Nations in Transit - Kazakhstan (2004)

Capital: Astana
Population: 14,800,000
Status: Not Free
PPP: $1,350
Private Sector as % of GNI: na
Life Expectancy: 66
Religious Groups: Muslim (47 percent), Russian Orthodox (44 percent), Protestant (2 percent), other (7 percent)
Ethnic Groups: Kazakh (53 percent), Russian (30 percent), Ukrainian (4 percent), Uzbek (2 percent), German (2 percent), other (9 percent)

Executive Summary

The long incumbency of Nursultan Nazarbaev, in office since 1989, has enabled the president, his family, and close associates to take control over vital economic resources and political positions. The increase in oil revenues, a high gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and the success of economic reforms and privatization have made Kazakhstan the most prosperous Central Asian state. However, increased levels of wealth and prosperity have coincided with the rise of an authoritarian regime and staggering levels of corruption among the ruling elite. Consequently, there has been a marked deterioration in civil liberties, freedom of media, political opposition, and civic activism. The regime has continued a relentless drive to coerce, buy off, co-opt, and criminalize independent media. It has also eliminated all major political challengers through exile, imprisonment, and the confiscation of financial assets.

Despite high economic growth (GDP up by 10.4 percent in the first half of 2003), the prospects for democratic reforms in Kazakhstan have worsened. The appointment of Danial Akhmetov as prime minister (replacing Imangali Tasmagambetov, who resigned in May following an acrimonious debate on the land code) shows how seriously the regime is preparing to win the forthcoming 2004 parliamentary elections. Akhmetov succeeded Ghalymzhan Zhakiyanov (now in jail for alleged corruption charges after challenging Nazarbaev) as the akim (head) of Pavlodar in 2002 and secured the victory of pro-regime candidates in the parliamentary by-elections in this opposition stronghold. The elections for local councils, or maslihats, in September 2003 enabled the regime to install its favored candidates, who will then select the members of the Upper House and the Senate and play a crucial role in securing a favorable outcome in the elections of the lower house, the Majilis, in 2004.

Electoral Process. The 2002 law requiring all existing political parties to reregister with 50,000 signatures (up from 3,000) has reduced the number of legal parties to 8 from 19 within the span of a year. All independent opposition parties, except for the more moderate Communist Party, have lost their legal status. The three major pro-regime parties – Otan, the Civil Party, and Ak Zhol – are likely to dominate the electoral competition in 2004. A development in 2003 with important implications for the 2004 parliamentary elections was the launch of a party called Asar in October by the president's daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva, confirming speculations about her ambition to succeed her father as president. Asar is expected to seek legal status soon and to co-opt individuals currently associated with other pro-presidential parties. It appears that Ak Zhol is being molded to play the role of the "official" opposition party. Kazakhstan's rating for the electoral process remains the same at 6.50, though the 2004 elections will have a decisive effect.

Civil Society. Although the regime has tried to shape civil sector development through financial incentives and pressure on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to cooperate more closely with the government, major NGOs have been effective in defending their positions. Overall, the contributions of NGOs to women's rights, health issues, children, the elderly, and the disabled have led to a positive change in the attitudes of local officials. Civic activists championing civil liberties, minority rights, and training for independent election observers have encountered the greatest governmental resistance. Most NGOs remain dependent on international funding. Although the government withdrew a draft law that ambiguously defined NGOs and restricted their ability to accept foreign funding, no noticeable improvement took place in the civil sector in 2003. Kazakhstan's rating for civil society remains unchanged at 5.50.

Independent Media. Defying international pressure, the government refused to release the highly regarded journalist Sergei Duvanov – serving a 3 1/2-year jail sentence for the politically motivated charge of raping a minor – and this has tarnished Kazakhstan's international image. An increase in physical assaults and the criminalization of independent journalists over the past few years has turned independent journalism into a hazardous profession. Increased revenues from oil exports have emboldened the regime to hire high-priced international PR consultants, host spectacles such as the Eurasia Media Forum (organized by Dariga Nazarbaeva), and patronize various pro-regime media outlets. The new draft Law on Media contains further restrictions on the activities of journalists and media sources. All media are owned or controlled by business interests connected to the presidential family, and virtually all opposition newspapers have closed. As a result, Kazakhstan's independent media rating deteriorates from 6.25 to 6.50.

Governance. The president and close family members wield control over all key positions within the government and economic sector. Kazakhstan has maintained a unitary and centralized administration by barring the direct election of oblast and local akims, who are currently nominated by and accountable to the president. The key instrument of stability is the continuing rotation of akims, the prime minister, and other key figures to prevent the growth of an independent support base that could potentially challenge the president. The large number of candidates (an average of seven per seat) in the September 2003 elections for maslihats illustrates the growing role of local elections in sustaining backing for regime. The rating for governance remains unchanged at 6.25.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework. The ongoing concentration of powers in the presidency has further weakened the legislative and judicial institutions. Since the ouster of Premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin in 1998, none of his successors has completed three years in office. Kazakhstan's judicial system has continued to lose credibility by acting in full compliance with the regime's interests. The local courts have been accused of many procedural and politically motivated charges. Kazakhstan has promised to revoke the death penalty in its bid to join the Council of Europe and secure the chairmanship in 2009 within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Additionally, the Supreme Court has refused to review the cases against Zhakiyanov and Duvanov without providing any valid explanations. Kazakhstan's rating remains 6.25.

Corruption. The 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International ranked Kazakhstan (together with Uzbekistan) 100th out of 133 countries, showing a steady deterioration. There is no independent inquiry into corruption cases. The anticorruption programs initiated by the government tend to be directed at lower or middle ranks. The top echelons of society enjoy a virtual immunity from such inquiry, unless they engage in political or economic activities that challenge the president. Although corruption is rampant at all levels of society, it has reached staggering proportions at the top of the hierarchy, as reflected in the ongoing investigations of the Kazakhgate scandal. In this case, U.S. merchant banker James Giffenwas accused of funneling at least $60 million in kickbacks to offshore accounts believed to belong to Nazarbaev. Kazakhstan's rating for corruption deteriorates to 6.50 from 6.25 owing to the rising levels of perceived – and real – corruption in the country and the government's refusal to allow any public discussion of the Kazakhgate case.

Outlook for 2004. In 2003, presidential spokesperson Ermukhan Ertysbaev declared that Nazarbaev's political rivals "can have a rest" for the next 10 years. The manner in which the regime has sought to disburse powers and privileges through the network of pro-regime parties clearly indicates that opposition activists will have little choice but to compete as independent candidates, facing innumerable hurdles in the 2004 parliamentary elections. By establishing the political party Asar, Dariga Nazarbaeva is gearing up to dominate the elections. Likewise, Ak Zhol is being groomed to play the role of the official opposition, whose activities will be moderated by other pro-regime parties. The Parliament is expected to approve the new Law on Media, which introduces a nebulous regulatory body and other restrictions to oversee media activities.

Electoral Process (Score: 6.50)

Kazakhstan's Constitution combines strong presidential authority with a republican form of government, but numerous amendments and political practices have conferred unchecked powers on the president. President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who has held office since 1989, secured a seven-year term in the January 1999 elections by winning 81.7 percent of the vote. Nazarbaev's most serious challenger, former premier Akezhan Kazhegeldin, was barred from that race. This in turn led the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and most international agencies to refuse to monitor the elections for their failure to meet basic international standards.

The current Parliament, elected in October 1999, is the third to be popularly elected in Kazakhstan since 1991. It is packed with deputies from pro-regime parties and so-called independents. The OSCE report on the 1999 parliamentary elections noted that almost a third of such independent deputies are closely allied to the regime or with the executive branch of the local governments, though they are not formally associated with any political party.

Kazakhstan's two-chambered Parliament consists of the Senate (upper house) and the Majilis (lower house). The Senate has 39 members who serve a six-year term. Thirty-two are chosen indirectly, through a joint session of the maslihats (local councils) from each oblast and Astana and Almaty. The president nominates the remaining seven members. The 77 members of the Majilis are elected for a 5-year term. Ten seats are filled by proportional representation from party lists and the remaining 67 seats from single-member constituencies, in which the winning candidate must receive more than 50 percent of the first-round vote. If no candidate attains the required number of votes, the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes compete in a second round. The candidate with the greater number of votes is then elected.

According to the Constitution, the president is above party politics but has the right to ban any political party. In practice, Nazarbaev frequently offers comments, advice, and directives to the various pro-regime parties and serves as their ultimate patron and benefactor. Constant tinkering with party registration procedures and membership requirements has undermined the constitutional right of political parties to participate in elections.

The Law on Political Parties, adopted in June 2002 despite criticism from the opposition as well as the OSCE, requires all existing parties to reregister with the Ministry of Justice. Parties must produce a minimum of 50,000 signatures (the previous requirement was 3,000) and have at least 300 representatives in each of the country's 14 oblasts and its 2 largest cities, Astana and Almaty. This is an impossible requirement in a country with a very low level of citizen engagement in politics and a plethora of laws that work against independent political activism. A party may be abolished if it fails to register within two months of its formation, does not participate in two consecutive elections, or polls less than 3 percent of the vote.

This law has achieved the intended objective of disbursing and legalizing power through pro-regime parties, thereby pushing out both existing and potential opposition. The number of registered parties fell from 19 in late 2002 to 8 in November 2003; these include the prominent pro-regime Otan, the Civil Party, and Ak Zhol, as well as 4 smaller parties enjoying varying degrees of official patronage – the Agrarian Party, the Party of Patriots, Aul, and Rukhaniyat.

The Communist Party is the only independent party to maintain its registration. It has been in opposition to the regime since 1999 but is considered less threatening than other opposition parties. The Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, better known by its Russian acronym DVK (Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana), was denied registration. The DVK was founded in 2001 by Ghalymzhan Zhakiyanov, the former administrative head of Pavlodar, and the powerful former minister Mukhtar Ablyazov, who was jailed in March 2002 for alleged misuse of office and subsequently given a presidential pardon in April 2003. Retaining its Russian acronym, the DVK renamed itself Democratic Power of Kazakhstan (Demokraticheskaya vlast Kazakhstana) in a failed bid to obtain registration as a new entity. A number of opposition parties, which include the People's Congress, the Socialist Party, the Justice Party, the Republican People's Party, and Azamat, refused to seek reregistration.

All parties, whether pro-regime or opposition, lack well-developed organizational structures or significant national membership. The notable pro-regime parties are Otan, the Civil Party, and the newly formed Ak Zhol. Otan, launched in January 1999 following the presidential elections, secured 24 seats, the largest share, in the 1999 parliamentary elections. It has mustered a large membership base on paper, presumed to be at least 300,000, that includes numerous state employees pressured to take party membership in order to keep their jobs.

The Civil Party, formed a few months before the 1999 parliamentary elections, is the political platform of the Eurasia corporate group. This entity includes Aleksandr Mashkevich and Azar Peruashev among its leadership and controls six major metallurgical enterprises in Kazakhstan, with the most significant located in Pavlodar. All employees of these enterprises and their families are included in the membership register of the party. Ak Zhol was founded in late 2001 by Alikhan Baimenov, Uraz Zhandosov, and Bulat Abilov – known as the Young Turks – as an opposition party; however, it soon became co-opted as a pro-regime force. It claims to represent young entrepreneurs and technocrats who advocate greater economic and political reform.

Though it no longer has legal status, the DVK enjoys the support of independent deputies Tolen Toktasynov and Zauresh Battalova as well as numerous activists in Almaty, Astana, and Zhakiyanov's native Pavlodar. However, an overall lack of leadership and resources and the regime's relentless drive to either co-opt or weed out any opposition have made it almost impossible for any genuine opposition to organize. The Kazhegeldin-sponsored Republican Party suffered a major blow in 2003 with the sentencing of its leader, Amirzhan Kosanov, to one year's probation and a fine of about US$225,000 for tax evasion. The alliance between former premier Kazhegeldin and the DVK appears to have ended, as most members of the Republican Party have defected to the DVK or other opposition parties.

A new development with important implications for the 2004 parliamentary elections was the launch of the party Asar by Dariga Nazarbaeva in October 2003. This move confirmed speculations about Nazarbaeva's long-term ambition to succeed her father as president. Asar is expected to dominate the electoral scene and weaken the entrenched bureaucratic interests that support Otan. The new party is likely to draft individuals and interests currently associated with other pro-presidential parties.

Ak Zhol could suffer a setback from Asar's rise, since both parties aim to rally the support of young professionals, entrepreneurs, and medium to big businesses by advancing an economic reform agenda. Ak Zhol has advocated greater economic freedom, local elections, and party law reforms. By contrast, Asar has pledged loyalty to the president and emphasized social reforms and poverty reduction without reference to party politics. Evidence suggests that Ak Zhol is already being molded as the so-called official opposition. Presidential spokesperson Ermukhan Ertysbaev has frequently referred to Ak Zhol as a "constructive" and "legal" opposition.

Ethnic Kazakhs hold 58 of 77 parliamentary seats, and only 8 deputies are women. In the new ethnic hierarchy prevalent since 1991, Kazakhs enjoy the status of "first among equals," whereas Russians and other non-Kazakh groups have undergone a steady demotion. Kazakhs form 53.4 percent of the population, according to the 1999 census, up from 39.7 percent in 1989, and their share continues to rise. The Russians' share has continued to decline, down to 29.9 percent from 37.7 percent in 1989, though their portion among the elderly and pensioner population is much higher. Among other ethnic groups, Uzbeks form 2.5 percent, Ukrainians 3.6 percent, Tatars 1.7 percent, and Germans 2.4 percent. Kazakh is the sole state language, though Russian is granted official language status.

The Constitution authorizes ethnic groups to form "national cultural" centers committed to protecting their cultural heritage. However, it prohibits the formation of public associations or political parties that have ethnic, religious, or nationalist agendas. The national centers are encouraged, and expected, to solicit support from their "kin" states for the cultural and material advancement of their respective groups. The German and Korean centers have received material support from their kin states as well as from individual ethnic sponsors. However, most other ethnic centers remain dependent on modest state support. A law requiring such centers to be registered with the Ministry of Justice serves as an important screening mechanism. Groups championing the rights of ethnic Uighurs, for example, have faced obstacles as well as prejudice because of a widespread perception among officials that many Uighurs are separatists or terrorists.

Instead of creating institutions for proper ethnic participation, Nazarbaev has used his personal patronage to create symbolic institutions of ethnic representation, such as the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, established in 1995 in nominal compliance with the recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Its members are nominated by the officially recognized, national cultural centers and by the president, who also serves as the assembly's chairman. Lacking juridical power or a representative base, the assembly serves as an instrument for co-opting leading ethnic figures into the existing political system. Its members are encouraged to engage in cultural activities and steer clear of politics.

Civil Society (Score: 5.50)

The Kazakhstani regime has attempted to promote development of the civil sector within the framework of Nazarbaev's Strategy 2030, the official blueprint for national reform through the year 2030. While the government has incorporated Western concepts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the rule of law into its official agenda, it has sought undue influence over the civil sector by regulating and co-opting its activities into official structures. The closure of nearly all independent media, widespread self-censorship, vigilant law enforcement officials, and pervasive public apathy are serious obstacles to the development of a genuine civil society in Kazakhstan.

Like political parties, all public organizations and NGOs in Kazakhstan must be registered with the Ministry of Justice. There are approximately 4,500 NGOs in the country, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, though over half of these have only a nominal existence. Almost half of all NGOs are concentrated in the Almaty oblast, and an overwhelming proportion are in Almaty itself. Over 100 NGOs have emerged in Astana in the past few years. The more remote and needy regions, particularly in central and northeastern Kazakhstan, have few NGOs. The NGO sector is estimated to employ about 34,000 full-time and 50,000 part-time workers and to enlist the services of approximately 100,000 volunteers. Over 300,000 Kazakh citizens are members of NGOs, reports the national news service Khabar.

Kazakhstan law does not yet contain an acceptable definition for NGOs. A draft law proposed in early 2003 described them as "noncommercial organizations" that are set up without the state's involvement to engage in activities that benefit the public but do not pursue political and religious aims. According to Marat Aytmagambetov, chairman of the Network of Centers for Supporting Civil Society, the ambiguity of this definition would allow government and local officials free rein to accuse NGOs of alleged engagement in political or religious activities deemed detrimental to the public interest.

The draft law also proposed a number of restrictions for foreign noncommercial organizations operating in Kazakhstan. Since virtually all NGOs receive funds from foreign donors, these provisions could severely threaten their survival and force them to conduct semilegal activities to generate funding. In October 2003, the government sponsored a Civic Forum, inviting NGO representatives and government officials to discuss ways to cooperate. The government finally withdrew the draft law following its widespread criticism at the forum.

The Kazakh government was also engaged in 2003 in drafting a Law on State Procurement Processes for NGOs. Accordingly, the state will provide grants for important social projects by NGOs, beginning with 42 million tenge (about US$285,000) earmarked for such projects in the 2003 state budget. Most NGO activists warn that state orders and funds are likely to be channeled to government-sponsored NGOs and not to those that are genuinely independent. Indeed, state-sponsored "independent" organizations have often received favorable treatment when obtaining registration and funds and competing for international aid. Bobek, the children's health and charity fund, is a typical example. Headed by the president's wife, Sara Nazarbaeva, Bobek serves as an umbrella organization, sponsoring smaller NGOs and funneling international aid to them.

Although strengthening the legal status of NGOs would significantly improve the climate for civic activism, it is unlikely to prevent the unofficial co-opting of NGOs by the government. A number of leading NGOs (such as the Counterpart Consortium – supported Civil Society Support Centers, the Coalition of Women's Organizations, Eco-Forum, and the network of Youth Information Centers) have formed a coalition to lobby for their participation in drafting suitable legislation. Others, such as the Feminist League, have chosen not to join this coalition, urging more radical action.

In 2000, lobbying by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law caused Kazakhstan to adopt an NGO tax regimen that is fairly progressive for Central Asia. NGOs that receive grant money from international organizations or individual donors are no longer obliged to pay taxes. According to the 2002 NGO Sustainability Index, published by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Kazakhstan ranked 4th out of the 15 post-Soviet states – just behind Russia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan – with regard to organizational capacity, financial viability, legal environment, public image, advocacy, service provisions, and infrastructure.

Thriving civic activism can be found in independent organizations and staff that monitor elections. The Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations, the Movement for a Rule-of-Law-Based Kazakhstan, and the Youth Congress of Kazakhstan have set up a Public Committee for Election Monitoring to educate voters and candidates about election legislation and their rights as citizens. These groups argue that the absence of properly trained local observers has undermined the credibility of elections in the past. They believe that local observers are essential in the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 2004 and the presidential elections currently scheduled for 2006.

Among the more effective NGOs are those promoting women's issues, particularly the Association of Single Mothers, the Feminist League, and NGOs in Semipalatinsk that help women suffering from the effects of nuclear test radiation. The Feminist League has branches in oblasts and has campaigned to elect women to positions in local government. The Women's Network of Almaty and the Kazakhstan Businesswomen's Association have demanded equal representation for women in Parliament and other political organs. They set up a Women's Political Leadership project that offers seminars in major cities to train women NGO leaders, businesswomen, and female politicians. The Political Alliance of Women's Organizations was formed out of a grouping of 15 women's NGOs originally known as the Women's Coalition.

USAID has actively trained NGOs in Kazakhstan to advocate their causes to the government. The agency has focused in particular on public health and electoral reforms, providing training through NGOs to local election observers. It has also trained energy and consumer NGOs to advocate open and transparent energy prices and improved services. The Soros Foundation provides small grants to NGOs to conduct hearings and other activities.

Some of the more experienced organizations, such as Counterpart Consortium, the Feminist League, and the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia, serve as umbrella groups for newer NGOs. Among the most active NGOs are those focused on children's welfare and health (16.6 percent), environmental issues (15 percent), and women's rights (13.3 percent). Only about 8 percent of NGOs are dedicated to civil liberties and ethnic issues; these groups have been subject to the most stringent governmental controls. The more successful NGOs, particularly in the health and education sectors, are slowly altering both official and popular perception of their roles. But local municipal officials complain that the lack of corresponding legal provisions often prevents them from helping or collaborating with NGOs.

Kazakhstan's embryonic civil sector is heavily dependent on funding from the West. While political and financial pressures understandably push NGOs to obtain international aid and protection, their sustainability is a particularly serious issue as current international aid declines. For example, U.S. assistance to Kazakh NGOs, especially those working on environmental issues, has shrunk since the start of the war in Iraq.

Under the leadership of Leonid Solomin, who retired in 2003, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions has effectively challenged the control of the state-sponsored Association of Trade Unions. It has set up local organizations representing miners and oil workers across the country, with the support of Kazakhstan's Human Rights Bureau, the Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations, and numerous other nonprofit organizations. It is the first Soviet-era union to gain membership in the World Labor Confederation. Solomin was succeeded by Sergei Belkin, former head of the Karaganda branch of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions.

Independent Media (Score: 6.50)

Kazakhstan's Constitution makes no specific reference to a free media. It has a general provision that guarantees freedom of speech but does not define or elaborate what that entails. The Constitution states that censorship is not allowed. However, informal pressures, intimidation, and an overall lack of legal safeguards make self-censorship quite pervasive. On the surface, Kazakhstan has a plurality of media channels and a diverse range of newspapers, though almost all are controlled by political and financial interests affiliated with the regime. Freedom House's annual Survey of Press Freedom rated Kazakhstan "Partly Free" in 1992 and 1993 and "Not Free" since 1994.

A new draft Law on Media proposes an ill-defined regulatory body that purportedly would provide assistance to journalists and assess media practices. Despite wide-ranging criticisms, the bill was passed by the lower house of the Parliament in December 2003 and is likely to be upheld by the upper house.

Representatives of the Congress of Journalists, the prominent NGO Edil Soz, and other journalists and lawyers criticized the bill for further undermining the freedom of the media. They claimed it will help the government to shut down newspapers and broadcasters without a court order for the alleged "misuse of freedom of speech," a civil liberty not yet clarified by the Constitution. Edil Soz representatives also complained that their recommendations were left out of the draft law and that the government failed to release the full text to the public until the final stage. Rozlana Taukina, president of the Journalists in Distress Foundation of Kazakhstan, referred to the former 1992 law as having been the best media legislation in Kazakhstan, adding that subsequent changes have led to more restrictions and a quantitative and qualitative decline in media outlets.

In January 2003, Sergei Duvanov, the independent and highly reputed journalist, received a 3 1/2-year jail sentence on the fabricated charge of raping a minor. The incident has damaged Kazakhstan's international image as well as investigative journalism within the country. Duvanov's real crime was the publication of articles in 2002 that detailed how payments from top American companies for oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan had been funneled to secret Swiss Bank accounts controlled by top Kazakh leaders, including Nazarbaev. The regime defies international pressure to release Duvanov by labeling the case against him as purely "criminal."

The rise of powerful financial and political interests allied with the regime has made media freedom the single largest casualty of economic reforms and privatization in Kazakhstan. Since Dariga Nazarbaeva became head of the privatized state news agency Khabar in 1996 (she is the largest shareholder and a current board member), she and her husband, Rakhat Aliev (who served as head of the taxation department, then head of the city of Almaty's National Security Service), have bought majority shares in numerous independent newspapers and TV channels. Journalists have steadily been bought out and subordinated by regime-affiliated business groups. Those offering resistance have been physically assaulted, punished, jailed, exiled, or ruined financially.

Nazarbaeva and Aliev (currently Kazakhstan's ambassador to Austria) wield control over major newspapers and broadcasters through auxiliary companies that have majority stakes in these nominally privatized media. The major newspapers, Vremya, Karavan, Novoe Pokolenie, Argumenty i fakty, and Komsomolskaya Gazeta, and the television channels Khabar, KTK, and Tan are directly controlled by Nazarbaeva. The Russian-language Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and the Kazakh-language Egemen Kazakstan are the main state-supported newspapers and loyal to the regime. Two other prominent newspapers, Panorama and Delovaya Gazeta, are owned by Nazarbayev's second son-in-law, Timur Kulibaev, through the Kazkommertsbank group and the Eurasian Bank Group, respectively.

The state oil-and-gas firm KazMunaiGaz, controlled by Kulibaev, has announced plans to set up a media holding company that would include newspapers, a news agency, and a company to rebroadcast programs from Russia's NTV channel. The organizers have been accused of trying to obtain broadcast frequencies illegally. The proposed news agency will compete financially with the media empire controlled by Dariga Nazarbaeva and strengthen the oligopolistic competition among the various newspapers and TV channels. The political repercussions of this apparent financial competition within the presidential family are yet unclear.

Information Minister Sautbek Abdrakhmanov claims that the number of registered media outlets in Kazakhstan is rising, with approximately 80 percent privately owned. Among those that are allegedly private are 1,237 newspapers, 503 magazines, 162 television and radio broadcasting companies, and 13 news agencies. The statistics paint a picture of media pluralism, but in actuality such so-called private media are owned by various oligopolistic interests under the umbrella of presidential patronage.

Article 318 of the criminal code penalizes a person who "insults the honor and dignity of the president." The 1999 Law on Confidential State Affairs made "disclosure or publication of information about the president and his family and their economic interests or investments into the realm of state secrets punishable by severe sanctions." These laws are a carryover from Soviet rule and have been routinely evoked against regional and central newspapers engaging in any form of investigative journalism.

Since the release in 2002 of materials related to the Kazakhgate scandal, the Ministries of Interior Affairs and of Justice, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, and the state-controlled media have been mobilized to carry out systematic reprisals against state critics and political opponents. In the past, critics of the regime faced reprisals if charged with "irresponsible" journalism, undermining stability, violating the country's Law on Media, or disrespecting the "honor and dignity of the president." Over the last two years, critics have been accused more and more of criminal offenses such as possession of drugs or illegal arms, moral misdemeanor, thefts, serious traffic violations, and financial misdealing.

A few independent newspapers continue sporadic publication in very small quantities. Respublika has managed to defy a previous government ban by renaming itself Respublika-Assandi Times, though it has been banned in the Pavlodar oblast, where the opposition DVK party has significant support. Ermurat Bapi, who as editor in chief of the opposition newspaper SolDat has fought numerous legal battles against the authorities, was charged in 2003 with tax evasion and improper bookkeeping. He was given a one-year suspended sentence, fined, and prohibited from working as a publisher for five years. SolDat ceased publication in August 2003 when all printing presses, acting under governmental pressure, refused to print it.

Investigative journalists have increasingly become targets of physical assaults. Andrei Doronin, a correspondent for the independent daily Ekspress-K, was beaten in 2003 by unidentified assailants after he wrote an article on national budget losses related to vodka production in the untaxed shadow economy. Maksim Erokhin, editor in chief of the independent Shymkent newspaper Rabat, was also assaulted after he wrote an article attacking city officials for building an elite sports and health complex in the city. The proliferation of such attacks suggests that law-and-order officials are either acting in collusion with vested interests or are simply unable and unwilling to defend the media.

Edil Soz (supported by USAID) and the Association of Independent Electronic Mass Media in Central Asia (funded by several international agencies) are major NGOs advocating independent media rights. The Ministry of Information has repeatedly accused Edil Soz of producing unconstructive criticism and failing to invite ministry officials to its meetings. Such a reprimand is indicative of the government's growing effort to regulate the debate and agenda of independent media as well as the NGOs championing their rights. The regime's frequent insistence that media engage in a "partnership" with the government and offer "constructive criticism" is reminiscent of Soviet-style directives.

The European Parliament has urged Kazakhstan to improve its worsening media and human rights records before endorsing the country's bid for the 2009 OSCE chair. The Kazakhstani elite have hired U.S. firms (Edelman Public Relations and the law firms Patton Boggs LLP and Shearman & Sterling LLP) to repair its international reputation following the Kazakhgate inquiry. In a similar exercise, Nazarbaeva organized the second annual Eurasian Media Forum in Almaty in April 2003 to demonstrate to the West the "pluralism and freedom" enjoyed by Kazakhstani media.

Although the government spent vast resources to invite 170 international journalists and media specialists to the forum, only a small number were independent figures with high professional reputations. Well-known BBC journalist Tim Sebastian, who was invited to give the keynote address, declined to attend when his request to meet journalist Sergei Duvanov was turned down by the authorities. Other prominent invitees from the West, as well as staff from major Western embassies and the OSCE, boycotted the forum, considering it a personal publicity front for Nazarbaeva instead of an open discussion on the role of media.

The Internet remains the only recourse available for independent journalists to post their articles and commentaries. The major Internet sites used by independent journalists are www.eurasia.org.ru, funded largely by the Kazhegeldin-sponsored group 21st Century, and the opposition Web site www.forumkz.org. These opposition Web sites offer Russian-language translations of regime critiques compiled from various Western newspapers and magazines as well as articles by local journalists and analysts employing pseudonyms. Independent, pseudonymous journalists also contribute periodically to the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting and the Washington, D.C.-based Eurasianet.org Web site. Only about 2-3 percent of the population are regular Internet subscribers, though the Internet is making rapid inroads. Kazakhstan's two largest Internet providers, Kaztelecom and Nursat, continue to block access to Web sites run by the opposition, but these can be accessed through proxy servers.

Governance (Score: 6.25)

The Nazarbaev regime has maintained control and stability through the creation of an extensive network of clients who are expected to be loyal to the regime and Nazarbaev personally. The regime's broad patronage sustains a large pool of political candidates at various levels, all of whom compete internally for advancement and may pledge allegiance to a local patron. Patrons pledge allegiance to the president through the pro-regime parties, business groups, and networks controlled by close associates or relatives of the president. Loyalty to the regime is duly rewarded, whereas independent political or financial ambitions (as displayed by ex-regime associates Kazhegeldin, Ablyazov, and Zhakiyanov) are severely reprimanded.

Kazakhstan has maintained a unitary and centralized administration, resisting domestic and international pressures to introduce direct elections of regional and local akims (heads). The president appoints the akims of the 14 oblasts and major cities such as Astana and Almaty, and they in turn appoint local district administrators. Nazarbaev as well as key members of the ruling elite support the idea of introducing elections for the akims but have not offered any concrete proposals or set up a time frame. Oblast akims are accountable solely to the president and deterred from developing independent support bases in their regions. A high turnover in regional leadership means that the average tenure of an akim is typically less than one and a half years.

Opposition parties such as the DVK, the Republican Party, and Azamat – all of whom now lack legal status – have advocated that administrators at all levels, from oblast akims and the mayors of Astana and Almaty down to the heads of village councils, be popularly elected for a limited term and held accountable for their actions. Following the September 2003 local elections, several leaders of Ak Zhol also called for reforms in the Law on Elections and urged a rapid introduction of elections for the positions of akims at all levels.

The official argument against these proposals is that many regions are neither financially prepared to hold elections nor ready for the responsibility. Nazarbaev has often mentioned that a hasty introduction of elections could result in candidates making populist promises to get elected without the means to fulfill them. In reality, the regime is fearful that elected akims, especially in the resource-rich oblasts, may be emboldened to rally popular support and exercise power like the governors of Russia's regions in defiance of the central government. Finally, direct elections of akims could also lead to a breakdown of the existing system of patronage and weaken the regime's hold on the regions.

The central government determines taxation rates and budget regulations. Regional heads do not have the formal authority to generate their own revenue from local taxation. In practice, however, they exercise de facto control over these matters. Notwithstanding the tight control wielded by the central government, the power and authority of akims has continued to rise, contributing to a de facto decentralization in various regions. Akims in the regions that have attracted the most foreign investment, such as west Kazakhstan, have exercised considerable control over budgetary matters and have even extracted significant contributions from foreign investors to various "social and welfare projects."

Kazakhstan held elections to the maslihats in September and October 2003. Although the maslihats have virtually no political power and are used to rubber-stamp laws introduced by the local heads, each oblast maslihat nominates 2 members to the Senate. Out of the 2,852 candidates elected, 1,696 were party affiliated and the remaining were elected as independents, though many in fact had party affiliations. According to the available results, Otan was at the top with 1,477 candidates, followed by the Agrarian Party (109), Azamat (87), Aul (18), and Ak Zhol (5). Out of 250 Ak Zhol members who ran as independents to minimize the interference by local officials, 140 won. There was an average of 7 candidates for each council seat. Only 56.4 percent of the population voted in the local elections.

According to the Republican Network of Independent Observers, members of the election commission in over half of the electoral districts had little knowledge of the country's electoral laws and did not follow a transparent voting procedure. According to reports by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, the most frequent violations were carelessness in handling voter records and ballots – thus allowing people to vote for family members – violations of voting secrecy, and campaigning on election day. Ak Zhol has advocated that Kazakhstan adopt new electoral laws and join the Convention on Standards for Free and Fair Elections (sponsored by the Commonwealth of Independent States).

Kazakhstan has taken some preliminary steps toward introducing a career civil service system. The Civil Service Agency, created to implement the 1999 Law on Civil Service, plays a leading role in administrative reform and the downsizing of ministries, which have traditionally controlled recruitment, promotion, and dismissal procedures. USAID and TACIS, the technical assistance program sponsored by the European Union (EU), have offered assistance in developing training programs, job descriptions, and classifications for civil servants. However, the prospects for creating a professional, independent, and merit-based civil service are still quite distant because patronage and personal connections remain central to recruitment and promotion procedures.

Kazakhstan has established major institutions in Almaty and Astana to train civil servants and management cadres, with financial assistance from TACIS under the European Commission office in Kazakhstan. These institutions include the Academy of Civil Service, the International Business School at the Kazakhstan Academy of Management, the Almaty School of Management at the International Academy of Business, the Institute for Development of Kazakhstan, and the Eurasian Civil Service Training Center.

Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework (Score: 6.25)

As Kazakhstan has evolved a unitary and centralized political system based on strong presidential patronage, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches have been subordinated to presidential authority. The president appoints the prime minister, his cabinet, and virtually all top officials and can dismiss them at any time. The government headed by the prime minister bears responsibility for enacting and implementing all policies, though it enjoys very little independent power to initiate legislation. Since the ouster of Kazhegeldin as premier in 1998, none of his successors have completed three years in office.

Premier Imangali Tasmagambetov resigned in May 2003 after 17 months in office. His departure followed acrimonious debates in the Parliament on the land code bill proposed by his government. The president subsequently suggested numerous changes to the land code, which were approved by the Parliament, and the law was passed in June 2003. Critics of the new land code argue that it lacks a proper mechanism for enabling small farmers to buy the land they work, allowing wealthy farmers (former collective farm directors) with close ties to local officials to buy up the best agricultural land. They point out that the real debate was not over establishing private rural landownership rights, but over who will become the rural landowners through privatization.

Kazakhstan's Constitution guarantees human rights but does not spell out mechanisms to safeguard them. Laws are designed primarily to protect the interests of the state rather than those of individuals, minorities, and the weaker strata of society. A prime illustration of this is Kazakhstan's Law on Public Associations, in force since 1998, requiring prior permission of the authorities to hold a public rally. In effect, this negates the freedom to assemble guaranteed by the Constitution. Participation in an "unsanctioned" rally or meeting can lead to an arrest and later a conviction and fine. Persons found guilty in a court of law are ineligible to occupy any public post or participate in elections. Article 337 of the criminal code also provides stiff penalties for participation in an unregistered public association and has been used frequently against independent and opposition activists.

The Constitution guarantees equal rights regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion. However, the status of Kazakh as the sole state language has facilitated the preferential treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and education. Not surprisingly, this has affirmed a widespread belief among Slavs and other ethnic groups that they are essentially second-class citizens.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and defines Kazakhstan as a secular state. Muslims make up 60 percent of the population, Russian Orthodox about 32 percent, and Protestants 2 percent. The remaining 6 percent consists of Catholics, Jews, and others. Following the events of September 11,2001, Kazakhstan tightened control over various religious groups, particularly those tied with Islam, though there is no reliable evidence on the scope and scale of the operation of such groups.

The Law on Terrorism and Religion passed in 2002 is intended primarily to protect government offices and personnel. It makes any attempt on the life of a state official punishable by up to 20 years in prison and any attempt on the life of the president punishable by death. It is a common practice to detain individuals for identity checks without cause or criminal suspicion.

Kazakhstan's judicial system has lost credibility by sentencing major opponents and critics of the regime, often without convincing evidence or proper procedures. These instances include the in absentia trial of Kazhegeldin in 2000 (Kazhegeldin has been living in the West since 1998), the trials of Ablyazov and Zhakiyanov in March 2002, and the sentencing of Duvanov in January 2003. Human rights activists and the opposition in Kazakhstan and abroad have condemned all these cases as being politically motivated.

The Supreme Court has denied appeals by Duvanov and Zhakiyanov. Zhakiyanov's lawyers have accused the Office of the Prosecutor-General in Kostanai oblast of illegally turning down his appeal on the grounds that Zhakiyanov had failed to admit his guilt and had questioned the fairness of his sentence. Mukhtar Ablyazov, one of the founders of the DVK, was granted a presidential pardon in 2003 after serving one year in jail in return for his promise to renounce politics completely. Lawyers for Zhakiyanov and Duvanov have alleged that their clients are being mentally and physically harassed to admit their guilt and seek pardon by promising not to engage in political activities.

Kazakhstan's Constitution spells out an elaborate procedure for the appointment of judges in which the president plays a decisive role. The president proposes nominees for the Supreme Court to the Senate. These nominees are recommended by the Supreme Judicial Council, which comprises the chair of the Constitutional Council, the chair of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor-general, the minister of justice, senators, judges, and other persons appointed by the president. The president may remove judges, except members of the Supreme Court, on the recommendation of the minister of justice.

To train judges, a judicial institute was established in 2001 under the Supreme Court with help from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The OSCE supported a number of seminars and organized a 2001 study trip to a similar center in Bulgaria for several staff members; it also helped with the acquisition of books and computers. The institute's purpose is to improve the Kazakhstani court system by developing judicial independence and professionalism.

The American Bar Association has estimated that 80 percent of Kazakhstan's lawyers are employed by the state, though the number of lawyers who are either self-employed or work with foreign companies is growing rapidly. The two main associations of independent lawyers are the Association of Lawyers of Kazakhstan and Legal Development of Kazakhstan, both based in Almaty.

The criminal code adopted in 1998 retained many of the features of the Soviet-era law on which it was based. It is subject to interpretation by the executive branch, particularly by officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The criminal code prohibits authorities from detaining individuals for more than 72 hours without charge. However, with the approval of a prosecutor, a person may be held for up to 10 additional days. In practice, police routinely hold detainees for months without bringing charges. A bail system exists, but bail is rarely granted. An arrest means the presumption of guilt. Individuals generally remain in pretrial detention, which may be extended for an indefinite period.

Kazhakstan offers no legislation intended to deter acts of torture by the police. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for conducting inquiries into allegations of torture, although ministry officials themselves have a widespread reputation for its use. The government has refused to allow independent international observers to examine allegations of the abuse of Zhakiyanov and Duvanov while in jail. Fearing further persecution and acts of vengeance, Duvanov issued a public statement denying that he was being tortured in jail.

In late December 2003, Kazakhstan imposed a moratorium on the death penalty, and in early 2004, the government will draft a bill regarding this as well as new regulations for life sentencing. The retention of the death penalty has been among the major obstacles to Kazakhstan's acceptance into the Council of Europe and its candidacy for the OSCE chairmanship in 2009. The EU has also urged Kazakhstan to ratify the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights and to institute a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.

According to Kazakhstan's Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Kazakhstan ranks among the top six or seven countries in the world in the per capita use of the death penalty. The number of people sentenced to capital punishment in 2002 dropped to 18 compared with 39 in 2001. Approximately 55,000 people are currently being held in the country's 81 prisons, and an estimated 1,500 prisoners are serving life sentences, reports Interfax-Kazakhstan.

The draft state program for reforming the judicial system, approved by the Supreme Judicial Council for 2004-2006, proposes the creation of a jury system, tax courts, improved witness protection, and increased judicial independence. However, the national budget commission has refused to allocate the resources to transform regional courts into jury courts during 2004. The president has proposed the introduction of jury trials over the past two years, though no concrete measures have been taken.

Corruption (Score: 6.50)

In Kazakhstan, bountiful natural resources (particularly oil reserves) and a lack of democratic oversight have together created an ideal environment for corruption. Those individuals who stand to gain the most from this advantage are found in public office or are closely tied to key public officials. Corruption is widespread at all levels of the government, bureaucracy, and legal system, and in education as well, though the scale varies enormously.

In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ranked 100th (out of 133 countries) on the Berlin-based Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Both countries tied with a score of 2.4 on a scale of 1 to 10 (the lower the score, the higher the perceived level of corruption). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had lower scores; Turkmenistan was not included. Kazakhstan's ranking has continued to deteriorate. It ranked 65th (out of 91) in 2000,71st (out of 91) in 2001, and 88th (out of 102) in 2002.

The U.S. Justice Department continued in 2003 its investigation into the scandal known as Kazakhgate, involving the suspected funneling of millions of dollars from U.S. oil companies to top Kazakh officials via the U.S. businessman James Giffen. Giffen was indicted in a New York federal court for offering bribes, though he is currently out on US$10 million bail as investigations continue. So far, Giffen has not mentioned the names of any Kazakhstani officials, although Nazarbaev and members of his family, as well as former premier Nurlan Balgimbaev, have been implicated in the inquiry. Independent parliamentary deputies who support the DVK have appealed to the U.S. government to provide information, since the Kazakh Parliament has refused to discuss the case.

Transparency Kazakhstan Foundation, a member of Transparency International, conducted a poll among 55 experts (including members of Parliament, NGOs, journalists, civil servants, businessmen, and independent specialists) to evaluate the transparency of the Kazakh budgetary system. Only 16.7 percent of the respondents described the process for drawing up the budget as fully transparent, whereas 9.3 percent said that the process of passing the budget was fully transparent; 68.5 percent noted that some of the budget funds were misused, as reported in 2003 by Interfax-Kazakhstan.

The extent of corruption is impossible to measure because there are no independent agencies for investigating allegations. The Office of the Prosecutor-General formally handles inquiries on corruption among government officials in conjunction with the Ministries of Justice and of Internal Affairs. The prosecutor-general, however, is appointed by the president and is not accountable to the government.

Though the government has punished some low-level political figures to demonstrate its commitment to check corruption, the top regime associates and supporters are beyond the reach of inquiry. Marat Koishibaev, a member of the Senate and an affiliate of Otan, was found guilty in 2003 of large-scale embezzlement and abuse of office; he received a relatively light 5 1/2-year suspended sentence and a 2-year ban on holding public office. All inquiries into alleged corruption at the top levels of government are politically motivated. The pattern set by the trials and sentencing of influential political figures such as Kazhegeldin, Ablyazov, and Zhakiyanov illustrates that individuals challenging or competing with the financial interests of the Nazarbaev family will invariably be accused of some financial misdemeanor.

Nazarbaev has endorsed a number of amendments to laws as part of a state program to fight corruption designed for 2001-2005. These amendments include a specific definition of corruption that covers gifts or property received indirectly. Also included is an extensive list of actions that are defined as corruption and a prohibition on government employment for eight years after a person has served a sentence for corruption.

Georgiy Kim, head of the State Commission Under the President for Observance of Public Official Ethics and the Fight Against Corruption, reported that complaints about law enforcement agencies and justice bodies accounted for 29.7 percent in 1997 and 42.4 percent in 2002 of the total complaints received. Most of the complaints came from Almaty, south Kazakhstan, Karaganda, and east Kazakhstan. Kim blamed regional governors and the mayors of Astana and Almaty for insufficiently implementing the state anticorruption program for 2001-2005.

Kazakhstan still lacks a professional stratum of civil servants with a strong public ethic. As shown by the increase in corruption-related offenses by civil servants, the penalties for such lawbreakers are not commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes committed. In fact, it is not uncommon for corrupt officials to be transferred to other posts or to be made redundant without an inquiry or penalty.

Yevgenii Zhovtis, head of Kazakhstan's International Bureau for Human Rights and the Observance of Legality, claims that pervasive corruption and an extremely low level of trust in laws and the judiciary are the main factors limiting investment in Kazakhstan. This has driven away small- and medium-scale investors. In contrast, investors in large companies tend to seek business protection from the political elite rather than the judiciary.

Author

Bhavna Dave is a lecturer in Central Asian studies in the politics department of the School of Oriental and African Studies. She has published articles on ethnic and language policies and the role of census and construction of national identity in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. She is completing a manuscript titled Kazakhstan: the Paradoxes of a Nationalizing State.