

Report

**Afghanistan: Security Report
November 2010 - June 2011 (PART I)**



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SUMMARY

The security situation in most parts of Afghanistan is deteriorating, with the exception of some of the big cities and parts of the central region. The situation is particularly tense in the southern and south-eastern provinces.

The insurgency has expanded far beyond its traditional strongholds. Parts of the central, western and northern regions experience a significant level of conflict-related activity and violence on a more or less regular basis. The number of civilian casualties is rising and a growing number of people experience severe problems caused by deteriorating security and an environment marked by corruption, war economy, drug traffic and crime.

Attempts to combat the fragmented insurgency seem so far not to have contributed to a more stable security situation.

SAMMENDRAG

Sikkerhetssituasjonen i Afghanistan utvikler seg i negativ retning, med unntak av situasjonen i de store byene, samt deler av de sentrale områdene av landet. Situasjonen er særlig vanskelig i de sørlige og sørøstlige områdene av landet.

Opprøret har spredd seg til områder hvor det tradisjonelt ikke har sterkt fotfeste. Områder i de sentrale, vestlige og nordlige delene av landet har vært gjenstand for regelmessige og betydelige konfliktrelaterte hendelser og voldsbruk. Antall sivile som blir drept i forbindelse med konflikten er økende og stadig flere står overfor alvorlige problemer på grunn av den forverrede sikkerheten og et miljø preget av korrupsjon, krigsøkonomi, narkotikahandel og kriminalitet.

Forsøk på å bekjempe det fragmenterte opprøret har så langt ikke ført til at sikkerhetssituasjonen har forbedret seg.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This report is an update of Landinfo's most recent security report dated 24 January 2011; *Afghanistan: Sikkerhetsrapport januar – november 2010* (Landinfo 2011) (not translated). The report addresses questions posed by UDI and UNE respectively (see enclosures 5 and 6). The comments provided by Landinfo in the introduction to the abovementioned report continue to be valid.

The report consists of two sections. Part I is about the general security situation in Afghanistan and includes an overview of observations made by key actors. Part II of the report gives an account of the security situation in selected provinces.

1.1 CIVILIAN SAFETY

1.1.1 Many parties and various conflicts at various levels

The security situation throughout Afghanistan has deteriorated further during the period following Landinfo's last security report. Reliable, independent informants still have limited or no access to parts of the country.

A number of factors and different conflicts set the framework for the safety of the civilian population. The Afghan conflict is not a conflict between a unified insurgency movement on the one hand and Afghan and international forces on the other. The insurgency, or what has been defined by authorities and international forces as representing the insurgency, comprises a number of groups, including the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hezb-e Islami, locally based groups and militias, criminal networks involved in, among other things, drug trafficking, Al-Qaida and groups originating in neighbouring countries, including *Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP)*, *Tehrik-na-faz-sharia-muslameen (TNFSM)*, *Lashkar-e Islam*, *Lashkar-e Taiba* and *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)*.

The insurgency is fragmented. Beyond the intention to weaken or overthrow the government and the international military presence, or to strengthen local autonomy, the groups do not have a common political platform. A significant proportion of the violence and attacks are associated with local conflicts linked to access to resources, economic, political or other type of influence. The motives behind insurgency operations can vary from gaining control over smuggling routes or altering/consolidating local power factors¹ to overthrowing the government and instituting a new social order or a fundamentalist Islamic world order. Common to the groups is the will and capacity to unleash violent insurgence against Afghan and international security forces, institutions and persons associated with the nation-building process, the authorities and also civilians. The agendas of the groups probably influence their strategies and to what extent they represent a security threat to civilians (violence, terror and violation of human rights in various forms). There are clear indications that the safety of civilians has been increasingly affected by the

¹ Both in terms of individuals (warlords, commanders) and group (clan) interests.

insurgents' approach to and use of asymmetrical actions and the nature of these. Armed hostilities can have different consequences in different areas:

However, the civilian casualty trends in Helmand and Kandahar provinces were markedly different. In Helmand, civilian casualties increased dramatically (78 per cent compared to 2009 from armed clashes between the Taliban and Pro-Government Forces and assassinations), while, in Kandahar, deaths and injuries of civilians increased by only 11 per cent (although civilian casualties in Kandahar were already high). The clearance operations by Pro-Government Forces in February 2010 in the central Helmand districts of Marja and Nad Ali were accompanied and followed by intense violence which accounts for a substantial portion of the overall increase in civilian casualties in that province. In contrast, clearance operations in the districts bordering Kandahar City — Arghandab, Dand, Panjwayi, and Zhari — between July and November 2010 did not lead to a similar spike in civilian casualties, although they resulted in large scale property destruction (UNAMA 2011, p. vi).

The situation in terms of civilians' safety and human rights in areas that are not under the control of the authorities will depend, among other factors, on who controls the area or who is fighting (for control) and why.

The situation for civilians is not solely linked to the scope and nature of the conflict-related attacks, terror and violence, but also violence, abuse of power and brutality linked to religion, tradition, absence of authority, crime, corruption, etc. The safety and human rights situation in an area in which few attacks are registered, is not necessarily considered safe by the entire local population. In the security update from January, Landinfo comments on UNHCR's information gathering and UNHCR's various parameters that are designed to describe the security situation in different districts:

[...] many factors counter-indicate that it has actually been possible during recent years to gather sufficiently valid basic information for a proper and comparative security analysis for the various districts in Afghanistan (Landinfo 2011, p. 8).

Some of the factors about which UDI requests information correspond with or relate to the parameters of UNHCR's security updates.²

Systematic acts of intimidation, involving arbitrary killings, abductions and other threats to life, security and liberty, by anti-government elements and by regional warlords, militia commanders and criminal groups [...]

Attacks by anti-government elements, including foreign fighters inter alia through the increased and consistent use of asymmetric tactics (IED on the roads, missile attacks, bombs and suicide bomb attacks), attacks on "soft targets" such as schools and teachers, religious figures, health community (health centres and staff) and aid workers; Military operation in places where the AGE have been reported or have established a known presence;

² The parameters vary somewhat in connection with UNHCR's different security updates, the last one of October 2008

Religious and tribal conflicts, conflicts over the use of pasture land and inadequate responses by the central government to address violence and protect civilians. Illegal land occupation and confiscation with limited possibilities for redress (UNHCR 2008).³

Landinfo is of the opinion that there are large obstacles to gathering sufficient and valid, representative basic information with a view to developing comparable security analyses for the various areas/districts in Afghanistan.

1.1.2 Civilian casualties – conflict-related security

The scope of civilian losses (fatalities) in Afghanistan has increased in recent years, and the relative increase is referred to as significant by a number of sources. UNAMA describes the development as follows:

The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan grew in 2010. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and UNAMA Human Rights recorded 2,777 civilian deaths in 2010, an increase of 15 per cent compared to 2009. Over the past four years, 8,832 civilians have been killed in the conflict, with civilian deaths increasing each year (UNAMA 2011, p. i).

At the same time, the civilian casualty figures are markedly lower when compared with longer periods of the war in Iraq and the final phase of the civil war in Sri Lanka.⁴ There are also indications that an increasing number of acts of war (number of attacks) when considered in isolation – measured in numbers of civilian deaths per attack – impact civilians to a lesser extent. A comparison of figures from the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) for 2010 and those from the equivalent report for 2007 shows that a total of 12 440 attacks were registered carried out in 2010, while the number of civilian deaths according to ANSO amounted to 2,428 (ANSO 2010).⁵ In 2007, the figures were 3,363 and 1,458 respectively (ANSO 2007). This entails a reduced civilian death rate per attack.

The causal profile for civilian fatalities related to attacks may have changed. ANSO's diagrams showing causes for loss of civilian lives, respectively 2007 (ANSO 2007, p. 20), (see enclosure 7) and 2010 (ANSO 2010, p. 14) (see enclosure 8), indicate, among others, the following trends:

- Fewer killings, both actual and relative figures, are attributed to the international forces.

³ AGE is an abbreviation for *Anti Governmental Elements*.

⁴ Iraq: Figures (*Total Estimated Iraqi Civilian Fatalities by Year*) for Iraq during the period 2003-2010 (Brookings 2011, p. 3), which presents more conservative figures than *Iraq Body Count*:

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
7,300	16 800	20 200	34 500	23 600	6,400	3,000	2,500	636

Sri Lanka: The UN reported that nearly 6,500 civilians were purportedly killed during the course of a three-month period of time in spring 2009.

⁵ ANSO's registrations of fatalities are lower than those of UNAMA, respectively 2,428 and 2,777.

- Fewer killings, both actual and relative figures, are attributed to suicide attacks.
- The number of fatalities resulting from roadside bombs was not registered in 2007, but accounted for more than 1/3 of the number killed in 2010.
- Figures for losses due to “AOG ground attacks”⁶ are constantly high, both actual and relative figures, and represent the most important and second most important cause for loss of civilian lives in 2007 and in 2010 respectively. The 416 killed in “AOG ground attacks” accounted for 28 per cent of the fatalities in 2007, while 687 accounted for 34 per cent of the total number of civilian casualties in 2010.

ANSO points out that “AOG ground attacks” for 2007 include hangings or decapitations of ordinary villagers accused of being spies (ANSO 2007). Outright liquidations remain a strong feature of the conflict, particularly in the south. UNAMA points out in its annual report for 2010:

Four hundred and sixty two civilians were assassinated representing an increase of more than 105 per cent compared to 2009. Half of all civilian assassinations occurred in southern Afghanistan. Helmand province saw a 588 per cent increase in the number of civilians assassinated by Anti-Government Elements and Kandahar province experienced a 248 per cent increase compared to 2009 (UNAMA 2011, p. i).

The total number of injuries to civilians due to insurgent attacks is increasing:

In 2010, conflict related injuries of civilians increased by 22 per cent compared to 2009. In total, 4,343 conflict-related civilian injuries were documented. 577 civilian injuries (13 per cent of the total number of injuries) were caused by parties that could not be determined) (UNAMA 2011, ii).

At the same time, it appears that relatively fewer insurgent attacks target civilians than representatives of the government and the international security forces.⁷ This trend seems to continue per June 2011:

As the conflict has never been defined by large scale, conclusive engagements, the state of the conflict is generally viewed through the volumes related to the standard tactics utilised by the parties of the conflict. Comparative graphs by tactics indicate that close range, direct attacks (i.e. SAF RPG)⁸ remain a key component of the position campaign plan and serve as one of the key tactics driving present growth. Suicide attacks remain relatively steady, and the use of indirect fire methods continues to be a regular feature of the conflict (ANSO 2011j, p. 1).

A comparison of UNAMA’s registration of total civilian casualties with the total number of attacks registered by ANSO for the years 2009 and 2010, indicates that the rate of other civilian injuries has been reduced, from 0.47 to 0.35 per attack. At the same time, ANSO’s registrations indicate that more civilians become victims in

⁶ AOG is an abbreviation for *Armed Opposition Groups* – used specially to denote the Taliban, Haqqani, Hezb-e Islami, Lashgar-e-Taiba (ANSO 2011).

⁷ In the form of fatalities. Attacks can also have less serious consequences for civilians.

⁸ SAF is an abbreviation for *Small Arms Fire*, RPG is an abbreviation for *Rocket Propelled Grenade*.

asymmetrical attacks compared to other types of attacks. The majority are injured in IED attacks,⁹ and a declining percentage in suicide actions. As is the case with IED attacks, there was an increase in suicide attacks until 2010; 2 in 2003, 17 in 2005, 137 in 2007 (Barakat & Zyck 2010). UNAMA points out that in March 2011:

Suicide attacks represented 11 per cent of all deaths attributed to Anti-Government Elements, and eight per cent of the total civilian deaths in 2010, a decrease of 15 per cent from 2009. As the number of suicide attacks remained at the same level in 2009 and 2010 (approximately 140 attacks per year), it appears that suicide attacks caused less civilian deaths in 2010 than in 2009 (UNAMA 2011, p. iii).

On the other hand, IED attacks increased markedly in the period leading up to 2010, and the increase appears to be continuing. According to Barakat and Zyck (2010), 83 IED attacks were registered in 2003, while the figure rose to 1,314 in 2007. During the period January to May 2010, according to security analyst Anthony Cordesman, some 1,000 IED incidents were registered each month (Cordesman, Allison & Lemieux 2010).¹⁰ UNAMA's reports:

Throughout 2010, UNAMA Human Rights and AIHRC closely monitored and analyzed civilian protection issues in the south and found they were similar to other regions: IEDs caused more civilian casualties than any other tactic [...] (UNAMA 2011, p. vi).

The information and reports Landinfo has reviewed indicate an apparently diverging development in the insurgency's attack profile and civilian suffering:

- An increase in minor, targeted symmetric actions (*SAF* and *RPG*) against international forces and representatives of the Afghan security forces.
- Increased use of strategies (especially IED attacks) that entail increased risk of higher civilian fatalities.
- Increased civilian suffering, both in terms of fatalities and other injuries.
- Relatively fewer fatalities and injuries in relation to the scope of attacks.

1.1.3 Direct conflict-related violence as an indicator

Different sources of information refer to different figures for conflict-related attacks affecting civilians. This is probably due, among other things, to different primary sources of information, varying degrees of access to different areas in Afghanistan, the parties' disinformation, dissimilar use of terminology, different focus and different agendas. However, there is no significant divergence in the information

⁹ IED is an abbreviation for *Improvised Explosive Device* - explosive devices used in asymmetrical actions (non-conventional attacks), often roadside bombs. AIHRC defines these as follows: *A bomb constructed and deployed in ways other than in conventional military action. IEDs can take the form of suicide bombs, such as Body-Borne IEDs (BBIEDs) and also include Remote-Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and pressure-plated IEDs.*

¹⁰ The figures encompass "IEDs Found and Cleared", "Effective IED Attacks" and "Ineffective IED Attacks", and "Effective IED Attacks" amount to between 100 and 140 per month. It is not explicit what Barakat and Zyck's figures for 2007 refer to.

about conflict related attacks and civilian casualties presented by the most reliable sources.

On the other hand, there seems to be limited updated and valid information on culture and religion-related violations and violence initiated by local groups and local strong men. Likewise sufficient and valid information on insurgents' actual presence, and operations in different areas, local sectarian, ethnic or tribally oriented conflicts and the authorities'/others' capability to address violations and conflicts related to rights, is not available. Nor is comparable information about the nature of insurgency groups' presence available (requirements for various forms of support, such as food, accommodation, intelligence, threats and sanctions). Afghan Crime statistics are not reliable (Landinfo 2011).

In spite of insufficient information on several aspects relevant for an assessment of the general security situation for civilians, Landinfo is of the opinion that a combination of information about the number of attacks, civilian casualties, the movements of internal refugees (IDPs) and to some extent the return pattern (see chapter 2.4), can serve as indicators of the risk of violations and security threats not directly related to the conflict in different areas in Afghanistan. The basis for this assumption is a correlation between the scope and risk of being exposed to threats and attacks from local power holders, crime, political and religious violence, conflicts between local groups and insurgent activity and attacks and acts of war. Information on IDPs and returnees from neighbouring countries may indicate how civilians perceive the security situation in certain areas.

2. GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE SECURITY SITUATION: NOVEMBER – JUNE 2011

In Landinfo's report for the period up to November 2010, *Afghanistan: Sikkerhetsrapport januar – november 2010* (Landinfo 2011), the security situation in Afghanistan was described as complex and in constant change. It was further pointed out that the general security for the Afghan civilian population deteriorated markedly in the course of 2010. With the exception of Kabul and some larger cities such as Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, there are few or no developments pointing in the direction of an improvement in the security situation in Afghanistan. The central areas in Hazarajat, however, appear to remain stable in terms of the number of registered conflict related security incidents. The total scope of regular acts of war, IED and suicide actions is higher so far in 2011 (up to and including May) compared with the same period in 2010 (UNAMA 2011).

2.1 THE QUARTERLY REPORT BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL

In his quarterly report to the Security Council of March 2011, the UN Secretary-General claims that the development of the conflict is continuing on the same course, and that the number of security-related incidents continues to be significant. In 2010, an average of 1,620 incidents was registered per month, while the number of registered incidents in the first month of 2011 was 1,664. The Secretary-General

reports that IED actions and armed clashes account for the majority of the incidents. The Secretary-General points out that between two and three suicide actions was registered each week in 2009 and 2010 and that abductions and summary executions still occur, but the scope of such incidents is not quantified or estimated.

UNAMA registered 7,120 documented “conflict-related civilian casualties” in 2010.¹¹ This amounts to an increase of 19 per cent compared with 2009.

The majority of registered civilian casualties as a result of IED and suicide actions as well as summary executions are recorded in the southern and south-eastern provinces.

The majority of civilian casualties occurred in the south and south-east regions. Improvised explosive devices planted alongside busy roads and suicide attacks by anti-Government elements in civilian areas accounted for the largest number of civilian deaths and injuries (UNSC 2011, p. 8).

The Secretary-General claims that civilian casualties primarily refer to victims of roadside bombs and suicide attacks in public places (*civilian areas*), but that civilians are also victims of suicide attacks against military targets, infrastructure or Government-affiliated forces. In addition, civilians are killed in air strikes and night raids carried out by international and national forces.

According to the Secretary-General, Kandahar and the surrounding areas remain a focus area of lethal violence, assassinations and abductions.

The Secretary-General is of the opinion that the number of districts under control of the insurgents has decreased. He identifies Kunduz and Balkh as areas where “joint operations of the Afghan national security forces and ISAF have displaced anti-Government elements”. At the same time, he claims that insurgent activity is increasing in previously “uncontested areas” in the north.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General claims that an increased tempo of security operations both in the north and west have resulted in an increased number of insurgents’ changing side and joining local re-integration programmes. As a reaction insurgents have attacked those who have chosen to reconcile and reintegrate with the Government. A total of 960 insurgents, many from less conflict-affected provinces, have joined such programmes.

The development in the south is described as follows:

[...] national security forces and international military forces continued to report progress in the stabilization of areas formerly controlled by insurgents. Insurgents have responded to the loss of terrain with an asymmetric campaign of violence and intimidation. Owing to improved rates of detection of improvised explosive devices and increased cooperation from communities, insurgents have increased their use of suicide attacks that are more indiscriminate in their impact on both civilians and aid organizations (UNSC 2011, p. 2).

¹¹ The Secretary-General refers to figures from UNAMA that include the number of fatalities. A total of 2,777 were killed in 2010 (UNAMA 2011, p. 57).

The Secretary-General comments specifically on Kabul and is of the opinion that Afghan national security forces are becoming increasingly more effective and continue to limit insurgent activity in the city. Norwegian government authorities seem to share the General Secretary's assessment. According to Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, the security situation in Kabul has undergone a positive development in recent time. In the immediate aftermath of the attack against Hotel Intercontinental in Kabul on 28 June 2011, Gahr Støre stated that: "Statistics show that security in Kabul is better than ever in recent times, and that a positive trend has continued after the responsibility for the security in the city was transferred to the Afghans" (Wergeland 2011).


2.2 REPORTS BY ANSO

In the first quarterly report of 2011, ANSO points out that the scope of armed attacks against NGOs has remained stable and low in the first quarter of 2011 (a total of 33 attacks). The attacks on NGOs, however, are not only associated with the conflict and insurgent activity. ANSO points out that the scope of what the organization defines as criminal acts increased by 50 per cent during the first quarter of 2011. Seven persons associated with NGOs were killed in the first quarter of 2011 (eight was killed in the first quarter of 2010). All were killed in light arms skirmishes / fires "[...] either as a result of deliberate intent (mostly criminal), a personal dispute or collaterally in attacks on other targets" (ANSO 2011f, p. 1). Accordingly there is little to indicate a change in the profile of attacks on volunteer organizations in the course of /during the most recent six-month period.

As regards the situation on the national level, ANSO states that there has been an all over increase in the conflict rate. The total number of armed attacks by insurgents increased by 51 per cent during the first quarter of 2011 (2,700 attacks) compared with the first quarter in 2010 (1,791 attacks) (ANSO 2011f, p. 8).

On the basis of the figures from the first quarter of 2011, ANSO concludes that the reduction in the number of insurgent attacks registered during the period September to December 2010 was most likely due to a temporary suspension of operations, and thus not an indication of a degraded military capacity among the insurgents. ANSO argues that the counter insurgency strengthens the insurgency and the striking capability of the insurgent groups. ANSO expects 2011 to become the most violent year so far.

ANSO's accumulated registrations of the number of attacks by insurgents during the first three months over the course of the past five years clearly illustrate how the conflict has developed and also indicate, according to ANSO, a continued development in 2011.



(ANSO 2011f, p. 8)

In Landinfo's report for the period up to November 2010, Afghanistan's provinces were categorized under the following five main areas: Central Afghanistan, North, West, South and East (Landinfo 2011).¹² Based on ANSO's figures for the number of attacks by insurgents in the various provinces during the first quarter of 2010 and 2011, respectively (ANSO 2011f, p. 9) (see enclosure 1), it is possible to anticipate general development trends in the areas defined by Landinfo in the report mentioned.

The figures for Central Afghanistan indicate that the situation is stable for substantial parts of the area; the number of attacks during the first quarter of 2010 was 211, while the number during the first quarter of 2011 had risen to 285. In a relative perspective, the number of registered attacks by insurgents in this area amounts to a modest percentage of the total number for the entire country during the first quarter. For example, the total number of insurgent attacks in the entire central region of Afghanistan during the first quarter of 2011 amounted to only 10 per cent of the total number of attacks nationwide, and only 40 per cent of the attacks in the most turbulent province, Helmand. Almost the entire increase for Central Afghanistan is registered in Ghazni, where ANSO recorded an increase of 69 attacks. The other two provinces in Central Afghanistan where an increase in attacks was registered are Wardak and Parwan, from 38 and 6 attacks in 2010 to 43 and 15 attacks in 2011. In the other provinces, ANSO has registered status quo or a declining number of attacks. The reduction in the number of attacks is most obvious in Kapisa, where the number of attacks fell from 37 in the first quarter of 2010 to 19 during the equivalent period in 2011.

ANSO's figures also indicate that the situation in the north is stable in terms of attacks by insurgents. The total number of attacks fell slightly from 222 in the first quarter of 2010 to 218 in the first quarter of 2011. The total number of attacks in the entire northern region also amounted to a relatively small percentage of the total for the entire country, only 8 per cent. All attacks in the nine provinces amount to only 32 per cent of the total number of attacks in Helmand during the first quarter of

¹² Central Afghanistan: Kabul city and province, Parwan, Panshir, Logar, Kapisa, Wardak, Bamian, Ghazni, Ghor and Day Kundi. North: Badakshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Sari Pul, Faryab and Jawzjan West: Farah, Herat, Badghis, South: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz and Uruzgan. East: Zabul, Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar and Nuristan.

2011. Compared with the central areas, the figures may indicate that the insurgency (in terms of attacks) in the north is more equally spread over several provinces. While the attacks in Ghazni and Wardak alone amounted to almost 70 per cent of all attacks in the central areas, the attacks in the province having the highest number of attacks, Fariyab, amounted to a fourth of all attacks in the entire northern region. Five of the nine provinces in the north are represented with close to or more than 10 per cent of all attacks in the area during 2011. The corresponding figures for the central areas are four of ten provinces.

At the same time there are relatively large differences within the northern area, both in terms of development and scope of attacks. Kunduz and Fariyab had the largest number of attacks in the first months of 2011, with 46 and 55 attacks respectively, and the attacks in these two provinces account for approximately 45 per cent of all attacks in the north. The development, however, has gone in different directions in the two provinces. Compared with the first three months of 2010, the total number of attacks in Kunduz was reduced by nearly 50 per cent during the first three months of 2011, while the number in Fariyab has almost doubled. Along with Kunduz, Baghlan is the northern province with an insurgency problem of significant size that has had the most positive development. The frequency of attacks in the province was reduced from an average of one attack every second or third day to one attack every fifth or sixth day. The substantial change in a negative direction has taken place in Badakhshan, where ANSO has registered an increase in insurgency attacks of 175 per cent. However, the total number of attacks in Badakhshan is modest: only 11 attacks during the first three months of 2011. Only Samangan and Takhar seem less affected, with two and five attacks respectively, during the first quarter. Balkh and Jawzjan are the two provinces, in addition to Fariyab, where the actual recorded number of attacks most markedly is developing in the wrong direction. The actual number of attacks in the provinces has risen by 17 and 21, respectively, from 2010 to 2011.

While the number of ANSO-registered attacks in both the central area and in the north appears to remain relatively stable, the situation is quite different in the east. In the eight eastern provinces, the relative number of attacks increased by 61 per cent when comparing the first three months of 2010 with the corresponding months in 2011. The total number of attacks, 1,088, is nearly five times higher than the aggregated number of attacks in the nine northern provinces, where a total of 218 attacks were registered during the first quarter of 2011.

ANSO's figures for the south indicate a development generally corresponding to that in the east: the number of attacks is high, 1,028, and has increased significantly.¹³ From the first quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2011, the relative number of attacks in the four provinces in the south has increased by 51 per cent. Helmand continues to be the most affected province, along with Kunar in the east. Compared with Kunar, however, the development in Helmand has worsened relatively markedly. Whereas in Kunar 312 and 338 attacks were registered in 2010 and 2011 respectively, the number of attacks in Helmand has nearly doubled, from 381 to 672.

¹³ With the exception of Nimroz, where the number of attacks has fallen from 21 to 14.

In the west, the actual number of attacks is approximately the same as in the north and central areas, between 200 and 300, i.e. significantly lower than in the south and east. In Farah, Herat and Badghis a steadily negative development has occurred from the first quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2011. The relative scope of attacks has increased more than in all of the other areas, by 86 per cent. The development is markedly negative in all three provinces.

2.3 REPORTS BY UNHCR: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Landinfo (2011) has previously pointed out that both humanitarian conditions and the serious conflict place increasingly larger groups of civilians in a vulnerable situation. More often than before, the population is forced to take sides in the conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) describes the conflict situation for civilians: “One armed group may demand food and shelter in the evening, then, the next morning, another may demand to know why its enemy was given sanctuary” (ICRC 2010). In the above mentioned Landinfo report, it is also pointed out that the unstable security situation has contributed to turning more than 300 000 Afghans into internally displaced persons (Landinfo 2011).

According to UNHCR’s update *Afghanistan estimated IDP population by district of displacement*, as of 31 May 2011 the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) on a national basis is approximately 435 000,¹⁴ of which about 280 000 are considered displaced due to the conflict in the period after December 2002.¹⁵ A significant percentage of those defined as IDPs due to the conflict after 2002, some 250 000 persons, were registered later than June 2009 (UNHCR 2011c, p. 4). The figures refer to the region where the IDPs have taken refuge (“district of displacement”), not to the districts they have left.

Landinfo assumes that internal displacement (conflict related) in Afghanistan is an important indicator, both of the security in the areas abandoned by IDP and in the areas they stay. Statistics on areas abandoned by IDPs could provide relevant and valuable information about security, but statistics referring to such areas are not available to Landinfo.

UNHCR is registering IDPs in Afghanistan, but the registration is inadequate. UNHCR conducts the screening in certain areas, while it is carried out by partners in other areas (interviews in Kabul, November 2010). In several areas, there is no screening of IDPs at all. There is also an unknown time lapse between internal displacement and the registration of IDPs. In Kabul in November 2010, Landinfo met with several reliable sources claiming that UNHCR’s figures on IDPs are too low, and that the organization’s threshold for registering IDPs is too high. This, along with several other factors,¹⁶ restricts the usability of the figures to provide information about the security situation in the areas which the IDPs have left. Landinfo is, nonetheless, of the opinion that the figures pertaining to *place of current location* are suitable as an indicator of the human rights and security situation in

¹⁴ The total figure includes “natural disaster induced displacement”.

¹⁵ UNHCR uses the term “Persecution and conflict-induced displacement”.

¹⁶ For example, many flee over long distances and the districts from which they flee are not located in the region where registration takes place.

various regions in Afghanistan, particularly because IDPs in Afghanistan normally move locally. The most prevalent patterns is to travel to a district centre, secondly to a neighboring district and thirdly, to provincial capitals (UNHCR, interview in Kabul November 2010).

UNHCR's two most recent updates showing *Persecution and conflict-induced displacement* for April and May 2011 (UNHCR 2011a; UNHCR 2011b) (see enclosures 2 and 3) correspond with ANSO's figures, the UN Secretary-General's assessments and a conflict development about which there is broad consensus. The aggregate figures for the period from July 2009 until 31 May 2011 indicate the same proportionality as that of ANSO's figures with regards to the level of conflict in the various regions.¹⁷

IDP figures confirm the negative development and the fact that the conflict is worsening in large parts of the country. During the period from June 2009 to March 2010, an average of 8,539 IDPs per month was registered, while the corresponding average for the ten-month period from June 2010 to March 2011 was 11 629. An isolated examination of the first two quarters in 2010 and 2011 confirms the pattern indicated by ANSO's figures. In the first months of 2010, 32 935 IDPs were registered, while in the corresponding period in 2011, more than twice this number, i.e. 66 930 IDPs, were registered. The negative trend is far more stable as of autumn 2010. In the period from August 2010 to May 2011, no fewer than 5,000 IDPs were registered in any month. During a corresponding ten-month period, August 2009 to May 2010, fewer than 3,000 IDPs were registered in six of the ten months. There are three months with registrations of more than 10 000 IDPs within this period, and all three of these concern the southern and the western regions.

Information from ICRC confirms the account of the situation and reports about substantially increasing security related displacement.

Further displacement was reported in other parts of Afghanistan, with ICRC assisting 40 per cent more people (51,000) displaced from their homes due to conflict between January and April 2011 compared to the same period in 2010 (ICRC 2011).

UNHCR's aggregate figures for internal displacement from the south during the period December 2002 to April 2011 and the organization's figures from the south for January, February and March 2011 supplement and substantiate the general picture that ANSO's figures provide of the geographical distribution of attacks by insurgents. According to UNHCR (2011b), 36 per cent of the IDPs are located in the southern region. In the first quarter of 2011, 33 988 IDPs were registered in the south, and this accounted for 59 per cent of the total number registered during the period. ANSO's aggregate figures for attacks in the area defined by UNHCR as the south, show that 40 per cent of the total number of attacks in Afghanistan took place in the southern region.¹⁸

¹⁷ As far as possible, Landinfo has corrected for UNHCR's use of a different classification of regions than the one used by Landinfo.

¹⁸ Contrary to Landinfo's practice, UNHCR does not include Nimroz, but does include Zabul in the south. Corrections have been made for this.

The figures for the north for the entire period from July 2009 to May 2011 indicate that conditions changed in the summer of 2010. Of all registered IDPs in the north, 92.5 per cent were registered during the previous year. In the west, IDPs have constantly been registered throughout the entire period from June 2009. The number of registered IDPs per month has remained relatively stable, with the exception of November 2009. Of a total of 37 381 IDPs registered in the west, 12 500 were registered in November 2009.

The area defined by Landinfo as the east corresponds with the two areas defined by UNHCR as the southeast and east, respectively.¹⁹ The aggregate number of internally displaced persons in this area accounts for 20 per cent of all IDPs registered nationwide. At the same time, IDPs in the east represent only 4 per cent of all those registered in the five first months of 2011, while attacks by insurgents in the area amount to 38 per cent of the total number nationwide.

Whereas ANSO registered 1,088 attacks in the east in the first quarter of 2011, markedly fewer were registered in the west and north: respectively 213 and 218 attacks.²⁰ At the same time, there is a striking difference in the relative percentage of IDPs in the west and north during the first five months, respectively 5.4 per cent in the west and 41.7 per cent in the north.

The low IDP figures for the east, and the divergence in the figures for the north and west, most likely illustrate a source of errors associated with using IDP figures as an indicator of the security situation, while at the same time this can be indicative of the scope of insurgent-initiated attacks as an indicator of the security situation for civilians. UNHCR's figures for IDPs in the south and east very probably cover only part of the refugees who are actually displaced inside and from the provinces, and the registration capacity in the south/east is probably lower than in the north. In addition, many of the areas are located along the Durand line, and many travel to Pakistan.

Insurgent activity and attacks will in varying degrees affect both the civilian population's perceived and actual security, as well as the thresholds and opportunities for internal flight. According to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC, conversation in Kabul, November 10th, 2010), the insurgents (Taliban) refuse to allow civilians to leave several districts in the east and south.

Under the premise stated in the introduction above, UNHCR's figures and maps²¹ showing the distribution of IDPs may underpin the connection between internal flight and insurgent activity (attacks),²² as well as serve as an indicator of the security and human rights situation in various areas. Given the fact that civilians first migrate locally, it is very likely that one will see stronger concentrations of IDPs

¹⁹ With the exception of Zabul.

²⁰ The attacks in the north and west amounted to 7.8 % and 8.1 % of the total number on the national basis in this period.

²¹ In addition to the abovementioned sources of error, it is important to point out that the figures on which the map is based are accumulated and that "natural disaster induced displacement" accounts for 18 % of all internal refugees. This weakens the assessments. At the same time, 66.2 % of the "Persecution and conflict-induced displacements" were registered after June.

²² Insurgent activity/attacks will increase the risk of acts of war targeting ANA/international forces.


when the security situation is (or is perceived to be) steadily deteriorating in a given region. In the south and southeast there is a high level of conflict in the form of attacks registered by ANSO. Here the map indicates a concentration of relatively many IDPs in relatively few areas (see enclosure 2), something that may indicate that conditions are and are perceived as being constantly insecure in large areas.

In the area that UNHCR has defined as east, the distribution of IDPs indicates another pattern, where relatively many of the IDPs are spread over several districts. This may indicate that the situation is still perceived as insecure, but less settled than what is the case in the south and southeast, where relatively large areas are perceived as constantly insecure. A corresponding pattern is prevalent in the area defined by Landinfo as the west (Farah, Badghis and Herat); the further north one comes in the western region, the more IDPs are found registered. This may indicate that civilians perceive the situation as decidedly insecure in the southern areas of the western region.

In the central highlands, the smallest number of attacks are registered and the number of IDPs is relatively low. In the central region, areas without registered IDPs indicate that civilians perceive the situation as relatively secure.²³

In the north, the distribution of IDPs indicates that the security situation is in the process of changing towards a higher level of insecurity. The majority of the internal refugees are concentrated in the three areas of Fariyab, Jawzjan and Kunduz, and these areas coincide with areas, or are in the proximity of areas, where either a high level or a marked increase in the number of attacks has been registered. According to ANSO, the scope of attacks by insurgents in Fariyab and Jawzjan has increased by 45 per cent and 175 per cent respectively, if one compares the first quarter of 2010 with the first quarter of 2011.


Based on the registrations of rebel activity (attacks) in the first quarter of 2011, ANSO has produced a key map where different areas are ranked by degree of security (ANSO 2011f).



(ANSO 2011f)

²³ “Secure” will here be used to refer to conditions where few residents choose to leave.

The overview illustrates the proportionality that Landinfo points out; the areas ANSO has rated as *extremely insecure* coincide with the areas on UNHCR's map that have few, but numerically large concentrations of internal refugees (UNHCR 2011b).



(UNHCR 2011b, see enclosure 2)

Most likely, this indicates that civilians consider the areas around these concentrations as constantly or stably insecure. Accordingly, areas with few incidents involving security (*low insecurity*), will also have few concentrations with low numbers of IDPs. This may mean that areas around the concentrations without registrations are perceived by civilians as stably relative secure.

Still proceeding from the basic premise mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, it is assumed that areas in the context of the Afghan conflict that develop from *low insecurity* to *extreme insecurity* will also undergo a parallel development in the distribution of IDPs. The development will go from low concentrations in a few areas to higher concentrations in relatively many areas, and then in the final stage to high concentrations in a few areas.


The IDP pattern is also likely to illustrate that in general, security is perceived as better in the larger cities than in the rural villages in the majority of areas. Clear examples of this are found in Lashkar Gah in Helmand, Tirin Kot in Uruzgan, Khost in Khost, Ghazni in Ghazni, Jalalabad in Nangarhar, and Herat in Herat province.

2.4 RETURNING FROM NEIGHBOURING AREAS: PAKISTAN AND IRAN

The scope of voluntary repatriation can provide information on the security and human rights situation in a given area. At the same time, it is obvious that figures relating to returnees have limited value in this respect, and that a range of factors, so-called *push* and *pull* factors, are significant for the pattern of return. Since an individual assessment of the security situation in the place to which one is returning can be assumed to lie at the base of a decision to return voluntarily to Afghanistan, Landinfo finds that it is justifiable to include information on returns of refugees in an analysis of the security and human rights situation in various areas.²⁴ The diagram

²⁴ The figures are based on self-reporting and thus reflect perceived and not actual security.

below shows the distribution of voluntary return to the various regions in Afghanistan in the period 1 January to 15 June 2011.²⁵



(UNHCR 2011c)

The diagram confirms the general picture presented by the UN Secretary-General and which emerges through ANSO's figures and the distribution of the IDP population. The scope of return from neighbouring areas is declining. The average number of returnees per day for the period 1 January to 15 June has fallen by 61 per cent, and compared with the same period in 2010, from 426 to 166 per day. It is natural to see this in connection with increased insecurity.

Based on information from the returnees, 45.4 per cent have returned to the central region,²⁶ mainly Kabul (28 per cent of all returnees (37 523) in 2011), Logar (3.9 per cent), and Parwan (3.9 per cent), as well as a few to Ghazni (1.4 per cent). 21 per cent have returned to the north, most of them to Kunduz (9 per cent), Baghlan, (3.8 per cent), and Balkh (3.7 per cent). 8 per cent have returned to areas in the west, principally Herat (6.9 per cent) and Farah (1 per cent). Nearly all of the returnees to the east (17 per cent) have returned to Nangarhar (12.2 per cent) and Laghman (3.4 per cent). 8 per cent of the returnees have returned to the south.

It is pointed out above that the conclusions regarding the security and human rights situation in the various areas on the basis of return patterns are laden with sources of error. The relatively clear connection between insurgent activity (security) and the return pattern, however, indicates that the scope of voluntary return can comprise a part of a security situation analysis for given areas. The correlation between return and security can be strengthened by the information that exists on the ethnic distribution among Afghans in Pakistan and their areas of origin. The great majority are Pashtuns from the provinces in the east and south (UNHCR & NADRA 2007) (see enclosure 4), and presumably the potential for return is largest in the provinces within the Pashtun Belt.

²⁵ All returning refugees have returned with the assistance of UNHCR from Pakistan and Iran, with the exception of 42 persons: 31 from India, 6 from Russia, 2 from Azerbaijan and 2 from Ukraine.

²⁶ Landinfo has incorporated UNHCR's figures for returnees to the "South-Eastern and Central Highland region" in the figures for the "Central region".

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
4. ENCLOSURES

ENCLOSURE 1: INSURGENT ATTACKS – DEVELOPMENT FIRST QUARTER 2010 – FIRST QUARTER 2011

PROVINCE	AOG Attacks Q1 2010	AOG Attacks Q1 2011	% Change	Absolute Change	
PAKTYA	14	140	900%	126	ABOVE AVERAGE GROWTH
NURISTAN	4	21	425%	17	
JAWZJAN	12	33	175%	21	
BADAKHSHAN	4	11	175%	7	
FARAH	22	58	164%	36	
PARWAN	6	15	150%	9	
KHOST	147	326	122%	179	
BALKH	14	31	121%	17	
HERAT	27	58	115%	31	
GHAZNI	71	152	114%	81	
URUZGAN	49	93	90%	44	
HELMAND	381	672	76%	291	
NANGARHAR	76	128	68%	52	
BADGHIS	65	97	49%	32	
FARYAB	38	55	45%	17	
LAGHMAN	26	32	23%	6	
WARDAK	38	43	13%	5	
PAKTIKA	43	48	12%	5	
KANDAHAR	228	249	9%	21	
KUNAR	312	338	8%	26	
ZABUL	52	55	6%	3	
SAMANGAN	0	2	0%	2	
LOGAR	23	23	0%	0	
GHOR	3	3	0%	0	NEGATIVE GROWTH
KABUL	24	22	-8%	-2	
SAR-E PUL	21	19	-10%	-2	
DAYKUNDI	8	7	-13%	-1	
NIMROZ	21	14	-33%	-7	
KUNDUZ	79	46	-42%	-33	
KAPISA	37	19	-49%	-18	
BAGHLAN	35	16	-54%	-19	
TAKHAR	19	5	-74%	-14	
BAMYAN	1	0	-100%	-1	


(ANSO 2011f)

ENCLOSURE 2: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS PER DISTRICT – 31 MAY 2011





(UNHCR 2011b)

ENCLOSURE 3: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS PER DISTRICT – 30 APRIL 2011



ENCLOSURE 4: PROVINCE OF ORIGIN / ETHNICITY – AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN



(UNHCR & NADRA 2007)

ENCLOSURE 5: ASSIGNMENT FROM THE NORWEGIAN DIRECTORATE OF IMMIGRATION (REVISED) OF 12 MAY 2011

PARAMETERS FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

The following list is not exhaustive, and it is our opinion that we do not need information on every item at all times, but the following are indicators that may be interesting for our assessment of the security situation. Landinfo is invited to submit input concerning these parameters.

SECURITY-RELATED CONDITIONS (in terms of incidents: number, type, where, consequences, etc.)

- *Presence of insurgent groups* (What does their presence entail for the civilian population? To what extent are the groups present? Are they established, increasing in scope or struggling to maintain their position?)
- *Clashes* (between civilians/insurgent groups, insurgents/national or international forces, insurgents and police, etc.)
- *Degree of insurgent control* (is the local population affected by this in terms of, for example, demands for support in the form of food, accommodation, intelligence, forced recruitment? To what extent is the local population affected and forced to choose sides?)
- *Local warlords* having control affecting the civilian population.
- *Known clan conflicts* which affect the district/province (including scope of and background concerning the conflict).
- *Crime* (killings, rape, groups dealing in narcotics, etc.).
- *Strategic importance* (for example, in relation to the proximity to military encampments/large cities/airports/other important institutions, as well as strategic roads, the ring road and other main traffic arteries).
- *Road security* (roadside bombs, control of roads, differences in road security between day and night).
- *Accessibility* (practical situation for returnees – accessibility by road and air).
- *Exposed groups* (are exposed groups more/less vulnerable in the areas in question? For example, is it more difficult to be a female teacher in the district than in the cities?).
- *Ethnic composition* (For example, the Kuchi conflict and/or other ethnic dividing lines that are the basis for conflicts in a district/province, as well as groups that are in the majority/minority).
- *Presence of ISAF/NGOs* (presence of forces/NGOs can impact the security situation for better (if they have control), or for worse (if they attract acts of war) for the civilian population. Low presence of both will likely affect our access to information).

OTHER FACTORS

- Geographic location (proximity to areas that are insecure or risk that a given area will be affected by insecurity).
- Returnee pattern (do people voluntarily return to the area? This need not mean that it is secure, but can be an indication that we can consider.)
- Seasonal conflicts / signals concerning the future (some conflicts are seasonal in nature, and knowledge of these can help us assess security in terms of what normally occurs (for example, the spring offensive). If sources signal future events, we wish to be informed of these.)

AREAS OF SPECIAL FOCUS

- Nangarhar – We wish to receive specially updated information on the following districts: *Bati Kot, Bishud, Kama, Kuz Kunar, Rodat and Surk Rod.*
- Herat – We wish more information on the situation in the province in general, and especially *Herat city/district, Injil and Guzera.*
- Ghazni – The entire province was rated insecure in the previous update. We want more information on the security situation, particularly in the *Hazara-dominated areas* in the west, such as, for example *Jaghuri*. Road security.
- Balkh – Especially *Chahar Bolak, Balkh and Chimtal* districts.
- Parwan – Especially *Ghorban, Shinwari and Bargam*. Special information on where any attacks in the province take place, and the number of attacks.
- Ghor – Especially in the *Hazara-dominated areas*.
- Takhar – Especially *Darqud, Khawaja-Bahuddin, Yangi Qala and Chabab.*
- Jawzan – Especially *Fayzabad, Shibirgan, Quyosh Topa and Darzab.*
- Sari Pul
- Nimroz

LARGE CITIES

We also wish to receive information on the security situation and the humanitarian conditions in the large cities: Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Jalalabad. We also want information on where the city borders run, if possible.

Parameters for assessment of humanitarian conditions:

- Food security
- Shelter
- Work
- Access to health services

- Returnee pattern

OTHER

Generally, we would like to receive information on the ring road and general road security, as well as an updated map of the ring road.

When it is impossible to acquire information at the district level – kindly inform us of this and provide the information you have (for example at province level).

ENCLOSURE 6: ASSIGNMENT FROM THE NORWEGIAN IMMIGRATION APPEALS BOARD (REVISED) OF 13 MAY 2011

The districts on the “southern side” of **Kabul** city: Paghman, Chahar Asyab, Musayi, Bagrami and Khaki Jabbar. The particular issue is how near the city insurgent activity and clashes between AOGs and security forces occur, that is, where the “demarcation line” runs in areas where the authorities cannot be said to have sufficient control. Paghman is perhaps the most important district for us.


Day Kundi: Are the Hazara-dominated areas affected by commander regimes, conflicts and clashes between various groups (i.e., not AOGs) that vie for power and control? If so, is information available on how this affects the civilian population?

The Hazara-dominated areas in **Ghazni:** Frequency and scope of armed and serious conflicts / power struggles between different local groups (for example, Nasr and Sepah) and, when these occur, how the local civilian population is affected.

Behsud 1 and 2 and Day Mirdad in **Wardak:** Generally we would like to be updated on the conflict between Hazaras and Kuchis, since this conflict is the main cause of the difficult security situation. We will inform Landinfo of the response we receive from Kabul. If Landinfo has other information on the situation in the three abovementioned districts, we would like to be informed.

Concerning **Sar-i Pul:** In our view, the problem seems mainly to be that the province is affected by some uncontrolled commander regimes. Is it possible to get some information on this and its impact on civilians? (This applies to few cases, so Landinfo should not spend excessive time and effort on investigating this if information is difficult to obtain.)


ENCLOSURE 7: CAUSES FOR CIVILIAN LOSSES 2007



(ANSO 2007)

ENCLOSURE 8: CAUSES FOR CIVILIAN LOSSES 2010

ANSO: Leading causes of civilian collateral fatality, 2010




(ANSO 2010)

ENCLOSURE 9: IED ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN – NOVEMBER 2006 – MAY 2010

Mo/Yr	CF KIA	CF WIA	CAS	Effective Incidents	Ineffective Incidents	Found and Cleared	Turn In	Total IED Incidents
Nov-06	4	18	22	11	53	44	12	120
Dec-06	1	25	26	11	35	35	10	91
Jan-07	0	13	13	5	62	63	14	144
Feb-07	4	20	24	10	38	71	14	133
Mar-07	0	16	16	8	78	83	13	182
Apr-07	11	25	36	15	78	76	19	188
May-07	3	65	68	30	120	88	26	264
Jun-07	15	43	58	24	119	101	35	279
Jul-07	12	55	67	24	112	103	16	255
Aug-07	10	40	50	19	111	103	23	256
Sep-07	9	44	53	22	116	142	9	289
Oct-07	5	49	54	25	123	129	7	284
Nov-07	4	33	37	19	97	100	1	217
Dec-07	4	12	16	5	82	99	0	186
Jan-08	6	37	43	16	59	90	0	165
Feb-08	4	12	16	8	56	113	1	178
Mar-08	12	62	74	25	87	122	16	250
Apr-08	17	56	73	32	123	165	11	331
May-08	11	70	81	33	155	191	15	394
Jun-08	25	90	115	47	109	160	14	330
Jul-08	8	74	82	39	148	181	11	379
Aug-08	26	114	140	53	177	195	14	439
Sep-08	22	71	93	36	153	176	8	373
Oct-08	13	72	85	35	130	170	5	340
Nov-08	10	79	89	31	144	206	7	388
Dec-08	29	53	82	32	129	123	16	300
Jan-09	14	64	78	28	98	180	13	319
Feb-09	18	33	51	25	91	163	12	291
Mar-09	21	57	78	26	146	231	26	429
Apr-09	6	52	58	32	149	233	21	435
May-09	12	92	104	44	200	258	11	513
Jun-09	22	167	189	83	336	409	12	840
Jul-09	49	237	286	110	340	480	25	955
Aug-09	55	333	388	136	418	487	26	1067
Sep-09	37	285	322	106	376	426	18	926
Oct-09	43	221	264	99	289	487	24	899
Nov-09	18	143	161	70	247	386	28	731
Dec-09	27	129	156	61	233	486	21	801
Jan-10	31	143	174	71	224	482	34	811
Feb-10	30	186	216	96	199	468	26	789
Mar-10	22	252	274	116	318	613	40	1087
Apr-10	17	230	247	110	365	594	16	1085
May-10	34	250	284	135	409	572	12	1128

(Cordesman, Allison & Lemieux 2010)

ENCLOSURE 10: MAP SHOWING INSURGENT INFLUENCE AROUND KABUL



Ghazni province:

1. Ab Band*
2. Ajristan
3. Andar*
4. Jaghatu
5. Deh Yak*
6. Gelan*
7. Giro*
8. Ghazni City
9. Jaghuri
10. Khwaja Umari
11. Malistan
12. Moquer*
13. Nawah*
14. Nawur
15. Qarabagh*
16. Rashidan
17. Waghaz
18. Khogiyani
19. Zana Khan

Kabul province:

1. Bagrami*
2. Charasiyab*
3. Deh Sabz*
4. Farza
5. Guldara
6. Istalif
7. Kabul City
8. Kalakan
9. Khaki Jabbar
10. Mir Bacha Kot*
11. Musayi*
12. Paghman*
13. Qarabagh
14. Shakardara
15. Surobi*

Kapisa province:

1. Alasai*
2. Hisay-e Awali Kohistan
3. Hisay-e Duwumi Kohistan
4. Kohband*
5. Mahmoud Raqi
6. Nijrab*
7. Tagab*

Laghman province:

1. Alingar
2. Alishang*
3. Badpakh*
4. Dawlat Shah*
5. Mehtarlam
6. Qarghayi

Logar province:

1. Azra*
2. Baraki Barak*
3. Charkh*
4. Kharwar*
5. Khoshi
6. Mohammad Agha
7. Puli Alam

Parwan province:

1. Bagram
2. Charikar
3. Siyagerd*
4. Jabalussaraj
5. Koh-e Safi*
6. Salang
7. Sayedkhel*
8. Sheikh Ali
9. Shinwari*
10. Surkh Parsa

Wardak province:

1. Chak*
2. Dai Mirdad
3. Hisay-e Awali Behsud
4. Jagathu*
5. Jalrez*
6. Markazi Behsud
7. Maidan Shar
8. Nirkh*
9. Sayadabad*

* Insurgent dominated area

(International Crisis Group 2011)