Islamic militant insurgency in Afghanistan experiencing "Iraqization"

By Claudio Franco: 11/08/05

Afghanistan's Islamic militants are demonstrating renewed vigor in attacking Afghan government and US military targets. Political analysts are alarmed by evidence suggesting radicals in Afghanistan are emulating the tactics of insurgents in Iraq – including the use of suicide bombers.

The most recent suicide bombing in Afghanistan occurred November 7, when an explosives-laden car detonated near the governor of strife-torn Helmand Province, Sher Mohammad, as he was heading to work. The governor escaped without serious injury, while the driver of the detonated car later died in an area hospital. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

The last few months have witnessed a spike in Taliban attacks in southern and eastern Afghan provinces, including Helmand, Khost and Kunar. That suicide bombings have become an increasingly common occurrence is a source of major concern to some political and military analysts. To date, the worst such attack came on September 28, when a suicide bomber on a motorcycle killed eight Afghan army soldiers and a civilian bus driver near a military training center in Kabul.

Afghanistan has been embroiled in a near-constant state of conflict since Soviet troops occupied the country in late 1979. But it was not until the summer of 2004 that the first known suicide bombing occurred. In recent months, Islamic militants have also started attacking Afghan civilians who are perceived to be cooperating with either the US military or the Afghan government.

The recent surge in violence has coincided with Afghanistan's prolonged-parliamentary elections process. Voters went to the polls on September 18, but final results are not expected to be released until November 9. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The Taliban tactics seem designed to dispel the impression that the legislative election can foster stability in the country. Accordingly, President Hamid Karzai's administration has seemed eager to minimize the strategic implications of the attacks.

Political analysts identify 2004 as a pivotal year for the Islamic militant insurgency in Afghanistan. Between the time of the Taliban's ouster in late 2001 and 2004, militant bands tended to stage small-scale hit-and-run raids. Since then, however, militant operations have become increasingly complex and their ability to project influence has expanded.

A Khost-based analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that militants were offering substantial bounties to people or groups that killed or kidnapped foreigners or government officials. The increasing effectiveness of militant operations has played a significant role in intimidating Afghans in southern provinces. "This [intimidation] has resulted in a drop-out rate of approximately 50 percent among ANA [Afghanistan National Army] recruits in the region," the analyst said. "Soldiers are afraid of the bounties being offered, and [they believe] their salary does not compensate the risks."

Farmers in rural Khost Province report that a bounty of roughly 15,000 Pakistani rupees (about $250) is offered for the assassination of Afghan government officials, or civilians working with the US Army. A bounty of up to 100,000 Pakistani rupees (approximately $1,700) is offered for the killing of a foreigner, whether soldier or civilian.

The "Iraqization" of the Afghan insurgency does not appear to be accidental. For the last two months or so, a steady stream of reports indicate that militants trained in Iraq have made their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the help of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. Sources close to Afghan security forces in the eastern Khost Province say they have information that Arab trainers are working in training centers along the desolate Pakistani-Afghan border. Islamic militants reportedly continue to enjoy a safe haven in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

According to the sources, these Arab trainers have helped indoctrinate new recruits on the "successes" experienced in Iraq, and on the effectiveness of new tactics, including suicide bombings and the targeting of Afghans. Arab operatives in Pakistan are also believed to be responsible for offering bounties on the lives of Afghan government officials and foreigners.

Helping to highlight the suspected Pakistani connection to intensifying military operations in Afghanistan was a November 6 incident, in which six people were killed in an explosion in a home in North Waziristan, a remote Pakistani region bordering Afghanistan. A Pakistani military spokesman said the explosion was caused by the mishandling of explosives. The victims were believed to be foreigners who were attempting to manufacture a bomb, the spokesman added.

Khost and other southern provinces have been a traditional stronghold of the Taliban, which ruled much of Afghanistan from 1996 until their ouster in the US-led anti-terrorism offensive of 2001. During the Taliban era, militants affiliated with the al Qaeda terrorist network established military camps in Afghanistan, from which they launched their global jihad.

According to a Taliban source, the improved operational capabilities are partly a byproduct of greater cooperation among various militant groups. In particular, forces loyal to two notorious warlords, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, supposedly entered into a tactical alliance in May with the Taliban and al Qaeda.

Well-placed sources close to Afghan security forces say that militants now operate in detachments of 15-20 guerrillas and tend to be led by an Arab. To secure sufficient manpower for militant operations, Arab operatives are offering large cash payments to local warlords, who are in turn responsible for quickly providing reinforcements for those militants killed, wounded or otherwise incapacitated during raids.

Posted November 8, 2005 © Eurasianet