Afghanistan: 1) Current Situation; 2) Progress and problems with Refugee Repatriation

1) The Soviet troop withdrawal was completed on schedule, 15 February 1989. The Afghan Mujahedin groups based in Pakistan optimistically predicted a short life for the regime in Kabul, and many Western analysts also believed that without Soviet troop support, the Afghan army would quickly fall to a concerted assault by the Afghan resistance. The Mujahedin underlined their confidence about impending victory as far back as February 1988, when they extended amnesties to government officials and minor Communist party workers ["Afghan rebels willing to grant amnesty", The Ottawa Citizen, 11 February 1988.]

However, as the Soviets left, Najibullah, the leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), moved rapidly to shore up any perceived weak points in his control of the Afghan regime. When the last Soviet troops pulled out, Najibullah declared a state of emergency and initiated house-to-house searches and arrests of suspected rebel sympathizers and draft dodgers in Kabul [Pamela Ferdinand, "The Ox won't budge", The Middle East, August 1989, p. 21.] He also established a Supreme Council for the Defence of the Homeland, purged non-PDPA cabinet members, quadrupled the wages of soldiers and officers, and recalled several thousand Afghans from studies in the Soviet Union. [Ferdinand, p. 21.] Throughout, Najibullah has presented himself as a devout Muslim and a conciliatory nationalist [Ferdinand, p. 21.] as he did in January 1987, when he first announced the plan for National Reconstruction. These measures served to boost the morale and increase the solidarity of loyal army supporters and party members [Ferdinand, p. 21.]

A highly trained, 10,000-strong Special Guard Corps (SGC) was also created to develop a mobile warfare capacity and replace the departing Soviet defenders. The SGC is comprised of two commando brigades, a Presidential Guard brigade, an interior ministry (Sarandoy) unit, and artillery units [Ferdinand, p. 21.] The result of Najibullah's astute manoeuvering, was an Afghan army which surprised both observers and the Mujahedin in its determination to persevere against rebel offensives.

As Najibullah successfully consolidated his control over the Afghan regime, the Mujahedin leadership ran into serious difficulties in reaching agreement on a number of issues. Foremost, they could not agree on the role and importance of Islam in a future government, and were unable to create a viable and credibly representative government-in-exile due to disagreements over the inclusion and level of participation of eight Shi'a Afghan parties and resistance groups based in Iran and in the Hazarajat (a central plateau region dominated by the Shi'a Hazara tribal group). The fundamentalist "progressive" parties (e.g. Hezb-i-Islami, of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) want an Islamic state and government, whereas some "traditionalists" believe that a government constituted under the deposed monarch, Zahir Shah (deposed in 1973), may offer the best chance for the unification of the Afghan people. Despite their differences, and the refusal of the Shi'a parties to participate because their conditions for representation were not met, the Sunni factions based in Peshawar established an Afghan Interim Administration (AIA).

The Mujahedin leadership in Pakistan recognized that a quick military victory was needed to demoralize government troops and revitalize the resistance. Jalalabad, a strategic city en route to Kabul from the Khyber Pass (on the Pakistan border) was chosen as the scene of the first major offensive by the united rebel forces. The bombardment and siege of Jalalabad began 7 March 1989, and lasted for over 15 weeks. The initial attack by Mujahedin forces resulted in the capture of a few smaller garrison towns around Jalalabad, including Samarkhel, the home of the 11th Division ["Fish or Cut Bait", Time, 27 March 1989, p. 34.] However, it soon became clear that the tactics employed by the small, detached guerrilla units which had been so successful over the past decade in preventing Soviet and Afghan government control of the rural countryside were not effective in more conventional offensives. The Mujahedin have been unable to consistently mount coordinated attacks against key government installations. The casualties the Mujahedin sustained in their attempt to take Jalalabad were estimated at several hundred to at least 4,000 dead [John Burns, "Afghan Rebels Divided but Resolute, Fight on from Peak above Jalalabad", New York Times, 12 August 1989.]

In July, the resistance suffered a heavy military blow when the government troops broke out of Jalalabad using tanks, and recaptured the strategic Samarkhel garrison. Reports indicated that at least 270 rebels died in the government offensive ["270 Afghan rebels reported killed as army recaptures key territory", Reuter, 7 July 1989.] The inability of the Mujahedin to either prevent the operation or to take advantage of the reduction in the number of Afghan government troops defending Jalalabad emphasized the failure of their siege. By mid-July, the resistance had only managed to capture 6 of 31 provincial capitals, and had effectively "lost" the battle for Jalalabad ["Elusive Afghan Settlement foils Soviet, U.S. officials" Globe and Mail, 2 August 1989.] The frustrated Mujahedin have now turned their sights on Kabul, and in the last month have repeatedly attacked the city with rockets. The civilian death-toll from the barrage has been estimated at over 200 in July alone ["U.S., Soviet Union start Afghan peace talks", Reuter, 1 August 1989.] The resistance strategy to demoralize the city's defenders may, in fact, eliminate any significant civilian support for the Mujahedin ["Afghanistan: Unpalatable truths", The Economist, 5 August 1989, p. 36.] The Najibullah regime does not appear to be weakening, and in light of the failure of the Mujahedin to secure a military victory in Jalalabad, analysts are again looking at the potential for a political solution ["U.S. Soviet Union start Afghan peace talks" Globe and Mail, 1 August 1989.] Representatives of the Soviet and American governments met in Stockholm for two days at the beginning of August 1989 to discuss positions and workable options, but the Americans did not agree to a Soviet proposal for a bilateral cut in arms shipments to the respective sides ["U.S., Soviet Union start Afghan peace talks", Globe and Mail, 1 August 1989.] Estimates of Soviet military assistance to the Afghan regime total approximately US $200 million per month over the last five months, though one recent estimate puts Soviet assistance to Afghanistan at US$ 706 million per month ["Rebel Attack on Kabul hits Ammunition Dump", The Globe and Mail, 9 August 1989.] There are indications that the Americans have also stepped up their supply of weapons to the resistance [Afghanistan: Unpalatable truths".] The Mujahedin are running low on anti-aircraft missiles (e.g. Stingers), an eventuality which may tip the scales decisively in the government's favour. The Afghan government has already begun to increase aerial attacks on rebel positions using converted Soviet-made Anotov-12 transport planes which release bombs at altitudes above the range of resistance missiles. Low-level flights by ground-support helicopters and aircraft apparently pose little threat now. However, bombing raids from high altitudes cannot be prevented by Stingers or other Mujahedin weapons [Paul Castella, "News from the forbidden country, Part 2: battle with the Mujahedin", International Defense Review, May 1989, p. 576.]

One of the greatest challenges facing the Mujahedin is to overcome the internal fragmentation among the various factions. The eight-party Shi'a Muslim union based in Iran has been unable to gain the concessions it wants from the Sunni parties in Peshawar vis-a-vis representation. The Shi'as claim to be 25 percent of the population, and want 25 percent of the seats, whereas hardline Sunnis claim they are less than 15 percent of the population ["The Mujahideen's Iran Factor", Asiaweek, 18 August 1989, p. 31.] In the second week of August, an alliance of the eight parties in Iran, an independent Shi'a party, and three Sunni splinter groups based in Peshawar formed the "Jihad Council" to put more pressure on the Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) (formed in February in Peshawar) to give Shi'a groups more representation in the AIA ["The Mujahideen's Iran Factor", Asiaweek, 18 August 1989, p. 31.] Najibullah has eroded the integrity of local resistance coordination in some parts of the country by offering individual opposition commanders local territorial control, with food and services provided by the government, in exchange for ceasefire agreements ["The Foolhardy Knights of Afghanistan", The Economist, 8 April 1989.]

More ominous developments in July foreshadow a possible escalation in the internecine conflict between Mujahedin groups which has plagued the Afghans since the early stages of the war; on 9 July 1989, members of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's radical Hezb-i-Islami party allegedly ambushed a group of Massoud supporters from the Jamiat-i-Islami party, killing 30 men, including at least five field commanders ["Clash of the Rival Rebels", Asiaweek, 4 August 1989, p. 29.] They had been returning from a strategy session in Farkhar, and the loss of these commanders may jeopardize the chances for the success of Massoud's planned late summer offensive. Jamiat-i-Islami apparently retaliated 2 August, when four members of Hezb-i-Islami died ["Unpalatable truths".] With the winter coming on, and the traditional four month "fighting season" beginning in July, the Mujahedin may only have until November to inflict major defeats upon the government and rebuild international confidence in their ability to secure a military victory ["Moscow ready to sign pact halting arms to Afghanistan", Globe and Mail, 28 June 1989.] For its part, the Afghan government has repeatedly threatened Pakistan with reprisals if it continues to supply the Mujahedin with military and logistical support ["Insurgents threaten rocket blitz on Kabul", Reuter, 17 July 1989; "End aggression or fight, Afghans warn Pakistan", Reuter, 13 July 1989.]

2) It is estimated that over half of Afghanistan's 24,000 villages have been partly or wholly destroyed during the ten-year long war [Edward Girardet, "Refugees reawaken Soviet-made wastelands", Christian Science Monitor, 21-27 December 1987.] Before the war, approximately 85 percent of the people lived off the land; now, one third to one half of the rural population has fled. More than five million have left the country, and another three million are internally displaced, wandering to the relative safety of different rural zones as the conflict shifts to other parts of the country, or adding to the population pressures in the main cities. Kabul has grown from a pre-war population of 700,000 to an estimated 2.5 million today ["Refugees reawaken Soviet-made wastelands". "State of Siege", India Today, 31 March 1989, estimates only 1.5 million inhabitants.]

In 1987-1988, there were an estimated 3.15 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and a further 2.35 million in Iran [Annick Billard, "Repatriation of Afghan refugees: the prospects", Refugees, November 1988, p. 38.] Recent figures suggest that there are more than 3.3 million Afghans in Pakistan now. Large scale repatriation has not occurred since the time of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the escalation of the armed conflict. Resettlement schemes and development programmes designed by the international community and specialized United Nations agencies cannot be implemented until the refugees, themselves, decide to voluntarily repatriate. Repatriation plans are based on the assumption that the initial repatriation will be largely spontaneous, based on the refugees' own assessments of the level of safety in their respective regions ["Repatriation of Afghan refugees: the prospects", p. 40.] Jean-Pierre Hocké (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) has announced that, until such time as the refugees decide to voluntarily repatriate, the refugee assistance programmes in Iran and Pakistan will continue at current levels with adjustments as necessary ["Repatriation of Afghan refugees: the prospects", p. 40.] However, in the short term, monitoring of the refugee population in camps in Pakistan indicates that, if anything, numbers of arrivals are on the increase [International Humanitarian Assistance, Canadian International Development Agency, 4 August 1989.] According to a spokesman for Pakistan's Afghan Refugee Commission, 18,000 refugees fled Jalalabad during the first week of fighting in March 1989 ["Fish or Cut Bait", Time, 27 March 1989, p. 35.] In July, the UNHCR reported that at least 60,000 new refugees had arrived in Pakistan between December 1988 and May 1989 ["Escape from Jalalabad", Refugees, July 1989, p. 10.]

Spontaneous return has been limited to small groups of families returning to valleys under the control of guerrillas where the returnees are partially protected from government aerial bombings by the anti-aircraft guns of the resistance ["Refugees reawaken Soviet-made wastelands".] The government claimed that approximately 35,000 refugees had returned to government-controlled areas by December 1987, but the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says it has no evidence that refugees have left the camps ["Refugees reawaken Soviet-made wastelands".] Resistance commanders inside of Afghanistan are trying to create the conditions to help Afghan farmers to stay, because a local civilian population provides the Mujahedin with supplies on the ground. Some relief people also believe that working directly with internal resistance commanders will be the most effective means of reaching people in the countryside. This may coincide constructively with recent government proposals to give internal resistance commanders control over their local regions ["The Foolhardy Knights of Afghanistan", The Economist, 8 April 1989.]

A few national and international organizations have been channelling funds into Afghanistan, but some observers estimate that only 15-25 percent of the assistance allocated (e.g. by USAID) was getting through to the interior of Afghanistan [Edward Girardet, "US aid is doing well - in Afghan shops", Christian Science Monitor, 14-20 December 1987.] (About 50-75 percent of the military assistance provided by the CIA is thought to make it through to its intended beneficiaries.)

The presence of large numbers of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has severely stressed the transportation system and water resources, and has contributed to overuse of farm and grazing lands, as well as deforestation. Tensions between the local Pakistani population and the Afghans settled in about 320 villages situated in provinces along the Afghan border have increased in recent years [Annick Billard, "Waiting for the day to return", Refugees, November 1988, p. 41.] Living conditions and employment opportunities in the Afghan refugee villages are less than ideal. The large towns in refugee areas, such as Peshawar, North West Frontier Province, are overpopulated, and services such as water, electricity, and sewage disposal no longer function ["Waiting for the day to return", p. 42.]

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, only the newly arrived Afghans in need of immediate basic assistance live in transit camps ["Integration a priority", Refugees, November 1988, p. 42.] They constitute only about 3 percent of the total Afghan population in Iran ["Integration a priority", p. 42.] Most refugees are integrated into the economy in one of twelve provinces, and over 1.5 million are settled in large towns (e.g. Shiraz, Tehran, Esfahan, etc.) or in smaller villages that they have set up themselves ["Integration a priority", p. 42.] The UNHCR budget has been modest in Iran - only US $22 million for 1988, although it is four times the 1986 budget. The government of Iran provides subsidized food rations, schooling and medical care to Afghans to the same extent as it does to Iranian citizens ["Integration a priority", p. 43.] Although life is not easy for the Afghans, some observers believe that many Afghans living in Iran will not seek to be repatriated because their standards of living have improved over what they were in Afghanistan. Moreover, post-war (Iran-Iraq) reconstruction offers a lucrative employment market for the Afghans willing to work as construction labourers ["Integration a priority", p.44.]

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan was appointed the Coordinator for the United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan on 11 May 1988 ["Interview: Sadruddin Aga Khan", Refugees, November 1988, p. 44.] In addition to appeals for approximately US $1.2 Billion for resettlement programmes for the first 18 month reconstruction and repatriation period, Sadruddin Aga Khan also established Operation SALAM - United Nations' exploratory missions to survey the agricultural situation, communications and transport conditions, and in general assess the damage inflicted to the infrastructure throughout the country ["Afghanistan: Operation SALAM", Refugees, February 1989, p. 11.] One estimate resulting from these expeditions concluded that 600 of the 1300 villages in Herat province have suffered serious structural damage ["Afghanistan: Operation SALAM", p. 12.] Another observation was that the damage sustained in some regions was far more severe than in others. For example, the Panjshir valley is a wasteland with roads, bridges, and land converted to rubble, whereas other regions have suffered relatively little damage, and have already begun to regain some economic and social stability ["Afghanistan: Operation SALAM", p. 12.] The Swedish Committee on Afghanistan estimated that agricultural output in 1987 was one third of the output in 1978, and that on average, Afghan farmers have 70 percent fewer sheep and goats than in 1978 [Paul Lewis, "U.N. Teams Will Enter Afghan Areas", The New York Times, 20 June 1988.]

Another problem to be addressed before large-scale repatriation can begin, is the presence of land mines. Estimates of the number of land mines in the country range from 10 million to as high as 30 million, and many thousands of Afghans have lost feet or hands to the devices [Robert Pear, "Mines put Afghans in Peril on Return", The New York Times, 14 August 1988.] Approximately 30 to 50 people are killed or wounded by mines each week [Mines put Afghans in Peril on Return". ] Because many of the mines are made of plastics and no army has a reliable device to detect non-metallic mines ["Mines put Afghans in Peril on Return".] it will be difficult to find all of them. A mine-clearing programme will have to be instituted in many parts of the country before women and children can return. To this end, Prince Sadruddin has initiated a "Mine Awareness" programme among the refugees in Pakistan [Paul Lewis, "U.N. Will Teach Afghan Refugees to Defuse Mines", The New York Times, 8 September 1988. ] This involves education, of women and men, in the identification, avoidance, and defusing of mines.

A primary repatriation concern of the office of the UNHCR is that the return is a voluntary process, and that once home, the refugees are relatively safe ["Planning for Action", Refugees, March 1989, p. 16.] Another potential concern to Pakistan or Iran may develop if most refugees who migrated to cities in neighbouring countries (or Afghanistan) are unwilling to return to a rural existence on land devastated by the war. Those who experienced the relatively higher living standards, and educational, health and employment opportunities in Iran may not consider a return to mine-strewn rubble-filled fields an attractive option.

Resettlement priorities include the establishment of health clinics, schools, agricultural aid, irrigation systems, roads, bridges; the provision of farming equipment, seeds, and livestock ["Afghanistan: Operation SALAM", p. 13-14.] International development agencies will need to concentrate on the rebuilding of the infrastructure, and consider the logistical problems of distributing assistance where no infrastructure exists. Although most grain intended for the interior has not made it past the frontier, sending in grain for relief operations during reconstruction is questioned by some relief observers, as it may upset the agricultural economy in sectors of the country which recover before others ["US aid is doing well - in Afghan Shops".] Reliance on resistance political parties for cross-border relief operations is not considered wise by some foreign observers, because the parties may not be willing - or able - to effectively distribute the aid to the many groups in the interior that may be in need of it ["US aid is doing well".] Some observers have also expressed concern about the absorptive capacity of the Afghan economy, and its ability to deal with the proposed US $1.2 billion over an 18 month period ["How much aid should the Afghans get?", The Economist, 16 July 1989, p. 34.]

A serious problem facing the Afghan regime is the possibility of famine in the main cities, principally Kabul, over the winter. Even if no refugees repatriate before spring, the regime will have significant problems feeding residents through the winter months. United Nations representatives were told by government officials that Kabul would need 100,000 metric tons of grain for the winter, of which only 40,000 could be supplied by the government [John Burns, "Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul: Winter Without Food Trucks", The New York Times, 26 July 1989.] Approximately 1000 tons of flour are brought in each week by Soviet airlift, but the rest must travel down the 250-mile highway from the Soviet Union, or through Jalalabad from Pakistan ["Rebels Plan Next Hardship for Kabul".] The safety of trucks carrying government supplies cannot currently be guaranteed on either of these road routes.

Until such time as the conflict between the Mujahedin and the central government in Kabul is resolved, plans for large-scale repatriation programmes must be put on hold. Refugees returning in small groups to villages or regions must rely on the protection offered by the local controlling force be they Mujahedin or the government. In pockets of the country, there has already been substantial economic recovery, however, without large scale development assistance to rebuild infrastructure, provide stock, seeds and agricultural tools, recovery in these resettlement villages will be slow.