITY	15.1	1715	16.3	12	**1043**	105.0
Minhou	67.4	**339**	27.2	13	250	110.2
Minqing	74.1	513	24.3	12	169	109.0
Yongtai	75.3	**303**	39.1	16	128	110.5
Changle	56.9	366	31.0	9	**843**	110.9
Fuqing	**81.2**	**327**	**43.8**	11	**596**	104.7
Pingtan	77.3	**298**	39.3	13	**742**	105.7
Lianjiang	64.1	**305**	**43.2**	13	**470**	106.4
Luoyuan	76.1	**265**	**46.9**	18	203	112.3
PUTIAN CITY	81.1	**287**	37.0	13	**755**	94.2
Xianyou	85.0	394	36.8	15	**424**	102.4
XIAMEN CITY	33.0	2251	21.0	11	**930**	104.1
Tong'an	**80.9**	422	**44.0**	14	**488**	98.5
QUANZHOU CITY	52.3	992	27.5	16	**775**	101.0
Hui'an	62.2	**224**	43.4	20	**1009**	96.6
Jinjiang	67.9	407	31.0	10	**1234**	102.1
Nan'an	80.0	**286**	35.5	14	**538**	100.4
Anxi	**86.2**	**209**	**49.5**	**29**	256	102.9
Yongchun	77.9	**324**	26.5	22	290	106.2
Dehua	77.4	358	34.8	25	106	107.7
ZHANGZHOU CITY	44.6	1496	28.5	16	**1116**	106.2
Longhai	**81.2**	583	**42.2**	20	**523**	101.9
Yunxiao	**81.5**	468	49.5	19	324	102.9
Zhangpu	**85.2**	**327**	**51.3**	20	326	101.2
Zhao'an	**85.7**	**308**	**48.4**	19	369	100.4
Changtai	**82.2**	705	**45.2**	21	171	100.9
Dongshan	63.9	569	**47.3**	22	**824**	98.2
Nanjing	**82.4**	589	39.6	**30**	148	104.0
Pinghe	**87.4**	387	40.9	24	193	105.5
Hua'an	**79.6**	606	**41.7**	**26**	108	104.1

TABLE A13. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1982
(**Continued**)

PLACE	% AG	GVIAO* PER CAP	% ILLIT	INFANT MORT	POP DEN	SEX RATIO
NANPING CITY	45.1	1268	29.3	17	153	111.2
Shunchang	59.6	696	27.4	18	108	108.3
Jianyang	67.8	754	34.5	19	88	112.7
Jian'ou	73.9	559	33.5	17	103	108.5
Pucheng	74.9	461	33.6	**29**	108	111.0
Shaowu	62.0	912	24.5	**27**	91	109.7
Chong'an	70.4	581	32.1	20	65	108.7
Guangze	68.6	658	27.9	**25**	61	112.1
Songxi	70.4	529	32.1	20	123	108.7
Zhenghe	74.0	458	**42.6**	13	94	115.5
SANMING CITY	20.0	3235	17.0	12	185	119.1
Mingxi	70.0	724	30.3	34	59	1090
Yong'an	47.6	1570	27.5	23	90	117.9
Qingliu	75.7	544	40.7	34	69	117.9
Ninghua	**81.1**	456	45.8	42	122	105.1
Datian	**80.4**	384	52.3	36	122	109.9
Youxi	79.3	494	34.1	32	95	113.9
Shaxian	64.8	981	34.7	25	114	108.9
Jiangle	71.1	667	33.9	39	61	107.6
Taining	67.9	925	33.2	37	75	109.7
Jianning	**80.4**	505	37.5	48	70	105.1
LONGYAN CITY	55.7	944	21.9	17	133	110.9
Changting	**80.2**	386	47.0	27	121	103.0
Yongding	**82.0**	401	25.0	22	169	105.8
Shanghang	**83.6**	373	39.6	29	132	100.5
Wuping	**86.1**	360	33.6	26	110	102.6
Zhangping	71.4	513	35.3	25	75	110.1
Liancheng	77.0	441	39.1	34	99	105.9
NINGDE CITY	68.5	370	**50.5**	16	234	118.6
Fu'an	71.1	416	**47.9**	13	275	**121.6**
Xiapu	76.9	461	**53.7**	17	275	**121.5**
Gutian	70.9	437	29.6	16	148	114.8
Pingnan	79.0	**326**	**40.2**	16	10	118.0
Zhouning	78.9	**326**	**50.2**	16	139	**122.7**
Shouning	77.2	**281**	**48.6**	22	137	116.4
Zherong	71.2	351	**54.7**	**49**	140	**128.9**
Fuding	71.4	453	**58.9**	**29**	295	**121.6**

*GVIAO = Gross Value of Industrial and Agricultural Output. Note: Illiteracy is proportion of population aged 12 and above. Counties have been regrouped from 1982 prefectures into 1990s prefectures.
Sources: State Council, Population Census Office and Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Geography. *Population Atlas of China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 174-175, based on 1982 Census. Provincial averages from Fujian Statistics Bureau and Fujian Public Security Bureau comps. *Compilation of Statistical Materials on Fujian's Population 1949-1988 (Fujian Sheng Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1988)* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 370-373 [in Chinese], which also has the same county data (except infant mortality).

TABLE A14. FUJIAN COUNTIES: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE: 1981
(Showing average marriage age for men and women)

TFR	PLACE	MEN	WOMEN	PREFECTURE 1982	PREFECTURE 1990s
4.46	Yongding	24.96	20.75	LY	W
4.46	Wuping	24.89	20.23	LY	W
4.38	Liancheng	25.95	21.15	LY	W
4.18	Dehua	23.50	20.37	JJ	S-QZ
4.03	Zhangping	23.90	20.63	LY	W
3.88	Changting	25.13	20.82	LY	W
3.85	LONGYAN PREFECTURE				
3.79	Pingnan	23.39	19.55	ND	E
3.74	Pinghe	26.28	22.36	LX	**S-ZZ**
3.60	Zhangpu	24.49	21.85	LX	S-ZZ
3.58	**Anxi**	23.70	**20.56**	JJ	**S-QZ**
3.49	Zherong	20.57	18.61	ND	E
3.38	Datian	22.08	19.58	SM	N
3.38	Zhouning	23.24	19.42	ND	E
3.29	Hui'an	22.39	19.96	JJ	**S-QZ**
3.27	Zhao'an	25.39	22.54	LX	**S-ZZ**
3.26	Shanghang	25.31	20.82	LY	W
3.23	Jiangle	23.98	20.64	SM	N
3.22	Qingliu	24.86	20.90	SM	N
3.18	Shouning	23.02	19.22	ND	E
3.17	Ningde	23.71	20.40	ND	E
3.16	Fu'an	23.59	20.42	ND	E
3.14	Fuqing	24.11	20.50	PT	**S-FZ**
3.12	Nan'an	24.42	21.00	JJ	**S-QZ**
3.08	JINJIANG PREFECTURE				
3.06	Ninghua	23.78	20.73	SM	N
3.03	NINGDE PREFECTURE				
2.97	Tong'an	24.97	22.62	XM	**S-XM**
2.96	Luoyuan	23.97	21.01	ND	N
2.94	Chong'an	24.94	20.56	JY	N-NP
2.94	**Changle**	24.08	**20.28**	PT	S-FZ
2.93	Xiapu	23.40	20.72	ND	E
2.92	Gutian	23.31	20.09	ND	E
2.91	Youxi	22.93	20.57	SM	N
2.91	Longyan City	26.12	22.07	LY	W
2.91	**Lianjiang**	24.98	21.23	ND	E
2.90	Mingxi	24.04	20.74	SM	N
2.88	LUNGXI PREFECTURE				
2.88	Taining	24.30	20.91	SM	N
2.78	Yunxiao	25.87	22.49	LX	S-ZZ
2.75	SANMING PREFECTURE				
2.74	**FUJIAN**	**24.79**	**21.53**		

TABLE A14. FUJIAN COUNTIES: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE: 1981
(**Continued**)

TFR	PLACE	MEN	WOMEN	PREFECTURE 1982	PREFECTURE 1990s
2.74	Jinjiang	25.70	21.21	JJ	S-QZ
2.72	Yongchun	24.58	20.65	JJ	S-QZ
2.72	**Yongtai**	23.24	20.34	PT	S-FZ
2.71	Minqing	23.29	20.93	PT	S-FZ
2.70	**Minhou**	24.77	21.30	FZ	S-FZ
2.70	Fuding	22.22	19.50	ND	E
2.69	Changtai	24.81	21.83	LX	S-ZZ
2.66	Zhenghe	24.87	20.38	JY	N-NP
2.64	Guangze	25.25	21.19	JY	N-NP
2.63	Hua'an	24.83	21.54	LX	S-ZZ
2.57	PUTIEN PREFECTURE				
2.54	Jianning	23.76	20.25	SM	N
2.49	Shaxian	24.61	21.48	SM	N
2.46	**Longhai**	26.07	23.01	LX	S-ZZ
2.41	**Xianyou**	24.18	**20.83**	PT	S
2.40	**Pingtan**	25.22	21.15	PT	S-FZ
2.36	JIANYANG PREFECTURE				
2.31	**Quanzhou City**	25.62	22.37	JJ	**S-QZ**
2.30	Yong'an	25.45	21.64	SM	N
2.28	**Nanjing**	25.48	22.02	LX	S-ZZ
2.26	Jianyang	24.88	21.40	JY	N-NP
2.25	Dongshan	26.19	22.85	LX	S-ZZ
2.24	XIAMEN CITY				
2.24	Shaowu	24.79	21.60	JY	N-NP
2.22	Shunchang	24.38	21.69	JY	N-NP
2.21	Pucheng	25.38	20.79	JY	N-NP
2.17	Putian	23.89	21.34	PT	S
2.12	Jian'ou	24.56	21.55	JY	N-NP
2.08	**Zhangzhou City**	27.12	23.70	LX	S-ZZ
1.97	Songxi	24.58	21.49	JY	N-NP
1.87	Nanping	25.09	22.16	JY	N-NP
1.84	FUZHOU CITY				
1.67	**Xiamen districts**	27.66	24.38	XM	S-XM
1.65	Sanming city	26.32	23.19	SM	N
1.50	**Fuzhou districts**	27.51	24.49	FZ	S-FZ

Note: Bolded localities are mentioned in the text; their bolded marriage ages are low. Bolded abbreviations are localities with TFR's that are high (first page) or low (second page) relative to their region and prefecture. Under PREFECTURE 1990s, the first term is a single letter abbreviation for the cardinal directions, referring to the informal regions mentioned in the text. The second term is a two-letter abbreviation for the name of the prefecture in which the county falls, if that changed from 1982. FZ=Fuzhou, JJ=Jinjiang (became Quanzhou), JY=Jianyang (merged into Nanping), LX=Longxi (became Zhangzhou), ND=Ningde, NP=Nanping, PT=Putian, QZ=Quanzhou, SM=Sanmin, ZZ=Zhangzhou.
Source: TFR from, Fujian Statistics Bureau and Fujian Public Security Bureau comps. *Compilation of Statistical Materials on Fujian's Population 1949-1988 (Fujian Sheng Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian 1949-1988)* (Beijing: China Statistical Publishing House, 1990), p. 344 [in Chinese], presumably based on 1982 census. Marriage ages from *Compilation of Statistical Materials on Fujian's Population 1949-1988*, p. 274, based on household registration.

TABLE A15. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1995
(Population in millions, % agricultural, net agricultural income, government revenue in billion yuan)

	1995 POP	% AG	NET AG INC	GOV REV
FUZHOU	5.623	75.0	2303	2.582
Fuzhou City	1.375	28.5	3341	1.777
Fuqing muni	1.142	90.4	2866	0.292
Changle muni	.657	90.1	2811	0.136
Minhou county	.596	89.6	2224	0.092
Lianjiang county	.610	91.8	2390	0.094
Luoyuan county	.243	89.1	1922	0.042
Minqing county	.295	85.3	2211	0.056
Yongtai county	.342	90.9	1523	0.035
Pingtan county	.362	91.1	1714	0.059
XIAMEN	1.214	56.4	2665	2.163
Xiamen City	.670	29.5	3359	2.021
Tong'an county	.544	89.6	2353	0.141
PUTIAN	2.833	91.6	2011	0.457
Putian City	.332	63.7	2574	0.171
Putian county	1.559	96.4	2091	0.175
Xianyu county	.942	93.5	1909	0.111
SANMING	2.583	77.3	1991	0.788
Sanming City	.256	28.1	2243	0.197
Yongan muni	.307	60.0	2141	0.149
Mingxi county	.115	81.6	2008	0.035
Qingliu county	.142	84.5	1915	0.044
Ninhua county	.342	89.0	1919	0.043
Datian county	.348	90.4	1851	0.072
Youxi county	.405	88.9	1979	0.083
Sha county	.231	76.7	2029	0.060
Jiangle county	.164	94.5	1908	0.053
Taining county	.124	85.5	1968	0.029
Jianning county	.148	87.5	1989	0.023
QUANZHOU	6.259	88.0	2768	1.677
Quanzhou City	.521	58.2	2885	0.512
Shishi Muni	.286	71.2	4100	0.206
Jinjiang Muni	.978	89.0	4321	0.318
Hui'an county	1.215	92.4	2812	0.227
Nan'an county	1.425	93.0	2723	0.167
Anxi county	1.015	93.6	1594	0.090
Yongchun county	.522	90.1	2122	0.094
Dehua county	.297	89.2	1836	0.064

TABLE A15. FUJIAN COUNTIES: BASIC DATA, 1995
(**Continued**)

	1995 POP	% AG	NET AG INC	GOV REV
ZHANGZHOU	4.322	84.6	2164	1.065
Zhangzhou City	.363	44.1	2388	0.399
Longhai muni	.863	88.2	2394	0.153
Yunxiao county	.391	86.1	2060	0.076
Zhangpu county	.770	91.5	2301	0.103
Zhao'an county	.544	89.3	2121	0.089
Changtai county	.183	89.0	2316	0.045
Taishan county	.193	68.8	2823	0.056
Nanjing County	.335	86.9	2007	0.073
Pinghe county	.523	91.7	1447	0.047
Hua'an county	.158	88.7	1597	0.025
NANPING	2.940	75.0	1823	0.742
Nanping City	.474	54.1	1812	0.217
Zhaowu City	.297	67.7	2004	0.097
Wuyishan City	.208	76.6	1876	0.057
Shunchang county	.497	81.3	2016	0.093
Jianyang county	.329	76.3	1885	0.072
Shunchang county	.239	73.2	2081	0.062
Pucheng county	.389	84.2	1810	0.057
Guangze county	.147	78.5	1681	0.037
Songxi county	.155	85.5	1605	0.023
Zhenghe county	.203	88.9	1549	0.027
NINGDE	3.093	84.4	1784	0.594
Ningde city	.392	81.2	1828	0.086
Fu'an city	.567	83.9	1863	0.115
Fuding county	.531	74.1	1821	0.125
Xiapu county	.488	88.1	1832	0.082
Gutian county	.423	85.4	1917	0.073
Kainan county	.179	89.5	1757	0.024
Shouning county	.237	92.9	1822	0.024
Zhouning county	.181	91.6	1489	0.021
Zherong county	.096	89.2	1735	0.017
LONGYAN	2.779	81.6	1671	0.626
Longyan city	.439	49.5	2328	0.274
Zhangping	.270	83.1	1906	0.069
Changting county	.465	82.1	1331	0.049
Yongding county	.456	89.7	1601	0.065
Shangkang county	.468	90.6	1539	0.053
Wuping county	.359	91.6	1526	0.055
Liancheng county	.322	87.3	1570	0.050

Source: Fujian government and Fujian Yearbook editorial committee. *Fujian Yearbook (Fujian Nianjian)* (Fuzhou, China: People's Press, 1996), p. 440, 450, 454, and 455 [in Chinese].

【1949—1996年区划变动情况一览表】

附表一：　　1949—1955年福州市行政区划表

区　名	街道	乡	区公所	辖区
鼓楼区	4			新民、华大、鼓东、鼓西街道办事处
大根区	8			河西、东门、安泰、水部、南街、东街、乌山、道山街道办事处
小桥区	5			茶亭、洋中、双杭、义洲、帮洲街道办事处
台江区	5			苍霞、中平、后洲、瀛洲、新港街道办事处
仓山区	6			上渡、下渡、临江、仓前、麦园、藤山街道办事处
水上区		2		江南乡、江北乡
市府郊办处			4	鼓山、洪山、盖山、新店区出所

备注：1、1949年8月，市区划为鼓楼、大根、小桥、台江、仓山区；2月从林森县划入松鼓、双岳、西峡、净屏、江南、江北、双湖、开闽、平远、白湖10个乡，增设鼓山、洪山区；

2、1950年，增设盖山区和水上区；

3、1952年，设市政府郊区行政办事处（简称市府郊办处，后同）；

4、1954—1955年城区分设28个街道办事处。

附表二：　　1956—1967年福州市行政区划表

区　名	街道	区公所	辖街道、区公所名称
鼓楼区	8		华大、鼓东、鼓西、东门、安泰、水部、南街、东街街道办事处
台江区	9		苍霞、后洲、瀛洲、新港、茶亭、洋中、双杭、义洲、帮洲街道办事处
仓山区	5		上渡、下渡、临江、仓前、水上街道办事处
市府郊办处		8	鼓山、新店、盖山、马尾、建新、亭江、琅岐、北峰区公所

备注：1、1956年撤销大根区，并入鼓楼区；撤销小桥区，并入台江区；撤销水上区，并入仓山区；

2、1957年撤销市府郊办处，1958年成立郊区人民公社；1959年撤销郊区人民公社，复设市府郊办处；1960年撤销市府郊办处，设鼓山、新店、马尾区；1962年设市府郊办处。

3、1960年闽侯县马尾公社划归福州市；1961年闽侯县亭江、琅岐、建新、北峰公社划归福州市。

4、1958年闽侯县划归福州市，1959年闽侯县复归闽侯专区。

附表三：　　1968—1977 年福州市行政区划表

区　名	街道	镇	辖街道、公社名称
红卫区	8		华大、鼓东、鼓西、东门、安泰、水部、南街、东街街道办事处
赤卫区	9		苍霞、后洲、瀛洲、新港、茶亭、洋中、双杭、义洲、帮洲街道办事处
朝阳区	5		上渡、下渡、临江、仓前、水上街道办事处
郊区		11	鼓山、马尾、亭江、琅岐、鼓岭、城门、朝阳、宦溪、岭头、红寮、日溪公社
蔬菜区		5	红卫、赤卫、仓山、建新、新店公社
闽侯县	1	12	甘蔗镇；祥谦、洋里、闽江、南通、南屿、上街、竹岐、鸿尾、荆溪、白沙、大湖廷坪公社

备注：1、1968 年鼓楼区更名为红卫区；台江区更名为赤卫区；仓山区更名为朝阳区。

2、1968 年成立郊区，1970 年撤销，1975 年复设。

3、1970 年闽侯县城门公社划归朝阳区。

4、1973 年闽侯县划归福州市。

5、1975 年设立蔬菜区，建新公社划归蔬菜区。1977 年新店公社划归蔬菜区。

附表四：　　1978—1982 年福州市行政区划表

区　名	街道	镇	公社	辖区
鼓楼区	9			华大、鼓东、鼓西、南街、安泰、东街、水部、东门、五四街道办事处
台江区	9			茶亭、洋中、苍霞、双杭、帮洲、义洲、新港、瀛洲、后洲街道办事处
郊区		1	10	马尾镇；鼓山、亭江、琅岐、鼓岭、城门、盖山、宦溪、岭头、红寮、日溪公社
环城区			5	洪山、台江、仓山、新店、建新公社
闽侯县		1	12	甘蔗镇、祥谦、闽江、南通、南屿、上街、竹岐、鸿尾、荆溪、白沙、洋里、大湖、廷坪公社

备注：1、1978 年红卫区复名鼓楼区；赤卫区复名台江区；朝阳区复名仓山区。

蔬菜区更名环城区；撤销马江区，并入郊区；恢复设立马尾镇，连同马尾公社直隶郊区。

2、1981 年鼓楼区增设五四街道办事处；恢复螺洲镇，归郊区政府。

朝阳公社复名盖山公社，红卫公社复名洪山公社，赤卫公社复名台江公社。

3、1982 年设马尾区；环城区撤销，所属洪山、台江、仓山、新店、建新公社划归郊区。

附表五：　　1983年福州市行政区划表

县（市）区	街	镇	公社	街道、镇、公社名称
鼓楼区	9			华大、鼓东、鼓西、南街、安泰、东街、水部、东门、五四街道办事处
台江区	9			茶亭、洋中、苍霞、双杭、帮洲、义洲、新港、瀛洲、后洲街道办事处
仓山区	5			仓前、下渡、临江、上渡、水上街道办事处
郊区			15	洪山、建新、新店、台江、仓山、日溪、红寮、岭头、宦溪、鼓岭、琅岐、亭江、鼓山、盖山、城门公社
马尾区	1		1	马尾街道；马尾公社
闽侯县		2	13	甘蔗、尚干镇；祥谦、青口、闽江、南通、南屿、上街、竹岐、鸿尾、荆溪、白沙、洋里、大湖、廷坪公社
连江县		1	17	凤城镇；琯头、晓澳、东湖、敖江、浦口、苔菉、黄岐、安凯、筱埕、官坂、潘渡、坑园、马鼻、长龙、丹阳、蓼沿、小沦公社
罗源县		1	10	凤山镇；松山、起步、飞竹、中房、鉴江、白塔、西兰、洪洋、碧里、霍口公社
闽清县		1	15	梅城镇；梅、白樟、金沙、白中、池园、上莲、坂东、后佳、三溪、塔庄、省璜、雄江、桔林、东桥、下祝公社
永泰县		1	20	樟城镇、塘前、葛岭、城峰、清凉、东洋、富泉、岭路、赤锡、梧桐、长庆、嵩口、洑口、盖洋、霞拔、同安、樟洋、盘谷、红星、白云、丹云公社
长乐县		1	15	吴航镇；航城、营前、首占、玉田、鹤上、古槐、江田、潭头、金峰、梅花、文岭、湖南、漳港、罗联、文武砂公社
福清县		1	20	融城镇；宏路、三山、沙埔、港头、龙田、新厝、江阴、上迳、渔溪、镜洋、一都、阳下、东张、音西、海口、江镜、城头、高山、南岭、东瀚公社
平潭县		1	13	潭城镇；苏澳、流水、潭东、北厝、南海、敖东、岚城、东庠、中楼、平原、白青、大练、屿头公社
合计	24	9	139	

说明：1、连江、罗源县从宁德地区划归福州市；闽清、永泰、长乐、福清、平潭县从莆田地区划归福州市。

2、1983年闽侯县祥谦公社调整划分为祥谦、青口公社和尚干镇。

附表六：　　1984年福州市行政区划表

县（市）区	街	镇	乡	街、镇、乡名称
鼓楼区	9			同1983年
台江区	9			同1983年
仓山区	5			同1983年

县　区	街	镇	乡	街、镇、乡名称
郊区		1	15	螺洲镇；洪山、建新、新店、台江、仓山、盖山、城门、琅岐、亭江、鼓山、鼓岭、宦溪、岭头、红寨、日溪乡
马尾区	1		1	马尾街道；马尾乡
闽侯县		4	11	甘蔗、白沙、尚干、南屿镇；祥谦、闽江、青口、南通、上街、荆溪、竹岐、鸿尾、洋里、大湖、廷坪乡
连江尾		6	13	凤城、琯头、浦口、黄岐、丹阳、晓澳镇；敖江、东岱、官坂、马鼻、坑园、筱埕、安凯、苔菉、东湖、寨沿、潘渡、长龙、小沦畲族乡
罗源县		2	9	凤山、鉴江镇；飞竹、西兰、白塔、起步、洪洋、中房、松山、碧里、霍口畲族乡
永泰县		2	19	樟城、嵩口镇；塘前、葛岭、城峰、清凉、富泉、岭路、赤锡、梧桐、洑口、盖洋、长庆、东洋、霞拔、同安、樟洋、盘谷、红星、白云、丹云乡
闽清县		3	14	梅城、池园、坂东镇；梅溪、白樟、白中、金沙、上莲、三溪、塔庄、省璜、东桥、下祝、雄江、桔林、后佳、佳头乡
长乐县		5	11	吴航、金峰、梅花、潭头、营前镇；航城、首占、玉田、罗联、鹤上、古槐、湖南、文武砂、江田、文岭、漳港乡
福清县		7	14	融城、海口、高山、龙田、渔溪、宏路、东张镇；音西、阳下、城关、南岭、江洋、港头、沙浦、三山、东瀚、上迳、新厝、江阴、镜洋、一都乡
平潭县		3	12	潭城、苏澳、澳前镇；南海、屿头、芦洋、中楼、流水、平原、大练、岚城、东庠、敖东、北厝、白青乡
合计	24	33	119	

注：1、1984年政社分开，以公社区域设立乡镇建制；

2、郊区拆城门公社，增设螺洲镇；

3、连江县拆浦口镇，增设东岱乡；

4、闽清县增设佳头乡（国营佳头农场改设佳头乡）；

5、平潭县增设芦洋乡（国营芦洋农场改设芦洋乡）

1985—1989年福州市行政区划表

县(市)区	1985年			1986年			1987年			1988年			1989年		
	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)
鼓楼区	9			10			10			10			10		
台江区	9			10			10			10			10		
仓山区	5			6			6			6			6		
马尾区	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1	1		1
郊　区		1	15		1	15		1	15		2	14		2	14
闽侯县		4	11		4	11		4	11		4	11		4	11
闽清县		3	14		3	14		3	15		3	15		3	15

县(市)区	1985年			1986年			1987年			1988年			1989年		
	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)
永泰县		2	19		2	19		2	19		2	19		3	18
长乐县		5	11		5	11		5	13		6	12		6	12
福清县		7	14		7	14		7	14		7	14		8	13
平潭县		3	12		3	12		3	12		3	12		3	12
罗源县		2	9		2	9		2	9		2	9		3	8
连江县		6	13		6	13		7	12		7	12		7	12
合　计	24	33	119	27	33	119	27	34	121	27	36	119	27	39	116

1990—1995年福州市行政区划表

县(市)区	1990年、1991年			1992年			1993年			1994年、1995年		
	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)
鼓楼区	10			10			10			10		
台江区	10			10			10			10		
仓山区	6			6			6			6		
马尾区	1		1	1	1		1	1		1	1	
郊　区		2	14		12	4		12	4		12	4
闽侯县		4	11		9	6		9	6		9	6
闽清县		3	15		8	10		8	10		9	9
永泰县		3	18		9	12		9	12		9	12
长乐县		10	8		16	2		16	2		16	2
福清县		12	9		17	3	1	18	2	1	19	1
平潭县		3	12		13	7		13	8		14	7
连江县		7	13		13	7		13	8		14	7
罗源县		3	8		5	6		5	6		6	5
合　计	27	47	109	27	94	69	28	95	61	28	100	56

1985——1995年行政区划变动说明

1、1986年：增设鼓楼区王庄新村街道办事处；增设台江区上海新村街道办事处；增设仓山区三叉街街道办事处。

2、1987年：闽清县析白樟乡增设云龙乡；长乐县析潭头镇增设猴屿乡，析江田乡增设首社乡；连江县撤销东岱乡，设立东岱镇。

3、1988年：仓山区撤销水上街道办事处，设立对湖街道办事处；郊区撤销亭江乡，设立亭江镇；长乐县撤销航城乡，设立航城镇。

4、1989年：永泰县撤销梧桐乡，设立梧桐镇；福清县撤销音西乡，设立音西镇；罗源县撤销起步乡，设立起步

镇。

5、1990年：撤销福清县，设立福清市；长乐县撤销鹤上乡，设立鹤上镇；撤销古槐乡，设立古槐镇；撤销江田乡，设立江田镇；撤销玉田乡，设立玉田镇；福清县撤销三山乡，设立三山镇；撤销江阴乡，设立江阴镇；撤销城头乡，设立城头镇，连江县析马鼻乡增设透堡乡。

6、1992年：马尾区撤销马尾乡，设立马尾镇；郊区撤销城门、盖山、仓山、台江、建新、新店、洪山、鼓山、琅岐、宦溪10乡，设立城门、盖山、仓山、台江、建新、新店、洪山、鼓山、琅岐、宦溪10镇；闽侯县撤销上街，青口、祥谦、南通、荆溪5乡，设立上街、青口、祥谦、南通、荆溪5乡镇，连江县撤销敖江、苔菉、筱埕、马鼻、透堡、东湖6乡，设立敖江、苔菉、筱埕、马鼻、透堡、东湖6镇；罗源县撤销松山、中房2乡，设立松山、中房2镇；闽清县撤销塔庄、白中、白樟、梅溪、东桥5乡，设立塔庄、白中、白樟、梅溪、东桥5镇；永泰县撤销葛岭、城峰、清凉、长庆、同安、樟洋6乡，设立葛岭、城峰、清凉、长庆、同安、樟洋6镇；长乐县撤销首占、文武砂、漳港、首址、湖南、文岭6乡，设立首占、文武砂、首社、漳港、湖南、文岭6镇；平潭县撤销北厝乡，设立北厝镇；福清市撤销融城镇，设立融城街道办事处；撤销沙埔、阳下、新厝、上迳、港头、东瀚6乡，设立沙埔、阳下、新厝、上迳、港头、东瀚6镇。

1993年：连江县析坑园乡，增设下宫乡；福清市撤销镜洋乡，设立镜洋镇。

1994年：撤销长乐县，设立长乐市；首社镇更名为松下镇；闽清县撤销雄江乡，设立雄江镇；福清市撤销一都乡，设立一都镇；平潭县撤销流水乡，设立流水镇；连江县撤销官坂乡，设立官坂镇；罗源县撤销飞竹乡，设立飞竹镇。

1996年福州市行政区划表

县(市)区	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道、镇、乡名称
鼓楼区	9	1		东街、南街、安泰、水部、温泉、鼓东、鼓西、华大、五凤街道；洪山镇
台江区	12			茶亭、洋中、后洲、新港、瀛洲、苍霞、帮洲、双杭、义洲、上海、宁化、鳌峰街道
仓山区	7	5		仓前、下渡、临江、三叉街、东升、对湖、上渡街道；建新、仓山、盖山、螺洲、城门镇
晋安区	3	4	4	茶园、王庄、象园街道；新店、岳峰、鼓山、宦溪镇；鼓岭、岭头、寿山、日溪乡
马尾区	1	3		罗星街道；马尾、亭江、琅岐镇
闽侯县		9	6	甘蔗、白沙、尚干、祥谦、青口、南通、南屿、上街、荆溪镇；闽江、竹岐、鸿尾、洋里、大湖、廷坪乡
连江县		14	7	凤城、浦口、晓澳、琯头、敖江、东岱、东湖、丹阳、马鼻、透堡、官坂、黄岐、筱埕、苔菉镇；潘渡、藤沿、长龙、坑园、下宫、安凯乡、小沦畲族乡
罗源县		6	5	凤山、鉴江、松山、起步、中房、飞竹镇；白塔、西兰、洪洋、碧里乡、霍口畲族乡
闽清县		9	9	梅城、坂东、池园、梅溪、白樟、白中、塔庄、东桥、雄江镇；云龙、金沙、上莲、三溪、省璜、下祝、桔林、后佳、佳头乡
永泰县		9	12	樟城、嵩口、梧桐、葛岭、城峰、清凉、长庆、同安、大洋镇；塘前、富泉、岭路、赤锡、洑口、盖洋、东洋、霞拔、盘谷、红星、白云、丹云乡

县(市)区	街道(个)	镇(个)	乡(个)	街道、镇、乡名称
平潭县		5	10	潭城、苏澳、澳前、北厝、流水镇；岚城、中楼、平原、白青、敖东、南海、屿头、大练、东庠、芦洋乡
福清市	1	19	1	融城街道；宏路、东张、海口、龙田、高山、渔溪、音西、城头、江镜、三山、江阴、阳下、港头、沙埔、东瀚、上迳、新厝、镜洋、一都镇；南岭乡
长乐市		15	2	吴航、航城、梅花、营前、金峰、潭头、玉田、江田、古槐、鹤上、首占、文武砂、漳港、湖南、文岭、松下镇；罗联、猴屿乡
合计	33	100	56	说明：郊区更名为晋安区；五四街道更名为茶园街道；王庄新村街道更名为王庄街道、上海新村街道更名为上海街道；马尾街道更名为罗星街道；红旗乡更名为寿山乡；撤销台江镇、设立岳峰镇；增设五凤、鳌峰、宁化、东升、象园街道

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