Evaluation of the
Emergency Shelter and
Non-Food Items Cluster
in the Ukraine

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Executive summary

In November 2013, the Government of Ukraine (GoU) decided to abandon an agreement that would strengthen its ties with the EU, sparking large-scale protests. In March 2014, a conflict erupted with Russia's unilateral annexation of Crimea, leading to a first wave of population displacement. A second wave of displacement followed shortly after, as a consequence of separatist offensives in the Donbas region. A ceasefire agreement (Minsk I) was reached in September 2014. However, clashes erupted again in early 2015, causing a third wave of displacement. A second ceasefire agreement (Minsk II) was signed in February 2015.

Ongoing ceasefire violations, heavy shelling and armed conflict have displaced 1.5 million people, creating fluctuating population movements including secondary displacement, commuting across the contact line, and returns. The influx has placed a strain on host communities, especially in areas with a high ratio of internally displaced people (IDPs) compared to the local population.

Activation of the Shelter Cluster

In July 2014, UNHCR activated a shelter sector and started developing a sectoral strategy, anticipating its' leadership responsibility for the Shelter Cluster (SC). The Regional Focal Point (RFP) to the Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) was deployed to Ukraine in September 2014. A month later his contract with GSC ended and he was recruited by UNHCR to lead the shelter sector, prior to the formal activation of the cluster system. He later became the Shelter Cluster Coordinator (CC) and has remained the CC to date.

The cluster system was activated on 23rd December 2014 with UNHCR as lead agency (CLA) for the Ukraine SC, in partnership with the Ministry of Regional Development and Housing (MoRD) and Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP). A sub-national SC was activated in July 2015, based in Sloviansk and led by People in Need. Many informants recognised the advantage of having an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) as co-chair of the SC.

The Response

The shelter response in the Governmental-Controlled Area (GCA), has been mostly well targeted and appropriate, supported by the SC coordination services. The SC has been described as the most effective cluster in Ukraine, with a highly valued information management (IM) system and country-wide mapping processes. The SC has also led technical working groups (TWIG), particularly on shelter winterisation and cash assistance which were essential for harmonising and standardising the shelter response. Monitoring of cash for shelter activities have shown high levels of beneficiary satisfaction with the programme.

The humanitarian set-up has been described as "Kyiv centric" and somewhat disconnected from priorities on the ground. Humanitarian actors have struggled to engage with the national government, while relations with regional and local authorities have been comparatively better. The access restrictions to the Non-Governmental-Controlled Area (NGCA) has been one of the main challenges to providing rapid and adequate humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in those areas.

A number of actors based in the field, including UNHCR, have been running informal shelter meetings to better coordinate shelter operations. However, when the SC sub-national hub was activated, a number of misunderstandings occurred amongst UNHCR staff, highlighting a lack of internal awareness of the cluster system.

Key SC personnel were fulfilling dual responsibilities for the SC and UNHCR until April 2015. While key informants generally perceived that this double-hatting was well managed by the staff in question, it blurred the lines between the SC and the CLA, and contributed to a perceived conflict of interest during Cash Work Group (CWG) discussions.

Activities of the Shelter Cluster

SC meetings (SCM) have been responding to the needs of SC partners through regular meetings in Kyiv and ad-hoc regional coordination meetings until the activation of the sub-national hub in July 2015, based in Sloviansk.

The SC strategy, setting out key priorities for the sector, was drafted in September 2014 and revised in June 2015. The first Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) meeting was called in December 2015, and until then all strategic decisions and priorities were made in plenary during SCM.

The SC Team (SCT) led a number of technical working groups (TWIGs) which were very well received by SC partners. The SCT also led early discussions on cash transfer programming, discussing cash for shelter as well as Multi-Purpose-Cash Grant (MPCG). In May 2015, OCHA activated an inter-sectoral Cash WG (CWG), which resulted in 3 months of disagreements and negotiations amongst humanitarian agency, on the harmonisation of the MPCG transfer value, and the HCT deciding to make cash a separate section in the Humanitarian Response Plan. This, unfortunately, drew attention away from the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The SC has published regular situation updates and factsheets, circulated via emails and through their Google group. These documents have enabled agencies to develop advocacy messages to donors, government and their head-quarters. A post-distribution monitoring (PDM) template, for cash assistance developed by the SC, contributed to consistency in agency reporting and improved transparency and accountability vis-à-vis the affected population.

Overall, the SC has been valued for the information it produces. However, the majority of the material aims to provide an overview of the situation, and is directed at stakeholders in Kyiv. An increase in field-level tools and analysis is desired by implementing agencies. While the SCT are seen as responsive and helpful in responding to individual agency requests, it is believed that time could be saved by making documents more easily accessible and traceable.

The SCT has provided capacity building for SC partners, including national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs) through various forums, TWIGs, SCM and individual ad-hoc meetings. The translation of meetings and key documents into English, Russian and Ukrainian has been essential to allowing engagement with national actors.

Conclusions

Overall the SC is perceived as one of the strongest and most relevant clusters of this response. Every key informant highlighted the strength of the SC compared with other clusters in Ukraine.

The general perception shows a satisfactory prioritisation of activities, but some informants expressed the need to refine this prioritisation, stressing the importance of needs in NGCA and the lack of humanitarian assistance in this area. The lack of baseline data especially in NGCA remains a challenge to providing a clear picture of the context. SCM minutes and the inter-cluster Contingency Plan described the need to support authorities in carrying out more effective IDP tracking in order to improve overall baseline data.

In light of the cluster transition, authorities in Kyiv do not currently appear ready or willing to take on further roles or responsibilities in the humanitarian response. Thus the most likely scenario for deactivation of the SC is an improvement of the humanitarian situation, minimising the need to coordinate response and gaps.

Key recommendations

	For the Shelter Cluster Team	Action points:
KR-1	Increase engagement with local actors, including authorities and NNGOs.	• Continue awareness raising on the cluster system for local actors. (R. 24) • Carry out advocacy to local and regional government on a harmonised response. (R. 29)
KR-2	Systemise cluster meetings and clarify the coordination structure.	• Formalise the decentralised coordination: standardising the informal shelter meetings, with focal points reporting back to the SCT. (R. 8) • Create an organisational map of the coordination structure, with national, sub-national and decentralised meetings and focal points. (R. 9)
KR-3	Improve sectoral data and systemise the dissemination of documents.	• Work to improve the baseline of the conflict-affected population. (R. 12) • Produce field-oriented tools and analysis. (R. 13) • Create an index document linking to key materials. (R. 17)
	For the Shelter Cluster	**Action points**
KR-4	Increase active and conscious engagement of SC partners in strategic decision making.	• Ensure SC partners are actively and consciously involved in decision making. (R. 7 & 12) • Use the SAG as a forum to define and develop strategies, priorities, work plans, and prepare joint assessments. (R. 7)
KR-5	Strengthen the work on accountability to affected populations and assistance to vulnerable people.	• Set up a vulnerability working group for guidance on beneficiary selection and inclusion. (R. 32) • Improve communication messages to the affected population on the type of assistance provided, how and to whom, with feedback mechanisms. (R. 31)
	For GSC and UNHCR	**Action points:**
KR-6	Build a stronger internal awareness of the role as CLA.	• Develop a standard information package for UNHCR staff on the role and responsibility of clusters and CLA, stressing the importance of dedicated CC. (R. 1)
KR-7	Increase engagement with HCT and ICCG.	• Request for HC/HCT to increase transparency, and take leadership in engaging national actors. (R. 14 & 29) • Demand for CC to be present at HCT meetings. (R. 15) • Continue to guide ICCG discussions, ensuring they are relevant, i.e. discuss the need for a CCPM. (R. 26)
KR-8	Build shelter sector capacity on the use of cash modalities.	• Provide dedicated cash expertise and/or specific SC guidance on cash programming. (R. 22)
KR-9	Encourage cluster architecture review, using lessons learned from Ukraine to inform future cluster activation.	• Advocate for a Ukraine cluster architecture review, to learn from middle income countries on appropriate coordination structures. (R. 27) • Initiate a discussion with Global ICCG and IASC for global evaluation of the humanitarian coordination system, to consider development of coordination structures that are more adaptable to different contexts, while remaining transparent and accountable. (R. 27)

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Disclaimer

The views and recommendations expressed in this document are those of the evaluation team, they do not necessarily reflect those of the Shelter Cluster team, the GSC or UNHCR. Responsibility for any omissions or errors of fact or interpretation rests with the authors.

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The purpose of this independent evaluation is to review the effectiveness of the coordination services provided by the UNHCR-led Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster Coordination Team to the humanitarian response to the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014.

Objective

The evaluation's objective is to identify key lessons from what has been achieved so far and to offer recommendations to improve and inform future coordination of the ongoing response.

The Global Shelter Cluster and UNHCR will use the evaluation outcomes and recommendations to improve future deployments to similar crises. The UNHCR-led coordination team will use it to learn from the findings and improve current practices. This will be completed through a Management Response Plan (see template in Annex F) detailing which recommendations are accepted and will be acted upon, when, and by whom.

2. Methodology

2.1 Overview

To conduct the review and measure the effectiveness of the coordination services provided to date, the evaluators have adopted a number of evaluation tools and methods, detailed below. The structure of the review was based on the OECD/DAC criteria and the evaluation questions also detailed below. The evaluation will consider the perspective of the SCT, SC partners, GSC support team, the CLA and UNHCR Ukraine office, the inter-cluster coordination members including OCHA, donors, governmental counterparts at national and regional level and beneficiaries targeted by shelter implementing agencies.

2.2 Evaluation Questions

The review of the Ukraine SC will address the questions listed below, as outlined in the evaluation Terms of Reference (Annex A). The order has been changed to correspond to the cluster *core functions* (in parenthesis is the section where the question and related findings are discussed):

Q1.	Did the Shelter Cluster fulfil its core functions as defined by the IASC? (4)
Q2.	Have lessons learnt from previous cluster activations been utilised? (4.1)
Q3.	Was there evidence of support from the Global Shelter Cluster? (4.1)
Q4.	To what extent did the cluster add value to the response undertaken by shelter actors? (4.2)
Q5.	Would it have been possible to add the same value in a more efficient way? (4.2)
Q6.	Has the relationship with the HCT and the cluster been effective? (4.3)
Q7.	Has the cluster effectively set its priorities? Are there gaps in these priorities? (4.4)
Q8.	Did the cluster do enough advocacy to donors, government and others? (4.5)
Q9.	Is the cluster supporting the government to take up a coordination role in the future? (4.7)
Q10.	What real difference did the cluster make to the people affected by the conflict? (4.8)
Q11.	Were cross-cutting issues and vulnerabilities explored and acted upon within the cluster? (4.8)

2.3   Data Collection and Analysis

To conduct the assignment, the evaluators adopted the following methods of data collection and analysis:

- ➤ Desk Review – a thorough and comprehensive desk review of documentation, files and reports, available on sheltercluster.org, on the Google group, on the internal Shelter Cluster shared drive, through documents provided directly to the evaluators, and using any other information available online, including on humanitarianresponse.info
- ➤ 32 key informant interviews (refer to Annex D for the list of key informants)
- ➤ An online questionnaire, which was developed and distributed during the field visit in order to reach a wider audience
- ➤ Stakeholder mapping exercise with the SCT
- ➤ Site visits with PIN in Sloviansk and NRC in Sievierodonetsk

2.4   Limitations to the Evaluation

Some key informants were not consulted for this review - the HC and the Head of OCHA. Unfortunately, although meetings with these key actors had been scheduled, due to changes in their schedule the meetings were cancelled with no rescheduling possibility within the timeframe required.

The authorities were only consulted indirectly in the field and in Kyiv. In the field, the evaluator met with an NNGO representative who was also working part-time for the regional authorities as an advisor to the humanitarian response. In Kyiv, although a meeting was scheduled with a representative of the MoRD, it was cancelled last minute because the evaluator was not a Ukrainian national and was not able to enter the government building. Thus the translator who was accompanying the evaluator proceeded with the meeting on behalf of the evaluator. Both of these meetings provided indirect information on the government's engagement and its perception of the SC, as a result of which some information can result in speculative assumptions.

The desk review was based on material provided by the GSC and the Ukraine SCT, as well as the information available on the sheltercluster.org and humanitarianresponse.info websites, the Ukraine SC Google Group, and later, the SCT internal server. However, as noted further in the report, there have been inconsistencies in recording and uploading of information to the relevant platforms, which has led to some information gaps especially when verifying data provided by key informants.

Finally, the evaluation team understands that this review is not a financial audit of the coordination services. As a result, it has not evaluated the specific details of the cluster coordination finances and expenditure. Rather, it has focused on the operational and qualitative aspects of the services provided by the Ukraine SCT.

3. Context

Fig. Timeline

Roman Ukraine conflict
Italics *Humanitarian response*
Bold **Shelter sector**

2013
Nov Ukraine opts out of EU agreement
Dec Protests erupt in Kyiv

2014
Feb Maidan protests climax, president Yanukovych leaves
Mar Russia incorporates Crimea, *first wave of displacement*
Apr Pro-Russian separatist offensives in the Donbas region, *second wave of displacement*
Jun Poroshenko elected president
Jul Reports of increased Russian support to rebels
Aug **Shelter sector active, coordinated by UNHCR**
     UNHCR establish a presence in Mariupol
Sep **Arrival of the Shelter Cluster Regional Focal Point**
     Publication of Shelter/NFI Sector Strategy
     Ceasefire signed (Minsk I)
Oct *Start of Cash for Winterisation (led by the SC)*
     UNHCR establish a presence Sievierodonetsk, Dniepropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kharkiv
Dec *Formal activation of the Cluster system*
     Establishment of the Ukraine Shelter Cluster based in Kyiv

2015
Jan *Launch of the Strategic Response Plan (SRP)*
     OCHA establish regional coordination in Sievierodonetsk, Kharkiv, Mariupol
     Renewed separatist offensive
Feb Battle of Debaltseve, *third wave of displacement*
     Second ceasefire deal agreed (Minsk II)
     Publication of revised 2015 Ukraine SRP
Mar *UNHCR high staff turn-over*
Apr **CC and Shelter Associate stop double hatting and become dedicated to the SC**
     Recruitment of UNHCR Shelter Officer
     First OCHA-led Cash WG
     Access restriction to NGCA
May **Agreement with PIN to co-chair the Shelter Cluster, and lead a sub-national hub.**
     UNHCR establish a presence in Luhansk
     OCHA establishes regional coordination in Luhansk
Jun **Publication of Shelter/NFI Cluster Strategy**
Jul **Sub-national Shelter Cluster becomes operational with the first meeting in Sloviansk**
     Start of OCHA regional coordination in Kramatorsk
Sep **Ukrainian translation of Shelter/NFI Cluster Strategy**
Dec **SCT calls the first SAG meeting**

3.1   Overview

In November 2013, the decision of the GoU to abandon an agreement that would strengthen ties with the EU sparked large-scale protests, and in February 2014 violent clashes between demonstrators and authorities took place in Kyiv. In March 2014, a conflict erupted with Russia's unilateral annexation of Crimea and a referendum on status was held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, leading to a first wave of population displacement from Crimea.

Since the eruption of hostilities in the Donbas region in April 2014, insecurity and displacement have increased across eastern Ukraine. Ongoing ceasefire violations, heavy shelling and armed conflict have displaced 1.5 million people. As of August 2015, the MoSP registered 1,459,226 IDPs in GCA, with fluctuating population movements including secondary displacement, commuting across the contact line, and returns. This influx of people has placed a strain on the hosting population, in particular in areas with a high ratio of IDPs compared to the local population.

Those remaining in conflict-affected areas of Donbas region, particularly in densely populated urban areas, face security threats due to on-going military activity. Basic life-saving services have been disrupted, access to the NGCA has been restricted, access to banks and cash services is limited, food and commodities are increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain, and an upsurge in lawlessness has been observed.[1]

Although Ukraine is a middle income country, the capacity of the government has been further constrained by economic crisis, to fully provide services in GCA. Its ability to provide services in areas not fully under government control is limited. In addition, the ability of the state to rehabilitate infrastructure and shelter has been weakened by this ongoing conflict.

3.2   Humanitarian Response

Before moving on to the review of the Ukraine SC, it is pertinent to look at some of the external factors that have had implications on the set-up of the cluster system, and the humanitarian response as a whole. Firstly, the activation of the cluster system with all clusters based in Kyiv has resulted in a "Kyiv centric response", removed from discussions in the field. Considering the size of the country and the time required to travel to the affected areas, the "Kyiv centric" set-up has negatively impacted on the entire humanitarian response in Ukraine. Some organisations have shifted their focus from Kyiv to the field, opening field offices in Sloviansk, Sievierodonetsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Mariupol, and Dniepropetrovsk. This late shift towards the field has been positive in terms of the relevance of the response. However, the distance between these hubs remains such that each location appears to be operating and coordinating independently from the others.

This has been exacerbated by the restrictions on access and permission to operate and provide assistance in the NGCA. Many discussions and meetings have been focusing on the issue of access. This is undeniably of great concern for humanitarian actors trying to provide assistance, but the extensive focus on one issue has resulted in other challenges being omitted from discussions. This highly politicised environment has to an extent distracted the humanitarian actors – including cluster coordinators – from their core functions.

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[1] Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO), 2015.

4. Findings and Recommendations

Q. 1 Did the Shelter Cluster fulfil its core functions as defined by the IASC?

Overall the SC is perceived as one of the strongest and most relevant clusters in this response. Every key informant explained the strength of the SC compared to other clusters in Ukraine. However, they also highlighted a number of challenges and recommendations, which will be presented and discussed in this chapter in relation to the core functions of the cluster.[2]

The findings of this study have been categorised into eight sections, throughout which the evaluation questions have been distributed: Cluster activation and leadership; and the 6 core functions defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), with "Accountability to affected populations" as an additional one. The review is based on the OECD/DAC criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. This structure provides a suitable framework to review and measure the effectiveness of coordination services provided to date.

A summary of key recommendations can be found in the executive summary. In this chapter, the detailed recommendations are distributed under the eight headings mentioned above, and presented in relation with the findings to which they correspond.

4.1 Cluster Activation and Leadership

Q. 2 Have lessons learnt from previous cluster activations been utilised?

Cluster Activation

4.1.1 A shelter sector was established in Ukraine around July 2014. A UNHCR emergency coordinator took responsibility for, and leadership of, running sectoral meetings, sharing meeting minutes and initiating a common strategy. Initial contact was made with the GSC, who provided remote support and deployed the RFP in September 2014 to take over these responsibilities. The cluster system was officially activated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator on 23rd December 2014 to enhance coordination between actors involved in the response.

4.1.2 UNHCR was appointed CLA for the SC and has led it in partnership with the MoRD and MoSP, and with various NGO partners coordinating to provide an appropriate response to the crisis. The RFP became the CC and remains in this position today. National coordination took place in Kyiv, with a sub-national hub operational since July 2015, based in Sloviansk and led by People in Need (PIN). The SC has had the advantage of building on the pre-existing shelter sector and staff retained from sector to cluster. This continuity greatly benefited the coordination services provided to SC partners, and is a result of lessons learnt from previous cluster activations.

4.1.3 In September 2014, the shelter sector first drafted a strategy that was later updated by the SC. The most recent review of the SC strategy dates from June 2015.[3] Given the protracted crisis in Ukraine, with ongoing conflict despite an agreed ceasefire, the SC adopted a dual approach, combining life-saving emergency assistance, and longer-term shelter solutions.

Leadership

4.1.4 UNHCR as CLA has provided resources, capacity, and competent staff allowing the Shelter Cluster Team (SCT) to be able to operate effectively and take leadership of the sector. It has anticipated this leadership role by proactively setting up a sectoral working group prior to the activation of the

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[2] Shelter Cluster Toolkit, Core Functions, and IASC reference module, July 2015.
[3] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015, retrieved from http://sheltercluster.org/response/ukraine

cluster system. The SC thus inherited the momentum, knowledge and resources from the sectoral working group, and became a "*role model*" for other clusters.

4.1.5 Between February and March 2015, the SCT identified the need of activating a sub-national SC hub. Careful consideration was given to the location of the hub taking into account needs, location shelter actors, activities and political engagement. Establishing a sub-national hub when most of the coordination structure was still Kyiv-centric set a precedent for other clusters. The SCT also considered the importance of another agency co-chairing the SC and act as sub-national cluster lead. In May 2015, People in Need (PIN) was identified and approached as a potential partner. Funding was secured, and the sub-national cluster became operational in July 2015. PIN mobilised resources and competent staff to fulfil their role, and an effective handover between the National CC and the sub-national CC allowed for a successful transfer of responsibilities. As recommended in lessons learnt from other cluster activations, having an INGO as co-chair of the SC has been essential to empower other INGOs to engage in the coordination structure, and has also increased the SC's legitimacy. Indeed, many organisations acknowledged the importance of having an INGO as co-chair.

4.1.6 The SC had also discussed the potential of opening other hubs, mainly in locations with UNHCR field offices. These hubs were not activated, probably due to the small number of shelter actors and the limited need for coordination in these locations. The SC also had limited resources, and Sloviansk was identified by the SC as a priority for decentralising the coordination.

4.1.7 A number of misunderstandings arose from the activation of the sub-national hub. Some of them resulted in corrective actions, but certain issues could have been anticipated and prevented.
- The activation process was likely not communicated well enough by the CC to UNHCR management. This was also exacerbated by UNHCR management staff turnover, including country representatives, emergency coordinators and field staff.
- UNHCR management did not properly inform their field offices and a key informant stated: *"The sub-national cluster was established with zero consultation internally [to UNHCR] (…) There was a bit of confusion, and what s/he was going to do in relation to UNHCR."*
- Some UNHCR staff have limited experience of the cluster system. As a result, they have not distinguished between refugee operations where UNHCR has the leadership in coordinating the response, and an IDP context where the cluster system coordinates the response and where the clusters operate independently from their lead agency. Consequently, some UNHCR field staff have been leading shelter meetings without clear consent from the SC, and without sharing minutes of meetings with the SCT. This was partly resolved by the CC's proactive communication with UNHCR's Country Representative and UNHCR head of field office. However, some UNHCR field-offices still lead shelter meetings without clear reporting lines to the SCT.
- Some key informants from the UNHCR raised questions around the meaning of *Provider of Last Resort* (PoLR). If they were to act on this responsibility, they felt the need to lead the coordination between local actors, in order to better understand remaining gaps.

These misunderstandings took up the time and energy of the CC, and could have been mitigated with deeper understanding from UNHCR staff on their role and responsibility as CLA.

R. 1 *Priority*	**For UNHCR and GSC:** Increase internal awareness of UNHCR staff on the cluster system. Develop and provide a standard information package for UNHCR Country Representatives and UNHCR staff on their role and responsibilities as CLA. This guidance should explain the coordination role of UNHCR in refugee operations versus an IDP context, and should address management and reporting lines between UNHCR-led clusters and UNHCR staff in main-office, sub-offices and field-offices. *(KR-6)*

With regards to the CLA role as PoLR, GSC guidance explains that *"Whilst the shelter clusters' role and responsibilities range from emergency to longer-term shelter, the concept of Provider of Last Resort[4] will only apply to meeting emergency needs and not to the provision of longer term shelter or housing or longer term settlement planning."*[5]

Cluster personnel

4.1.8 As of November 2015, the Ukraine SCT was made up of the following six staff:

Tab. 1

	Title	Role	Deployment dates
1	National Cluster Coordinator	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	GSC RFP during 09/14; UNHCR-recruited from 10/14 to current (double hatting until 04/15)
2	Shelter Cluster Co-Chair & Sub-National Coordinator	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	06/15 to 11/15
3	Shelter Associate*	Information Manager & Deputy to the National Cluster Coordinator	In position 07/14 to current; double hatting from 09/14 to 04/15
4	Sub-National Cluster Assistant*	Translator to the Sub-National CC	06/15 - current
5	Information Manager Associate*	GIS and mapping	50% SC / 50% UNHCR since 12/14
6	Intern*	IM Assistant	09/15 to 11/15

* Ukrainian national

Fig. 2

Ukraine Shelter/NFI Cluster Coordination team structure.[6]

4.1.9 UNHCR has provided competent personnel to run the SC, and the CC and sub-national CC both have prior experience in cluster coordination. Additionally, the GSC drew on lessons learnt by deploying their RFP and rapidly providing qualified staff to the country in need. The RFP was deployed in September 2014 (before the formal activation of the SC) and remains the CC to date.

4.1.10 However, the CC and the Shelter Associate were not dedicated to their coordination role from October 2014 until April 2015, when UNHCR recruited a Shelter Officer to manage the shelter operations. This resulted in key SC staff being overloaded with work and therefore unable to dedicate appropriate time to the tasks required.

4.1.11 In this particular context, the double hatting was mentioned as problematic by one organisation, with regards to the Cash WG. Since UNHCR and the SCT were strongly aligned while a number of other agencies' perspective differed from UNHCR, it was perceived that UNHCR used the cluster as leverage during discussions in the Cash WG.[7]

4.1.12 That said, most other organisations perceived the double hatting as well managed by both the CC and the Shelter Associate, and felt that once the dedicated UNHCR Shelter Officer arrived, a clear distinction between the cluster and UNHCR as lead agency was observed.

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[4] Refer to IASC definition of the Provider of Last Resort, IASC Reference Module, July 2015.
[5] Shelter Cluster Toolkit, Scope of country-level shelter clusters.
[6] Adapted from Ukraine Shelter Cluster Terms of Reference (Annex 3 to the Ukraine Shelter/NFI Cluster Strategy).
[7] Refer to section 4.4.14 to 4.4.18 for further information on Cash WG.

R. 2 **For CLA and GSC:** The independence of the CLA from the SCT is essential in enabling the views and interests of the entire sector to be represented. It is therefore recommended that UNHCR and the GSC deploy dedicated teams to run the SC, and in particular deploy a dedicated CC.[8]

4.1.13 The CC mobilised staff within UNHCR in order to acquire as much human resources as possible for the cluster. The Shelter Associate (who mainly focused on IM) was retained as dedicated staff. An IM Associate supporting both SC and UNHCR with developing maps has recently been providing more support to the SC. The CC also recruited an intern for additional IM support.

4.1.14 The positive collaboration and work atmosphere between UNHCR SC staff and PIN SC staff greatly benefited the functioning of the team. The SCT has been effective at providing relevant data to SC partners, as well as leading technical discussions on reconstruction, repairs, and winterisation. TWIGs provided a unifying platform for SC partners whilst being strongly action oriented.

HQ/Global Cluster support

Q. 3 *Was there evidence of support from the Global Shelter Cluster?*

4.1.15 The GSC has provided support to the Ukraine SC from its inception, including the deployment of the RFP, the REACH assessment, support in setting up the website, and remote assistance on developing strategic documents and dealing with discussions around the CWG led by OCHA. The GSC carried out two field visits to Ukraine, one for coordination support in February 2015, and one for IM support in August 2015. As a result of these visits, the cluster strategy was revised and redrafted, TWIG Terms of Reference (ToRs) were prepared, and the activation of a sub-national hub was agreed and funding was identified. The Global IM also provided direct support with a field visit and in-depth recommendations and action points to improve the IM services provided[9]. In October 2015, the CC and the Shelter Associate attended the GSC meeting in Geneva. This guidance and support provided by the GSC has been valued by the SCT and further support would be welcomed, especially in regards to improving synergies with other country clusters.

R. 3 **For GSC and SCT:** Improve cross-fertilisation between different country clusters. It was recognised that in July 2015, the GSC has set up a Google group for that purpose.

4.1.16 It was also noted by the GSC that communication with the Ukraine SCT and CC was somewhat inconsistent, at times lacking responsiveness from the CC. It was also understood that the SCT and CC were extremely stretched during the period of double-hatting, and therefore unable to update the GSC on a regular basis.

R. 4 **For GSC and SCT:** Improve communication between global and country level through regular scheduled updates, on a monthly or quarterly basis depending on needs. This would allow the GSC to provide more appropriate support, anticipating certain issues and provide a platform of exchange for the CC.

4.1.17 The double hatting of the two SC staff was resolved in May 2015 once the UNHCR Shelter Officer was recruited. This took longer than expected due to recruitment processes.

Relations with IASC actors

4.1.18 Relations with the HC and HCT have been minimal since the CC does not directly attend HCT meetings, and it is attended by the representative of CLA. Refer to 4.3.4 for more details.

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[8] Refer to IASC Reference Module, July 2015, p5 and p11.
[9] Refer to Annex H

4.1.19 The relationship between OCHA and the SC has been somewhat fragile, a result of the high number of requests from OCHA to CCs that were not always seen as a priority for the SCT and SC partners, as well as the ongoing issues with the CWG described in 4.4.14 to 4.4.21.

R. 5 **For GSC:** Provide global guidance on which inter-cluster coordination tools, reports, and reviews are generally perceived as a priority, which ones are compulsory for the SC to contribute to, and which ones are a lower priority. Refer to Annex G.

4.1.20 The relations between OCHA, the SC and SC partners at field level have been more effective than in Kyiv. OCHA calls for General Coordination meetings in various hubs in the GCA and NGCA, which are attended by area managers and the sub-national SC. A key informant noted that "*OCHA has filled an important role building relationships in the field between partners*" and in some areas with local authorities. Despite it being mentioned that some of the OCHA's staff were not experienced coordinators, they nevertheless had a good knowledge of the context.

R. 6 **For SCT:** Lessons learnt have shown the importance of strengthening positive relationships, thus it would be recommended for the SCT to focus on their relationship with OCHA in the field.

4.2 Supporting shelter service delivery (Core function #1)

Q. 4 *To what extent did the cluster add value to the response undertaken by shelter actors?*

Q. 5 *Would it have been possible to add the same value in a more efficient way?*

4.2.1 The shelter response in Ukraine has included rehabilitation and winterisation activities, as well as cash assistance and cash for rent. The SC has been adding value to the response by aiming to fulfil its core functions and by supporting service delivery through coordination and information management, technical support and integration (see 4.8.4 and 4.8.5 for more details). This section will explain how the SC has added value and where it could have done this in a more efficient way.

Coordination management

4.2.2 A SAG meeting was first called in December 2015, although the SC Strategy document from June 2015 lists names of permanent SAG members. The CC explained that due to the set-up and limited number of active SC partners, all decisions and development of strategic documents happened in plenary during SCM. Therefore, the CC did not consider it a priority to call the SAG.

R. 7
Priority **For CC and SCT:** While a small and functional SCM can be an effective decision making platform for strategic priorities, it is recommended to establish a SAG with agreed ToR, a committed group of organisations including an active and conscious participation of relevant donors. SAG members' responsibility extends beyond regular cluster attendance, and should be formalised. *(KR-4)*

4.2.3 The SC Meetings (SCM) in Kyiv were held weekly until March 2015. Since then they have been running on a fortnightly basis. At sub-national level, SCM have been taking place on an ad-hoc basis until the appointment of a dedicated co-chair and sub-national CC. Since July 2015, SCM have been running on a monthly basis in Sloviansk or Kramatorsk, with some additional ad-hoc meetings in Sievierodonetsk, Dniepropetrosk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk. SCM have generally been running consistently, although data analysis on cluster meetings showed that they were not consistently taking place on the same day of the week or in the same location. This was likely in order to remain flexible and provide meetings on the days and in the locations that suited most actors, however consistency in time and place of meetings can allow for more regular partner engagement and a broader reach to less active SC partners.

4.2.4 In Mariupol and Sievierodonetsk, SC partners have held informal sectoral meetings on a weekly basis to better coordinate their field operations. In these localities, there was no dedicated shelter

focal point, yet meetings were perceived as useful. UNHCR field offices have also been running informal sectoral meetings with the few actors present in their location. In Kharkiv and Donetsk, for instance, the heads of sub-office have called shelter and protection meetings on a regular basis. However, none of these meetings have been consistently feeding back to the SCT. The ad-hoc and flexible decentralised coordination structure has allowed for meetings to take place in various field locations where the SCT was not able to establish a regular presence. However, the SCT has not had the opportunity to adequately respond to certain issues due to the informal nature of the set-up.

R. 8
Priority

For SCT: Standardise the informal shelter meetings that are not led by the SCT, whilst remaining flexible and supportive to those leading them. Formalising the decentralised hubs would enable the SCT to improve its leadership role, strengthen information flows, and allow for the SCT to be proactive rather than reactive. This could also provide the SC with further reach, with regards to the coordination services provided to partners. *(KR-2)*
  - Identify focal point(s) to report to SCT
  - Announce meetings through the SC mailing list so that other actors in the area may attend
  - Share minutes of meeting template with those leading the meetings
  - Request minutes of meetings, and share with SC partners for accountability and preparedness measures
  - Promote SC reporting tools (5W)
  - Share contact lists

4.2.5 All SCM in Sloviansk included representatives from local authorities except one (27th August 2015). There has also been a solid representation of national NGOs, churches and civil society organisations (CSOs). The first sub-national SCM in Sievierodonetsk was attended by 14 agencies, including representatives from Luhansk local authorities (in the NGCA). The two next meetings in Sievierodonetsk was attended by 5 and 7 stakeholders respectively, all of them international.

4.2.6 Some actors were unsure of the SC's geographical coverage, and understood that the SC was not coordinating certain geographical areas: *"When the sub-cluster in Sloviansk was established, they were planning to include a city which was part of Kharkiv area and the coverage of the sub-cluster was only clarified later"*. While the SCT might not be running SCM in all operational hubs, the SC should cover all affected areas through a clear structure that could include the decentralised coordination system led by other agencies.

R. 9
Priority

For SCT: Develop and disseminate an organisational map of the coordination structure,[10] with the sub-national sub and decentralised hubs. This would provide the SCT with further accountability and transparency on the coordination structure already in place. *(KR-2)*

4.2.7 There have been 67 meetings in 2015, including TWIGs, national and sub-national. Meeting minutes are prepared and shared regularly through the Google Group, while 35 meeting minutes out of 67 from the same period are found on the cluster website (52%).

R. 10

For SCT: Consolidate a systematic coordination management approach by:
  - Sharing draft SCM agenda prior to SCM with partners allowing them to contribute items.
  - Consistently drafting and sharing of meeting minutes: including name of organisations attending for accountability and reporting purposes, and recording of key decisions.
  - Upload all meeting minutes and relevant documents on the SC website, with relevant tags.
When and where possible, allow remote attendance via telecom to extend the reach of SCM.

4.2.8 The SC has also carried out a number of TWIGs to discuss and develop guidelines on technical issues including winterisation, cash, permanent shelter, HLP, and heavy repairs (Refer to 4.4).

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[10] For an example refer to Shelter Cluster Philippines Hub Overview, sheltercluster.org

Information management

4.2.9 Overall the SC has been valued for the information it produces, including maps and analysis, but this information is sometimes hard to find. The Google group has been an effective tool to communicate with SC partners but it is less efficient for storing documents.[11] Key informants have been contacting the SCT directly to acquire information, since the website often does not contain the latest updates. This shows that the SCT is very responsive to SC partners but it is not an efficient way of disseminating information. The table below clearly shows that SC partners tend to retrieve most of the SC information from emails and the website.

	Source of information	>3/week	1-3/week	1-3/month	<1/month	never
Tab. 2	Emails	4%	41%	48%	4%	4%
	Website	4%	15%	41%	30%	11%
	Google group	4%	15%	19%	26%	37%

Online survey responders indicating the frequency of use of different sources of information.

R. 11 **For SCT:** Improve the dissemination of information through consistent upload of all documents shared with SC partners on the SC website, essentially using the website as a depository of data. A more effective use of the website could allow SC partners to find the information they need independently and this would reduce the need for one-to-one intensive partner support.

4.2.10 Despite the efforts of the IM team in producing relevant data analysis, the lack of baseline data remains a challenge to providing a clear picture of the context. The lack of information from NGCA is highlighted by most key informants, and is due to lack of access and security. But there is also a lack of baseline data on housing damage, needs and gaps in GCA – despite relatively stable access since February 2015. Excluding the REACH assessment (Refer to 4.2.11 below), there has been no initiative to carry out a quantitative household level damage assessment, as a key informant explained: "*We still don't know how many houses have been damaged and how many have been repaired*". The current SC baseline data is based on the REACH assessment, a representative sample only focused on IDPs. This provides initial data but is subject to obvious limitations.

4.2.11 The REACH assessment was carried out to "*facilitate the establishment of a baseline of the 850,000 IDPs registered by MoSP*" and provided additional data to the existing multi-sectorial needs assessment. This assessment was generally very well received, especially considering the general lack of baseline data. However, a few actors had concerns about the REACH process. Despite the assessment team being deployed to Ukraine for about 4 weeks between May and July 2015 to develop a questionnaire in collaboration with SC partners, some actors based in the field felt excluded from the process. While the questionnaire was circulated for comments, several informants mentioned that they were only informed a few days before the assessment was going to take place. This feedback reflects the challenge of Kyiv being disconnected from the field. Two other informants also mentioned that the REACH assessment only focused on IDPs, thus representing only one portion of the beneficiaries targeted by the SC. As a consequence, agencies requested a pilot assessment of non-IDPs in other geographical areas.

R. 12
Priority **For SC and SCT:** Work on improving the overall baseline data, including GCA and accessible parts of NGCA. The data should include housing damage and vulnerabilities of all target groups detailed in the SC strategy. The SAG should advise on how to carry out sectoral assessments, defining the target population and geographical area. Leverage on CLA and co-chair with access to Donetsk and Luhansk to gather further data on localities where others might not have access. *(KR-3 & 4)*

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[11] Refer the Mission Report, Global Shelter Cluster IM mission to Ukraine, Bo Hurkmans, August 2015. This report provides details recommendation to the Ukraine Shelter Cluster and GSC on how to improve IM services. Refer to Annex H.

4.2.12 It seems that the IM services provided have focused more on the "big picture", providing useful information for Kyiv: heads of agencies, government, and donors. Indeed, some key informants have noted that "*the information is produced more for Kyiv than for the field*". This could be expected, as the SC often initially focuses on providing an overview of the context, and then collects more detailed data for additional field-level analysis. For example, the SCT recently released a map on the *Grey zone for winterisation, gaps analysis of December 2015,* providing field level gap analysis, perceived as a more useful for implementing staff.

4.2.13 Additionally, it was mentioned by a number of key informants that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who remain an observer to the SC, provide a large amount of shelter assistance that is not always represented in the information analysis developed by the SCT.

R. 13 **For SCT:** Continue to provide an overview of the context, while also producing more detailed needs
Priority and gaps analysis, maps, graphs and other useful tools relevant aimed at the field level. Explore opportunities of improving the representation of SC observers with sensitive data (such as ICRC) in the analysis to provide a clearer overview of the coverage and gaps. *(KR-3)*

4.2.14 All further recommendation on information management should be referred to the mission report of Bo Hurkmans, GSC IM Associate from August 2015. Refer to Annex H.

Integration

4.2.15 The SCT consists mainly of local staff, with the exception of the National CC and sub-national CC. The National CC is fluent in Russian, which has been of great advantage in engaging a wider range of local actors, authorities and NNGOs. The sub-national CC had a dedicated translator to provide support during meetings. Although the set-up of the humanitarian response lacks local involvement, the SC has done its best to provide an open platform for integrating national actors and allowing for their participation in SCM, also witnessed by the translation of key documents into Ukrainian and Russian. Despite this, few NNGOs attend cluster meetings, mainly due to a lack of awareness of the cluster system and humanitarian structure.

4.2.16 Integration with authorities has been challenging for many actors. Refer to 4.7.4-4.7.13.

4.3 Informing strategic decision-making by the HC/HCT (Core function #2)

Q. 6 Has the relationship with the HCT and the cluster been effective?

4.3.1 The HC / HCT has been criticised as a weak strategic decision-making body by most key informants interviewed for this review. "*The HCT is not very effective. Some actors present have a lot of experience, and others take too much space with no experience*". Although the HCT should be an effective decision making platform in Ukraine, with a high number of INGOs represented and MSF and ICRC attending as observers, this mechanism has been a dysfunctional platform for reasons detailed below.

4.3.2 It was noted that the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) is UNDP staff has been described as having limited experience with humanitarian response. This has meant that OCHA, who acts as a secretariat to the HC, has been overwhelmed and has inherently taken leadership on decisions related to humanitarian issues. The "*weak HCT has provided room for OCHA to monopolise the debate*" and OCHA "*is working beyond its mandate*". The lack of leadership has made the HCT into a reactive rather than proactive platform, "*certain issues are not being put on the table and are not being discussed. The only focus of the HCT is accreditation (meaning access).*"

4.3.3 The HCT has been criticised for lack of accountability and transparency, with no or very few minutes of meetings shared, and no official record of the discussions and decisions made. Some

NGOs have stated that they have pushed for some decisions to be taken at the HCT mainly to move forward with implementing the response because the HCT does not provide an effective platform for discussion, debate, or negotiation.

R. 14 *Priority*	**For GSC and UNHCR:** Request for accountability and transparency of the ICCG and HCT, by asking HCT/OCHA for all meeting minutes, reports, assessments and other relevant documents produced for ICCG and HCT meetings to be shared and published on humanitarianresponse.info. *(KR-7)*

4.3.4 The CC does not attend HCT meetings and the cluster is represented by the CLA. Although this is common practice, in some countries the CC joins HCT meetings to provide technical support and ensure that the interests of the cluster are represented. In Ukraine, the non-attendance of CCs in HCT meetings has been questioned as some decisions made in HCT meetings require the technical knowledge of a sectoral representative, which a CLA representative might not have. In July 2015, following an HCT retreat, a recommendation was made to include CCs as observers and advisors during HCT meetings. This recommendation was never actioned nor implemented.

R. 15 *Priority*	**For UNHCR and SCT:** Request the HCT to act on its' decision from the July 2015 retreat, to invite CCs to HCT meetings. Until then, the SCT is to provide the CLA representative with SC updates prior to each HCT meeting, and organise a debriefing session with the SCT afterwards. *(KR-7)*

4.3.5 Additionally, there is the questions of how a CLA can represent its agency and the sector(s) it leads in HCT meetings when the opinions of the two differ. Should the CLA have additional votes: one for the organisation and one for each cluster it represents, or should the CC be present during HCT meetings? Although CLA has a role in supporting the CC in situations where relations with other IASC actors are fragile, this cannot always be achieved due to perceived conflicts of interest. As a result, the cluster's opinion is often not represented at HCT meetings.

4.3.6 Donors do not usually attend HCT meetings in Ukraine. However, in some countries, to ensure the donor community is involved in discussions and decision-making, a donor representative maybe invited to all HCT meeting or quarterly HCT and donor meetings are organised. In Ukraine there has been only one meeting with HCT members and donors. This suggests that there is a need to strengthen communication between the HCT and the donor community.

R. 16	**For UNHCR and SCT:** Advocate the HCT to explore ways of involving the donor community in this humanitarian platform, with the aim of increasing its relevance and effectiveness.

Joint assessments

4.3.7 A number of joint assessments have been carried out in Ukraine. The OCHA-led Humanitarian Situation Monitoring (HSM) was first published in December 2014, and has provided an ongoing source of multi-sector information. Even if this initial data was incomplete, it formed the basis of the 2015 SRP. However, it was explained by a number of key informants that the HSM provided a very limited overview of the context, that the methodology was based on a sample of 66 *raions*[12] out of 172 most affected *raions*, that the community level assessment was based on key informant interviews, and that the institutional assessment focused on education and health. For SC partners this provided a very limited overview as their need for household level data was crucial to strategically plan their programmes.

4.3.8 Between February and March 2015, the Ukraine NGOs Forum carried out a Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) to acquire a better overview of needs in the Donbas region and inform the design of humanitarian responses. The assessment provided new useful data and a better overview of the situation, but due to the access restriction to the most affected areas, this could still not

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[12] Raions are the second level of administrative division of Ukraine and are primary the most common division of regions of Ukraine.

serve as a baseline for the SC. In July 2015 a shelter REACH assessment was carried out and provided additional data to the existing HSM and MSNA, see section 4.2.11.

4.3.9   The HNO that was carried out in December 2015 for the HRP 2016, did not provide clusters with any particularly new information. Additionally, the outcome of the report was not officially shared with the national authorities. Many of the assessments detailed above were developed without consistent support or inclusion of national actors, NNGOs and authorities.

4.4   Strategy, planning, policy and standards (Core function #3)

Q. 7   Has the cluster effectively set its priorities? Are there gaps in these priorities?

Shelter Cluster Strategy

4.4.1   To establish priorities, the SC usually uses the SAG as a forum for discussion and decision-making. In Ukraine, the first SAG meeting was only called in December 2015, and until then all strategic decisions and priorities were defined in plenary during SCM. For further information on the SAG refer to 4.2.2.

4.4.2   The SC strategy document that sets out the sectoral priorities was first drafted in September 2014 and later revised in June 2015[13]. The 2014 strategy clearly defines priority activities and the population of concern, which includes *"IDPs, communities directly affected by the conflict, returnees, host communities"*. The document also emphasises on winterisation assistance and the "one warm room" concept, NFI distribution, cash assistance, transitional and recovery shelter, as well as reconstruction including of basic infrastructure.

4.4.3   The revised 2015 SC strategy takes a dual approach, combining life-saving emergency assistance, and longer-term shelter solutions.[14] The document provides details on target groups and new cluster objectives. These objectives emphasise three points: *(1) the most vulnerable living in GCA and NGCA, (2) harmonisation of technical standards, and (3) decentralisation of the coordination*. The strategy also elaborates on beneficiary selection, cross-cutting issues, advocacy, contingency planning, and presents key challenges, such as access.

4.4.4   The online survey carried out for this evaluation states that 45% of respondents confirm having been part of developing the SC Strategy, and 59% and 15% of the respondents perceive the priorities as being relevant and very relevant. Only 3% perceive the priorities as not being relevant. 75% of the respondents who see the priorities as very relevant come from NNGOs. Additionally, 52% of respondent confirm having adapted their programme according to the priorities and gaps identified by the SC. According to the majority of partners, the SC has effectively set out priorities to respond to the needs of the affected population.

4.4.5   Yet, two key informants representing large agencies mentioned that until June 2015, the SC had mainly focused on assistance to IDPs (referring to the IDP-focused REACH assessment as an example) while their organisations were repairing and reconstructing houses of the non-displaced population. Additionally, as mentioned previously the REACH assessment was also only focused on IDP data. One of the key informant questioned how and when this decision was made. Although both strategy documents from September 2014 and June 2015 clearly mention that the SC target population is wider than just IDPs, it seems that some large actors were not well informed of the priorities. This could also be explained by:

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[13] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015, retrieved from http://sheltercluster.org/response/ukraine
[14] idem

> ➢ Weak dissemination of key documents including the SC strategy (Refer to R. 11 & R. 17). For example, the 2014 SC strategy is not available on the website (possibly replaced by the most recent version), even though it would be useful to include it for transparency.
> ➢ High turnover of staff in agencies, which means that some information is not handed over and the SC does not systematically share key documents with new arrivals.
> ➢ Disconnection between the field and Kyiv, and the challenge in communicating decisions with field actors. Indeed, most of the strategic discussions are taking place in SCM in Kyiv, despite the outcome potentially having a significant effect on the field.

R. 17
Priority

For SCT: Develop a standard package of key documents. For example, the SC Philippines had developed a Technical Index document with links to all key technical documents. This was a useful tool to increase the dissemination of key documents to new SC partners, and to hand over all key SC documents to newly arrived staff. *(KR-3)*

4.4.6 Although the general perception suggests a satisfactory prioritisation of activities, some individuals expressed the need to refine the prioritisation. For example, a few key informants have highlighted the outstanding humanitarian assistance in NGCA and stressed the importance of prioritising these areas. Due to the restricted access of NGCA and the current broad priorities set out by the SC, many agencies have been prevented from providing assistance in NGCA and have re-targeted their assistance to GCA, leaving vulnerable families in NGCA with no support.

R. 18

For SCT and SC: Refine SC strategic priorities with stronger data for NGCA. The SC should work towards identifying the specific needs and assistance required in NGCA and better guide geographical prioritisation, differentiating the needs of Donetsk and Luhansk as two distinct locations. The SC has the advantage of being led by PIN and UNHCR who both have been granted access to NGCA.

Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)

4.4.7 The HRP is the inter-sectoral strategy document that sets out priorities, and presents projects or activities per sector matched with funding for the overall country strategy to be realised. It is broader than the shelter sector, and the priorities are often extracted from sectoral strategies.

4.4.8 The 2015 SRP (now called HRP) was drafted very quickly with minimal baseline data. Many key informants explained that it was not a particularly successful document due to the limited timeframe provided to develop a relevant document in a consultative, accountable and transparent manner. Even though it was revised in February 2015, most sectors explained that the baseline data available at that time was largely inaccurate. The OCHA Head of Office also imposed an activity-based document rather than a project, which was not welcomed by cluster partners nor by the SCT. As a result, the relevance of the 2015 SRP has been questioned by a number of key informants.

4.4.9 The 2016 HRP has received mixed feedback. In a first instance, the CCs were successful in convincing OCHA in making the HRP a project-based document rather than an activity-based one. Secondly, a number of SC partners explained that going through the process of developing the document was useful, as it forced them to think strategically ahead of time and to plan their activities accordingly. The SCT convened a number of HRP meetings to develop an activity matrix with detailed activities, costs, duration and timeframe. Harmonising these activities allowed SC partners to develop their own proposals with more confidence and details, since the momentum of these HRP meetings provided useful operational discussions.

4.4.10 Even though the SC embraced the HRP process allowing organisations to strategically develop their programme following a common strategy, it was still very much perceived as a Kyiv centric, inefficient process, especially since the focus was on funding. Indeed, the Ukraine HRP seemed to

be mainly used to attract and justify funding. However, some of the donors explained that they usually select agencies based on previous experiences working together, rather than on the HRP.

4.4.11 Finally, donors also mentioned not having been involved in the process of preparing the HRP. This includes the SC. As a result, donors were presented with a final document and a *"catalogue of projects which were not prioritised"*. This means that the HRP has perhaps been a more useful process through which agencies can develop a common strategy with activities and budgets. However, for donors it does not provide a clear overview of the humanitarian priorities, nor is it perceived to be developed in a collaborative and consultative manner.

R. 19 **For SCT:** Involve donors in the development of the SC section of the HRP.

Working Groups

4.4.12 Technical Working Groups (TWIGs) were established in response to a need to discuss and resolve technical issues. The SC strategy[15] identifies three TWIGs currently established: (1) Permanent Shelter solutions, (2) Shelter and NFI monetization, and (3) Housing Land and Property Rights – the latter in partnership with the Protection Cluster. The desk review has identified two additional active TWIGs: Winterisation WG, and a heavy repairs WG.

4.4.13 Most SC partners mention TWIGs among the greatest added value of the SC. *"The winterisation WG was the most successful, it really unified everyone"; "the SC has been very useful, especially through the technical WG, and harmonising the response at different levels"; "The document that came out of the TWIGs was very good, they did a lot of work and the recommendation that came out is realistic".* It allowed shelter programme managers to develop better strategies and project proposals. It also added weight to submissions to their HQ and donors, and it brought agencies together focusing on operational issues rather than political barriers. These TWIGs have been so useful that most agencies have requested for more technical discussions.

R. 20 **For SCT:** Continue its efforts in identifying technical issues and addressing them through TWIGs.

Cash Working Group

4.4.14 The SC also lead a Cash WG (CWG), which was later named the SC Monetisation WG, when OCHA took the lead in running an inter-cluster CWG in April 2015. This WG resulted in useful discussions but also raised a number of issues and disagreements detailed here.

4.4.15 A cash advisor from UNHCR came to support UNHCR's operations and provided support to the SCT leading the CWG. This resulted in the SC taking the lead amongst other clusters to harmonise the Multi-Purpose Cash Grant (MPCG) transfer value, where many agencies including OCHA, donors and the Food Security Cluster and many others were involved. The value agreed in February 2015 was going to be revised in May 2015[16], but a new value was only agreed in August after an additional three months of lengthily debate and disagreements. A key informant explained that UNHCR might have influenced the position of the SCT, which would have contributed towards exacerbating the negotiations.

4.4.16 The SCT sought advice from the GSC team when OCHA's CWG wanted cash to become a separate section in the HRP 2016. Since MPCG responded to multi-sectoral needs it was considered that this should be monitored separately from cluster activities. However, extracting these activities from each cluster monitoring responsibility was an issue for the SC and other cluster to be able identify gaps and coverage of their own sector. The HCT took the final decision, agreeing to make cash a

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[15] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015, retrieved from http://sheltercluster.org/response/ukraine
[16] Meeting minutes from CWG, 20 April 2015.

separate section in the HRP. This conflicted with the GSC position, and although they were informed of the debate, they were unable to provide leverage in time to support the SC in influencing the decision in country. The GSC took this issue seriously and has commissioned further research on cash and shelter to inform their decision making.

R. 21   **For GSC:** Such country-level disagreements may have repercussions on the SC not only nationally, but also globally as these decisions could be used as precedents of good practice for future emergencies. When the GSC has a position that is not aligned with decisions made at country level these need to be formally expressed, documented and addressed at global level.

4.4.17   The table below summarises the cash transfer value agreed, discussed or recommended during various meetings between October 2014 and August 2015 (extracted from meeting minutes).

Tab. 3

	Oct-14	TBC	Feb-15	Apr-May-Jun 15	Jul-15	Aug-15
Chair	ECHO	ECHO/SC	SC	OCHA CWG	OCHA CWG	OCHA CWG
Participants	SC, PIN, DRC, WFP	Info extracted from meeting minutes OCHA CWG from 04/15	DRC, SCI, DFID consortium, ECHO, OFDA, OCHA, ACF, PIN, WFP, UNHCR, FSC	OCHA, DRC, Save the Children, WFP, SC CC, UNHCR, IOM, PIN, GOAL	OCHA, ECHO, ICRC, DRC, DFID consort., WFP, UNHCR, IOM, PIN, ADRA, GOAL	OCHA, ECHO, DRC, DFID consort., WFP, ACF, PIN, ADRA, GOAL
USD/ Person/ Month	food: 45/per/month **Winter: 235** for 3 months	**Winter: 100/per**	**15/per/m** for 3 months	Many discussions, no agreement	cash transfer value for discussion **34/per/month** for 6 months	DFID Consortium **30/per/m**

*Government subsidy was based on **23USD/person/month**. ICRC cash assistance was based **16USD/person/month**.*

4.4.18   The discrepancies between the different cash transfer values presented in the table above may be explained by the increased market prices throughout 2015, but also by the underlining purpose of these grants. The disagreements on the purpose of the MPCG included whether it should cover rent, whether it should cover a period of 3 or 6 months, and include recovery as well as emergency needs. *"ICRC's basket (…) is calculated on the cost of current coping mechanisms. Not intended to take a recovery objective or enable households to reduce risk."[17]* This resulted in highly variable cash transfer values, despite a thorough underlying analysis.

4.4.19   When OCHA activated an inter-sectorial CWG in April 2015, they initially did not invite the SCT who had been leading a TWIG on this subject. This led to immediate questioning of the CWG legitimacy, and disagreements between agencies and clusters. The three months of negotiations between organisations involved an unnecessary personal and political debate, which slowed down the process of providing humanitarian assistance.

4.4.20   As a result, a decision-making structure for the CWG was established through a steering committee attended by CLA and donors, separating the technical discussions from strategic decisions. This structure seems inappropriate, since it would have been desirable to have decisions endorsed by sectoral experts rather than heads of agencies. It has also been unclear what the ICCG members' responsibilities are in terms of strategic decision for an OCHA-led WG.

R. 22
Priority   **For GSC:** Provide dedicated cash expertise and specific SC guidance on cash programming, including how to define cash transfer values, and how to deal with multi-purpose cash grants at the inter-cluster coordination and HC/HCT level. (KR-8)

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[17] Meeting minutes from CWG, 29 July 2015.

> **For SCT and GSC:** Advocate all inter-cluster CWG to provide technical advice to the sectors (rather than becoming sector, creating separate sections under the HRP). There is a need to provide clear guidance on the different cash modality, MPGC, conditional cash, restricted cash, unconditional cash, as well as defining the cash terminologies, and providing relevant tools.

4.5 Shelter advocacy and communication (Core function #4)

Q. 8 Did the cluster do enough advocacy to donors, government and others?

4.5.1 The GSC defines advocacy as *"a targeted communication with the goal to change a decision maker's opinions, attitudes, actions or lack of actions. Advocacy usually aims to influence public policy or resource allocation within political, economic and social systems and institutions".*[18]

4.5.2 The SC strategy mentions that *"key advocacy messages will be developed and validated by the SAG in consultation with the Protection Cluster"*[19]*.* It also states that the SCT will identify gaps and advocate donors on behalf of cluster partners for further funding, as well as cross-cutting and inter-sectorial issues. As the first SAG meeting was held in December 2015, it is assumed that all earlier shelter advocacy activities were discussed in plenary during SCM.

4.5.3 In the context of Ukraine, the SC advocacy has focused on the following activities:
   ➤ Information sharing and communication of humanitarian needs for the purpose of fundraising (maps, factsheet, strategic documents, technical guidelines);
   ➤ Humanitarian access, including access to various shelter items, and to geographical areas in need of humanitarian assistance (especially NGCA);
   ➤ Raising awareness of the cluster system;
   ➤ Harmonising reconstruction strategies with authorities.

4.5.4 The SC has been consistent in the publication of information which has enabled agencies to develop advocacy messages aimed at donors, government and their head-quarters. According to the online questionnaire, 59% of respondents confirm that they have used SC information to develop their own advocacy messages.

4.5.5 According to key informants, most of the advocacy messages have been developed at inter-cluster or HCT level, especially with regards to issues of access and lack of funding. The SC was involved in both platforms, through the CLA and ICCG advocating on behalf of its membership. *"OCHA has been taking the lead on advocacy especially on problems of access"*.

4.5.6 Some mentioned that SC advocacy should have focused also on access to shelter materials (NFIs, heaters, construction materials, etc.) and others mentioned taxes on humanitarian goods imposed by the authorities.[20] Some actors believed that OCHA spent too much time doing advocacy and forgot its core function of carrying out joint assessments in order to get a better overview of damages, especially in NGCA[21]. Overall, there was too much focus on advocating access, as a result of which other important issues were left behind, or not discussed at all.

4.5.7 According to the online questionnaire, 37% of respondents believe the SC has produced and shared a useful advocacy message, on behalf of cluster partners, to donors. 48% said *I don't know.* On the other hand, 22% think that the SC has produced and shared useful advocacy messages on behalf of cluster partners to the government, with 59% responding *I don't know*. In both cases there are half or more who *do not know* whether the cluster has done enough advocacy. This is notable, and

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[18] Communication and Advocacy Strategy for the Shelter Cluster, March 2014 retrieved from http://www.sheltercluster.org/
[19] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015, retrieved from http://www.sheltercluster.org/
[20] According to the CC, the GoU is currently working on how to expedite the tax exemption process for humanitarian projects.
[21] Assessment in the NGCA is made difficult by access, but also safety risks associated with data collection and sharing with Kyiv.

could either be perceived as concerning, assuming that advocacy messages have not reached all shelter actors, or it could be understood that some advocacy messages are not of interest to all actors. Only 22% believe the SC has exercised sufficient advocacy with government: *"there could have been more advocacy with local authorities"*.

R. 23 **For SC:** Ensure that a broad range of relevant issues are addressed in the advocacy messages developed by the cluster, not solely focusing on one specific challenge.

4.5.8 The SC has also done communication and advocacy to raise awareness on the cluster system and the role of the SC in Ukraine. More recently, the SC has proactively initiated communication with the authorities, for example through the heavy repair TWIGs, where the SC worked towards harmonising and agreeing on a common strategy for the permanent reconstruction. Indeed, a lot of questions were being raised with regards to the repair and reconstruction of large infrastructure damage related to shelter, such as water pipelines for heating, and electricity systems which have not been maintained and now require large investments.

R. 24
Priority **For SCT:** Continue efforts on communication with local and regional government on the harmonization of the response, using this tool to advocate further coordination. *(KR-1)*

4.5.9 A further advocacy gap that needs increased focus is the issue of shelter being an emergency process, instead of merely a recovery process which may provide permanent shelter solutions. In November 2015, during a HRP presentation to donors, there was a debate as to whether the SC should be talking about "permanent solutions" especially when there are still emergency gaps. Some humanitarian donors do not perceive permanent reconstruction as being a humanitarian response. Donors needs to be better informed of the SC country strategy, which includes: *"(…)provid[ing] longer-term shelter solutions for populations seeking either return or integration into host-community for IDPs, conflict affected population (…)"*[22]. Furthermore, the GSC strategy includes recovery and reconstruction.

R. 25 **For GSC:** Advocate its position with regards to durable reconstruction and repairs during a humanitarian response. There is a need to raise donor's awareness on the GSC position on shelter recovery and durable solutions. Indeed, the GSC 3rd strategic objective states that it will through advocacy and communication *"Enhance articulation of the linkages between shelter risk reduction, preparedness, relief, recovery, and development, through a resilience approach, resulting in a seamless transition from emergency relief to recovery and reconstruction"*[23].

4.6 Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy, shelter achievements and corrective action (Core function #5)

4.6.1 Through the IM system the SCT monitors the progress of the activities carried out by its partners since the activation of the cluster. This has allowed agencies to better understand the context in which they operate and identify areas with the highest needs. However, this review has also identified limitations to the SC IM system. Refer to sections 4.2.9 to 4.2.14.

4.6.2 The SC has set up a coordinated Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) system for all cash assistance. Agencies use the template developed by the SC and share the outcome of the PDM in a report, which includes recommendations and corrective actions. This has been an effective tool, combined with the 5W matrix, to monitor the progress of the shelter sector.

4.6.3 The SC has not carried out a Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring (CCPM), which the IASC recommends to be implemented six months after the onset of an emergency.

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[22] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015, retrieved from http://www.sheltercluster.org/
[23] GSC Strategy 2013 -2017, retrieved from http://www.sheltercluster.org/global

R. 26 *Priority*	**For SCT:** Discuss with SC partners the need to carry out a CCPM. This external review covers parts of what a CCPM would achieve, however the process and outcomes are clearly different. *(KR-7)*

4.6.4 Some of the key informants have recommended a global cluster architecture review. They are questioning the reasons behind the activation of the cluster system in Ukraine, the relevance of the HC/HCT, and the accountability of OCHA, as well as the heavy coordination structure, described as self-serving rather than as providing essential humanitarian coordination services. Time and time again, clusters are activated following a crisis using a template format that is not adapted to the context. Ukraine has never before experienced a similar crisis and the humanitarian system put in place is lacking when it comes to leadership and coordination with government and civil society. When the humanitarian coordination system fails to address such fundamental principles, one may question its legitimacy. How can this system remain effective in terms of leadership, as well as adaptable to the context, transparent and accountable?

R. 27 *Priority*	**For GSC and SCT:** Advocate a Ukraine cluster architecture review, through a comprehensive and action-oriented evaluation of the current humanitarian coordination structure, looking at: *(KR-9)* ➤ Coordination structures adapted to the context (specifically for middle income countries). ➤ Coordination structures that enable further engagement of the authorities and further ownership of local actors. ➤ Coordination system with clear leadership by relevant humanitarian actors, while remaining transparent and accountable. Initiate discussions with the Global ICCG and IASC for a global evaluation of the humanitarian coordination system, to considering developing coordination structures that are more adaptable to different contexts including middle income countries, and remain transparent and accountable.

4.7 Contingency planning/ preparedness/ capacity-building (Core function #6)

Q. 9	*Is the cluster supporting the government to take up a coordination role in the future?*

Contingency planning

4.7.1 The 2015 SRP had a marginal section on contingency planning and preparedness. This section was updated following a contingency plan support mission from Geneva in May 2015. The outcome of this exercise was a comprehensive inter-cluster Contingency Plan, which included cluster responsibilities during the first three months of an escalation of violence resulting in increased vulnerabilities, displacement and pressure on host communities.

4.7.2 Prior to this inter-cluster exercise, the SC had been leading discussions since early March 2015 on preparedness activities and tracking of warehouse contents. An online template for warehouse tracking was adopted by other clusters in May 2015, to centralise the stockpiling of information and monitoring in one database. The SC confirmed they would continue to monitor warehouse statuses with additional support from the Logistics cluster[24]. This has been an important preparedness and contingency planning measure.

4.7.3 At inter-cluster level, there has been a lack of preparedness for and adequate response to the scenario of losing access to NGCA. Indeed, since July 2015, most operational actors have lost access to NGCA, and the inter-cluster Contingency Plan in place seems to have failed to address the needs of those vulnerable communities. It was mentioned by several partners that:

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[24] Shelter Cluster Strategy, June 2015.

> ➤ Due to lack of access, funding originally allocated for NGCA has been retargeted to GCA communities, leaving behind vulnerable households in NGCA.
> ➤ The actors still operational in NGCA are concerned about the lack of response to vulnerable and inaccessible communities; markets are ineffective, making cash interventions irrelevant.
> ➤ Many organisations who have lost access to NGCA are working remotely through implementing partners, mainly NNGOs, who are themselves overstretched and overworked. There is a need for capacity building and monitoring to ensure an adequate response and reduce the risk of corruption, but little can be achieved due to access restrictions.

R. 28   **For SCT:** Include in the SC contingency plan a section on setting up a remote coordination system for NGCA to support actors operating on behalf of others. Develop an agreed mechanism with focal points and information sharing system, to allow for a systematic approach of remote assistance, limiting duplication of assistance, reducing gaps and allowing for monitoring of programmes and accountability to affected population.

Capacity building

4.7.4   Civic activism has been high throughout the crisis in Ukraine, and there was an existing energy and willingness from local actors to engage. However, NNGOs and CSOs have expressed a lack of familiarity with the international humanitarian system, and requested capacity building and cross-fertilisation between local and international actors involved in the response.

4.7.5   UNHCR organised a Civil Society Forum in Kharkiv in December 2015 where NNGOs could showcase their organisation and projects. Despite such efforts, some NNGOs have conveyed a lack of willingness from some international organisations to engage.

4.7.6   SCM minutes and the inter-cluster Contingency Plan described the need to support authorities to carry out more effective IDP tracking. Since October 2014, MoSP is responsible for tracking IDPs, although during an acute crisis they may not have the resources and capacity to deliver in a timely and effective manner.

4.7.7   The SC has provided capacity building for SC partners, including NNGOs through various forums, TWIGs, SCM and individual ad-hoc meetings. The translation of meetings and key documents into English, Russian and Ukrainian has been essential to allow engagement with national actors. This highlights the efforts from the SCT to reach out to civil society and authorities, however it was acknowledged by the CC that further engagement is still required.

R. 29   **For SCT:** Increase awareness raising activities of cluster system for local actors, including authorities
Priority   and NNGOs. By building on the relationships established and the documentations translated, there is an opportunity to increase the reach of the SC. *(KR-1)*

Advocate the HCT to take the lead in engaging with local actors, civil societies and authorities. Provide authorities with the appropriate support, capacity building and resources. *(KR-7)*

Transition, de-activation and exit strategy

Q. 9   *Is the cluster supporting the government to take up a coordination role in the future?*

4.7.8   *"Good practice suggests that the HC/HCT, clusters and national authorities should develop transition and de-activation strategies at the start of a response"*[25]

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[25] IASC Reference module, July 2015.

4.7.9   In reality, this is difficult in a conflict response where the situation remains volatile, unpredictable and can regress rapidly. However, despite violations of the ceasefire agreement, the situation in Ukraine has improved during 2015. One year has passed since the formal activation of the cluster system, and a transition plan should be discussed and prepared. IASC guidance recommends an annual review of the cluster and coordination architecture to be carried out by the HC/HCT, with a view to continuing, deactivating, scaling down and/or handing over clusters as appropriate.

4.7.10 *"The condition for deactivation of formally activated clusters may be considered when at least one of the conditions that led to its activation is no longer present (1) the humanitarian situation improves (…) (2) National structures acquire sufficient capacity to coordinate and meet residual humanitarian needs".* [26]

4.7.11 Ukraine is a middle-income country with some national and local capacity to respond to emergencies. Several government entities have engaged in the response, but considering the deteriorating economic context and pressure on social services, the question remains of how much left-over capacity authorities retain with which to coordinate the residual humanitarian needs. The internal government coordination structure – STAB – was partly effective in the early stages of the response, but has been less effective recently. Various informants mentioned that the humanitarian crisis in Eastern Ukraine does not seem to be a key priority for the government in Kyiv. At regional level, there are weekly meetings, which the UNHCR Country Representative has attended once, while OCHA seem to be attending occasionally (not verified). Authorities at regional level appear more open to engaging with the SC and they have, on several occasions, hosted and opened SC meetings in Sloviansk.

4.7.12 As mentioned in section 2.3, the evaluator was not able to meet with the authorities directly due to bureaucratic restrictions. The issues faced attempting to meet with the authorities in Kyiv illustrates some of the challenges the SC has faced trying to engage with authorities.

4.7.13 Authorities in Kyiv are for now not ready nor willing to take on further roles or responsibilities in the humanitarian response. Thus the most likely scenario for deactivation of the SC is an improvement of the humanitarian situation, minimising the need to coordinate response and gaps. The underlying assumption would be that the shelter response is harmonised, implementing actors know where they are working, shelter standards across the sectors have been agreed, and that gaps are minimal and addressed through effective coordination between implementing organisations and with the local/regional authorities and civil society. In this case, the need for a full time dedicated SC coordination team may not be required.

R. 30 **For SC:** Initiate discussions around transition internally with SC partners. Develop a transition plan involving, as much as possible, national counterparts and development actors, linking humanitarian and longer term recovery, and aligning with national development objectives.

For the GSC: Provide further guidance as to how and when to start the transition. Especially in a context such as Ukraine, where the nature of the conflict is moving towards a protracted crisis, the government has capacity but currently does not seem willing to engage further.

4.8 Accountability to affected populations (Core function #7)

4.8.1   The GSC provides guidance on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) through information produced by the GSC Accountability WG. It states that *"Accountability for the implementation of shelter programs lies with cluster members, not the cluster team members themselves (…) However, the coordination team should be accountable to cluster members, promoting transparency and positive coordination. Shelter clusters should advocate for:*

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[26] IASC Reference module, July 2015.

> ➤ *Inter-sectoral messaging with affected populations*
> ➤ *Cluster members seeing accountability as being to all affected populations, not just those narrowly defined within specific projects*
> ➤ *Area coverage: ensuring that gaps are not influenced by pressures other than need.[27]"*

4.8.2 The SC in Ukraine has provided a platform to encourage transparency and accountability to affected populations through discussions on cash assistance and Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM). The SC – through the Cash WG[28] – developed a PDM template to generate reports shared with other cluster partners. This provided organisations with a tool to better understand the impact of their interventions and for the sector to measure the effect of shelter activities, but only focused on one type of assistance: cash. Hopefully, the PDM also encourages organisations to use similar systems for other shelter assistance. The PDM provided feedback on beneficiary satisfaction, and how was the cash utilised. A complaints mechanism is mentioned, but no detailed information is available on this mechanism outside the PDM questionnaire.

4.8.3 Although the PDM has provided a platform for accountability and communication with affected populations who receive cash assistance, there is no evidence that this was applied to other shelter assistance, such as NFI distributions, repairs and reconstruction. Additionally, there is no evidence available online of inter-cluster accountability messages to affected populations in Ukraine. "*Part of the issue around of acceptance of cash grants/complaints in the communities (i.e. those that get and don't get) is lack of beneficiary communication by many agencies. Packages need to be clearly communicated to beneficiaries, i.e. vulnerability criteria and justification for transfer amounts, where different. OCHA will take forward beneficiary communication as a technical area to support in the CWG.*"[29] While beneficiary communication has been discussed at cluster and inter-cluster level, there is no evidence of a follow-up.

R. 31 | **For SCT:** Encourage the use of various tools – among SC partners – to increase accountability to
Priority | affected populations beyond the cash PDM. This may include inter-sectoral communication messages to affected population; feedback and complaints mechanisms; diagnosis tools for communication with affected populations; or beneficiary-led community evaluation[30]. *(KR-5)*

Q10. | *What real difference did the cluster make to the people affected by the conflict?*

4.8.4 The SC has indirectly made a difference to the people affected by the conflict, by providing coordination services that allow implementing agencies to work effectively and provide targeted and relevant assistance. In some areas, these services have had a real added value, in others less so. Examples of positive impact include:
> ➤ Outreach of the shelter assistance through the IM system and mapping (although it has been noted that gaps remain, especially in the NGCA).
> ➤ Targeted and appropriate shelter response, aiming to provide the people affected by the conflict with necessary items and appropriate shelter assistance.
> ➤ Harmonisation of the assistance through TWIGs, aiming to provide the population in need with equal and fair shelter assistance from one family to another, and across agencies.
> ➤ Emergency referral system during winterisation (26 out of 26 referrals addressed in 2015)
> ➤ Providing a feedback and complaints mechanism for cash assistance, as described above.

4.8.5 Reports coming out of the PDM framework described above show a general satisfaction of beneficiaries towards the cash assistance provided. IOM states that out of 644 households, 89% of

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[27] Accountability to Affected Populations, November 2013, GSC Accountability Working Group, retrieved from https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACCOUNTABILITY-%20two%20page%20summary-2013-11-11.pdf
[28] Prior to the activation of the inter-cluster Cash WG
[29] Meeting minutes, CWG 21 May 2015
[30] Accountability to Affected Populations, November 2013, GSC Accountability Working Group, retrieved from https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACCOUNTABILITY-%20two%20page%20summary-2013-11-11.pdf

respondents are satisfied or totally satisfied with the program, and 73% are satisfied with the amount of cash provided.[31] ADRA reports that out of 820 households, 91% of respondents are satisfied or totally satisfied with the program, and 96% are satisfied with the cash amount[32].

4.8.6 Two field visits (to Sloviansk and Sievierodonetsk) highlighted the extent of the needs, and the limited humanitarian funding available to respond. In some cases, organisations have been unable to comply with minimum standards established by the SC, such as the "one warm room" concept, but other agencies have stepped in to "top up" the assistance for extremely vulnerable families. An informal referral system and good coordination between agencies has filled certain gaps, while others remain. For example, one house visited had received assistance from two organisations but was still not complying with the "one warm room" standard. The family had been obliged to rent a small summer shed while gathering enough funds to finalise the repairs.

Cross-cutting issues

Q11. Were cross-cutting issues and vulnerabilities explored and acted upon within the cluster?

4.8.7 The SC Strategy mentions that the SC "*will ensure attention to and mainstreaming of cross- cutting issues in all activities, in cooperation with other clusters as appropriate, in particular with the Protection and WASH Clusters".* The list of cross-cutting issues from the SC Strategy are:
  ➤ Age
  ➤ Disabilities
  ➤ Environment
  ➤ Gender
  ➤ Housing, Land and Property (HLP)
  ➤ Human Rights considerations, e.g. freedom of movement
  ➤ Mines and UXOs
  ➤ Registration & Population tracking
  ➤ Stockpiling & contingency (refer to contingency planning section)
  ➤ Income generation
  ➤ Owner vs. rental
  ➤ Humanitarian access to disputed areas & conflict-affected population
  ➤ Humanitarian access to goods

4.8.8 There is evidence of some of the issues above being addressed and discussed, while others have been omitted. The 2015 HRP identified "*protection as the overarching concern and central to the humanitarian planning and response of each cluster active in Ukraine"[33]. Most cross-cutting issues were viewed through a protection lens, a useful approach for the SC in Ukraine considering that the Protection Cluster is also led by UNHCR, and the proximity of CC offices allows for effective partnership and cross-fertilisation. For example, the SC's vulnerability criteria for cash assistance[34] was developed with support from the Protection Cluster. The document provided guidance on cash assistance modalities in relation to the following criteria: age, disability, health, gender, family size, income, financial resilience and social network, housing damage, and housing situation. The SC also holds a comprehensive data collection of population figures and displacement data, which is analysed by the SCT on a monthly basis, and presented and disseminated through maps and tables.

4.8.9 While the vulnerability criteria document was perceived as a useful tool, its wider dissemination and use was hindered by the fact that it only appeared on the cluster website in August 2015, and was categorised under "cash assistance". Many of the criteria are also highly relevant for other

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[31] "Preliminary Results of PDM, Cash Assistance to IDPs in 10 Regions", IOM, October 2015.
[32] PDM report provide by ADRA, Cash Assistance to IDPs, October 2015.
[33] HRP 2015, retrieved from https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/
[34] Vulnerability Criteria for Cash Assistance, retrieved from http://www.sheltercluster.org/response/ukraine

shelter assistance, especially when considering that this is the only document on beneficiary selection and vulnerability available on the website.

4.8.10 Minutes from a number of SCM show discussions and contributions from cluster partners on cross-cutting issues. HelpAge provided inputs to the vulnerability criteria document mentioned above. Handicap International gave a presentation on disability inclusion at national and sub-national level. But despite initiatives to explore and discuss cross-cutting issues such as age, disability, gender, and environment, specific and systematic guidance from the SC is lacking.

R. 32
Priority
For SC: Activate a vulnerability WG or identify a focal point with the following tasks:
  ➤ Develop cluster-wide guidance on vulnerability and beneficiary selection, developing a cluster-specific scoring system to support agencies in their prioritisation35.
  ➤ Create a matrix which provides guidance on vulnerabilities matched with shelter assistance type, allowing agencies to prioritise their assistance while minimum standards are met. (KR-5)

4.8.11 As protection was considered a cross-cutting issue to the response in the HRP 2015, some specific aspects such as age, gender and disability would be interesting to discuss at the inter-cluster level. For example, in the Philippines and Pakistan, an active "Age and Disability Task Force" provided support and guidance to the clusters. While this is not a direct responsibility of the SC, this represents an opportunity for SC partners.

R. 33
For SCT: Request the ICCG to activate an Accountability to Affected Population WG or an Accountability Task Force, to address concerns related to beneficiary communication, transparency and accountability. Examples can be found in other countries and it is believed to be particularly relevant in Ukraine, especially considering the strength of civil society. This could be an opportunity for SC partner with a specific expertise in age and disability inclusion, or any other cross-cutting issues, to take the lead, develop inter-cluster guidance and contribute to better mainstreaming.

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[35] Refer to SC Philippines, Beneficiary selection and recommendations on targeting and prioritisation as an example, available at https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/prioritisation_final_v1_2.pdf and https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Beneficiary%20Selection%20Criteria%20-%20Background%20Document%201.pdf

Annex A. List of Recommendations

Cluster leadership

R. 1
Priority
For UNHCR and GSC: Increase internal awareness of UNHCR staff on the cluster system. Develop and provide a standard information package for UNHCR Country Representatives and UNHCR staff on their role and responsibilities as CLA. This guidance should explain the coordination role of UNHCR in refugee operations versus an IDP context, and should address management and reporting lines between UNHCR-led clusters and UNHCR staff in main-office, sub-offices and field-offices. *(KR-6)*

Cluster personnel

R. 2 **For CLA and GSC:** The independence of the CLA from the SCT is essential in enabling the views and interests of the entire sector to be represented. It is therefore recommended that UNHCR and the GSC deploy dedicated teams to run the SC, and in particular deploy a dedicated CC.[36]

Global Shelter Cluster / HQ Support

R. 3 **For GSC and SCT:** Improve cross-fertilisation between different country clusters. It was recognised that in July 2015, the GSC has set up a Google group for that purpose.

R. 4 **For GSC and SCT:** Improve communication between global and country level through regular scheduled updates, on a monthly or quarterly basis depending on needs. This would allow the GSC to provide more appropriate support, anticipating certain issues and provide a platform of exchange for the CC.

Relations with IASC actors

R. 5 **For GSC:** Provide global guidance on which inter-cluster coordination tools, reports, and reviews are generally perceived as a priority, which ones are compulsory for the SC to contribute to, and which ones are a lower priority. Refer to Annex G.

R. 6 **For the SCT:** Lessons learnt have shown the importance of strengthening positive relationships, thus it would be recommended for the SCT to focus on their relationship with OCHA in the field.

Coordination management

R. 7
Priority
For CC and SCT: While a small and functional SCM can be an effective decision making platform for strategic priorities, it is recommended to establish a SAG with agreed ToR, a committed group of organisations including an active participation of relevant donors. SAG members' responsibility extends beyond regular cluster attendance, and should be formalised. *(KR-4)*

R. 8
Priority
For SCT: Standardise the informal shelter meetings that are not led by the SCT, whilst remaining flexible and supportive to those leading them. Formalising the decentralised hubs would enable the SCT to improve its leadership role, strengthen information flows, and allow for the SCT to be proactive rather than reactive. This could also provide the SC with further reach, with regards to the coordination services provided to partners. *(KR-2)*
- ➢ Identify focal point(s) to report to SCT
- ➢ Announce meetings through the SC mailing list so that other actors in the area may attend
- ➢ Share minutes of meeting template with those leading the meetings
- ➢ Request minutes of meetings, and share with SC partners for accountability and preparedness measures
- ➢ Promote SC reporting tools (5W)
- ➢ Share contact lists

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[36] Refer to IASC Reference Module, July 2015, p5 and p11.

R. 9 **For SCT:** Develop and disseminate an organisational map of the coordination structure,[37] with the
Priority sub-national sub and decentralised hubs. This would provide the SCT with further accountability
and transparency on the coordination structure already in place. *(KR-2)*

R. 10 **For SCT:** Consolidate a systematic coordination management approach by:
  - Sharing draft SCM agenda prior to SCM with partners allowing them to contribute items.
  - Consistently drafting and sharing of meeting minutes: including name of organisations
    attending for accountability and reporting purposes, and recording of key decisions.
  - Upload all meeting minutes and relevant documents on the SC website, with relevant tags.
When and where possible, allow remote attendance via telecom to extend the reach of SCM.

Information management

R. 11 **For SCT:** Improve the dissemination of information through consistent upload of all documents
shared with SC partners on the SC website, essentially using the website as a depository of data. A
more effective use of the website could allow SC partners to find the information they need
independently and this would reduce the need for one-to-one intensive partner support.

R. 12 **For SC and SCT:** Work on improving the overall baseline data, including GCA and accessible parts
Priority of NGCA. The data should include housing damage and vulnerabilities of all target groups detailed
in the SC strategy. The SAG should advise on how to carry out sectoral assessments, defining the
target population and geographical area. Leverage on CLA and co-chair with access to Donetsk
and Luhansk to gather further data on localities where others might not have access. *(KR-3 & 4)*

R. 13 **For SCT:** Continue to provide an overview of the context, while also producing more detailed
Priority needs and gaps analysis, maps, graphs and other useful tools relevant aimed at the field level.
Explore opportunities of improving the representation of SC observers with sensitive data (such
as ICRC) in the analysis to provide a clearer overview of the coverage and gaps. *(KR-3)*

Informing HC/HCT strategic decision-making

R. 14 **For GSC and UNHCR:** Request for accountability and transparency of the ICCG and HCT, by asking
Priority HCT/OCHA for all meeting minutes, reports, assessments and other relevant documents
produced for ICCG and HCT meetings to be shared and published on humanitarianresponse.info.

R. 15 **For UNHCR and SCT:** Request the HCT to act on its' decision from the July 2015 retreat, to invite
Priority CCs to HCT meetings. Until then, the SCT is to provide the CLA representative with SC updates
prior to each HCT meeting, and organise a debriefing session with the SCT afterwards. *(KR-7)*

R. 16 **For UNHCR and SCT:** Advocate the HCT to explore ways of involving the donor community in this
humanitarian platform, with the aim of increasing its relevance and effectiveness.

Shelter cluster strategy

R. 17 **For SCT:** Develop a standard package of key documents. For example, the SC Philippines had
Priority developed a Technical Index document with links to all key technical documents. This was a useful
tool to increase the dissemination of key documents to new SC partners, and to hand over all key
SC documents to newly arrived staff. *(KR-3)*

R. 18 **For SCT and SC:** Refine SC strategic priorities with stronger data for NGCA. The SC should work
towards identifying the specific needs and assistance required in NGCA and better guide
geographical prioritisation, differentiating the needs of Donetsk and Luhansk as two distinct
locations. The SC has the advantage of being led by PIN and UNHCR, both with access to NGCA.

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[37] For an example refer to SC Philippines Hub Overview on sheltercluster.org

R. 19 **For SCT:** Involved donors in the development of the SC section of the HRP.

Working groups

R. 20 **For SCT:** Continue its efforts in identifying technical issues and addressing them through TWIGs.

Cash Working Group

R. 21 **For GSC:** Such country-level disagreements may have repercussions on the SC not only nationally, but also globally as these decisions could be used as precedents of good practice for future emergencies. When the GSC has a position that is not aligned with decisions made at country level these need to be formally expressed, documented and addressed at global level.

R. 22 **For GSC:** Provide dedicated cash expertise and/or specific SC guidance on cash programming,
Priority including how to define cash transfer values, and how to deal with multi-purpose cash grants at the inter-cluster coordination and HC/HCT level. (KR-8)

For SCT and GSC: Advocate all inter-cluster CWG to provide technical advice to the sectors (rather than becoming sector, creating separate sections under the HRP). There is a need to provide clear guidance on the different cash modality, MPGC, conditional cash, restricted cash, unconditional cash, as well as defining the cash terminologies, and providing relevant tools.

Shelter advocacy and communication

R. 23 **For SC:** Ensure that a broad range of relevant issues are addressed in the advocacy messages developed by the cluster, not solely focusing on one specific challenge.

R. 24 **For SCT:** Continue efforts on communication with local and regional government on the
Priority harmonization of the response, using this tool to advocate further coordination. *(KR-1)*

R. 25 **For GSC:** Advocate its position with regards to durable reconstruction and repairs during a humanitarian response. There is a need to raise donor's awareness on the GSC position on shelter recovery and durable solutions.

Monitoring

R. 26 **For SCT:**
Priority Discuss with SC partners the need to carry out a CCPM. This external review covers parts of what a CCPM would achieve, however the process and outcomes are clearly different. *(KR-7)*

R. 27 **For GSC and SCT: For GSC and SCT:** Advocate a Ukraine cluster architecture review, through a
Priority comprehensive and action-oriented evaluation of the current humanitarian coordination structure, looking at: *(KR-9)*
  ➤ Coordination structures adapted to the context (specifically for middle income countries).
  ➤ Coordination structures that enable further engagement of the authorities and further ownership of local actors.
  ➤ Coordination system with clear leadership by relevant humanitarian actors, while remaining transparent and accountable.

Initiate discussions with the Global ICCG and IASC for a global evaluation of the humanitarian coordination system, to considering developing coordination structures that are more adaptable to different contexts including middle income countries, remain transparent and accountable.

Contingency planning

R. 28   **For SCT:** Include in the SC contingency plan a section on setting up a remote coordination system for NGCA to support actors operating on behalf of others. Develop an agreed mechanism with focal points and information sharing system, to allow for a systematic approach of remote assistance, limiting duplication of assistance, reducing gaps and allowing for monitoring of programmes and accountability to affected population.

Capacity building

R. 29   **For SCT:** Increase awareness raising activities of cluster system for local actors, including
Priority   authorities and NNGOs. By building on the relationships established and the documentations translated, there is an opportunity to increase the reach of the SC. *(KR-1)*

Advocate the HCT to take the lead in engaging with local actors, civil societies and authorities. Provide authorities with the appropriate support, capacity building and resources. *(KR-7)*

Transition, de-activation and exit strategy

R. 30   **For SC:** Initiate discussions around transition internally with SC partners. Develop a transition plan involving, as much as possible, national counterparts and development actors, linking humanitarian and longer term recovery, and aligning with national development objectives.

For the GSC: Provide further guidance as to how and when to start the transition. Especially in a context such as Ukraine, where the nature of the conflict is moving towards a protracted crisis, the government has capacity but currently does not seem willing to engage further.

Accountability to affected population

R. 31   **For SCT:** Encourage the use of various tools – among SC partners – to increase accountability to
Priority   affected populations beyond the cash PDM. This may include inter-sectoral communication messages to affected population; feedback and complaints mechanisms; diagnosis tools for communication with affected populations; or beneficiary-led community evaluation.[38] *(KR-5)*

Cross-cutting issues

R. 32   **For SC:** Activate a vulnerability WG or identify a focal point with the following tasks:
Priority
   ➢   Develop cluster-wide guidance on vulnerability and beneficiary selection, developing a cluster-specific scoring system to support agencies in their prioritisation.[39]
   ➢   Create a matrix which provides guidance on vulnerabilities matched with shelter assistance type, allowing agencies to prioritise their assistance while minimum standards are met. *(KR-5)*

R. 33   **For SCT:** Request the ICCG to activate an Accountability to Affected Population WG or an Accountability Task Force, to address concerns related to beneficiary communication, transparency and accountability. Examples can be found in other countries and it is believed to be particularly relevant in Ukraine, especially considering the strength of civil society. This could be an opportunity for SC partner with a specific expertise in age and disability inclusion, or any other cross-cutting issues, to take the lead, develop inter-cluster guidance and contribute to better mainstreaming.

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[38] Accountability to Affected Populations, November 2013, GSC Accountability Working Group, retrieved from https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACCOUNTABILITY-%20two%20page%20summary-2013-11-11.pdf
[39] Refer to SC Philippines, Beneficiary selection and recommendations on targeting and prioritisation as an example, available at https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/prioritisation_final_v1_2.pdf and https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Beneficiary%20Selection%20Criteria%20-%20Background%20Document%201.pdf

Annex   B. Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Emergency Shelter and Non Food Items Cluster in the Ukraine

1. Background

In November 2013, the decision of the Government of Ukraine to abandon an agreement that would strengthen ties with the EU sparked large scale protests, and in February 2014 violent clashes between demonstrators and law enforcement took place in Kiev. In March 2014, a referendum on status was held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, leading to a first wave of displacement of persons from Crimea.

Violence in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine has intensified since May 2014, with a second wave of displacement occurring in July and major humanitarian needs emerging. Following events in non-government controlled areas of Donbas from autumn 2014, change in conflict trends have led people to return home and then forced them into displacement again.

In October 2014, the Government of Ukraine announced a dedicated new IDP registration system (Resolution #509) along with a resolution on state provision of cash assistance to cover utility bills for all registered IDPs for 6 months (Resolution # 505). A Law on IDPs was adopted by the Government of Ukraine in October 2014, including provisions for the new registration system and outlining of establishment of rights of IDPs to free accommodation and employment. Initially, with moderately low numbers of displaced persons, hosting communities and volunteer groups tackled the crisis well. However, with further increase of IDPs coming per day the needs exceeded the capacity of existing societal mechanisms to respond.

In December 23, 2014 the Cluster system was officially activated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator to enhance coordination among members of the humanitarian community. UNHCR was appointed as the lead agency for the Emergency Shelter and NFIs cluster.

In January and February 2015 a third wave of mass displacement occurred from areas under shelling (Debaltsevo crisis). As of 1st June 2015 there are 1.3 million persons registered as displaced by the Ministry of Social Policy, with fluctuating population movements including secondary displacement, commuting across the contact line, and returns.

The Emergency Shelter and Non Food Items Cluster is partnered with the Ministry of Regional Development & Ministry of Social Policy and led by UNHCR with various NGO partners coordinating to provide an appropriate response to the crises.

National coordination is conducted in Kiev with sub-national coordination occurring in various areas as illustrated below.

Office / location	Cluster Mechanism	Regularity of meetings	Hosting organization	Status
National	National Cluster	Weekly	UNHCR	Activated
Northern Donbas *Severodonetsk, Sloviansk, Izium* to be discussed	Sub- national	fortnightly	PIN	Activated
Southern Donetsk, (*mariupol, berdiansk, Nikopol, zaparojihie*)	Sub-national (in project)	Fortnightly	To be determined	In project in regard of the growing numbers of partners. Previous UNHCR decentralized meeting in Mariupol not working. Possibility to identify a sub-national cluster for this area
Dniepropetrovsk	Decentralized coordination meeting	Fortnightly On hold	UNHCR	Activated, on hold from May 2015

Kharkiv	Decentralized coordination meeting	Fortnightly till May 2015, actually monthly	UNHCR	Activated
Kiev	Decentralized coordination meeting	Fortnightly till May 2015, actually monthly	UNHCR	Activated
Donetsk	Decentralized coordination meeting or Sub-national cluster (to be discussed if associated with Luhansk)	Fortnightly or according to feasibility	UNHCR (compulsory)	Activated but irregular due to registration issues
Luhansk	Decentralized coordination meeting or Sub-national cluster	Fortnightly	UNHCR (compulsory)	In project

2. Evaluation purpose

UNHCR Shelter and Settlements Section seeks to review the effectiveness of the coordination services provided by the UNHCR-led Emergency Shelter and NFI Coordination Team to the humanitarian response to the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014.

The evaluation is to identify key lessons from what has been achieved thus far and recommendations to improve and inform future coordination of the ongoing response.

UNHCR will use the evaluation outcomes and recommendations to improve future deployments into similar crises. The UNHCR-led coordination team members will use it to learn from the findings and improve current practices. This will be completed through a Management Response Plan that will be completed detailing which recommendations are accepted, which will be acted upon, by whom, and when and that progress on the implementation of this will be made.

The report will be public and available at sheltercluster.org allowing the Humanitarian Country Team to use it to inform the current coordination arrangements for the shelter response in the Ukraine and Cluster partners may use it as reference for improving their shelter response as relevant.

As such the main purpose of the evaluation is as follows:
1. Appraise the service provided by the UNHCR coordination team to the participating cluster agencies including Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other relevant actors.
2. Understand the members engagement and the benefits of their participation in the clusters
3. Review and analyse the experience of UNHCR with respect to the establishment and operation of the Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations and deployments.
4. Appraise the approach and management of the cluster activities undertaken at a sub-national level and their effectiveness.
5. Examine the activities undertaken by the Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster and their relevance to the sector with a focus on cash programming.
6. Review and evaluate the relations with other sectors, the IASC coordination actors, the Government/INGO and other coordination mechanisms including inter-cluster coordination as applicable
7. Examine any working groups currently within the Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster for their relevance and if these should continue with a recommendation on the resources required to support such working groups.
8. Provide recommendations with regard to UNHCRs leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities.
9. Evaluate the relations between the cluster and UNHCR at Country, Regional and Global levels.

3. Evaluation scope

The evaluation is to cover the period from the time of cluster activation to the present day covering the different coordination deployments undertaken and the geographic areas of both coordination and shelter activities.

Particular focus is to be on the national coordination activities undertaken in Kyiv, sub-national coordination activities undertaken in Nothern Donbass (Donetska and Luhanska Governmental controlled) and to a certain extent in Donetska Non Governmental Controlled Area, Dnipropetrovska, Kharkivska, and Zaporizka.

The evaluation is also to appraise the effect of the cluster coordination activities on the type of shelter response, the delivery of shelter materials and impact on beneficiaries.

4. Evaluation criteria

The evaluation is to follow the OECD/DAC criteria as per below:

Relevance.
The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

Effectiveness
A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

Efficiency
Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs.

Impact
The positive and negative changes produced by a humanitarian intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Sustainability
Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

In addition to the OECD/DAC criteria above the following criteria will be followed:

Cluster Core functions and supporting functions:
- Cluster leadership
- Cluster personnel
- Strategy, planning, policy and standards
- Informing strategic decision-making by the HC/HCT
- Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity-building
- Cluster resources and partnerships
- Supporting shelter service delivery
- Shelter advocacy and communication
- Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy, shelter achievements and corrective action

Other additional criteria,
- Lessons learned from other cluster deployments
- Cluster contribution to shelter response
- Accountability to affected populations
- Attention to cross-cutting issues, i.e.
  - age
  - disability,
  - environment
  - gender,
  - HIV and AIDS
  - human rights

- mental health
- mines and other explosive devices
- Sphere standards and indicators
- Shelter Cluster standards and indicators

5. Main evaluation questions

The evaluation is to ensure that the following questions are addressed through various methods of information collection and are related to the criteria above.

Any addition or reduction in the list of questions below is to be articulated in the inception report and agreed with the internal evaluation manager.
- Did the Shelter Cluster fulfil its core functions as defined by the IASC?
- To what extent did the cluster add value to the response undertaken by shelter actors?
- What real difference did the cluster make to the people affected by the conflict?
- Would it have been possible to add the same value in a more efficient way?
- Is the cluster supporting the government to take up a coordination role in the future?
- Has the cluster effectively set its priorities? Are there any gaps in the priorities the cluster has set?
- Has the relationship with the HCT and the cluster been effective?
- Have lessons learnt from previous cluster activations been utilised?
- Did the cluster do enough advocacy to donors, government and others?
- Were cross-cutting issues and vulnerabilities explored and acted upon within the cluster?
- Was there evidence of support from the Global Shelter Cluster?

6. Methodology

The methodology will be developed based on the Shelter Cluster Evaluation Guidelines and should include;
a. Desk Review
- Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Emergency Shelter and NFI Cluster. All relevant documentation is available at https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/ukraine
b. Data Collection and Stakeholders Analysis
- Interviews with Shelter Cluster member agencies (NGOs and INGOs)
- Interviews with other UN agencies participating in Shelter Cluster.
- Interviews with regional shelter cluster lead agencies and co-chairs.
- Interviews with other cluster lead like Protection, WASH, CCCM clusters and OCHA to analyse the inter-cluster coordination mechanism.
- Interviews with key NGO/INGO staff that have had a key role (SAG, TWIG, sub-national coordination) in the shelter cluster coordination.
- Informal interviews with beneficiaries during site visits where possible
- Observations of the impact and acceptance of shelter interventions on the lives of beneficiaries
  * A suggested list of interviewees will be provided to the evaluator
c. This terms of reference is to be shared with the SAG in Ukraine allowing some augmentation to best suit the requirements of the context.
d. Draft report to be shared with the UNHCR Country Representative, the Coordinator, the Ukraine SAG and the SSS in Geneva
e. The final report and management response plan will be publicly available.

7. Risks, constraints and assumptions

The ongoing tensions in the affected areas may necessitate changes in the operational situation and possibly prevent access to the affected region with little notice.

Humanitarian assistance continues to be hindered in non-government controlled areas due to the registration process by de facto authorities.

Further to the potential lack of access to affected areas there is a lack of reliable baseline data and furthermore IDP population baseline is relying on Ministry of Social Policies data which is under revision. Furthermore, due to security constraint along the contact line and also within the Non Governmental Controlled Area, data collection remains exceedingly difficult.

The movement of population and secondary displacement are very difficult to estimate due to the large geographical territory of Ukraine and the fluidity of the political situation may trigger rapid changes in terms of Population of Concern (return or new displacement).

The affected population and many of the partners work mainly in Russian/Ukranian. In Kiev a translator could be provided, but for field visit the consultant should secure translation capacity if required, this is commonly available for approximately $100-150 USD per day. The consultant shall foresee a limited request in term of translation support and be able to partially be able to cope with the language barrier (30% of the mission).

Assistance for transportation to and around field sites is limited due to operational priorities however Ukraine has a functioning rail network and taxis are readily available in all areas.

The cluster's member composition changes with a influx of international NGO first and second quarter of 2015. Furthermore, these missions opening induce a high turnover of their staff and only recently cluster member staffing stabilised with an ability to capitalise institutional memory.

It is assumed that Cluster partners and other agencies are willing to share information about activities, achievements and challenges (including internal organisational challenges). At both the national and sub-national level UNHCR and Cluster partners will attempt to facilitate the mission to ensure the consultant is able to fulfil their commitments.

8. Schedule

The evaluation will be implemented during approximately 30-40 days over a two-month period between November and December 2015. A total of 15-20 days of this period will be spent in the field. The report must have been submitted, reviewed and accepted by the Shelter and Settlement Section and all financial transactions must have taken place before the end of this period. A more detailed timeline with deadlines and deliverables will be included in the inception note mentioned below.

Approximate timing of the mission could potentially cover:
-   5 to 7 days at national level (Kyiv) focusing on general cluster aspects
-   5 to 7 days at sub national level (Sloviansk, Severodonetsk) focusing on field aspect on priority zone near the contact line.
-   2 to 4 days in Kharkiv or Dniepropetrovsk reviewing cluster involvement on field level in area distant to the contact line.

9. Main outputs

1. Inception report (a sample format will be provided) in English
2. Draft Evaluation report in English with executive summary, key recommendations and supporting information. This document will be reviewed by the evaluation manager, the Ukraine Shelter Cluster Coordinator, the UNHCR representative, and the Ukraine Cluster SAG. These stakeholders will provide comments and clarifications to the report of which the external consultant should take into account. Alterations to the final report as a result of comments should be evidence based, restricted to clarifications and for operational security issues.
3. Final Evaluation report not exceeding 40 pages in English with executive summary, key recommendations and supporting information. This document will be completed by addressing the clarifications made to the draft document. This document will be the basis for the Management Response Plan.
4. Recommendations relating to the cluster structure and systems to support future activation and/or closure in Ukraine.
    As annexes:
5. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation.

6. Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.
7. Comments on use and applicability of shelter cluster evaluation guidelines

Expected timeline for the evaluation:
- Selection of evaluator/s and signing of contract by end October
- Inception Report first week of November
- Desktop review completed by end second week November
- Ukraine fieldwork complete by end second week December
- Draft report submission prior to end December
- Final report submitted end January 2016

10. Evaluator(s)

The evaluation will be carried out by an external independent consultant with support of an internal evaluation manager from UNHCR in Geneva and the coordination team in the Ukraine.

- *External Independent Consultant:* leads the evaluation process, carry out the desk review, do the interviews (skype or phone), plan the trip to the Ukraine in coordination with the evaluation manager and the coordination team on the ground, lead the field visit, lead the interviews, write the draft evaluation/review, finalize the evaluation/review according to the comments received.
- *Internal Evaluation Manager:* Advise on the preparation of the trip, give feedback and orientation on the people to be interviewed, give background to the issues raised by the interviewees as required. Give comments to the draft evaluation/review and any other actions that they and the external consultant might find useful for the evaluation/review.

The evaluator will have a thorough understanding of Humanitarian Reform and the Transformative Agenda, of the IASC and UNHCR guidance related to the Shelter Cluster, and of the context in Ukraine, preferably with previous experience in the country but not directly linked to the current ESNFI cluster operations in Ukraine, or any other conflict of interest that would interfere with the independence of the evaluation.

11. Management

UNHCR will provide a comprehensive security briefing, the consultant will be required to abide by the security protocols of UNHCR at all times.

The consultant will, prior to acceptance of any contract have completed both the basic and advanced online security training through the UNHCR website and agree to relevant code of conduct requirements.

UNHCR will arrange travel bookings to Kyiv and provide reasonable assistance in obtaining any required visa for work being undertaken in Ukraine and Geneva if required.

Accommodation, interpretation, workspace, other logistics while in Ukraine will be facilitated by UNHCR in Kyiv. Accommodation and workspace if required will be provided while in Geneva by UNHCR Shelter and Settlements Section.

The schedule of fees once agreed is as follows:
30% after acceptance of the inception report
30% after draft report received
40% after final report approved

Annex   C. List of Key Informants

	Organization/title	#	Name(s)	Location
20/11	GSC, GFP for Ukraine until August 2015	1	Davide Nicolini	Geneva *
23/11	UNHCR, Shelter Officer, Dniepropetrosk	2	Andrea parisi	Kyiv
	Protection Cluster Coordinator	3	Christine Goyer	Kyiv
24/11	PIN, Site visit of house repairs in Semenovka, Sloviansk	4	Viktor Gladchenko	Sloviansk
	PIN, Shelter Programme Manager	5	Andrew Meyer	Sloviansk
	Shelter Cluster, Co-chair and sub-national CC	6	Kate Holland	Sloviansk
25/11	ICRC, Delegate, WatHab Engineer	7	Aleksander Mailyan	Sloviansk
	ADRA, Project Director	8	Maria Sliacka	Sloviansk
	UNHCR Head of sub-office, Kharkiv	9	Aslak Gimse Solumsmoen	Sloviansk
26/11	SOS-Kramotorsk / Regional Govt Advisor	10	Aleksander Voroshkov	Kramotov
	Save the Children / Area Manager	11	Eva Sztacho	Sloviansk
27/11	UNHCR Head of sub-office, Sievierodonetsk	12	Jeff Wilkinson Konstanin Dmitrenko	Sievierodonetsk
	NRC, Shelter field visit – Shelter PM	13	Koba Tsiramua	Sievierodonetsk
30/11	UNHCR, Deputy Country Rep (acting Country Rep)	14	Vanno Noupech	Kyiv
	Shelter Cluster, National CC	15	Igor Chantefort	Kyiv
	GSC, Evaluation Manager	16	Gregg Mcdonald	Skype
	Shelter Cluster, Shelter Associate, IM	17	Andrii Mazurenko	Kyiv
	OCHA field office, Humanitarian Advisor	18	Tagui Melkumyan	Sievierodonetsk*
	PIN, Deputy Country Director	19	Vanessa Merlet	Kyiv
1/12	Mercy Corp, Country Director	20	Stuart Willcuts	Sievierodonetsk*
	UNHCR head of office, Luhansk NGCA	21	Dimitar Jelev	Luhansk*
	CRS, Programme Manager	22	Erik Heinonen	Sievierodonetsk*
2/12	NRC, Shelter Programme Advisor	23	Antoine Barbier	Kyiv
	Fourth Society	24	Ruslan Viksich	Kyiv
	DRC, DFID consortium Coordinator	25	Joreng Stahlhut	Kyiv
	USAID, Supervisory Project development officer	26	Gregory Olson	Kyiv
3/12	Wash CC	27	Carmen Paradiso	Kyiv
	DRC, Emergency Response Team	28	Isla Fraser	Kyiv
	ECHO, Humanitarian Aid Expert, Head of Office	29	Samuel Marie-Fanon Mamar Merzouk	Kyiv
	OCHA, Humanitarian Officer	30	Ivane Bochorishvili	Kyiv
	Ministry of Regional development and housing, Head of priority construction projects implementation	31	Nadiya Leonidivna	Indirectly, translator
4/12	OCHA, Cash WG Coordinator	32	Ruth Aggiss	Kyiv

Carried out over phone/Skype

Annex   D. Field Visit Schedule

	Monday 23	Tuesday 24	Wednesday 25	Thursday 26	Friday 27
Place	Kyiv	Sloviansk	Sloviansk	Sloviansk	Sievierodonetsk
09:00	Introductions	Travel to Sloviansk			UNHCR Head of sub- office for Sievierodonetsk
10:00	National Shelter Cluster meeting		Structural repair WG		
11:00			ICRC WatHab Delegate	Sub-National Shelter Cluster meeting	field visit NRC
12:00	UNHCR Shelter Officer		Structural repair WG		
13:00			ADRA Project Director		
14:00	Planning of evaluation	field visit PIN	Structural repair WG	SOS-Kramotorsk & Rep to local authorities	Travel to Kyiv
15:00	discussion with SCT	PIN Shelter Manager			
16:00	Protection Cluster Coord	SC Co-chair Sub-national CC	UNHCR Head of sub-office for Kharkiv	Save the Children Area Manager	
17:00	Planning of evaluation				

	Monday 30	Tuesday 1	Wednesday 2	Thursday 3	Friday 4
Place	Kyiv	Kyiv	Kyiv	Kyiv	Kyiv
09:00		Mercy Corps Country Director	NRC Shelter Advisor	WASH Cluster Coord	OCHA Cash WG Coord
10:00					
11:00	UNHCR Country rep	UNHCR head of sub-office Luhansk	Fourth Wave Society	DRC Emergency Coord	presentation on initial findings of the review
12:00					
13:00	SC National CC				
14:00			DFID	MoRD	final discussion with SC Ukraine
15:00	OCHA sub-office	SC IM			
16:00			DRC DFID consortium	OCHA Humanitarian officer	
17:00	PIN dept. country director	Erik CRS	USAID		

Annex E. Online Survey Questionnaire

1.	Do you work for?
	◯ International NGO ◯ UN organisation ◯ National NGO ◯ National authority ◯ Red Cross Movement ◯ Donor ◯ Other (specify)
2.	The organization you work for is a:
	◯ Shelter/NFI Cluster member ◯ Shelter/NFI Cluster observer* ◯ Other ◯ Don't know ◯ Shelter Cluster Coordination team ◯ Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (OCHA, Cluster Lead Agency, or other Cluster Coordinator) *Observers are not full members of a cluster but may share information with it and participate in its meetings
3.	At what level do you participate in the Shelter Cluster?
	◯ National - Kiev ◯ Other (specify) ◯ Sub-national- Northern Donbas ◯ Both national and sub-national
4.	How often do you participate in the Shelter Cluster meeting?
	◯ Always (every meeting) ◯ Mostly (most meetings) ◯ Sometimes (from time to time) ◯ Rarely (only attended meeting once or twice) ◯ Never
5.	How useful do you find Shelter Cluster meetings?
	◯ Very useful ◯ Mostly useful ◯ Somewhat useful ◯ Not useful ◯ I don't know
6.	Where and how do access Shelter Cluster information? (multiple choice question)
	◯ Shelter Cluster website ◯ Google Group ◯ Emails ◯ Printout ◯ Word of mouth ◯ Other
7.	How often do you visit the Shelter Cluster website?
	◯ More than 3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per month ◯ Less than once per month ◯ Never
8.	How often do you use the Shelter Cluster Google group?
	◯ More than 3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per month ◯ Less than once per month ◯ Never
9.	How often do you read and use information from Shelter Cluster team emails?
	◯ More than 3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per week ◯ 1-3 times per month ◯ Less than once per month ◯ Never
10.	How useful do you find the information on the Shelter Cluster website, Google group and/or emails?
	◯ Very useful ◯ Mostly useful ◯ Somewhat useful ◯ Not useful ◯ I don't know
11.	Has your organisation participated in Technical Working Groups?
	◯ Always (every time) ◯ Mostly (most times) ◯ Sometimes (from time to time) ◯ Rarely (only once or twice) ◯ Never
12.	Have you received useful technical guidance from the Shelter Cluster?
	◯ Very useful ◯ Mostly useful ◯ Somewhat useful ◯ Not useful ◯ I don't know
13.	Has your programme met/used the technical standards/guidance from the Shelter Cluster?
	◯ Yes ◯ Partially ◯ No ◯ Don't know
14.	How do you perceive the Shelter Cluster's guidance on addressing cross-cutting issues (gender, age, disabilities, environment, health, human rights)?
	◯ Completely sufficient ◯ Mostly sufficient ◯ Somewhat sufficient ◯ Not sufficient ◯ I don't know
15.	Has your organisation helped develop the Shelter Cluster Strategy?*
	◯ Yes ◯ No ◯ Was not here ◯ Don't know
16.	Do you think the priorities set out by the Shelter Cluster strategy as the most relevant?
	◯ Very relevant ◯ Mostly relevant ◯ Somewhat relevant ◯ Not relevant ◯ I don't know

17.	Has your organisation contributed to Shelter Cluster monthly reporting: Who / What / Where / When/ For whom (5W)?
	○ Yes ○ No ○ I don't know
18.	Have you adapted your coverage based on gaps identified by the Shelter Cluster?
	○ Yes, completely adapted ○ Some adaptation ○ A little adaption ○ No adaptation ○ I don't know
19.	Has your organisation used information produced by the Shelter Cluster (maps, factsheet, advocacy) for internal purposes and/or programme development?
	○ Yes ○ No ○ I don't know
20.	Has your organisation used Shelter Cluster information (strategy, maps, factsheets etc) to develop advocacy messages?
	○ Yes ○ No ○ I don't know
21.	Has the Shelter Cluster produced and shared useful advocacy messages on behalf of the Shelter Cluster members for donors?
	○ Yes ○ No ○ I don't know
22.	Has the Shelter Cluster produced and shared useful advocacy messages on behalf of the shelter cluster members for government?
	○ Yes ○ No ○ I don't know
23.	How do you perceive the Shelter Cluster's involvement with National authorities in Kiev?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
24.	How do you perceive the Shelter Cluster's involvement with authorities at sub-national level?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
25.	How do you perceive the Shelter Cluster's involvement with National NGOs?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
26.	Do you or staff in your organisation attend other cluster meetings?
	○ No ○ I don't know ○ Yes (WASH) ○ Yes (Protection) ○ Yes (Livelihoods/Early Recovery) ○ Yes (Food) ○ Yes (Health/ Nutrition) ○ Yes (Education) ○ Yes (Logistics)
27.	How do you perceive the coordination between the Shelter Cluster and International NGOs?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
28.	How do you perceive the coordination between the Shelter Cluster and UN agencies?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
29.	How do you perceive the coordination between the Shelter Cluster and the Red Cross Movement?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
30.	How do you perceive the coordination between the Shelter Cluster and the donor community?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
31.	How effective is the coordination between Shelter Cluster and other clusters (e.g. Wash, Protection)?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
32.	How effective is the coordination at inter-cluster level with OCHA?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know
33.	How effective is the coordination at the HCT level?
	○ Very Effective ○ Effective ○ Somewhat effective ○ Not effective ○ I don't know

Annex   F. Prioritisation of ICCG Items

In light of the high number of reports, strategy documents, assessments, monitoring, and working groups, led by OCHA and the ICCG, it would be useful to provide a list of items frequently encountered during an emergency and which of these should be considered high priority and compulsory for the CC to contribute to, and which items are recommended and/or advised but not essential. This table could be included in the package provided to UNHCR staff (refer KR: 7)

The table below provides a non-exhaustive list of items, meetings and report types frequently used during emergencies. It would be useful for the GSC to elaborate this list and provide a priority scoring to facilitate the task of CC:

	Description	Mandatory	Important	Advised	Est. workload (hours/week)	Notes
Meetings	ICCG/Inter-cluster meeting	X			4	
	OCHA IM WG		X		3	
	OCHA Cash WG		X		3	
	OCHA AAP WG			X	-	
	OCHA CWC WG			X	-	
	Humanitarian Country Team	X			2	Mandatory to brief, CLA represents.
	Weekly workload, external meetings				12	*Report if actual time exceeds by 50%*
Reports/ Joint Assessment	Mid-year PMR	X			-	
	Quarterly PMR		X		-	
	MIRA / MSNA		X		-	
	Other multi-cluster assessment			X	-	
	OCHA SitRep			X	2	
	Humanitarian Bulletin			X	0.5	
	Weekly workload, external reports				3	*Report if actual time exceeds by 50%*
Other	Central Emergency Response Fund		X		-	
	Humanitarian Needs Overview	X			-	
	Humanitarian Response Plan	X			-	
	Ad hoc workshop (preparation of HRP, contingency planning)			X	-	
	Weekly workload, other commitments				-	*Report if actual time exceeds by 50%*

Annex   G. Recommendations from IM Review Mission to Shelter Cluster Ukraine

Below is a list of recommendations from the mission report from Bo Hurkman following the Information Management review mission to Shelter Cluster Ukraine on 24-29 August 2015:

Use of e-mail

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster
1. Set-up Shelter Cluster e-mail accounts per function in the cluster coordination team and forward incoming e-mail to existing organisational accounts to ensure ease of use for the cluster coordination team and predictability for cluster partners.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine
1. Explain to partners that they can use the Google Groups e-mail account to write to all partners if needed.

Use of the website

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster
1. Train the cluster coordination team on the use of Tableau and install Tableau Public so that interactive tables can be kept up-to-date.
2. Provide basic guidance on the use of the Drupal content management system to ensure that content is uploaded properly and that interactive dashboards can be embedded.
3. Explore possibilities of connecting the Shelter Cluster website with HR.info to avoid having to maintain two websites.
4. Need to be able to clearly distinguish between latest official version and draft versions of uploaded documents.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine
1. Once agreed upon, make recommended NFI kit content available per situation and region.
2. Try to update the website regularly (for instance weekly on Friday mornings).

Data storage and sharing

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster
1. Look at the option of expanding on the paid Dropbox plan from FICSS to avoid the use of personal accounts that run out of space rather quickly.
2. Google Apps can be considered for wider implementation as well given the wide use of Google Sheets and Forms.
3. Support from FICSS in GIS training and setting up ArcGIS software with templates should be made available to other clusters as needed.
4. It is good practice to record requests from partners for maps to track their usage.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine
1. Smaller working groups for operational coordination are needed in the east.
2. Beneficiary duplication should be avoided through sharing national ID number (if legally possible and consent has been given by the beneficiaries), however, this requires a national humanitarian registration database that currently does not exist.

Contact list

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster

1. Consider using Gmail as the e-mail provider for Shelter Cluster e-mail accounts to avoid the need to register new e-mail accounts for the purpose of accessing Google Apps.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine

1. Add additional fields (such as organisation category and participation in national/sub-national cluster meetings and/or TWIGs/SAG) to the contact list to avoid having to add this information manually afterwards.

Maps

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster

1. Ensure that the GIS Officer is enrolled in the upcoming GIS and DataViz Workshop in Geneva, followed by a debrief to the cluster coordination team and IMWG.
2. Explore options for publishing static maps to ArcGIS Online.
3. Need to define standard icons and graphics for use on maps by the Shelter Cluster.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine

1. Include more trend analysis in the maps where possible and resource allowing.

Who is doing What, Where and When (4W)

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster

1. Agree on whether or not the value of interventions should be captured in the 4W.

Recommendations for Shelter Cluster Ukraine

1. Expand the coverage of the 4W where possible by gathering information on interventions by other actors (such as for instance the ICRC) at local level and share cluster 4W with them for their use. Some information might have to be kept internal but can still serve to get a more comprehensive idea about the needs met by other actors. In most cases, this information can be gathered through the sub-national cluster.
2. Explore options of making the 4W available online so that partners can access the most up-to-date version at any time.
3. Regularly check with partners to see if additional training is needed in using the 4W tools.

Assessments

Recommendations for Global Shelter Cluster and Shelter Cluster Ukraine

1. Make mobile data collection methodology and tools available to cluster partners, the GSC and Shelter Cluster Ukraine could support other clusters with this. A library of assessment forms can be created as well.

General recommendations

1. Always make raw data available to partners.
2. Need to keep the assessment methodology simple and train enumerators of partners.

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Annex I. List of Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Population
CC	Cluster Coordinator
CLA	Cluster Lead Agency
GCA	Government-controlled area
GSC	Global Shelter Cluster
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-agency Standing Committee
HH	Household
ICCG	Inter-Cluster Coordination Group
IDP	Internally displaced person
IM	Information Management
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
MoRD	Ministry of Regional Development and Housing
MoSP	Ministry of Social Policy
MSNA	Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment
MPCG	Multi-Purpose Cash Grant
NFI	Non-food Items
NGCA	Non-government controlled areas
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NNGO	National non-governmental organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PoLR	Provider of Last Resort
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PIN	People in Need
RC	Resident Coordinator
RFP	Regional Focal Point to the Shelter Cluster
SC	Shelter Cluster
SCM	Shelter Cluster Meeting
SCT	Shelter Cluster Team
SES	State's Emergency Services
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
TOR	Terms of Reference
TWIG	Technical Working Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WG	Working Group