Assessment for Somalis in Kenya
Publisher | Minorities at Risk Project |
Publication Date | 31 December 2003 |
Cite as | Minorities at Risk Project, Assessment for Somalis in Kenya, 31 December 2003, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f3aa678.html [accessed 7 June 2023] |
Disclaimer | This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States. |
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Risk Assessment | Analytic Summary | References
Risk Assessment
The Somalis have one of the factors that increase the chances of future protest: significant political restrictions. While there has not been any state repression targeted against group members in recent years, some Muslim leaders assert that their community has suffered from greater discrimination since the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, reportedly masterminded by Al-Quaeda.
Analytic Summary
More than 40 ethnic groups comprise Kenya's population. While no single group forms a majority, the largest are the Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), and the Kalenjin (12%). The Somalis, who primarily reside in the country's northeastern region, are one of Kenya's smaller groups, making up 3% of the population (GROUPCON = 3). Group members have migrated across the country's regions both in search of economic opportunities and to escape hardships such as periodic droughts (MIGRANT = 1). This has led to conflicts between the Somalis and some of the other communities.
There are two groups of Somalis in Kenya, those who are nationals of the country and others who are refugees who fled the civil war that began in neighboring Somalia in the late 1980s. Most Kenyans are Christians (66%) or animist (26%), in contrast to the Somalis who make up half of the country's 6% Muslim population (BELIEF = 3). Many of the various ethnic groups have distinct primary languages as is the case with the Somalis who speak multiple languages (LANG = 2). Along with following different social customs than the other groups, the Somalis are also racially distinguishable (CUSTOM = 1; RACE = 1).
Migrations of various peoples to the territory that became Kenya predate the colonization period. The 1884-85 Berlin Conference that carved up Africa among the European powers led a decade later to British rule over much of East Africa, including Kenya. The colonial settlers forcibly evicted the indigenous African pastoralists and peasantry from the territory's most fertile highlands region, the Rift Valley area, (they referred to it as the White Highlands), in order to produce export crops. The Kikuyu ended up on inferior land or had to join the urban labor market. Others including the Kisii, Luhya, and Luo were brought to the Rift Valley as sources of cheap labor. The nomadic Somali, Maasai, and Turkana not only faced discrimination from the British colonialists but also from successive post-independence governments.
Indigenous political activism dates to the early 1920s and in 1929 Jomo Kenyatta, a leader of the Kikuyu Central Association, went to London to press for Kikuyu land claims. He remained in Britain until 1947 when he returned and became president of the Kenyan African Union (KAU), the country's first nationalist movement which was formed in 1944. For most of the 1950s, Kenya was under a state of emergency due to the Mau Mau rebellion, a Kikuyu attempt to overthrow British rule. The rebellion was brutally suppressed as some 13,000 were killed and more than 100,000 were forcibly relocated. In 1957, the British sought to address nationalist demands by allowing African members to be elected to the legislative council on a limited franchise. The successor of the KAU, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU), was created in 1960 by two of the country's largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo.
Restrictions on African ownership of land in the White Highlands were lifted in the early 1960s and to prepare for independence, the territory's first general elections were held. KANU defeated its competitor, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU, which represented the country's smaller ethnic groups including the Kalenjin, favored the adoption of Majimboism, a policy that would create ethnically-based semi-autonomous regions. Elections were next held in December 1963 and again KANU emerged victorious. Later that month, Kenya became independent and Jomo Kenyatta assumed the prime ministership. The following year, Kenya was declared a republic, and Kenyatta became president.
President Kenyatta held power from 1963 until his death in August 1978. During this period, members from his Kikuyu group received a disproportionate share of political power along with special access to land and resources which reinforced their advantaged economic status. The ruling KANU party also consolidated its position by absorbing the KADU and the only other political party, the African People's Party. Kenyatta was succeeded by Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin.
President Moi has come under intense criticism from domestic and international sources for his repression of opposition forces which has included human rights abuses such as extra-judicial executions, widespread torture, and the disappearance and harassment of activists. From 1982 until 1991, political parties other than the ruling KANU were not allowed to exist. International pressure, including threats to withdraw foreign aid, forced Moi to concede to multiparty elections in 1992. Moi had earlier rejected multipartyism, asserting that it would lead to ethnic violence. From the end of 1991 to 1994, widespread ethnic violence emerged in the Rift Valley Province and other areas as Moi's Kalenjin along with the Maasai fought against the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kisii. The Kalenjin and Maasai want to evict all non-indigenous groups from the region. More than 1,500 deaths were reported, and around 300,000 Kisii, Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya were driven out of the Rift Valley, Kenya's richest and most fertile region. There are credible reports that the government, in an effort to counter the opposition parties, instigated much of this large-scale violence, partially through its support for the Kalenjin and the Maasai. No compensation has been provided and the government has suggested that those who were displaced can apply for resettlement on land other than their original property.
Since the mid-1990s, the level of ethnic violence in the Rift Valley has declined. Hostilities did emerge during the 1997 elections and again there were allegations that some government officials either supported or instigated the ethnic violence. President Moi won the elections with less than 40% of the popular vote largely due to the fragmented nature of the opposition.
Under President Moi, his Kalenjin ethnic group has disproportionately benefited in the economic and political arenas. Moi's control over the key bureaucratic agencies has allowed him to dispel political patronage to maintain his hold on power. Kenya is riddled by poverty, corruption and widespread crime. Some 60% of the residents in Nairobi, the capital city, live in slums, averaging a monthly wage of $6. In recent years, international financial institutions such as the World Bank have periodically refused to distribute millions of dollars in loans due to widespread corruption that implicated President Moi, his family, and his friends. In late 2002, the opposition National Rainbow Coalition ousted KANU from power.
The Somalis drew the attention of the government in the early 1960s when Somalia's leader Siad Barre began to actively promote the creation of a Greater Somalia that would include Somali-dominant areas of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia and also Djibouti. The northeast was isolated even further in order to counter this threat (PROT60X = 3). In 1989, the Somalis were targeted by the Moi government which accused them of poaching in Kenya's national parks. This increase in tensions coincided with the flow of refugees into the country as they sought to escape Somalia's civil war. Kenya instituted a new policy to register all Somalis to check their citizenship. Kenyan Somalis are required to produce two identification cards to prove their citizenship.
By early 1993, there were some 500,000, mostly Somali, but also Ethiopian, refugees in Kenya. Throughout the decade, both Somali refugees and Kenyan Somalis asserted that they were mistreated by the government and that they faced attacks by bandits, especially in the refugee camps. Many Somali and Ethiopian refugees had returned home by the late 1990s amid UNHCR concerns that Kenya would forcibly repatriate them. There were some 200,000 refugees, 80% of whom are Somalis, in UNHCR-supported camps at the end of 2001. The Kenyan government has temporarily closed its border with Somalia twice in recent years, reportedly to stem illegal weapons flows.
The Somalis face significant demographic stresses including declining public health conditions, and competition with other groups for the use of land. Group members are pastoralists who are significantly affected by drought conditions and in recent years hundreds of Somalis have died. They have frequently criticized the government for its limited and delayed responses to famines in the region. Environmental problems coupled with the government's limited economic development in the northeast have circumscribed the economic status of the Somalis and there are no formal policies that attempt to improve their position (ECDIS03 = 1).
Political restrictions against the group include limits on the freedom of expression, voting, recruitment to the police, military and civil service, and restrictions on movement. In addition, the Somalis are the country's only ethnic group that is required to produce two forms of identification to verify their citizenship (POLDIS03 = 1).
There do not appear to be any political organizations that specifically represent group interests. While the Somalis are seeking more political participation at the central level along with a greater allocation of public funds, there has been minimal political activism in the past decade (PROT90-98X = 1; PROT99-00 = 0; PROT01-PROT03=0). There has been no rebellion against state authorities.
Relations between the Somalis and some of the country's ethnic groups have periodically erupted in violence. In 1999, there were clashes between the Somalis and the Oromos, who were either from Kenya or neighboring Ethiopia. Both groups are pastoralists who often cross state boundaries. In addition, during 1999 and 2000, disputes over land led to violence between the Somalis and the Boran in Central Kenya and also drew in the Meru community. More than 100 people were killed. Disagreements between Somali sub-clans also resulted in sporadic violence during the same time period. There was no intergroup conflict against other ethnic groups or intra-group conflicts within Somalis from 2001-2003.
References
Africa South of the Sahara. 1999. London: Europa Publications.
IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Network): United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Various reports, 1996-1999
Kenya: A Country Study. 1984. Foreign Area Studies, American University. Washington, D.C.
Lexis/Nexis: Various news services, including BBC, Reuters, Africa News Service
Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchell, and John Naber Paden (Eds.). 1989. Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. New York: Paragon House.